Inside Nato – Outside the Eu Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North

MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU STRATEGIAN LAITOS JULKAISUSARJA 4: TYÖPAPEREITA No 32

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES SERIES 4: WORKING PAPERS No 32

INSIDE NATO – OUTSIDE THE EU NORWEGIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE HIGH NORTH

NINA GRÆGER

MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Strategian laitos HELSINKI 2009

Nina Græger: Inside NATO – Outside the EU: Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitos Julkaisusarja 4: työpapereita No 32 National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 4: Working Papers No 32

Recent publications in pdf-format: http://www.mpkk.fi/fi/tutkimus-opetus/julkaisut/stratl/

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ISSN 1236-4983 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu – National Defence University Strategian laitos – Department of Strategic and Defence Studies

Edita Prima Oy Helsinki 2009 “INSIDE NATO - OUTSIDE THE EU”: NORWEGIAN SECU- RITY AND DEFENCE POLICY IN THE HIGH NORTH* Nina Græger

The end of the Cold War brought about changes in NATO’s strategic concept, command structure, tasks and identity as an organisation. NATO has transformed itself from a territorial defence alliance into a politico-military instrument with a global reach. This paper will discuss some of the challenges NATO is facing before the NATO summit 3-4 April, as well as how Norway is affected by and relates to them, not the least because Norway be- longs to the diminishing group of NATO countries that are not inside the EU.

Today, international operations “out of Afghanistan. An additional challenge is area” have largely become NATO’s the increased need for coordination and main task, with the ISAF-operation in cooperation with other international Afghanistan representing the biggest institutions and actors involved in milestone thus far. Military transforma- peace operations. For instance, through tion has been a focal point in NATO its common European security and de- since 2002, and came in response to fence policy the EU has become a secu- 9/11 and the following US-led “war on rity actor that NATO increasingly terror”. Transformation was, however, needs to take into account. At the same played down in the last years of the time, the institutionalised EU-NATO Bush administration, under US secre- cooperation under the “Berlin Plus” tary of defence, Secretary Robert Gates. agreement has since long been ham- Furthermore, the idea that European pered by the conflict between Turkey security can be guaranteed once and for and Greece over Cyprus. all seems to have been replaced by the recognition that security risks are Norway’s security context: Inside “manageable”, but rarely perishable.1 NATO, outside the EU Such a “risk society” potentially also questions the transatlantic security Certain notions and ideas have defined community as a “community of action”. and are put to work in national debates The transatlantic community also has about Norwegian security and defence met with a number of political chal- policy. During the Cold War, these lenges, for example in relation to the ideas were, first, Norway’s geographi- Iraq war, as well as military challenges, cal location – the proximity to the So- for instance in the effort to stabilise viet Union. The second defining concept has been Norway’s NATO membership and close bilateral relationship * Paper presented at The Nordic Security with the US.2 Territorial defence and Seminar in Helsinki, 18 November 2008 (with the need for allied assistance in the case some recent revisions and an epilogue). 1 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the 2 Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder 1965-1995. Norsk Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge Utenrikspolitikks Historie. Oslo: Universitets- University Press, 2006. forlaget, 1997. 2 of an attack on Norway (meaning an Although NATO is Norway’s first pri- invasion) formed Norwegian security ority in security and defence policy, and defence policy in the Cold War Norwegian governments gradually ac- period. Even with today’s threat image, cepted that the EU also has a role to NATO is still the cornerstone of Nor- play, except with regard to security way’s security and defence policy. The guarantees: commitments under Article 5 are one of the pillars of the Norwegian defence [I]n the future the EU will play an concept. In fact, territorial defence con- increasing role in European security cerns – now covered under the heading and stability...For all practical pur- “core functions” and “core areas” (or poses, it is NATO which has ad- “near abroad”) seem to be back on the justed to the developments within Norwegian security and defence policy the EU in the last decade, even though NATO’s well established agenda. I will return to this below. role and tasks set certain limits on which tasks the EU can take on.4 To a considerable extent, Norway’s participation in the military trans- While NATO is dominant in defence formation of NATO is based on the matters, “the development of a unitary view that Norwegian security depends European security and defence policy is on the continued relevance of NATO. positive, also seen with Norwegian The Defence Plan for the period 2005– eyes”.5 The ESDP to a large extent still 2008, for example, stated that: is seen as subordinated to NATO and the transatlantic relationship, however: Norway’s most important contribu- “A strengthened ESDP leads to a tion in this respect [to maintaining strengthened European pillar in the NATO’s relevance] will be to fol- 6 low up on the allied intentions real- transatlantic security community…” ised through the work with NRF Norway’s initial support for the ESDP [NATO Response Force], a new was based on the idea that a stronger command structure and PCC [Pra- European defence capability would gue Capabilities Commitment], to strengthen the transatlantic relationship ensure NATO remains an efficient and the total Euro-Atlantic crisis man- security political tool seen from agement capacity.7 Similar attitudes both sides of the Atlantic.3 were expressed in response to the European Security Strategy, which was Thus, defence reform in Norway has seen to represent “a useful contribution been legitimized and explained both to improve transatlantic relations.”8 with reference to NATO transformation and territorial security, and the linkages 4 Ministry of Defence, ”For Budsjetterminen between the two. Despite this, trans- 2005”, Stortingsproposisjon nr. 1. Oslo: MoD. forming the Norwegian armed forces 2004, p. 19. has dragged on, and there is still a long 5 Ibid. way to go before the old defence struc- 6 Ibid, chs. 1, 2. 7 ture – and culture – is replaced by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ”Norge og Europa ved inngangen til et nytt århundre”, modern one. Stortingsmelding nr 12. Oslo: Mfa., 2000-01. 8 Jan Petersen, Sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid i 3 Ministry of Defence, ”Den videre Europa eller over Atlanterhavet? Ja takk, moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005- begge deler. Tale i Oslo Militære Samfund, 2008”, Stortingsproposisjon nr 42. Oslo: 2003 [www.odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/aktuelt/taler/ MoD., 2003-04, p. 29. statsraad-a/032171-090162/dok-bu.html].

