Inside Nato – Outside the Eu Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North

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Inside Nato – Outside the Eu Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU STRATEGIAN LAITOS JULKAISUSARJA 4: TYÖPAPEREITA No 32 NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES SERIES 4: WORKING PAPERS No 32 INSIDE NATO – OUTSIDE THE EU NORWEGIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE HIGH NORTH NINA GRÆGER MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Strategian laitos HELSINKI 2009 Nina Græger: Inside NATO – Outside the EU: Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitos Julkaisusarja 4: työpapereita No 32 National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 4: Working Papers No 32 Recent publications in pdf-format: http://www.mpkk.fi/fi/tutkimus-opetus/julkaisut/stratl/ Cover design: Janne Kopu ISSN 1236-4983 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu – National Defence University Strategian laitos – Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Edita Prima Oy Helsinki 2009 “INSIDE NATO - OUTSIDE THE EU”: NORWEGIAN SECU- RITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE HIGH NORTH* Nina Græger The end of the Cold War brought about changes in NATO’s strategic con- cept, command structure, tasks and identity as an organisation. NATO has transformed itself from a territorial defence alliance into a politico-military instrument with a global reach. This paper will discuss some of the chal- lenges NATO is facing before the NATO summit 3-4 April, as well as how Norway is affected by and relates to them, not the least because Norway be- longs to the diminishing group of NATO countries that are not inside the EU. Today, international operations “out of Afghanistan. An additional challenge is area” have largely become NATO’s the increased need for coordination and main task, with the ISAF-operation in cooperation with other international Afghanistan representing the biggest institutions and actors involved in milestone thus far. Military transforma- peace operations. For instance, through tion has been a focal point in NATO its common European security and de- since 2002, and came in response to fence policy the EU has become a secu- 9/11 and the following US-led “war on rity actor that NATO increasingly terror”. Transformation was, however, needs to take into account. At the same played down in the last years of the time, the institutionalised EU-NATO Bush administration, under US secre- cooperation under the “Berlin Plus” tary of defence, Secretary Robert Gates. agreement has since long been ham- Furthermore, the idea that European pered by the conflict between Turkey security can be guaranteed once and for and Greece over Cyprus. all seems to have been replaced by the recognition that security risks are Norway’s security context: Inside “manageable”, but rarely perishable.1 NATO, outside the EU Such a “risk society” potentially also questions the transatlantic security Certain notions and ideas have defined community as a “community of action”. and are put to work in national debates The transatlantic community also has about Norwegian security and defence met with a number of political chal- policy. During the Cold War, these lenges, for example in relation to the ideas were, first, Norway’s geographi- Iraq war, as well as military challenges, cal location – the proximity to the So- for instance in the effort to stabilise viet Union. The second defining con- cept has been Norway’s NATO mem- bership and close bilateral relationship * Paper presented at The Nordic Security with the US.2 Territorial defence and Seminar in Helsinki, 18 November 2008 (with the need for allied assistance in the case some recent revisions and an epilogue). 1 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the 2 Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965-1995. Norsk Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge Utenrikspolitikks Historie. Oslo: Universitets- University Press, 2006. forlaget, 1997. 2 of an attack on Norway (meaning an Although NATO is Norway’s first pri- invasion) formed Norwegian security ority in security and defence policy, and defence policy in the Cold War Norwegian governments gradually ac- period. Even with today’s threat image, cepted that the EU also has a role to NATO is still the cornerstone of Nor- play, except with regard to security way’s security and defence policy. The guarantees: commitments under Article 5 are one of the pillars of the Norwegian defence [I]n the future the EU will play an concept. In fact, territorial defence con- increasing role in European security cerns – now covered under the heading and stability...For all practical pur- “core functions” and “core areas” (or poses, it is NATO which has ad- “near abroad”) seem to be back on the justed to the developments within Norwegian security and defence policy the EU in the last decade, even though NATO’s well established agenda. I will return to this below. role and tasks set certain limits on which tasks the EU can take on.4 To