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SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DE ECONOMÍA,

MINISTERIO SECRETARÍA GENERAL DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA DE ECONOMÍA Y ECONOMÍA INTERNACIONAL Y HACIENDA SUBDIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ECONOMÍA INTERNACIONAL

CUADERNO DE DOCUMENTACION

Número 94

ANEXO VI

Alvaro Espina Vocal Asesor 12 Julio de 2011

ENTRE EL 15 DE MAYO Y EL 15 DE JUNIO DE 2011 (En sentido inverso)

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EUROPA Y EL MUNDO ORIENTE MEDIO Una Europa desarmada ante las crisis 15 junio 2011 LIBÉRATION PARÍS

Glez Partida de ajedrez entre Anders Fogh Rasmussen (jefe de la OTAN), y Bachar El-Assad (presidente sirio), con Gadafi (líder libio) interpuesto entre ambos. Implicados en Libia, los europeos descubren que no cuentan con los medios para responder a sus ambiciones. Y sin medios militares, Europa está condenada a no tener una diplomacia creíble en una región estratégica para el continente. Por este motivo, los países europeos deben poner en común sus programas de Defensa. Bernard Guetta Ha sido un estadounidense el que ha revelado el secreto. Si la mayoría de países europeos no participan, por así decirlo, en las operaciones de apoyo aéreo a la insurrección libia, cuyo principio, sin embargo, sí aprueban, se debe simplemente, tal y como declaraba hace poco [el secretario estadounidense de Defensa] Robert Gates, a que su presupuesto militar es demasiado limitado para poder hacerlo. El jefe del Pentágono lo único que decía era toda la verdad y nada más que la verdad. No sólo muchos países de la Unión prácticamente carecen de fuerzas armadas porque contaban con la protección estadounidense desde el inicio de la guerra fría y la desaparición de la amenaza soviética les ha llevado a reducir sus esfuerzos militares, sino que incluso las grandes potencias europeas, incluidas Londres y París, cuentan con capacidades de proyección extremadamente limitadas. Francia y Gran Bretaña pueden asumir la operación libia, pero al estar implicados en otros territorios, sobre todo en Afganistán, agotan sus reservas de municiones y demuestran su falta de hombres y de material, algo que además se agravará debido a sus dificultades presupuestarias. Una solidaridad que creían inquebrantable Perfecto, pensarán los europeos que consideren que sus países no tienen nada que hacer en Kabul, Misrata o Abiyán. Pero más allá del debate sobre la idoneidad de estas 2

intervenciones, ninguna potencia puede prescindir de medios militares si no desea estar condenada a no tener existencia política. Para hacerse escuchar y tener influencia en el ámbito internacional, es necesario contar con la posibilidad de actuar o de reaccionar y es algo que se aplica en especial a la Unión Europea en este comienzo de siglo por dos motivos. El primero es que, incluso los europeos que consideraban su dependencia militar con respecto a Estados Unidos la mejor garantía de cohesión del terreno occidental, se han visto obligados a replantearse su postura desde que los estadounidenses no movieran un dedo para apoyar a Georgia durante su conflicto con Rusia. En agosto de 2008, los europeos más atlantistas se dieron cuenta de repente de que Estados Unidos podía dar preferencia a la estabilización de sus relaciones con Moscú antes que a uno de sus más fieles aliados europeos y anteponer sus intereses a una solidaridad que creían inquebrantable. EE UU ya no está dispuesto a financiar la defensa La misma Polonia se sumó a las ideas de política exterior y de defensa europeas comunes y ese momento decisivo fue mucho más crucial, ya que se produjo a continuación el crack de Wall Street. Estados Unidos, dispuesto a no volver a dejar que un conflicto europeo de segundo orden pesara en el conjunto de sus intereses nacionales, tuvo que inyectar tanto dinero público en el rescate de su economía que incluso el Pentágono tendrá que participar ahora en el esfuerzo para encauzar las cuentas federales. Estados Unidos ya no está dispuesto a financiar la defensa de Europa y existen pocos motivos para pensar que pueda volver a estarlo algún día. El mensaje de Robert Gates fue explícito y es lo que se observa actualmente en el modo deliberado con el que los estadounidenses dejan a los europeos en la primera línea de Libia. Obligados a asumir la parte esencial de esta operación, los europeos se darán cuenta ahora de que tendrán que aumentar sus gastos militares, sobre todo porque tendrán que hacer frente al largo periodo de inestabilidad que se ha iniciado con la primavera árabe, desde Rabat a Saná. Poner en común medios y programas Nadie sabe hasta dónde llegará la locura sanguinaria del régimen sirio, pero está claro que producirá una serie de efectos en cadena en toda la región, del mismo modo que la caída del coronel Gadafi trastocará el paisaje del norte de África tan pronto como se produzca. Todo esto sucede a un paso de Europa, que ya no podrá mantenerse indiferente ante estos hechos ni podrá quedarse al margen. Este es el segundo motivo por el que los europeos ya no pueden dejar de reflexionar sobre la financiación de su defensa, pero, ahora que las restricciones presupuestarias llegan al extremo en la mayoría de los países de la Unión, ahora que son intolerables en Grecia y corren el riesgo de generar tensiones políticas por todas partes, simplemente sería inconcebible hacer recortes en educación, urbanismo o sanidad para destinar el dinero a los ejércitos. Los europeos sólo lograrán aumentar sus esfuerzos militares poniendo en común sus medios y desarrollando programas comunes. Es lo que han hecho Gran Bretaña y Francia. A pesar de su atlantismo, la propia Gran Bretaña comprendió esta necesidad, que no sólo afecta a la defensa. La Unión Europea

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debe poner en común sus medios y unir sus políticas en todos los ámbitos. Es la conclusión que podemos sacar de la constatación de Robert Gates. DEBATE Más vale no mezclarse en Siria “¿Intervenir o no intervenir?” plantea el columnista de The Guardian Chris Doyle: “Habiendo presenciado que el régimen de Assad ha asesinado a más de 1.400 sirios, arrestado a decenas de miles, empleado helicópteros de artillería y tanques contra su propio pueblo, abusado y asesinado niños según indican los informes, muchos se plantean por qué, si en el caso de Libia se consideró necesaria la intervención, no lo es en el de Siria. El comportamiento del régimen sirio difiere muy poco del de su homólogo Gadafi y aún así Occidente no sabe qué hacer, cómo hacerlo y con quién, y, sobre todo, no ha sido invitado a intervenir. Un famoso proverbio sirio reza: 'el ziwan (centeno) de tu país es mejor que el trigo del extranjero'. En otras palabras, puede que los sirios prefieran el peor de los regímenes al mejor del que los extranjeros pudieran ofrecerles”. Los sirios, señala Doyle, tienen escaso interés en una intervención extranjera, están “bien instruidos en la historia [de la región] sobre ocupación e injerencia foránea”. Además, “tienden a no impresionarse por las acciones de la OTAN en Libia”. Con unos pocos opositores del régimen pidiendo a la ONU que intervenga, la comunidad internacional tampoco manifiesta interés en hacerlo: “Un veterano funcionario británico me confirmó que existen pocas alternativas respecto a Siria. Rusia, China, Brasil y otros Estados se oponen firmemente a cualquier acción, incluso a las sanciones de Naciones Unidas de alcance limitado. Las sanciones de la ONU tendrían un impacto limitado. Estados Unidos y la UE ya han impuesto sanciones, así que es incierto qué más puede aportar la ONU. Tal y como Irak ejemplifica, las sanciones a gran escala pesan más sobre el pueblo que sobre el propio régimen”. “Pero Occidente solo puede culparse a sí mismo. La inconsistencia de sus políticas y el fracaso de fundamentar legal y éticamente sus acciones a lo largo de las últimas décadas – no son menores los casos de Irak, Palestina y de arropar a los regímenes más dictatoriales – ha llevado a que se desconfíe de sus motivaciones y a los dilemas a los que ahora se enfrenta”. Bernard Guetta Una Europa desarmada ante las crisis15 junio 2011 http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/714681-una-europa-desarmada-ante-las- crisis

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IDEAS DEBATE La Europa unida beneficia a los burócratas 15 junio 2011 THE DAILY TELEGRAPH LONDRES

Mayk Tras las declaraciones de Tony Blair en las que alegaba que Europa necesita más integración con un presidente elegido democráticamente para que la lidere, un columnista del diario Daily Telegraph expone que los únicos que se beneficiarían de ello son los integrantes del ejército de eurócratas de Bruselas. Alasdair Palmer La semana pasada se produjeron algunas escenas tristemente habituales en la UE: autoridades que viajan por separado en aviones privados mientras sermonean al mundo sobre la necesidad de reducir las emisiones de CO2; eurodiputados que exigen un aumento presupuestario y proponen nuevos impuestos para lograr una mayor "armonía" entre los Estados de la UE, a pesar de los recortes que se están aplicando en todo el continente. La mayoría de los políticos de la UE, al igual que la mayoría de políticas dictadas en la UE, carecen de legitimidad y lo saben. Así pues, cuando Tony Blair insistió la semana pasada en que Europa necesita un "presidente electo", estaba expresando con palabras la arraigada creencia de todos los funcionarios que participan en la burocracia política paneuropea de que una mayor unidad beneficia a todos. UE vs Estado-nación No importa que "el proyecto" no cuente con apoyo popular. Tampoco el hecho de que los votantes ahora señalen su preocupación sobre (por ejemplo) las fronteras abiertas entre miembros de la UE. Para los eurócratas solo existe una ruta válida: la que lleva a una unión más estrecha dentro de la UE y, por lo tanto, a la anulación del Estado- nación. ¿En qué se basa esta creencia de que el Estado-nación será y debe ser sustituido por las autoridades europeas? Se resume con la afirmación aparentemente inofensiva realizada 5

por Blair la semana pasada de que es "sensato que las naciones europeas se combinen y empleen su peso colectivo para ganar influencia". Pero siempre queda sin responder la pregunta de cómo esa entidad formada mediante la "combinación" llega a tener autoridad política y legítima por encima de la de los Estados-nación que la conforman. Barniz democrático para Bruselas Existe un motivo muy obvio por el que se responde con ese silencio ensordecedor: las naciones individuales y sus asambleas elegidas son consideradas entre las personas de esas naciones como las únicas instituciones que crean leyes que ellas mismas han refrendado. La elección de un presidente europeo no cambiaría esta situación. Simplemente aportará una falsa apariencia democrática al proyecto de la unificación, cuando, de hecho, el efecto será la erosión de la única conexión entre el modo en el que se dictan las leyes y la voluntad de las personas. La legislación que surge de Bruselas carece de esta conexión. Pero es en lo que se basa el proyecto de unificación.Comprendo que una mayor unión en Europa presenta ventajas para los políticos del continente, pues podrán disfrutar de los agradables privilegios del cargo: comitivas oficiales, aviones privados, funcionarios aduladores y la embriagadora sensación de poder. Pero ¿qué obtenemos el resto? ¿Una burocracia supranacional? Los entusiastas exponen que una Europa unida será una Europa con poder, capaz de negociar mejores acuerdos en cuestión de comercio y seguridad. El libre comercio entre naciones tiene grandes ventajas, pero para lograrlo no se necesita más que la cooperación entre los diferentes Estados-nación. Claramente no requiere la sustitución del Estado-nación por una burocracia supranacional. Y la idea de que una Europa unificada dispondrá de mejores medios para defender la seguridad y los valores de su gente es una quimera. "Europa" cuenta con toda la parafernalia propia de una política de defensa unificada: una burocracia de defensa, una oficina de Exteriores y un ministro de Exteriores. La UE apoya la operación en Libia. Pero tal y como señaló la semana pasada Robert Gates, secretario saliente de Defensa estadounidense, los países europeos son incapaces de organizarse. La campaña de bombardeos ha "necesitado un aumento de especialistas en establecer objetivos, principalmente de Estados Unidos, para realizar el trabajo". Tras una campaña que dura 11 semanas, las naciones europeas "comienzan a quedarse sin munición, por lo que ha sido necesario, una vez más, que Estados Unidos actúe para paliar esta carencia". Un encumbramiento destructivo Esto se ha producido porque hay demasiados países europeos que quieren disfrutar de las ventajas de la cooperación militar, pero no están dispuestos a compartir sus riesgos y sus costes: quieren aprovecharse sin aportar nada. Esto en cierto sentido es tranquilizador, ya que demuestra que el proyecto de unificación fracasa ante el interés individual nacional. Indica que, en el fondo, no es más que una forma de hacer que los eurócratas se sientan importantes. Pero lo triste es que su encumbramiento personal puede llegar a destruir nuestra democracia. http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/714101-la-europa-unida-beneficia-los- burocratas

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151 juin 2011 Des soldats syriens racontent leur défection

Parmi le flot de réfugiés syriens arrivés en Turquie au cours des derniers jours se trouvent des soldats ayant déserté. Le plus illustre d'entre eux, le colonel Hossein Harmouch de la 11e division, a annoncé sa défection et celles de soldats sous ses ordres, dans une vidéo (ci-dessous). "Notre mission est désormais de défendre les manifestants non armés, qui demandent la liberté et la démocratie", dit-il. Il avance trois motifs : "Premièrement, le massacre de civils désarmés dans toute la Syrie. Deuxièmement, l'implication d'officiers syriens et d'officiers de second rang dans les raids contre des villes et villages pacifiques [...]. Troisièmement, le massacre d'enfants, de femmes et de personnes âgées et la découverte de charniers, ainsi que la perpétration de massacres de grande ampleur, notamment celui de Jisr Al-Choughour le 4 juin". Le colonel Hossein Harmouch annonce sa défection le 9 juin (sous-titres en anglais avec le bouton CC). Une interview de Al-Jazira avec le colonel séditieux Hossein Harmouch. La journaliste Rania Abouzeid relate dans le magazine Time sa rencontre avec le colonel Harmouch. Le colonel a reçu des "ordres clairs" : quitter sa base de Homs et "ratisser les villes" en commençant par Al-Serminiyye et en continuant 5 km plus au nord à Jisr Al-Choughour. "On nous a dit que nous faisions cela pour capturer des gangs armés mais je n'en ai vu aucun. J'ai vu des soldats tirant sans distinction sur des gens, tout en les pourchassant, brûlant leurs champs et coupant leurs oliviers. Il n'y a pas eu de résistance dans les villes. J'ai vu des gens qui s'enfuyaient à pied dans les collines être tués d'une balle dans le dos." C'est une fois arrivé à Al-Serminiyye, le 3 juin, que le colonel Harmouch a décidé que "trop, c'est trop". "Quand nous les avons vu bombarder la ville, bombarder sans distinction, j'ai décidé de faire défection. Je connaissais mes hommes. Ce sont des conscrits pour la plupart. Je sais que si l'opportunité leur était donnée - et la garantie qu'ils ne seraient pas tués pour avoir fait défection- les trois quarts d'entre eux partiraient, mais la peur les gardait à leur poste". Trente l'ont suivi. Témoignages de soldats ayant fait défection, reportage AFPTV, doublé en français. Sur le chemin vers Jisr Al-Chouhour, ils ont été rejoints par d'autres soldats jusqu'à être 120. Ils sont arrivés dans la ville le 5 juin, quand des centaines de manifestants ont été tués. "A Jisr Al- Choughour, nous avons décidé de défendre les gens jusqu'au dernier moment, mais nous avions des armes légères, des fusils. Ils avaient des tanks. Nous avons mis au point des pièges, une embuscade. Cela nous a laissé du temps pour évacuer des civils." Une trentaine de soldats ont alors approché les soldats séditieux, disant vouloir les rejoindre mais leur ont tiré dessus, poursuit le colonel. Certains se sont enfuis dans les montagnes, d'autres en Turquie.

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LE MASSACRE DE JISR AL-CHOUGHOUR Le témoignage du colonel Harmouch éclaire d'un jour nouveau ce qui a eu lieu à Jisr Al- Choughour, le 5 juin. Des habitants et des militants des droits de l'homme avaient rapporté que 120 membres des forces de sécurité avaient été tués dans une mutinerie avec des soldats loyalistes. Un nombre de victimes avancé par le gouvernement syrien, qui a attribué leur mort à des gangs armés. Son témoignage remet en cause la thèse de la "mutinerie", à laquelle n'adhère pas, par ailleurs, le blogueur syrien Ammar Abdoulhamid. Sur son blog Syrian Revolution Digest, l'opposant politique qui vit en exil estime ainsi : "alors, c'est ça la taille de la mutinerie : 100 soldats armés légèrement, avec peu ou prou accès à des munitions et fournitures !". Dans un autre post, l'opposant politique qui vit en exil conteste par ailleurs le nombre de 120 victimes avancé. Une vidéo amateur montre un soldat qui rejoint les manifestants à Deir Ezzor, le 13 juin. Pour lui, "la vérité est simple : il y a eu des défections, et il y a eu un bref affrontement entre quelques soldats ayant fait défection et l'armée de loyalistes, qui s'est révélée être plus meurtrière côté séditieux que côté loyalistes". Une analyse que partage également Joshua Landis, sur son blog Syria Comment, qui parle également de défections encore limitées dans les rangs de l'armée. Pour Ammar Abdoulhamid, ces événements ne peuvent être appréhendés que d'une seule façon. "Ce qui arrive à Jisr Al-Choughour aujourd'hui est exactement ce qui est arrivé à Rastan, la semaine dernière et à Deraa, il y a quelques semaines : une vaste opération militaire contre une population majoritairement désarmée [...]. C'est basiquement un massacre de sang-froid perpétré par des tanks et hélicoptères." http://printempsarabe.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/06/15/des-soldats-syriens-racontent-leur- defection/

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Published on Al-Masry Al-Youm: Today's News from Egypt (http://www.almasryalyoum.com)

Islam and Ideologies By sohdatolba Gender: Female Country: Egypt City: Cairo Occupation: Other Birth Date: 11/06/1982 Created 14/06/2011 - 12:24 Elections recommendation: Since the creation of mankind, man has developed many ideologies of politics and economics through the centuries. As evolution of man had lived, his ideological thinking has developed with him. We have heard several ways of thinking and approaches in order to uphold the most convenient ideology that would match our way of life and fulfill all what we are all seeking for. In this thesis, I am going to illustrate different philosophies on its own, then compare it to Islam. As a start, we all have been familiar with the concept of liberalism; we understand it is the meaning of freedom of expression, human rights, equality and democracy. We never had a close look on the development of that word and the real intension of that perception. As a start, Liberalism was taken from a Latin word meaning "freedom". It interprets the importance of liberty and equal rights; it intends for free trade, freedom of religion and human moralities. Returning to the Age of Enlightment, liberalism aimed at creating an ideology for hereditary, establishing an authority as head of state and head of government , his powers not being limited by a constitution or by law. Man in the 16th century believed in the conception of individuality of human nature. It was been believed that "now if individuals are moral entities, equal in value, they can submit to no will that is arbitrary or capricious. To do so would be to deny their moral equality, to deny the dignity which they possess as human beings endowed with reason." Liberalism has acknowledged that an individual can submit to an authority which is impersonal, objective and eternal. As the concept of liberalism was recognized, they agreed that freedom should be under a law which by this freedom is secured. In other words, humans are free as long as it is set under values and ethics and natural law. They depended on the conscience on how an individual should be approaching his liberal thinking and way of living. In the 17th century , it was believed that law can no longer be obligatory and man no longer need to be compelled by it. The acceptance of eternal truth, values and conscience has been lost and can no longer be depended on, instead liberalism is being driven by the concept of following one own logic of either to make the sovereign absolute or individual absolute. As the rise of math, physics, man has decided to remain God as the Creator, the great mechanic of a mechanism that ran by itself, but no longer the regent of the universe. Extending to the 18th century, law became related to the time and place and not anymore universal or absolute. In the 19th century, liberty has converted to the perception of the interest of the stronger and powerful, aiming at securing the oneself.

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Communism, an economic system, was established in the Soviet at the time of the world war and in China as well. It designed at depriving the concept of classes. Everyone is given an equal weight in the decision-making process. So, everyone in the society is an owner in the community of industry as a whole. One of the main who affected the concept of communism as an example for this economic system,was Joseph Stalin, premier of the Soviet Union and first General Secretary of the Communist Party 1922. His regime looked for agriculture, which ended in a failure and the violence of the peasants at that time. It concluded of 20,201 people executed as result of the anger that the regime caused. AS well as the death of 400,000 thousand cause of the crop failure. Stalin controlled too science ideologies, art and literature. On the other hand, he gave women rights to work and share in the society and he took care of education and health. Stalin believed that religion should be removed in order to maintain ideal communist society. He depended on anti-religion institutions and propaganda was spread against religion. It also resulted of monks and priests were executed and 10,000 were shot. Even churches were perished at that time. Capitalism, in contrast, was being applied by the 16th century in Europe. It meant that it is owned by one and profitable. Any organization built on the principle of capitalism is divided into wages, profits or loss. In addition, the government has no control on it by any means, but paying taxes for the government in return. It matched the idea of liberalism at that time. Socialism,differently from communism, depended on the publicity of production. The government are the ownership of the organizations. It is built on equal-powers, depends on production of goods for consumption through the market. By this movement, the workers are given a political crusade and are considered as the owners of the economy. They are given rights and are important in any political or economic issues. The socialism system was pioneered by Marx who aimed for the equality of human classes as the means of production. And so, socialism was the road that ended to the system of communism. Moving to scientism, as a lot are mistaken in the aim of this ideology, I would clearly like to embody this ideology. By the age of reason and acknowledging the importance of science, man realized that inspiration and spiritual methods are no longer matching with the new era. Scientists limited the work of God, denied all spiritual means and depended on what is seen to believe in. This philosophy, is related to research and scientific system. It is based on experiments, forming assumptions and interpreting results till the correct outcome is being relieved .This ideology was much affected by Darwin's theory "life on earth was emerged out of the evolution from one or few common ancestors." Going through all the previous ideologies man has recognized during the centuries, Islam is to be proven to include all these ideologies and all their followers looking for. As the beginning, Islam means "peace of mind" in order to live purity of heart and peace, you must submit yourself to God and His Divine law. Islam has discussed science and its importance, economy and its ethics, human rights and democracy, etc. A lot has accused Islam hasn't proven to be depending by scientific thinking. As by the experiments that were started in the 17th century, it was proven what was written in the Holy Quran thousands years ago. Scientists proves that the Holy Quran has mentioned what they didn’t realize before the age of reason, such as the planets, the development of the baby inside the woman's womb and what man is created from. Scientists like

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Prof. Gerald, Prof. William, and Prof. Persuad, all have proven The Divine work of God. Islam doesn’t conflict with science and logic thinking, by logic thinking you conclude the world around you. As God has asked man to use his mind in everything goes around him, starting from the ability of life and death, to the planets and its system, to the difference of light and day till the law of the world. Coming to economics, Islam has put guidelines and rules to ensure justice and equality in all its aspects. It declared individual obligations and rights, property rights, importance of contracts, work and wealth, prohibition of interest and importance of competition. God has created man to worship God, not only by praying, but as well in many other means such as living with the laws of God, justice and ethics. "Indeed God is not concerned with your appreance nor your wealth, but rather your hearts and deeds." Said by the Prophet PBUH. "Oh humankind! Indeed We created you from a male and female, and we made you different nations and tribes, that you may come to know one other. Indeed the most honored amongst you are the most God conscious" Quran 49:13 So, by the rules that God has told us to live, preliminary with honesty, just, faith, fairness, we will sure establish a good economic ground of growth. As I would demonstrate, there are boundaries of Islam that should be taken care of and followed. First, in goods, God has told us that in weighting, we should be fair and we are forbidden to cheat in the amount of weight or lie about the quality of the good we are selling. Second, in having a new business agreement, God in the Holy Quran told us to write contract with having two witnesses in order to ensure one's right. In addition, God hasn’t forbid profit, and we can buy and sell as we like as long we are following honesty and fairness. In having a business, you must know you're obligatory towards this business from wages and morality. Your money should never be out of gambling, stealing, cheating, or lottery as it counted as unfairness for other people are trying to work hard to fulfill their needs. You work hard to earn your wealth. As God mercifulness, He reminded us of the poor and their needs, as so He has asked us to give away a percentage of money to the poor after making sure that you have fulfilled all your other obligations of wages and expenses, etc. God has also asked us to help the needy by any means we can, as a proof of thankfulness to God for the great things He has given us. The most Merciful, has also forbidden us to take what is not ours, from orphans' money or by any means that has become out of cheat or stealing. In addition, Islam has encouraged competition to improve your goods and services. It moreover asked for cooperation between others to learn the concept of teamwork and help in order to erase the feeling of envy that can destroy anything. As a lot accused Islam for not knowing the concept of human rights and as it has been continuously the core problem among our nations, people tried to look for law to save it not realizing that it was mentioned in Islam. "The liberal understanding of free speech allows for humor, insult, lying, criticism and even hateful speech in so far, as it does not harm others". In Islam God has prohibited the insult of human kind, as He has created man to be the most highest of all creatures. God has said all humans are equal and that only are our deeds in life that makes us near or far from God. God has said that no one should insult or harm any other human being either by word or deed. Islam doesn’t differ through their religion, race or color. Prophet Mohamed PBUH said" No Arab has any superiority over an non-Arab, nor does non- Arab have any superiority over an Arab, nor does a white man have any superiority over a black man, or the black man

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have any superiority over the white man. You are all the children of Adam, and Adam was created from clay." Islam as well, has prohibited killing anyone or to end one's life. "One who kills a man under covenants will not even smell the fragrance of paradise. " Said by the prophet. Islam has also given the right to live with dignity among people "You, who believe, do not let one (set of) people make fun of another set. Do not defame one another, do not insult by using nicknames. And do not backbite or speak ill of one another". Even women God has put her in a very special place, He has warned man to mistreat woman by any means, He has given her rights in inheritance. Women as well had rights and equality in many phases, He obliged man to take care of her financially and emotionally. He gave them right to elect as they did when they went to the Prophet to elect him to speak for them in any problems. Women in Islam helped in the spreader of faith, by meetings and by being beside their husbands at the time of war. Islam had certain obligation about the concept of democracy. At first, the meaning of democracy is “ demo”standing for people and ‘carcy’ that meant power. So, by this it means that the law comes from man and not from the Divine. As man,is incomplete in himself and by having no real book of law to return to or seek advice from,it will mean that people will live in choas. Laws will be an outcome from self-interest rather than the benefit of mankind. Islam was very clear that anything that is related in life, you must at first return in to what God has said and His prophet,seeing if it matches or is against the Divine Law. At the sametime, God has asked the prophet to take the opnion of his friends and who are well in knowledge in order to preserve the rightous conclusion as long what is being discussed doesn’t contradict with the laws of Allah. For example, at the time of war, the prophet discussed with his fellow friends the best way of war startegy and how to defend their town. God as well, has forbidden his prophet to force anyone to enter religion and if he is a muslem, he should be talken to, as long as the person didn’t commit a crime that has to take an action with, like prison and so on. By this, I concIude, Islam has stated all what people has been searching for during the past centuries, no matter what name they chose for their ideology, Islam has said it first and asked for it. So, I really wonder why there is fear of what has called for equality, freedom, faith, honesty, fairness and dignity? References: The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology by John Hawell Democracy – A religion by Mohamed El Makdasy www.witness-pioneer.org - www.about.com – www.islamreligion.com – www.scienceislam.com- www. Wikipedia- dictionary.com – www.tawheed.net

Source URL (retrieved on 28/06/2011 - 09:31): sohdatolba Islam and Ideologies Created 14/06/2011 - 12:24 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/467910

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MIDDLE EAST http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2e5af4b2-96a2- 11e0-baca-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1QeuWsx5Z From political prisoner to power broker By Eileen Byrne in Tunis Published: June 14 2011 18:00 | Last updated: June 14 2011 18:00 Six years ago Hamadi Jebali was a political prisoner on hunger strike. Now, the secretary-general of Tunisia’s Nahda party has been doing the rounds of the Washington think-tanks, meeting state department officials and members of Congress and weighing up comparative constitutional models. EDITOR’S CHOICE Tunisia to try Ben Ali in absentia - Jun-19 Tunisia readies funds to create jobs for youth - Jun-13 Tunisian election delayed to October 23 - Jun-08 Opinion: Too much aid will hobble Arab spring - Jun-07 Strike tests Tunisia’s economic hopes - Jun-06 Editorial: Funding north African aid corps - May-29 Nahda, the country’s main Islamist party, seems likely to be confirmed as a leading political player when the country goes to the polls on October 23 to elect a 215-strong assembly to reform the constitution. This first election since the overthrow of President Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14 is seen as a test case for the “Arab spring” and its promises of participatory democracy. The US and other countries that have pledged funding to ease Tunisia’s transition are therefore keen to build lines of communication with likely future decision-makers. The Washington think-tank, the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, helped arrange Mr Jebali’s US visit last month. This was an opportunity for the party to introduce itself to “the American elite”, he said in an interview last week. Ever “pragmatic”, the US, from the early 2000s, realised that moderate political Islam would be part of any democratic landscape in the Arab world, he added. But many Tunisians fear mixing religion with politics creates a potent force that works against individual liberties. Nahda is said to use a “double discourse” – appearing tolerant to outsiders while using a very different vocabulary among the broad Arabic- speaking public. Mr Jebali acknowledged the problem: “We have been through three decades of fear, clandestinity and repression. We haven’t had the opportunity to discuss things within the party and arrive at more or less the same discourse. “So you find among our activists some who might express themselves in a certain way in Arabic, which could be misinterpreted.” Nahda, which began in the mosques of Tunis in 1969 before developing into a political movement, has always had a problem with fringe radical activists. But it emerged as the 13

strongest opposition force in parliamentary elections in 1989, when its candidatestook more than 14 per cent of the vote nationwide and over 30 per cent in urban areas. A crackdown by Mr Ben Ali’s feared security services saw tens of thousands of its members and supporters imprisoned in the 1990s. The party was taken by surprise by the revolution that toppled Mr Ben Ali. But many voters will remember that it represented the main opposition to his authoritarian rule. Like Rachid Ghannouchi, the party’s president, Mr Jebali says Nahda could participate in a multi-party “government of national unity”. The allocation of ministries after the October poll “doesn’t necessarily need to reflect the results of the election”, he says. “We could even work with some current ministers, or, say, the current president or prime minister.” Another party, the centrist PDP, advocates asix-month deadline for the assembly to agree a new constitution, Iyed Dahmani, a party spokesman, told the Financial Times. This would allow the current unelected government – which has stressed it should leave office after the October poll for a constituent assembly – to remain in place during those six months, he said. In theory, this could allow the assembly to concentrate on the constitution while the transitional government runs the country. Parties should be prepared to share power for the full period of democratic transition, advises Abdelfatah Mourou, who founded Nahda along with Mr Ghannouchi but is yet to decide whether he will share its election platform. “The previous regime left such a mess,” Mr Mourou said. “It will take two to five years for things to begin to fall into place and we need to work hand in hand during that time. This transition is not the business of one party, it’s the business of all Tunisians.” Mr Mourou wants the party to go further in adapting to a new role: “If you have a political party, it’s no good acting like a religious brotherhood. A political speech is not a sermon and shouldn’t being with a Quranic verse” as often happens at Nahda meetings. In the weeks a the revolution, other political parties complained that mosque preachers installed by the former regime were often replaced by ones supporting Nahda. Nahda has since agreed that none of its leaders will act as a mosque imam, said Mr Jebali. “And we forbid anyone in our party from carrying out propaganda in a mosque.” Unfortunately radical Salafist Islamists have sometimes stepped into the vacuum, Mr Jebali added. “It’s not easy to arrive and persuade people, especially Salafists, to step down, because for them a mosque is a place of worship and also discussion, just as it was for us in the past.” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2e5af4b2-96a2-11e0-baca- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1Qb5tKUUw

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Why foreign intervention is not welcome in Syria Syrians are well versed in the history of foreign occupation and interference, and do not trust the west's motives

Chris Doyle guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 14 June 2011 13.13 BST

Syrian internally displaced persons arrive to a makeshift camp in the northern city of Idlib, near the Turkish village of Guvecci in Hatay. Photograph: Mustafa Ozer/AFP/Getty Images To intervene or not to intervene? Having watched the Assad regime kill more than 1,400 Syrians, arrest tens of thousands, use helicopter gunships and tanks on its own population, reportedly abuse and kill children, many are asking why, if action was deemed necessary for , it is not for Syria. The Syrian regime has behaved little better than its Gaddafi counterpart and yet the west does not know what to do to, how to do it and with whom, and above all has not been invited to intervene. There is a famous Syrian proverb: "The ziwan (rye grass) of your own country is better than the wheat of the stranger." In other words, Syrians may prefer the worst of the regime to the best foreigners would offer. For all the daily brutality, there seems to be little appetite to open the doors for foreign action. Syrians are well versed in the history of foreign occupation and interference. The French colonial period saw their country fragmented, one piece carved off for , Alexandretta given away to Turkey and the setting up of quasi-independent areas for the Alawis and the Druzes.