As long as Norway is not an EU- Norway was invited to participate in a member, its relations with the EU sup- Nordic EU Battlegroup where some plements its relationship with NATO 150 personnel would be listed every and the United States. In the debate third year for six months at a time and about whether Norway should join the take part in joint training and exercises Nordic EU Battlegroup in 2004, the as part of the “preparedness” claim. The Ministry of Defence assured that: Socialist Left Party and the Centre “there is no competition but reciprocal Party, were against Norway’s participa- complimentary”.9 This reflects the tion in the Nordic EU Battlegroup, dominant Norwegian view that with claiming that Norway should contribute regard to foreign and security policy to upholding NATO’s relevance rather Norway cannot choose between Europe than supporting competing projects and the US. This policy goes back to (Haga 2004). Furthermore, they argued the 1980s and was also stressed by the that it was not in Norway’s interest to foreign minister in the aftermath of the be part of the controversial EU army harsh debate on the war in Iraq: and the EU Battlegroups. The term “EU army”, often used by anti-EU parties, is Our security political approach probably intended as a warning that the must [thus] be anchored through building up of an EU military capability our cooperation in both Europe and is in direct competition to and, hence, a across the Atlantic. We say, as challenge to NATO (even the most pro- Winnie the Pooh: ‘Yes, please – EU politicians do not like the idea that both, please.’ Not because we are NATO would be replaced). In addition demanding or naïve, but because this is the best protection we can to the usual EU scepticism, not to say muster against the security threats resistance, the Nordic EU Battlegroup of our time.10 was seen as an additional framework for assigning Norwegian forces abroad. Because the country is not a member of These personnel could otherwise have the EU, Norwegian governments need been used in UN operations or in the to work hard to keep security and de- national defence of Norway, as argued 12 fence issues within NATO and – where by the Centre Party. National defence this is not possible – to obtain the best in this context referred specifically to possible access to the ESDP. This is for Norway’s allegedly international re- all practical purposes likely to continue sponsibility for ensuring sustainable to be Norwegian policy, independent of resource management in the High which government is in power.11 North but also for asserting national sovereignty and interests. Despite the critique, a majority in Parliament 9 Bengt T. Eidem, ”Norsk deltakelse i EUs innsatsstyrker”, Aftenposten, 27. november agreed that Norway should join the 2004. Nordic Battlegroup, and the country 10 Petersen, Sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid i was on call in spring 2008. Europa eller over Atlanterhavet? Ja takk, begge deler, p. 7. (My translation from Nor- wegian). 11 Nina Græger, “Norway between Europe and the US”. In New Security Issues in Northern 12 Marit Arnstad, ”Ordinær spørretime”, 25 Europe: The Nordic and Baltic States and the november 2004 (jfr. Spørsmål nr. 242 til ESDP, Clive Archer (ed), London: Routledge, forsvarsministeren fra Marit Arnstad (Sp), 2007, pp. 94-114. Dokument nr. 15, Stortingstidende (2004-05).

