No. 248 Strategic Forum October 2009 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/inss
Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan by Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond
of military units working at cross-purposes, Key Points The U.S. Government strategy for success and civil-military coordination challenges are in Afghanistan unveiled by President Obama even more daunting. on March 27, 2009, emphasized a classic pop- The Barack Obama administration is de- Some opponents of General McChrystal’s ulation-centric counterinsurgency approach. bating alternatives to the population-centric plan argue for abandoning counterinsurgency in The novelty of this approach can be debated, counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan favor of less complicated and less costly strikes but clearly the emphasis has shifted under that it unveiled in March 2009. The reevalua- against terrorists in Pakistan. However, the the Obama administration. Securing the pop- tion is prompted by the recent submission of review of special operations offered here sup- supporting civil and military campaign plans ports General McChrystal’s view that effective ulation and reducing civilian casualties are that indicate substantial additional resources kill/capture operations require intelligence and now the focus of attention. This approach are required for success. The resource issue political support from indigenous populations. should be more popular with North Atlantic is important, but as General Stanley McChrys- They should be based on an indirect approach Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, who pre- tal, USA, the new commander of U.S. and to irregular warfare, which in turn is critically fer stabilization operations to offensive opera- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dependent upon improved unity of effort. tions against insurgents, and with the Afghan forces in Afghanistan, argues, the need to The United States is trying to improve government, which has vocally objected to pursue an “indirect” strategy that is sustain- unified effort, but more needs to be done. The operations that produce inadvertent civil- able for the Afghans and implemented with recommendations from this research are ian casualties. The possibility of greater sup- unified purpose is more important.1 Lack of threefold. First, all Operation Enduring Freedom port from Allies and the Afghan government progress in Afghanistan to date is due more (OEF) mission forces except SOF special mis- increases the likelihood that the strategy can to international donors and forces working sion units (and their support) should be merged be executed with better unity of effort. The at cross purposes, and unilaterally instead of into the NATO International Security Assistance architects of the new strategy recognize that with Afghans, than to insufficient resources. Force (ISAF) mission, binding the United States it puts a premium on better collaboration and The current strategy requires an indirect and NATO in one common effort. NATO is more that they have limited time for demonstrat- military approach that emphasizes working willing to embrace this option than is commonly ing progress. In these circumstances, taking by, through, and with indigenous forces and recognized. Second, key U.S. civil and military every reasonable step to strengthen unity of populations. So did the strategy of Obama’s leaders should be given procedures that clarify effort is necessary. predecessor, George W. Bush. Nonetheless, who has final decision authority in the complex The Obama administration already has operations alienating the Afghan public and and rapidly evolving environment. Finally, steps taken important steps to improve unified effort producing civilian casualties increased must be taken to ensure that SOF operating among the diverse actors working to promote rather than decreased, which crippled under the ISAF mission uniformly focus on the stability and defeat the Taliban insurgency. progress. In 2002, such operations often were indirect approach, that any ISAF kill/capture Even so, more needs to be done. To make the conducted by conventional forces, but they missions support counterinsurgency objectives, case for this assertion, we first review what now primarily involve U.S. special operations and that special mission units pursuing OEF forces (SOF). SOF failure to support counter- counterterrorist objectives are constrained to has been done to improve unity of effort. Next, insurgency objectives is a cardinal example minimize disrupting the ISAF mission. we summarize generally why unified effort is so important and yet so difficult to achieve.
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 1 We illustrate those points by examining the The commitment to pursue counter- effort to do that.”9 General Petraeus simi- case of special operations in Afghanistan and insurgency as an indirect means of isolat- larly affirms that counterinsurgency is the the extent to which they support the indirect ing and weakening al Qaeda was not open priority, noting that whether Allied forces are approach championed by General McChrystal. ended. Thus, Secretary of Defense Robert involved in counterterrorism or counterin- Because they benefit from an authoritative Gates’ description of Afghanistan in 2008 surgency, “their actions and operations must chain of command and a common culture as “the longest campaign of the long war” adhere to basic counter-insurgency prin- that values unity of command, military oper- gave way to an informal deadline of 1 year in ciples.” Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl ations should be easier to execute with uni- which measurable progress needs to be dem- Eikenberry also stresses that the new strategy fied effort than more complex politico-military onstrated.5 As Secretary Gates noted, “It’s “depends upon protecting the Afghan people” endeavors. However, the record to date demon- my view—and, I think, the President’s— and requires integrating civilian and military strates that special operations serve conflicting that if we can show we are making progress, strategies and capabilities.10 objectives in Afghanistan. We offer an expla- if we’re headed in the right direction, then Thus, absent a major change in strategy, nation for this incongruity to underscore just the American people and the Congress will those executing operations in Afghanistan how difficult unity of effort is to achieve, and to sustain this effort. But if in a year or so, it will follow classic counterinsurgency doctrine, establish some baseline requirements for reme- appears that we are in a stalemate and we’re dial action. We then make recommendations taking even more casualties, then patience designed to improve unity of effort in mili- will wear thin pretty soon.”6 Secretary Gates’ utter failure in the unity tary operations, civil-military cooperation, and assessment now appears optimistic since the of effort department is among international and Afghan partners. administration is currently debating whether there is sufficient political support for provid- the most serious problem New Strategy and ing the resources required by the strategy. in Afghanistan today Leadership Team Thus, military commanders now under- stand that “the trend lines better start swing- The new strategy had to address the rel- ing in our direction or we’re going to lose which views the population as the key center ative priority of dislodging al Qaeda from the the international community and we’re of gravity. The new approach emphasizes the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region versus