a considerable extent, Norway’s participation in the military trans- While NATO is dominant in defence formation of NATO is based on the matters, “the development of a unitary view that Norwegian security depends European security and defence policy is on the continued relevance of NATO. positive, also seen with Norwegian The Defence Plan for the period 2005– eyes”.5 The ESDP to a large extent still 2008, for example, stated that: is seen as subordinated to NATO and the transatlantic relationship, however: Norway’s most important contribu- “A strengthened ESDP leads to a tion in this respect [to maintaining strengthened European pillar in the NATO’s relevance] will be to fol- 6 low up on the allied intentions real- transatlantic security community…” ised through the work with NRF Norway’s initial support for the ESDP [NATO Response Force], a new was based on the idea that a stronger command structure and PCC [Pra- European defence capability would gue Capabilities Commitment], to strengthen the transatlantic relationship ensure NATO remains an efficient and the total Euro-Atlantic crisis man- security political tool seen from agement capacity.7 Similar attitudes both sides of the Atlantic.3 were expressed in response to the European Security Strategy, which was Thus, defence reform in Norway has seen to represent “a useful contribution been legitimized and explained both to improve transatlantic relations.”8 with reference to NATO transformation and territorial security, and the linkages 4 Ministry of Defence, ”For Budsjetterminen between the two. Despite this, trans- 2005”, Stortingsproposisjon nr. 1. Oslo: MoD. forming the Norwegian armed forces 2004, p. 19. has dragged on, and there is still a long 5 Ibid. way to go before the old defence struc- 6 Ibid, chs. 1, 2. 7 ture – and culture – is replaced by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ”Norge og Europa ved inngangen til et nytt århundre”, modern one. Stortingsmelding nr 12. Oslo: Mfa., 2000-01. 8 Jan Petersen, Sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid i 3 Ministry of Defence, ”Den videre Europa eller over Atlanterhavet? Ja takk, moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005- begge deler. Tale i Oslo Militære Samfund, 2008”, Stortingsproposisjon nr 42. Oslo: 2003 [www.odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/aktuelt/taler/ MoD., 2003-04, p. 29. statsraad-a/032171-090162/dok-bu.html]. 3 As long as Norway is not an EU- Norway was invited to participate in a member, its relations with the EU sup- Nordic EU Battlegroup where some plements its relationship with NATO 150 personnel would be listed every and the United States. In the debate third year for six months at a time and about whether Norway should join the take part in joint training and exercises Nordic EU Battlegroup in 2004, the as part of the “preparedness” claim. The Ministry of Defence assured that: Socialist Left Party and the Centre “there is no competition but reciprocal Party, were against Norway’s participa- complimentary”.9 This reflects the tion in the Nordic EU Battlegroup, dominant Norwegian view that with claiming that Norway should contribute regard to foreign and security policy to upholding NATO’s relevance rather Norway cannot choose between Europe than supporting competing projects and the US. This policy goes back to (Haga 2004). Furthermore, they argued the 1980s and was also stressed by the that it was not in Norway’s interest to foreign minister in the aftermath of the be part of the controversial EU army harsh debate on the war in Iraq: and the EU Battlegroups. The term “EU army”, often used by anti-EU parties, is Our security political approach probably intended as a warning that the must [thus] be anchored through building up of an EU military capability our cooperation in both Europe and is in direct competition to and, hence, a across the Atlantic. We say, as challenge to NATO (even the most pro- Winnie the Pooh: ‘Yes, please – EU politicians do not like the idea that both, please.’ Not because we are NATO would be replaced). In addition demanding or naïve, but because this is the best protection we can to the usual EU scepticism, not to say muster against the security threats resistance, the Nordic EU Battlegroup of our time.10 was seen as an additional framework for assigning Norwegian forces abroad. Because the country is not a member of These personnel could otherwise have the EU, Norwegian governments need been used in UN operations or in the to work hard to keep security and de- national defence of Norway, as argued 12 fence issues within NATO and – where by the Centre Party. National defence this is not possible – to obtain the best in this context referred specifically to possible access to the ESDP. This is for Norway’s allegedly international re- all practical purposes likely to continue sponsibility for ensuring sustainable to be Norwegian policy, independent of resource management in the High which government is in power.11 North but also for asserting national sovereignty and interests.
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