Geopolitics and new great powers – stitutional order based on the rule of implications for Norway? law and binding institutions, small states may appeal to international As a small state, Norway’s security has norms, rules and practices should they been heavily influenced by those pow- become subject to political and/or mili- ers or power constellations which at tary pressure from other states. Interna- any given time have had interests in tional organisations play an important Northern Europe, traditionally Russia, role in such a system by restricting the USA and leading European states. states’ legitimate use of power and, This is also, as noted above, the main hence, room of maneuver.14 The politi- reason why Norway has one foot in cal costs paid by an aggressor through Europe and one foot in the US when it shaming and other reputational mecha- comes to security. nisms may at least encourage norm compliance.15 This is not always the While this is likely to continue, global case, however. political developments may have an impact on these constellations of inter- The Georgian-Russian conflict in Au- est, as well as on Norway’s relationship gust 2008 displayed that Russia is ca- with them. Such themes, which have pable and willing to use military force emerged in the international political to pursue its political goals, despite in- and academic debate over the past few ternational protests and in disrespect of years, are also reflected in the Norwe- international norms. The conflict may gian debate. illustrate the geopolitical notion that great powers live by different rules than The end of the Cold War shifted the other states, and that great powers have power balance from bi-polarity to uni- “spheres of influence”. Georgia was polarity, with the United States as the part of the Soviet Union for seventy dominant power. Over the last three years, and Georgia has a Russian years or so, we have seen the rise of a (speaking) minority and is located in multi-polar or non-polar system where what Russia sees as its zone of protec- regional powers like Russia, China and tion or “backyard”. Russia is a key state India have become aspiring global both for NATO and for Norwegian se- powers. Shifting power relations could, curity and defence policy. eventually, also be reflected in a future re-negotiation of the international order. ties of order among states are analysed in Ad hoc diplomatic arrangements be- Ikenberry, G. J. (2001) After Victory. Institu- tween great powers, informal institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding th of Order after Major Wars. Princeton: Prince- tions like the 19 century Concert of ton University Press. Europe, a hegemonic order or the idea 14 Anders Wivel, “The Security Challenges of of geopolitics generally reduce the po- Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity litical space for small states.13 In a con- and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor”, Journal of Common Market Studies 43 (2005), pp. 393-412. 13 For an analysis of the theory and history of 15 Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Double Puzzle the Concert of Europe, see Holbraad, C. (1970) of Eu Enlargement. Liberal Norms, Rhetorical The Concert of Europe. A Study of British and Action, and the Decision to Expand to the German International Theory 1815-1914. East”, ARENA Working Paper. Oslo: London: Longman Group Ltd. Different varie- ARENA/University of Oslo 1999.

NATO-Russia relations in change Norway-Russian relations in a tight spot? NATO has been important for the integration of Russia into Western security How are these changes in the global cooperation structures, and the pros- power-relations likely to affect the dy- pects for close partnership were quite namics and precondition for action in good in the 1990s.16 The relationship the High North, which is becoming in- between the West and Russia has dete- creasingly important in a Norwegian riorated for some time due to NATO security context? The recent years’ de- enlargement to the east, the 1999 Kos- terioration of Western-Russian relations ovo War, the Western acceptance of the potentially has serious and negative independent status of Kosovo, the de- security implications for Norway. So ployment of U.S. missile defence in- far, the importance of pursuing a coop- stallations in Poland and the Czech Re- erative approach towards Russia has public and, most notably, the Georgian- been emphasised by the Norwegian Russian conflict in 2008. In the wake of defence minister: ”Our policy towards the Russian invasion of Georgia coop- Russia will still be marked by pragma- eration between NATO and Russia, tism, interests and cooperation”.17 In including bilateral defence cooperation, the same vein the foreign ministry has was mutually frozen (but meetings in stressed that Norwegian policy in the the Preparatory Committee were held). High North is marked by cooperation, The continued Russian withdrawal firmness, predictability, clarity and en- from the CFE Treaty, which e.g. regu- gagement, and should be recognisable lates the military presence on the to Russia, to avoid misunderstand- ground in the North and ensures mutual ings.18 inspections, also reduced the number of arenas for Russian-Western security Norwegian-Russian bilateral coopera- cooperation and dialogue. tion in the region goes back to the 1970s.19 The Arctic Military Environ- When the dialogue between NATO and mental Cooperation from 1996 repre- Russia is cut this also affects NATO’s sents the most important international role as an arena for political consulta- cooperation network in the region. tions. In a long term perspective, this could reduce the prospects for and at- traction of Russian-Western security 17 Anne Grethe Strøm-Eriksen, Trusler og and military cooperation. Hence, the utfordringer, sikkerhet og forsvar. Speech in main problem for NATO in its relation- Oslo Militære Samfund, 7th January, 2008. 18 ship with Russia seems to be that Rus- Øyvind Nordsletten, Speech in Oslo sia does not conceive of NATO as an Militære Samfund, 26th March 2007; Jonas Gahr Støre, Et hav av muligheter - en arena for political consultation and dis- ansvarlig politikk for Nordområdene. Speech cussions but as a political player, a at the University of Tromsø, 10th November Western player or actor. 2005. 19 It includes the management of marine re- sources since the 1970s, nuclear safety cooperation with Russia since 1995, and Norway’s nuclear safety action plan, which was revised 16 Yuriy Borko, Possible Scenarios for Geopo- in early 2008. For documents, see litical Shifts in Russian-European Relations. [www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Sik Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, kerhetspol/atomhandlingsplan0802.pdf]. Territory and Identity. London: Sage, 1997. Accessed on February 18, 2008.

