DOCSLIB.ORG

The Gulf Military Balance: Volumethe Gulf Military III the Gulf Military

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Gulf Military Balance: Volumethe Gulf Military III the Gulf Military The Gulf Military Balance: Volume III The Gulf Military Balance: Volume The Gulf Military CORDESMAN, SHELALA, AND MOHAMED CORDESMAN, Balance 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW| Washington DC 20036 Volume III: The Gulf and the t. (202) 887-0200 | f. (202) 775-3199 | www.csis.org Arabian Peninsula ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706 t. (800) 462-6420 | f. (301) 429-5749 | www.rowman.com AUTHORS Cover photo: http://www.flickr.com/photos/yeowatzup/4324097467/. Anthony H. Cordesman ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Robert M. Shelala ISBN 978-1-4422-2795-8 Omar Mohamed Ë|xHSLEOCy227958z v*:+:!:+:! A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy JANUARY 2014 Blank The Gulf Military Balance Volume III: The Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula Authors Anthony H. Cordesman Robert M. Shelala Omar Mohamed A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy January 2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in April 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-4422-2795-8 (pb); 978-1-4422-2796-5 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com Table of Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................................................ viii Executive Summary ....................................................................................... ix Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 The US and the Arab Gulf States: Challenges and Interests .......................... 4 Enhanced US Partnership with the Southern Gulf States ....................................................... 4 The Impact of Terrorism and Other Threats ........................................................................... 5 Reacting to Evolving Threats .................................................................................................. 6 The Importance of Terrorism as a Threat to the Gulf ........................................................................................ 8 The Impact of Iran and Syria as Sponsors of State Terrorism and Pressures on Iraq ........................................ 9 Emphasizing the Middle East and Rebalancing the US Force Towards Asia ...................... 33 Continuing the Emphasis on the Gulf In Spite of Defense Budget Cuts ......................................................... 33 The US Central Command View ........................................................................................... 34 Cooperation by Country ........................................................................................................ 37 Using Arms Transfers to Build Partnerships ........................................................................ 39 Dealing With the Strengths and Weaknesses of Gulf Partners ............................................. 45 Southern Gulf Alignments With the US .......................................................................................................... 46 The Impact of the Divisions Between the Arab Gulf States ............................................................................ 49 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Moves Towards Federation and Unity ............. 51 Movements Towards Enhanced Cooperation .................................................................................................. 51 GCC Relations with the US ............................................................................................................................ 52 GCC Relations with Iran ................................................................................................................................. 53 Movements Towards Greater Unity and “Federation” .................................................................................... 54 Iranian Interests in the Gulf .......................................................................... 56 Internal Dynamics Affecting US and Iranian Competition .......................... 57 Sectarian, Ethnic, Tribal, and Regional Divisions ................................................................ 64 Resource Trends .................................................................................................................... 67 Economic Trends ................................................................................................................... 72 The Need for Country-by-Country Case Studies ................................................................... 76 Saudi Arabia .................................................................................................. 77 A Long and Growing Strategic Partnership.......................................................................... 78 Saudi-Iranian Competition .................................................................................................... 82 The History of Saudi and Iranian Competition ..................................................................... 83 Tensions Over the Iranian Nuclear Program ................................................................................................... 83 Tensions Over Saudi Shia ............................................................................................................................... 84 Tensions Over Energy Resources ................................................................................................................... 85 Tensions Over the Hajj ................................................................................................................................... 