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Syrians also tend to be unimpressed by Nato's actions in Libya. They have generally supported their regime's foreign policy but despaired of it domestically. For these reasons, Syrian opponents of the regime are intensely nervous of collaborating with external actors. Very few opponents of the regime have called for the UN to take action. A leading Syrian writer and former political prisoner, Louay Hussein, told me from Damascus: "We have to distinguish between foreign intervention and foreign pressure. We oppose foreign intervention but we would like to have foreign pressure based on support for human rights, not the support of a particular party against the other according to their own self-interest." The lack of enthusiasm in Syria is matched internationally. A very senior British official confirmed to me that there are few options over Syria. Russia, China, Brazil and others are strongly opposed to any action, even to limited UN sanctions. UN sanctions would have limited impact. The US and the EU have already imposed sanctions so what more the UN can do is unclear. As Iraq showed, broad scale sanctions hit the people much harder then the regime. If UN sanctions appear improbable, military action is even more so. Donald Rumsfeld famously said Iraq was "winnable and doable" – a mistake his successors will live with for years. While Syria, armed with ageing Soviet weaponry, may not be a formidable military power, the absence of any real partner on the ground, the delicate sectarian and ethnic mix and the volatile neighbourhood means that, like Iraq, it is very losable. Louay Hussein pointed out that "any foreign intervention with such diverse social structure, may lead us to a scenario similar to what happened in Iraq – we all know the outcome of such scenario." There is a risk of not just a civil war but a regional conflict. Any US-led intervention moreover, would be perceived in Syria and regionally as driven mainly by Israeli interests. Turkey, too, has historical baggage. The Turkish prime minister, Recep Erdogan, has accused the regime of "not acting in a humane manner" but regime apologists have responded by referring to the Turks as "Ottomans" – a reference to the Ottoman control over Syria. A no-fly zone or protection zone would be massively problematic to implement. The costs would be financially prohibitive in the current climate and Nato's military assets are suffering from massive overstretch. Outside forces could support opposition groups. But one thing that has kept many Syrians from joining their countrymen on the streets is the fear that there is no viable alternative. As with Iraq, the risk is that outside powers would sustain groups that have no credibility on the ground. Farid Ghadry is the Syrian version of Ahmed Chalabi – a US- backed regime opponent and a warm supporter of Israel who is disliked by most Syrians. The only genuinely organised movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, is largely external and is remembered for having killed scores of Syrians in the early 1980s, in actions sponsored by Saddam Hussein. The regime's ex-insiders have their small groups too, including the president's uncle, Rifat Assad and his smooth-talking son, Ribal, plus former vice-president Abdul Halim Khaddam. Both camps are detested. The situation in Syria will only get worse in the coming weeks, with further demonstrations and killings, increased economic hardship 16

as vital tourism and foreign investment drops away, increasing the pressure on the international community to act. Chaos in Syria will be almost impossible to contain. Turkey is faced with a refugee crisis on its southern border and may even create a buffer zone inside Syria. Many Syrians have fled into Lebanon, a country heavily dependent on Syria for its imports. Israel is also worried. Rami Makhlouf, the president's notoriously corrupt cousin, threatened in the New York Times that "If there is no stability here, there's no way there will be stability in Israel." This warning was given substance on 5 June when protesters, no doubt encouraged by the regime, attempted to breach the armistice fence with Israel on the occupied Golan Heights. Israeli forces reportedly killed around 20 people. There is also a Palestinian dimension with 450,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, and clashes in the largest refugee camp at Yarmouk left up to 20 dead. Most Palestinians are terrified of being sucked into this crisis, and the PLO is barely making a comment. At best, the international response will be to isolate the regime further and to contain the impact, a damning indictment not just of its consistently inconsistent position towards the Arab Spring but also of the declining influence in the region of the United States and its allies, perhaps an irreversible process. But the west has only itself to blame. It is the inconsistency of its policies and the failure to root its actions legally and ethically over decades – not least over Iraq, Palestine and cosying up to the most dictatorial of regimes – that has led to the lack of trust in its motives and the dilemmas it faces now. Chris Doyle Why foreign intervention is not welcome in Syria Syrians are well versed in the history of foreign occupation and interference, and do not trust the west's motives Tuesday 14 June 2011 13.13 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/14/syria-intervention-west

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M. Á. BASTENIER El Tanzimat de Erdogan M. Á. BASTENIER 15/06/2011 El probable punto final de la reforma sería la coronación del líder en un sistema presidencialista La última encarnación de Turquía, que dirige Recep Tayyip Erdogan, el vencedor en las elecciones del domingo, encuentra sus primeras dificultades con la erupción de la primavera árabe, precisamente cuando el país empezaba a rivalizar en influencia con su antecesor, el Imperio Otomano. Pero no son las armas sino el llamado soft power, basado en un espectacular desarrollo económico y una política exterior soberana, lo que se proyecta desde Oriente Próximo y el Cáucaso hasta el Asia Central. Durante la mayor parte del siglo XIX, Estambul desplegó un formidable esfuerzo de modernización conocido como Tanzimat, que, aunque no consiguió su principal objetivo, la preservación del imperio, estuvo lejos de ser un fracaso. Los progresos en la aproximación a Europa facilitaron la tarea de Mustafá Kemal, que en 1923 refundó la nación como república exclusivamente turca y laica, limitada a Asia Menor. Pero esa Turquía se europeizaba sin democratizarse, porque, presuntamente, el carácter islámico de la sociedad era incompatible con un sistema representativo. Y el Ejército, que había hecho posible esa refundación derrotando a Grecia en una derivación de la Gran Guerra, adquiría un derecho al golpe de Estado sobre los Gobiernos civiles, de lo que el país únicamente se está liberando bajo Erdogan. El líder, al que muchos electores llaman papá Tayyip, en contraste con la solemne canonización de Mustafá Kemal como Atatürk (padre de los turcos), se ha sumergido en una Turquía a la que la obsesión laicista aislaba de sus raíces musulmanas, y, al frente de su partido, Justicia y Desarrollo, ha sabido reislamizar tanto como democratizar. Cabe argüir, incluso, que era necesario pasar por el periodo de europeización dictatorial de Mustafá Kemal para que Turquía sea hoy un país básicamente europeo, en el que un partido de islamismo contenido niega espacio al islamismo radical, y tampoco podría, aunque quisiera, edificar una república de ayatolás. La UE aceptaba en 2005 a esa Turquía en proceso de redefinición como candidato al ingreso, bien que ad calendas; un mega-proceso conocido como Ergenekon -lugar mítico de la cordillera del Altay, supuesto origen del pueblo turco- conducía, tras una investigación comenzada en 2007, a la detención de más de 200 altos mandos militares, acusados de conspiración contra el poder, que se escudaban en la defensa de esa laicidad; Erdogan lanzaba en noviembre de 2009 una política de reconocimiento limitado de los derechos lingüísticos del pueblo kurdo; en septiembre pasado ganaba un referéndum que le rendía las llaves del poder judicial; y, como arco de bóveda, Ahmet Davutoglu -aterrizado directamente de la academia en el Ministerio de Exteriores en mayo de 2009- ponía patas arriba la política medio-oriental. En aplicación de esa política, Ankara osaba negar a Washington la utilización de su territorio para invadir Irak en 2003, y, apoyándose en el sentimiento propalestino del pueblo, comenzaba a marcar distancias con Israel. Era el momento de arreglar cuentas con el pasado, iniciando el deshielo con Armenia y reclamando el parentesco con el Asia de lenguas túrquicas. La nueva Turquía se presentaba, así, como poder 18

estabilizador y de mediación en la zona, de acuerdo con el planteamiento de Davutoglu: "Ningún problema con el vecindario". Pero las revueltas árabes han embarullado ese propósito porque la masacre en Siria y la guerra de Libia obligan a tomar partido contra los aliados de ayer. Turquía ha hecho juegos malabares, aunque a la defensiva, rompiendo con el hasta hace poco íntimo vecino, el sirio Bachar el Asad, y pidiendo a Gadafi que acepte la derrota. Pero lo más negativo para Erdogan sería el regreso de Egipto. Con el país del Nilo bajo una dictadura teledirigida por Washington y Jerusalén, Ankara tenía vía libre para su diplomacia, pero la democratización de El Cairo metería a un segundo gallo en el corral. La culminación del nuevo Tanzimat debería ser la aprobación de una Constitución que recluyera al Ejército en los cuarteles, pero Erdogan necesitará para ello los escaños del partido nacionalista con los que alcanzar los dos tercios de la Cámara; tarea, sin embargo, nada imposible porque el primer ministro también es nacionalista y los nacionalistas tampoco son laicos. El probable punto final de la reforma sería la coronación presidencial del líder en un sistema, desde luego, presidencialista. Y por ahí rebotan los temores. El sultanismo es un fantasma de la historia turca, y un autoritarismo creciente es perceptible en los modos del gran modernizador. El peligro puede que no sea el islam, sino que Erdogan llegue a creerse un segundo Atatürk. M. Á. BASTENIER El Tanzimat de Erdogan15/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Tanzimat/Erdogan/elpepiint/20110615elpe piint_9/Tes

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TRIBUNA: JULIO MARÍA SANGUINETTI ¡Ay!, las oposiciones... No hay nada más estable en democracia que un sólido bipartidismo y la alternancia JULIO MARÍA SANGUINETTI 14/06/2011 En las democracias no se ha inventado nada más estable que un sólido bipartidismo ni nada más saludable que una alternancia de los dos polos. Cuando uno de ellos tiene problemas, el otro avanza, y eso es lo que les suele pasar a los Gobiernos, enfrentados siempre a dificultades que plantean demandas superiores a las posibilidades. Aun en la exitosa experiencia política de Chile, las turbulencias que se vivieron adentro de la Concertación, después de cuatro Gobiernos excelentes, llevaron al poder a la oposición de centro-derecha, bien alineada detrás de un candidato fuerte. La alternancia no nació de la situación económica o social, cuando el hemisferio vive una coyuntura de comercio internacional tan favorable como no ha conocido nunca antes. Todo provino de insatisfacciones, conformismos y debates mal canalizados en el proceso de selección de las candidaturas. En el resto del continente, ese viento a favor viene ayudando: pasó en Brasil, pasó en Colombia, pasó en Costa Rica. En todos estos casos, los problemas mayores los tuvieron los opositores. En Brasil, el poderoso Partido de la Social Democracia brasileña tenía una razonable posibilidad de ganarle a una candidata eminentemente técnica como Dilma Rousseff, pero la elección del candidato no fue la mejor en términos electorales: con el carismático Aecio Neves, gobernador de Minas Gerais, la oposición tenía mejores chances que con el gobernador de São Paulo, José Serra, un estadista completo pero de mucho menor tirón popular. En Perú, el caso ha sido paradigmático. Las corrientes centristas obtuvieron una mitad del electorado en la primera vuelta, pero divididas dejaron al país delante de un balotaje de dos minorías extremas, con una opción de hierro: o la hija del enigmático seudodictador Fujimori o un exmilitar nacionalista y populista de errática ideología. Ganó éste y encomiéndense a la Providencia quienes creen en ella, para pedirle que se hagan realidad las primeras declaraciones -muy conciliadoras- de un candidato hasta anteayer caracterizado por la demagogia populista. En Argentina, la cuestión es parecida. La segunda vuelta posee allí un sistema muy especial: no se da si un candidato obtiene el 45% de la votación o si, superando el 40%, aventaja al que le sigue por más de un 10%. Nadie duda que la oposición es, por lo menos, la mitad. Pero dividida en tres o cuatro segmentos, lleva a dudar que su mejor opción quede, como diferencia, a menos de ese fatídico 10%, ante un oficialismo tan armado como lo es siempre el peronismo a la hora de luchar por el poder. Pocos Gobiernos han ofrecido tantos flancos de ataque, pero desde la muerte del expresidente Kirchner y el alejamiento de su confrontativa imagen, la sucesión en manos de su viuda ha desconcertado a una oposición que perdió la motivación de un enemigo ríspido y se desgrana en un extraño juego de personalismos. Nada está definido, pero hoy - objetivamente- eso es lo que se ve.

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En la propia Venezuela, donde el arbitrario poder de Chávez inevitablemente unifica el sentimiento opositor, no se ha logrado generar y consolidar un liderazgo capaz de enfrentar esa máquina electoral montada desde el Gobierno. De todo lo cual se desprende que en el ejercicio político hay un arte, un imponderable oficio hecho de racionalidad y oportunismo, mensaje y medio de comunicarlo, sin cuyo buen manejo es difícil salir victorioso. Ello es así, aun en estos tiempos de rápido crecimiento económico y con la velocidad de los Twitter y los Facebook para llegarle a la gente. En una palabra, no hay sustituto para la conducción política. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Ay/oposiciones/elpepiopi/20110614elpepiopi_4 /Tes

El primer ministro promete negociar la nueva Constitución al no lograr la mayoría necesaria La entrada en la UE y el conflicto kurdo continúan aparcados en su agenda J. C. SANZ - Ankara - 14/06/2011 En su tercer discurso en nueve años desde el balcón de la sede del Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP) en Ankara para celebrar una victoria electoral, el primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan tendió el domingo por la noche la mano a la oposición y la sociedad civil de Turquía. "Consenso y negociación" fueron el eje de su mensaje tras haber ganado los comicios con el 49,9% de los votos, pero sin haber podido sumar los 330 escaños (se quedó a las puertas, con 326) que le hubiesen permitido elaborar en solitario una nueva Constitución. Lo mismo dijo hace cuatro años. Pero Erdogan alegó pocos meses después que la oposición no lograba ponerse de acuerdo entre sí -parece difícil que la extrema derecha turca y los nacionalistas kurdos se sienten en la misma mesa- y todo quedó en el olvido. "Volverá a hacer lo mismo ahora. Erdogan no aspira a convertirse en un presidente como Nicolas Sarkozy, que está sometido a controles democráticos, sino como el todopoderoso Vladímir Putin", advierte Yusuf Kanli, columnista de Daily News, quien recalca que las reformas constitucionales que pretenden aplicar los islamistas pueden acabar convirtiendo a Turquía en "una nueva Rusia autoritaria en la frontera sur de Europa". El mayor reto del primer ministro recién reelegido es precisamente ofrecer una nueva Constitución "civil y democrática" para derogar la vigente, impuesta por una junta militar tras el golpe de Estado de 1980. "Con una Constitución hecha a su medida, Erdogan quiere a toda costa ser el primer presidente elegido directamente por el pueblo y con plenos poderes ejecutivos", asegura Kanli, "para seguir en el poder hasta 2023, en el primer centenario de la República de Turquía". La adhesión a la Unión Europea, un proceso estancado desde hace cinco años, es otro de sus grandes desafíos. "Nadie ha hablado de Europa durante la campaña, parece como si a los turcos hubiese dejado de interesarnos el ingreso en la UE", argumenta el analista político Burak Bekdil. Lo que nadie parece discutir, sin embargo, en Turquía es la política "neo-otomana" de pujante expansión comercial hacia los países vecinos. "Es

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una política de Estado, no solo del AKP", advierte Bekdil. Y nadie cuestiona el impresionante crecimiento del 8,9% del producto interior bruto en 2010, a pesar de que la economía turca se está recalentado con un déficit de la balanza comercial del 8%. Mientras Ankara no haga algún gesto hacia Chipre, que sigue vetando las negociaciones en Bruselas, y permita que sus barcos y aviones puedan acceder a Turquía, la cuestión europea seguirá aparcada en la mesa del primer ministro. La cuestión kurda, sin embargo, puede recibir un impulso hacia su solución si los 36 diputados nacionalistas elegidos el domingo hacen valer su peso en la nueva Constitución, de modo que Erdogan pueda sentirse menos presionado por los otros dos grupos parlamentarios de la oposición: socialdemócratas laicos y ultraderecha. Tendrá tiempo para abordar estos retos. Ahora deberá centrar su atención en dos focos de conflicto. Uno ya está ardiendo en la frontera suroriental por el éxodo de miles de civiles sirios que huyen de la represión del régimen de Damasco. El otro puede estallar pronto si la nueva flotilla de ayuda a Gaza que se está formando en el puerto de Estambul zarpa a finales de mes, como está previsto. En el primero, Erdogan parece haber dado por perdido a su aliado regional y prometedor socio comercial Bachar el Asad. En el segundo deberá demostrar si aún tiene temple para restablecer los lazos cortados con Israel tras el sangriento asalto al Mavi Mármara o su temperamento impetuoso le llevará a autorizar una nueva flotilla esta vez con muchos más barcos y activistas. J. C. SANZ El primer ministro promete negociar la nueva Constitución al no lograr la mayoría necesaria14/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/primer/ministro/promete/negociar/nueva/C onstitucion/lograr/mayoria/necesaria/elpepiint/20110614elpepiint_4/Tes

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COMMENT http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5bdf4198-96b8-11e0-baca- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1PLB42tdE The road to ruin for the Assad regime By Bassma Kodmani Published: June 14 2011 22:17 | Last updated: June 14 2011 22:17 After a week of suppression and mass punishment, the Syrian army has regained control of the town of Jisr al-Shughour. It has been a brutal campaign in the classic mode of tyrants. But not withstanding this success, the world should be in no doubt that the oligarchy of Assad sons, cousins and buddies is seeing the rationale that has governed for years turn against them. The regime has long controlled society through a multi-tier strategy relying on security, and dominating the economy. President Bashar al-Assad inherited a functioning security apparatus. The equilibrium maintained between different security agencies was designed to prevent the domination of any one of them. But now in face of the uprising it is leading to an inconsistent response to the protests. So too, while disproportionate brutality in response to dissent was an effective deterrent for years, this time brutality triggered the uprising in the city of Deraa. The repetition of the unrest in other towns is fomenting the insurgency. EDITOR’S CHOICE In depth: Syria - Jun-10 Syria’s finances under scrutiny - Jun-14 Syrian forces head for second protest town - Jun-14 Assad’s brother blamed for regime brutality - Jun-13 Syrian refugee flow to Turkey rises - Jun-13 Syrian blog revealed as hoax - Jun-13 Economic planning was always subordinated to sectarian and security considerations. The regime embraced liberal economics, first reluctantly then wholeheartedly as it learnt to pervert its rules to suit its financial appetite. The business empires controlled by the inner circle of the Assad family – banks, insurance companies, mobile phone firms – allowed the regime to breed a new middle class of workers, primarily concentrated in the large urban centres which came to form a new social base for the regime. In the meantime, the traditional middle class, when it was not co-opted or corrupted, sank into poverty. But with bankruptcy looming for the entire regime and its big businesses, the new middle class is quickly losing the incentive to continue its support of the regime, and the urban merchants will soon have no reason left to protect their alliance with it. The silent majority of Damascus and Aleppo is showing signs of a change of mindset. Now Aleppo seems increasingly restive. Probably the most damaging factor in the long-term is the sectarian strategy that Mr Assad led personally. There was never any illusion about his actual power base: as the ultimate guarantor of his survival, members of the Alawite minority have always held key security and political posts. All the while he has cultivated ties with Sunni, Christian, Druze and Ismaili religious leaders, and worked hard on building an image for himself as protector of a tolerant society. But he particularly sought to encourage 23

religiosity within the Sunni majority – as long as it did not take a political turn – while convincing minorities, Christians in particular, that they need the regime to protect them from this same Muslim majority. In response to the revolt since March, the regime has activated all the sectarian tools it can use and has caused as much damage to inter-sectarian relations in a few weeks as it did in 40 years. It has forced Christian patriarchs to express their fears of a future without the regime and shown pictures of churches on fire, a manipulation that was quickly unmasked. It has armed Alawite civilians and sought to resolve any grievances with the different clans within the community to secure its loyalty. Yet the community itself is under high tension. As the regime grows more isolated and the protest movement gains credibility, Alawite leaders may decide the survival of the community lies in joining the movement now rather than in supporting the scorched earth strategy of the regime. Syrian opposition media – supported by sources inside the country – report that Alawite leaders have sought to establish contacts with Sunni imams to seek guarantees for the community in return for abandoning the Assad regime. This, rather than defections in the army, could herald the unravelling of the regime’s powers of suppression. The Assad dynasty will have dug its own grave and brought about its own downfall. The writer is executive director of the Arab Reform Initiative Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web. Bassma Kodmani The road to ruin for the Assad regime June 14 2011 22:17 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5bdf4198-96b8-11e0-baca- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1PGnQq2JQ

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MIDDLE EAST http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be7d154c-96b7-11e0- baca-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1PLEJfhFq Syria’s finances under scrutiny By Abigail Fielding-Smith in , Roula Khalaf in London and an FT reporter in Damascus Published: June 14 2011 20:57 | Last updated: June 14 2011 20:57 Syria could by the end of the year be forced to look for outside aid to keep its economy afloat, analysts warn, as the country reels from three months of protests and a huge military crackdown. As troops advanced on the northern town of Maarat al-Numan on Tuesday, observers increasingly questioned the health of Syrian finances. EDITOR’S CHOICE In depth: Syria - Jun-10 Syrian forces head for second northern protest town - Jun-14 Assad’s brother blamed for regime brutality - Jun-13 Syrian refugee flow to Turkey rises - Jun-13 Syrian blog revealed as hoax - Jun-13 Syria regime wages propaganda war - Jun-12 With the tourism sector devastated by the unrest, foreign investment on pause and government spending rising to help ease the discontent, analysts say foreign exchange reserves at the central bank are being depleted as the government tries to stem pressure on the local currency. The Syrian pound slipped about 15 per cent against the dollar in April and sells for less than the official rate on the black market. “The reserves are certainly doing a lot of work propping up the Syrian pound but the exact level of depletion since the crisis began is impossible to say,” says a western analyst in Damascus. High oil prices have boosted revenue from Syria’s limited oil exports, which, combined with a relatively good year for agriculture after several seasons of drought, may prevent dramatic economic contraction. Oil revenues bring in an estimated $7m-$8m a day. Opposition figures say they would like companies to stop buying Syrian oil to raise economic pressure on the regime. But the combination of lower revenues from other parts of the economy and the additional spending burden means Syria “could run out of money”, according to Chris Phillips, chief Syria analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit. Analysts say the regime could survive on foreign reserves and domestic bank lending for a while – one of the lower estimates is six months – but would then probably have to turn to oil-rich Gulf countries for help. Whether they would come to the rescue is uncertain. Opposition figures say Qatar, one of Syria’s closest friends in the Gulf, has been distancing itself from the regime. But both the United Arab Emirates and appear afraid of giving up on President Bashar al-Assad for fear of an unknown alternative.

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Tour operators say hotel occupancy in Aleppo and Damascus is close to zero. The unrest has slowed trade and disrupted manufacturing. Commerce, even in the relatively calm capital, is down about 50 per cent, according to local economists. “It’s a time of crisis now,” says one prominent businessman in Damascus. “This generation is not used to a crisis, so everyone is cutting back and spending less.” Meanwhile, the regime has overstretched itself on spending commitments in efforts to quell the unrest. Before the crisis broke out this year the regime had wanted to reduce fuel subsidies and liberalise the state-led economic model. But after the unrest in the region began, the regime decided to raise heating oil allowances, diesel subsidies and civil servants’ salaries, and cut food taxes. Local economists estimate that the pay rise to civil servants alone could cost the government S£50bn ($1bn) – or about 6 per cent of the annual budget Even with optimistic growth forecasts, the budget deficit is likely to be 7.7 per cent – almost double the 2009 figure. Syria is not well connected to international lending markets and domestic banks have limited capital. Cutting spending seems politically unfeasible, international investment seems to be on hold, and printing money risks hyperinflation. “Their only option will be to raise capital from foreign (sovereign) lenders,” says a western analyst in Damascus. Mohammed al-Jleilati, the minister of finance, insisted last week that the economy was “strong and healthy”, claiming Syria was self-reliant in food and sitting on foreign currency reserves worth $18bn. However, according to Mr Phillips, “the goal at the moment seems to be stay in power whatever the costs, the costs to both the population and the economy”. Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web. Abigail Fielding-Smith in Beirut, Roula Khalaf Syria’s finances under scrutiny June 14 2011 20:57 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/be7d154c-96b7-11e0-baca- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1PGnQq2JQ

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TRIBUNA: JAVIER SOLANA Para recomponer las relaciones Turquía-UE Con la "primavera árabe" las ventajas de la adhesión turca resultan evidentes La adhesión es mi sueño y seguiré luchando por hacerlo realidad JAVIER SOLANA 14/06/2011 Hace tan solo cinco meses, Osama bin Laden estaba vivo, Hosni Mubarak tenía un dominio firme de Egipto y Zine el Abidine ben Ali gobernaba Túnez con mano de hierro. Hoy, la rebelión popular y el cambio político se han extendido por toda la región. Hemos presenciado una represión brutal de las protestas en Siria y , la entrada de tropas saudíes en Bahréin y una batalla aún no concluida por Libia. Para Europa, la "primavera árabe" debe hacer que se vuelva a centrar la atención en una cuestión en gran medida pasada por alto en los últimos meses: los beneficios de la adhesión plena de Turquía a la Unión Europea. Dadas las tremendas oportunidades que ofrecen las circunstancias actuales, las ventajas para Europa de la adhesión de Turquía han de resultar evidentes. Como Recep Tayyip Erdogan ha sido elegido para un nuevo mandato como primer ministro de Turquía y Polonia, país muy consciente de la importancia de la posición estratégica de Europa en el mundo, ocupará la presidencia de la UE al final de este mes, ahora es el momento de que la Unión y Turquía reanuden y recompongan sus negociaciones sobre la adhesión de Turquía. El beneficio que Turquía puede aportar a Europa resultaba visible aun antes de la "primavera árabe". Europa es, por definición, culturalmente diversa, por lo que la diversidad es el destino de la UE y, para que Europa pase a ser un activo protagonista mundial, y no un museo, necesita las nuevas perspectivas y energía del pueblo de Turquía. En la actualidad, Europa es a un tiempo mayor y diferente en comparación con la Europa de 1999, cuando se invitó a Turquía a iniciar el proceso de adhesión. También está experimentando una profunda crisis económica, que estalló hacia el momento en que se aprobó por fin el Tratado de Lisboa para adaptarse a la ampliación de la UE. Si se hubiera aprobado ese tratado en 2005, como se pretendía, ya se habría estado aplicando durante seis años y la presión ejercida por la crisis en la gobernación económica de la UE, tan visible en los recientes problemas de la zona del euro, habría sido mucho más abordable. Pero la UE siempre afronta problemas, los resuelve y sigue avanzando. Hoy, no tenemos un Ministerio de Economía, pero estamos a punto de tener algo similar. Asimismo, el Banco Central Europeo tiene hoy capacidades que nadie imaginaba en 1997, pongamos por caso. Un importante imperativo que Europa debe abordar aún es el de la migración, que solo llegará a ser un problema mayor con el tiempo. De aquí a 2050, la fuerza laboral de Europa se reducirá en 70 millones. Para mantener nuestra economía, es necesaria la migración y unas fronteras de la UE abiertas... y afrontar los movimientos populistas en Europa deseosos de excluir a "los de fuera".

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La Turquía de hoy también ha cambiado espectacularmente desde 1999, tanto política como económicamente, cosa que tiene mucho que ver con el proceso de adhesión a la UE. De hecho, sin la atracción de la UE -su poder "blando"-, esos cambios no se habrían producido. Económicamente, Turquía está ahora en el G-20 y está desempeñando un papel eficaz en él y, políticamente, Turquía ha surgido como una potencia con iniciativa regional, papel que se toma extraordinariamente en serio. Concluidas las recientes elecciones parlamentarias y a punto de aprobarse una nueva Constitución, Turquía está acercándose a un momento que hará época. Yo fui miembro de la Comisión Constitucional española que formuló la Constitución española en 1975 y 1976, tras la muerte de Franco, por lo que sé lo que es pasar de una dictadura a la democracia y lo importante que es que se formule una Constitución por consenso. La relación Turquía-UE comenzó con un acuerdo de asociación firmado en 1963. Ahora han comenzado las negociaciones sobre la adhesión y hay que iniciar el examen de 35 "capítulos", que abarcan desde la agricultura hasta la energía, pasando por la competencia, el medio ambiente, el empleo, la política social y demás. Ya hemos iniciado el de 19 capítulos... menos de los que nos gustaría, pero el verdadero problema estriba en que solo hemos dado por concluidouno y, lo que es peor, el ritmo de las negociaciones se ha aminorado. En realidad, en la segunda mitad de 2010, nada sucedió. Espero que en 2011 se logren avances sólidos. Turquía y la UE se necesitan mutuamente. Ahora corresponden a la UE el 75% de toda la inversión extranjera en Turquía y la mitad, aproximadamente, de sus exportaciones y turismo procedente del exterior. Asimismo, la seguridad energética de Europa depende de la cooperación con Turquía en materia de tránsito del petróleo y del gas natural procedentes del Asia central y de Oriente Próximo. También nos necesitamos políticamente. Los vecinos de Turquía son nuestros vecinos; sus problemas, nuestros problemas. Los beneficios en materia de seguridad y las ventajas estratégicas para la UE de tener como miembro a Turquía serían numerosas, comenzando por la relación entre la UE y la OTAN, de la que Turquía es miembro desde hace mucho. Asimismo, la participación de la UE en la resolución de los problemas actuales de la región mediterránea sería mucho más fácil gracias a la concertación con Turquía. En Bosnia-Herzegovina, la cooperación UE-Turquía es fundamental para lograr una solución duradera. En 1999, Turquía no quiso pasar a ser un candidato a la adhesión, porque sus dirigentes consideraron que las condiciones serían demasiado duras. Yo estaba allí, hablé con el primer ministro Bülent Ecevit a medianoche y después con el presidente Süley-man Demirel y, dos días después, Ecevit estaba en Helsinki para declarar oficialmente el deseo de Turquía de llegar a ser miembro de la UE y dijimos: Turquía será miembro de la UE. Yo apoyé la firma de aquel documento; lo mismo haría ahora. En estos tiempos, difíciles e imprevisibles, pero cargados de esperanza, el mundo necesita que Turquía y la UE colaboren juntos. Eso no significa reunirse de vez en cuando y después decidir cómo abordar determinado problema. Significa algo mucho más profundo y muy concreto. Significa la adhesión de Turquía a la UE. Ese es mi sueño y seguiré luchando por hacerlo realidad. JAVIER SOLANA Para recomponer las relaciones Turquía-UE14/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/recomponer/relaciones/Turquia- UE/elpepiopi/20110614elpepiopi_5/Tes?print=1

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June 14, 2011 Camel’s Nose Under the Wheel? By MAUREEN DOWD WASHINGTON I guess you don’t get to be the richest man in Saudi Arabia without being able to sum up a situation quickly. When I called him in Riyadh on Tuesday night, the Arabian Warren Buffett, as the billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud is known, was quite definite in his views on allowing Saudi women to drive. “We’re not calling for diplomatic relations with Israel,” he said. “We’re just asking for ladies to drive the car. Please, give me a break. Even in , women can drive. It’s a joke. The issue of women driving can happen tomorrow morning because it’s not really an issue at all. Frankly speaking, we need strong political leadership to do it and get it behind us. What are we waiting for?” Of course, Prince Alwaleed is a pillar of modernity in the medieval kingdom. In his skyscraper office in Riyadh, women in tight jeans and suits rule the roost, working side by side with men, something that is forbidden elsewhere. Government offices in Saudi Arabia are segregated by gender. The prince made a point of hiring a woman, born in the holy city of Mecca, and training her to be the pilot of his private jet. “Ladies can fly above but not drive on the street,” he said dryly, noting: “My wife drives in the desert and in every city we go to immediately from the airport. She’s an excellent driver — better than me, for sure.” In the ’50s, at the height of the American mania for jokes and TV skits about ditzy women behind the wheel, there was a saying: “Women drivers, no survivors.” That takes on an ominous new meaning as Saudi women agonize over whether to join in a drive-in Friday — a national protest where women will take the wheel to see if they get thrown in the clink en masse. In 1990, 47 women from the Saudi intelligentsia were so inspired by American troops — and female soldiers — gathering in the kingdom for the first President Bush’s war against Saddam that they went for a joy ride to protest Saudi Arabia being the only country where women can’t drive. The fundamentalist clerics went into overdrive, branding the women “whores” and “harlots.” They lost their jobs and were harassed. Their passports were revoked and they had to sign papers agreeing not to talk about the drive. When I interviewed some of them 12 years later, they were only beginning to shake off the vengeful backlash. For all the highfalutin talk of George and Laura Bush about how W.’s wars would help expand the rights of women in the Middle East, there’s only so much pressure America can put on Saudi Arabia about letting women drive without jeopardizing the flow of oil that lets people drive here. President Obama did not even mention Saudi Arabia in his big speech about the Middle East last month.

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Driving may not be as important an issue as the end of male guardianship, but it is the high-octane nexus where our hypocrisies interlock. The latest drive to drive started last month, a Twitter and Facebook feminist blossoming in the Arab Spring, following a Saudi “Day of Rage” in March where nobody showed up except the police. King Abdullah passes for progressive in Saudi Arabia. (He just issued a decree allowing women, instead of men, to sell women lingerie.) Frightened by the uprisings all around him, he snuffed out wisps of democratic protests the Saudi way: with his checkbook. After the “Day of Rage” fizzled, he rewarded his complacent citizens with $130 billion in salary increases, new housing and financing for religious organizations. But then a 32-year-old single mother named Manal al-Sharif, an Internet consultant for the state-run oil company Aramco, posted a video of herself on YouTube, driving in a black abaya in the Eastern Province city of Al-Khobar. She told CNN that the last straw was one night when she was trying to get home to her 5-year-old son and she couldn’t catch a cab or find her brother to pick her up or get away from male drivers harassing her as she walked alone. “I’m a grown-up woman,” she said, adding: “And I was crying like a kid in the street because I couldn’t find someone to pick me up to take me back home.” She was put in jail for a week and forced to sign a document agreeing not to talk to the press or continue her calls for reform. This had a chilling effect on women. But, this week, Reem al-Faisal, a princess, activist and Jidda photographer who is the granddaughter of the late King Faisal and the niece of the Foreign Minister Saud al- Faisal, spoke out, writing in The Arab News that “it is truly tragic that we have to fight for such an essential yet mediocre right” and be treated as “eternal minors.” She suggested that women simply drive pollution-free camels. Except then men would “deny women camel-driving rights, too. Then we will have to content ourselves with taking the backseat of the camels or start looking for other options — mules maybe?” Camel’s Nose Under the Wheel? June 14, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/opinion/15dowd.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines& emc=tha212

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Arab League issues first condemnation of Syria violence Comments 'unbalanced and politically motivated', says Syrian representative, as army's onslaught continues

Martin Chulov in Beirut guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 14 June 2011 18.49 BST

The Arab League's outgoing secretary general, Amr Moussa, who has said Arab states are monitoring the crisis in Syria. Photograph: Mohamed Abd El Ghany/Retuers

The Arab League has publicly criticised the violence in Syria for the first time, saying Arab states are "angry and actively monitoring" the crisis. The comments from the outgoing secretary general, Amr Moussa, drew a bitter response from Damascus. Syria's representative at the league described them as "unbalanced and politically motivated". Mounting international condemnation, however, has done little to slow the onslaught of the Syrian army as it pushes through northern border villages on an operation it claims is cleansing the area of criminal gangs. Residents of the town of Deir Azzor were reportedly bracing themselves on Tuesday night for the arrival of armour and troops from the Syrian military's feared 4th division, commanded by Maher al-Assad, brother of Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad. The same division has been in control of the town of Jisr al-Shughour since Friday, forcing most remaining people in the besieged enclave to flee to the nearby mountains bordering Turkey.

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Syrian refugees continue to arrive at crossing points into Turkey and some are reported to have told authorities that the army arrested at least 15 people along the way. More than 7,000 refugees are now in southern Turkey and at least 5,000 have fled into Lebanon. Moussa said: "Though their views differ, Arab states are all worried, angry and actively monitoring the current crisis in Syria. What we are hearing and monitoring, about many victims falling, indicates great tumult in Syria ... The situation in Syria should not be left in this state. Continuation of the status quo could lead to what may not be desired ... for Syria." Syria's envoy, Youssef Ahmad, claimed Moussa was recommending the same sort of military intervention that the Arab League endorsed in Libya three months ago. "Days before leaving his post, Moussa calls for a kind of foreign intervention in the Syrian affairs, when the Libyan blood, shed by Nato air strikes as a result for a [UN] security council resolution, based, regrettably on an Arab demand in which Moussa's efforts immensely contributed, isn't dry yet," he said. On the Lebanon-Syria border, few refugees crossed on Tuesday. "The Syrians are keeping people away from the border," said a man in the town of Wadi Khaled, who identified himself as Omar. "It has been like this for many days." Wadi Khaled is teeming with refugees from towns and cities, especially Hama and Homs, scenes of fierce violence over the last fortnight. "There are at least 5,000 Syrians here," said Omar. "But it is very difficult for any more to come because the army is stopping them or shooting them." Syrian troops were clearly visible patrolling a river that acts as an unofficial border. Several Syrian tanks had their turrets pointed towards Lebanon. At an official crossing point further up the road, there was no sign of anyone arriving. Martin ChulovArab League issues first condemnation of Syria violence Tuesday 14 June 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/14/arab-league-condemnation-syria- violence/print

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06/14/2011 02:58 PM Last Bastion Saudi Arabia's Silent Battle to Halt History By Susanne Koelbl in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia's rulers are doing their utmost to resist the tide of history. The wealthy Arab country wants peace and stability within its society and in the region. But even the ultraconservative kingdom has not remained untouched by the unrest in the Arab world.