going to lose Washington.”7 With the clock need to shape, clear, hold, and build: shape pursuing broader counterinsurgency objec- ticking, senior leaders such as General the environment through intelligence and tives in Afghanistan.2 The tension between David Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central information operations, clear areas affected the two objectives was a point of conten- Command, emphasize that success in imple- by insurgent presence, hold the areas cleared tion as the strategy was being prepared and menting the new strategy will require unprec- to ensure that insurgents will not reas- remains one today as the strategy is being edented unity of effort: “Addressing the sert their authority, and build national and reassessed. Some senior leaders focus on challenges and threats . . . requires a compre- local institutions that improve living stan- attacking al Qaeda, while others favor defeat- hensive, whole of government approach that dards.11 Assuming the strategy is reapproved ing the Taliban as a means of denying al fully integrates our military and non-military and resources are provided by Congress, the Qaeda its sanctuary over the long term.3 efforts and those of our allies and partners. key to success will be getting all the dispa- When President Obama unveiled the strat- This approach puts a premium on unity of rate components of the international effort in egy, the stated goal was “to disrupt, disman- effort at all levels and with all participants.”8 Afghanistan to work well together in imple- tle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Better unified effort in turn requires menting the strategy. This will not be easy. Afghanistan,” as well as “prevent [al Qaeda’s] clear strategic guidance, which senior mil- As a former senior U.S. military com- return to either country in the future.” The itary leaders provided when they insisted mander noted in early 2009, unity of effort is focus on al Qaeda may be interpreted as giv- that the population-centric counterinsur- the most serious problem in Afghanistan today: ing priority to counterterrorism, but the goal gency approach take precedence over coun- “It’s not the Taliban. It’s not governance. It’s of denying al Qaeda a future sanctuary from terterrorism operations. General McChrystal not security. It’s the utter failure in the unity which to operate justified a wider counterin- is unequivocal on this point: “If we win of effort department.”12 Getting the multiple surgency effort to defeat the Taliban in both this effort it will be because we protected international organizations, dozens of nations, Afghanistan and Pakistan.4 the population. . . . Going after the high- numerous development organizations, myr- value enemy targets will just be a supporting iad U.S. departments and agencies, and even diverse U.S. military units to pull in the same Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the direction is a monumental challenge. National Defense University. Dr. Martin Cinnamond worked in a number of United Nations positions in One common recommendation for Afghanistan in 2007–2008. He also trained and co-led the Afghan Special Investigation Team investigating improving unity of effort is to select com- assassinations by the Taliban. Comments may be directed to [email protected]. patible personalities for key leadership posi-
2 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009 tions. Another way is to add command Secretary Gates gave General McChrystal imacy of the central government and rein- structures dedicated to coordination activi- 60 days to tour Afghanistan, size up the situ- force Afghan national identity by improving ties. Both these expedients were proposed at ation, and make a detailed report on how best the government’s capacity to deliver basic the April 3, 2009, NATO summit, and were to implement the new strategy and layered services to the population. Yet Kabul’s abil- subsequently approved. Secretary Gates sug- commands. McChrystal’s August 30 report ity to extend its authority and provide services gested that the four-star commander of emphasized the importance of unified effort across the country is weak, and Afghans often NATO’s International Security Assistance and identified additional ways to improve it. attach greater significance to local relation- Force (ISAF) focus on strategy and high- To assess whether the urgent, well-conceived, ships. Thus, support for the central govern- level “cooperation between civil and military and collectively unprecedented reorganiza- ment must be balanced with support for good efforts.” Among other key issues, the new tion of command structures and leadership local governance without alienating Kabul command could help improve the disjointed would ensure unity of effort, it is first nec- and the local populace from one another. international aid effort and training of essary to understand why collaboration in Many other difficult tradeoffs can be Afghan national security forces.13 Secretary pursuit of common objectives is such a chal- identified: the timing and extent of political Gates proposed, and NATO accepted, a new lenge in irregular warfare in general and in reconciliation with insurgents, how boldly to subordinate three-star command to over- Afghanistan specifically. attack sanctuaries in Pakistan, how much see the day-to-day battle to ensure that intelligence to share and with whom, which all the diverse U.S. (and Allied) forces in Unity of Effort in areas of the country should receive the main Afghanistan are in synch. He introduced Irregular Warfare focus with a limited number of troops, and NATO leaders to his handpicked choices for so forth. Such strategy implementation issues the new commands: General McChrystal Arguments about the need for a whole- must be resolved in complex and shifting and Lieutenant General David M. Rodriguez, of-government approach to counterinsur- circumstances—including rapid adaptation USA, respectively. McChrystal and Rodriguez gency (one form of irregular warfare) are by the enemy—that vary greatly from one are counterinsurgency experts with close commonplace, yet the need is rarely satis- province to another. With so many issues to ties to Secretary Gates, and have a personal fied for several reasons. First, counterinsur- coordinate, the entire effort can easily lose friendship spanning several decades. General gency is a multidimensional enterprise that coherence. When counterinsurgency ele- McChrystal, perhaps best known for lead- requires the integration of diplomatic, infor- ments work at cross-purposes, political and ing the special operations forces14 (SOF) spe- mational, military, economic, and other ele- moral capital is squandered. The popula- cial mission units that tracked down Saddam ments of power. Thus, a nation’s multiple tion is likely to conclude the government and Hussein and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, national security bureaucracies must work its allies are incompetent, untrustworthy, or more recently led a Pentagon task force that well together to succeed in counterinsur- both. Since the center of gravity is the sup- reviewed strategy alternatives in Afghanistan. gency. Second, counterinsurgency strategy port of the population, insufficient unity of General Rodriguez was selected by Secretary must be implemented flexibly as evolving cir- purpose and effort in a fast-moving situation Gates as his personal military assistant after cumstances dictate rather than determined is often the critical shortcoming in a coun- Rodriguez’s previous tour in Afghanistan was a priori by the strategy. The situation-depen- terinsurgency campaign. widely