86 Tensions Over Terrorism and Covert Operations............................................................................................ 86 Tensions Over Bahrain.................................................................................................................................... 87 Tensions Over Iraq .......................................................................................................................................... 88 Tensions Over Yemen and Saudi Perceptions of a Wider Threat from Instability in Yemen ......................... 91 Tensions Over the Arab-Israeli Peace Process ................................................................................................ 94 Saudi Arabia’s Security Relations with the US ..................................................................... 95 Military Cooperation ....................................................................................................................................... 95 Problems in Force Development ..................................................................................................................... 99 Missile Defense ............................................................................................................................................. 100 Gulf Unity ............................................................................................................................ 100 Cooperation in Counterterrorism .................................................................................................................. 101 Policy Implications for the US ............................................................................................ 107 Kuwait ......................................................................................................... 113 Kuwait’s Relations with Iran ............................................................................................... 115 iv | Anthony H. Cordesman, Robert M. Shelala, and Omar Mohamed Kuwait’s Relations with the US ........................................................................................... 117 Military Cooperation ..................................................................................................................................... 118 Problems in Force Development ..................................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Yemen Crisis Student Officer: Albert
    Forum: Joint Crisis Committee Issue: Yemen Crisis Student Officer: Albert Pan, Kay Zin, Nandar Khine Tun Introduction The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is a continuous crisis in which at least 8.4 million people on the brink of starvation, 22.2 million people require humanitarian assistance, and approximately 400,000 children under the age of five are in life-threatening situations due to acute malnutrition, according to the United Nations. The Yemen crisis began with an international coalition by Saudi Arabia that was interrupted. This was first ignited when the Yemenis protested against the then president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who led the country to widespread poverty and unemployment. These rebellions were led by a politically Shia rebellion group called the Houthis. In 2012, the then Vice - President of Yemen, Hadi, became the new President after Ali Abdullah Saleh got overthrown. The intent of the political transition was to bring stability. However, President Hadi had difficulties addressing the issues of food insecurity, corruption, and militant attacks. Political unrest caused groups such as the Al Qaeda and Daesh to attempt to take over the country. At the same time, the Houthis were attempting to do the same, but was lacking military power. They somehow formed an alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh, who they had kicked out of office. Saudi Arabia saw this alliance as a threat, because it meant that Iran was backing the Houthis. This could raise the risk of Iranian influence affecting Saudi Arabia. This caused Saudi Arabia to create a wall and bombed Yemen in 2015 to drive the Houthis out.
    [Show full text]
  • Use of Negative Peace (Molly King) (1).Key
    Timeline of Conflict in Yemen The Use of Negative Peace Abstract 2000: President Ali Abdullah Saleh seeks to disarm Rebellion group, Houthis led by Hussein Badreddin al- Molly King My intended message of this project Houthi. is to give insight into ways the 2004: Arrests of Houthis members begin, fighting leads Faculty Advisor: Matt Tibbles to Al-Houthi’s death theories of change can be 2005: Fighting continues between Houthis and implemented into regions and people government forces resulting in many fatalities. An agreement is reached at the surrender of top military groups that are in conflict. Exploring commander of Houthis. conflict in Yemen can provide insight 2006: Conflict continues, however Saleh releases 600 to how conflicts have the potential to Houthi fighters and eventually wins the 2006 election. Early 2007: Ceasefire agreement between Saleh and be resolved peacefully. In Al-Houthi. researching alternative peace 2008: Fighting begins again between rebels and government powers. strategies, I will provide ways 2009-2010: Operation Scorched Earth is initiated by negative peace can be transformed Yemeni military to end the Houthi rebellion in Saada. Saleh finally agrees to a ceasefire with the Houthi into a useful took to change the rebels. However, Yemeni military continues to execute direction of on going conflict. Operation Blow to the Head against rebels and al- Qaeda. 2011 Arab Spring: Protests call for the resignation of Saleh. Saleh’s military and supports fight back against rebels which leads to the death of 200-2000 people. Peaceful Solutions 2011: Saleh is seriously injured in a bombing, he turns over his power to Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi.