TheT fact that Russia has interests and would increase NATO’s relevance and claims in a region marked by not only a legitimacy in the public opinion. Nor- lack of international rules and regula- way’s position was immediately sup- tions but also marked by territorial ported by countries who also were claims and border disputes between sceptical towards the sidelining of Arti- countries represents a major challenge cle 5 operations and ”out of area” op- to Norway. The High North now ap- erations back in 1999 and who are fac- pears as a showground for Russia’s re- ing potentially similar challenges lations with the West. With reference to around the Black Sea and the Mediter- the increased Russian military exercises ranean like Greece and Turkey (and and tests in the region, the defence min- Poland).22 The Norwegian position is in ister has noted: “…we see that the High line with those who argue that NATO North will still be of great strategic im- should “come home to Europe” and portance. This underlines NATO’s con- reclaim its role as a Euro-Atlantic secu- tinued relevance for the stability in the rity organisation, rather than an organi- North.”20 While the intensified military sation for global security.23 The nega- activity hardly is directed towards its tive developments in Afghanistan may small neighbour, a more self-confident make such a view more attractive to and ambitious Russia is something that NATO-countries. Norway is following closely.21 Strategic partners in the High North This situation constitutes the backdrop – constraints and possibilities for the Norwegian position in the early negotiations about NATO’s new strate- Norway’s security challenges in the gic concept, to be adopted in 2010 (or High North have been a driving force in 2011 at the latest). A key concern Norwegian debates about the value of voiced by Norway is about NATO’s NATO-membership and about NATO’s profile on Alliance territory and on its future role. What role could NATO periphery to restore the balance be- play in this increasingly complex tween missions away (e.g. the ISAF- northern picture? operation) and at home. According to a Norwegian position paper (non-paper), Arguably, the extent to which the rules NATO should increase its ”situational of the game in the High North are de- awareness” and “geographical knowl- fined by norms, regimes and laws or, edge” about the regions in NATO’s conversely, by “hard power” will also periphery on a daily basis. To Norway define which actors (states, organisa- this means the High North, where Nor- tions) that are seen as legitimate, and way shares a border with but has con- which capabilities that are most effi- flicting interests with Russia. However, cient. The importance for Norwegian Norwegian officials argue that a security of an international order based stronger focus on NATO territory also on law, and the indivisibility of national and European security has been empha- sized by the government as well as by 20 Anne Grethe Strøm-Eriksen, Aktuell norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk - fra Kabul til Nordområdene, Speech at the convention of 22 Sources in NATO, interviews 27 and 28 Folk og Forsvar (landsmøte) in Oslo, 22nd October 2008. February, 2007. 23 See e.g. Pierre Pascallon, “What Will Nato's 21 Espen Barth Eide, Interview, Jane's Defence Future Be?”, Europe Diplomacy and Defence Weekly. 27th February, 2008. 173, 4 November 2008.

7 academics.24 In a multi-polar world, North as a priority in Norwegian for- Norway should seek to be embedded in eign and security policy in 2005, Nor- a substantive multilateral Western secu- wegian authorities emphasised the im- rity web and to blend all of its bilateral portance of environmentally sustainable relationships into the multilateral resource management (of fish and in strategies.25 In that sense, as noted by the exploitation of energy) and the Ståle Ulriksen, “[T]he international world’s need for energy security and community is Norway’s first line of energy diversification to reduce the de- defence, literally speaking”.26 pendency on oil and gas from more troubled regions like the Middle East In the case of a bilateral dispute be- and a more self-conscious Russia.29 In tween Russia and Norway, however, NATO, energy security was only re- the relevance of established security cently added to its mandate at the Riga structures and bilateral partnerships is summit in 2007. As part of the High not obvious. A major challenge since North Strategy (2005), Norway initi- the end of the Cold War, when the High ated bilateral dialogues with countries North was NATO’s important Northern like Germany, Great Britain, France, flank, has been to attract international Canada, the United States, as well as attention to the region. The immediate with the EU. However, there is no sys- post-Cold War enthusiasm and visions tematic documentation of the results of in Northern Europe for cross-border these dialogues. Indeed, the assumed cooperation and integration (e.g. the interest from international actors such Euro-Arctic Barents Region initiative in as the EU and US in the High North in 1992) were replaced by disappointment an energy context appears as somewhat and detachment from the mid-1990s.27 exaggerated.30 Which potential security implications could this apparent lack of For most other states than Russia the (non-commercial) stakeholders in the region has remained either marginal or region entail? peripheral.28 When revitalizing the High