acknowledged as a model for success- dent nature of counterinsurgency strategy The third obstacle to unified effort is the ful counterinsurgency efforts.15 implementation substantially increases the sheer number and competing objectives of In another move calculated to improve complexity of operations and the challenge players and activities involved. Currently, over unity of effort, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for unified effort. Some examples illustrate 40 countries, 3 major international organiza- of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen invited this point. tions (United Nations [UN], European Union, General McChrystal to handpick his subor- One strategy objective is to turn over and NATO), and scores of other agencies and dinates, and McChrystal chose several flag military operations to Afghan forces rap- nongovernmental organizations are work- officers from the Pentagon. In addition, idly, but if done too quickly, they may not ing in Afghanistan. Moreover, these diverse McChrystal is having SOF veteran Brigadier have the capacity to respond effectively to the actors are more or less aligned in support General Scott Miller, USA, assemble “a corps insurgency. Conversely, delaying handover for of one of two different missions with com- of 400 officers and soldiers who will rotate too long and relying on international forces peting priorities that have evolved over time: between the United States and Afghanistan (meaning all non-Afghan forces in Operation NATO’s ISAF mission, and the U.S.-led OEF for a minimum of three years” to pro- Enduring Freedom [OEF] and ISAF) risk mission. ISAF has evolved from a small secu- vide deep expertise and continuity. When alienating a population increasingly critical rity force concentrated in Kabul to a coun- not serving in Afghanistan, officers will fill of those forces. Another difficult implementa- try-wide “stabilization” effort driven by classic important positions in the Pentagon, which tion issue is promoting good governance, not population-centric counterinsurgency objec- should ensure good communication between only in Kabul but also in the provinces. The tives, including “the extension of government the field and headquarters in Washington. United States wants to strengthen the legit- authority across Afghanistan; the development
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 3 of the Afghan Government structures neces- rorists and alienate them from sympathiz- Eventually, new U.S. leadership put the effort sary to maintain security across the coun- ers who otherwise would provide support for back on track: try without the assistance of international their activities. In practice, however, coun- forces . . . and the promotion by the Afghan terterrorism and counterinsurgency mis- Between late 2003 and early 2005, we were Government of democracy, human rights and sions tend to clash. With their emphasis on moving on the right path in Afghanistan. the rule of law.”16 nighttime raids, counterterrorist operations Under Ambassador [Zalmay] Khalilzad and However, a core strategic objective of can produce inadvertent civilian casualties Lieutenant General David Barno, the United the OEF mission is the disruption of terrorist that anger the population and complicate States completely overhauled its strategy for activity by killing or capturing al Qaeda lead- attempts by counterinsurgents to win popular Afghanistan. We increased the number of ers.17 OEF operations have expanded to sup- support. Resentment runs even higher when American forces in the country, expanded port counterinsurgency by targeting Taliban counterterrorist operations are carried out nonmilitary assistance to the Afghan gov- insurgent leaders.18 Each mission involves by foreign forces that appear insensitive to ernment and—most importantly—aban- organizations from many nations and the local communities. Counterinsurgents work- doned a counterterrorism-based strategy that international community, and each mission ing with Afghan authorities and forces may emphasized seeking out and attacking the can be pursued with more or less empha- compromise a counterterrorist operation if enemy, in favor of one that emphasized sis on cooperation with the Afghan forces the Afghan counterparts warn the enemy, or counterinsurgency and the protection of the and populace. In addition, the diverse mili- if those operations are carried out less skill- population. All of this was overseen by an inte- tary forces operating in Afghanistan include fully than otherwise would be the case if con- grated civil-military command structure, in general purpose (or conventional) forces and ducted by international forces. which the Ambassador and the coalition com- special operations forces that do not always The tension between the two missions is mander worked in the same building, from cooperate well. thus a question of priorities: the importance adjoining offices. The result was that, by late For all these reasons, unity of effort is of targeting individual enemies relative to 2004, governance and reconstruction were a critical but difficult challenge in irregu- the risk of incurring civilian casualties and improving. . . . Entrenched warlords were lar warfare, especially in Afghanistan. Using damaging relationships with local commu- being nudged out of power. . . . [N]ational special operations as a cardinal example, we nities; and the importance of working with elections were conducted successfully [and] can illustrate that unified effort is difficult to Afghan authorities and forces relative to the the Taliban showed signs of internal dis- achieve even when all the organizations pur- risk that doing so will compromise efforts to sention and splintering. Rather than build- suing an objective share a common chain of target enemy leaders. Only a clear strategy ing on these gains, however, we squandered command and consider unified effort a core and unified effort can minimize the tension them. Beginning in 2005, our integrated civil- organizational value. between these two missions. Hy Rothstein military command structure was disassembled provides a compelling account of how the and replaced by a balkanized and dysfunctional SOF in Afghanistan original focus on killing terrorist leaders and arrangement. The integrated counterinsur- destroying Taliban forces in 2002 needed to gency strategy was replaced by a patchwork Special operations forces typically are of different strategies, depending on the trained specifically for counterterrorism and location and on which country’s troops were counterinsurgency and often approach those theoretically, the doing the fighting.20 missions with different tactics than those two missions can employed by conventional forces. Even within complement one another; U.S. Government policy statements at the the SOF community, units may approach time emphasized counterinsurgency and close in practice, however, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency mis- cooperation with allies. However, the Embassy sions differently for historical and cultural counterterrorism and turned its attention to other matters, and reasons. Thus, SOF are in the middle of the counterinsurgency General Karl Eikenberry, USA, who succeeded debate over the relative priority of counterter- missions tend to clash General Barno, returned the military empha- rorism against al Qaeda and counterinsur- sis to kill/capture operations. The result was gency against the Taliban. an increasing number of incidents producing Theoretically, the two missions can shift to counterinsurgency when the Taliban civilian casualties, which led to a steep decline complement one another. Counterterrorist adopted insurgent tactics.19 Instead, conven- in popular support.21 Civilian casualties are kill/capture operations can disrupt insur- tional forces and headquarters pushed aside not the only factor alienating the Afghan pop- gent operations, produce intelligence on the Army Special Forces that had developed close ulation,22 but they are the main one. insurgency, and buy time for other popula- working relationships with their Afghan This historical overview suggests that tion-centric counterinsurgency efforts to bear counterparts. Unilateral search operations by it will not be easy to ensure that operations fruit. Similarly, counterinsurgency efforts can conventional forces caused increasing resent- give priority to protecting the population, generate good intelligence for targeting ter- ment, particularly in Pashtun communities. even though doing so is required by the new