    [Show full text]
  • The Thistle and the Drone
    AKBAR AHMED HOW AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR BECAME A GLOBAL WAR ON TRIBAL ISLAM n the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States declared war on terrorism. More than ten years later, the results are decidedly mixed. Here world-renowned author, diplomat, and scholar Akbar Ahmed reveals an important yet largely ignored result of this war: in many nations it has exacerbated the already broken relationship between central I governments and the largely rural Muslim tribal societies on the peripheries of both Muslim and non-Muslim nations. The center and the periphery are engaged in a mutually destructive civil war across the globe, a conflict that has been intensified by the war on terror. Conflicts between governments and tribal societies predate the war on terror in many regions, from South Asia to the Middle East to North Africa, pitting those in the centers of power against those who live in the outlying provinces. Akbar Ahmed’s unique study demonstrates that this conflict between the center and the periphery has entered a new and dangerous stage with U.S. involvement after 9/11 and the deployment of drones, in the hunt for al Qaeda, threatening the very existence of many tribal societies. American firepower and its vast anti-terror network have turned the war on terror into a global war on tribal Islam. And too often the victims are innocent children at school, women in their homes, workers simply trying to earn a living, and worshipers in their mosques. Bat- tered by military attacks or drone strikes one day and suicide bombers the next, the tribes bemoan, “Every day is like 9/11 for us.” In The Thistle and the Drone, the third vol- ume in Ahmed’s groundbreaking trilogy examin- ing relations between America and the Muslim world, the author draws on forty case studies representing the global span of Islam to demon- strate how the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian 'Cold War'
    Research Paper Peter Salisbury Middle East and North Africa Programme | February 2015 Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’ Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’ Summary • The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional influence is exacerbating a number of existing disputes in the region, where the two powers are backing different sides – including Yemen. • This paper argues that primary drivers of tension and conflict in Yemen are local, but the perceived, and often exaggerated, roles of external players continue to affect the calculations of the Yemeni players and of different regional actors. • The Houthis, founded as a revivalist movement for the Zaydi form of Shia Islam that is largely unique to northern Yemen, have transformed themselves over the past decade into a formidable militia, and their military takeover in January 2015 has plunged the country into uncertainty. • Interviews with people who have been granted rare access to the Houthis’ inner circle of leaders suggest that the core leadership is in many cases genuinely committed to the Islamic revolutionary principles set out by Hussein Badr al-Deen al-Houthi, which in turn borrow heavily from those of Iran. • Saudi Arabia perceives the Houthis as an Iranian proxy. However, while the group has some support from Iran, this is not the same as taking orders from it. • Domestically, the Houthis are unlikely to be able to govern the country and deal with its multiple insurgencies alone. Yemen will also require the financial backing of its much wealthier neighbours, above all Saudi Arabia, to prevent its economic collapse. • The issue for Saudi Arabia and the United States in the short and medium term will be how to achieve a working relationship with a key power broker in a strategically important country that is unlikely to feel the need to serve their interests in the way that past regimes in Sana’a have.
    [Show full text]
  • AQAP Opens Third Front
    Date Posted: 10-Feb-2011 Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor AQAP opens third front Key Points Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has opened a third front against Yemen's Huthis, militant Zaydi Shia who have embarrassed Saudi and Yemeni militaries in the past. While the group's new campaign may help rally support amongst the Sunni tribes who have suffered at the hands of the Huthis, AQAP is also trying to capitalize on more general fears of Iranian influence in the region. The anti-Huthi rhetoric could have major repercussions if it encourages another round of heavy fighting between the Zaydi rebels and government forces. Waging 'jihad' against the West and Muslim governments, AQAP has also set its sights on Yemen's Shia Huthis. Jane's assesses the reasons behind this new focus and its potential impact on regional security. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is now waging a 'jihad' against Al-Shabab al- Muminin, the Yemeni militant group popularly known as the Huthi movement. The Sunni jihadist AQAP has already claimed two suicide bombings against the Shia Zaydi militants, who have joined Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United States on its growing list of enemies. While these attacks are ostensibly diverting resources away from AQAP's war with its primary enemies, the anti-Huthi campaign is primarily aimed at embarrassing Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which have struggled to defeat the Zaydi militants. Scorched earth The Huthis effectively control much of the northern province of Sadah and have fought a series of wars with Yemeni government forces since 2004, the most recent of which began in August 2009, when the military launched Operation Scorched Earth.
    [Show full text]
  • MUNUC XXIX UN Security Council Background Guide
    UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic A: The Situation in Burundi Topic B: The Situation in Yemen LETTER FROM THE CO-EXECUTIVE Dear delegates, Welcome to the United Nations Security Council! My name is Helen, and I’m your Co-Executive. Over the course of this conference, you will be engaging with a complex current conflict with serious implications for the international community. To introduce myself, I’m a third-year undergraduate student at the University of Chicago. I’m majoring in in Public Policy with a specialization in Education Policy. Outside of class, I tutor students in local Chicago schools and work in the UChicago Admissions Office as a tour guide. I first became involved in Model UN in my Seattle-area high school, when my first conferences as a delegate gave me incredibly eye-opening experiences that have continued to influence me in my time here at UChicago. Outside of classes and MUNUC, I am also involved with our collegiate competitive Model UN team as well as ChoMUN (our collegiate MUN conference). This will be my third year in MUNUC and second year as an executive, as I chaired our Interpol committee last year. I’m very excited to be Co-Executive of the Security Council this year, and look forward to meeting you all. The Security Council is charged with maintaining international peace and security. To carry out this responsibility, it is the only UN body authorized to impose sanctions or deploy peacekeeping forces. Of its 15 delegates, 5 will have veto power, making the diplomatic process in this committee particularly complex.