24 Ministry of Defence (2003-04) ”Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005- 2008”, p. 20. 25 Alyson J.K. Bailes, “Security and the Nor- wegian interests in a globalized world”, Globale Norge - hva nå? Friske blikk på norsk utenrikspolitikk. Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet, 2007; Christoph Bertram, “Security Threats Facing Norway - How Can These Be Ap- proached?”. In Globale Norge - hva nå? Friske blikk på norsk utenrikspolitikk. Oslo: Utenriks- Oslo: Den Norske Atlanterhavskomité, 2005, departementet - Refleksprosjektet, 2007. p. 5. 26 Ståle Ulriksen, ”Norske Sikkerhetspolitiske 29 Støre, Et hav av muligheter; Jonas Gahr Utfordringer”. In Globale Norge - hva nå? Støre, Nordområdene - geopolitiske og Friske blikk på norsk utenrikspolitikk. Oslo: sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer. Opening Utenriksdepartementet - Refleksprosjektet, speech at a conference in Paris, 24th 2007. November, 2005. 27 Geir Hønneland, Barentsbrytninger. Norsk 30 Simen Ramberg, Nordområdene: En Nordområdepolitikk Etter Den Kalde Krigen. Blindsone i Amerikansk og Europeisk Oslo: Høyskoleforlaget, 2005. energipolitikk. Master thesis, University of 28 Jakub M. Godzimirski, ”The New Geopoli- Trondheim (NTNU), Department of Sociology tics of the North?”, Security Policy Library 2. and Political Science, 2007.

The role of NATO the four NATO-countries, which stand outside [the EU] . . . fall While NATO still is the bedrock of completely on the sideline in the ef- Norway’s security, NATO is only mar- forts to put their mark on this transatlantic cooperation. It means a fur- ginally interested in the High North in a 33 security context in so far as a major ther marginalization of Norway. violent conflict in the region invoking One year later, the new German chan- NATO’s Article 5 is unlikely for the 31 cellor, Angela Merkel, stressed the foreseeable future. And formally, need to strengthen NATO as a political NATO has no role in conflicts or inci- forum, also for transatlantic relations. dents over territorial claims in disputed This shift probably made the Norwe- areas where sovereignty is not perma- gian government breathe a sigh of re- nently established according to interna- lief. The lessons from Iraq and Af- tional law. NATO involvement, should ghanistan with regard to the legitimacy a situation involving a NATO ally oc- gained through allied cooperation are cur in the High North, is therefore ques- also likely to strengthen US commit- tionable. ment to NATO.34 If seen as the em-

bodiment of the Western security Secondly, while NATO’s role as a fo- community, however, NATO undoubt- rum for transatlantic consultations edly has been dealt a blow over the past would be vital to Norway in the case of six to seven years. This may change such an incident, NATO is being chal- with the new US administration under lenged in this capacity. German chan- president elect Barack Obama, whose cellor Gerhard Schröder stated in Feb- speeches have emphasised dialogue, ruary 2005 that NATO was no longer diplomacy and cooperation with Euro- the primary arena for transatlantic con- pean allies and partners. This is likely sultations and coordination and called 32 to affect NATO in a positive way. for reform of Europe–US relations. However, tighter bilateral relations be- The statement probably reflected the tween the EU and the United States United States’ neglect of NATO in the could also result from a new US ad- planning and initiation of “Operation ministration, with more focus on the Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan in EU–US Summits, for example. As a 2001 and especially the unilateral inter- non-EU member, Norwegian influence vention in Iraq and the subsequent split on security matters of importance to between the US and European allies. Norway would be significantly reduced Schröder’s statement triggered negative should such a scenario materialise. reactions in Norway, not least from the

Norwegian foreign minister: The EU nevertheless has become a cen-

The moment we get an axis be- tral arena for European political debates and decisions about the broader re- tween Washington and Brussels 35 within security policy, it means that gional and global security issues. Fur- thermore, the EU has a multifaceted 31 This was remarked by Norway’s ambassador to NATO, Mr. Kim Traavik, at the opening 33 Quoted in Ibid. session of the Norwegian Atlantic Commit- 34 Bertram, “Security Threats Facing Norway - tee’s Leangkollen conference on 4. February How Can These Be Approached?” 2008. 35 Helene Sjursen, “What Kind of Power?”, 32 ”Ny Norsk EU-runde etter Nato-utspill”, Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2006), Aftenposten, 14 februar 2005. pp. 69-81.