4 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009 Table 1. Major (>10) Civilian Casualty Incidents, 2006–2009 strategy. There are several reasons why this Estimated Civilian Date Location Military Forces/Type of Incident** is true. The main one is the reliance on air Fatalities* support to compensate for the inadequate Kirjan District, June 14, 2009 NA/13 International forces†/targeted airstrike number of U.S., Allied, and properly trained Dai Kundi Province Afghan forces. Airstrikes that result in major U.S. special operations forces (SOF)/troops in May 4, 2009 Bala Boluk, Farah Province 26/86 contact (TIC) civilian casualties can occur in support of conventional forces. However, over the past February 17, 2009 Gozara District, Herat Province 13/13 U.S. forces†/unspecified airstrike several years, 80 percent of the major civil- Shah Wali Kot District, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces† and November 5, 2008 37/37 Kandahar Province Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)/TIC ian casualty incidents where ground forces Shindand District, Herat could be identified involved U.S. SOF (see August 21–22, 2008 33/78–92 U.S. SOF/TIC Province table 1). Operating in small teams, SOF often North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) make contact with enemy forces, find them- August 9, 2008 Tagub District, Kapisa Province NA/11–12 airstrike/targeted selves outnumbered, and require close air Dela Bala District, June 6, 2008 NA/47 OEF airstrike† support that occasionally results in high Nangarhar Province civilian casualties. Sangin District, May 8, 2008 NA/21–80 U.S. SOF/TIC Most Afghans’ experience with bomb- Helmand Province ing is “strongly correlated with negative atti- January 23, 2008 Ghazni Province 11/11 U.S. SOF/TIC tudes towards the U.S., towards the Afghan Greshk District, June 26–27, 2007 12/45–65 U.S. forces† and ANSF/TIC central and provincial governments, and Helmand Province regarding Afghanistan’s direction.”23 The Greshk District, June 22, 2007 NA/25 NATO forces†/TIC Helmand Province Taliban are working hard to exploit this pop- Sangin District, ular resentment in order to counter the tacti- May 8, 2007 NA/21 U.S. SOF/TIC Helmand Province cal advantage that international forces enjoy. Maruf District, Insurgents quickly capitalize on the issue May 1, 2007 NA/13 U.S. forces†/TIC Kandahar Province of civilian casualties with a more agile and Shindand District, April 29, 2007 NA/42 U.S. SOF/TIC dynamic communications capacity than the Herat Province international military forces. They sometimes Jalalabad District, March 4, 2007 16/16 U.S. SOF/road convoy succeed in pressuring local officials to inflate Nangarhar Province estimates of civilian casualties. However, it is November 1, 2006 Kandahar Province NA/31 U.S. SOF/TIC also evident that international military esti- Panjwayi District, October 26, 2006 12/40 NATO forces†/TIC Kandahar Province mates of civilian casualties can err. Afghan public resentment is compounded when inter- Greshk District, October 18, 2006 NA/13 NATO forces†/TIC Kandahar Province national military forces resort to blanket Panjwayi District, statements denying or contesting the num- May 21, 2006 17/34 U.S. forces†/TIC Kandahar Province ber of civilian casualties without an adequate investigation. The emergence of video foot- Sources: Air Strike Tracker Web site (http://ourbombs.com/striketracker); United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan age showing dead civilians prompted a review (UNAMA) Mid Year Bulletin on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2009); UNAMA Annual Report on Protection of Civilians of initial findings that just seven civilians in Armed Conflict (2008); and Human Rights Watch “Troops in Contact” Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (2008), were killed during August 2008 airstrikes in which include details of specific incidents. Shindand District, Herat Province. The inves- tigation determined that at least 33 civilians * Casualty figures are often disputed. The first figure is the international military forces estimate; the second figure is either an were killed during the operation.24 Afghanistan government or a public media estimate. NA: not available. Although they receive less media atten- ** Shaded boxes highlight incidents involving SOF troops. tion, civilian casualties incurred during † Indicates military forces involved or type of incident is disputed. house raids—the vast majority conducted by SOF—also cause resentment among Afghans (see table 2). Many such operations produce benefits never made public for security rea- sons. Yet their cumulative political effect may turn tactical successes into a strategic fail- ure, a point repeatedly highlighted by Afghan authorities and increasingly by U.S. military officials as well. For example, in December
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 5 2006, in the aftermath of a SOF operation in of force. In September 2008, Karzai pro- outweighs the value of these raids in fight- Khost Province, the U.S. military claimed four tested the continued killing of Afghan civil- ing the Taliban.” Ominously, 25 percent of suspected terrorists had been killed. However, ians before the UN General Assembly. Shortly poll respondents now say attacks on U.S. or then-Governor Arsala Jamal, with whom the thereafter, he announced: “This is my first NATO/ISAF forces can be justified—twice U.S. military had developed a strong working demand of the new president of the United the level in 2006.31 Even though interna- relationship, contested the statement, stat- States—to put an end to civilian casualties.” tional forces are aware of these trends and ing that the raid mistakenly targeted a pro- More recently, Karzai has campaigned on the want to avoid civilian casualties, the number government village. Four of the five brothers promise of bringing international military of civilian casualties produced by coalition living in the compound worked for the gov- forces under control. operations nevertheless continued to climb ernment, and Jamal asserted there was “little Karzai’s stridency may be calculated to throughout 2008, increasing somewhere reason to suspect them of being anti-govern- garner popular support, but it also reflects between 39 and 54 percent.32 ment elements.”25 In March 2008, in response the public mood. An increasing number of Several steps were taken to address the to two SOF operations that led to the deaths mass demonstrations against civilian casu- civilian casualty issue. First, in a memoran- of several Afghan women and children, Jamal alties testify to serious public discontent, and dum to Admiral Mullen in October 2008, complained to Richard Holbrooke that “this evidence suggests civilian