He landed at around midnight with two wives, an entourage of 59 people, including three cabinet ministers -- and a 7.6-centimeter (3 inch) piece of shrapnel in his chest. He walked down the gangway with great difficulty -- but "upright," according to eyewitnesses -- to a waiting convoy that would take him from the airport north of Riyadh to the city's large military hospital. The Saudi Arabian capital lay silent in the desert night, its landmark Kingdom Tower brightly lit in the darkness. Riyadh stood in sharp contrast to the city Yemeni President had just fled. For the past four months, the people in the Yemeni capital Sana'a had 33

demonstrated against his regime and had taken to the streets, first by the tens and then by the hundreds of thousands, to demand an end to his regime. Saleh had his forces shoot at the protesters almost every night, but with each week the attacks from the other side came closer to his palace -- until June 3, when grenades were launched into the presidential mosque during Friday prayers, killing several of Saleh's bodyguards and seriously wounding him and his ministers. Saleh, 69, is the third autocrat to be swept out of office by the tide of Arab unrest in the region, and the second to find refuge in Saudi Arabia. Since the Tunisians forced their leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to flee to Jeddah in January, none of the monarchs and presidents in the Arab world can be sure of retaining power anymore. Their subjects continue to vent their rage across four time zones, from Mauritania to Oman. The Arab world is out of joint. Life as Usual But not Saudi Arabia, or so it seems. And not Riyadh. As ever, Saudi men sit in their large SUVs, stuck in traffic between the steel-blue facades of office buildings, and the wives of these men are still having their drivers drop them off in front of the shopping malls in downtown Riyadh, where they scurry from Prada to Ralph Lauren and then disappear into Starbucks for a latte -- in the "family department," a room on the side kept separate from the world of men. The boulevards and promenades of the Saudi capital look as though they had been swept clean, as if some mysterious force had extinguished all public life. Riyadh has nothing like Avenue Bourguiba in Tunis or Tahrir Square in Cairo. In fact, there is no sign in Saudi Arabia of a public political discourse that could be compared with the debates, held in secret at first and then more and more in the open, with which the unrest began in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Almost every political discussion seems to end with the same words: Long live the king! Saudi Arabia feels like a realm that has come to a standstill in a rapidly changing world. Its leaders, most notably the 86-year-old King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, are pinning their hopes on the old principle of stability, as if Ben Ali had not been driven out of Tunisia, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had not been toppled and Yemen's Saleh had not just been admitted to one of their hospitals with a piece of shrapnel in his body. Influencing Neighbors King Abdullah must have been pleased to see his enemy Moammar Gadhafi in difficulties, but it troubled him to see the avalanche the young protesters in Tunis had unleashed. He didn't hesitate a moment before offering exile to the embattled Ben Ali. Abdullah was disgusted to see what happened to Mubarak in Cairo. Saudi Arabia still hasn't come to terms with the Egyptian revolution. Nevertheless, it promised €2.7 billion ($3.98 billion) to the military council in Cairo to provide the new leadership with "a certain level of comfort," as an Arab financial expert put it. It went without saying in Cairo that the Saudis wanted the Egyptian courts to spare the elderly Mubarak, and the Egyptian chief of staff personally thanked the Saudi king for his pledge of financial support. Abdullah noted angrily how the spark of revolution jumped to the small country of Bahrain in February, and the Shiite majority rebelled against the Sunni Al Khalifa royal 34

family. The moderate king finally lost his patience and, in a first in Saudi history, sent the soldiers of his national guard across the King Fahd Causeway to Manama to crush the uprising. Saudi Arabia cannot intervene directly in Syria, where the unrest began in March and came to a preliminary head last week with a massacre in the city of Jisr al-Shughour. The House of Saud and the clan of Syrian President Bashar Assad have eyed each other suspiciously for years, and yet the Saudis would like to see the Syrians released from the embrace of their Shiite archenemy . But there is one concern the two leaders share: They want calm in their countries, not change. As a result, Damascus supported Riyadh when its troops marched into Bahrain, and Riyadh is remaining silent, no matter how brutally Assad's forces crush the protests in Syria. Bringing History to a Halt And finally there is Yemen, whose sovereignty the Saudi Arabian air force had until recently routinely ignored to bomb Shiite rebels across the border. But now that it has been confronted with sheer chaos since the eruption of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia is pinning its hopes on stability. On Tuesday of last week, the Saudis announced that they were sending a donation to the orphaned leadership in Sana'a, in the form of 3 million barrels of oil. By sending troops to Bahrain, billions to Egypt, goodwill to Damascus and oil to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, which is expected to earn $300 billion in oil revenues this year alone, is leaving no doubt as to what it intends to do with its power and money in the region: The kingdom wants to bring history to a halt and reinstate calm and stability on all fronts. But how stable is Saudi Arabia itself? There are few countries on whose stability the world depends as much as it does on that of Saudi Arabia, which is currently responsible for 12 percent of global oil production. Exactly how calm is this wealthy country that wants nothing but calm all around it? And where are the first cracks beginning to appear? 'Democracy Is the Only Solution' Jamal Khashoggi sits in his office in the Kingdom Tower, 300 meters (about 1,000 feet) above a city that stretches to a hazy horizon. "The absolute monarchy is obsolete," says Khashoggi. "Democracy is the only solution." Others in Saudi Arabia would be interrogated and locked up for such words. Khashoggi, one of the country's most outspoken intellectuals, is wearing a snow-white shirt that reaches to the floor, known as the thaub, and a black cord keeps his head scarf in place. It's the standard work attire of Saudi Arabian businessmen. The former reporter was a good friend of former Al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden, whom he knew as a young man in the 1980s, during the war in Afghanistan. He often visited him in the caves of Tora Bora and most recently met him in Sudan in 1995. At the same time, Khashoggi is seen as one of the most progressive thinkers in the country. He is building a television network modeled after Al-Jazeera for Prince Waleed Bin Talal, a billionaire and a reformer within the royal family. Saudi Arabia is a land of contradictions. Some of the things that are thought and expressed there would sound absurd, even outrageous, if voiced in the West. To this

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day, many in Saudi Arabia believe that bin Laden did not attack the Twin Towers in New York. "Of course it was him," says Khashoggi. He confesses that he had long shared bin Laden's view that there are only two ways to liberate the Arab world of its corrupt regimes: by infiltrating the political system through its institutions, or by violently overthrowing the depraved ruling cliques. Democracy "was not an option at the time," says Khashoggi. Signs of Insecurity A drive through the kingdom today, to Jeddah in the relatively liberal West, for example, to Dammam in the oil-rich Eastern Province, or to the fundamentalist city of Buraydah, which is nicknamed the "heart of darkness," reveals a society that senses that things cannot continue the way they have been going if everything is to remain unchanged -- in other words, stable. There are signs of insecurity, such as a decree recently issued by the king, under which the grand mufti and other clerics can no longer be criticized. The law probably says more about the dwindling power of the religious leaders than about their strength. Members of the opposition are constantly being imprisoned. Some 11,000 have been arrested since Sept. 11, 2001, and more than 5,000 are still in prison today. Who exactly these prisoners are is difficult to say. There is no transparency, and there are no legal procedures that adhere to international standards. Some are members of radical Islamic movements that are strongly resistant to Western-style modernization. 'We Must Be Careful that the Current Doesn't Wash Us Away' "We are sensitive," says General Mansour Sultan al-Turki of the Saudi Arabian Interior Ministry. The two-star general is sitting in a large, yellow leather armchair in a wing of the Interior Ministry in Riyadh. The building looks like a giant UFO with which half the city could be evacuated into space, if necessary. "We must be careful that the current doesn't wash us away," he explains. The general is part of a generation that perceived the introduction of the telephone as "confusing and dangerous," and which was worried about women getting the devices into their hands, because it would enable them to speak to strange men outside the house. No one invited globalization to Saudi Arabia. It simply arrived. Banning satellite connections or blocking websites didn't help stave it off. TV soap operas, Pizza Hut and online dating services are changing Saudi society as much today as the religious reformer Mohammed Bin Abd al-Wahhab, who preached the pure teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and the strict separation of the sexes, did 200 years ago. Like everywhere else in the Arab world, the Internet and television are used intensively in Saudi Arabia, to which furious conservatives say: "The camel already has its snout in the tent." The divorce rate is 40 percent today, families are shrinking and cities are exploding. One in three Saudi Arabians has diabetes, and just as many are overweight.

High Expectations

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Some 2 million of the country's 20 million citizens are studying in universities, with 110,000 attending the world's top institutions. After studying abroad, the grandchildren of the wealthy oil generation return home with high expectations. They want the same things that their parents have: a driver, a nanny and a gardener. But there are no jobs, and 26 percent of men are unemployed. The first girls' school in the country opened in the early 1960s. Today young women make up 52 percent of university students. Many men are horrified at the thought of these women driving themselves to work in the future -- like 32-year-old Manal al- Sharif who recently filmed herself driving as part of a campaign for women's rights, and was promptly arrested. The general with the moustache sinks more deeply into his armchair, as if he felt the burden of responsibility on his shoulders. He too has daughters. "The woman is a cause for concern," he says with a sigh. The ministry he serves is run by a strict hand. Interior Minister Nayef bin Abdul-Aziz is seen as a counterweight to, and potential successor of, his brother, the moderate reformist Abdullah. Nayef's ministry is a bastion against all those who could destabilize the Saud monarchy, which has ruled the country for two generations: terrorists, criminals and provocateurs. A joke making the rounds these days is that one reason wealthy Saudis never take part in protests is that it would mean having to get out of their SUVs. Instead, goes the joke, if they were ever to take to the streets, they would prefer to send their employees, the Pakistani drivers and Filipino gardeners, who would then hold up the protest signs for them. 'There Are Very Few Dissidents Here' "We don't need demonstrations, because we talk to one another," says General Turki. He speaks softly, as if he knew that the masses support him and his king. "There are very few dissidents here," he adds. A law has been in place for the last three months that bans demonstrations. It was adopted in the wake of protests by the Shiite minority in the city of Qatif that had supported the rebellious Shiite majority in Bahrain. The protests continue to this day. Large oil pipelines lie to the left and right of buildings in Qatif, but Shiites have never attacked any of these facilities. They are apparently not fundamentally opposed to the state or in favor of overthrowing the king. Instead, they are protesting over civil rights, a lack of recognition and discrimination against a minority that the regime doesn't trust. The Shiites make up about 10 percent of the population, but they are not permitted to serve in the military or hold high office. They are denounced in the schoolbooks as heretics. The regime senses that these conditions are unsustainable in the long run. In Qatif, the provincial governor is now speaking directly with representatives of the protesters about the construction of new mosques and the possibility of women becoming school principals. The government's concessions go far enough to tame the protesters' rage, but only as far as necessary.

Deep Pockets

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Until now, the government has simply had to reach into its coffers to keep the people happy whenever there has been a problem. King Abdullah recently promised his people $129 billion in new benefits. He approved low-interest mortgages, forgave the debts of the families of deceased farmers and ruled that students no longer had to repay the government for their foreign tuition. He also raised the salaries of civil servants by 15 percent and introduced unemployment insurance. Medical care is already free for Saudi citizens. Under these circumstances, who would rebel against the government? "It still won't work," says Jamal Khashoggi. "We can't just spend another 100 trillion riyal tomorrow to keep everyone happy. What do we do when the oil runs out?" Khashoggi speaks quietly and quickly, as if with his words he were trying to accelerate developments in his country. "Everyone wants modernity," he says, "but no one wants the side effects which go with it." Khashoggi and his radical ideas trouble the establishment, especially because of his dire predictions: "This nation will be reformed, just like other nations. We too need freedom, transparency, the rule of law, a prime minister, a real parliament." What if the democratic process succeeds in Tunisia or Egypt, Khashoggi asks? "We can't afford to become politically isolated." The royal family does figure in Khashoggi's scenario, but in the form of guardians in a constitutional monarchy. It isn't surprising that someone like Khashoggi has already been fired several times from his positions as editor-in-chief of leading Saudi newspapers. No one in the country wants so many changes to happen so quickly. Refusing to Wear a Headscarf The female blogger Kholoud al-Fahad, 30, might be a kind of a symbol of this rapid, disconcerting development. Fahad lives in Damman in the Eastern Province and is the mother of two children. She wears her hair uncovered. In addition to refusing to wear the face veil known as the niqab, Fahad often goes out in public without a headscarf. Fahad wears an expensive designer abaja around her slim figure, with a knee-length silk skirt and high heels visible underneath it. And she smokes. She writes angry articles about the fact that women in Saudi Arabia are not permitted to travel without the signed permission of their so-called male protectors, that they were not allowed to vote once again in local elections in September, even though the law only requires that a person be 21 years old, be in full command of his mental faculties and have a Saudi passport. She ridicules the practice of men controlling every movement women make and the claims of high-ranking clerics that women are too emotional to make decisions. Fahad has everything -- a car, a driver and money -- and could easily lead a comfortable life behind the walls of her large house. 'Don't Be Afraid' But she wants more. She wants to become a TV host. Her family is horrified over the prospect of her having to show her face to an audience of millions. "Why are you working against society?" her mother asks. "Why do you humiliate us?" an uncle asks angrily.

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As a girl, Fahad was the most devout child in school, until her father, a developer who traveled a lot, threw the Wahhabite books she had been reading into the bathtub, where they came apart. Six years ago, she was with her father in a shopping mall when the mutawa, the golden robe-wearing religious police, approached them. She quickly pulled her veil over her head. "Why are you doing that?" the father asked. "Don't be afraid." That incident changed her life, says Fahad. Male Feminists It is possible that there are as many male feminists as there are female feminists in Saudi Arabia today. Some are even in the palace. In 2009, the king opened the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology near Jeddah. He had ordered the separation of the sexes to be lifted at the new institution, where women and men sit next to each other in lecture halls. When a cleric issued a fatwa against the modern university and its promoters, the king dismissed him. Political scientist Samir Anabtawi taught at Yale University for a long time. Paintings by Wassily Kandinsky and Paul Klee hang in his living room, while a string concerto is playing on the stereo. The king and his princes are the glue that holds society together, says Anabtawi. He points out that many in Saudi Arabia want reforms, including many of the royals, but that no one wants the country to end up like Iraq, Yemen or Syria. Soon the king could be a man who was educated at an elite American university, says the professor. The only question, he adds, is whether the kingdom will first experience a "period of gerontocracy," as the crumbling Soviet Union did 30 years ago. The sons of the country's founder, Ibn Saud, are all older than 65 today. Perhaps the biggest source of instability lies in the rivalry within the large family over the throne. 'History Is Happening' The Saudis have invested their oil billions cleverly in the last 30 years. When the king breeds Arabian horses, and when he irrigates the desert and educates his elites, he now has top advisers from Europe and the United States to help him. There is even progress in the so-called heart of darkness, Buraydah, where women now have mobile phones and access to the Internet. Instead of the black full-body veil that even covers the hands and the face, very young women are now wearing veils with a narrow slit for their eyes, which sometimes offers a view of sophisticated makeup -- which can be considered progress by Saudi Arabia's standards. General Turki would like to have seen the king enact a law early on that at least banned the cameras in mobile phones. "Because of our daughters," he says. In Kingdom Tower, the journalist Jamal Khashoggi leans triumphantly against his desk, his eyes flashing with excitement. "The mobile phone camera is on my side," he says. "History is happening. No one can stop it." Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

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URL: Susanne Koelbl, Last Bastion. Saudi Arabia's Silent Battle to Halt History06/14/2011 02:58 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,768368,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • The World from Berlin: Yemen Faces Abyss Despite President's Departure (06/06/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,766869,00.html • Obama's Marshallette Plan: Baby Steps for a Tentative Statesman (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763791,00.html • Has the Arab Spring Stalled?: Autocrats Gain Ground in Middle East (05/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762861,00.html

06/14/2011 03:52 PM The World from Berlin 'Turkey is Facing Great Challenges' Erdogan and his conservative party won a majority in Sunday's elections in Turkey, but not enough to unilaterally change the constitution. The prime minister is now likely to seek a compromise. In Germany, however, commentators are more concerned about Ankara's future relations with the EU. On Sunday, Turkish voters delivered a third term for Recep Tayyip Erdogan and gave his Justice and Development Party (AKP) a resounding victory, but one just short of what would have been required for the prime minister to unilaterally change his country's constitution. Erdogan had wanted to convert Turkey's parliamentary system into a presidential one based on the French model, with himself assuming the role of president. Voter turnout on Sunday was high -- about 84 percent of eligible voters went to the polls. The Kurdish minority succeeded in winning 36 seats in the 550-seat parliament, which is more than they had ever won before, and which allows them a potential role in any development of a new constitution. Erdogan's conservative AKP won 326 seats. A super majority of 367 would have been needed to change the constitution without referendum. On Tuesday, the Turkish newspaper Sabah reported that Erdogan would be sending representatives to meet with the other Turkish parties this summer to hear their thoughts on constitutional reform. Turkish media reports indicate that the leader of the chief opposition party, the CHP, is willing to seek a compromise with Erdogan. In Germany, some leaders of Chancellor Angela Merkel's party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), challenged Erdogan to focus more on Europe in the future following the Sunday election. "Turkey has European common values, and we expect that will continue," Andreas Schockenhoff, a parliamentary leader of the CDU, told the daily newspaper Rheinische Post. 40

Meanwhile, thousands of refugees from Turkey's neighbor, Syria, continue to flee across the border, where they are being housed in camps enclosed with barbed wire. Turkish authorities have blocked media access to the camps, and Erdogan has said that he plans to speak with Syrian President Bashar Assad, whose government is waging a violent crackdown on protestors, soon. The Turkish election dominates the editorial pages on Tuesday in Germany, where the population includes about 4 million people of Turkish origin. German commentators largely considered it a positive development that Erdogan's party did not win a super majority, and pointed out the many challenges the country faces, from finding compromise with the Kurdish minority, to maintaining strong economic growth. The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "The biggest obstacle that Erdogan's state faces on its way to becoming a first league power is a domestic one. Erdogan said over and over again during his campaign that Turkey no longer has a Kurdish problem. The question is whether or not that was just campaign rhetoric, or the prime minister either, in a manner of many mighty paladins and claqueurs, is battling against the adversity of reality, and really no longer recognizes his own country. Because the 'Kurdish problem' not only has not been solved in Turkey, but it remains a domestic time bomb. And if it is not defused, Ankara's foreign policy aspirations as a ruling power will remain tarnished." "Currently, the Kurdish parties in Turkey are calling for a new constitution without an ethnic definition for citizenship; Kurdish language instruction from kindergarten to university; and 'regional autonomy' in the Kurdish dominated regions in southeastern Turkey. A fulfillment of these wishes is a long way off, and even if they were satisfied at some point, that does not mean there will be an end to the Kurdish conflict. The nationalist Kurdish parties will then issue new, far-reaching demands, because that is what their parties are based on. They have to in order for their supporters not to abandon them. A lasting domestic peace can therefore only exist when the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) finally lays down its weapons." "Without an agreement between the state and the PKK, along with general amnesty for its fighters, that would not be possible. And even then success would be uncertain, because such scenarios treat the PKK as if it were a monolistic block, which it is not. A state that is facing such difficulties can only employ a foreign policy at half its possible strength." The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "The Turks are pragmatic to the core. They gave Erdogan this victory, not because he is a pious Muslim, but simply because he gave them a better country, with more than 8- percent growth. Of all the G-20 countries, only China has grown at a faster pace. Erdogan has turned Turkey into a confident actor in the region, and the people like that. Perhaps he deserves the most credit for breaking the political power of the military, and along the way giving new freedoms to Christians and Kurds in his country. The politician who likes to play the populist has possibly changed his country more than any other leader since the nation's founder Atatürk. But that is not enough." "Turkey is on its way to modernity, on its way to becoming a full democracy that recognizes the diversity of its society and the rights of individuals. It has come a long way, but the toughest challenges remain. The decaying judiciary, the cover of censorship, the still enormous disadvantages for women -- a lot of the issues that 41

Europeans decry as human rights violations have their roots in the undemocratic constitution in the country that was inherited from the 1980 putsch. Turkey desperately needs a new constitution. It needs real reconciliation with the Kurds. And it needs new passion for the dormant process of joining the European Union." The left-leaning Die Tageszeitung writes: "Tayyip Erdogan, the most powerful prime minister that Turkey has ever had, did not succeed in the election on Sunday in winning a majority large enough to change the constitution. He did win for the third time in a row, and won the vote of every second person, but his march on the way to becoming a dictator has been stopped..." "His original goal of joining the EU has broken down because of the short-sighted policies of Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel. But domestic politics has become too parochial for Erdogan. Since Europe doesn't want him, he is trying for a bigger role in the Middle East, making Turkey the leading power between Sarajevo and Cairo." "There is one mission that could turn him into a type of new founder for the modern Turkish state, and that is finding a solution for the conflict with the Kurdish minority. Nothing has damaged Turkey, and its population, more than the bloody war between the army and Kurdish nationalists. Erdogan would have the power to end this war with a real compromise. And through that he could achieve a real place in history." The Financial Times Deutschland writes: "Turkey sent a clear signal to its proud prime minister: through moderate reform you turned our country into a regional power, that can serve as a model for Muslim neighbors. But the first civilian constitution since the militarily shaped laws of the 1980s should not only have the handwriting of the pasha, who gathers more power for himself instead of decentralizing it." "It is in Turkey's, and the region's, best interests that Erdogan gets the message. Already during the Arab Spring, he squandered much of the political capital that his country, as a living democracy in the Arab world, had to offer. When only the worst despots still backed Libya's Gadhafi, Erdogan clung to the Libyan government's ability to reform itself. He advised his Syrian friend Assad to change, while Assad eagerly bludgeoned his opponents. Now Erdogan must be moderate and control his own authoritarian inclinations." The business daily Handelsblatt writes: "Erdogan is now behaving modestly. On the issue of reforming the constitution, he is consulting with representatives from different political groups and all corners of society. That is the right path. But Erdogan must be careful that, by focusing on the debate over the constitution, he doesn't lose sight of everything else. Because Turkey is facing great challenges. Above all is the country's economic policy, which was Erdogan's trump card during the campaign." "The per-capita income has almost tripled in Turkey since he took office. But now the economic situation is showing all the signs of a dangerous overheating. The current account deficit is likely reach 8 percent of the GDP this year." "That he wouldn't want to bother the partying mood before the election with restrictive financial policies is understandable. But now the prime minister must get back to business. The campaign talk, that, at best, there would be zero percent interest rates, is

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unworldly. The central bank must raise interest rates and the government must control spending, so that the boom on the Bosphorus doesn't end in a crash. That would be dangerous, both for Turkey, and for its partners." -- Mary Beth Warner URL: 'Turkey is Facing Great Challenges'06/14/2011 03:52 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,768347,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • The AKP's Disappointing Victory: Erdogan Falls Short of Goal in Turkish Elections (06/13/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,768175,00.html • The Sultan of Istancool: Is Erdogan's Success Pulling Turks Away from Europe? (06/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767427,00.html • SPIEGEL Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister: 'Turkey and Europe Need Each Other' (06/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767432,00.html • Turkey's 'Realm of Fear': A Former Judge Takes on Erdogan's Heavy Hand (04/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,758101,00.html • Command Conflict: Turkey Blocks NATO Mission in Libya (03/21/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,752222,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Wants to Be the Father' (03/01/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,748379,00.html

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4418e0a-95d2-11e0-ba20- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Qf5LxaVF Tunisia readies funds to create jobs for youth By Eileen Byrne Published: June 13 2011 17:36 | Last updated: June 13 2011 17:36 Tunisia’s interim government is readying two new financial investment vehicles to channel the billions of dollars in funding it hopes to garner from governments and institutions to boost young people’s chances of finding work. Jalloul Ayed, a former Citibank banker who has been finance minister since January, says the first vehicle will fund public sector infrastructure projects that are central to attracting job-generating projects to Tunisia’s regions. EDITOR’S CHOICE From political prisoner to power broker - Jun-14 Tunisian election delayed to October 23 - Jun-08 Opinion: Too much aid will hobble Arab spring - Jun-07 Strike tests Tunisia’s economic hopes - Jun-06 Editorial: Funding north African aid corps - May-29 Tunisia: after the revolution - May-06 “Without infrastructure, you’re not going to have real economic development and access to remote regions of the country,” he says. Complementing this, a “generational fund”, with sectorial sub-funds, will enable multilateral investors and government agencies to take equity stakes in ventures of various sizes. The idea is that the investors can then exit a few years later, ideally after the growing companies have listed on the Tunis bourse, Mr Ayed says. Since a nationwide revolt ousted Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, generating jobs for Tunisia’s relatively highly educated young people has been at the top of the agenda for the interim government. Meeting In France last month, members of the G8 said multilateral institutions would free $20bn to support economic reforms efforts in Egypt and Tunisia until 2013. Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, said the rest of a $40bn package of support for the “Arab spring” would consist of $10bn of bilateral support from G8 governments and $10bn from Gulf Arab governments. Another G8 meeting is due in Brussels on July 12, which may produce harder commitments and a split of the funding between Tunisia and Egypt, which are currently identitifed as the main beneficiaries. In the meantime, Mr Ayed is liaising with World Bank advisers. “From the G8 it was a very strong declaration of support” and the next step is for the International Monetary Fund to validate the broad macroeconomic framework proposed by Tunisia, he says. The country’s existing debt burden of $21bn is judged to be not excessive by analysts. In the wake of the ousting of Mr Ben Ali, Moody’s downgraded Tunisia’s sovereign debt to Baa3 – still investment grade – while S&P has the foreign currency debt at BBB-. But the Tunis stock market is still down by a fifth in the year to date. 44

The infrastructure investment fund, modelled on ’s Caisse de Depot et de Gestion, is designed not to weigh heavily on the government’s budget and to allow multilateral institutions and government agencies to monitor easily how resources are being deployed, Mr Ayed says. The Moroccan fund is in turn modelled on a French institution established in 1816 to restore order to public finances after Napoleonic rule; while parallels with Tunisia after Mr Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime are not something Mr Ayed dwells on, the list of individuals associated with the old regime whose assets are subject to confiscation by the government was last week expanded to 155. Bank lending to Mr Ben Ali, his extended family and associates totalled about TD2.5bn ($1.82bn), Mr Ayed says. “But they are not bad loans necessarily because a lot of those companies continue to work normally” under government supervision,” he says. “These people set up businesses in some very good and productive sectors of the economy. They were everywhere. And most of the lending was in fact supported by strong guarantees, whether land, shares, real estate and so on.” Mr Ayed is to be chairman of a commission supervising confiscated assets as the process of determining claims proceeds, always under the fierce glare of public opinion. Last week, Tunisia’s interim cabinet in effect had its mandate extended after the country’s first election since the revolution was rescheduled from July to October 23. Some parties are now suggesting that this cabinet might continue beyond October as the elected constituent assembly debates a constitution. If so, Mr Ayed will jealously guard his apolitical status. Having worked outside Tunisia since 1988, “I’m really not politically connected”, he says. “I’m too busy doing what I have to do. Serving a party, or parties, would be a different ball game.” His focus is rather on areas such as banking sector reform “because sooner or later the size of investments will increase in this country, and we need to have strong banks. We have too many small banks.” He also wants to boost public sector wages, which he believes are too low. In what he admits is a short-term “palliative” measure, a monthly payment equivalent to $145 has been introduced for graduate job seekers, subject to various conditions. It will soon be extended, at a lower rate, to certain non-graduate job seekers. In the longer term, his hope is that other Tunisians will follow his example of returning from abroad, not least to contribute some of the financial expertise needed for the management of the two proposed funds.

Eileen Byrne Tunisia readies funds to create jobs for youth June 13 2011 17:36 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a4418e0a-95d2-11e0-ba20- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1Qb5tKUUw

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June 13, 2011 Rescuing the Real Uncle Tom By DAVID S. REYNOLDS THE novelist Harriet Beecher Stowe, born 200 years ago today, was an unlikely fomenter of wars. Diminutive and dreamy-eyed, she was a harried housewife with six children, who suffered from various obscure illnesses worsened by her persistent hypochondria.

June 14, 2011

M.K. Perker

And yet, driven by a passionate hatred of slavery, she found time to write “Uncle Tom’s Cabin,” which became the most influential novel in American history and a catalyst for radical change both at home and abroad. Today, of course, the book has a decidedly different reputation, thanks to the popular image of its titular character, Uncle Tom — whose name has become a byword for a spineless sellout, a black man who betrays his race. And we tend to think of the novel itself as an old-fashioned, rather lachrymose affair that features the deaths of an obsequious enslaved black man and his blond, angelic child-friend, Little Eva. But this view is egregiously inaccurate: the original Uncle Tom was physically strong and morally courageous, an inspiration for blacks and other oppressed people worldwide. In other words, Uncle Tom was anything but an “Uncle Tom.” 46

Indeed, that’s why in the mid-19th century Southerners savagely attacked “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” as a dangerously subversive book, while Northern reformers — especially blacks — often praised it. The ex-slave Frederick Douglass affirmed that no one had done more for the progress of African-Americans than Stowe. The book was enormously popular in the North during the 1850s and helped solidify support behind the antislavery movement. As the black intellectual W. E. B. Du Bois later wrote, “Thus to a frail overburdened Yankee woman with a steadfast moral purpose we Americans, both black and white, owe our gratitude for the freedom and the union that exist today in these United States.” The book stoked fires overseas, too. In Russia it influenced the 1861 emancipation of the serfs and later inspired Vladimir Lenin, who recalled it as his favorite book in childhood. It was the first American novel to be translated and published in China, and it fueled antislavery causes in Cuba and Brazil. At the heart of the book’s progressive appeal was the character of Uncle Tom himself: a muscular, dignified man in his 40s who is notable precisely because he does not betray his race; one reason he passes up a chance to escape from his plantation is that he doesn’t want to put his fellow slaves in danger. And he is finally killed because he refuses to tell his master where two runaway slaves are hiding. As for Little Eva, she bravely accepts her coming death and says she would gladly give her life if that would lead to the emancipation of America’s enslaved blacks. Together Tom and Eva form an interracial bond that offers lessons about tolerance and decency. Unfortunately, these themes were lost in many of the stage versions of “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” that inevitably sprung from its immense popularity. Indeed, Stowe’s novel yielded the most popular and one of the longest-running plays in American history. The first dramatization of the novel appeared in 1852, the year it was published, and countless others followed. By the 1890s, there were hundreds of acting troupes — so- called Tommers — that fanned out across North America, putting on “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” in every town, hamlet and city. Some troupes even toured internationally, performing as far away as Australia and India. The play, seen by more people than read the book, remained popular up to the 1950s and still appears occasionally, including a staging last fall at the Metropolitan Playhouse in New York. But as the story moved from the book to the stage, Stowe’s revolutionary themes were drowned in sentimentality and spectacle. Eva’s death was frequently a syrupy scene in which the actress was hauled heavenward by rope or piano wire against a backdrop of angels and billowing clouds. Uncle Tom, meanwhile, was often presented as a stooped, obedient old fool, the model image of a submissive black man preferred by post-Reconstruction, pre-civil rights America. It was this Uncle Tom, weakened both physically and spiritually, who became a synonym for a racial sellout by the mid-20th century. Black musicians, sports figures, even establishment civil rights leaders were all tarred with the “Uncle Tom” label, often by younger, more radical activists, as a way of demeaning them in the eyes of the African-American community.

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But it doesn’t have to be that way; Uncle Tom should once again be a positive symbol for African-American progress. After all, many people who over the years were derided as Uncle Toms — Jackie Robinson, Louis Armstrong and Willie Mays, to name a few — are now seen as brave racial pioneers. Indeed, during the civil rights era it was those who most closely resembled Uncle Tom — Stowe’s Tom, not the sheepish one of popular myth — who proved most effective in promoting progress. Rosa Parks didn’t mind the Uncle Tom label, since she believed that great change could result from nonviolent moral protest. The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., though often called an Uncle Tom, also stuck to principled nonviolence. Their form of protest was just as active as Tom’s, and just as strong. Both Stowe and Tom deserve our reconsideration — and our respect. David S. Reynolds, a professor of American studies and English at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, is the author of “Mightier Than the Sword: ‘Uncle Tom’s Cabin’ and the Battle for America.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/opinion/14Reynolds.html?nl=todaysheadlines&em c=tha212

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Mediterranean & Arab World Visited 21 times

Elcano Dossier on the Arab Unrest Nº 2

Silvia Montero and Juan A. Sánchez, Elcano Royal Institute 13/6/2011

Barack Obama’s speech on 19 May was one of the most expected events last month. He outlined his vision of the new US diplomacy for the Middle East, including the explicit demand for the recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and announced US economic support for the region. Although widely accepted by the international community, Obama’s plan met with the outright opposition of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who emphatically rejected the border issue. Both leaders actually met a few days later at the White House where, despite their disagreements, they insisted on their good relationship. The international reaction also had a deeply economic character. On 24 May, the President of the World Bank, Robert Zoelick, presented the Bank’s new partnership for the MENA region and announced a US$6 billion package of aid over the next two years for Tunisia and Egypt. A day later, the EU presented its renovated Neighbourhood Policy, which focuses on the southern Mediterranean and is based upon conditionality. Also in late May, the G8 met in Deauville, France, with an agenda that included the so-called ‘Arab spring’. Ahead of the meeting, the US Secretaries of State, Hillary Clinton, and of the Treasury, Timothy F. Geithner, had sent a joint letter urging the Ministers to consider the democratic transitions in the region a priority. Thus, together with the final declaration that renewed the commitment to freedom and democracy of the most industrialised countries, the leaders of the G8 also issued a specific declaration on the ‘Arab Spring’ and launched the ‘Deauville Partnership’ that envisages political and economic support from G8 countries and multilateral

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development banks. The two countries that are already engaged in a democratic transition, Egypt and Tunisia, continued taking steps to advance the process. Egypt entered May in the midst of increasing ethnic clashes between Muslims and Copts. To face and prevent a further spiral of sectarian violence, the Cabinet created a National Justice Committee entrusted with drafting a unified law on religious places. Also, the Muslim Brotherhood registered its Freedom and Justice Party to run for the September elections, and so did the workers’ leftist movement with the newly founded Democratic Workers Party. On the judicial side, in early May Habib al-Adly, Minister of the Interior under Mubarak, was sentenced to 12 years in prison, although he still has to face charges of assassination for his action against the demonstrators. As for the former President Mubarak and his sons, their trial before the Cairo Criminal Court has finally been scheduled for 3 August . In Tunisia, the former Minister of the Interior’s warning of a coup d’état if Islamists win the elections caused unrest and further demonstrations. On the other hand, the High Commission for the Realization of the Revolutionary Goals chose the 13 members of the electoral body that will organise the upcoming elections and proposed, despite the government’s initial rejection , government rejected the delay (finally, on early June, the government fixed the election date for October 23rd). Meanwhile, and despite a new attempt by Jacob Zuma, as the envoy of the African Union, to broker a peace deal, no significant progress has been made regarding Libya. By mid-May, the ICC Prosecutor General presented his report on Libya requesting the Court to issue a warrant for the arrest of Colonel Gaddafi, his son, Saif al Islam, and his Chief of Intelligence, Abdullah Senussi. The UN International Commission of Inquiry also accused Gaddafi of human rights violations. Furthermore, NATO decided to extend its intervention for a further 90 days, while representatives of the Libyan rebels attended the second meeting of the International Contact Group in Rome and the EU opened a representative office in Benghazi. Increasingly moving towards a Libyan-type revolution, the Syrian government’s crackdown on protesters intensified, with the 13-year-old Hamza al Khatib becoming the symbol of the revolution. At the beginning of the month, both the US and the EU decided to impose sanctions on Bashar al Asad and other high-ranking officials (although the EU was initially reluctant to target the Syrian President). Rising international pressure also pushed Syria to withdraw its bid for a seat at the Human Rights Council. In turn, at the end of the month, the Syrian opposition gathered in Turkey for the Syrian Conference for Change, while Bashar al Asad issued a general amnesty to all political prisoners, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood. As for Yemen, civil war is looming after President Saleh’s refused, for the third time, to sign the transition plan proposed by the . As regards the latter, the GCC announced in early May the potential joining of Jordan and Morocco, aroused no little controversy. Finally, considered a positive move by some but negative by others, May saw the reconciliation, brokered by Egypt, of the two Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah. On this issue, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé joined Barack Obama in his intention to foster durable peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians.

