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Cuaderno De Documentacion SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DE ECONOMÍA, MINISTERIO SECRETARÍA GENERAL DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA DE ECONOMÍA Y ECONOMÍA INTERNACIONAL Y HACIENDA SUBDIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ECONOMÍA INTERNACIONAL CUADERNO DE DOCUMENTACION Número 94 ANEXO VI Alvaro Espina Vocal Asesor 12 Julio de 2011 ENTRE EL 15 DE MAYO Y EL 15 DE JUNIO DE 2011 (En sentido inverso) 1 EUROPA Y EL MUNDO ORIENTE MEDIO Una Europa desarmada ante las crisis 15 junio 2011 LIBÉRATION PARÍS Glez Partida de ajedrez entre Anders Fogh Rasmussen (jefe de la OTAN), y Bachar El-Assad (presidente sirio), con Gadafi (líder libio) interpuesto entre ambos. Implicados en Libia, los europeos descubren que no cuentan con los medios para responder a sus ambiciones. Y sin medios militares, Europa está condenada a no tener una diplomacia creíble en una región estratégica para el continente. Por este motivo, los países europeos deben poner en común sus programas de Defensa. Bernard Guetta Ha sido un estadounidense el que ha revelado el secreto. Si la mayoría de países europeos no participan, por así decirlo, en las operaciones de apoyo aéreo a la insurrección libia, cuyo principio, sin embargo, sí aprueban, se debe simplemente, tal y como declaraba hace poco [el secretario estadounidense de Defensa] Robert Gates, a que su presupuesto militar es demasiado limitado para poder hacerlo. El jefe del Pentágono lo único que decía era toda la verdad y nada más que la verdad. No sólo muchos países de la Unión prácticamente carecen de fuerzas armadas porque contaban con la protección estadounidense desde el inicio de la guerra fría y la desaparición de la amenaza soviética les ha llevado a reducir sus esfuerzos militares, sino que incluso las grandes potencias europeas, incluidas Londres y París, cuentan con capacidades de proyección extremadamente limitadas. Francia y Gran Bretaña pueden asumir la operación libia, pero al estar implicados en otros territorios, sobre todo en Afganistán, agotan sus reservas de municiones y demuestran su falta de hombres y de material, algo que además se agravará debido a sus dificultades presupuestarias. Una solidaridad que creían inquebrantable Perfecto, pensarán los europeos que consideren que sus países no tienen nada que hacer en Kabul, Misrata o Abiyán. Pero más allá del debate sobre la idoneidad de estas 2 intervenciones, ninguna potencia puede prescindir de medios militares si no desea estar condenada a no tener existencia política. Para hacerse escuchar y tener influencia en el ámbito internacional, es necesario contar con la posibilidad de actuar o de reaccionar y es algo que se aplica en especial a la Unión Europea en este comienzo de siglo por dos motivos. El primero es que, incluso los europeos que consideraban su dependencia militar con respecto a Estados Unidos la mejor garantía de cohesión del terreno occidental, se han visto obligados a replantearse su postura desde que los estadounidenses no movieran un dedo para apoyar a Georgia durante su conflicto con Rusia. En agosto de 2008, los europeos más atlantistas se dieron cuenta de repente de que Estados Unidos podía dar preferencia a la estabilización de sus relaciones con Moscú antes que a uno de sus más fieles aliados europeos y anteponer sus intereses a una solidaridad que creían inquebrantable. EE UU ya no está dispuesto a financiar la defensa La misma Polonia se sumó a las ideas de política exterior y de defensa europeas comunes y ese momento decisivo fue mucho más crucial, ya que se produjo a continuación el crack de Wall Street. Estados Unidos, dispuesto a no volver a dejar que un conflicto europeo de segundo orden pesara en el conjunto de sus intereses nacionales, tuvo que inyectar tanto dinero público en el rescate de su economía que incluso el Pentágono tendrá que participar ahora en el esfuerzo para encauzar las cuentas federales. Estados Unidos ya no está dispuesto a financiar la defensa de Europa y existen pocos motivos para pensar que pueda volver a estarlo algún día. El mensaje de Robert Gates fue explícito y es lo que se observa actualmente en el modo deliberado con el que los estadounidenses dejan a los europeos en la primera línea de Libia. Obligados a asumir la parte esencial de esta operación, los europeos se darán cuenta ahora de que tendrán que aumentar sus gastos militares, sobre todo porque tendrán que hacer frente al largo periodo de inestabilidad que se ha iniciado con la primavera árabe, desde Rabat a Saná. Poner en común medios y programas Nadie sabe hasta dónde llegará la locura sanguinaria del régimen sirio, pero está claro que producirá una serie de efectos en cadena en toda la región, del mismo modo que la caída del coronel Gadafi trastocará el paisaje del norte de África tan pronto como se produzca. Todo esto sucede a un paso de Europa, que ya no podrá