casualties are one Secretary Gates directed a change in com- undermines everything we are trying to do reason some Afghans take up arms against munications posture from “investigate first, here.”26 On a subsequent visit to the White international military forces.28 In Herat make amends later” to “make amends House in April 2008, he argued to President Province in April 2007, villagers reportedly first, investigate later.”33 The new approach George W. Bush that “special operations is took up arms against SOF in response to a includes refraining from making initial state- the biggest, biggest challenge and [they have series of raids that resulted in the deaths of ments contesting casualty estimates, respond- a] negative impact on the people’s mind in several civilians.29 General Barno has sum- ing more quickly to allegations, conducting marized the dilemma posed by SOF opera- joint investigations with Afghan authorities, “special operations is tions that alienate Afghans: and apologizing publicly where civilian casu- alties are confirmed as a result of interna- the biggest, biggest the tolerance of the Afghan population for tional military operations.34 challenge and [they have foreign military forces [can be described as] Second, in late 2008, General David a] negative impact on the a bag of capital that has to be spent very McKiernan, USA, former commander of U.S. slowly. . . . every time we kick down doors and ISAF forces, directed that all searches people’s mind in regard in the middle of the night, every time we and house raids should be led by Afghan to coalition forces—there create some offense to Afghan cultural sen- security forces except when there was a “clear is no single bigger issue sibilities, we spend that bag of capital— and identified danger” coming from a build- than that” that toleration for foreign forces—more ing. McKiernan’s directive did not apply to and more quickly. And we’ve been spend- SOF special mission units, and it is unclear ing that bag of capital at an extraordi- whether it applied to other SOF. Nevertheless, regard to coalition forces. There is no sin- narily fearsome rate, here, in the last two SOF leaders independently suspended special gle bigger issue than that.”27 President Hamid years, in part because of civilian casual- mission unit activities for 2 weeks in February Karzai and Afghan Defense Minister Abdul ties and in part because of, simply, the tac- 2009 to review procedures to reduce civilian Rahim Wardak also have called for an end to tics that we’ve been using.30 casualties. The problem did not disappear, uncoordinated SOF raids. however. In June 2009, in a rare depar- Karzai has long been extremely crit- General McChrystal’s recent report on ture from diplomatic protocol, Kai Eide, the ical of airstrikes and house raids. In July the situation in Afghanistan also concluded Norwegian head of the UN Assistance Mission 2002, following an American airstrike by a that “civilian casualties and collateral dam- to Afghanistan, publicly called for an “urgent SOF AC–130 that killed scores of people cel- age to homes and property . . . have severely need to review” SOF activities in Afghanistan, ebrating a wedding, Karzai stressed the damaged ISAF’s legitimacy in the eyes of the asserting the political costs of SOF raids were importance of procedures to prevent future Afghan people.” This contention is supported “disproportionate to the military gains.”35 tragedies. He has repeatedly called for an by early 2009 polls, which indicate that the Shortly thereafter, General McChrystal end to airstrikes and to international forces number of Afghans who say the United States issued a tactical directive that curtails the entering Afghan homes without permission has performed well in Afghanistan was cut use of airstrikes to “very limited situations” from Afghan authorities, and his rhetoric has in half, from 68 percent in 2005 to 32 per- where forces are in imminent danger. The escalated over the years. He has lamented cent—and ratings of NATO/ISAF forces were directive emphasizes that “Commanders must the inability to stop “the coalition from kill- just as bad. Civilian casualties are a key weigh the gain of using [close air support] ing our children” and accused foreign forces irritant: “77% of Afghans call such strikes against the cost of civilian casualties, which of “extreme” and “disproportionate” use unacceptable, saying the risk to civilians in the long run make mission success more
6 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009 Table 2. Major (>5) Civilian Casualty Incidents (House Raids), 2006–2009 commanders who, after 8 years of learning Date Location Estimated Civilians Killed* Military Forces** in multiple theaters, are increasingly atten- April 9, 2009 Gurbuz District, Khost Province 4/5 U.S. special operations forces (SOF) tive to counterinsurgency principles. March 22, 2009 Kunduz Province NA/5 U.S. forces† March 13, 2009 Charkh District, Logar Province NA/5 U.S. and Afghan SOF Disunity in Command March 6, 2009 Sabari District, Khost Province NA/4 U.S. forces†; Afghan forces present† and Control North Atlantic Treaty Organization February 12, 2009 Uruzgan Province 5/3 There is broad agreement among the Australian forces† U.S. national security community, the lead- January 23, 2009 Laghman Province NA/16 U.S. SOF ership of U.S. Special Operations Command, January 19, 2009 Kapisa Province NA/14 U.S. SOF and many individual SOF personnel that January 7, 2009 Laghman Province NA/13 U.S. SOF the indirect approach to counterinsur- September 1, 2008 Kabul Province NA/4 International and Afghan forces† gency should take precedence over kill/cap- April 28, 2007(?) Nangarhar Province 2/5 U.S. forces† ture operations. However, the opposite has Mandozai District, Khost occurred. Understanding why is important December 12, 2006 5/5 U.S. SOF Province if unity of effort is to be improved. One rea- * In some of these cases, the Department of Defense asserts that combatants and not civilians were killed. The first figure is the son for the undue emphasis on direct action international military forces estimate; the second figure is either an Afghanistan government or a public media estimate. NA: not is that resources have been disproportionately available. allocated to targeting insurgent and terrorist ** Shaded boxes highlight incidents involving SOF troops. leaders rather than to indirect SOF activities † Indicates military forces involved or type of incident is disputed. in support of counterinsurgency. An explana- tion for the discrepancy between these opera- difficult and turn the Afghan people against many overlapping forces in Afghanistan own tions and national policy was the overlapping us.”36 This approach has not been without any given battle space: “The correct answer is and ad hoc command and control arrange- criticism, but General McChrystal has said the Afghans own the battle space and we are ments extant in Afghanistan to date.42 that he “cannot overstate” his support for there in support of them. But [the] mental- In OEF, civilian casualties resulting operating in ways that limit civilian casual- ity that we own the battle space in a sovereign from operations may not be viewed as det- ties.37 The directive is also consistent with the country . . . can cause us to operate in ways rimental to the core mission of destroy- approach some NATO military forces already that are counterproductive.”40 ing terrorist organizations. However, civilian use in Afghanistan, which bodes well for bet- To reiterate, the new population-cen- casualties are a critical issue for ISAF and ter unified effort within the Alliance. tric counterinsurgency strategy requires