NPR 1.2: a Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime

Deborah A. Ozga A CHRONOLOGY OF THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME by Deborah A. Ozga1 Deborah A. Ozga is Project Manager of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project of the Program for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. OVERVIEW he Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is and ability to combat missile proliferation in a new, rapidly- an informal, non-treaty association of states that have changing international order. China's and North Korea's Tan established policy or interest in limiting the spread continuing aid to foreign states' missile programs increases of missiles and missile technology. The MTCR's origins date the importance that a well functioning regime is in place to back to the 1970s, when the U.S. government became aware deal with missile proliferation issues. This report is in- of dangers posed by the missile programs of developing na- tended to provide the necessary background data with which tions. Several events, including South Korea's 1978 ballistic to undertake this reassessment. missile test, Iraq's attempt in 1979 to purchase retired rocket stages from Italy, India's July 1980 SLV-3 test, and the former GUIDELINES AND ANNEX German firm OTRAC's 1981 testing of a rocket in Libya, contributed particularly to U.S. apprehensions.2 At its founding, MTCR members released guidelines ex- The concerns of the United States were translated into a plaining the regime's general principles and an annex defin- Reagan administration initiative that resulted ultimately in ing certain technologies to be controlled. The original guide- an agreement by seven founding members to limit the spread lines established that MTCR members would refrain from of missiles and missile technology and in the release of guide- exporting annex items on a voluntary and independent basis. lines on April 16, 1987. According to the guidelines, the The guidelines also outlined the basic criteria to assess mis- MTCR's original purpose was to "reduce the risks of nuclear sile-related export applications, such as nuclear prolifera- proliferation by placing controls on equipment and technol- tion concerns, the nature of the recipient state's missile and ogy transfers which contribute to the development of un- space programs, the item's significance in the development manned, nuclear-weapon delivery systems." Over time, that of a nuclear weapons delivery system, end-use assessment goal was expanded to "limit the risks of proliferation of weap- of the item, and any relevant multilateral agreements. At the ons of mass destruction by controlling transfers that could same time, a wide spectrum of activities were permitted, make a contribution to delivery systems for such weapons."3 including provisions for educational exchanges, research The MTCR currently provides the central institutional ar- programs, and servicing agreements. According to the guide- rangement, as well as the base international norm, for deal- lines, the MTCR was not intended to impinge upon the peace- ing with missile proliferation. But while the international ful use of advanced missile technology, national space pro- community now recognizes the spread of missiles and mis- grams, or international space cooperation efforts "as long as sile technology as a crucial security issue, the sweeping po- such programs could not contribute to nuclear weapons de- litical changes witnessed over the last three years demand a livery systems."4 re-examination of the regime's focus, strengths, weaknesses, The guideline update in January 1993 extended the regime 66 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 Deborah A. Ozga significantly to cover not only delivery systems for nuclear meetings for non-MTCR Western European states and for weapons but also for other weapons of mass destruction. the newly-democratized nations of the Eastern bloc. The new guidelines added that there is a "strong presump- Member states volunteer to host MTCR meetings. The host- tion" to deny an export if an MTCR member judges that a ing nation serves as chairman and determines the meeting's missile, whether or not listed in the annex, is "intended" for agenda. France acts as the regular Secretariat, fulfilling the use in weapons of mass destruction delivery systems. In regime's normal administrative functions, which include theory, the changes establish substantially tightened control serving as the point of contact. Decisions taken by mem- parameters, since chemical and biological warheads can be bers--such as approval of membership applications and an- placed on small rocket systems that fall well below the pre- nex changes--require a consensus vote. Due to intelligence vious 500 kg. and 300 km. parameters. sharing among members, records of meetings and negotia- The current technical annex contains 20 item groups di- tions remain confidential. vided into two categories. Category I consists of complete missile systems and subsystems as well as specially designed Membership: production equipment and technology for these systems.5 Full member states are those nations that either joined the In regards to Category I exports, the guidelines state "there regime at its inception, later submitted applications that were will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers (...)."6 approved for membership, or were directly recruited by the They also require that "Until further notice, the transfer of regime to participate in its closed circle. (See page 6 for a Category I production facilities will not be authorized."7 list of MTCR member states.) The recruitment process often Other Category I transfers will be authorized on "rare occa- involves seminars, dialogue in the form of bilateral consulta- sions" where a government secures binding intergovernmen- tions, and fact-finding missions by MTCR delegations. Re- tal end-use assurances from the recipient. Category II items cruiting attempts have included, for example, U.S. efforts to consist of less sensitive components and technologies, most obtain some form of participation in the regime by the So- of which have dual-use applications.8 These items may be viet Union. Similarly, Japan has approached (sometimes with exported by MTCR members, provided that the importing other MTCR members) China, North Korea, Argentina, Bra- state furnishes sufficient end-use guarantees for the item. zil, as well as the former Soviet Union, encouraging them to Two critical control parameters established by the annex adopt MTCR guidelines.10 It should be noted that since the are the 300 km. range limit and the 500 kg. payload limit. end of the Cold War and the advent of the Persian Gulf According to a Canadian government release, the 500 kg crisis, membership size has dramatically increased. Thir- payload limit recognizes that emerging nuclear states are teen of the MTCR's current members joined between Au- likely to develop initially relatively-heavy, and rather crude, gust 1990 and June 1993. nuclear weapons. The 300 km. range correlates to distances Decisions regarding a state's application to join the MTCR in a majority of strategic theaters of conflict where nuclear are made on a confidential, case-by-case basis. MTCR mem- missile use might be considered. This range was also con- bers generally judge applicants on the effectiveness of a state's sidered to be a convenient, workable, and achievable param- export controls, its contribution to the regime, and its prolif- eter around which international export controls could be es- eration record. Backing and assistance from an influential tablished.9 member can also be helpful in gaining membership. All members must approve of an applicant before it is admitted ORGANIZATIONAL OPERATIONS to the regime. Meetings: Adherence: MTCR members conduct three types of meetings: plenary, Since its onset, the MTCR has welcomed adherence to its technical, and special. MTCR members meet at least once a guidelines by all states. The definition of "adherence," how- year for a plenary session to exchange intelligence informa- ever, varies widely. A state, such as South Africa, can adopt tion regarding missile proliferation developments, to discuss export controls based on MTCR guidelines and proclaim proliferation policy issues, and to explore ways of improving itself to be an adherent. This does not necessarily imply that the regime's performance. At technical meetings, represen- members will automatically recognize the "adhering" nation tatives examine the regime's specific control parameters to as an adherent; each member state has its own policy for refine and expand the annex. Special meetings have been determining whether a nation is an official adherent. For called for recruitment purposes; two such instances were example, the United States has in the past only recognized The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1994 67 Deborah A. Ozga adherent status after a bilateral accord has been reached. Its move sanctions when a nation comes under criticism for its efforts with Russia and Israel are both cases in point.11 Rec- export policies. ognition of adherent status by the U.S. government is par- Rationales for states not to join or adhere to the regime ticularly critical, as its sanction laws are triggered when non- include: the MTCR is seen as a medium for economically MTCR participants transfer controlled goods to other non- developed nations to defend their space industries; it is an participants. instrument designed to suppress developing nations from Some states volunteer their adherence while others

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