9 tool box to deal with them. In relation Norwegian EU-membership is not an to Russia, for instance, the EU has ini- issue in the foreseeable future but a tiated an EU-Russia strategy, and the closer partnership with the EU’s com- dialogue has been furthered also after mon foreign and security policy seems the war in Georgia. If the EU’s poten- possible. The EU strategy for the Arctic tial in these regards were exploited, (2008) may also increase the European then NATO’s role increasingly would awareness of Arctic-related issues, in- be as a military tool at the disposal of cluding the emerging security chal- its members but also of the UN and the lenges in the region. The EU has a EU. The likelihood of such a scenario greater potential for managing Russia also depends on the EU’s ability to fol- and for de-securitising issues in the low up on its ambitions with action, of High North than NATO, because of its course. NATO is militarily superior to political nature and civilian tools. This the EU, which might be one of the rea- would be in Norway’s interest. The sons why France is returning to the value of both NATO and the EU military cooperation in NATO, from largely depends, however, on the path which the country has opted out for of Russian foreign policy and on more than forty years.36 whether the West is willing to accom- modate Russia. Because Russia gener- The role of the EU – potential new ally views international relations as a partner? zero-sum game, it will probably have difficulties in accepting that other What could Norway expect from the states, and especially the United States, EU in the High North then? The EU become central players in the High represents the world’s most heavily North. institutionalised security community.37 Norway is integrated into the EU struc- Special relationships: The role of the tures and is participating in several pol- United States icy areas, including in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Norway’s relationship with Russia in and the Nordic EU Battlegroup in 2004, the High North also mirrors Norway’s which was on standby in spring 2008 relationship with its closest ally, the for the first time. Norwegian participa- United States. In a multi-polar world, tion in the ESDP is not coupled to terri- having good relations with a major torial defence, but to its role as a con- player like the US is important for a tributor to international operations, and small state. Besides, the US still is the to the idea that the provision of forces security provider of last resort for Nor- could produce influence, based on what way. At the same time, bilateral priority I have earlier called a “troops-for- relations to the US could affect Norwe- influence” strategy.38 gian security concerns towards Russia in a negative way, because of difficult 36 President Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military structure in NATO in 1966, due to what he considered to be US dominance in the alliance. egy”. In The ESDP and the Nordic Countries: 37 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Four Variations on a Theme, Nina Græger, Union as a Global Actor. London: Routledge, Henrik Larsen and Hanna Ojanen (edd). Hel- 2006. sinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs 38 Nina Græger, “Norway and the EU Security and Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik, Dimension: A ‘Troops-for-Influence’ Strat- 2002. pp. 33-89.

US-Russian relations.39 At the extraor- attention to and support for Norway’s dinary meeting of NATO’s foreign security challenges in the High North, ministers on 19th August 2008 during either bilaterally or within a NATO the Georgian-Russian conflict, Secre- framework. Sea and air surveillance in tary of State Condoleezza Rice warned the High North are among the areas of that by flexing its military muscle in bilateral cooperation suggested by the Georgia as well as elsewhere, and by Norwegian and Swedish chiefs of de- resuming the Cold War-era strategic fence.42 Former foreign minister of bomber patrols off the coast of Alaska, Norway Thorvald Stoltenberg led a Russia was playing “a very dangerous group that was mandated to identify game and perhaps one the Russians concrete ways in which Nordic foreign want to reconsider”.40 According to the policy and security cooperation could Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang, be enhanced in a ten year perspective.43 Rice also made a direct reference to the Whether his report to the Nordic for- Russian Bear planes patrolling off eign ministers will lead to concrete Norway’s coast as a demonstration of policies, however, remains to be seen. military force against a small neighbour country that was not inspiring confi- Nordic defence cooperation has taken dence.41 Though Norwegian decision- place in UN and NATO peace opera- makers not necessarily shared this in- tions since the 1990s, and later within terpretation, it illustrates how Norway the EU (e.g. the Nordic EU Battle- is being drawn into international power group). To Norway, Nordic cooperation politics, because of its geographical also represents a potentially important location. It demonstrates the return of backdoor to the EU.44 The adoption of geopolitics. It also shows that it is not the EU’s Northern Dimension in 1997 up to Norway alone to decide when and under the Finnish EU presidency shows how Russia is framed as a potential ag- that even small Nordic states may suc- gressor, a strategic partner, or a security ceed in putting their issues on the EU partner. Again, the election of Barack agenda.45 The new regionalization Obama as president of the United States trend in the EU may increase the incen- may probably have a positive impact, tives for Nordic regional security coop- due to his focus on dialogue and cooperation and, in the longer run, eration (which should not be confused strengthen “Norden” as an actor in the with softness, though). High North. However, regionalization of security, at the cost of security coop-