its counterinsurgency mission. Most Afghans McChrystal’s directive and his priorities the indirect approach traditionally champi- cannot distinguish between OEF and ISAF reflect the indirect approach to SOF opera- oned by Army Special Forces. This means it forces, and relationships painstakingly devel- tions historically embraced by Army Special is necessary to build the capacity of indig- oped by ISAF are adversely affected when Forces, one that gives priority to working by, enous forces that know the populace bet- OEF kill/capture operations incur civil- through, and with indigenous forces and pop- ter, even for kill/capture operations. However, ian casualties. Despite procedures to decon- ulations.38 This means the relationship with U.S. forces operating under the OEF mandate flict missions, lack of coordination between local forces and population is determined to have focused for years on the direct approach SOF and conventional forces is all too com- be more important than the effects that U.S. to special operations, targeting individual mon. For example, in Nangarhar Province, forces can achieve against targets unilater- enemy leaders unilaterally. This is true not the Army brigade commander who ostensi- ally. For example, in 2001 a Special Forces only for SOF special mission units that spe- bly controlled the battle space was aware of captain routinely deferred to the judgment cialize in direct action, but also increas- only 5 of the 30 operations conducted by a of the Afghan leader he worked with, who ingly for Army Special Forces, who now often SOF unit in the area and had no knowledge happened to be Hamid Karzai, the current accord equal or higher priority to unilat- of the one in which 17 civilians were killed president of Afghanistan: “Hamid was very eral kill/capture operations than the indi- and 50 injured.43 careful. If there was any doubt, we wouldn’t rect approach.41 Ironically, whereas in 2002 The problem is exacerbated by the bother killing it. I could afford to let a few conventional forces such as the 82d Airborne fragmentation of SOF command and control. guys go if I wasn’t sure. Hurting the populace conducted counterinsurgency sweeps that Special mission units conducting direct hurt our own cause.”39 damaged relationships carefully cultivated action against terrorists do not report to The spirit and challenge of implementing by Army Special Forces, today the reverse is the same chain of command as other SOF the indirect approach was captured recently by true. It is now common for SOF kill/capture units. From early on in OEF, SOF operated an Army Special Forces colonel who answered operations to disrupt relationships with local under the command of multiple joint task his own rhetorical question about which of the Afghans cultivated by conventional force forces. Task Force Sword, comprised of SOF
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 7 special mission units, reported directly to the and agencies, and between Allies that lack If the United States does decide to stick combatant commander while other SOF such common organizational values and do not with its current strategy and provide the as Task Forces Dagger and K-Bar reported to share a single, hierarchical chain of com- additional resources it requires, it can and a Combined Joint Special Operations Task mand. Disunity of command within the mil- should take some more steps to improve Force (CJSOTF) component commander.44 A itary, the U.S. Government, and among the unity of effort, particularly with NATO allies. new SOF headquarters established in February United States and its Allies unfortunately is Eliminating the tension between OEF forces 2009 layers a one-star command on top of the the norm, not the exception. Yet the archi- targeting enemy leadership and ISAF forces CJSOTF command. Ostensibly, the purpose is tects of the current strategy recognize that it pursuing stabilization and population secu- to enhance coordination between SOF units requires “clear unity of effort at all levels and rity efforts is the single most important and conventional international military with all participants.”48 The administration requirement for better unified effort. Toward forces, but many in Army Special Forces therefore needs to take every possible step to this end, almost all of the U.S.-led OEF forces worry that the net effect of another layered improve unified purpose and effort. should be consolidated under the NATO ISAF headquarters will be less, rather than more, mission, to include most SOF forces and unity of effort.45 In any case, special mission Observations and all U.S. training command forces that sup- unit forces reside outside this command Recommendations port Afghan force development and employ- structure, so the potential for working at ment programs.52 Only SOF special mission cross-purposes remains. The same point News reports suggest the Obama units (and their support elements) would holds for other U.S. organizations conducting administration is evaluating the option of continue to operate under the OEF man- kill/capture operations, such as the Drug giving precedence to counterterrorism over date. Taking this step would solidify the stra- Enforcement Administration. Their operations counterinsurgency, and concentrating on tegic direction from General Petraeus and targeting individuals linked to drugs and relatively low-cost “surgical” strikes.49 While General McChrystal that nests counterterror- the insurgency are increasing and need to this strategy alternative should be evaluated ism within a wider counterinsurgency mis- be coordinated with military operations, in detail, several observations based on the sion.53 More importantly, it would improve so they will not undermine broader research offered here are in order. Effective the legitimacy of the international effort in counterinsurgency objectives.46 kill/capture operations require political sup- Afghanistan and reinforce European sup- The disproportionate emphasis on port and intelligence from indigenous pop- port for the endeavor. The NATO ISAF mis- kill/capture operations also can be attrib- ulations, which are more easily obtained sion is operating under a UN Security Council uted to organizational culture and reward resolution and has a broader base for popu- systems that reinforce the different objec- lar support than the U.S.-led OEF mission. tives embraced by OEF and ISAF commands. ironically, whereas Finally, the consolidation under NATO would Americans in general, the military in partic- in 2002 conventional be consistent with the administration’s focus ular, and SOF especially are results-oriented. forces conducted COIN on multilateral solutions. The capture or elimination of enemy lead- Merging the two missions is more sweeps that damaged ers is a measurable, concrete, and energetic practicable than might be assumed. The activity that is easily rewarded in individual relationships carefully missions have been converging for several and unit performance assessment. Making a cultivated by SOF, today years. The OEF counterterrorism focus has contribution to population security is passive, the reverse is true broadened to include disrupting the Taliban difficult to measure, often ambiguous, and insurgency by targeting its leadership. therefore less likely to be rewarded. Within the More importantly, since 2006 the OEF mis- subgroups of SOF, there are different cultural when the population has confidence in the sion has included a nationbuilding compo- propensities toward the indirect approach to government and its forces. For this reason, nent in the form of the Combined Security operations, but in general, the military ethos