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KASPER-DISSERTATION-2021.Pdf Copyright by Jeremy Ray Kasper 2021 The Dissertation Committee for Jeremy Ray Kasper Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Dissertation: Forgetting How to Win: the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development in Post-Combat Operations (1983-2008) Committee: William Inboden, Supervisor Robert Hutchings Donald Kettl Aaron O’Connell Jeremi Suri Forgetting How to Win: the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development in Post-Combat Operations (1983-2008) by Jeremy Ray Kasper Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin May 2021 Dedication To the warriors, diplomats, and foreign aid practitioners serving in the shadow of wars past, present, and future. And to my father, whose fascinating stories – told while milking cows on a modest Wisconsin dairy farm – inspired my interest in history and strategy. Acknowledgements This work was made possible by the support, mentorship, and encouragement of each dissertation committee member and the United States Army Goodpaster Scholars program; the candid insights of the practitioners and executives who agreed to be interviewed; and the saintly patience of the author’s wife. v Abstract Forgetting How to Win: the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development in Post-Combat Operations (1983-2008) Jeremy Ray Kasper, PhD The University of Texas at Austin, 2021 Supervisor: William Inboden This dissertation explores how bureaucracies adapt to – and learn from – unexpected crises that lay outside their core mission. Few modern crises have challenged bureaucratic practitioners more than unexpected post-combat operations, which is today a trillion-dollar policy problem with many lives at risk. The central research question for this study is how do bureaucracies adapt to conduct unexpected post-combat operations? This study examines three national security institutions – the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – and how these organizations adapted to unexpected post-combat operations across four cases: Grenada (1983-1985), Panama (1989-1994), Kosovo (1999-2008), and Afghanistan (2001- 2008). The study is organized as a comparative case study that draws from three overlapping bodies of literature: bureaucracy theory, the theory and practice of modern post-combat operations, and the available literature on the four cases and three bureaucracies in question. vi This dissertation makes two main arguments. The central argument is that these bureaucracies adapted to individual post-combat operations in similar ways. These comprise four adaptive pathways: relying on existing offices or capabilities; hand-selecting the best of its available leaders, resources, and capabilities; responding favorably to practitioners’ calls for more resources or autonomy; and investing in long-term organizational learning and institutional change. This dissertation’s secondary argument is that personal relationships and trust shaped how each bureaucracy adapted to each crisis. The study concludes that these lessons provide a framework for bureaucratic executives and practitioners guiding organizations through future crises. This work also examines interagency unity of effort in each case, the comparative advantages of each bureaucracy, and the merits and limitations of top-down and bottom-up adaptations. vii Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................1 Methodology and Case Selection ...............................................................................8 The U.S. Army ..........................................................................................................13 The U.S. Department of State ...................................................................................26 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) .....................................38 Chapter 2: Background .....................................................................................................52 Background: U.S. Post-Combat Operations .............................................................53 Theory of Organizations and Bureaucracies .............................................................60 Modern Post-Combat Operations .............................................................................67 The Cases - Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, and Afghanistan........................................76 Chapter 3: Grenada ...........................................................................................................83 Grenada in Context ...................................................................................................85 State in Grenada: My Operation ...............................................................................90 The U.S. Army in Grenada: Big Trouble, Small Island .........................................103 USAID in Grenada: A Dream Job ..........................................................................116 Bureaucracies in Grenada: Conclusion ...................................................................128 Chapter 4: Panama ..........................................................................................................133 Panama in Context ..................................................................................................134 The U.S. Army in Panama: The Army's Show .......................................................140 State in Panama: From Passenger to Driver ...........................................................153 USAID in Panama: Turning a Dump Truck into a Ferrari .....................................166 viii Bureaucracies in Panama: Conclusion ....................................................................177 Chapter 5: Kosovo ..........................................................................................................182 Kosovo in Context ..................................................................................................183 State in Kosovo: A House United ...........................................................................187 The U.S. Army in Kosovo: From Disaster to Success............................................200 USAID in Kosovo: Playing God ............................................................................210 Bureaucracies in Kosovo: Conclusion ....................................................................225 Chapter 6: Afghanistan ...................................................................................................228 Afghanistan in Context ...........................................................................................230 The U.S. Army in Afghanistan: Light Footprint, Heavy Burden ...........................234 State in Afghanistan: Not My Operation ................................................................249 USAID in Afghanistan: Stealing the Ring ..............................................................265 Bureaucracies in Afghanistan: Conclusion .............................................................277 Chapter 7: Conclusion.....................................................................................................279 Adaptation in Post-Combat Operations: Fruit Salad ..............................................281 The Human Dimension: Trust Matters Most ..........................................................289 Unity of Effort and Comparative Advantage ..........................................................294 Post-Combat Adaptation: Top-Down versus Bottom-Up .......................................301 Future Research ......................................................................................................307 The Last Word ........................................................................................................312 ix Appendix: Acronyms .......................................................................................................313 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................316 x Chapter 1: Introduction In 1983, the United States invaded the island of Grenada, rescuing American students and overthrowing the island’s communist government. For the Reagan administration, the geopolitical stakes were high, and U.S. national security institutions responded accordingly. Facing a crisis outside their core mission, normally hierarchical organizations responded with bottom-up, network-centric and trust-based adaptations. Hand-selected practitioners traveled to Grenada and capitalized on their autonomy, pressing beyond their respective organizations’ standard procedures and tailoring solutions for the crisis at hand. The Army dispatched civil affairs, military police, and special forces units to aid governance and security programs. State Department diplomats directed a public diplomacy campaign toward Grenadian, American, regional, and global audiences. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) foreign aid practitioners developed programs to grow Grenada’s tourist industry and oversaw construction of a major international airport. The collective work paid dividends; Grenada transitioned to a peaceful
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