Enhanced focus on Nordic security 42 Håkan Syrén, and Sverre Diesen, ”Nytt and defence cooperation försvarssamarbete mellan Sverige och Norge”, Dagens Nyheter, 31. august 2007. 43 Thorvald Stoltenberg, Nordic Cooperation The renewed focus on Nordic defence on Foreign and Security Policy. Oslo: Report cooperation could increase the Nordic to the Nordic foreign ministers, 2009. 44 Græger, “Norway between Europe and the 39 Bertram, “Security Threats Facing Norway - US. How Can These Be Approached?” 45 For an early analysis, see Lassi Heininen, 40 ”NATO won’t let Russia succeed in Geor- “Finding a Concrete Form for the Northern gia”, Associated Press. Accessed on April 2, Dimension Initiative”. In The Northern Dimen- 2009. sion: Fuel for the EU?, Hanna Ojanen (ed). 41 [www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/artikkel.php? Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International artid=534407]. Accessed on September 12, Affairs & Bonn: Institut für Europäische 2008. Author’s translation from Norwegian. Politik, 2001. pp. 20-53.

11 eration in NATO (and the EU) is not on presence in the region.47 This demand the Nordic agenda. The Nordic coun- was intensified by the Russian invasion tries want to maintain a strong Ameri- of Georgia in August 2008. Another can interest and presence in Europe and state with stakes in the region, Canada in the High North. already has adopted a plan for a stronger military presence in its north- Increased attention to the High North ern areas. from existing security institutions and partners, as well as the creation of new The security-related challenges in the strategic partnerships could reduce High North already are shaping the Norway’s prospects for being “left proposals for Norway’s future defence alone” with Russia. However, such at- policy.48 Norway should be able to es- tention is not necessarily favourable tablish a military threshold that in- with regard to Norwegian foreign pol- creases the costs of using military icy interests, such as territorial claims. power and reduces the room to ma- Norway’s exercise of jurisdiction be- noeuvre for a potential aggressor.49 yond the territorial waters of the Sval- Also during the Cold War was Norway bard archipelago also is challenged by expected to handle smaller incidents on those EU-members who have individ- its own. While the invasion scenario ual national interests and engagements created the Army as lead service, the in the High North. And it was an awak- new security challenges in the High ening to the Norwegian government North are strengthening the role of the when Great Britain invited Russia, the Navy and the Air Force. The new frig- US and several EU-members to a meet- ates have a stronger capacity than the ing about Svalbard without involving old, increasing Norway’s military ca- Norway.46 The balancing of foreign pabilities in the region. In the purchase policy and security interests in the re- of new fighter planes, their capacity to gion is likely to be a continuous chal- conduct surveillance, patrols and to ex- lenge to Norwegian authorities. ercise sovereignty, which is particularly relevant in the High North, is given The prospects for conflict – the role considerable weight.50 The ability to of the armed forces

47 Jacob Børresen,”En Forsvarsstrategi som Despite the security cover Norway en- ikke passer for Norge”, Aftenposten, 10 februar joys through NATO and its “special 2005; Finn Martin Vallersnes, Interpellasjon relationship” with the US, and despite om Nordområdestrategien. Oslo: Stortinget, the importance of international norms, a 2007. 48 limited military conflict in areas not Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007 subject to international law, or disputed Sluttrapport. Oslo, 2007; Et Styrket Forsvar. Rapport fra Forsvarspolitisk utvalg. Oslo: areas, is possible. What role is there for Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU) 2007. the armed forces? While the Norwegian 49 Sverre Diesen, Status og utfordringer i armed forces were not intended to pro- Forsvaret. Speech in Oslo Militære Samfund, vide the flesh on the bones of the High 26th November, 2007. 50 North Strategy, increased Russian mili- Industrial cooperation agreements involved in the purchase, as well as the planes’ fighter tary activity has fuelled the public de- capabilities (air combat) also are important. mand for a stronger Norwegian military For a discussion of the strategic aspects, see Jakub Børresen, “Noen Betraktninger Om 46 Morten Fyhn, ”Støre gikk i taket”, Kjøp Av Nye Kampfly Til Luftforsvaret”. Aftenposten, 13 april 2007. Norsk Militært Tidsskrift. 2006.