General McChrystal’s indirect approach to Transition Command–Afghanistan, which provides all SOF commanders incentives to irregular warfare50 is more likely to pro- is charged with training and equipping give priority to kill/capture operations instead duce effective kill/capture operations than Afghan National Security Forces. General of population security. This is particularly true attempts to strike surgically from afar. In McChrystal’s report indicates the OEF train- now that SOF units have built up a remark- addition, a strategy shift to give precedence ing component command will be subsumed able capability to conduct such operations fre- to counterterrorism would not reduce the under ISAF, a positive step that is consistent quently and for sustained periods.47 irregular warfare requirement for greater with the decision announced at the April Unity of effort is difficult in irregular unity of effort, as kill/capture operations in NATO summit to form an Alliance training warfare, even within the military and within Iraq demonstrated.51 Whether the emphasis mission and have it led by a single com- SOF organizations that embrace unity of is on counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, mander who also would control the U.S.-led command as a core value. Unified effort is the requirement for improved unity of effort Combined Security Transition Command– even more difficult among U.S. departments is a constant in irregular warfare. Afghanistan under OEF.54
8 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009 At the same time, the ISAF mission lethal force. But the new U.S. strategy deem- Operations and Revolutionary Development has broadened as well. After NATO assumed phasizes the attrition of insurgent forces, the Support Program in Vietnam was instituted. command of ISAF in 2003, the UN Security type of operations Europeans could not sup- These rare experiments in formally inte- Council authorized the extension of the ISAF port.57 In addition, NATO troop-contributing grated civil-military chains of command pro- security and stabilization mission to cover the states are relaxing their opposition to hav- duced good results that more than justify entire country, an expansion that ISAF com- ing their forces involved in combat operations pleted by late 2006. ISAF experienced more when such operations are an unavoidable combat when it moved into the south and byproduct of stabilization operations.58 The the standard practice east where insurgent activity is concentrated. French, for example, now express frustra- has been to proclaim In this environment, the practical distinctions tion with national caveats that limit com- the importance of civil- between “security and stabilization” and bat by NATO troops, and recently, a European classic population-centric counterinsurgency Parliament report made the argument that military integration missions almost disappear. The terminology national caveats are counterproductive. On while doing nothing remains politically important because NATO the ground, more nations are finding combat to facilitate it, which, does not refer to ISAF’s mission as counter- unavoidable and a necessary means of paci- typically and not insurgency but rather prefers the euphemism fication.59 Even German forces, with arguably “the comprehensive approach” to empha- the most restrictive national caveats, now rou- surprisingly, produces size the full range of civil-military activities tinely are involved in combat.60 ISAF forces unsatisfactory results required to stabilize Afghanistan. Some NATO also can rely more heavily on NATO SOF when forces will continue to avoid offensive oper- combat operations are necessary. Many Allies ations against the Taliban, but the current have been willing to allow their SOF to con- their broader use in complex politico-military strategy emphasis on population security and duct combat operations with a low profile. contingencies. The standard practice, how- the indirect approach underscores the need Where fighting is heaviest, U.S. forces ever, has been to proclaim the importance of to have Afghan forces take the lead in such and likeminded Allies will have to bear the civil-military integration while doing nothing operations anyway. Thus, this limitation is brunt of the operations until Afghan forces to facilitate it, which, typically and not sur- not a severe handicap. are ready. However, that is the case today and prisingly, produces unsatisfactory results.61 Moreover, past NATO reluctance to con- not an argument against rolling OEF activi- Occasionally, a pair of extraordi- sider merging elements of the two missions ties under ISAF. Any U.S. concerns over the nary personalities will mesh and develop appears to be dissipating. Until 2005, Britain, future direction of the ISAF NATO mission noteworthy rapport, as was the case with France, and Germany all opposed merg- could be assuaged by the provision that the Ambassador Robert Oakley and Lieutenant ing ISAF and OEF because they believed the commander of ISAF would always be a U.S. General Robert Johnston in Somalia (1993); United States wanted to dump the mission on flag officer, which is entirely reasonable given Ambassador Khalilzad and Lieutenant NATO and concentrate on Iraq, and because that the United States provides the majority of General Barno in Afghanistan (2003); they thought the U.S. focus was on fighting forces and support to the mission. and General Petraeus and Ambassador the Taliban and al Qaeda rather than pop- The second most important requirement Ryan Crocker in Iraq (2007). The fact that ulation security and nationbuilding. Since for better unified effort is improved civil-mil- Ambassador Eikenberry is a retired Army 2006, however, some Allies (or particular itary collaboration. Since, as argued above, lieutenant general may improve the odds political parties within NATO countries) have successful irregular warfare requires rapid that he and General McChrystal will col- recommended merging the missions; Italy resolution of innumerable implementation laborate, but it does not guarantee this explicitly did so with the rationale that the issues, mechanisms for authoritative civil- will be the case. Even if they do, their pos- merger would reduce civilian casualties by military decisionmaking are imperative. The itive example will not ensure cooperation ramping down OEF operations.55 Since the United States must lead the way for NATO down the line through subordinate lev- ISAF stabilization mission now includes the in this area by ensuring close collaboration els of organization, as the experience with full range of activities necessary to execute between General McChrystal and Ambassador the civil-military Provincial Reconstruction the new U.S. population-centric counterinsur- Eikenberry. In this regard, McChrystal’s plan Teams in Afghanistan attests.62 Great gency strategy, NATO should be more ame- is insufficient. It calls for parallel chains of Ambassador–military commander teams nable to seeing the ISAF mission absorb the command with coordination at every level. are the rare exceptions that prove the gen- bulk of OEF forces and activities if the United Historically, however, the way to ensure civil- eral rule that such leaders typically respond States emphatically renews its commitment to military cooperation is to formally integrate to the demands of their own organizations success in Afghanistan.56 the military and civilian chains of com- and cultures, as do their subordinates. As a Many observers would be hesitant to give mand, as occurred when General Douglas recent report from the House Armed Services the lead to ISAF because European countries MacArthur was given authority over all Committee (HASC) concluded, “While senior have demonstrated a marked reluctance to use U.S. activities in Japan and when the Civil leaders should get along in the interest of
