Economic Survey 1994/01

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Economic Survey 1994/01 Ecoomic Suey 119 osecs 3 Ieaioa ecoomy 5 owegia ecoomy 7 vlpnt n 7 1993 Otl fr 199 nd 1995 9 En pl 1 Ecoomic oicy caea 1993 22 Aei tnl nt fr r 3 ew eseac uicaios i Egis 5 h t ff dt fr nfrtn d n th pbltn 2 brr 4. Eioia oa Olv jrhlt (d rtn Ådn Cppln Olv jn Øtn Oln r Slnd Eioia assisas Wnh rz (rtl bth r (n rv esig Enz nr n i lh rttr Eioia aess Sttt r rh prtnt O x 131 p -33 Ol l + 7 / 9 7 lfx + 7 11 1 3 Ecoomic Suey pblhd fr t r b th rh prtnt f Sttt r h rh - prtnt tblhd n 195 h prtnt h bt 9-1 pl (b 199 h rh prtnt td rnzd n fr dvn d f prtnt Olv jrhlt. • vn fr bl En • Mrn vn rtr f rh Olv jn rtr f rh Adn Cppln - bl n tx - n l nl - br rt nl - Mrn dl - Mr ltn dl - Gnrl lbr dl • trl r vn • Mrntr vn rtr f rh Knt . Alfn rtr f rh hn K. v - Envrnntl n - Cnr nd prdr bhvr - Intrntnl nr rt - In dtrbtn nl - trl nd nr nl - Entr thd Symos i aes Symo t nt vlbl t fr pbltn l rvnl r prlnr fr ,, 2 Economic Survey 1194 En rv 1993 Ecoomic Suey osecs At th trt f 199 thr r lr n f rvr n th rn n- ftr th vrt nd t prtrtd rn n th Snd Wrld Wr Add b btntl ntrt rt fll nlnd dnd pd p thrht 1993 h ttn n th lbr rt l d ht brhtr trd th nd f lt r nd pr nd t n r rn n l prd trnd Aprt fr th ntrt rt fll n trn Erp dv- lpnt n th rld n hv d dt ntrbtn t th rv- r S fr pt t rth h bn prvdd b ff-hr nvtnt nd x- pnnr fl pl bt prvt nptn nd nvtnt n th n- lnd tr r n tn vr h dvlpnt rltd t rdl prvnt n th fnnl ttn f ntrpr nd hhld ftr th brrn pr n th d-19 Mrvr th lvl f lbr t n r h rpdl nvrd n th lvl n t trdn prtnr n th t t fr rn nftrr t bnft fr th dt dnd rth nd l t prtpt n th ntr- ntnl rvr tht dl xptd vr thr r btl In ddtn t ntnd nrtnt bt th n- trntnl rvr th rtt nrtnt fr th rn n tth t th l pr nd th t th z f ptrl rnn hd h xtnv dvlpnt f th ptrl tr nd th fl pl xpnn d pbl b th btntl l rvn rn t th tt hv ntr- btd btntll t ntnn th lvl f tvt n th rn n- h pl h nrrntl nrd r l-dpndn vlpnt f th l tr h thrt r nt th frt rn f l-xprtn ntr- h vlnrbl ptn ntln rt r xpr fr hh-t pr- dr Expr n rnt r h bn xrbtd b th lbrltn f - ptl vnt n th ndtrld rld t hh r bln Ex ppl n th l rt nd nrtnt bt OEC rl n th prd hd d th rl pr f l t fll trd th lt lvl fr tnt r rnd th nd f 1993 n r l prdtn p n- d th th lt-vr rl pr f l In th d tr lbl dnd fr l p p nd ntrbt t hhr pr nd n fr ntr th l rrv rnn vr n th lnr tr th ptrl tr n- trbtn t th rn n ll b rdd rrdl nd th vrn- nt t b r thr n pnt fr th fll-ff f rvn h nd ld n tp f th vrnnt nrd pnn bltn - td th th n f th ppltn 3 Ecoomic suey 1993 Economic Survey 1/94 l pr ll ntrbt t dnn n lrd btntl ntrl vrn- nt dft nd thrb rndr fl djtnt vn r dndn h ptrn n th rn n nt prtlrl trn fr th t bn nd ntnd nl drvn b dt fr n th thrt f dfflt h rrd h th hld rt f l pr rn l ltr n th prn A fl ntrtn dpn th rvr On th thr hnd th rn xhn rt r ntrt rt ndr prr f th thrt rn pv A r bnt rvr ntrntnll ll rv r ll n th ttn vr r trd t rt xtnt th th l rpdl xpndn ndtrld n f th rld nd t nl- bl xtnt drtd trd th n brnn ndtrld n thr th EEA rnt nr th n GA rnt ll hn th pt- trn n th hrt tr h rnt ntll hrld frthr lbrltn f trd n d nd rv nd nrd blt f ptl nd lbr h rtr rrnt f pttvn r r nd ndtr h trdtnl prttv r njd b rn r nd nd- tr ll rdll l thr nfn nd prdt dvlpnt ptl t nd ndtn f p nd plnt ll r nrd nfn fr pttvn Indtr bd n ntrl rr ll ntn t prvd pttv dvnt n thr n r bt ll nt b vlbl t pprt thr rl tvt t th xtnt t prnt pt prhnv lbr-rt r nd rrd nbr f t- dnt pl nplnt rnnn t htrll vr hh lvl n r th th hh nplnt lvl nd th dln n th r fr n rnt r vdn btntl bln n th lbr rt d th rth n th nbr f ln-tr