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Documents of interest Amnesty International (2011), ‘Egypt Rises. Killings, Detentions and Tortures in the ’25 January Revolution’, Report, May. Damascus Center for Human Rights (2011), ‘Open Letter from the Damascus Center for Human Rights to the Arab League’. Dennison, Susi, Nicu Popescu & José Ignacio Torreblanca (2011), ‘A Chance to Reform: How the EU Can Support Democratic Evolution in Morocco’, ECFR- Policy Brief, online. HRW (2011), ‘“We’ve Never Seen Such Horror” Crimes against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces’, 1/VI/2011, online. Muasher, Marwan (2011), ‘A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan. The Resilience of the Rentier System’, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, May, online. Paciello, Maria Cristina (2011a), ‘Tunisia: Changes and Challenges of Political Transition’, Mediterranean Prospects Technical Report nr 3, Istituto Affari Internazionali, May, online. Paciello, Maria Cristina (2011b), ‘Egypt: Changes and Challenges of Political Transition’, Mediterranean Prospects Technical Report nr 4, Istituto Affari Internazionali, May, online. Pioppi Daniela, Maria Cristina Paciello, Issandr El Amrani & Philippe Droz-Vincent (2011), ‘Egypt: A Neo-Authoritarian State Steering the Winds of Change’, Mediterranean Paper Series, German Marshall Fund of the United States, May, online. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_ CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/mediterranean+arab+world/elcanodossierarabu nrest_june2011

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Mediterranean & Arab World Visited 198 times

Elcano Dossier on the Arab Unrest Nº 1

Elcano Royal Institute 10/5/2011

April has been particularly marked by the events in Syria. Despite Bashar al Assad’s announcement of further reforms, including the lifting of the emergency law, during his speech before the Syrian Parliament on March 30th, the crackdown on demonstrators carried out by security forces has become more and more violent. In this respect, and given the lack of external observers, the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights has played a key role in offering an updated non-government death toll. In the midst of growing demonstrations that broke out in important cities like Homs, Aleppo and the capital, Damascus, and increasing international pressure, mainly stemming from NGOs, in a further speech in Parliament on 15 April al-Assad confirmed the lifting of the 48 year-old emergency law, which was finally abolished on 19 April. Nevertheless, the demonstrations continued, as did their brutal repression by government agents. As a result, strongly- worded condemnations were issued by several governments, including those of the US, France and the UK. Precisely, on behalf of some of these countries, the UN Security Council called a Special Session on Syria on 27 April, although no resolution was adopted. The Human Rights Council also met in a Special Session in Geneva, where it adopted the S16/1 Resolution that condemns ‘the use of lethal violence against peaceful demonstrators by the Syrian authorities’ and requests the OHCHR to dispatch a mission to the country to investigate alleged violations of human rights. Also on 29 April, in line with the US, the EU met in Brussels to agree upon the consideration of new sanctions on Bashar’s regime. Libya and the ongoing military operation have also been at the forefront of the international news media. After taking command of the military operations on 31

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March, NATO’s Operation Unified Protector was the subject of criticism by some allied governments and even from the revolutionary forces. Detailed and updated information on the operations can be found on its website. Likewise, the EU has also prepared a pdf file in which it describes its involvement in the Libyan crisis. Regarding international efforts to stop the crisis, on 10 April the African Union produced a second road map in an aim to foster peace talks and put an end to the fighting, but with no success. Also, the Contact Group on Libya, which had been created at the London Meeting of 29 March, met for the first time in Doha, Qatar, in mid-April to analyse the developments in Libya. A second meeting was scheduled to take place in Rome, Italy, on 5 May. In turn, and following the indications of the UN Human Rights Council Special Session on Libya, the UN sent a fact-finding team to Libya to investigate alleged human rights violations. By late March, the military authorities in Egypt announced that legislative elections were to take place in September. A survey carried out by the Pew Research Center and released on 25 April showed strong popular support for the Egyptian military as well as approval for the ousting of the former president, Mubarak. Regarding the latter, Hosni Mubarak and his two sons were interrogated in mid-April by the prosecutor- general, Abdel Maguib Mahmoud, leading to the imprisonment of Gamal and Alaa Mubarak at Tora prison, while the former President was hospitalised at Sharm-el- Sheikh. The situation in Yemen remains at a deadlock, with President Saleh refusing to step down. The last and almost successful attempt to make him leave was made through the intermediation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, an agreement that Saleh failed to sign at the last minute. There was better news from Tunisia, where the Higher Authority for the Achievement of the Goals of the Revolution adopted a new electoral code to regulate the elections for the Constituent Assembly scheduled for 24 July. The new code includes very positive steps towards a democratic transition, such as gender parity in candidate lists and the banning of former members of the Ben Ali regime. Slightly overshadowed by the revolts taking place in other countries, the UN Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) for a further year. Finally, the end of April witnessed the terrorist bombing of a tourist café in Marrakech, that took the lives of 16 people, and whose impact on Morocco’s political reform process remains to be seen. Documents of interest Vasconcelos, Álvaro de (Ed.), Amr Elshobaki, George Joffé [et al.] (2011), European Union Institute for Security Studies, ‘The Arab democratic wave. How the EU can seize the moment’, [On line] Brussels, European Union Institute for Security Studies, March [Download: 24/III/2011], Report nr 9. IMF Survey on Mid-East unrest. Cordesman, Anthony H. (2011), Stability in the Middle East: The Other Side of Security, [on line] Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 April [Download: 15/IV/2011]. Survival, vol. 53, nr2, April-May 2011 [Edited by International Institute for Strategic Studies]. UNSC Resolution 1970, February 2011, Peace and security in Africa. UNSC Resolution 1973, March 2011, The Situation in Libya.

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UNSC Resolution 1979, April 2011, extending Minurso’s mandate. UNSC S/PV 6524th Meeting of the Middle East Situation, 27 of April 2011, no action taken. Animated map up to 11 April, Slate. Gallup Center, Egypt: The Arithmetic of Revolution, March 2011. Pew Research Center, Survey on Egypt, 25 April 2011. http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_ CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/mediterranean+arab+world/elcanodossierarabu nrest_may2011

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TRIBUNA: TAHAR BEN JELLOUN El viento de la 'primavera árabe' Las rebeliones en curso están dirigidas contra el padre autoritario de la tradición árabe. No reclaman subidas de sueldos, sino que reivindican el individuo y su derecho a la libertad y la dignidad. Esta es su gran novedad Gadafi y El Asad son de la estirpe de Sadam Husein. A la oposición solo saben tratarla con las armas El despertar de los árabes no ha terminado. Tarde o temprano, se desharán de esos locos furiosos TAHAR BEN JELLOUN 13/06/2011 Muamar Gadafi y Bashar el Assad están de acuerdo, al menos, en una cosa: hay que eliminar la primavera; a partir de ahora, el año no tendrá más que tres estaciones. Por culpa de ellos, el fenómeno denominado la primavera árabe está ensombreciéndose y empezando a parecer un «infierno árabe». Son hombres de la estirpe de Sadam Huséin. Como él, no toleran la oposición y reaccionan con las armas. Como él, se aferran a su sillón, que ocupan sin legitimidad. Como él, se apoyan en el tribalismo para mantenerse en el cargo. Como él, temen a la justicia. Como él, están convencidos de que tienen razón. Las revueltas de Túnez y Egipto triunfaron porque el ejército se unió a los manifestantes. Sin el valor y la audacia de unos cuantos altos oficiales, los dos países estarían aún enterrando a sus muertos. ¿Qué ha sucedido, por qué y cómo fue posible que el sueño se hiciera realidad, aunque sea una realidad salpicada, en estos momentos, de dificultades, decepciones e impaciencia? El genio de un pueblo es imprevisible. No se sabe por qué, un día, la gente sale a la calle y se enfrenta con valentía a las balas de la policía o el ejército. Despreciar, humillar, aplastar al ciudadano es una forma de gobernar y garantizar la consolidación del poder. El Raïs se convierte en padre de la nación, en un personaje indiscutible y libre de hacer y poseer lo que quiera; la tradición y la mentalidad árabe enseñan el respeto absoluto al padre. No se critica al padre, no se levanta la voz en su presencia, se le obedece y se le dan las gracias por existir. Por eso tanto Mubarak como Ben Alí, Gadafi y Bashar el Assad son capaces de considerar alegremente que el país y sus recursos son patrimonio suyo y se presentan como padres de sus respectivas naciones. En Occidente, esta noción del padre no existe. ¿Por qué está tan arraigada en el mundo árabe y musulmán? En esos países hay una constante: el individuo, como entidad única y singular, no existe, no está reconocido, lo más importante es la familia, el clan o la tribu. La novedad que caracterizó las primeras manifestaciones en Túnez y Egipto fue la aparición del individuo; la gente en la calle no reclamaba aumento de sueldo, sino unos valores universales como la libertad, la dignidad, el respeto a los derechos de la persona. Querían reafirmarse como individuos con derechos y obligaciones y se negaban a que los considerasen súbditos del jefe del Estado. La inmolación de Mohamed Buazizi, que se prendió fuego, es una rebelión contra el padre. El islam prohíbe el suicidio y la inmolación no pertenece a la cultura tradicional árabe.

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Hamza al Khatib tenía 13 años. Le detuvieron en Deraa el 29 de abril por gritar «Abajo el régimen sirio». Fue torturado, recibió descargas eléctricas, le quemaron los pies, los codos y las rodillas, luego le hirieron en el rostro y le cortaron los genitales. Le remataron de tres balazos, uno de ellos en pleno pulmón. El 25 de mayo entregaron el cuerpo a sus padres; se encontraba en estado de descomposición. El padre fue detenido y le obligaron a acusar a los salafíes de haber cometido el crimen. Hamza, como Mohamed Buazizi, se ha convertido en símbolo de una rebelión en la que la sangre no deja de correr. Estas revueltas no son revoluciones. Surgieron de forma espontánea, sin líderes, sin ideología, sin partidos políticos. Fue la voluntad de no seguir viviendo doblegados, de que no les sigan negando su dignidad de hombres y de mujeres; fue la tozudez de una rebelión que no se detuvo hasta la marcha de quien simbolizaba la represión, el robo, la corrupción y el ejercicio del poder absoluto. Fue una misma cólera que habitaba en el cuerpo y alma de millones de ciudadanos de todo el mundo árabe. Y ahora, a pesar del desorden actual y las improvisaciones más o menos afortunadas en Túnez y Egipto, el viento de esta primavera continúa soplando sobre el mundo árabe en su conjunto. Los dos países en los que los combates contra la dictadura se saldan a diario con docenas de muertos de civiles desarmados, Siria y Libia, están en manos de un sistema que tiene raíces antiguas y estructuradas. Siria siempre ha sido un Estado policial, con un ejército sólido, que se aprovecha de la proximidad de Israel y Líbano, de donde salió expulsado en 2005. Líbano (sin gobierno desde hace seis meses) vive en un estado de angustia. Su seguridad es frágil. «Los libaneses», me dice Fouad Siniora, que fue primer ministro, «temen que Siria cree dificultades en la frontera para desviar la atención de la prensa internacional, que sigue de lejos y a través de internet (está prohibida en territorio libio) lo que ocurre todos los días en el país». Los países del Golfo contemplan con especial interés la evolución de la situación en Siria porque saben que detrás de El Assad está Irán, una potencia a la que las monarquías del petróleo tienen miedo. Tanto Yemen como Libia, aunque haya grandes diferencias entre los dos regímenes, están condenados a librarse de sus dictadores. Alí Abdalá Saleh se aferra a su puesto de una manera indigna. Los muertos se cuentan por centenares. Se sabe que el país es complejo, está dividido, y la gente está armada. Herido por disparos el 3 de junio, el presidente aprovechó para ir a curarse a Arabia Saudí. Gadafi ya no tiene futuro. El día que sus mercenarios se cansen, caerá. Ha habido 10.000 muertos desde el comienzo de la rebelión. Qué importa, dice él. Sólo saldrá de Libia por voluntad divina, parece que ha asegurado. Pero la voluntad divina no le ha dicho que asesine a su pueblo. Por eso el Consejo de Seguridad aprobó la resolución 1973 y por eso interviene la OTAN. Creer que Gadafi va a ceder a las presiones internacionales y emprender el camino de un exilio negociado es conocerle mal. Su patología no es de hoy. Es un hombre acorralado que no comprende que se le pueda exigir que se vaya. Está convencido de que tiene razón, que es víctima de Occidente y de los elementos de Al Qaeda. Cuando uno lleva 42 años en el poder, se olvida de lo que es real, piensa que lo normal es lo que él decide. Ha perdido toda noción de la realidad. No está loco, está enfermo. Al contrario que Milosevic, Gadafi no tiene nada que negociar, salvo su marcha.

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El caso de Bahréin es significativo. En este país de mayoría chií, la población se rebeló para reclamar el fin de la monarquía. Entonces intervino Arabia Saudí (con la bendición de Estados Unidos). Todo debe cambiar, salvo las monarquías del Golfo. Con los recursos petroleros, pocas bromas. El 1 de junio se levantó el estado de emergencia. La primavera árabe sigue adelante en este comienzo de verano. Una de sus victorias fundamentales es el fracaso del islamismo, la coartada que permitía a Ben Alí y Mubarak mantenerse al mando y negociar con Occidente. Ahora descubrimos que era un engaño. El islamismo se ha visto totalmente superado por unas revueltas en las que no ha participado. Ha pasado el tren, y los islamistas ni siquiera se habían dado cuenta de su llegada. Han perdido la ocasión. Su programa está caduco. Bin Laden ha muerto, y, con él, toda una fantasmagoría que no corresponde a la realidad. En Egipto, los Hermanos Musulmanes se han constituido como partido. Tendrán que aceptar las leyes de la democracia o desaparecerán del panorama político. El islamismo es una corriente más, entre muchas otras. Tiene derecho a existir, pero de acuerdo con las reglas y las leyes del respeto democrático. La desaparición de Bin Laden no acaba con el terrorismo. Siempre habrá en alguna parte un iluminado, un loco, un grupo de enfermos dispuestos a poner bombas y matar a inocentes, como sucedió en Marraquech el 27 de abril. El terrorismo tendrá más dificultades sencillamente porque las poblaciones se han vuelto más vigilantes y la policía ha hecho de la seguridad su objetivo prioritario. El mundo árabe es una entidad que no corresponde a nada; no existe unidad ni filosofía común. Hay unos Estados árabes que no se soportan entre sí, aunque celebren reuniones y cumbres. La hipocresía es manifiesta. Marruecos y Argelia no se entienden. Sus fronteras están cerradas. Túnez tiene miedo del vecino libio. Siria juega en todos los tableros al tiempo que consolida su régimen policial y represivo y confía en volver a introducirse en Líbano, que vive en tensión permanente. Irak cuida sus heridas mientras el terrorismo sigue matando. En Jordania, por ahora, hay calma; ha vivido tiempos difíciles. Sudán se encamina hacia un montón de problemas. Yemen corre el peligro de perderse en una guerra civil. E Israel observa este desbarajuste mientras endurece su política colonial, rechaza la unión de los palestinos y deja caer las propuestas de Barack Obama en el olvido. El rey Mohamed VI previó estos acontecimientos y propuso, en un histórico discurso pronunciado el 9 de marzo, profundas reformas por las que delegará parte de su poder en el primer ministro y el parlamento. Se celebran manifestaciones todos los viernes y domingos. Las del 3 de junio produjeron la muerte de un manifestante por una paliza de la policía, un hecho grave e imperdonable. El papel de la policía es garantizar el orden, no golpear y matar. El despertar de los pueblos árabes no ha terminado. El miedo ha cambiado de bando. Los dictadores que ocupan el poder sin legitimidad no podrán mantenerse en él. Tarde o temprano, el mundo árabe se deshará de esos locos furiosos que se aferran a sus cargos a costa de multiplicar las matanzas. La primavera árabe acaba de dar un rodeo por Europa. Los jóvenes de España y Grecia manifiestan todos los días su indignación. Tahar Ben Jelloun es escritor marroquí. Traducción de María Luisa Rodríguez Tapia. TAHAR BEN JELLOUN El viento de la 'primavera árabe'13/06/2011http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/viento/primavera/arabe/elpepiopi/20110613elpe piopi_12/Tes 57

June 13, 2011 Iran Without Nukes By ROGER COHEN LONDON — Remember Iran? I do. It’s been two years since the Iranian people rose up to protest a stolen election with a bravery that stirred the world and presented Americans with a truer image of a young and highly educated nation than the old specter of the bearded Islamic zealot. The Green Movement was suppressed through barbaric violence but its example helped kindle the Arab Spring. As Hamid Dabashi of Columbia University wrote in July, 2009: “, I believe, is ground zero of a civil rights movement that will leave no Muslim or Arab country, or even Israel, untouched.” He added, “The moving pictures of Iranians flooding colorfully into the streets have forever altered the visual vocabulary of the global perception of ‘the Middle East.”’ Seldom were there more prescient words. They were quoted by Nader Hashemi of the University of Denver in a recent talk on Iran, in which he noted shared Iranian and Arab aims: “Democracy and dignity, the rule of law and respect for basic human rights, political transparency and an end to corruption.” That urge is still powerful in Iran beneath the opaque, directionless apparatus of the Islamic Republic. Iran is weak now, its ideology as tired as Osama Bin Laden’s, as marginal to peoples questing to reconcile their Muslim faith and modernity in new ways. I would probe this weakness through new approaches. But we are stuck still with the world’s most paranoid relationship: the American-Iranian relationship. That’s largely because there’s another way to remember Iran — as the Godot of nuclear threats, the country always on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon or acquiring the “breakout capacity” to make one, but never, despite the dire warning of Israeli leaders dating back to the 1990s, doing either, preferring to dwell in the Islamic Republic’s favored zones: ambivalence and inertia. As one awaits this tortuous Godot, one might recall a forecast of a bomb by 1999 (Shimon Peres) or 2004 (Ehud Barak), or Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s talk of “a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs,” or my friend Jeffrey Goldberg’s allusion in The Atlantic last year to a “consensus” that there is “a better than 50 percent chance that Israel will launch a strike by next July.” That would be next month. It might also be worth recalling that Meir Dagan, the former head of Israel’s Mossad spy agency, declared last month that attacking Iran would be “a stupid idea.” He 58

suggested his main worry was not Iran itself but Netanyahu’s susceptibility to “dangerous adventure.” Dagan’s concerns have surfaced as Seymour Hersh concludes in a New Yorker article this month that, as he put it in one interview, “There’s just no serious evidence inside that Iran is actually doing anything to make a nuclear weapon.” His reporting reveals that the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (N.I.E.) of 2007 — which concluded “with high confidence” that Iran had halted a nuclear-weapons program in 2003 — still pertains in the classified N.I.E. of 2011. As a retired senior intelligence official put it to Hersh, there’s nothing “substantially new” that “leads to a bomb.” In other words, Iran, epicenter of inefficiency, unable to produce a kilowatt of electricity through its Bushehr nuclear reactor despite decades of effort, is still doing its old brinkmanship number. Remember, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, is the guardian of the revolution. That is a conservative business. Breakout, let alone a bomb, is a bridge too far if the Islamic Republic is what you’ve vowed to preserve. Much better to gain leverage by producing low-enriched uranium — far from weapons grade — under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection and allow rumors to swirl. So Iran, long at the top of the Washington agenda, has slid down. It’s partly the Arab Spring. It’s partly that you can’t keep saying the same thing. People do begin to remember the refrain, although nobody in the large Iran-the-clear-and-present-danger school ever seems to get called to account. They should be. The nuclear bogeyman obsession has been a distraction from the need to try to tease out a relationship with Tehran, see Iran as it is. Only the most flimsy efforts have been made, insufficient to test the waters. Those waters are troubled. The Islamic Republic has not recovered from its convulsion of 2009. It is sickly, consumed by hypocrisy as it cheers on some brave Arabs (but not those in Syria) while brutalizing its own seekers of the freedom promised in 1979. Arabs aren’t buying Iranian hypocrisy. Only Iran’s command of Revolutionary Guard force and the opposition’s lack of a shared goal salvage it. Khamenei is at loggerheads with President , who got into such a sulk recently that he took 11 days off work, infuriating everybody. The Majlis, or parliament, is investigating Ahmadinejad for various alleged frauds including, of all things, vote-buying in 2009! Ahmadinejad was booed during his June 3 speech commemorating Ayatollah Khomeini’s death. Iran is characterized by what Farideh Farhi of the University of Hawaii recently termed “administrative chaos.” That’s not how you make a nuke. When remembering Iran — and it must be remembered — call the fear-mongers to account. You can follow Roger Cohen on Twitter at twitter.com/nytimescohen . ROGER COHEN Iran Without Nukes June 13, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/opinion/14iht- edcohen14.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

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Under suspicion: American Muslims search for identity 10 years after Sept. 11 By Marc Fisher, Published: June 12 First in a series on American Muslims. Today: Ten years after the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. Muslims search for a way to reconcile their American and Islamic identities. Hungry to be just one of the guys after immigrating to Texas, Palestinian Fawaz Ismail asked everybody to call him “Tony.” The nickname put people at ease at his Dallas high school, where Tony switched from soccer to football and picked up a bit of a Texas twang. He remained Tony when he moved to Northern Virginia to expand his family’s flag- selling business. The name made him feel as American as his Falls Church store, Alamo Flag, a patriot’s paradise brimming with Stars and Stripes banners, pins and stickers. Then came the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the day Tony became a foreigner again. That afternoon, people started pouring into Alamo Flag, many wearing sunglasses to hide their crying eyes. Ismail sold thousands of American flags in those days of fear and unity, and he gave away thousands more. But soon after the twin towers fell and the Pentagon burned, Ismail felt his adopted homeland pushing him away. He decided to push back. He sent Tony into permanent exile, taking back his given name. Now, a decade later, his name is a daily message to his fellow Americans: They must deal with him for who he is — a Muslim who loves his country and proudly sells its banner. “A lot of people use a nickname to make it easier for Americans to pronounce,” he says, “but now, I don’t care. They’re going to have to pronounce my name. It’s not that hard — Fah-wahz.” There was pride in that decision but also a real and still-growing anger — at Americans who assume that anything Islamic is shorthand for terrorism; at the older generation of American Muslims, whose immigrant, old-world version of Islam paints them as rigid and intolerant; and at people who accept him if he’s Tony but recoil at a name such as Fawaz. “It’s hard hearing your faith put down all the time as this scary, evil thing,” he says. And hard to endure the cloud of suspicion that American Muslims feel has grown rather than dissipated over the past decade. Like most American Muslims, Ismail, who is a buff and hale 50, is not particularly religious. He likes to listen to tapes of Koranic chants at night to relax. But in the past few years, he has struggled with the reality that some Americans take one look at him and think, “Hmm, is he really one of us?” “I pay my taxes. I love this country. You want to talk about patriotic? I am the definition,” says Ismail, who became an American citizen as a teenager. “I sell the best

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flags, made in the United States, not in China like a lot of stores sell. I’m all about moderation — man, I like Fleetwood Mac.” Late at night, Ismail has a cup of chamomile tea with anise seed to try to get to sleep. It can be a struggle, just as it is for many of his Muslim friends. “I see them with their sleeping pills and antidepressants, and I know how hard it is,” he says. “I smoke because I’m stressed. Sometimes I wish I was born a Swede.” As Ismail talks, his 20-year-old son, Talal, pops in to say he’s heading over to the the mosque — in the basement of a Best Western on Route 7 — for Friday prayers. Talal, in T-shirt, jeans and earrings, is a drummer in a metal band — “progressive metal,” his father qualifies — and works at the flag store. Talal is what his father sees for the future of Islam in this country, a thoroughly American kid who barbecues burgers with his dad and then stops off for prayer on his way to work. “Fitting in,” Fawaz Ismail says. Osama bin Laden is dead, but his legacy colors the lives of the estimated 2.4 million American Muslims every day. Some have reacted to a decade of stares, cutting comments, airport humiliations and disturbing incidents of homegrown terrorism by drifting away from their religion, some by deepening their faith, and a few by turning to the very extremism that sparked the mistrust they encounter. In the past 18 months alone, U.S. Muslims have felt compelled to explain — to themselves and their non-Muslim neighbors — the Fort Hood, Tex., massacre, the attempted bombing of Times Square, the backlash against a proposed Islamic center near Ground Zero, and sting operations that led to the arrests of alleged Muslim proto- terrorists from Portland, Ore., to Ashburn. The more Muslims feel singled out, the more they focus on painful divisions in their own ranks, between young and old, native and newcomer, secular and devout, militant and moderate. Two-thirds of this country’s Muslims are immigrants, according to a survey by the Pew Research Center, hailing from scores of countries. In the Washington area, Muslims attend mosques with some of the region’s leading professionals in medicine, technology and government. Yet they have also prayed alongside people who were later charged with plotting to blow up Metro stations or traveling to Pakistan to train for jihad against the United States. Younger Muslims often complain about a blanket of orthodoxy that weighs on them. Many of the country’s large Muslim organizations — religious, civic, educational — are run by immigrants or funded by groups with strong ties to countries with very different cultures. “In my parents’ generation, there was more of a sense of clinging to a foreign country, and with that, more of a religious orthodoxy,” says Saqib Ali, 36, a software engineer and former Maryland state legislator who lives in Gaithersburg. “People of my generation are much more confident and more assertive of our rights. We’re not just thankful to be allowed in this country. Unfortunately, as younger Muslims fell away from that level of devotion, the people who retained power were the most orthodox.” Charities preaching an ultraconservative brand of Islam remain important donors to many Muslim schools and mosques. And most U.S. mosques are still led by imams 61

trained overseas, often in the fundamentalist tradition, complicating efforts by the next generation to mold a distinctly American brand of Islam.

At the Giant in Sterling not long ago, a woman looked at Sadaf Iqbal’s oldest daughter, 4-year-old Asiyah, and said: “She has such beautiful curly hair. It’s a shame she’ll have to cover it up.” Iqbal, 30, who has covered her hair in public since she was 11, reacted with stunned silence. Days later, “I still don’t know what I should have said,” she says. “For me, it’s not at all a shame that I cover. And the woman who said it was very nice — totally friendly, just ignorant.” Iqbal’s husband, Ibrahim Moiz — a 31-year-old Fairfax City lawyer who handles small- business and family cases, often from Northern Virginia’s large, rapidly growing Muslim community — would not have stayed silent. His anger, he says, would have “taken control of me.” He would have challenged the woman to consider if she could be strong enough to wear such an evident expression of faith. Still, Moiz’s impulse to defend his wife is tempered by his American practicality. “Islam has flourished for 1,400 years because it fits into every society and adapts to it,” he says. “So those people who would require women to wear the hijab, or men who say you have to grow your beard out two fists long, are making life more difficult for their children if they take such a rigid approach.” The blame for Americans’ suspicion toward Muslims, Moiz argues, lies mostly with his fellow Muslims, especially those who refuse to adapt to the culture of their new home. Moiz, an American-born child of immigrants from India, is a devout Muslim who spent years studying the Koran in Syria before beginning his legal career in the Washington area. Ask Moiz about Islam, and his answers often cite the Constitution and the Founding Fathers. “We have to figure out what’s right for Islam in this country,” he says. “It’s like in the law — you have your Scalias who strictly construe the Constitution and you have your Justice Kagans, who ask how we can interpret those texts for today. We know we have to emulate the prophet, but does that mean we have to have a long beard? Do we have to look like him or is it more important to understand him?” Moiz clerked in Prince George’s County for Maryland’s first Muslim judge and then worked for a time on discrimination claims made by American Muslims. He left that job believing that too many of his fellow Muslims — such as the worker who complained that his employer wouldn’t give him Fridays off to pray, when he really needed only an hour — are too quick to take on the victim label. The Islam that Moiz has chosen is traditional in some ways yet markedly American in others. “I don’t wear the traditional garb,” says Moiz, who has on a tennis shirt and chinos. “But I believe the way I dress is Islamic” because it is simple and modest. Moiz’s ability to adapt his faith to his country has turned him into a hot commodity at his mosque, the 5,000-member All Dulles Area Muslim Society in Sterling. At ADAMS, some immigrant parents ask Moiz to mentor their teenagers, who sometimes 62

frighten their parents by retreating into their rooms to commune with the Internet, where radical jihadist preachers aim their videos at young Americans. Two of those teens are hanging out in Moiz’s living room in Sterling as Moiz and Iqbal are busy corralling their own small children, with the goal of getting them to bed before evening prayer. Iqbal leans over to scoop up their 8-month-old baby, Tasneem, who scampers along the carpeting. Moiz takes the video game controller from Tarek Zagade, a 14-year-old who is losing a game of Madden NFL football to his buddy Salman Mehter, 17. “Here, let me help you come back,” Moiz says, but a few minutes later, Salman has vanquished his mentor, too. Tarek, who after years of home schooling attends Briar Woods High School in Ashburn, is trying to find his place between the devotion of his parents — his father is from India and his mother is U.S.-born — and the secular lives of his fellow students. Religion never comes up at school, he says, but there are times when he feels as if he has to drag his family into American ways, as when his parents wanted to name his baby sister “some terrible name, a ‘Lion King’ name, Zaina or something like that.” They finally chose Noreen, thanks to pressure from their American-born kids. The boys banter with Moiz about Eli Manning’s passing style and rib him over his passion for old-school video games from the dark ages of Atari. The boys are deep into their game — Colts-Giants, no Redskins fans here — when Moiz calls over, “We’ll pray at the end of the quarter, okay?” Tarek’s parents “wanted me to get through to him, see what’s in his mind,” Moiz says, “ԝ’cause at home, he just gets back from school and goes to his room.” What he does there, what his adolescent mind makes of the clash between his parents’ ways and the culture’s notions of Islam, can be scary to parents who grew up in an unquestioning, authoritarian environment. They don’t need to worry, Tarek says — his passion is ice hockey, not politics. But Moiz knows that “a lot of American kids really struggle with Islam. They may pray at home but drop it entirely at school. They hear about jihad and all these strict laws that weren’t even applied through most of Islamic history.” Moiz says Islam will adapt to American values only when U.S.-born Muslims — guys like him who know football and video games as well as they know the Koran — are handed the torch of leadership. In the meantime, he tries to show immigrant parents the advantage of America’s questioning culture. “What helped me stay away from extremists — either religious crazies or wild partying — was always questioning, doubting whatever I was taught,” he says. “That’s the American way, and that fits perfectly with Islam, but not with the rigid, closed Islam that too many of the imams from other cultures bring here.” As the sun sets, the boys, Moiz and his wife move into the living room and turn toward Mecca. Moiz and the boys stand side by side in front, his wife behind them. Tarek leads the chanting in Arabic. For 10 minutes, silent contemplation alternates with the soft rhythms of prayer as they bow and prostrate.

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When they finish praying, Moiz and Iqbal check their smartphones and the boys head back to their game. “Oreos and milk?” Iqbal offers.

Zehra Fazal wraps a hijab over her hair, takes a deep breath and steps onstage, transformed into Zed Headscarf, Muslim punk rocker and bisexual. An audience of 150, a mix of Muslims and others at the Round House Theatre in Silver Spring, meet Fazal’s alter ego, a brash but flirty character who relishes asking the kinds of questions most young Muslims wouldn’t dare pose to parents: Why must she and her father stay in separate rooms at a party at the mosque? If a woman must cover her hair in front of men who are not part of her family, how about a lesbian — must she wear a hijab in front of all women? “Why do I have to be the ambassador for Islam? Why do I have to represent Pakistan when I’ve only been there twice?” Zed demands in her one-woman show, “Headscarf and the Angry Bitch.” Zed is a child of 9/11, an in-your-face Muslim who rocks out yet still covers. “Zed is braver than I am. She can ask the questions I’m not allowed to ask,” says Fazal, who is 26 and trying to make it as an actress and writer in Washington, though she still holds a graphic-design job in Crystal City to make ends meet. Despite the show’s title, Zed — and her creator — are less angry than frustrated and confused. They live on the edge of alienation, teetering between worlds where they don’t quite belong. Playing Zed, Fazal challenges American Muslims to confront the contradictions of their hyphenated identity. In the audience, 20-somethings studiously avoid turning to look at their parents as Zed performs a song about falling in love despite religious rules that prohibit sex before marriage. Zed frankly tells her lover, “The only thing I’ll do five times a day is you.” But Zed and the show win over the parents. Soon enough, the generations are laughing together as Zed sings, to the tune of America’s “A Horse With No Name”: “I been through the airport as a Muslim detained / At the airport, you can’t use your real name / ’Cause the no-fly list forbids any Hussein.” Fazal’s parents, Pakistani physicians, never got to see “Headscarf and the Angry Bitch.” They died before their daughter finished writing it. But she thinks they would recognize the pain, humor and anger of her portrait of Muslim life in America. Born in Libertyville, Ill., Fazal grew up in a home that was liberal by Muslim standards and conservative in the eyes of her Christian friends. Her family wasn’t much for going to mosque, but some parental rules rendered Fazal and her sisters different. “Let your books be your boyfriends,” her father would say. And sorry, no prom, either. At Wellesley College in Massachusetts, Fazal steered clear of the Muslim student groups . Her friends were mostly white. But in the aftermath of Sept. 11, she became uncomfortable with her father’s decision to go on local TV to try to explain that Islam was a religion of peace. She grew exasperated over having to somehow prove her patriotism to strangers and angry when 64

her dad’s name temporarily popped up on a no-fly list because it was similar to that of some bad guy. After moving to Washington, Fazal found herself doodling as she waited for her turn onstage in a play about homeland security at the District’s Church Street Theater. She drew a scantily clad punk rocker who wore a hijab. Over time, the doodles morphed into a character, a folk-singing Muslim whose lyrics managed to offend just about everyone. Now the lanky, onyx-eyed actress, six years out of college, has come to think of Zed as her tougher, bolder, prouder side. “It’s time for this religion and ethnic group to stop taking itself so seriously,” Fazal says. “I’m not sure the conservative Muslim community has a sense of humor yet, but the younger generation is ready for this. They know it’s okay to let different labels make up your identity. Just because I’m Muslim doesn’t mean I can’t also be this other thing, even if that thing is haram” — religiously forbidden. Or, as Zed puts it at Round House: “Skittles — first they were haram, now they’re halal,” or religiously approved. “Ellen DeGeneres — definitely haram.”

Someone recently asked Siron Zidan what she would do if her daughter came home and said, “I have a boyfriend, and I want to have his baby.” “It’s not even open for discussion,” Zidan replied. Zidan’s husband, Yahya Hendi, has been listening from across the room. He pipes up: “Siron, I have to challenge you. Such a thing can happen, and you have to be ready to discuss it.” Hendi — Georgetown University’s imam, the first full-time Muslim chaplain at a U.S. college — tells his wife about a family he counseled recently in which a 15-year-old told his parents he is not remotely interested in Islam and wants nothing to do with the faith. “Oh God!” Zidan exclaims. “I can’t believe such a thing could happen.” “It can, and it does,” Hendi says. “At that age, you have to ask questions. In this culture, that is how you learn and grow.” Working on a college campus, Hendi sees the clash of identities many times a day. His version of Islam has become more about asking questions than about forbidding them. Zidan, a Palestinian who immigrated to the United States at 25 and now lives in Frederick with her husband, has no desire to make life harder for her kids. But as an observant Muslim who wears a head scarf outside the house, she has definite ideas about how to balance her own traditional upbringing with her children’s reality as Americans. So the four kids, who range in age from nine to 14 and go to public school, know they aren’t allowed to wear provocative clothing or drink alcohol. “I don’t want them to be fanatic Muslims, and I don’t want them to be liberal Muslims who eat pork and drink alcohol,” Zidan says. “I want them to be moderate. I know they will be a blend of Muslim and American.”