12 protect Norwegian interests in its near the past ten to fifteen years events and abroad is “the rationale for our future developments in both the EU and the fighter plane capacity”, whereas the US have called transatlantic relations fighter plane’s capacity “to contribute into question. internationally comes as a bonus effect of our national efforts”, the defence The close relationship with the US is minister has assured.51 likely to be continued and, hopefully, further strengthened under president The indivisibility of security is gener- Obama. Such cooperation is not likely ally accepted and has changed the to be based on the idea of a transatlantic framework conditions for Norwegian ‘community of destiny’ but on the need defence policy.52 The threat of invasion for cooperation with relevant allies. In lies in the past but Russian political and the foreign policy of the Bush Admini- military pressure against Norway to stration NATO seemed to play a less enforce a change of its policy positions important role, and it seemed as if the or give in to Russian demands is a pos- EU might have a greater role to play as sible scenario.53 A scenario where a transatlantic forum in a long term per- Norway might have to deter Russia spective. The wider implications of militarily could re-open the debate these developments for Norway’s secu- about Norway’s contributions to inter- rity policy are only slowly trickling national operations and military “over- down into the political discourse. At stretch”. At least, the need to strike a least there have been few principal pub- new balance in the allocation of re- lic debates about the impact of these sources to international operations and events for Norway’s traditionally At- national military presence has been lantic security policy orientation. voiced in several political and military circles. Recent Russian foreign policy For Norway, who shares the European and regular military activity are likely values and visions about how to deal to strengthen these voices. with the security threats of the 21st century, standing outside of the EU may Concluding remarks become even more challenging than before. Norway’s new security chal- Norwegian security and defence policy lenges in The High North do not easily has been anchored in NATO since attract the interest of neither old nor 1949. The continued relevance of traditional partners in security. In prin- NATO and a close relationship with the ciple, the NATO–Russia Council could USA are still seen as vital for the terri- be a forum for dialogue in the case of a torial defence of Norway, and territorial dispute or incident between Norway defence still means a lot in the Norwe- and Russia in the High North. How- gian security discourse. However, over ever, with the Russian-Georgian conflict last August, NATO-Russia coop- 51 Strøm-Eriksen, Speech at the convention of eration is in a stalemate (though for- Folk og Forsvars (landsmøte). mally re-opened). These concerns are 52 For an analysis of the post-1990 develop- playing into Norway’s positions in ments in Norwegian defence discourse and practice, see Nina Græger, Norsk forsvars- NATO’s work on a new strategic con- diskurs 1990-2005: Internasjonaliseringen av cept, which will formally commence at Forsvaret, Dr.polit dissertation, University of the NATO summit in Strasbourg on 3-4 Oslo, Department of Political Science, 2007. April 2009. 53 Diesen, Status og utfordringer i Forsvaret.

Epilogue tegic concept, Norway’s “Near abroad initiative” has gained support also from Europeans in NATO already have ex- key NATO-countries like Great Britain, perienced that the new Obama admini- Germany, Denmark and even the stration is in place in Washington. Un- United States. der the leadership of President Barack Obama and secretary of state Hillary R. Clinton, the US has set a new tone in the US relationship with Europe. Not necessarily because they are more fond of Europe than the administration they replaced but rather because more atten- tiveness towards the US allies and partners would benefit American national interests. This echoes the advice from Suzanne Nossel to the Bush government back in 2004, where she argues that a foreign policy that is “focusing on the smart use of power to promote U.S. interests through a stable grid of allies, institutions, and norms” will “re- assure an uneasy American public, united a fractious government bureauc- racy, and rally the world behind U.S. goals”.54 In addition, president Obama shares more of the European foreign policy goals pursued by NATO but to some extent also the EU. For NATO, as well as for Norway, this is good news.

Another piece of good news for Nor- way in the context of security policy is that NATO seems to recognise the security challenges the country is facing in the High North. At least this was the message from participants – officials and analysts – at a security conference held in Iceland in early 2009, where Norway presented its concerns to NATO officials, including the secretary general. The success was followed up by an interview with the Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre pub- lished by NATO Review. Furthermore, in the debate on the revision of the stra-

54 Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.

Of the author

Dr. Nina Græger is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Department of In- ternational Politics at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

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Series 4: Working Papers (ISSN: 1236-4983)

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