npld In th ttn thr lttl frt n th nld tht nplnt btntll lr n r thn n n thr Erpn ntr It rn t b n hthr th hn n ntrntnl frr ndtn nd ht rtr nt n th n n fltt rtrn t rlr lvl f nplnt hr r hrdl d rnd fr pt n th rpt fr th r dtl hd 4 Economic Survey 1/94 Ecoomic suey 1993 Ieaioa ecoomy Although economic growth in other parts of the world eco- resumed an upward trend, partly because of the upswing in nomy, especially Asia, was buoyant in 1993, the OECD the economy. Forecasts point towards a short-term interest countries were in the throes of a serious recession. GDP rate level of almost 4 per cent in the second half of 1994, growth from 1992 to 1993 in the OECD as a whole is put while long rates will probably remain at around 6 per cent. at just under 1 per cent. However, the economic situation varied widely from area to area. Whereas the US economy Japan is in the throes of an unusually deep recession. The showed clearer signs of recovery throughout last year, the weakness displayed by the economy is primarily due to the EU countries combined experienced their weakest econo- decline in domestic demand, accompanied by a marked mic growth since the Second World War. Close to zero drop in private investment after several years of over-in- growth in the Japanese economy also contributed to pul- vestment and property- and asset-price inflation. Private ling down total growth in the OECD area. The outlook for consumption also showed sluggish growth, partly as a re- the western industrialised countries in 1994 is somewhat sult of a weak income trend. Exports have been checked in brighter: continued low interest rates in the US and Japan recent years by the appreciation of the yen; in volume and falling rates in Europe will stimulate economic activi- terms exports expanded by a mere 1 per cent between ty. However, growth will be moderate, and unemployment 1992 and 1993, which is a very low figure by Japanese - which in the OECD as a whole rose above 35 million per- standards. Nevertheless, a weak import trend left Japan sons in 1993 - seems set to continue to increase. with a substantial balance of payments surplus in 1993. The strong financial position of Japan's general govern- After a moderate rise over the past two years, the rate of ment sector lays the basis for providing impetus to the eco- growth in the US picked up in 1993. A number of indica- nomy through fiscal policy. However, unstable political tors rose strongly in the second half of last year and, accor- conditions have impeded agreement on a focused expansio- ding to preliminary national accounts figures, GDP expan- nary policy. So far the measures presented do not seem to ded by almost 3 per cent from 1992 to 1993. The rate of have had more than a modest impact. Growth impulses growth in the economy is expected to remain at this level from public sector demand and the residential market will in 1994. The main force behind the improved trading con- nonetheless facilitate some pick-up of GDP growth this ditions in the US is increased domestic demand. The lar- year. gest upswing in 1993 was in private business fixed invest- ment which expanded by more than 11 per cent on the pre- In Europe the currency market turbulence continued in vious year according to preliminary estimates. The buo- 1993. Around the end of July and start of August the tur- yant expansion is probably attributable to the low level of moil culminated in agreement on wider swing margins interest rates.
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