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The Georgetown imam — at 45 a jovial, hefty figure who cannot walk across campus without students of all kinds stopping him for a word of counsel or a quick joke — knows that tension well. But he has come to believe that living in America makes Islam stronger and more flexible. As a Palestinian child, Hendi says, he saw the world in black and white. “To me, Jews were Israelis in tanks,” he says. “I thought if you weren’t Muslim, you were going to hellfire.” He moved to the United States at 22 for graduate school at Temple University. Hendi studied Hebrew and the Torah under an Israeli professor who regularly invited him to her home. One day, when the professor had to go out shopping, she left Hendi alone in her house. “That simple gesture changed my life,” he says. “That she would trust me, a Palestinian, and show me that love. America opened the door for me to see the beauty of Islam as an open, inclusive, pluralistic faith. America taught me that I can sit with friends who are drinking alcohol even if I am not. America showed me that music can be holy, that marriage is about love, and that all of this fits easily in an open, modern Islam.” Hendi rejects the idea that it is older, immigrant Muslims who are blocking the faith from adapting to the new land. Rather, he says, too many U.S. Muslim communities are saturated in a “haram culture — this or that is not allowed, no, no, no,” Hendi says. While traveling recently in the South, Hendi heard an imam — “a guy with a long beard and a Saudi dagger” — teach that music is forbidden and dancing is forbidden and boys and girls should be educated separately. “I went to this imam’s board members and I said, ‘Look at what you’re shoving into your children.’ There were 700 people in that room listening to that crazy guy. And the board members said, ‘Yes, we know, but we don’t know what to do.’ ”

A hundred-acre spread of lush, rolling farmland in Frederick County is where Hendi and Zidan will go when they are called home. The imam and some members of his Frederick mosque were at a Borders coffee shop a few years ago when the topic of death came up. For many Muslims, as for generations of immigrants before them, dying meant being shipped back to the old country to be reunited with their ancestors. The time had come for U.S. Muslims to make a different kind of commitment. Abdul Majeed, a physician from Pakistan who had practiced in Frederick for 35 years, became a founder of al-Firdaus Memorial Gardens. As it happened, Majeed became the first person buried at al-Firdaus, the first all-Muslim burial ground in the Washington area. Eighty-eight Muslims have been interred there since it opened in 2008. They came from Bosnia, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Trinidad, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Iran and a dozen other countries. There are 8,000 burial sites, 530 of which have been sold. Sayed Naved owns six of them. He moved from India to Maryland 22 years ago, when he was 26, to study engineering at College Park. Now, with his sons in college and high school, he wants to ensure that his family will be together for eternity.

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“This is where we belong,” says Naved, president of a federal contracting firm based in Rockville and a member of the Maryland State Board of Education. “We sometimes feel caught between the Islamophobes and the extremists in our own community who give us all a bad name. But this is our country. We see a lot more Muslim values in America than in most of the world — honesty, integrity, people taking care of neighbors, charity, freedom to practice religion.” Hendi and his family have also bought plots at al-Firdaus. “In the ’60s and ’70s, we built mosques only to pray,” the imam says. “In the ’80s and ’90s, we built schools to educate our children. Now we are building cemeteries because we want to die in America. We are saying, ‘We are here. This is home.’ԝ” Marc Fisher, Under suspicion: American Muslims search for identity 10 years after Sept. 11 June 12 http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/under-suspicion-american- muslims-search-for-identity-10-years-after-sept-11/2011/06/10/AGPiqpQH_story.html

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Turquía cambia su política exterior forzada por las revueltas árabes La represión en Libia y Siria alteró su objetivo de neutralidad con los vecinos J. C. SANZ - Ankara - 13/06/2011 Hace poco más de una década Turquía estaba enemistada con casi todos sus vecinos. Estuvo a punto de declarar la guerra a Siria, que daba cobijo a la guerrilla separatista del Partido de los Trabajadores del Kurdistán (PKK), y a enfrentarse a Grecia por un disputado islote en el Egeo. Su único aliado, con quien compartía numerosos enemigos, era Israel. Pero con la llegada al poder de los islamistas moderados de Recep Tayyip Erdogan la estrategia exterior de Ankara ha evolucionado hasta dar un vuelco completo. Erdogan incluyó pronto en su equipo de consejeros al profesor de relaciones internacionales Ahmet Davutoglu, teórico de una política exterior neootomana que se resume en el lema cero problemas con los vecinos. De la mano de la expansión comercial de sus empresas, Turquía se ha convertido en una emergente potencia regional. Grecia no ha dudado en apoyar el proceso de adhesión de Turquía a la UE, con la esperanza de que Ankara acabe gastando más en infraestructuras que en defensa. Solo la frontera con Armenia se mantiene aún cerrada a causa de la acusación de genocidio que Erevan lanza por las matanzas y deportaciones masivas de cristianos armenios en la etapa final del Imperio Otomano. Antes de ser nombrado ministro de Exteriores, en mayo de 2009, Davotuglu alcanzó su máximo logro al conducir la mediación turca entre Israel y Siria. Turquía había suscrito en 1999 un tratado de cooperación militar para permitir que la aviación de combate israelí participara en maniobras sobre el amplio espacio aéreo de Anatolia y obtener en contrapartida sistemas de modernización para su propia Fuerza Aérea. Años más tarde, Turquía también desmanteló su impresionante despliegue militar en los 900 kilómetros de frontera común con Siria. La intervención israelí en Gaza, sin embargo, enfrió las relaciones bilaterales, sobre todo después de que Erdogan clamara en el Foro de Davos contra la matanza de civiles palestinos. Pero el asalto por comandos israelíes de la flotilla con ayuda a Gaza, en el que murieron nueve ciudadanos turcos en aguas internacionales, congeló por completo los contactos bilaterales hace ahora un año. Mientras, las relaciones con Siria parecían ir viento en popa y las exportaciones turcas se triplicaron hasta alcanzar en 2010 los 2.270 millones de dólares. El presidente sirio Bachar el Asad era entonces un amigo y aliado para Erdogan. Al igual que Muamar el Gadafi, sin duda gracias a que las empresas turcas habían obtenido contratos por un monto de 15.000 millones de dólares y más de 25.000 trabajadores turcos consiguieron empleo en Libia. Cuando estalló la ola de cambio en el mundo árabe muchos analistas internacionales pusieron a Turquía como modelo de compatibilidad entre democracia e islam para países que, como Túnez o Egipto, se iban liberando de sus dictadores. Erdogan fue 68

incluso aclamado como un héroe por la multitud de la plaza de Tahrir cuando pidió al presidente Hosni Mubarak que abandonará el poder. Pero el estallido de la represión contra los opositores civiles libios y sirios ha desbaratado la estrategia de cero problemas del Gobierno islamista turco. Pese a sus vagos intentos de mediar ante Trípoli, Turquía, país miembro de la OTAN, ha acabado por aceptar la intervención aliada en Libia y ha reconocido al Consejo Nacional de los rebeldes de Bengasi. También intentó lidiar con Damasco y recomendó a El Asad que emprendiese reformas. Pero la crisis siria le ha estallado en la cara a Erdogan en plena campaña electoral con la llegada de unos 5.000 refugiados amenazados por las balas de las tropas sirias. Tras condenar las "inaceptables atrocidades" del régimen de Damasco, el líder de la emergente potencia turca no ha tenido más remedio que entender que a veces es imposible conciliar los negocios con los principios. J. C. SANZ Turquía cambia su política exterior forzada por las revueltas árabes La represión en Libia y Siria alteró su objetivo de neutralidad con los vecinos 13/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Turquia/cambia/politica/exterior/forzada/r evueltas/arabes/elpepiint/20110613elpepiint_2/Tes

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REPORTAJE: vida&artes Humanitarismo a cañonazos Las intervenciones armadas para proteger a la población civil en guerras o catástrofes suscitan dudas sobre su legitimidad MARÍA ANTONIA SÁNCHEZ-VALLEJO 13/06/2011 En la Gran Guerra, solo el 5% de los muertos eran civiles, hoy lo son el 80% En la contienda de Irak murieron unos 60.000 civiles, 31 cada día Los genocidios de Ruanda y Bosnia hicieron reaccionar a Naciones Unidas Los expertos creen que se ha abusado de la etiqueta "humanitario" Las guerras entre militares profesionales prácticamente han dejado de existir. Los combates ya no se libran solo en el campo de batalla, también en las casas, las escuelas o los campos de labranza. Conflictos asimétricos, entre un ejército regular y un grupo insurgente o terrorista; contiendas entre milicias armadas por líderes tribales o señores de la guerra multiplican hasta el infinito el número de víctimas civiles, en una proporción sangrante: frente al 5% de población civil muerta en la Gran Guerra, las víctimas civiles en cualquier conflicto se sitúan hoy en torno al 80% del total de bajas. Solo en el de Irak hubo 60.000 víctimas civiles, es decir, 31 iraquíes muertos al día, según los papeles de Irak filtrados por Wikileaks. Impedir que esa y otras sangrías mayores, como el genocidio, se repitan es uno de los propósitos de las denominadas intervenciones -a veces llamadas guerras- humanitarias. Pero ¿puede una guerra ser humanitaria, o es una pura contradicción en los términos? ¿Pueden las Fuerzas Armadas, además de disparar misiles, ser agentes humanitarios, o se trata de mero posibilismo? La intervención aliada en Libia para proteger a la población civil, de la mano de la resolución 1973 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, ha vuelto a suscitar la pertinencia de la más neutra -y ampliamente legitimada- de las guerras del siglo XXI. Este debate hunde sus raíces en el oprobio que para la comunidad internacional supuso la inacción en las matanzas de Ruanda (1994) y Bosnia (genocidio de Srebrenica, en 1995, y cerco de Sarajevo), dos ejemplos de limpieza étnica que sirvieron de aldabonazo a la conciencia del mundo. Los expertos consultados en la elaboración de este reportaje son en general críticos con la denominación "humanitaria" por cuestiones semánticas. "Habría que distinguir entre una intervención humanitaria, con presencia de ONG especializadas y organismos internacionales (Unicef, FAO, Programa Mundial de Alimentos) y un apoyo logístico militar, de carácter puntual pero cuyo peso recae en el componente civil, y la guerra humanitaria, una guerra derivada de una catástrofe humanitaria, que sería una respuesta militar a una situación de desastre humanitario", distingue Viçens Fisas, director de la Escuela de Cultura de Paz de la Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona. "La intervención humanitaria siempre está justificada; la guerra humanitaria, en cambio, obedece a un cálculo puramente militar sobre las capacidades de revertir una situación igualmente militar, y eso no siempre está justificado".

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Y Libia, ¿en qué caso se encuadra? Fisas: "Desde mi punto de vista había que actuar con rapidez y de forma militar ante la posible toma de Bengasi, y después de que Gadafi no optara por medios diplomáticos para arreglar la crisis". El almirante de la Marina francesa Pierre-François Forissier, el pasado 3 de junio, decía sobre la perspectiva de una ayuda humanitaria militarizada: "Cuando alcancemos nuestros objetivos militares, necesitaremos asistencia humanitaria. Se usarán medios militares en una primera fase porque es la forma más rápida y fácil de proporcionarla". Una tercera opinión, la de Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde, director del Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria (IECAH): "La intervención aliada en Libia se está convirtiendo en el apoyo aéreo a uno de los bandos", el de los rebeldes. "Es una prostitución de los términos. Cuando un concepto genera simpatía en la opinión pública, se utiliza para todo: hoy no hay nada que no lo sea, y una intervención humanitaria es una cosa más. Pero no podemos hablar de humanidad cuando lo que en realidad se está planteando es justicia o no justicia, legalidad o ilegalidad", sostiene Núñez Villaverde. "En el caso de Libia, la resolución 1973 de la ONU parecía al fin un paso en la dirección correcta, porque hace referencia a la 'responsabilidad de proteger' que formuló la ONU en 2005 (el Estado es el primer responsable de sus ciudadanos, y si no, es la comunidad internacional quien debe protegerlos), pero la resolución se está prostituyendo, porque esa intervención se está convirtiendo en el apoyo aéreo de una de las fuerzas combatientes". Para este experto, todos los pasos que se están dando en Libia desde el 19 de marzo violan la legalidad internacional: "Armar a los rebeldes, la presencia de unidades terrestres especiales [de EE UU y Gran Bretaña]... todo esto viola la ley". La acción militar, para el responsable del IECAH, debe limitarse a "crear un entorno de seguridad para que los agentes humanitarios puedan, en catástrofes naturales o en conflictos violentos, hacer su trabajo, es decir, aportar ayuda humanitaria". El problema de confundir los términos -o las funciones- implica, para Núñez, "despilfarrar el capital político acumulado tras la adopción de la 'responsabilidad de proteger', en septiembre de 2005. Desde [el Tratado de] Westfalia regía el principio de no injerencia en los asuntos internos de un país, pero las tragedias de los Grandes Lagos y los Balcanes rompieron esa convención. Pero en las relaciones internacionales, que se mueven por el cortoplacismo, sigue imperando el doble rasero. ¿Dónde está la responsabilidad de proteger en el caso de Siria?". "Un Ejército nunca puede ser un actor humanitario. No es bueno que un soldado reparta botellas de agua", sostiene con firmeza Núñez Villaverde, que plantea el hecho de que el Ejército, "con un presupuesto de 18.000 millones de euros al año", sea la institución más valorada por los españoles. "El debate sobre defensa y seguridad sigue pendiente en España, pero en vez de eso se refuerza la idea de revestir de humanitario lo militar, eso explica muchas cosas en clave nacional. Y no es el único país donde sucede: desde la época de [el primer ministro Tony] Blair, en Gran Bretaña la cooperación es un elemento más de la política exterior y de seguridad. En el caso de EE UU, USAID, la agencia estadounidense de cooperación, es, desde el 11-S, un componente más del departamento de Estado de Defensa". Para Joana Abrisketa, profesora de Derecho Internacional Público de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Deusto, el requisito legal para justificar una intervención

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militar es que exista, previamente, una resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU con un mandato determinado. "Salvo que la acción militar sea en legítima defensa, una resolución del Consejo de Seguridad es el fundamento para legitimarla". Como Villaverde, Abrisketa cree que en la década de los noventa se abusó de la etiqueta humanitaria, "que garantiza poco en términos jurídicos". En 2000, la llamada 'responsabilidad de proteger' se incorporó a este debate, quizás porque la "intervención humanitaria" había quedado desprestigiada. "Me pregunto cómo se materializa la expresión 'responsabilidad de proteger', formalmente impecable y que quiere transmitir la idea de imparcialidad, a través del Consejo de Seguridad, un órgano político difícilmente imparcial", recuerda Abrisketa. Históricamente, y aunque desde el siglo XIX se han invocado razones humanitarias en algunas intervenciones (por ejemplo, la de Francia y Grecia en Siria en 1860, en apoyo de los cristianos maronitas), las raíces de este tipo de intervención hay que buscarlas en el nuevo orden internacional que siguió a la guerra fría. "El Consejo de Seguridad se reactiva al desaparecer los dos bloques, porque durante la guerra fría un bloque neutralizaba al otro. Yugoslavia, Somalia y Ruanda son los tres casos emblemáticos. Pero el papel del Consejo de Seguridad se va diluyendo porque ninguna de ellas es exitosa, por falta de recursos o error de tácticas, por ejemplo una operación aérea y no terrestre... Por eso se deslegitima". En el debate sobre las intervenciones humanitarias planea también un concepto, forjado a finales de los ochenta por el francés Bernard Kouchner, médico, político y fundador de la ONG Médicos sin Fronteras, y el jurista Mario Bettati: el deber de injerencia. Bettati dio cuerpo jurídico a la idea. En palabras del ensayista David Rieff, claramente intervencionista, "la diplomacia, sin la habilidad de desplegar una fuerza militar, no sirve para nada". Porque la diplomacia es muchas veces un factor subordinado. Sobre los intereses no confesados, pero a veces clamorosos, que acompañan este tipo de intervenciones -asegurar el suministro de petróleo, por ejemplo-, o el aparente resabio colonialista de algunas de ellas, Fisas opina: "Desde hace muchos años se ha venido denunciando el carácter neocolonista de muchas intervenciones, sobre todo de exmetrópolis que intentan recuperar o asegurar sus espacios de influencia política y económica a través de lo humanitario. Es un riesgo real". Si sobre las relaciones internacionales planean en todo momento intereses geopolíticos y geoeconómicos, para Oladiran W. Bello, del think tank FRIDE, este tipo de intervenciones militares han ayudado a repintar el mapa del mundo tras la guerra fría. "En el pasado, habría resultado muy difícil que Rusia y China no hubieran vetado la resolución 1973. Esta vez no la han apoyado, pero tampoco la han vetado, y eso indica, motivaciones humanitarias al margen, que lo hacen también por motivos políticos, porque nadie quiere quedarse fuera de la ola de cambio en el mundo árabe. Brasil es otro ejemplo: también se opone a ella; los tres países son contrarios a la intervención militar, pero no han hecho mucho por evitarla". "Ahora existe más presión de la opinión pública de que hay un riesgo cierto de genocidio, como el que existía en Bengasi cuando el Consejo adoptó la resolución 1973. En el pasado, al menos hasta las tragedias de Grandes Lagos y Bosnia, no existía ese clamor. Así que lo que mueve a decidir una intervención de este tipo es la consideración de motivos humanitarios, sí, pero también las probabilidades de tener éxito. Algo que no puede aplicarse hoy por hoy al caso de Siria", apunta Bello.

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Libia versus Siria. En lo que a intervenciones se refiere, esa dicotomía, que revela la tensión de la cuerda en la relación de fuerzas mundial, no solo sirve para circunscribir el debate, también para situarlo en el centro de un círculo viciado: el del doble rasero. "Siria es un país excepcional en el cálculo de probabilidades de una hipotética solución al conflicto de Oriente Próximo. Muchos analistas temen que el recambio de Bachar el Asad al frente del país no sea un régimen tan previsible como el actual; si hay cambios en Siria, se van a extender al resto de países vecinos", opina Bello. "Libia es una reválida para la aplicación del principio de 'responsabilidad de proteger", asegura Bello, "pero lo que no sé es qué va a suceder a medio y largo plazo: prevenir el genocidio es algo relativamente fácil, no así la solución del problema real de esta guerra: el fin del régimen". Ejércitos para misiones de paz En los últimos 22 años, el Ejército español ha intervenido en 57 operaciones en el extranjero, la mayoría de ellas como fuerza de interposición o mantenimiento de la paz; una minoría han sido intervenciones humanitarias. A diferencia de las normales, "las humanitarias no requieren la intervención del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU", explica el general Miguel Ángel Ballesteros, director del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. Se trata en la mayoría de los casos de paliar los efectos de catástrofes naturales u otras causadas por el hombre, como éxodos de población por una guerra. "Por ejemplo, en el terremoto de Haití, la magnitud de la catástrofe fue tal que los únicos capaces de reaccionar, por medios y por aproximación integral, eran los militares. El Ejército de EE UU fue el primero que actuó. Pero es siempre el Estado el que da respuesta a la emergencia, y los militares son complementarios a la parte civil salvo en casos de conflicto bélico como Libia", recuerda Ballesteros, que cita la Operación Atalanta de la UE, en aguas de Somalia, como paradigma de intereses sobrepuestos: "La primera obligación de las patrulleras es proteger a los barcos del Programa Mundial de Alimentos de la ONU, aunque es una operación de seguridad, no estrictamente humanitaria". "El Ejército no es una ONG, y a las Fuerzas Armadas solo hay que llamarlas con carácter excepcional. Con las ONG nos entendemos, y las críticas que nos hacen de invadir su espacio son muchas veces teóricas; sobre el terreno hay mucho más entendimiento". La primera Estrategia Española de Seguridad "invitará a las ONG a sumarse a la coordinación sobre el terreno". Porque, recuerda Ballesteros, "ni siquiera los conflictos bélicos se resuelven solo militarmente: hay que llevar desarrollo, estabilidad y paz". Mandatos para evitar genocidios - Resolución 1296 del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas (2000). "La deliberada selección de poblaciones civiles como objetivo y la comisión de violaciones sistemáticas y flagrantes del derecho internacional humanitario pueden constituir una amenaza para la paz y la seguridad internacionales". - 'Responsabilidad de proteger'. Las matanzas de Ruanda (1994) y Bosnia (1995) suscitaron un vivo debate sobre la suerte de la población civil en conflictos armados. A iniciativa de Canadá, que creó en 2000 la Comisión Internacional sobre Intervención y Soberanía de los Estados, la Cumbre Mundial de Naciones Unidas dio en 2005 cuerpo jurídico a la doctrina responsabilidad de proteger (RtoP o R2P, en sus siglas en inglés), sobre la protección de grupos amenazados de genocidio o violaciones de sus derechos 73

humanos. En 2006, el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU recogió la idea en la resolución 1674. - Fundamentos de la RtoP. Riesgo evidente de genocidio o crímenes de guerra; que el Gobierno del país no demuestre capacidad a la hora de evitarlos; la probabilidad de tener éxito para prevenirlos, y la articulación de una acción colectiva de la comunidad internacional de la mano de la ONU. - Otras resoluciones. El Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU ha adoptado con posterioridad otras resoluciones que recogen el principio de la responsabilidad de proteger. Son la 1674 (2006), sobre protección de civiles en conflictos armados; la 1706 (2006), sobre la crisis de Darfur; la 1820 (2008), sobre mujeres, paz y seguridad, y las resoluciones 1888, 1889 y 1894 (las tres adoptadas en 2009), sobre protección de civiles en conflictos armados. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Humanitarismo/canonazos/elpepisoc/2011061 3elpepisoc_1/Tes

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06/13/2011 12:14 PM The AKP's Disappointing Victory Erdogan Falls Short of Goal in Turkish Elections By Jürgen Gottschlich in Istanbul

REUTERS Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has won a third term in Sunday's parliamentary elections in Turkey. Here, supporters of Erdogan's AKP celebrate the election results in front of party headquarters in Ankara. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has won a third term in Sunday's parliamentary elections in Turkey. But he fell short of his stated goal of a two- thirds majority, which would have allowed him to unilaterally change the constitution. His AKP was hampered by a strong showing by the Kurds and ultra- nationalists. Winning an election with around 50 percent of the vote certainly sounds like an impressive result. But measured against the expectations that Recep Tayyip Erdogan had fueled in the runup to Sunday's parliamentary election in Turkey, the victory almost seems like a defeat. During campaigning across the country, Erdogan had announced that his target was to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Turkish parliament, a total of 367 of the 550 seats. Instead, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) won just 326 seats, slightly down from the 331 seats it had in the outgoing parliament. That is certainly a stable absolute majority, but it falls far short of the "super majority" that would have allowed the AKP to unilaterally change the Turkish constitution. Erdogan will now serve a third term as prime minister. Erdogan's declared goal had been to launch a debate on a new constitution immediately after the elections. He wanted to convert Turkey's existing parliamentary system into a presidential system based on the French model, with himself as president.

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REUTERS AKP supporters celebrate in Ankara. During campaigning across the country, Erdogan had announced that his target was to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Turkish parliament, a total of 367 of the 550 seats. Instead, the AKP won just 326 seats, slightly down from the 331 seats it had in the outgoing parliament. In order to push through a new constitution based on his ideas, he would have needed at least 330 seats. That would have allowed the AKP to approve a new constitution in parliament as a first step, which would then be submitted to voters in a referendum. Erdogan would probably have won such a referendum. A super majority of 367 seats would have allowed the government to change the constitution without a referendum. Now the prime minister will be forced to cooperate with at least one of the other parties represented in parliament over his constitution plans. Indeed, it is unclear whether Erdogan will even tackle the issue of a new constitution, in light of the AKP's disappointing result. 'The People Gave Us a Message' Speaking on Sunday evening, Erdogan said that the nation had not only given his party a mandate to govern, but to draft a new constitution: "The people gave us a message to build the new constitution through consensus and negotiation." He said that the AKP would discuss the new constitution with opposition parties and parties outside of parliament, as well as the media and NGOs, in "all-encompassing" negotiations. In addition to the AKP, other parties that will be represented in parliament include the center-left Republican People's Party (CHP) and the far-right, ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). There will also be 36 independent members of parliament who ran on behalf of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and who will now form a parliamentary group -- a significant gain over the 20 seats the Kurds had in the outgoing parliament. The BDP fielded independent candidates to get

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around the 10 percent hurdle for representation in Turkey's parliament. Turnout in the election was said to be over 84 percent.

AP The center-left CHP under its new chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu failed to live up to expectations, gaining less than 26 percent of the vote. Here, Kilicdaroglu votes in Ankara. Although Kilicdaroglu made a good impression during the campaign, he could not compete with the AKP's track record on the economy and Erdogan's popular foreign policy. The election was overshadowed by a bomb attack in Sirnak province in southeastern Turkey at around 11 p.m. local time on Sunday, which injured 11 people, six of them seriously. The victims had been celebrating the victory of Kurdish candidates. It was not clear who had carried out the attack. Strong Showing by Kurds and Ultra-Nationalists Erdogan's disappointing result is largely due to the strong showing by the Kurds and the ultra-right MHP. With their 36 seats, the Kurds will play an important role in any future constitutional debate, and the Kurdish question looks set to move to the top of the political agenda. What was more crucial in determining the AKP's result, however, was the 13 percent of the vote won by the ultra-nationalist MHP. The party found itself in crisis ahead of the election amid a scandal involving anonymous sex videos that forced several senior party officials to resign. Polls taken in the run-up to the vote showed the MHP at close to the critical threshold of 10 percent. If the party had failed to get into parliament, the 77

distribution of seats would have been different, and Erdogan would have obtained his 330 seats.

REUTERS Turnout in Sunday's election was over 84 percent. The center-left CHP under its new chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu, on the other hand, failed to live up to expectations, gaining less than 26 percent of the vote. Many observers had expected the party to get around 30 percent, given its committed campaigning. Compared to nationwide local elections in January 2010, the CHP also lost support in several of its key strongholds. They lost the Mediterranean city of Antalya to the AKP and won only one major city, Izmir. It's the Economy Although Kilicdaroglu made a good impression, he could not compete with the AKP's track record on the economy and Erdogan's popular foreign policy. The prime minister's self-assured appearances on the international stage, which both domestic and foreign critics had often slammed as megalomania, came across well with Turkish voters, including among people who were not AKP supporters. Erdogan won popularity through his assertive stance toward the West and his commitment to the Palestinian cause. But the decisive factor in the AKP's victory was probably the sustained economic boom of the past nine years, for which the AKP and Erdogan have taken credit. Many voters appeared convinced by Erdogan's election promise to double per-capita income in Turkey once again in the coming years. URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,768175,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • The Sultan of Istancool: Is Erdogan's Success Pulling Turks Away from Europe? (06/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767427,00.html 78

• SPIEGEL Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister: 'Turkey and Europe Need Each Other' (06/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767432,00.html • 'The Imam's Army': Arrested Journalist's Book Claims Turkish Police Infiltrated by Islamic Movement (04/06/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,755508,00.html • Courting the Diaspora: Erdogan Hopes Germany's Turks Can Get Him Re- Elected (03/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,749389,00.html POLITICS TURKEY Confortable victory for Erdogan 13 June 2011

Radikal, 13 June 2011

Recep Tayyp Erdogan is the “master of the ballot box,” headlines Turkish daily Radikal, following the victory of the Party for Justice and Development (AKP) in the June 12 legislative elections. Reaping nearly 50% of the vote and 326 seats out of 550, the Prime Minister’s conservative, Islamist party takes the legislative lead for the third election running, after 2002 and 2007. It is the sixth win for the party if the local elections of 2004 and 2009 are included, as well as the September 2010 referendum. With five million supplementary votes but fewer seats in parliament, the AKP will, as it has done in the past, be able to form a government alone. But it will have to deal with the other parties to formulate the new Constitution promised by Erdogan following the ballot. In his first post-electoral speech, the Prime Minister promised “to consult the opposition, civil society and the media” to find a consensus around this reform, of which one of the issues will be to redefine the country’s national identity by taking into account the demands of the Kurds. In fact, as leader writer, Oral Çalişlar notes, the independent bloc, grouped around the pro-Kurd Party for Peace and Democracy (BDP), is the second place winner of the ballot, raising its number of seats to 36 from 22. As for the main opposition party, the People’s Republican Party (CHP), it made a 5% gain in votes to 135 seats but it still doesn’t measure up to the AKP.

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El Ejército sirio devasta la ciudad rebelde de Jisr al Shughur El asalto consiste en una operación de castigo.- El conflicto aumenta el flujo de refugiados hacia Turquía ENRIC GONZÁLEZ | Jerusalén 12/06/2011 El Ejército sirio devastó la ciudad rebelde de Jisr al Shughur e incendió sus alrededores, matando ganado y destruyendo cultivos. El asalto consistió básicamente en una operación de castigo, porque gran parte de la población de Jisr al Shughur había huido en los últimos días y las tropas del general Maher el Asad encontraron poca resistencia. Los soldados y policías que desertaron el pasado fin de semana, en número desconocido, apenas aparecieron en los combates. Los bombardeos, el éxodo de civiles hacia la frontera turca y la destrucción de cosechas crearon en la región noroccidental de Idlib una "emergencia humanitaria", según la Media Luna Roja. La agencia estatal de noticias de Siria, Sana, portavoz del régimen junto a la televisión oficial, habló de "duros combates" contra "grupos armados". "Dos miembros de los grupos armados resultaron muertos, hubo un gran número de detenidos y las armas letales en su poder quedaron incautadas", informó Sana. Un periodista de la agencia estadounidense Associated Press, al que le fue concedida autorización para trabajar en Siria y viajar en uno de los vehículos militares de la expedición, no hizo referencia a ningún "duro combate" e informó de que a mediodía Jisr al Shughur estaba desierta y solo se veían montones de escombros por todas partes, el resultado de casi 24 horas de ataque con helicópteros artillados, cañones y tanques. Añadió que 10 cadáveres uniformados fueron encontrados en una fosa común excavada frente al edificio de la Policía Militar. Cuatro de los cuerpos estaban decapitados o habían recibido hachazos en la cabeza. El edificio había sido incendiado y en varias de sus estancias se veían manchas de sangre. Según el enviado de Associated Press, los indicios tendían a confirmar que en el cuartel se había registrado un motín y que los soldados habían combatido unos contra otros. Un residente en Jisr al Shughur que permaneció en la ciudad hasta el mismo domingo, poco antes de que entraran las tropas, explicó que los bombardeos previos habían sido muy intensos y que solo unos 60 soldados y policías, que una semana antes se negaron a disparar contra civiles desarmados y se unieron a la resistencia contra el régimen, se habían preparado para hacer frente al asalto. El mismo testigo indicó que otros 200 hombres sin armas se quedaron también para intentar oponerse a las unidades de élite de Maher el Asad. Ignoraba qué había ocurrido con los soldados y los civiles. El humo de los campos y granjas incendiados alrededor de Jisr al Shughur era visible desde varias localidades cercanas y desde una franja de terreno cercana a la frontera siria en la que se acumulaban miles de fugitivos, temerosos de pasar a Turquía por si no se les permitía volver, pero dispuestos a dar el paso en caso de que se aproximaran columnas militares, según Mustafa Osso, un activista por los derechos humanos residente en Siria. Osso aseguró que además de Jirs al-Shughur el Ejército había bombardeado otras ciudades de la provincia de Idlib como Maaret al-Numan (donde días atrás los manifestantes incendiaron la comisaría y los juzgados) y la cercana 80

montaña de Jabal al-Zawiya, donde se hallaban varias pequeñas aldeas que, según diversos fugitivos en Turquía, podrían haber acogido a desertores del Ejército. El enviado de Associated Press pudo hablar con algunos residentes de Jisr al-Shughur que se habían ocultado en sótanos durante el bombardeo. "Los grupos de matones armados nos intimidaban, nos decían que el Ejército iba a matarnos y que debíamos huir", declaró Zeina Salloun, de 37 años, coincidiendo con exactitud con las informaciones oficiales, las mismas que afirmaban que miles de personas se habían refugiado en Turquía "por comodidad" y para "reunirse con familiares". El periodista precisó que no se le permitió hablar con residentes sin la presencia de funcionarios del Ministerio de Información y que "no era seguro que los testigos se expresaran libremente", dado que "quien expresa opiniones antigubernamentales se expone a la detención". Idlib, una provincia de mayoría suní (como el conjunto de Siria) con varias comunidades alauíes y cristianas, fue escenario en los años 70 de intermitentes insurrecciones islamistas, protagonizadas por los Hermanos Musulmanes. En 1980, el entonces presidente Hafez al Asad ordenó a su hermano Rifaa que bombardeara Jisr al- Shughur. El ataque causó miles de muertos y acabó con la resistencia antigubernamental. Dos años después, en 1982, el bombardeo de Hama causó entre 10.000 y 20.000 muertos y puso fin a la presencia de Hermanos Musulmanes en el país. Desde entonces, la simple pertenencia a la organización es castigada con la muerte. Como en aquella época, el presidente Bachar el Asad y su hermano Maher, jefe de la Guardia Presidencial y de la Cuarta División y virtual jefe del Ejército, se reparten los papeles: uno se encarga de la administración y el otro de la represión. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ejercito/sirio/devasta/ciudad/rebelde/Jisr/S hughur/elpepuint/20110612elpepuint_3/Tes

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Erdogan refuerza su poder pero tendrá que pactar la Constitución

El primer ministro logra su tercera mayoría absoluta consecutiva, pero no alcanza el cupo de diputados exigido para imponer una nueva Carta Magna.- El líder islamista ofrece un pacto de consenso a la oposición

JUAN CARLOS SANZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Ankara - 12/06/2011

El primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, junto a los miembros del Consejo Supremo Militar, en el mausoleo de Mustafá Kemal, Atatürk, el pasado noviembre.- ADEM ALTAN (AFP) Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Rize, 1957) se ha convertido en la noche del domingo en el segundo primer ministro turco en revalidar en la urnas un tercer mandato consecutivo. El otro, Adnan Menderes, fue ahorcado en 1961 tras un golpe de Estado militar cuando estaba punto de conseguir la cuarta victoria en las urnas. A Erdogan no le ocurrirá lo mismo. Primero, porque no podrá presentarse a un cuarto mandato: lo prohíben los estatutos de su triunfante Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP). Y segundo, porque los militares turcos han ido dejando de marcar el paso a los gobernantes civiles desde que los islamistas moderados del AKP llegaron al poder, en 2002, y emprendieron el camino de las reformas que lleva hacia Europa. Erdogan se ha negado a sí mismo un triunfo histórico, con un inapelable 50% de los sufragios al 99% del escrutinio, al colocar demasiado alto el listón de sus expectativas: acaparar al menos 330 de los 550 escaños del Parlamento para poder imponer 82

unilateralmente la nueva Constitución que necesita Turquía para poder convertirse en una nueva potencia global y democrática. Con 326 diputados, se ha quedado a las puertas de su objetivo, que le permitiría redactar en solitario el texto constitucional para someterlo directamente a referéndum. Y todavía más lejos de los 367 escaños, con los que habría aprobado la Constitución por goleada en la propia Cámara sin recurrir a una consulta popular. Las elecciones turcas han sido un juego en el que todos ganan. A pesar de que el fatuo sueño de Erdogan de intentar dictar las reglas de juego se ha desvanecido, su tercer triunfo electoral consecutivo es incontestable, digno de líderes históricos como Margaret Thachter en Reino Unido o Helmut Kohl en Alemania. Un plebiscito imponente a las reformas políticas y económicas que han abierto nuevos espacios de libertad y bienestar para los 74 millones de turcos. Gana el AKP y gana también el Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP), de Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, "el Ghandi turco" que logra para el centro-izquierda un 26% de los votos, frente al magro 20% que obtuvo su predecesor, Deniz Baykal, en los comicios de 2007. Kiliçdaroglu podrá imponerse ahora frente a la vieja guardia nacionalista de su partido y afianzarse en su giro de de alternativa laica y socialdemócrata al conservadurismo islámico de Erdogan. "Agradezco la fortaleza que nos han dado los votantes", aseguro emocionado anoche en la sede de su partido. Gana incluso el Partido del Movimiento Nacionalista (MHP), a pesar de haber perdido algunos miles de sufragios y haber caído hasta el 13%. La extrema derecha temía quedar fuera de la Cámara si no superaba la barrera del 10% de los votos nacionales tras la oleada de escándalos sexuales que han salpicados a su dirigentes. Y ganan -y de forma notable- los nacionalistas kurdos del Partido de la Paz y la Democracia (BDP), que al presentarse como independientes en sus feudos del sureste de Anatolia han sorteado el escollo del 10% para sumar 35 diputados, 15 más que hace cuatro años. Erdogan y los grupos parlamentarios tendrán que escuchar su voz para pactar la nueva Constitución viable. Pero sobre todo gana la democracia turca, que ha negado el poder omnímodo a un líder excepcional como Erdogan para obligarle a buscar el consenso que exige el mayor contrato social de una nación. Le ha concedido, eso sí, una poderosa mayoría para gobernar sin ataduras y proseguir la senda del crecimiento y las reformas. Sin la sonrisa burlona de la hace cuatro años. Circunspecto como un imán majestuoso, Erdogan ha predicado en la noche del domingo ante miles de partidarios desde el balcón de la sede del AKP en Ankara la buena nueva de que había entendido el mensaje del pueblo. "Los electores nos han dicho que debemos negociar la nueva Constitución. La haremos por consenso, con la participación de la oposición, de los partidos que no están en el Parlamento y de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil",ha clamado ante un público enfervorecido. "La única condición que impondremos es que los derechos del ciudadano serán siempre lo primero, la época de las banda golpistas ha quedado atrás". Nueva Constitución La orientación de la nueva Constitución turca que redactará del Parlamento recien elegido se verá sometida forzosamente a equilibrios y contrapesos. Erdogan ha defendido en la campaña un modelo presidencialista, como el de Francia o Estados Unidos, en el que él mismo se postularía como candidato a jefe del Estado para ejercer un fuerte poder ejecutivo hasta el horizonte de 2023, centenario de la fundación de la 83

Turquía moderna. Pero la oposición laica del CHP exige mantener el actual modelo parlamentario para poder ejercer mayor control sobre el Gobierno. El reelecto primer ministro Erdogan tendrá que enfrentarse a partir de ahora a las viejas asignaturas pendientes de Turquía, acumuladas durante sus nueve años de Gobierno en dos mandatos consecutivos. Como precisa en su último informe Hugh Pope, director de los análisis para Turquía del International Crisis Group, la reactivación del proceso de negociaciones para la adhesión a la Unión Europea, que arrancaron en 2005 pero siguen encalladas a causa del veto de Chipre, y la solución del conflicto kurdo, que ha causado más de 40.000 muertos desde hace tres décadas, son las tareas más urgentes que aguardan al nuevo Gabinete. En la misma línea, el Consejo Europeo de Relaciones Exteriotres (ECFR en sus siglas en inglés), se interroga en su última publicación sobre si el país euroasiático podrá gestionar su diversidad interna, reconciliar las tensiones internas y curar las heridas del pasado sin pactar la nueva Constitución. El EFCR defiende que, a pesar del rechazo creciente de los turcos hacia la UE por la congelación de las negociaciones de adhesión, Europa puede ayudar a Turquía en la solución pacífica del conflicto kurdo, así como utilizar su influencia (los Veintisiete son el mayor cliente comercial de la economía turca) sobre el nuevo Gobierno de Ankara para disipar los temores de que el AKP pueda ejercer un poder absoluto. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Erdogan/refuerza/poder/tendra/pactar/Con stitucion/elpepuint/20110612elpepuint_1/Tes

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Los primeros resultados otorgan una abultada victoria a Erdogan en Turquía Al 50% del escrutinio, el partido del primer ministro obtiene más de la mitad de los sufragios y la oposición se queda en resultados similares a los de las últimas legislativas.- El nuevo Gobierno turco quiere afrontar los viejos problemas con una nueva Constitución.- Si logra tres quintos de los diputados, podrá aprobar otra Carta Magna sin pactos parlamentarios JUAN CARLOS SANZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Ankara - 12/06/2011 Los primeros resultados de las elecciones legislativas celebradas hoy en Turquía confirman la victoria incontestable del primer ministro, Tayyip Erdogan. Con el escrutino en más del 50%, su formación, el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP, islamista moderado y conservador) obtiene más de la mitad de los sufragios y la proyección de diputados le sitúa por encima de la barrera de los 330, lo que permitiría reformar la Constitución sin apoyos parlamentarios. Enfrente, el Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP, laico y socialdemócrata) se quedaría en número de diputados con resultados similares a los de hace cuatro años, aunque sube al 24% de los votos y en su feudo, Esmirna (oeste). Pero en la capital, Ankara, y en el feudo islamista de Konya los resultados parciales sitúan al AKP con más del 50% de los votos. El Partido Nacionalista (MHP) es la tercera fuerza con un 13% de los sufragios en todo el país. Aunque la legislación turca prohíbe difundir los primeros resultados hasta cuatro horas después del cierre de los colegios a las cinco de la tarde (las cuatro, hora peninsular española), las cadenas de televisión se han saltado el embargo para informar de la victoria del gobernante AKP. En una plácida jornada de votaciones sin apenas tráfico en el centro de Ankara y con una estricta ley seca electoral en vigor hasta la medianoche, los turcos han acudido hoy ordenadamente, salvo algunos incidentes aislados en la capital y en el sureste kurdo, a las urnas para elegir un nuevo Parlamento. El gran aspirante, el primer ministro Tayyip Recep Erdogan, depositó su voto a media mañana en la parte asiática de Estambul acompañado por su esposa, Emine, cubierta con el velo islámico. "Confío en que las elecciones sirvan para fortalecer nuestros derechos y libertades", declaró ante las cámaras de televisión el líder del AKP. Su principal rival, Kemal Kiliçdaroglu, líder del CHP mostró confianza en que sus "esfuerzos en pro de la democracia y la libertad sean apreciados" tras ejercer su derecho al sufragio poco después en Ankara. Las encuestas previas a la jornada electoral ya apuntaban una victoria del AKP con cerca del 50% de los votos mientas asignaban al CHP hasta un 30%. Previsiblemente, el primer ministro Erdogan tendrá que enfrentarse a partir de la mañana a las viejas asignaturas pendientes de Turquía, acumuladas durante sus nueve años de Gobierno en dos mandatos consecutivos. Como precisa en su último informe Hugh Pope, director de los análisis para Turquía del International Crisis Group, la reactivación del proceso de negociaciones para la adhesión a la Unión Europea, que arrancaron en 2005 pero siguen encallados a causa del veto de Chipre, y la solución del conflicto kurdo, que ha causado más de 40.000 muertos desde hace tres décadas, son las tareas más urgentes que aguardan al nuevo Gabinete. 85

En la misma línea, el Consejo Europeo de Relaciones Exteriotres (ECFR en sus siglas en inglés), se interroga en su última publicación sobre si el país euroasiático podrá gestionar su diversidad interna, reconciliar las tensiones internas y curar las heridas del pasado. El EFCR defiende que, a pesar del rechazo creciente de los turcos hacia la UE por la congelación de las negociaciones de adhesión, Europa puede ayuda a Turquía en la solución pacífica del conflicto turco, así como utilizar su influencia (los Veintisiete son el mayor cliente comercial de la economía turca sobre el nuevo Gobierno de Ankara para disipar los temores de que el AKP pueda ejercer un poder omnímodo. La orientación de la nueva Constitución turca que redactará del Parlamento elegido hoy dependerá de los equilibrios internos que produzcan los resultados electorales. Mientras Erdogan defiende un modelo presidencialista, como el de Francia o Estados Unidos, en el que él mismo se postularía como candidato a jefe del Estado con un fuerte poder ejecutivo, la oposición laica del CHP exige mantener el actual modelo parlamentario para poder ejercer mayor control sobre el Gobierno. Los islamistas moderados del AKP necesitan acaparar al menos las tres quintas partes de los escaños (más de 330 diputados) para poder imponer en solitario el nuevo texto constitucional. En pocas horas se sabrá si Erdogan contará con todo el poder en sus manos o tendrá que buscar el consenso con una oposición que le rechaza de plano. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/primeros/resultados/otorgan/abultada/victo ria/Erdogan/Turquia/elpepuint/20110612elpepuint_1/Tes

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World June 12, 2011 U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour Around Censors By JAMES GLANZ and JOHN MARKOFF The Obama administration is leading a global effort to deploy “shadow” Internet and mobile phone systems that dissidents can use to undermine repressive governments that seek to silence them by censoring or shutting down telecommunications networks. The effort includes secretive projects to create independent cellphone networks inside foreign countries, as well as one operation out of a spy novel in a fifth-floor shop on L Street in Washington, where a group of young entrepreneurs who look as if they could be in a garage band are fitting deceptively innocent-looking hardware into a prototype “Internet in a suitcase.” Financed with a $2 million State Department grant, the suitcase could be secreted across a border and quickly set up to allow wireless communication over a wide area with a link to the global Internet. The American effort, revealed in dozens of interviews, planning documents and classified diplomatic cables obtained by The New York Times, ranges in scale, cost and sophistication. Some projects involve technology that the United States is developing; others pull together tools that have already been created by hackers in a so-called liberation- technology movement sweeping the globe. The State Department, for example, is financing the creation of stealth wireless networks that would enable activists to communicate outside the reach of governments in countries like Iran, Syria and Libya, according to participants in the projects. In one of the most ambitious efforts, United States officials say, the State Department and Pentagon have spent at least $50 million to create an independent cellphone network in Afghanistan using towers on protected military bases inside the country. It is intended to offset the Taliban’s ability to shut down the official Afghan services, seemingly at will. The effort has picked up momentum since the government of President Hosni Mubarak shut down the Egyptian Internet in the last days of his rule. In recent days, the Syrian government also temporarily disabled much of that country’s Internet, which had helped protesters mobilize. The Obama administration’s initiative is in one sense a new front in a longstanding diplomatic push to defend free speech and nurture democracy. For decades, the United States has sent radio broadcasts into autocratic countries through Voice of America and other means. More recently, Washington has supported the development of software that preserves the anonymity of users in places like China, and training for citizens who want to pass information along the government-owned Internet without getting caught.

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But the latest initiative depends on creating entirely separate pathways for communication. It has brought together an improbable alliance of diplomats and military engineers, young programmers and dissidents from at least a dozen countries, many of whom variously describe the new approach as more audacious and clever and, yes, cooler. Sometimes the State Department is simply taking advantage of enterprising dissidents who have found ways to get around government censorship. American diplomats are meeting with operatives who have been burying Chinese cellphones in the hills near the border with North Korea, where they can be dug up and used to make furtive calls, according to interviews and the diplomatic cables. The new initiatives have found a champion in Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, whose department is spearheading the American effort. “We see more and more people around the globe using the Internet, mobile phones and other technologies to make their voices heard as they protest against injustice and seek to realize their aspirations,” Mrs. Clinton said in an e-mail response to a query on the topic. “There is a historic opportunity to effect positive change, change America supports,” she said. “So we’re focused on helping them do that, on helping them talk to each other, to their communities, to their governments and to the world.” Developers caution that independent networks come with downsides: repressive governments could use surveillance to pinpoint and arrest activists who use the technology or simply catch them bringing hardware across the border. But others believe that the risks are outweighed by the potential impact. “We’re going to build a separate infrastructure where the technology is nearly impossible to shut down, to control, to surveil,” said Sascha Meinrath, who is leading the “Internet in a suitcase” project as director of the Open Technology Initiative at the New America Foundation, a nonpartisan research group. “The implication is that this disempowers central authorities from infringing on people’s fundamental human right to communicate,” Mr. Meinrath added. The Invisible Web In an anonymous office building on L Street in Washington, four unlikely State Department contractors sat around a table. Josh King, sporting multiple ear piercings and a studded leather wristband, taught himself programming while working as a barista. Thomas Gideon was an accomplished hacker. Dan Meredith, a bicycle polo enthusiast, helped companies protect their digital secrets. Then there was Mr. Meinrath, wearing a tie as the dean of the group at age 37. He has a master’s degree in psychology and helped set up wireless networks in underserved communities in Detroit and Philadelphia. The group’s suitcase project will rely on a version of “mesh network” technology, which can transform devices like cellphones or personal computers to create an invisible wireless web without a centralized hub. In other words, a voice, picture or e-mail message could hop directly between the modified wireless devices — each one acting as a mini cell “tower” and phone — and bypass the official network. Mr. Meinrath said that the suitcase would include small wireless antennas, which could increase the area of coverage; a laptop to administer the system; thumb drives and CDs

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to spread the software to more devices and encrypt the communications; and other components like Ethernet cables. The project will also rely on the innovations of independent Internet and telecommunications developers. “The cool thing in this political context is that you cannot easily control it,” said Aaron Kaplan, an Austrian cybersecurity expert whose work will be used in the suitcase project. Mr. Kaplan has set up a functioning mesh network in Vienna and says related systems have operated in Venezuela, Indonesia and elsewhere. Mr. Meinrath said his team was focused on fitting the system into the bland-looking suitcase and making it simple to implement — by, say, using “pictograms” in the how- to manual. In addition to the Obama administration’s initiatives, there are almost a dozen independent ventures that also aim to make it possible for unskilled users to employ existing devices like laptops or smartphones to build a wireless network. One mesh network was created around Jalalabad, Afghanistan, as early as five years ago, using technology developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Creating simple lines of communication outside official ones is crucial, said Collin Anderson, a 26-year-old liberation-technology researcher from North Dakota who specializes in Iran, where the government all but shut down the Internet during protests in 2009. The slowdown made most “circumvention” technologies — the software legerdemain that helps dissidents sneak data along the state-controlled networks — nearly useless, he said. “No matter how much circumvention the protesters use, if the government slows the network down to a crawl, you can’t upload YouTube videos or Facebook postings,” Mr. Anderson said. “They need alternative ways of sharing information or alternative ways of getting it out of the country.” That need is so urgent, citizens are finding their own ways to set up rudimentary networks. Mehdi Yahyanejad, an Iranian expatriate and technology developer who co- founded a popular Persian-language Web site, estimates that nearly half the people who visit the site from inside Iran share files using Bluetooth — which is best known in the West for running wireless headsets and the like. In more closed societies, however, Bluetooth is used to discreetly beam information — a video, an electronic business card — directly from one cellphone to another. Mr. Yahyanejad said he and his research colleagues were also slated to receive State Department financing for a project that would modify Bluetooth so that a file containing, say, a video of a protester being beaten, could automatically jump from phone to phone within a “trusted network” of citizens. The system would be more limited than the suitcase but would only require the software modification on ordinary phones. By the end of 2011, the State Department will have spent some $70 million on circumvention efforts and related technologies, according to department figures. Mrs. Clinton has made Internet freedom into a signature cause. But the State Department has carefully framed its support as promoting free speech and human rights for their own sake, not as a policy aimed at destabilizing autocratic governments.

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That distinction is difficult to maintain, said Clay Shirky, an assistant professor at New York University who studies the Internet and social media. “You can’t say, ‘All we want is for people to speak their minds, not bring down autocratic regimes’ — they’re the same thing,” Mr. Shirky said. He added that the United States could expose itself to charges of hypocrisy if the State Department maintained its support, tacit or otherwise, for autocratic governments running countries like Saudi Arabia or Bahrain while deploying technology that was likely to undermine them. Shadow Cellphone System In February 2009, Richard C. Holbrooke and Lt. Gen. John R. Allen were taking a helicopter tour over southern Afghanistan and getting a panoramic view of the cellphone towers dotting the remote countryside, according to two officials on the flight. By then, millions of Afghans were using cellphones, compared with a few thousand after the 2001 invasion. Towers built by private companies had sprung up across the country. The United States had promoted the network as a way to cultivate good will and encourage local businesses in a country that in other ways looked as if it had not changed much in centuries. There was just one problem, General Allen told Mr. Holbrooke, who only weeks before had been appointed special envoy to the region. With a combination of threats to phone company officials and attacks on the towers, the Taliban was able to shut down the main network in the countryside virtually at will. Local residents report that the networks are often out from 6 p.m. until 6 a.m., presumably to enable the Taliban to carry out operations without being reported to security forces. The Pentagon and State Department were soon collaborating on the project to build a “shadow” cellphone system in a country where repressive forces exert control over the official network. Details of the network, which the military named the Palisades project, are scarce, but current and former military and civilian officials said it relied in part on cell towers placed on protected American bases. A large tower on the Kandahar air base serves as a base station or data collection point for the network, officials said. A senior United States official said the towers were close to being up and running in the south and described the effort as a kind of 911 system that would be available to anyone with a cellphone. By shutting down cellphone service, the Taliban had found a potent strategic tool in its asymmetric battle with American and Afghan security forces. The United States is widely understood to use cellphone networks in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries for intelligence gathering. And the ability to silence the network was also a powerful reminder to the local populace that the Taliban retained control over some of the most vital organs of the nation. When asked about the system, Lt. Col. John Dorrian, a spokesman for the American-led International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, would only confirm the existence of a project to create what he called an “expeditionary cellular communication service” in Afghanistan. He said the project was being carried out in collaboration with the Afghan government in order to “restore 24/7 cellular access.”

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“As of yet the program is not fully operational, so it would be premature to go into details,” Colonel Dorrian said. Colonel Dorrian declined to release cost figures. Estimates by United States military and civilian officials ranged widely, from $50 million to $250 million. A senior official said that Afghan officials, who anticipate taking over American bases when troops pull out, have insisted on an elaborate system. “The Afghans wanted the Cadillac plan, which is pretty expensive,” the official said. Broad Subversive Effort In May 2009, a North Korean defector named Kim met with officials at the American Consulate in Shenyang, a Chinese city about 120 miles from North Korea, according to a diplomatic cable. Officials wanted to know how Mr. Kim, who was active in smuggling others out of the country, communicated across the border. “Kim would not go into much detail,” the cable says, but did mention the burying of Chinese cellphones “on hillsides for people to dig up at night.” Mr. Kim said Dandong, China, and the surrounding Jilin Province “were natural gathering points for cross-border cellphone communication and for meeting sources.” The cellphones are able to pick up signals from towers in China, said Libby Liu, head of Radio Free Asia, the United States- financed broadcaster, who confirmed their existence and said her organization uses the calls to collect information for broadcasts as well. The effort, in what is perhaps the world’s most closed nation, suggests just how many independent actors are involved in the subversive efforts. From the activist geeks on L Street in Washington to the military engineers in Afghanistan, the global appeal of the technology hints at the craving for open communication. In a chat with a Times reporter via Facebook, Malik Ibrahim Sahad, the son of Libyan dissidents who largely grew up in suburban Virginia, said he was tapping into the Internet using a commercial satellite connection in Benghazi. “Internet is in dire need here. The people are cut off in that respect,” wrote Mr. Sahad, who had never been to Libya before the uprising and is now working in support of rebel authorities. Even so, he said, “I don’t think this revolution could have taken place without the existence of the World Wide Web.” Reporting was contributed by Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Andrew W. Lehren from New York, and Alissa J. Rubin and Sangar Rahimi from Kabul, Afghanistan. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/12/world/12internet.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=t ha2

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Middle East June 10, 2011 Opposition Is Split on How to Reshape Yemen By THE NEW YORK TIMES SANA, Yemen — The protesters, arrayed in the tens of thousands under a blazing sun, pumped their fists in unison as they stood on the hot tarmac on Friday and chanted triumphantly, “The people, at last, have defeated the regime!” But inside the ragged tents where they have camped out for months, the revolutionaries seem far less certain that they have won. With Yemen’s president recovering in Saudi Arabia from an attack last week on his palace mosque, the opposition seems increasingly divided about how to move forward, with some favoring far-reaching changes and others urging a more moderate political resolution endorsed by the United States and Yemen’s Arab neighbors. Many are anxious that the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, will destroy their movement if he is allowed to return. “This is our chance, now Saleh is away,” said Muhammad al-Ha’et, an elderly lawyer, as he held up a gray umbrella against the sun, his voice full of anguish. “Yemen has always been run by the military. This is the first real revolution — the others were just military coups. We must not fail.” As he spoke, another, more tentative chant broke out in the crowd: “The people must continue defeating the regime.” Across town, Mr. Saleh’s supporters chanted their own slogans and held up his picture, as they have every Friday for months — though this time the numbers were a little low on both sides, perhaps because of the intense heat and the worsening scarcity of gasoline and water. Most of those who form the original core of the protest movement say they want to preserve the transforming vision of civility and tolerance they have glimpsed in public squares since the uprising began, much like their peers in Egypt. They deeply oppose the political solution advocated by Saudi Arabia and the United States, which grants Mr. Saleh and his family immunity from prosecution and is likely to preserve more of the status quo. They say the proposal — which Mr. Saleh repeatedly refused to sign before he was wounded last week — misses a golden opportunity for meaningful change and leaves Yemen’s direst problems unaddressed. Their chief demand echoed across Sana and other Yemeni cities on Friday: “The people want a transitional council!” It may not have the same ring as the old revolutionary mantras borrowed from Egypt. But for many protesters, creating a civilian council of technocrats, rather than the compromise political coalition called for by the Persian Gulf countries, represents the key to Yemen’s salvation. 92

“We will not accept to have a new president and the same system,” said Khaled al- Anisi, as he sat Indian-style on the floor of the tent where he has lived for the past four months, a cup of milky tea sitting uneasily on the lumpy rug beside him. “Oh, it is a long time, four months,” Mr. Anisi said with a weary smile, shifting his weight on the hard floor. A human rights lawyer, Mr. Anisi has been one of the most passionate advocates of radical change, including prosecution of Mr. Saleh and a more democratic system of government. “The gulf countries are afraid of the influence of our revolution on their countries, so they want to engineer a political solution,” he said. “They want to kill our peaceful movement; this is their target.” Mr. Anisi and his allies say they will name a transitional council in days, after first giving some of the country’s mainstream politicians a chance to join them. They then plan to call for huge demonstrations to press their cause, invoking “revolutionary legitimacy” as the grounds for abandoning precedent and the Yemeni Constitution. A few protest leaders even hint at a more forceful tactic: urging the military leaders who have already defected to add their weight to the demands for a transitional council. The more moderate opposition figures, including most of those with political experience, argue that a more gradualist and accommodating approach is the only sensible one, given Yemen’s many rival tribes and political factions and its violent past. If Mr. Saleh’s family members are not given immunity from prosecution, they could turn much more violent, the moderates say. The same thing could apply to the wider circle of the president’s political followers. Inclusion, the moderates say, is the sensible path forward. The violence engendered by Iraq’s de-Baathification program, in which Saddam Hussein’s party members were punished and disenfranchised en masse, is invoked often here. “What Yemen needs now is reconciliation,” said Muhammad Abu Lahoum, a former member of Mr. Saleh’s party who resigned to join the protests soon after they started. Mr. Abu Lahoum said he was optimistic about the current move toward a political settlement, which he called the second stage of the revolution. With the country still deeply unsettled after the recent fighting in the capital between Mr. Saleh’s loyalists and opposition tribesmen, there is a desperate need for a compromise that will allow for a smooth transition, he said. That transition, Mr. Abu Lahoum said, will create a peaceful opportunity for the hard- line protesters to begin pushing their more far-reaching goals: fighting corruption and regionalism, creating accountable state institutions, and building on the culture of nonviolence that was manifest in the sit-ins across Yemen in recent months. It will not happen all at once, he said, and the protesters must become reconciled. “We’d like to see corruption drop from 99 percent to 40 percent,” he said. “We need to go from 80 percent lawless to 40 percent lawless. It takes time. But Yemenis are patient, as long as you are moving in the right direction.” In the tents in the area the protesters have renamed Change Square, that kind of talk elicits scowls.

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“We have seen a new Yemen in the making,” said one protester, who gave his name only as Murad. “This is a chance that will never come again.” Referring to the moderate transition plan advocated by Yemen’s Arab neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council, which would give Mr. Saleh and his family immunity, Murad said, “If the G.C.C. deal happens, the system will never change. It is just a management of the problem, not a resolution.” One thing the entire opposition shares is the dread of Mr. Saleh’s return. “If Ali Abdullah Saleh returns and is president, people will blow themselves up,” said Tawakul Karman, another protest leader. “We will not care about our lives.” Opposition Is Split on How to Reshape Yemen June 10, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/middleeast/11yemen.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=t ha2

El líder que aspira a perpetuarse 'Tayyip Baba' pretende convertirse en el nuevo padre de los turcos J. C. SANZ - Ankara - 12/06/2011 Altanero. Carismático tras arrasar dos veces en las urnas y amarrar Turquía a Europa. Prágmatico, arrogante siempre. El tribuno que enciende a las masas de Anatolia en campaña también puede ser héroe en la plaza de Tahrir por exigir la dimisión de Mubarak. Pero sus críticos aún se preguntan si tendrá una agenda integrista oculta tras su bigote cortado a cepillo, pese a que hoy será plebiscitado de nuevo por los turcos. Del barrio de Kasimpasa procede la leyenda urbana de que de niño vendía simit (rosquillas con sésamo) por las empinadas callejuelas que desembocan en el Cuerno de Oro. Lo cierto es que, mozo bien plantado, Recep Tayyip Erdogan jugaba en el equipo de fútbol de ese distrito popular de Estambul, en un estadio rebautizado ahora con el nombre del primer ministro de Turquía. Era un adolescente recién llegado a Estambul, como otros millones de inmigrantes en la gran metrópolis turca, que vino desde Rize, en la costa del mar Negro, donde hace 57 años, cuando nació, su padre era marino. Y entre simit y regates, estudió el bachillerato en un imam hatip (seminario islámico), como otros chicos despiertos sin recursos. Pocos en el barrio tuvieron su suerte: estudiar Empresariales en la Universidad de Mármara y colocarse después como gestor en la Empresa de Transportes del Área Metropolitana de Estambul. Pero todos le consideran ahora el orgullo de Kasimpasa. Alcalde de Estambul. Diputado. Primer ministro. Probablemente será también el próximo presidente de Turquía y heredará el cargo fundado por Mustafá Kemal, Atatürk (el padre de los turcos), en 1923. Piadoso lector del Corán, conoció en la Universidad al profesor Necmettin Erbakan, patriarca del movimiento islamista turco y su mentor político. Y de la mano del Partido del Bienestar de Erbakan (efímero primer ministro entre 1996 y 1997) conquistó la alcaldía de Estambul con un programa de obras en los barrios y lucha contra la corrupción. El derrocamiento de su jefe de filas tras un golpe militar "posmoderno" en

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el que los generales ni siquiera tuvieron que sacar los tanques a las calles, amenazó también con llevarse por delante su carrera política. Erdogan fue condenado en 1998 por "incitación al odio religioso". Los fiscales basaron su acusación en la lectura de un poema otomano: "Las mezquitas son nuestros cuarteles, los alminares nuestras bayonetas, las cúpulas nuestros cascos y los creyentes nuestros soldados". Cumplió cuatro meses de cárcel y quedó inhabilitado para ejercer cargos políticos. Pero rompió con el islamismo nacionalista y extremo de Erbakan para fundar con otros dirigentes jóvenes -como Abdulá Gül, actual presidente turco- en 2001 el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo o Partido AK (limpio, en turco), inspirándose en el modelo de los democristianos europeos para aunar religión y política. El resto ya está en los libros de historia. La victoria electoral de su partido en 2002, que propició su rehabilitación política con su llegada al poder. El comienzo del proceso de adhesión de Turquía a la UE en 2005. La firmeza democrática ante las amenazas de golpe de Estado colgadas en Internet por la cúpula de las Fuerzas Armadas en 2007, que propició un segundo arrollador triunfo en las urnas poco después. Pero los turcos recordarán sobre todo que bajo sus mandatos han triplicado la renta per cápita y que viven en un país considerado ya como potencia emergente dentro del G-20. Ha prometido que pactará una Constitución de consenso con la oposición, pero en el fondo sueña con un modelo presidencialista para poder seguir en el poder hasta 2023. Al Erdogan de Kasimpasa le pierde siempre la intemperancia de carácter. "Si hubiese estado en el Gobierno cuando fue detenido, habría enviado a la horca a Abdalá Ocalan", acaba de declarar en plena campaña al referirse al jefe de la guerrilla kurda del PKK, encarcelado a perpetuidad en una isla del mar de Mármara. "Terco e hiperactivo", como aparece descrito en los documentos diplomáticos de EE UU filtrados por Wikileaks, soporta mal las críticas de la prensa, incluso se ha querellado por caricaturas políticas. Aunque no precisamente por sus denuncias, en Turquía hay cerca de 60 periodistas encarcelados, más que en China. Su Gobierno prepara también la imposición de filtros generalizados en Internet so pretexto de proteger a la infancia. Las páginas de reformismo de Tayyip Baba (papi), como muchos turcos le apodan ya, empiezan a estar manchadas con los inevitables borrones que echan los líderes cuando tienden a perpetuarse en el poder. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/lider/aspira/perpetuarse/elpepuint/2011061 2elpepiint_2/Tes

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REPORTAJE: EN EL CORAZÓN DE LIBIA Desde Misrata, la mártir El autor relata las destrucciones provocadas por las fuerzas de Gadafi y la bravura de los habitantes de la ciudad atacada. De ahí su convicción de que ha nacido el ejército de la Libia libre, capaz de marchar sobre Trípoli cuando los helicópteros franceses abran camino No creo haber visto nunca una ciudad tan metódicamente destrozada. Esto es peor que Sarajevo Aunque la OTAN atacó a los gadafistas, los habitantes tuvieron que enfrentarse a los tanques del dictador BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY 12/06/2011 Alquilar un barco al azar en Malta, pues Misrata está rodeada por las tropas de Gadafi, aislada del mundo, y solo se puede llegar hasta allí por mar. Encontrar, tras haber recibido varias negativas, a un marino maltés que, como casa a su hija la semana próxima y se ha endeudado para la boda, acepta, en el último minuto y sin conocer el barco, hacer la travesía conmigo y con los miembros de la oposición libia que me han acompañado desde Francia: Ali Zeidan, Mansur Sayf al-Nsar y Suleiman Fortia. Navegar durante una noche, un día, una noche más, para, sin instrumentos de a bordo dignos de tal nombre, sin cartas de navegación realmente fiables, llegar hasta la ciudad mártir de Misrata, donde nos esperan, en la completa oscuridad de un desembarcadero desierto y silencioso -solo una ráfaga de kalashnikov en el momento en que atracamos-, las autoridades de la ciudad y el general Ramadán Alzarmouh, comandante de las fuerzas insurgentes. Entrar, sí, en una ciudad sin electricidad, tinieblas casi totales, solo una media luna en el cielo azul-negro sobre los primeros escombros. No tener agua es una cosa. Ni gas para cocinar. No diré que sea corriente, pero, dado que, como voy a comprobar muy pronto, de todos modos no hay casi nada para comer, los habitantes se han adaptado. Pero no tener electricidad... Había una central, una sola para toda la ciudad, que los tanques bombardearon sin descanso hasta que explotó su último depósito de petróleo. Los depósitos ardieron durante ocho días. Y la noche en que dejaron de hacerlo, las últimas luces de la ciudad se apagaron con ellos; como en Fukushima, unas espesas nubes hinchadas de ceniza se estancaron sobre la población hasta estas últimas horas; y, al alba, en lugar de la magnífica central que era su orgullo, los misratíes encontraron esta ruina que ahora descubro yo gracias solo a la claridad de los faros de los coches que me esperan en el puerto y en los que ya nos hacinamos mis amigos libios y el que suscribe: chatarra retorcida, vigas de acero fundidas, chapas calcinadas y retorcidas, tuberías reventadas, placas de hierro colosales e igualmente retorcidas, cables colgando en el vacío como candelabros invertidos y un fragmento de tejado que ha permanecido intacto pero al que las llamas han achicharrado tanto que se diría un friso de oro en voladizo de un templo. Ir, todavía de noche, hasta las ruinas del Café Central, aquel lugar con tan buen ambiente, aquel espacio de libertad, uno de los pocos en los que los jóvenes de la ciudad 96

podían reunirse, reír, soñar con un futuro mejor, tal vez sin Gadafi: "Y eso es lo que no les han perdonado", me sugiere Abdelhamid Fortia, el hijo del representante de la ciudad ante el Consejo Nacional de Transición (CNT), un antiguo alumno de una gran escuela británica que, como su padre, ha hecho el viaje con nosotros; y por eso han bombardeado nuestro café hasta la última silla de plástico y la última jukebox [máquina reproductora de música]. Y ahora, este desastre: tumba para una juventud deshecha, réquiem por sus sueños enterrados. Partir, a la mañana siguiente, en busca del lugar en el que, el 20 de abril, murieron Tim Hetherington y Chris Hondros, los dos valerosos fotógrafos: ese edificio desvencijado en la esquina de las dos arterias de la ciudad; ese agujero en la fachada en el que Tim iba a deslizarse cuando le alcanzó el fragmento del cohete; y las lágrimas en los ojos de Mohsin, el vecino que intentó reanimarlo bajo la lluvia de obuses, antes de que lo llevaran al hospital. Un hospital, precisamente, en el que el doctor Khalid Abuflaga, desbordado, carente de todo, y especialmente de analgésicos y anestésicos, calcula que, este lunes 30 de mayo, a las 17 horas, ya han llegado 60 heridos graves procedentes del frente, que se suman a los otros 6.000 heridos y 1.600 muertos de las semanas pasadas. Y "heridos graves", en Misrata, quiere decir cabezas medio arrancadas, rostros hechos papilla, cuerpos desmembrados, alaridos. La víspera, el 29 de mayo, fuimos a primera línea, a la aldea de Abdul Raouf, donde, en las dunas, entre banderas de la Libia libre mezcladas con una bandera francesa, los insurgentes protegen lo que queda de su ciudad. De todo esto, extraigo al menos tres lecciones. No creo haber visto nunca una ciudad tan metódicamente destrozada como Misrata. Recuerdo Huambo, en Angola. Abyei, en el sur de Sudán. Fui testigo del calvario de Sarajevo y Vukovar. Pero ahora observo los escombros de Tripoli Street. El Ayuntamiento hecho añicos. Los edificios desplomados sobre sí mismos. Otros que siguen en pie pero tienen la fachada acribillada por la metralla de las bombas de fragmentación. Otro más con el que se ensañó un francotirador. "No podíamos detenerlo", dice Khalifa Azwawi, presidente del Consejo de la ciudad. "Parecía un serial sniper, un maníaco, tal vez se había vuelto loco, simplemente loco; y locos estuvieron a punto de volverse los de enfrente, los de la casa contra la que disparaba. ¿Por qué la locura general no iba a alcanzarlo a él también?". Veo todo esto. Considero este puro gozo de disparar, de matar, de destruir. Y me digo que en Misrata se ha alcanzado la cumbre de la demencia urbicida contemporánea. Sí, urbicida... Esa palabra inventada al comienzo de las guerras de Yugoslavia por Bogdan Bogdanovic, antiguo alcalde de Belgrado... Ese concepto que, como el otro, como el de genocidio, supone premeditación, planificación, programa... Y es lo que ha debido de producirse para que hayan conseguido partir la ciudad en dos, exactamente por la mitad. Es eso, tiene que ser eso lo que ha dirigido esta operación de destripamiento, disección y evisceración. No puede ser que este intento de aniquilamiento de una ciudad rebelde haya sido concebido aquí, en el fragor del combate, sino más arriba, más lejos, en la capital, Trípoli, cuyo nombre había osado usurpar la avenida en la que me encuentro ahora. Y si todavía hubiera albergado alguna duda sobre este urbicidio orquestado, se habría despejado cuando, en un rincón del Ayuntamiento en ruinas que los bombardeos han respetado milagrosamente, un empleado municipal fantasmagórico -y absurdamente fiel a su puesto- me muestra una especie de museo en cuyos muros ha pegado como tesoros: 97

