The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building
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THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Security Research Division View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Praise for The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building No challenge in international relations today is more pressing or more difficult than that of supporting weak states. James Dob- bins, one of the leading practitioners of the art, offers a set of clear, simple prescriptions for helping to build a stable peace in the wake of conflict and disorder. Drawing on the often pain- ful lessons of recent history, Dobbins brings a new level of rigor and openness to this essential subject, and provides a useful tool for all in the United Nations who are engaged in meeting this challenge. —Kofi A. Annan, United Nations Secretary-General I cooperated closely with Ambassador Dobbins in facing the challenges of postconflict stabilization in the Balkans and then Afghanistan, and came to greatly value his expertise. This latest RAND study draws upon that expertise and demonstrates his deep insights into the field of nation-building. —Joschka Fisher, Visiting Professor at Princeton University, former German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor Cogent, concise, and yet remarkably comprehensive in both its thematic and country coverage, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building distills the lessons from 24 historical case stud- ies. The resulting wisdom—detailed, accessible, sobering, and instructive—should guide every policymaker who considers or prepares for such bold intervention, and every student and ana- lyst who attempts to assess it. This is (and will likely remain for some time) the essential manual for rebuilding war-torn states. —Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University The value in this Guide is as much in the questions it forces poli- cymakers to ask as in the recommendations it offers. If policy- makers had asked before going into Iraq who would maintain law and order, how quickly could local police and military maintain the peace, how would local governance be established, or what would be the source of creating jobs—and found that they had few answers—then perhaps the whole mission would have been radically reassessed. The Guide also presents a challenge to our civilian institutions and the U.S. Congress. If we hope to manage the international consequences posed by conflict abroad, then we must build civilian capacities to support governance, the rule of law, and job creation, just as we would never expect to fight a war without training and equipping our soldiers. —Carlos Pascual, Vice President of the Brookings Institution, former Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, U.S. Department of State I know of no challenge in international affairs as demanding as that of state-building—what in the U.S. is called nation- building—and none where it is as imperative to learn from our experiences—good as well as bad—during the last few years. James Dobbins has not only guided U.S. policy on some of these operations, but has also led the groundbreaking work by RAND to draw the necessary lessons from them. This book will be required reading for policymakers and practitioners alike. —Carl Bildt, Swedish Foreign Minister, former Prime Minister, and first High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina THE BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO NATION-BUILDING JAMES DOBBINS, SETH G. JONES KEITH CRANE, BETH COLE DEGRASSE Prepared for the Smith Richardson Foundation Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION The research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation and was conducted under the auspices of the International Security and Defense Policy Center within the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The beginner’s guide to nation-building / James Dobbins ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-3988-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Nation-building. 2. Nation-building—Case studies. 3. Peace-building. 4. Democratization. I. Dobbins, James, 1942– JZ6300.B44 2007 327.1—dc22 2006100823 Cover Photo Credits (clockwise from top left): AP Photo/Hidajet Delic; AP Photo/Karim Kadim; AP Photo/Jozo Pavkovi; Photo Courtesy of www.defenselink.mil The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover Design by Stephen Bloodsworth © Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (412) 802-4981; Email: [email protected] Foreword The U.S. occupation of Iraq was marked by a series of unanticipated challenges and hastily improvised responses. U.S. officials did not fore- see the looting that accompanied the fall of Baghdad, were not pre- pared for the disintegration of the Iraqi army or the collapse of most other Iraqi institutions, failed to appreciate the impact of years of sanc- tions and misgovernment on the Iraqi economy, and were surprised by the emergence of organized resistance. U.S. troops stood by while Iraq’s public property was ransacked. U.S. occupation authorities moved to disband the Iraqi military and dismiss thousands of senior Iraqi offi- cials. Washington first assumed that Iraq’s reconstruction would be largely self-financing, and then initiated the largest bilateral U.S. aid program in history. Responsibility for managing this rebuilding effort was assigned to the U.S. Department of Defense, an agency without modern experience in postwar reconstruction. A casual observer might conclude that the United States lacked experience in the field of nation-building. Appearances to the con- trary, however, Iraq was not the first but the seventh society in a little more than a decade that the United States had entered to liberate and rebuild. In 1991, the United States liberated Kuwait. In 1992, U.S. troops went into Somalia, in 1994 into Haiti, in 1995 into Bosnia, in 1999 into Kosovo, and in 2001 into Afghanistan. Six of these seven societies were Muslim. Thus, by the time U.S. troops entered Iraq, no country in the world had more modern experience in nation-building than the United States. No Western military had more extensive recent practice operating within Muslim societies. iii iv The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building How could the United States perform this mission so frequently yet so poorly? To answer that question, one must recall the contro- versy that surrounded the practice of nation-building when that activ- ity emerged in the early 1990s as the leading post–Cold War military endeavor. Between 1945 and 1989, the United States launched a new military intervention about once per decade. With the end of the Cold War, the United States suddenly found itself leading a new multina- tional military intervention nearly every other year. The pace of UN peacekeeping accelerated even faster, from one new mission every four years during the Cold War to roughly one new mission every six months ever since. For both the United States and the United Nations, these missions also became increasingly lengthy undertakings, the average lasting five to ten years. As a result, by the early years of the current decade, the United States found itself having to maintain three or four such missions simultaneously, while the UN was struggling to oversee as many as two dozen active operations at the same time. The character of international peacekeeping also changed. During the Cold War, most U.S.-led interventions involved either prolonged hot wars, as in Korea and Vietnam, or relatively brief incursions, as in Panama and Grenada. Most UN peacekeeping missions were quite limited in size and purpose. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, constraints imposed by superpower competition on both UN- and U.S.-led military operations fell away.