Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan by Christopher J
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
No. 248 Strategic Forum October 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan by Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond of military units working at cross-purposes, Key Points The U.S. Government strategy for success and civil-military coordination challenges are in Afghanistan unveiled by President Obama even more daunting. on March 27, 2009, emphasized a classic pop- The Barack Obama administration is de- Some opponents of General McChrystal’s ulation-centric counterinsurgency approach. bating alternatives to the population-centric plan argue for abandoning counterinsurgency in The novelty of this approach can be debated, counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan favor of less complicated and less costly strikes but clearly the emphasis has shifted under that it unveiled in March 2009. The reevalua- against terrorists in Pakistan. However, the the Obama administration. Securing the pop- tion is prompted by the recent submission of review of special operations offered here sup- supporting civil and military campaign plans ports General McChrystal’s view that effective ulation and reducing civilian casualties are that indicate substantial additional resources kill/capture operations require intelligence and now the focus of attention. This approach are required for success. The resource issue political support from indigenous populations. should be more popular with North Atlantic is important, but as General Stanley McChrys- They should be based on an indirect approach Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, who pre- tal, USA, the new commander of U.S. and to irregular warfare, which in turn is critically fer stabilization operations to offensive opera- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dependent upon improved unity of effort. tions against insurgents, and with the Afghan forces in Afghanistan, argues, the need to The United States is trying to improve government, which has vocally objected to pursue an “indirect” strategy that is sustain- unified effort, but more needs to be done. The operations that produce inadvertent civil- able for the Afghans and implemented with recommendations from this research are ian casualties. The possibility of greater sup- unified purpose is more important.1 Lack of threefold. First, all Operation Enduring Freedom port from Allies and the Afghan government progress in Afghanistan to date is due more (OEF) mission forces except SOF special mis- increases the likelihood that the strategy can to international donors and forces working sion units (and their support) should be merged be executed with better unity of effort. The at cross purposes, and unilaterally instead of into the NATO International Security Assistance architects of the new strategy recognize that with Afghans, than to insufficient resources. Force (ISAF) mission, binding the United States it puts a premium on better collaboration and The current strategy requires an indirect and NATO in one common effort. NATO is more that they have limited time for demonstrat- military approach that emphasizes working willing to embrace this option than is commonly ing progress. In these circumstances, taking by, through, and with indigenous forces and recognized. Second, key U.S. civil and military every reasonable step to strengthen unity of populations. So did the strategy of Obama’s leaders should be given procedures that clarify effort is necessary. predecessor, George W. Bush. Nonetheless, who has final decision authority in the complex The Obama administration already has operations alienating the Afghan public and and rapidly evolving environment. Finally, steps taken important steps to improve unified effort producing civilian casualties increased must be taken to ensure that SOF operating among the diverse actors working to promote rather than decreased, which crippled under the ISAF mission uniformly focus on the stability and defeat the Taliban insurgency. progress. In 2002, such operations often were indirect approach, that any ISAF kill/capture Even so, more needs to be done. To make the conducted by conventional forces, but they missions support counterinsurgency objectives, case for this assertion, we first review what now primarily involve U.S. special operations and that special mission units pursuing OEF forces (SOF). SOF failure to support counter- counterterrorist objectives are constrained to has been done to improve unity of effort. Next, insurgency objectives is a cardinal example minimize disrupting the ISAF mission. we summarize generally why unified effort is so important and yet so difficult to achieve. No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 1 We illustrate those points by examining the The commitment to pursue counter- effort to do that.”9 General Petraeus simi- case of special operations in Afghanistan and insurgency as an indirect means of isolat- larly affirms that counterinsurgency is the the extent to which they support the indirect ing and weakening al Qaeda was not open priority, noting that whether Allied forces are approach championed by General McChrystal. ended. Thus, Secretary of Defense Robert involved in counterterrorism or counterin- Because they benefit from an authoritative Gates’ description of Afghanistan in 2008 surgency, “their actions and operations must chain of command and a common culture as “the longest campaign of the long war” adhere to basic counter-insurgency prin- that values unity of command, military oper- gave way to an informal deadline of 1 year in ciples.” Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl ations should be easier to execute with uni- which measurable progress needs to be dem- Eikenberry also stresses that the new strategy fied effort than more complex politico-military onstrated.5 As Secretary Gates noted, “It’s “depends upon protecting the Afghan people” endeavors. However, the record to date demon- my view—and, I think, the President’s— and requires integrating civilian and military strates that special operations serve conflicting that if we can show we are making progress, strategies and capabilities.10 objectives in Afghanistan. We offer an expla- if we’re headed in the right direction, then Thus, absent a major change in strategy, nation for this incongruity to underscore just the American people and the Congress will those executing operations in Afghanistan how difficult unity of effort is to achieve, and to sustain this effort. But if in a year or so, it will follow classic counterinsurgency doctrine, establish some baseline requirements for reme- appears that we are in a stalemate and we’re dial action. We then make recommendations taking even more casualties, then patience designed to improve unity of effort in mili- will wear thin pretty soon.”6 Secretary Gates’ utter failure in the unity tary operations, civil-military cooperation, and assessment now appears optimistic since the of effort department is among international and Afghan partners. administration is currently debating whether there is sufficient political support for provid- the most serious problem New Strategy and ing the resources required by the strategy. in Afghanistan today Leadership Team Thus, military commanders now under- stand that “the trend lines better start swing- The new strategy had to address the rel- ing in our direction or we’re going to lose which views the population as the key center ative priority of dislodging al Qaeda from the the international community and we’re of gravity. The new approach emphasizes the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region versus going to lose Washington.”7 With the clock need to shape, clear, hold, and build: shape pursuing broader counterinsurgency objec- ticking, senior leaders such as General the environment through intelligence and tives in Afghanistan.2 The tension between David Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central information operations, clear areas affected the two objectives was a point of conten- Command, emphasize that success in imple- by insurgent presence, hold the areas cleared tion as the strategy was being prepared and menting the new strategy will require unprec- to ensure that insurgents will not reas- remains one today as the strategy is being edented unity of effort: “Addressing the sert their authority, and build national and reassessed. Some senior leaders focus on challenges and threats . requires a compre- local institutions that improve living stan- attacking al Qaeda, while others favor defeat- hensive, whole of government approach that dards.11 Assuming the strategy is reapproved ing the Taliban as a means of denying al fully integrates our military and non-military and resources are provided by Congress, the Qaeda its sanctuary over the long term.3 efforts and those of our allies and partners. key to success will be getting all the dispa- When President Obama unveiled the strat- This approach puts a premium on unity of rate components of the international effort in egy, the stated goal was “to disrupt, disman- effort at all levels and with all participants.”8 Afghanistan to work well together in imple- tle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Better unified effort in turn requires menting the strategy. This will not be easy. Afghanistan,” as well as “prevent [al Qaeda’s] clear strategic guidance, which senior mil- As a former senior U.S. military com- return to either country in the future.” The itary leaders provided when they insisted mander noted in early 2009, unity of effort is focus on al Qaeda may be interpreted as giv-