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The Nordics and the New European Security Architecture — Björn Fägersten (Ed.)

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The Nordics and the New European Security Architecture — Björn Fägersten (Ed.) 3/2020 The Nordics and the New European Security Architecture — Björn Fägersten (ed.) PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE Björn Fägersten Head of the Europe Programme, UI This project was made possible by a grant from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Language editing: Andrew Mash Cover photo: Shutterstock Content Summary ............................................................................................................................ 4 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 5 Part I – The New European Security Architecture ................................................................. 7 The Initiatives ............................................................................................................................ 7 Value added – Crisis Management, Collective Defence and Capacity Building ...................... 10 The Future and the Nordic States ........................................................................................... 13 Part II – Nordic perspectives on European security ..............................................................16 Norway .................................................................................................................................... 16 Sweden .................................................................................................................................... 22 Denmark .................................................................................................................................. 27 Finland ..................................................................................................................................... 31 Sections authored by Björn Fägersten, Calle Håkansson, Gunilla Herolf, Karsten Friis, Maren Garberg Bredesen, Matti Pesu, Mikkel Runge Olesen © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 3 Summary There has been a rapid development of forums and mechanisms for security cooperation in Europe in recent years. Novelties such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF), Framework Nation Concept (FNC) and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) have been added to a field already dense with acronyms. This study summarizes recent developments in European security cooperation, analyses the added value of the new structures and discusses what these might mean for Nordic security and the Nordic states. From a Nordic perspective, it is striking that Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland – which differ considerably on European Union (EU) and NATO membership, as well as on EU defence policy and euro participation – have all adopted fairly similar positions on Europe’s new security formats. From different positions, and with somewhat different arguments, all of these states are trying to reap the benefits of the new EU structures and have joined “mini-lateral“ groupings focused around big players such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. This alignment of institutional choices should not, however, be interpreted as a surge of “Nordism” – the Nordic states as a political force. On the contrary, the report illustrates how Nordic cooperation and cohesion are formed within specific frameworks, such as bilateral links and Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), but rarely leave these formats. Joint Nordic positions and interests are thus rarely leveraged in wider European platforms for security cooperation. Regarding cooperation formats with one dominant leader – such as France’s EI2, the UK’s JEF and Germany’s FNC – the Nordic states to a large extent seem to be driven by national ambitions to build strong bilateral relations with Europe’s larger powers, while the other cooperative benefits of these frameworks are secondary. One perceived benefit of all the Nordic states participating in the new platforms for cooperation is the increased levels of interoperability and enhanced habits of cooperation. Regardless of whether cooperation platforms add value to crisis management, deterrence or defence, there is a clear added value in increased levels of cooperation with the actors are already present in your geographical neighbourhood in a time of crisis. © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 4 Introduction Following Russian hostility in Georgia and later in Ukraine, the leitmotif of austerity was challenged by that of . This The first two decades of the 21st century protection chimed with the more general level of have seen remarkable but uneven conflict in the neighbourhood following the development of European security Arab Spring and the effects it had on cooperation. Following its failed attempt to migration to Europe. Europeans and their attach a military dimension to European societies were to be protected against integration through the 1952 European hybrid warfare and terrorism, but also from Defense Community, the European Union the dark undercurrents of globalization and (EU) stayed clear of any direct security and even migration. For much of the 2010s, the defence role throughout the Cold War. Since activities of the Common Security and the early 1990s, however, it has been Defence Policy (CSDP) were geographically developing gradually as a security forum and focused along the borders of Europe or its actor with various leitmotifs. periphery, and often had as their aim to shield Europe from what were perceived as The first is on European actorness. The malign flows of goods or persons. “A Europe Balkan wars of the 1990s illustrated how that protects” was a lead theme in unprepared European states were for Commission President Jean Claude Juncker’s managing issues in their own region. At the 2016 State of the Union and subsequent same time, the new orientation of NATO comments in the years that followed. was still unclear following the demise of its traditional adversary. The capacity of By the end of the 2010s, however, the Europeans to act and respond to crises was mainly defensive focus on protection had first channelled through the Western been supplemented by that of . The European Union (WEU) but transferred to power rise and increasing assertiveness of China the EU around the turn of millennium. and the America First policies of President Under the lead of High Representative Javier Trump opened European eyes to a new Solana, the EU increased its capacity as a game of geopolitical and geo-economic crisis management actor during the early competition and conflict. The departure of years of the century. the UK demanded action by the remaining 27 to showcase that integration was not A second leitmotiv in the development of dead, but more importantly also removed European security cooperation was that of barriers to what could be achieved. The austerity. The effects of the lending and effect has been a rapid development of the banking crisis of late 2008/ early 2009 hit instruments and mechanisms for security almost every European state and also cooperation within the EU, strongly affected military spending. Investing supported by an enthusiastic HR/VP, together and making the defence sector Federica Mogherini. Recognizing the more effective were championed as the only centrality of power and power projection, way for European states to remain credible the newly appointed HR/VP, Josep Borrell, actors on the international security stage. As stated in his European Parliament the then HR/VP, Catherine Ashton, confirmation hearing that “the EU has to suggested in 2012: “It’s the only pragmatic learn to use the language of power”, and way forward”.1 1 Opening address by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the EDA annual conference (2012). © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs has repeated the point in his The Nordic states have long been separated communications since.2 by their divergent geopolitical choices on how to provide security, how to deal with While the main leitmotif by which European affairs and what currency to trade cooperation has been communicated – and in. By the end of the 2010s, however, it was to some extent also the output of European possible to identify a trend towards an security cooperation – has shifted, the idea increasing level of cohesion. Sweden and that Europe should undertake security tasks Finland are now close partners of NATO. with some level of autonomy from other Norway is keen to make use of the new actors has been a recurrent theme. Whether mechanism for security cooperation within in pursuit of actor capabilities, economic the EU, and Denmark, Norway, Sweden and rationality, protection or the ability to Finland have joined the main hubs of project power, the aim has been to cooperation established outside of formal accomplish these ambitions with less institutions: the France-led European reliance on external actors in general and Intervention Initiative (EI2), the British-led the USA in particular. There has been a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the dramatic increase in ambition concerning German-led Framework Nations Concept autonomy in recent years. For example, the (FNC). The question is of course whether initial ambition for an autonomous capacity they want the same out of these for small-scale interventions has developed engagements, and whether there is any into an ambition for full-blown strategic ambition to turn this cohesion on autonomy,
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