    [Show full text]
  • Insecure Gulf: the End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era ISBN 9780190241575
    INSECURE GULF POWER AND POLITICS IN THE GULF Christopher Davidson and Dirk Vanderwalle (editors) After decades of sitting on the sidelines of the international system, the energy-exporting traditional monarchies of the Arab Gulf (Saudi Ara- bia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman) are gradually transforming themselves into regional, and potentially glo- bal, economic powerhouses. This series aims to examine this trend while also bringing a consistent focus to the much wider range of other social, political, and economic issues currently facing Arab Gulf socie- ties. Quality research monographs, country case studies, and compre- hensive edited volumes have been carefully selected by the series editors in an effort to assemble the most rigorous collection of work on the region. KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN Insecure Gulf The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era A A Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Copyright © Kristian Coates Ulrichsen 2015 All rights reserved.
    [Show full text]
  • The Conflicts in Yemen and US National Security
    Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrate- gic analysis. The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on: • Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces; • Regional strategic appraisals; • The nature of land warfare; • Matters affecting the Army’s future; • The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and • Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army. Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of De- fense, and the larger national security community. In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip re- ports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders. The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army par- ticipation in national security policy formulation. SSI Monograph THE CONFLICTS IN YEMEN AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY W. Andrew Terrill January 2011 The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the -De partment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen War: an Overview of the Armed Conflict and Role of Belligerents
    Journal of Politics and Law; Vol. 13, No. 1; 2020 ISSN 1913-9047 E-ISSN 1913-9055 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education Yemen War: An Overview of the Armed Conflict and Role of Belligerents Abdullah Al Dosari1 & Mary George1 1 Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Malaysia Correspondence: Abdullah Al Dosari, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Malaysia. E-mail: [email protected] Received: October 28, 2019 Accepted: November 24, 2019 Online Published: January 29, 2020 doi:10.5539/jpl.v13n1p53 URL: https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v13n1p53 Abstract Since 2004, Yemen is facing a rebellious movement by a Shiite militant group called the Houthis1. The Houthis established a parallel rule in northern part of the country and occupied the capital Sana'a. Due to involvement of regional powers including Iran, UAE and Saudi Arabi the nature of conflict became both sectarian and separatist. Following the Arab uprising in 2011, the roots of recent conflict lies in the failure of political transition between the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his opposition. The geopolitical situation and support of Iran for the Houthis made the station in Yemen more complex. Therefore, the Gulf countries particularly Saudi Arabia was concerned because of the strategic and political situation of its fragile neighbor. This paper provides an insight to the conflict in various aspects including the role of conflicting parties, role of proxies, role of world powers and regional actors to analyze the conflict in a detailed manner. At the end study also discusses the most recent political and strategic developments having implication on the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Saudi Arabia and the Regionalization of Yemen's Conflict
    Saudi Arabia and the Regionalization of Yemen’s Conflict Written by Sumaya Almajdoub This PDF is auto-generated for reference only. As such, it may contain some conversion errors and/or missing information. For all formal use please refer to the official version on the website, as linked below. Saudi Arabia and the Regionalization of Yemen’s Conflict https://www.e-ir.info/2016/05/03/saudi-arabia-and-the-regionalization-of-yemens-conflict/ SUMAYA ALMAJDOUB, MAY 3 2016 On March 25, 2015 Saudi Arabia (KSA) launched operation “Decisive Storm” in Yemen against the Houthi rebel movement and their allied militias. The Houthis took over Yemen’s capital Sana’a in 2014 causing the near collapse of the state. The conflict’s turning point occurred on March 19, 2015 when the Houthis seized the port city of Aden, and attacked Yemen’s president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi in his Presidential Palace. Hadi subsequently fled to Riyadh and formed a government in exile. Saudi Arabia stated that the operation’s main goal is to defeat the Houthis – whom it views as Iranian proxies- and reinstate the internationally recognized and legitimate Yemeni government headed by Hadi (Abdullah, 2015). The Saudi military intervention has led to the regionalization of the conflict in Yemen, which has further complicated the country’s domestic power struggle (Al-Madhaji , Sidahmed, & Al-Muslimi, 2015). Further, Clausen (2015) explains that there have been three narratives to explain the current crisis in Yemen: “the Saudi-Iranian proxy war narrative, the sectarian narrative, or the al-Qaeda/failed state narrative” (p.16).