las fotos de los mártires del barrio, incluidos los dos fotógrafos anglosajones asesinados el 20 de abril; el centenar de pasaportes de los nigerianos, malianos y chadianos abatidos o apresados por los insurgentes; los falsos billetes de cien dólares, o euros, con los que Gadafi les pagaba; y luego, en medio de todo eso, una hoja de papel amarillento, de estilo oficial, aunque dibujada y escrita a mano, en la que se ve el plan de entrada e invasión de la ciudad: ¡qué confesión! La segunda cosa que tenía que ver para creer era la increíble bravura que han demostrado los ciudadanos. Varsovia resistió, pero terminó sucumbiendo. Las ciudades españolas aguantaron (algunas mucho tiempo, como Madrid, por ejemplo), pero igualmente llegó un momento en que, exangües, tuvieron que deponer las armas. Sarajevo fue heroica, pero los carros de combate no estaban en la ciudad, sino en Lukavica, en las colinas, con los francotiradores. Cuando los carros están entre los muros, como en 1944, en París, siempre hace falta una fuerza aliada, una columna Leclerc, una 2ªDB, para desalojarlos desde el exterior. Ahora bien, aquí, los tanques de Gadafi habían entrado. Pero aunque la OTAN destruyó algunos, aunque, por ejemplo, sus aviones bombardearon bajo la losa de cemento del mercado cubierto a los cuatro que se ocultaban allí, los hechos hablan por sí solos: la mayor parte de esas decenas de tanques, todos los que los gadafistas habían apostado cerca de las mezquitas o de los pocos puntos de agua a los que los habitantes venían a aprovisionarse, los que habían colocado a la puerta del hospital e incluso en su interior, los más difíciles de alcanzar, que eran, por definición, los más amenazadores, han sido los habitantes, solos, con las manos casi desnudas y con un coraje inaudito, quienes han tenido que dejarlos fuera de combate. Cócteles molotov arrojados a la boca de los cañones... Granadas lanzadas a las torretas, como aquí, en la carcasa de ese tanque que apuntaba hacia la calle paralela a la calle de Bengasi y en el que distinguimos, con horror, los restos de unas tibias humanas recién quemadas. Cohetes RPG7 disparados a quemarropa, en contacto, un cuerpo a cuerpo con la máquina, una danza con el monstruo de acero... Ardides también, maravilla de ingeniosidad, del estudiante, del ingeniero, del militar retirado (una idea luminosa que sin duda quedará para siempre sin autor...) que dio con esto: las alfombras empapadas de aceite que, en plena noche, aprovechando el descanso del tanquista, disponen delante de las orugas para que, al despertar, su máquina patine, no responda y sea, a su vez, un blanco para los cazadores de tanques... O con esto: cuando los insurgentes quieren atacar pero la OTAN no está ahí para cubrirles, o cuando sus fuerzas son demasiado endebles y Gadafi va a aprovechar para avanzar, esta otra idea luminosa que nadie sabe tampoco de qué cerebro salió y consiste en emitir por los altavoces de las mezquitas, en vez de las llamadas a la oración, ruidos de avión grabados previamente para hacer creer que los ejércitos aliados velan desde el aire... Misrata ha resistido. Misrata sigue asediada, pero ha liberado la mayor parte del centro. Edificio tras edificio, calle tras calle -y cada vez, una muralla de camiones volcados, de contenedores o de buldózeres llenos de arena para consolidar su último avance-, en cuarenta días, Misrata ha hecho retroceder a una columna infernal. Y de esta marcha modesta pero, por ahora, victoriosa, de esta reconquista paciente pero segura y que permite que, esta noche, podamos deambular sin que nos disparen por las calles de la ciudad, ni un alma, solo gatos, no conozco, lo repito, muchos ejemplos. Y, finalmente, la tercera lección es que de esta batalla de Misrata ha surgido un verdadero ejército: disciplinado, aguerrido, avezado en los combates callejeros y, sobre todo, temiblemente eficaz. En los frentes de la Cirenaica vi a unos cuantos bravos. Admiré a los intrépidos chebabs, dispuestos a asumir todos los riesgos para defender el 98

alma, y a los vivos, de Bengasi. Pero fueron los aviones los que, justo antes de que los tanques la invadiesen, salvaron la ciudad de Bengasi. Fueron ellos los que, detrás de Francia e Inglaterra, impidieron el baño de sangre. Mientras que aquí, en Misrata, los tanques habían entrado una vez más y han sido los ciudadanos quienes han hecho el trabajo de los aviones y, cuerpo a cuerpo y en tierra, han tenido que destruirlos o hacerlos retroceder. He visitado, en la zona oeste de la ciudad, los talleres secretos de fabricación de armas de los insurgentes. He visto las escopetas de perdigones en las que montan cañones de 12 milímetros. Los racimos de obuses arrebatados a los tanques enemigos que desunen para adaptarlos a las ametralladoras montadas sobre camionetas. He visto, semejantes a la camioneta del pequeño repartidor de verduras que, nada más llegar a Libia por primera vez, me dejó subir en la frontera y me llevó hasta Tobruk, estos humildes vehículos con la parte delantera blindada por dobles placas de hierro entre las cuales han aplicado cemento para convertirlos en arietes. He visto otros a los que una placa semicircular soldada, esta vez, en la parte trasera, aparenta con los carros de Ben Hur. Y otros más a los que les han soldado en los laterales delanteros unas enormes aletas de hierro, al abrigo de las cuales dos, tres, a veces cuatro combatientes, pueden mantenerse en cuclillas para, cuando el vehículo llega al objetivo, surgir en el último segundo como diablos. Y, finalmente, he visto en el frente a unos hombres abrumados pero no quebrados, espantados pero determinados. He visto a unos hombres que han vivido la prueba de fuego y, demacrados, con los ojos brillantes por el agotamiento y el hambre, están dispuestos a resistir el fuego enemigo y a responder con sus armas improvisadas. ¿Dónde está el ejército de la Libia libre? Cuando llegue el momento, cuando los helicópteros franceses abran camino, ¿quién va a poder marchar sobre Trípoli? Pues Misrata, precisamente. BERNARD-HENRI LÉVY Desde Misrata, la mártir12/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/Misrata/martir/elpepuint/20110612elpdmgrep _6/Tes

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El futuro de Siria pasa por Idlib La provincia fronteriza con Turquía se ha convertido en el principal foco de insurrección contra el régimen - Helicópteros artillados atacan desde el aire Siria informa de "fuertes combates" en la ciudad donde desertaron los militares 9.000 sirios esperan en tierra de nadie Bachar el Asad aún es fuerte. El final de la revuelta resulta imprevisible ENRIC GONZÁLEZ - Jerusalén - 12/06/2011 Idlib era solo una remota provincia agraria al noroeste de Siria, junto a la frontera turca. Ahora es el lugar donde está en juego el futuro de la revuelta contra el presidente Bachar el Asad y, por extensión, el futuro de todo Oriente Próximo. Idlib ha sido escenario de las primeras deserciones relevantes en el Ejército sirio y el propio Gobierno de Damasco admite que "de forma intermitente" ha perdido el control sobre la provincia. Eso ha abierto la posibilidad de que se produzca una situación similar a la de Libia, con un "territorio rebelde" en el que los insurgentes puedan organizarse y en el que sean posibles intervenciones extranjeras de tipo humanitario o militar. La información disponible, como desde el inicio de la crisis, resulta confusa y ocasionalmente contradictoria. Pero los recursos bélicos desplegados para someter Idlib demuestran que el régimen considera muy grave la situación. Maher el Asad, hermano del presidente y virtual jefe del Ejército, utiliza helicópteros artillados para atacar desde el aire las ciudades de Jisr al Shughur y Maaret al Numan. El uso de la fuerza aérea por parte de Muamar el Gadafi en Libia fue el hito que separó en aquel país la revuelta política de la guerra abierta. También es nueva la autorización concedida a un pequeño grupo de periodistas de medios internacionales para que acompañaran a las tropas sirias. El enviado de la agencia estadounidense Associated Press explicó que a menos de dos kilómetros de Jisr al Shughur, la columna de vehículos militares con la que viajaba fue tiroteada y tuvo que detenerse. No hubo heridos. Cabe la posibilidad de que el incidente fuera organizado por el propio Gobierno para respaldar su versión de que se enfrenta a "grupos terroristas armados", pero todo indica que las tropas de El Asad topan en Idlib con una resistencia mucho menos pacífica que en otras zonas del país. Jisr al Shughur escapó al control de Damasco hace una semana. Eso es mucho tiempo para una dictadura como la siria, que presume de ser implacable frente al menor asomo de disidencia. El cambio de actitud del primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, es otro acontecimiento significativo. Erdogan hizo grandes esfuerzos para acercarse al régimen sirio y cerrar la crisis que a finales de los noventa amenazó con provocar una guerra entre ambos países, a raíz del apoyo de Damasco a los rebeldes kurdos en Turquía. En los pasados dos años estableció una amistad personal con Bachar el Asad y desde el inicio de la revuelta, en marzo, ha hablado por teléfono casi diariamente con el presidente de Siria. Hasta la semana pasada, Erdogan apostaba por la voluntad reformista de El Asad y creía que la situación podía reconducirse. Ahora habla de "atrocidades inaceptables". El dirigente turco ha dedicado las últimas jornadas a actos 100

electorales y sus palabras pueden tener un tinte populista (la violencia del Ejército contra la población civil es tan impopular en Turquía como en el resto de los países vecinos); sin embargo, no se apunta a un radical giro diplomático para ganar unos votos cuando se es el claro favorito. La frontera turca es la más delicada para Siria. Turquía pertenece a la OTAN, lo que facilitaría todo tipo de misiones de asistencia si Idlib se convirtiera finalmente en "territorio rebelde", y cuenta con una población mayoritariamente suní que simpatiza con los suníes sirios, protagonistas de la revuelta contra un régimen, el de El Asad, basado en la minoría chií alauí y respaldado en general por la minoría cristiana. El número de refugiados sirios en Turquía es aún manejable: algo menos de 5.000 en las tiendas de campaña instaladas por la Media Luna Roja junto a la frontera, más una cantidad indeterminada en domicilios privados. Pero Erdogan ya ha anunciado que acogerá a cuantos haga falta. La opción de enviar a la familia a un territorio seguro podría empujar a muchos hombres sirios a empuñar las armas (Damasco dice que las que circulan por Idlib han sido enviadas por los Hermanos Musulmanes desde Turquía, aunque parece más probable que hayan sido robadas a su propio Ejército) y a sumarse a una insurrección. Bachar el Asad aún es fuerte. El desenlace de la revuelta resulta imprevisible. En cualquier caso, la importancia estratégica de Siria (aliado de Irán, dominante en Líbano a través de la milicia chií de Hezbolá, teórico estandarte de la resistencia árabe contra Israel) hace trascendentales los acontecimientos de Idlib. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/futuro/Siria/pasa/Idlib/elpepuint/20110612 elpepiint_3/Tes

Israel se moviliza para que la ONU no acepte el Estado palestino E. G. - Jerusalén - 11/06/2011 Israel movilizará todos sus recursos diplomáticos para impedir que la ONU reconozca, en septiembre, el Estado palestino. El diario israelí Haaretz publicó ayer los mensajes secretos enviados por el Gobierno de Netanyahu a sus embajadores. "El objetivo consiste en que el máximo número posible de países se opongan al reconocimiento del Estado palestino", decía en sus instrucciones Rafael Barak, director general del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, "y hay que definir las peticiones palestinas como un proceso que deslegitima al Estado de Israel". La argumentación que debían manejar los embajadores se resumía de la siguiente forma: "El argumento básico consiste en que pidiendo la actuación de la ONU, los palestinos intentan conseguir sus objetivos por una vía distinta a la negociación con Israel, lo cual viola el principio de que la única vía para resolver el conflicto pasa por las negociaciones bilaterales". Conviene recordar que Israel existe desde 1948 gracias a una resolución de la ONU, y no a una negociación con los palestinos o con los países árabes vecinos.

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El Gobierno israelí exige una completa movilización diplomática (las vacaciones en septiembre quedan prohibidas) y ha establecido un grupo de trabajo, llamado Foro de Septiembre, dirigido por el director del Departamento de Oriente Próximo, Yaakov Hadas, para coordinar esfuerzos. Estrategia diplomática Los embajadores, que deberán enviar un informe semanal al Foro para explicar cómo desarrollan su estrategia, recibieron estas instrucciones: "El plan debe incluir aproximaciones a los políticos más influyentes, movilizar los multiplicadores de fuerza [una referencia a grupos como las comunidades judías locales o las ONG], usar los medios de comunicación y persuadir a la opinión pública". En otro mensaje se hacía referencia a países europeos que ya habían planteado objeciones a un Estado palestino (Alemania e Italia), otros que resultaban dudosos (Chequia, Eslovaquia, Polonia, Hungría, Rumanía, Bulgaria) y otros que "tienden automáticamente a alinearse con los palestinos", como Suecia, Irlanda, Portugal o Bélgica. Israel considera que Estados Unidos y Canadá votarán con seguridad contra el Estado palestino, pero da por descontado que la gran mayoría de los países americanos, asiáticos y africanos votarán a favor. E. G. Israel se moviliza para que la ONU no acepte el Estado palestino11/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Israel/moviliza/ONU/acepte/Estado/palesti no/elpepiint/20110611elpepiint_2/Tes

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El rey Mohamed VI de Marruecos deja de ser "sagrado" en la nueva Constitución IGNACIO CEMBRERO - Madrid - 11/06/2011 Marruecos dará a conocer la semana próxima el borrador de una nueva Constitución que recorta el hasta ahora inmenso poder del rey y le priva de su carácter sagrado. Fue el propio Mohamed VI quien pidió que su persona fuera solo "inviolable". Un consejero real, Mohamed Moatassim, recibió el martes a los responsables de los partidos políticos y centrales sindicales para exponerles oralmente el proyecto, pero dos líderes políticos y uno sindical abandonaron la reunión porque no les entregaron el texto o porque desaprueban la metodología seguida para modificar la Carta Magna. De las revelaciones hechas a posteriori por los asistentes al encuentro queda claro que el entramado institucional de Marruecos va a cambiar en profundidad. El primer ministro, que se llamará presidente del Gobierno, sale reforzado de la reforma en ciernes. Surgido de la mayoría parlamentaria, el presidente determinará la política del Ejecutivo, puede solicitar la convocatoria del Consejo de Ministros e incluso presidirlo por delegación del rey. Entre sus potestades figura la disolución del Parlamento aunque la comparte con el monarca. La Cámara alta del Parlamento se convertirá en un órgano de representación territorial. Las cámaras podrán amnistiar y enmendar la Constitución a condición de que lo solicite el 60% de sus diputados. El presidente del Gobierno nombrará no solo a los ministros sino a los altos funcionarios, a los directores de empresas públicas, a los gobernadores y a los embajadores, aunque para estos últimos requerirá la aprobación del rey. Mohamed VI seguirá, no obstante, siendo jefe espiritual de los creyentes y de él dependerá la política religiosa. Presidirá además un Consejo Nacional de Seguridad que coloca bajo su autoridad a las Fuerzas Armadas e incluso a las de seguridad. El bereber, que en el norte del país se llama rifeño, será lengua oficial al mismo nivel que el árabe. Una ley orgánica desarrollará esta disposición constitucional. La justicia escapa al control del Ejecutivo. La regentará un Consejo Superior del Poder Judicial que presidirá simbólicamente el rey, pero del que formará parte el representante de un órgano encargado de velar por el respeto de los derechos humanos. Hace tres meses Mohamed VI pronunció un discurso en el que anunció la reforma de la Constitución. Encargó a una comisión, presidida por el constitucionalista Abdellatif Menouni, que elaborase un borrador consultando con partidos y sindicatos. La nueva Constitución será sometida a referéndum el 1 de julio -la campaña empezará el 20 de junio- y poco después el Parlamento será disuelto. En octubre, probablemente el día 7, se celebrarán unas elecciones legislativas anticipadas. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/rey/Mohamed/VI/Marruecos/deja/ser/sagr ado/nueva/Constitucion/elpepiint/20110611elpepiint_6/Tes

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El Ejército sirio ataca la ciudad donde resisten los militares desertores Las fuerzas de seguridad lanzan su ofensiva sobre Jizr al-Shughur y reprimen con dureza las manifestaciones contra el régimen que tienen lugar en numerosos puntos del país.- Hay, al menos, 28 muertos, según Reuters.- Los combates obligan a miles de sirios a huir hacia la frontera con Turquía ENRIC GONZÁLEZ | Jerusalén 10/06/2011 El Ejército sirio ha lanzado este viernes su esperado ataque sobre la ciudad rebelde de Jizr al-Shughur. Soldados y policías del presidente Bashar el Asad han atacado también a los manifestantes en decenas de ciudades del país. En Maaret al-Numan, cerca de Jizr al-Shughur, una multitud ha incendiado la comisaría y los juzgados, y la guarnición militar ha respondido con artillería (por primera vez desde el aire, según Reuters), matando a 21 personas. Durante la jornada, en todo el país han muerto al menos, 28 personas, según la misma agencia, por la represión de las fuerzas de seguridad. El régimen quería hacer una demostración de fuerza pero sus zarpazos parecen, sin embargo, cada vez más desesperados. Las matanzas perpetradas hasta el momento solo habían conseguido exasperar a la población, agravar las divisiones entre los distintos grupos religiosos y mermar la autoridad del Gobierno de Damasco, todopoderoso hasta hace solo tres meses. El riesgo de una guerra civil en el corazón de Oriente Próximo se perfilaba con creciente intensidad. El primer ministro turco, Tayyib Recep Erdogan, que hizo de las buenas relaciones con Bachar el Asad uno de los pilares de su diplomacia, ha calificado de "inhumanos" los ataques del Ejército sirio contra la población. Robert Gates, secretario de Defensa de Estados Unidos, ha acusado a El Asad de perpetrar "una matanza de inocentes". Más allá de las condenas, ningún dirigente internacional se atrevía a exigir de forma abierta la dimisión del presidente de Siria, por temor a que tras la dictadura comenzara una guerra civil con múltiples bandos, al estilo libanés, o que los Hermanos Musulmanes impusieran un Estado islámico. A Bachar el Asad solo le quedaba el respaldo estratégico de Rusia y China y el apoyo rotundo de Irán, aliado desde la revolución de los ayatolás en 1979. Eran cada vez más frecuentes las denuncias de que agentes iraníes (distinguibles por la ropa negra, la barba larga y el escaso conocimiento de la lengua árabe) cooperaban con las fuerzas de seguridad y con los shabiha, los civiles de religión alauí armados por el régimen. El Gobierno británico fue el primero en hacer constar que sus servicios de espionaje habían detectado la presencia de asesores iraníes en territorio sirio. Hay pocas noticias de Jizr al-Shughur. A la ausencia de periodistas, prohibidos por el régimen, se suma el corte de líneas telefónicas. Solo está claro que al menos 10.000 soldados (15.000 según otras fuentes) dirigidos por el general Maher el Asad, hermano del presidente, y apoyados por 40 tanques y varios helicópteros atacaron la ciudad a primeras horas de la mañana. "En respuesta a los llamamientos de la población,

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unidades del Ejército Árabe de Siria han iniciado su misión para arrestar a personas armadas", ha anunciado la televisión estatal. En Jizr al-Shughur, cuya población ronda los 50.000 habitantes, quedaba poca gente, según los testimonios de los refugiados en Turquía. Miles han huido al otro lado de la frontera o a las aldeas cercanas, aterrorizados por las amenazas de venganza lanzadas desde Damasco. Sigue sin conocerse con exactitud lo ocurrido en Ibn al-Shughur el pasado fin de semana. El Gobierno se limita a insistir en que 120 policías y soldados murieron por disparos de "grupos armados". Los civiles fugitivos y las organizaciones opositoras coinciden en señalar que parte del Ejército desertó para unirse a los manifestantes y que eso provocó combates muy violentos. Fue, tal vez, una muestra de lo que podría ocurrir pronto en gran parte de Siria si continuara creciendo el rencor entre la mayoría suní (que compone también la mayoría de los soldados) y la minoría alauí (que domina el régimen y el Ejército), respaldada en general por la minoría cristiana. Abundan los indicios de que la revuelta, inicialmente pacífica, se hace paulatinamente violenta. Las manifestaciones de este viernes han sido convocadas bajo el lema Viernes de las Tribus, con la intención de atraer hacia la protesta a la población beduina. Varios jeques beduinos ya participaron en la reunión de opositores celebrada en Antalya (Turquía) y desbordaron incluso a los delegados de los Hermanos Musulmanes en cuanto a islamismo y a voluntad de responder a la represión con una rebelión armada. Ha habido manifestaciones contra el régimen de Bachar el Asad en numerosas ciudades, incluyendo la capital, Damasco, donde según la red de activistas que informa desde el interior del país han muerto tres personas por disparos de la policía. Como en otras ocasiones, la policía política, no uniformada, ha tenido un papel preponderante y ha utilizado francotiradores para dispersar a la multitud. En Daraa, donde comenzó la revuelta, la manifestación se ha saldado con decenas de heridos. En Homs, por el contrario, una numerosa manifestación contra El Asad ha discurrido sin incidentes. La zona noroccidental del país, con ciudades como Jizr al-Shughur y Maaret al-Numan, ha sido escenario de los enfrentamientos más violentos. En la segunda ciudad, el régimen ha utilizado por primera vez helicópteros con ametralladoras para dispersar una manifestación, según Reuters. • Claves de la revolución siria • Más de mil sirios cruzan a Turquía en 24 horas • Unos 2.700 refugiados sirios han cruzado ya a Turquía • "Tememos que quemen nuestras tierras" http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ejercito/sirio/ataca/ciudad/resisten/militare s/desertores/elpepuint/20110610elpepuint_3/Tes

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REPORTAJE: La revuelta en Siria "Tememos que quemen nuestras tierras" La mayoría de los 3.000 sirios que huyen del régimen de Damasco hacia Turquía son campesinos - Ankara amenaza con "taponar" la frontera si aumenta el éxodo BLANCA LÓPEZ ARANGÜENA - Güveçci - 11/06/2011 "One, two, three, four, five". Así, hasta ten. Mohamed, sirio, se niega a dar su nombre verdadero mientras muestra emocionado cómo su hija de cinco años, que ahora está en el campamento de refugiados instalado en Yayladagi -una antigua fábrica de tabaco en la frontera entre Turquía y Siria-, acaba de aprender a contar en inglés. La escucha a través de un viejo teléfono móvil blanco, mientras toma un café en la casa de unos amigos turcos en Güveçci, un pequeño pueblo fronterizo por el que cada día cruzan centenares de sirios que huyen de su país para escapar de la represión del régimen de Bachar el Asad. En el pueblo, de casas de ladrillo sin pintar y adobe, todos tienen familia al otro lado. Güveçci se ha convertido en un pequeño centro neurálgico para quienes intentan ayudar a resistir a los que todavía aguardan en la frontera siria. Desde aquí, salen cada mañana niños con bidones de agua y alimentos para los que se encuentran en tierra de nadie sin atreverse a cruzar. También hay quienes, como Mohamed, ayudan a cruzar a los hombres sin que sean vistos para que puedan subir información a la Red, ya que las telecomunicaciones en el lado sirio sufren continuos cortes. Otros hombres pasan tan solo a ver a sus familias, que ya llevan días refugiadas en suelo turco. En la sala hace calor y las alfombras que sirven para proteger la vivienda, que no tiene cristales, del frío invierno, no ayudan en junio. Mohamed pone el altavoz de su móvil para que todos oigan los progresos de su hija. Hablan muy a menudo, explica. Sin embargo, él no quiere ir al campo de refugiados porque debe cuidar sus tierras y "ayudar a los suyos". Roza la treintena, pero su físico enjuto, su tez ajada por el sol y sus dientes manchados de nicotina le suman años. Es campesino, como la mayoría de los 3.000 sirios que ya han cruzado la frontera huyendo del régimen que gobierna en Damasco. "Enviamos a las mujeres, a los niños y a los ancianos a los campos de refugiados para que estén más seguros" cuenta. Su familia llegó hace una semana, antes de que los combates en el pueblo de Jisr al Shughur, en el norte de Siria, precipitaran el éxodo masivo de los locales. "Los heridos los traemos a la frontera para que los asistan los militares turcos. El resto de los hombres nos quedamos en la frontera, esperando. Somos campesinos, si dejamos nuestras tierras los soldados sirios las quemarán y saquearán todo", cuenta entre sorbo y sorbo. Al menos 300 personas cruzaron en la madrugada de ayer el paso de Güveçci. Pero a lo largo del día se esperaban muchos más, según un responsable de la Media Luna Roja en la región. "Es la pauta general en los levantamientos en Oriente Próximo", aseguró refiriéndose a las protestas y a la represión que se vive después del rezo de los viernes. En previsión de otra oleada, la Media Luna Roja ha dispuesto un nuevo campo de refugiados algo más al norte, en Altinozu, con una capacidad para 5.000 personas, según informa Reuters.

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Los 3.000 sirios que ya se encuentran en territorio turco descansan en el campo de Yayladagi, situado a escasos kilómetros de la frontera norte de Siria. Ahí los niños juegan al fútbol entre las tiendas mientras los abuelos charlan bajo la sombra de los árboles. En ese campamento está también la hija de Mohamed, con sus nuevas clases de inglés y turco impartidas, según explica su padre, por los miembros de la Media Luna Roja. Pero es imposible comprobarlo. Los periodistas tienen totalmente vetado el acceso. Tanto el Ejército turco como las ONG que trabajan en la zona, tienen orden expresa de no hablar con la prensa, que ha de conformarse con sacar fotos de los refugiados cuando entran en los minibuses que los trasladan desde la frontera a Yayladagi. Turquía intenta no poner cara al drama sirio. La avalancha de refugiados llega en un momento delicado para el partido del Gobierno, que este domingo aspira a renovar por tercera vez su mandato. El éxodo amenaza con desplazar la actualidad nacional de Ankara a la frontera siria. Algunos expertos señalan que el primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan pretende llevar a cabo una acción más concreta contra Damasco después de las elecciones, por lo que trata de evitar que las historias e imágenes de los refugiados se hagan públicas antes de esta fecha. En toda esta provincia de Hatay, los hospitales estaban bajo vigilancia militar para que nadie se comunique con alguno de los 56 refugiados heridos, la mayoría ingresados en el hospital de Antakya, la capital provincial. El jueves, en declaraciones a la televisión turca, Erdogan instó a la ONU a tomar cartas en el asunto. "Ya no es posible defender a Siria. La represión ha llegado a un punto inaceptable", declaró. El mandatario turco instó a su vez a la ONU a tomar cartas en el asunto y habló de la posibilidad de crear una "zona tapón" en esta provincia si sigue llegando gente. En Güveçci, mientras tanto, los lugareños cuentan cómo muchos jóvenes llegan malheridos e incluso algunos mueren. Se les vela en la mezquita local antes de devolverlos a territorio sirio. "Allí está su casa. Esa es su tierra y es donde deben descansar, aunque lamentablemente se hayan ido demasiado pronto", explica una lugareña que no quiere dar su nombre. El tejado de su casa se ha convertido en un improvisado observatorio desde donde la prensa vigila los movimientos en la frontera. Al rato cambia de idea. "Por favor, váyanse", espeta. La explicación es simple: "Bachar el Asad es un asesino, tenemos miedo por nuestras familias al otro lado, pero también por nosotros. Desde hace unas semanas ya nadie duerme tranquilo. Por favor, váyanse". http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Tememos/quemen/tierras/elpepiint/20110 611elpepiint_3/Tes Unos 2.700 refugiados sirios han cruzado ya a Turquía El asedio del régimen a la ciudad de Jisr al Shughur acelera la salida de ciudadanos sirios del país EL PAÍS / EFE - Madrid / Ankara - 10/06/2011 La agencia de Naciones Unidas para los refugiados (ACNUR) calcula que alrededor de 2.700 sirios han cruzado ya la frontera con Turquía huyendo de la represión del régimen de Bachar el Asad en el noroeste del país. Según los cálculos de ACNUR, solo en las

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últimos 24 horas han llegado al sur de Turquía unos 1.570 sirios. Estos se han unido a otros 1.200 refugiados, entre ellos muchos niños, que habían llegado en días y semanas anteriores. El goteo de sirios desplazados al país vecino se aceleró el pasado 7 de mayo, día en el que una cantidad indeterminada de soldados se amotinó en la localidad siria de Jisr al Shughur, en el noroeste y cerca de la frontera turca. La sublevación de los militares, los primeros que desertan de forma colectiva desde el inicio de las revueltas para unirse a las manifestaciones civiles, derivó en una batalla que, según cifras de las autoridades, causó la muerte de 120 uniformados. Las tropas del general Maher al Asad han iniciado precisamente hoy el asalto de la ciudad. Metin Corabatir, portavoz de ACNUR en Ankara, ha manifestado que la ONU está siguiendo de cerca los acontecimientos y que está preocupada de que la situación vaya a empeorar más. "Estamos listos para ayudar al Gobierno turco con todos los medios disponibles, si es requerido", ha afirmado Corabatir. El primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, dijo anoche en una entrevista televisada que los próximos dos días son "críticos", insinuando que Turquía podría tener que acoger a muchos más sirios. El campamento construido por la Media Luna Roja turca para los refugiados sirios en la ciudad fronteriza de Yayladagi ya estaba lleno ayer, por lo que se está preparando la construcción de uno nuevo para posibles nuevas llegadas. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/2700/refugiados/sirios/han/cruzado/Turqui a/elpepuint/20110610elpepuint_5/Tes

Claves de la revolución siria EL PAÍS - Madrid - 09/06/2011 La familia Asad se aferra al poder que ostenta desde hace cuatro décadas. Las protestas están siendo reprimidas con dureza por las fuerzas de seguridad del régimen dejando más de 1.100 muertos y unos 10.000 detenidos. Estas son algunas de las preguntas clave del conflicto. ¿Cuándo y cómo empezó la revuelta en Siria? Dos meses después del triunfo de la revolución tunecina que culmina el 14 de enero con la huída del país del sátrapa Ben Ali, comienzan los primeros incidentes en Siria, concretamente en Deraa, una ciudad de 75.000 habitantes cercana a la frontera jordana. Varios adolescentes fueron encarcelados por pintar con spray el lema de la revolución popular, "La gente quiere la caída del régimen", en una de las paredes del colegio. Los residentes protestaron, pidiendo la liberación de los niños y cantando "Dios, Siria, Libertad". Las fuerzas de seguridad abrieron fuego contra los manifestantes, matando e hiriendo a varios. Las revueltas en Deraa se extendieron rápidamente a otras ciudades, incluida Homs, la tercera ciudad más grande, y Banias, en la costa mediterránea. Los manifestantes exigen una mayor libertad, fin a la corrupción, y el derrocamiento del presidente Bashar el Asad. ¿Qué papel ha jugado Bashar el Asad y su familia? 108

La figura de Bashar el Asad suscita numerosas dudas. No está del todo claro si ha llegado a asumir realmente el poder que heredó porque su hermano mayor Basil murió en accidente de coche y porque el hermano menor, Maher, fue descartado por su carácter violento e inestable. Precisamente es este último al que se dirigen todas las miradas por su responsabilidad en la sangrienta represión que el régimen sirio está llevando a cabo desde el inicio de la revuelta. Maher el Asad, al frente de la Cuarta División Acorazada, considerada la fuerza militar más fiel a la familia El Asad, ha atajado la rebelión en Jisr al Shugur, localidad al noroeste del país, en la que por primera vez unidades del Ejército desertaron para luchar contra el régimen. El presidente no es visto en público desde el 30 de marzo, cuando pronunció un discurso ante la Asamblea, y es el clan familiar el que aparece en la prensa siria para defender al régimen. Una noticia difundida por diarios británicos y no confirmada, según la cual la esposa y los hijos del mandatario habrían huido a Reino Unido, ha contribuido a fomentar la incertidumbre sobre la posición de El Asad. Los puestos más importantes del régimen son ocupados por otros miembros de la familia. Destaca la figura de Rami Makhlouf, multimillonario primo de Bashar el Asad, quien afirma que las decisiones políticas se toman "de forma conjunta" dentro de la familia y que la familia "está dispuesta a luchar hasta el fin". ¿Qué medidas ha tomado contra el régimen la comunidad internacional? La brutalidad de la represión del régimen sirio ha suscitado duras condenas en la comunidad internacional. El hermano y número dos del régimen sirio, Maher el Asad, encabeza la relación de 13 personalidades del régimen que la Unión Europea sancionó a principios de mayo por su responsabilidad en la "violencia contra los manifestantes" en el país. Las sanciones les vetan la entrada en territorio comunitario y autorizan la confiscación de los bienes que tengan en Europa. El pasado 23 de mayo la Unión Europea acordó incluir al presidente sirio, Bashar el Asad, y a otras 10 personalidades de su régimen en la lista negra de sancionados por la sangrienta represión. Los Veintisiete siguen sin ponerse de acuerdo en pedir a Asad que abandone el poder, como ha hecho con el libio Muamar el Gadafi. Francia y Reino Unido han presentado un borrador de resolución de condena ante el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Rusia (con poder de veto), Sudáfrica, Brasil e India expresaron dudas sobre la resolución, por temor a que constituyera un primer paso hacia una intervención militar internacional similar a la de Libia. EE UU, por su parte, también ha impuesto sanciones contra el régimen. El Departamento del Tesoro anunció el 18 de mayo la imposición de sanciones contra el presidente sirio Bashar el Asad y otros seis altos cargos de su Gobierno. Estas medidas consisten en bloquear las cuentas o propiedades en EE UU de las personas incluidas en la lista de sancionados y se prohíbe a ciudadanos estadounidenses realizar transacciones económicas con ellos. ¿Cuál ha sido la respuesta del régimen para atajar las revueltas? El número de hombres, mujeres y niños muertos desde que las protestas comenzaron en marzo supera los 1.100 y el de detenidos puede ser de 10.000 o más, según datos de organizaciones humanitarias. El régimen ha respondido con contundencia, utilizando tanques, artillería y francotiradores siempre que ha sido necesario. ¿Quién está informando de lo sucedido? 109