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 9 the mission, history is replete with examples deleterious results of forcing equal authorities SOF kill/capture operations should con- where they have not. Rather than depending with competing mandates to cooperate. tinue, but only in support of counterinsur- exclusively on personalities for success, the As for unified effort within the military gency objectives. In some cases, conventional right interagency structures and processes and SOF community, General McChrystal’s units integrate SOF kill/capture operations need to be in place and working.”63 plan calls for improved SOF command and into their counterinsurgency efforts in a way The optimum means of ensuring uni- control, and it hints that some SOF will be that strengthens rather than weakens rela- fied effort would be a formal decision to inte- realigned under ISAF, as recommended here. tionships with local Afghans.71 However, this grate the civilian and military chains of Improved coordination between OEF and must be done systematically and not be left to command for the purpose of complex con- ISAF SOF will be provided by enhanced “SOF chance. Layering of headquarters that con- tingency operations such as counterinsur- operations and planning staff, SOF advi- strains the latitude SOF traditionally exer- gency, but this would require changes to sors, and liaison officers to the Regional cise is not the preferred way to achieve this laws that mandate a dual civil and military Command Headquarters.”67 McChrystal has objective. Instead, SOF must be subject to the chain of command at the country level.64 the credentials to reorient the SOF focus in culture change on the issue of civilian casu- The more immediate solution would be an Afghanistan so that population-centric strat- alties that General McChrystal is advocat- informal agreement between Eikenberry and egy objectives take precedence over kill/cap- ing.72 Several steps already taken or currently McChrystal to work collaboratively. Such a ture operations. He is a veteran of both Army under way should help ensure the change in relationship can be hoped for, but the more Special Forces and special mission units who perspective extends to all SOF. prudent route would be for the administra- recognizes that decapitation of the enemy Moving Army Special Forces from OEF tion to take steps to ensure a collaborative leadership will not work, but that a focused to the ISAF counterinsurgency mission would relationship. effort to keep the insurgency on the defensive underscore national mission priorities for General McChrystal and Ambassador SOF. SOF collaboration with Afghan army Eikenberry have developed a joint plan for units working on counterinsurgency objec- Afghanistan,65 as should be the norm in com- SOF collaboration tives should be the norm, and it is more likely plex civil-military operations. They should with Afghan army to happen if SOF are working under the ISAF also exchange key staff members and make units working on mission mandate. Making ISAF the main decisions collaboratively whenever possi- effort in Afghanistan would also make it eas- counterinsurgency ble, in keeping with the best practices of our ier to eliminate irregularities that complicate most accomplished Ambassador-commander objectives should be unity of effort, such as different OEF/ISAF teams. However, as the HASC recommends, the norm, and it is more target lists of key enemy leaders.73 General they also should be given some procedural likely to happen if SOF McChrystal’s emphatic statements about the rules of thumb for collaboration. When dip- need to limit civilian casualties and the sub- lomatic and military needs sharply con- are working under the ordinate importance of targeting enemy lead- flict—as they must on occasion in irregular ISAF mission mandate ership effectively communicate commander’s war—who has the final say should be a intent to all SOF forces, including the special function of the security situation, which mission units he knows so well.74 McChrystal’s could be determined on a province by prov- is valuable if conducted properly. Offensive priorities and plan should also help reinforce ince basis. Ambassador Eikenberry would operations against insurgents must be the traditional Army Special Forces indirect have the last say for the few contentious informed by the kind of interagency intelli- approach that emphasizes the critical impor- issues that could not be resolved collabora- gence fusion McChrystal pioneered in Iraq.68 tance of the Afghan population and forces. tively in those provinces where security was In-depth knowledge of local personalities and General McChrystal will have to per- good enough to allow progress toward politi- politics increases the odds that kill/capture sonally attend to setting SOF special mis- cal objectives to take priority—generally the operations will improve security and reduces sion unit priorities within the OEF mandate. northern half of the country at the moment. the likelihood that local information sources They do not formally report to him, and In provinces where the security environ- might manipulate international forces for they would continue to operate under differ- ment is so poor that progress toward secu- their own objectives.69 To improve intelligence ent rules of engagement than ISAF forces. rity objectives must take precedence before and political awareness, General McChrystal’s Historically, special mission units report political progress can be realized—generally new command and control guidance for SOF directly to combatant commanders. If the the southeast and southern half of the coun- should pair Army Special Forces with Afghan plan to realign all SOF to the commander of try—General McChrystal would resolve the units that have graduated from basic train- ISAF does not include special mission units, issue at hand.66 Knowing in advance who has ing and are ready for employment, and with General McChrystal’s past experience should the final say will minimize the conflict, tardy local irregular forces generated through the at least allow him to exercise an infor- decisions, stalemates, and least common Afghan Public Protection Force program (if mal veto over their operations should they denominator solutions that are frequently the that controversial pilot program continues).70 threaten counterinsurgency objectives. If
10 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009 this kind of informal oversight relationship achieve it. With so much at stake and so little 19 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: U.S. proves insufficient, SOF special mission units time to reverse a deteriorating situation, the Naval Institute Press, 2006), 7. could be further constrained to operate in administration must clarify its strategy and 20 John McCain, remarks at the American Enterprise a geographically limited area and by a very then go the extra mile by taking additional Institute, February 25, 2009, available at
No. 248, October 2009 Strategic Forum 11 July 20, 2009. For evidence of the confusion surrounding the 2007); Anna Husarska, “Trampled by the ‘Civilian Surge,’” focus of Special Forces, see Major Darin Blatt and Major Glenn The Washington Post, July 10, 2009. Bollinger III, “3d SFG Develops Special Army Forces Combat 63 U.S. House of Representatives, House Armed Services Advisers for Afghanistan,” June 24, 2009, available at
12 Strategic Forum No. 248, October 2009