mantenerse indiferente ante estos hechos ni podrá quedarse al margen. Este es el segundo motivo por el que los europeos ya no pueden dejar de reflexionar sobre la financiación de su defensa, pero, ahora que las restricciones presupuestarias llegan al extremo en la mayoría de los países de la Unión, ahora que son intolerables en Grecia y corren el riesgo de generar tensiones políticas por todas partes, simplemente sería inconcebible hacer recortes en educación, urbanismo o sanidad para destinar el dinero a los ejércitos. Los europeos sólo lograrán aumentar sus esfuerzos militares poniendo en común sus medios y desarrollando programas comunes. Es lo que han hecho Gran Bretaña y Francia. A pesar de su atlantismo, la propia Gran Bretaña comprendió esta necesidad, que no sólo afecta a la defensa. La Unión Europea 3 debe poner en común sus medios y unir sus políticas en todos los ámbitos. Es la conclusión que podemos sacar de la constatación de Robert Gates. DEBATE Más vale no mezclarse en Siria “¿Intervenir o no intervenir?” plantea el columnista de The Guardian Chris Doyle: “Habiendo presenciado que el régimen de Assad ha asesinado a más de 1.400 sirios, arrestado a decenas de miles, empleado helicópteros de artillería y tanques contra su propio pueblo, abusado y asesinado niños según indican los informes, muchos se plantean por qué, si en el caso de Libia se consideró necesaria la intervención, no lo es en el de Siria. El comportamiento del régimen sirio difiere muy poco del de su homólogo Gadafi y aún así Occidente no sabe qué hacer, cómo hacerlo y con quién, y, sobre todo, no ha sido invitado a intervenir. Un famoso proverbio sirio reza: 'el ziwan (centeno) de tu país es mejor que el trigo del extranjero'. En otras palabras, puede que los sirios prefieran el peor de los regímenes al mejor del que los extranjeros pudieran ofrecerles”. Los sirios, señala Doyle, tienen escaso interés en una intervención extranjera, están “bien instruidos en la historia [de la región] sobre ocupación e injerencia foránea”. Además, “tienden a no impresionarse por las acciones de la OTAN en Libia”. Con unos pocos opositores del régimen pidiendo a la ONU que intervenga, la comunidad internacional tampoco manifiesta interés en hacerlo: “Un veterano funcionario británico me confirmó que existen pocas alternativas respecto a Siria. Rusia, China, Brasil y otros Estados se oponen firmemente a cualquier acción, incluso a las sanciones de Naciones Unidas de alcance limitado. Las sanciones de la ONU tendrían un impacto limitado. Estados Unidos y la UE ya han impuesto sanciones, así que es incierto qué más puede aportar la ONU. Tal y como Irak ejemplifica, las sanciones a gran escala pesan más sobre el pueblo que sobre el propio régimen”. “Pero Occidente solo puede culparse a sí mismo. La inconsistencia de sus políticas y el fracaso de fundamentar legal y éticamente sus acciones a lo largo de las últimas décadas – no son menores los casos de Irak, Palestina y de arropar a los regímenes más dictatoriales – ha llevado a que se desconfíe de sus motivaciones y a los dilemas a los que ahora se enfrenta”. Bernard Guetta Una Europa desarmada ante las crisis15 junio 2011 http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/714681-una-europa-desarmada-ante-las- crisis 4 IDEAS DEBATE La Europa unida beneficia a los burócratas 15 junio 2011 THE DAILY TELEGRAPH LONDRES Mayk Tras las declaraciones de Tony Blair en las que alegaba que Europa necesita más integración con un presidente elegido democráticamente para que la lidere, un columnista del diario Daily Telegraph expone que los únicos que se beneficiarían de ello son los integrantes del ejército de eurócratas de Bruselas. Alasdair Palmer La semana pasada se produjeron algunas escenas tristemente habituales en la UE: autoridades que viajan por separado en aviones privados mientras sermonean al mundo sobre la necesidad de reducir las emisiones de CO2; eurodiputados que exigen un aumento presupuestario y proponen nuevos impuestos para lograr una mayor "armonía" entre los Estados de la UE, a pesar de los recortes que se están aplicando en todo el continente. La mayoría de los políticos de la UE, al igual que la mayoría de políticas dictadas en la UE, carecen de legitimidad y lo saben. Así pues, cuando Tony Blair insistió la semana pasada en que Europa necesita un "presidente electo", estaba expresando con palabras la arraigada creencia de todos los funcionarios que participan en la burocracia política paneuropea de que una mayor unidad beneficia a todos. UE vs Estado-nación No importa que "el proyecto" no cuente con apoyo popular. Tampoco el hecho de que los votantes ahora señalen su preocupación sobre (por ejemplo) las fronteras abiertas entre miembros de la UE. Para los eurócratas solo existe una ruta válida: la que lleva a una unión más estrecha dentro de la UE y, por lo tanto, a la anulación del Estado- nación.
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