    [Show full text]
  • A Case Study of the Stabilizing Fragile States Project
    PM 5:13 12/15/10 2011 RUHE Y THE R OF JANUA PROJECT JONATHAN TES A AND STUDY T S SE A C MISZTAL GILE A A R BLAISE F MAKOVSKY, BILIZING A T S MICHAEL FRAGILITY AND EXTREMISM IN YEMEN :: A CASE STUDY OF THE STABILIZING FRAGILE STATES PROJECT :: BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 20005 NW DC 1000 Street, 202.204.2400 I Suite 1225 Phone: Washington, www.bipartisanpolicy.org 1 62357_CVR_X2.indd FRAGILITY AND EXTREMISM IN YEMEN A CASE STUDY OF THE STABILIZING FRAGILE STATES PROJECT January 2011 62357_TXT_X2.indd 1 12/15/10 5:14 PM ABOUT THIS REPORT In the fall of 2009, the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Stabilizing Fragile States steering committee directed project staff to undertake a case study of Yemen in order to provide a more granular understanding of the specific challenges found in fragile states. The original version of that case study was published in February 2010, accompanied by a public discussion, entitled “Yemen: The Next Afghanistan?” featuring project co-chairs Ambassador Paula Dobriansky and Admiral (Ret.) Gregory Johnson, as well as former Ambassador to Yemen Thomas Krajeski, Les Campbell of the National Democratic Institute and for- mer Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Doran. This staff paper is an update to that original publication and is being released in conjunction with the Stabilizing Fragile States report. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the Stabilizing Fragile States steering committee for their advice and guidance over the course of this project. We are also grateful to a number of former BPC staff and interns, without whom this report would not have been possible.
    [Show full text]
  • SMA Reach-Back 1 June 2017
    SMA Reach-back 1 June 2017 Question (R4.11): What are the implications for the U.S. and GCC countries if the Arab coalition does not succeed or achieve an acceptable outcome in Yemen? Contributors: Kim Cragin (National Defense University), Gerald Feierstein (Middle East Institute), Hussein Ibish (Arab Gulf States Initiative), Vern Liebl (CAOCL, Marine Corps University), Shoqi A. Maktary (Search for Common Ground), Fahad Nazer (National Council on US Arab Relations), Abdulaziz Sager (Gulf Research Institute), Daniel Serwer (Middle East Institute), Martin Styszynski (Adam Mickiewicz University), PiX Team (Tesla Government Services), Kristian Coates Ulrichsen (Rice University) Executive Summary Weston Aviles, NSI Overview Conflict in Yemen is now reaching the third year of its current incarnation, and despite the foreign intervention of GCC nations and several failed ceasefire attempts, the Houthi movement (Ansarullah) has continued to succeed on the Battlefield. Several SMA contriButors (e.g., Anonymous, Ulrichsen, & Cragin) suggest that the GCC campaign is unlikely to produce a desirable and timely military victory in Yemen. Ulrichsen and Cragin argue that rising domestic socio-economic costs of the Arab coalition campaign are outpacing a realistic timeline of a satisfactory outcome; moreover, Ulrichsen asserts that the Houthis have sufficient Iranian support and that the coalition is unable to comBat “a foe that has nearly 40 years’ experience of running proxy groups throughout the Middle East.” Only one author (Styszynski) contends that an impending coalition offensive on the strategic West Coast ports of Yemen will be successful and force Houthi forces to engage in a peaceful, diplomatic end to the conflict. Nazer notes that while the parties to the conflict generally understand what measures are necessary to end the conflict, they lack the political will to make necessary and difficult compromises.
    [Show full text]