El vacío informativo es notable y hasta el momento la única información procedente del país es la que ofrece el Observatorio Sirio de los Derechos Humanos y las ONG's que trabajan en la zona. La implementación de las redes sociales es otra de las singularidades de las revoluciones árabes, hasta tal punto que muchos medios se han hecho eco de los acontecimientos y las refriegas por medio de imágenes y testimonios tomados a través de YouTube, Twitter y Facebook. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Claves/revolucion/siria/elpepuint/2011060 9elpepuint_12/Tes

Erdogan tira de la locomotora turca El fuerte crecimiento de la economía, un 9% en 2010, impulsa su reelección - El primer ministro islamista propone obras faraónicas en Estambul y Ankara

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, primer ministro y líder del Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP), se dirige a sus seguidores durante el mitin de ayer en Erzurum (este de Turquía).- REUTERS JUAN CARLOS SANZ | Ankara (Enviado Especial) 11/06/2011 "Tengo locos proyectos y algún día los contaré", aseguró a comienzos de año con aire misterioso el primer ministro de Turquía, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. El mes pasado, con la campaña para las elecciones legislativas que se celebran mañana ya en marcha, el líder islamista moderado anunció a bombo y platillo la construcción de un canal navegable al este de Estambul para acabar con el paso de petroleros y buques con mercancías peligrosas por el estrecho del Bósforo, que amenaza a los 15 millones de habitantes de Estambul. Poco después, desveló su proyecto de crear una nueva ciudad al sur de la congestionada Ankara (más de cinco millones de habitantes), que bien podría ser la nueva capital administrativa del país. La oposición laica no dudó en tomarse a chanza las faraónicas propuestas del gobernante. Pero cerca de la mitad de los 50 millones de turcos que están llamados a las urnas se muestran dispuestos, según los sondeos, a darle este domingo otra oportunidad para que gobierne durante un tercer mandato consecutivo. El peso de la economía turca se ha triplicado desde que Erdogan llegó al poder, a finales de 2002, hasta alcanzar un producto interior bruto (PIB) de 510.000 millones de euros, la mitad del de España. La inflación, que se disparaba hasta magnitudes de tres cifras en los años ochenta y

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noventa, se encuentra ahora en mínimos históricos, con la previsión oficial de que acabe este año por debajo del 5%. A los turcos no parece haberles ido mal la política económica liberal de Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP), que no ha dejado de atraer capitales extranjeros durante esta década. Salieron con fuerza de la recesión en 2010, con un crecimiento del PIB del 8,9% mientras la vecina Grecia sigue a un paso de la bancarrota. De la pujanza de la economía turca da idea el auge de los intercambios comerciales con España. "Hemos sido el octavo cliente mundial de Turquía en 2010 -con 3.063 millones de euros, un 16,2% más que el año anterior- y su octavo proveedor global, con 3.753 millones, un 32% más", precisa María Victoria Azpiazu, agregada comercial de España en Estambul. "Les compramos sobre todo prendas de vestir (un 29% del total) y les vendemos componentes para la naciente industria automovilística turca (un 28% de las exportaciones)". Cualquier viajero que haya recorrido la autopista que lleva desde el aeropuerto hasta el centro de Ankara en los últimos años habrá constatado la desaparición de los poblados de chabolas que se extendían hasta el horizonte por las colinas. En su lugar han surgido grandes bloques de pisos de protección oficial con carteles del Organismo Público de Vivienda y Construcción (TOKI, en sus siglas en turco), que depende directamente de la Administración del primer ministro. Desde 2003, TOKI ha construido medio millón de viviendas, 700 escuelas y 100 hospitales. La oposición denuncia que Erdogan se ha convertido en el mayor promotor inmobiliario del país y que utiliza los recursos del Estado para contentar a su clientela electoral y favorecer a constructores próximos al AKP. Lo cierto es que la economía no deja de crecer y que los turcos no dejan de consumir a manos llenas, animados por las facilidades para obtener créditos, a pesar de que el desempleo roza el 11,9% (supera el 20% entre los menores de 30 años). El déficit de la balanza comercial turca se ha disparado hasta alcanzar el 8%. Como advertía en un reciente debate celebrado en Madrid el exministro de Finanzas turco Kemal Dervis, Turquía está amenazada por un estallido de la burbuja de las importaciones, que han crecido el doble que las exportaciones. Tras una campaña electoral jalonada de "locos proyectos", el nuevo Gobierno de Erdogan tendrá que empezar a preparar el lunes medidas de ajuste para contener la desbocada demanda interna y los turcos tendrán que pensar en devolver su colección de tarjetas de crédito a los bancos. • El auge de la oposición laica desafía la hegemonía islamista en Turquía • Ankara se va • Los jóvenes turcos toman la palabra • Erdogan busca perpetuar su poder con una gran victoria en las urnas • Sexo, vídeos y chantajes políticos

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Erdogan/tira/locomotora/turca/elpep iint/20110611elpepiint_7/Tes

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JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA Ankara se va JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA 10/06/2011 Conforme se alejaba la UE, los márgenes de acción de los islamistas del AKP se han ido ampliando Años discutiendo si Turquía era Europa o Asia, si iba hacia Occidente o si giraba hacia Oriente, y por fin hemos encontrado la respuesta. La pregunta era incorrecta. Turquía no va hacia el Este ni hacia el Oeste: va hacia arriba. En solo una década, la economía turca ha cuadruplicado su tamaño, pasando de 200.000 a 800.000 millones de dólares (550.000 millones de euros); triplicado su renta per cápita, que ha pasado de 3.000 a 10.000 dólares; reducido la deuda pública del 75% al 40% del PIB y situado su prima de riesgo muy por debajo de la mayoría de los países del sur de Europa. Mientras, la Unión Europea está estancada, y muchos dudan de si en lugar de progresar, su futuro es uno marcado por el declive y el retroceso en los estándares de vida que los europeos han venido dando por sentados. Al tiempo que Europa debatía si aceptar o rechazar a Turquía y se permitía el lujo de ningunearla o incluso de despreciarla abiertamente, los turcos han rebatido todos los estereotipos y forjado una historia de éxito. Incluso hay quienes hablan de "calvinistas islámicos" para describir a la nueva, exitosa y orgullosa clase empresarial turca que ha surgido en las ciudades más dinámicas de Anatolia. Esa Turquía pobre y analfabeta que tantas veces nos han pintado, supuestamente llena de ignorantes campesinos anatolios deseosos de asaltar la fortaleza del bienestar que representa Europa, ya no está allí. En las calles de Rabat, Túnez o El Cairo, Europa ha dejado de ser el modelo a seguir para ser sustituida por Turquía, un país que demuestra que se puede ser a la vez musulmán, democrático y próspero, e incluso tener una política exterior propia no sometida a los dictados de Occidente. Viniendo de un pasado reciente donde el Mediterráneo estaba plagado de sumisos regímenes autoritarios, la Turquía de Erdogan representa muy bien un futuro lleno de orgullosos e independientes regímenes democráticos que no tendrán ningún reparo en señalar con el dedo a Europa y avergonzarla públicamente cuando aplique dobles raseros a Israel, la apertura de mercados, los derechos humanos, la proliferación nuclear o la inmigración. Así pues, nunca los turcos han vivido mejor ni enfrentado el futuro con tanto optimismo. No es de extrañar que nadie dude de que los islamistas del AKP vayan a ganar por mayoría absoluta las elecciones legislativas que se celebran el próximo domingo: la única duda (y fuente de preocupación) es si lograrán alcanzar los 367 diputados (sobre un total de 560) que permitirán al partido de Erdogan modificar unilateralmente la Constitución sin necesidad de celebrar referendos y dar una nueva vuelta de tuerca a lo que muchos perciben como una peligrosa deriva autoritaria que vendría manifestándose desde hace algunos años. Hasta la fecha, la perspectiva de adhesión a la UE ha tenido un impacto sumamente beneficioso sobre la política interna turca: para los islamistas, Europa significaba la garantía de que los militares no intervendrían en la política, como habían hecho frecuentemente en el pasado; para los militares y las fuerzas laicas y liberales, que la mayoría islamista no les impondría sus valores ni restringiría los derechos humanos y 112

las libertades individuales. Pero según el vínculo europeo ha ido debilitándose, ya que las negociaciones de adhesión están completamente bloqueadas y cada vez son menos los turcos que creen que la adhesión terminará por tener lugar, los márgenes de acción de los islamistas del AKP se han ido ampliando. Por ello, aunque la Turquía de hoy es infinitamente más democrática, rica y estable que la que obtuvo una promesa de ingreso en 1999 y comenzara negociaciones de adhesión en 2005, muchos temen que una mayoría tan rotunda permitirá a los islamistas desatarse del poste democrático al que Europa les había anclado. Así pues, mientras que para muchos árabes Turquía es el modelo, el referente de los islamistas del AKP no necesariamente es el ideal europeo como nosotros lo entendemos: algunos incluso malévolamente insinúan que el modelo europeo de Erdogan es el otro arquetipo europeo, es decir, el ruso de Putin, un autoritarismo disfrazado bajo elecciones libres y con unos medios de comunicación y una clase empresarial completamente sometidos al poder político. Si esta deriva autoritaria se impusiera se confirmaría que la Unión Europea habría dejado pasar de largo, con sus torpezas y miopías a la hora de gestionar sus relaciones con Turquía, la oportunidad estratégica más increíble que pudiera pensarse de ayudar a convertir Turquía en el faro desde el que irradiar democracia a todo Asia Central y el Cáucaso, Oriente Próximo y el Norte de África. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ankara/va/elpepiint/20110610elpepiint_5/Tes

El auge de la oposición laica desafía la hegemonía islamista en Turquía El nuevo líder del Partido Republicano moviliza el voto urbano frente a Erdogan J. CARLOS SANZ / BLANCA LÓPEZ - Estambul - 10/06/2011 De apacibles maneras, el líder del principal partido de la oposición no tardó en ser bautizado como Gandhi por los turcos cuando relevó en 2010 al nacionalista Deniz Baykal al frente del Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP). El notable parecido de Kemal Kiliçdaroglu con el Mahatma indio y su discurso templado contribuyeron al acierto del apodo. Desde entonces, este probo funcionario de 62 años ha dado un giro radical al CHP, fundado por Mustafá Kemal, Atatürk, tras la caída del Imperio Otomano, para devolverlo a la tradición socialdemócrata y reformista. Kiliçdaroglu parece haber conseguido movilizar durante la campaña electoral a los sectores urbanos y laicos de Turquía que más temen la creciente hegemonía del Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP, islamista moderado). Tras casi una década en el poder, el primer ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan aspira a revalidar su aplastante mayoría parlamentaria en los comicios del domingo con hasta un 50% de los votos, como predicen las encuestas. Pero los sondeos también reflejan el auge del CHP, que aspira a alcanzar un 30% de los sufragios (en la votación de 2007 cayó hasta el 21%) con el objetivo de bloquear el proyecto de los islamistas de Erdogan de redactar en solitario una nueva Constitución. El nuevo líder laico ha roto con el extremismo de Baykal -que dimitió en medio del escándalo tras la difusión de un vídeo sexual en el que aparecía junto a una diputada de su partido- y ha dejado de cuestionar el uso del pañuelo islámico por las universitarias o las reivindicaciones de los nacionalistas kurdos para centrar su campaña en la lucha 113

contra la corrupción, la redistribución de la riqueza y la defensa de las libertades cívicas: las mayores sombras que se proyectan sobre el Gobierno del AKP. Kiliçdaroglu ha abierto las listas de su partido y ha incorporado a políticos centristas como Aydin Ayaydin, vicepresidente del club de fútbol Besiktas. "Solo apoyaremos la reforma constitucional si Erdogan es sincero en su propuesta de profundizar en la democracia y en los derechos civiles", advertía ayer Ayaydin, un profesor de Economía de 59 años, en el cuartel electoral del CHP en Estambul. "Pero Turquía aún no está madura para un modelo presidencialista como el que propone, seguiremos defendiendo el sistema parlamentario". Para ampliar su base política, que se nutre de las clases medias urbanas, el CHP lanza guiños a los votantes de formaciones minoritarias -"queremos acabar con la barrera del 10% de los votos nacionales, y rebajarla al 3% o el 5%", explica este candidato por la circunscripción de la parte europea de Estambul- y a los de origen kurdo -"nací en el sureste de Anatolia y aprendí a hablar turco a los siete años, por eso creo que los kurdos tienen derecho a recibir educación en su lengua materna"-, pero el partido de Kiliçdaroglu busca ante todo la complicidad de las clases más desfavorecidas: "Crearemos un salario social de 600 liras [unos 300 euros] para las familias con rentas más bajas". El Gandhi turco emergió como figura política cuando disputó la alcaldía de Estambul a los islamistas de Erdogan en 2009. Aunque el AKP sigue en el poder en la gran metrópolis turca, Kiliçdaroglu consiguió en una exitosa campaña -centrada en la sencillez de su discurso y la honestidad de su trayectoria- duplicar el apoyo a su partido con cerca de un 40% de los votos. Bajo su dirección, el CHP proclama ahora su fe en el liberalismo económico y en la integración en la Unión Europea, mientras que la vieja guardia de Baykal -un líder que parecía sentirse a gusto en la oposición- renegó durante años de las reformas que el Gobierno islamista puso en marcha para la integración de Turquía en Europa. Erdogan, consolidado en el poder desde 2002, se ha acostumbrado mientras tanto a ofrecer recepciones en el palacio de Dolmabahçe, antigua residencia de los sultanes a orillas del Bósforo. Tras haber resistido las presiones del Ejército y del aparato del Estado, el primer ministro observa cómo los votantes liberales, que respaldaron sus reformas, amenazan ahora con darle la espalda en las urnas ante la emergencia de un nuevo líder tranquilo que habla sin estridencias de cambio. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/auge/oposicion/laica/desafia/hegemonia/is lamista/Turquia/elpepiint/20110610elpepiint_4/Tes

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Alternativas a la indignación 9 junio 2011 Una oleada de reivindicaciones sociales, económicas y políticas sacudió España en vísperas de las elecciones municipales y autonómicas del 22 de mayo de 2011. Este movimiento social espontáneo, que agrupa a diversas tendencias y plataformas sociales, ha lanzado al espacio público una serie de demandas que abarcan desde lo social hasta lo económico, pasando por la regeneración del sistema político español y de los partidos.

Este fenómeno evidencia un síntoma de la existencia de fallos en el sistema político y económico, nacional, europeo y global, y de un comprensible descontento entre sectores significativos de la población, especialmente los jóvenes. Pero lo más destacable del 15- M es que – a pesar de su rechazo del sistema de partidos y el poder económico - es un movimiento genuinamente político. Nuestra Fundación considera que algunas de las reformas son posibles desde las instituciones, siempre y cuando se corrijan los fallos de control democrático como respuesta al sentir de la ciudadanía. La Fundación Alternativas lleva tiempo elaborando propuestas de cambio en muchas de estas áreas, incluyendo medidas concretas para eliminar la corrupción, las carencias de participación ciudadana, del sistema político español y europeo, la crisis económica, la sostenibilidad medioambiental, la fiscalidad, el sistema financiero internacional, o la reforma de las instituciones internacionales. Por ello abrimos una sección especial con las alternativas que hemos ido elaborando a lo largo de estos años y que seguimos innovando, para que todos aquellos que quieran opinar o debatir sobre estos temas puedan hacerlo. 115

Nuestro marco de Alternativas para dar una respuesta a estas demandas y abrir el debate, se resume del siguiente modo: 1. Una democracia de calidad y sin corrupción 2. Medidas para el pleno empleo 3. Vivienda accesible y ciudad sostenible 4. Excelencia de los servicios públicos 5. Control del sistema financiero internacional 6. Fiscalidad justa y suficiente 7. Sostenibilidad: Cambio climático y energías renovables 8. Erradicación del hambre y la pobreza 9. Hacia un Estado realmente no confesional http://www.falternativas.org/la-fundacion/alternativas-a-la-indignacion/alternativas-a- la-indignacion 06/09/2011 04:23 PM The Sultan of Istancool Is Erdogan's Success Pulling Turks Away from Europe? By Daniel Steinvorth and Bernhard Zand Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to win a third term in Sunday's election. His hunger for power may be bad for Turkey's democracy, but he has helped transform the country into an economic powerhouse. The once- promised EU membership seems increasingly irrelevant for the rising power.

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DER SPIEGEL Graphic: Turkey's economic performance in comparison to selected European countries He walks up to the podium, looking serious, and waits patiently until the applause subsides. "Üstat! Üstat!" ("Teacher! Teacher!") they call out, while clapping and whistling. Then he begins to speak. In conversations, his voice has become quieter and quieter the longer he has been in power. Conversely, it sounds more powerful than ever when he speaks in public. He greets his audience, calling them "kardesler" ("siblings"), a word that implies a much stronger sense of familiar affection in Turkish than in English or German. Then he gets serious. He has a plan to announce, one that his campaign strategists have already characterized as an "insane project," an idea that exceeds all "powers of imagination." These are not his words but the embellishments of his speechwriters. Recep Tayyip Erdogan is responsible for the core of the matter. On this day in Istanbul, he unveils a project that he hopes will secure him a place in the history books. "Dreams are seeds that sprout in reality," he says. "We have rolled up our sleeves for this city, whose nights are filled with the scent of hyacinths. We are giving it a new canal." Erdogan wants to dig a new canal between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, a second Bosporus, which is to be opened in 2023, on the 100th birthday of the Turkish Republic. Hoping for a Big Majority Erdogan's words make it clear that he is a master politician with long years of experience. He no longer searches for issues that are likely to please voters and be tolerated by the military. When he gives a speech today, every word has an impact. And when he says provocative things -- such as calling the opposition leader a semi-infidel, accusing generals of treason or telling the Israeli president: "When it comes to killing, you know very well how to kill" -- these are no longer gaffes. In fact, he knows exactly what he is doing. Erdogan, who grew up in the Istanbul district of Kasimpasa on the Golden Horn, back when it was still a cesspool, has now been in power longer than US President Barack Obama, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and most of the other world leaders he encounters at G-20 summits. He has won two elections with triumphant majorities, and he is more than likely to win a third term in Sunday's elections. The only question is how big his margin of victory will be. If it's only enough to secure half of the seats in the parliament, he will have to make compromises regarding the new constitution he hopes to introduce. But if his margin of victory is big enough to secure three-fifths of seats, he will be able to write this constitution himself, although it would still have to be submitted to the people for a referendum. And if he wins a two-thirds majority, which is not impossible, he probably won't even have to do that. And if that happens, Erdogan will be what his opponents and supporters alike already call him today: the Sultan, the Padishah of Turkey. Economic Achievements

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Erdogan has achieved a lot. He has taken the fight out of Turkey's powerful military brass, demoralized the secular elites and straightened out the cotton kings and concrete tycoons who once amicably divided up the country with the generals. He has built up Turkey, traditionally a country of coups and crises, into a regional power. He is taken seriously as an important player in London and Washington, just as he is in Riyadh and Beijing. And even Israel -- with whom he has picked fights, much to the delight of Arabs -- follows his every step with great attention. Erdogan has provided the Turks, even those who can't stand him, with a self-confidence they lacked before. The Ottoman Empire was once known as the "Sick Man on the Bosporus," but today's Turkey looks very healthy indeed. After eight years of Erdogan, it is much richer and more modern than the poor country that applied to join what was then known as the European Community more than 20 years ago. Its economy is growing three times as fast as those of other European countries. Driving from the western part of Turkey into the eastern provinces of Bulgaria and Romania, one wonders which side of the border the affluent part of Europe is actually on. At the same time, Turkey has become more bigoted. The Islamists in the government harass their opponents with at least as much implacability as they were once harassed. They bully artists and celebrities who do not share their worldview, they gag media companies whose newspapers are critical of the administration, and they have journalists tossed into prison on absurd charges. It is time for Europe to rethink how it actually wants to treat this powerful and difficult neighbor: to take it seriously and align itself with Turkey, stall it for another 20 years or tell it that it has nothing in common with Europe and its predominantly Christian and Western orientation. It is time to take stock of the situation, because the parameters of one of the most torturous and protracted European debates have changed fundamentally in recent years. 'The Government Gave Us Nothing' In Gaziantep, a fast-growing industrial city about 1,150 kilometers southeast of Istanbul, gray factory buildings stretch endlessly along the highway, as columns of buses and trucks rumble across the asphalt. This is the right place to witness what is behind Turkey's rise to 17th place among the largest economies in the world. Today Gaziantep, once known for not much more than its eggplant kebabs and pistachio trees, is one of the "Anatolian tigers," as the dynamic economic centers of the Turkish hinterlands are known. The city's industrial production has doubled since 2005, and in 2008 it exported goods worth $3.9 billion (€2.67 billion). Cahit Nakiboglu, 63, a stout man with a moustache and glasses, played a key role in shaping the economic miracle in Gaziantep. He is the head of Naksan Holding, the third-largest maker of plastic bags in Europe. His customers have included Germany's Plus supermarket chain, the Pierre Cardin fashion house and furniture giant Ikea. "The government gave us nothing," says Nakiboglu. "For decades, all it did was put obstacles in our way." That changed in 2002, when Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power. A severe financial crisis had driven the country to the brink of ruin in 2001. Kemal Dervis, a Turkish executive at the World Bank who was recently mentioned as a possible successor to International Monetary Fund (IMF) chief Dominique Strauss- Kahn, introduced a massive debt-restructuring program. The AKP government reaped 118

the fruits of his labor. Turkey's average economic growth had increased to 6 percent by 2007, and hardly any other country recovered as successfully from the 2008 and 2009 global financial crisis. Unless his spiritual predecessors, who had dreamed of an "Islamic economic order," Erdogan did not see capitalism and Islam as contradictions. Guided by the interests of the rising Muslim middle class, the AKP's most important group of voters, the new prime minister set out to open up the country's economy. The China of Europe Turkey achieved a growth rate of 9 percent last year. Unemployment has fallen to 11 percent, inflation is now down to 6 percent, and the most recent figures showed total public debt at 41 percent of gross domestic product -- a figure that most European Union countries can be envious of. Per capita income has tripled since Erdogan came into office. The British magazine The Economist has dubbed the country "the China of Europe." As the example of Gaziantep shows, the large cities in western Turkey are no longer the only ones benefiting from the boom. Anyone who visited cities like Denizli, Kayseri, Trabzon and Samsun 10 years ago would hardly recognize them today. City highways, skyscrapers and new port facilities are being built, and the Turkish state railway plans to inaugurate a new high-speed line between Eskisehir and Konya at the end of the year. The only concern on the eve of Erdogan's third election victory is that the economy is becoming overheated, that the Turks are buying and producing too much, and that imports are so high that they even exceed the country's growing exports. "Despite the imbalances," writes the Wall Street Journal, the strength of the Turkish boom is sustainable: "The growth story can continue." Flocking to Istancool The Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank, ranks Istanbul at the top of its list of the 30 most dynamic cities in the world. No one knows whether there are 15 million or perhaps already 17 million people living in the megacity on the Bosporus. New skyscrapers, each one more avant-garde than the next, are constantly going up in Istanbul's business districts, while the satellite towns on the outskirts are continually growing as more people migrate to the city. Most of these new arrivals are able to find work. Gone are the days when the only people flocking to the Bosporus were tea pickers from the Black Sea and refugees from the troubled Kurdish regions. Europeans and Americans have also discovered "Istancool," the most modern city in the Islamic world, a city that never sleeps. Among the new arrivals are people whose parents and grandparents once emigrated to faraway Germany in search of a better life. Germans of Turkish descent, derided in Turkey as "Almancilar" (literally "Germanyers"), are discovering that the city is much more dynamic than anything they could find in Germany. One of these children of guest workers is Nese Stegemann, 43, a doctor specializing in orthopedics and surgery, who is married to a German and characterizes herself as "about as German as it gets." When she flew to Istanbul with her family two years ago, Stegemann was overwhelmed by the wealth of cultural contrasts, the galleries,

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exhibitions, designer outlets, mosques and bazaars. She was offered a job in a private hospital. She accepted, and today she earns more than she did at home in Hanover. Stegemann is just one of thousands. The number of Turkish-Germans returning to the country of their forefathers has long outnumbered the number of Turks heading to Germany. In 2009, the most recent year for which figures are available, they totaled 40,000. Many of them are highly qualified and extremely well adjusted to the globalized world, in which being rooted in two cultures is seen as a career bonus. Declining Birthrate Many Europeans see the Turks as an alien people who have far too many children. But is the cliché of the "demographic bomb," one of the favored arguments of those who oppose Turkey joining the EU, even true anymore? Turkey, unlike Europe's aging societies, has a very healthy population pyramid resembling that of the United States or Canada. In recent years, the birthrate has declined to 2.1 children per woman. This is a development that results from growing affluence and improved education levels. Demographers even predict a population decline in Turkey starting in 2030, a prospect that prompted Prime Minister Erdogan to say that every Turkish woman ought to have at least three children in the future. But Turkish women have no intention of complying with his wishes. Economically speaking, Turkey doesn't even need a high birthrate. The average age is currently 29 (compared to 43 in Germany), and roughly 700,000 university graduates enter the job market every year. Turkey has almost exactly the rate of replenishment it needs for stable economic growth: not too low and not too high. At any rate, the overpopulation scenarios of anxious Europeans are greatly exaggerated. But the strongest argument in favor of Turkey joining the EU is a different one. Americans and the British have been using it for years, but so have Germans like former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Ruprecht Polenz, a foreign policy expert with Chancellor Angela Merkel's center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). It is the geostrategists' argument, and it goes like this: What better leverage does Europe have to influence developments in the Islamic world than through relations with its most modern nation, Turkey? Good Relations with Neighbors Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu recently bought a house in Meram, an exclusive residential neighborhood in the Anatolian city of Konya. Last week, his first guest at the house was the vali, or governor, of Konya, Turkey's largest province. After that, he met with SPIEGEL journalists for an interview. Davutoglu comes from the region, but he says that he hadn't been in Konya more than 10 times in the last five years. In fact, he says, he has recently traveled to Damascus much more often -- about 60 times, he estimates. Davutoglu, a mild-mannered man with strong convictions, supports his country's strategic reorientation. Ankara has good relations with almost all of its neighbors today. In recent years, Turkish diplomats participated in negotiations in the Azerbaijani capital Baku over the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, which is supposed to transport natural gas to Europe, in Tehran over the Iranian nuclear program, and

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in Tripoli with the tottering Gadhafi regime. Turkish businesspeople are building airports in northern Iraq, high-rises in Mecca and seawater desalination plants in Libya. This new foreign and economic policy has been dubbed "Neo-Ottomanism," another term that triggers anxiety in the West. Are the Turks trying to rebuild the empire that controlled the Middle East for 400 years? Loyal to Its Allies Such fears are exaggerated. At most, what will materialize is nothing more than a loose commonwealth of former Ottoman provinces. What is important, however, is the Turkish example that is being transmitted into a politically backward region. It is proof positive that even an Islamic government can be democratic, and that it doesn't take oil revenues to build affluence. The Turks' connections are also important. From Baghdad to Tripoli, they are talking to radical groups and individuals which the West does not talk to, either for fundamental reasons or out of political consideration for Israel, but which one day it may need to engage with. They include the Palestinian group Hamas, in Lebanon and Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr. It seems unlikely that the Turks could turn away from the West. Despite serious crises, Ankara has not severed its relations with Israel. And even though he felt rudely overlooked by France in the military operation against Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, Prime Minister Erdogan did not withdraw from the Western alliance. Instead, Turkey is doing its part to implement the United Nations Security Council resolution on Libya -- with a greater commitment, in fact, than its NATO partner Germany. This is one side of today's Turkey: economically strong, dynamic, self-confident and loyal to its allies. Indiscriminate Use of State Power One supporter of the Turkish prime minister says that he admires how the irascible Erdogan now manages to keep his temper under control. At the same time, it is interesting that the man is unwilling to be quoted on the record. It offers a small insight into a serious liability in Erdogan's Turkey: Its leader has a problem with authority. He can't get enough of it. The premier, says Sedat Ergin, the head of the Ankara office of the Turkish daily newspaper Hürriyet for many years, entered his first term eight years ago with great caution. He took stock of his adversaries in the army, the economy and the press, says Ergin, but he also treated them with respect. "He was decisive in advancing his policies, but he also exercised restraint," he says. According to Ergin, this changed after Erdogan's second election victory in 2007. "That was when he started using the power of the state more indiscriminately." Ergin knows what he's talking about. The more critical newspapers were in their reporting on the government, the more sharply did the prime minister's office, the Basbakanlik, strike back. A cartoonist who took the liberty of portraying the prime minister as a cat found himself facing charges in court. The same thing happened soon afterwards to another cartoonist, who had drawn Erdogan as a blood-sucking tick on the back of a respectable citizen, as a comment on the government's taxation policies.

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The Dogan Group, which owns the secular Hürriyet and the Turkish division of the US news broadcaster CNN, was particularly hard-hit. In 2009, a dozen tax inspectors descended on the company. When they were finished with their audit, Dogan was slapped with an order to pay the government the equivalent of €2.2 billion ($3.2 billion). "That's the problem with Erdogan," says Ergin. "He is using the power of the state more and more arbitrarily to promote his political interests. There is no one left to keep him in check." Power Trip In 2008, a group of former senior military leaders were put on trial for allegedly plotting to overthrow the Erdogan regime in its early years. The so-called Ergenekon trial, named, like the group of conspirators, after the mythical ancestral home of the Turks in Central Asia, had a cathartic effect on the people. For the first time, the previously untouchable officers were facing charges in a court of law. But the longer the trial dragged on, the wider the government cast its net, arresting professors, civil servants, attorneys and journalists opposed to the regime. In March, the astonished nation realized that what had been an important trial had turned into a vehicle with which the regime was eliminating its influential critics. That was when the police arrested and filed terrorism charges against investigative reporter Ahmet Sik, the journalist who had been one of the first to report on the Ergenekon group's alleged plans to overthrow the government, but then also looked at the pro-government Islamist network. Sik, along with 67 other journalists and dozens of professors, is still in prison today. In his self-aggrandizement, the premier who introduced historic change to Turkey, could become a growing liability for his country. His critics say that there is now little difference between Erdogan and Russia's strongman, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Of course, Russia hasn't applied for EU membership, but Turkey has. The prime minister's power trip is now backfiring on the Turks, increasing opposition to Turkey joining the bloc. "This man is dangerous," says Celal Sengör, 56, a renowned seismologist. He experienced firsthand how the AKP intervenes in the autonomy of academia. In 2009, Sengör, the dean of Istanbul Technical University who holds a critical stance toward Islam, was told that he was being let go -- without any explanation or dismissal procedure. It was only the intervention of the president of the International Academy of Science that saved him from losing his job. Since then, Sengör has been even more disillusioned than he was before. "Europe shouldn't be naïve," he says. "Turkey simply isn't ready to be a true democracy." Brutality Against Women People like Sengör, who belong to Turkey's urban elite, are shocked when they open their morning newspapers to read horror stories from the provinces: of religious fanatics who sprayed acid onto the exposed legs of schoolgirls in Mersin; of a young woman near Malatya who was buried alive because she allegedly had a boyfriend; and of the rapes of two sisters in Siirt by almost 100 men. The brutality with which women are treated is as old as Turkey itself, and the previous regimes failed just as miserably when it came to protecting the victims. 122

But between 2002 and 2009, the number of violent acts and so-called honor killings rose from 66 to 953. A woman dies every day, say human rights activists. The AKP argues that the figures are so high because more murders are now being reported and documented. Sociologist Binnaz Toprak acknowledges this as a possibility, but she also has another explanation: "The pressure to behave devoutly, to pray regularly, to fast and not to drink alcohol, has gone up. Society has become more conservative." A climate has developed in which women are no longer seen on the streets after dark outside the big cities, a climate in which some feel emboldened to interpret verses of the Koran in a misogynistic way. Toprak's analysis confirms the suspicions of secular Turks and skeptical Europeans that a broad segment of Turkish society espouses a view of the world and of women that is incompatible with that of the West. This casts a dark shadow over Turkey as an EU candidate. Tough Truths On balance, the argument over whether Turkey should join the EU comes down slightly in favor of the eternal accession candidate, a reflection of the mixed feelings that Europeans have had toward their complicated neighbor for decades. Nevertheless, from a rational point of view, wouldn't the pros outweigh the cons if Turkey were to join the European family? Hasn't it made impressive progress in the 12 years since it formally became a candidate and began efforts to satisfy the EU's criteria? And wouldn't closer ties to Europe be the best way to prevent this progress from being reversed? It's more likely that the Europeans and the Turks will continue to spend years talking at cross-purposes, but without expressing the two truths that everyone knows by now: that Europe doesn't want Turkey -- and that soon Turkey will no longer need Europe. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767427,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • SPIEGEL Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister: 'Turkey and Europe Need Each Other' (06/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767432,00.html • Turkey's 'Realm of Fear': A Former Judge Takes on Erdogan's Heavy Hand (04/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,758101,00.html • Digging too Deep: Journalist Arrests a Blow for Press Freedom in Turkey (03/15/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,751115,00.html • SPIEGEL 360: Our Full Coverage of Turkey http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/turkey 06/09/2011 05:21 PM SPIEGEL Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister 'Turkey and Europe Need Each Other' Elections are looming in Turkey and, once again, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP party is expected to emerge victorious. SPIEGEL spoke with

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Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, 52, about Turkey's disappointment over Europe and Ankara's influence in the Arab world. SPIEGEL: Minister Davutoglu, Turkey has been seeking European Union membership in vain for more than 20 years. Why do you even want to be part of Europe anymore? Davutoglu: I can give you three reasons why we belong in the European Union. First, Turkey has been a part of European diplomacy for centuries. We are not China. Second, Europe needs Turkey for strategic reasons. The EU can only become a major power together with Turkey. And third, we share central political values that are laid down in the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is an important member of the family of democracies. SPIEGEL: We took a look at the foreign policy section of your campaign platform. The word Europe doesn't appear in it until page six. Davutoglu: (laughing) Well, sometimes the most appealing chapters are at the end of a book. This has nothing to do with our preferences. Europe remains our ultimate goal. SPIEGEL: And yet less than 50 percent of Turks support EU accession today, down from 75 percent in 2004. Davutoglu: We have to distinguish between the questions of whether people want Turkey to become an EU member and whether they believe it will happen. Only 30 percent respond in the affirmative to the latter question. People have lost confidence. In that respect we are like all southern Europeans: very emotional. We react when we notice that someone doesn't want us. SPIEGEL: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also a very emotional man, told SPIEGEL that Europe needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Europe. Davutoglu: That's not an emotional but a very rational statement. Just think of energy security. Do we need Europe to satisfy our demand for energy? No, we need Iraq, Iran and Russia. The Europeans, on the other hand, depend on the Anatolian corridor to get oil and gas. The truth is that we need each other. It's the only way we can prevail against powers like China and India. We should both ask ourselves the question: Where does Europe's future lie? SPIEGEL: At the moment, many are also asking themselves where the future of the Middle East lies. Did you anticipate the unrest in the Arab world? Davutoglu: Yes, undoubtedly. Ten years ago, I wrote in my books that there are two historic anomalies in the Arab world: the colonialism of the 20th century, which divided Arab societies, and the Cold War, which contributed to the establishment of autocratic regimes in the region. A transformation like the one the Soviet bloc experienced in the 1990s didn't happen in the Arab world. But now change has come. SPIEGEL: And what is Turkey's position on this change? Davutoglu: We have formulated two principles. First, the Cold War is over once and for all, and it's time for change. Second, the transformation has to happen peacefully. These two principles apply to all countries in the Middle East. SPIEGEL: Really? Why then was Prime Minister Erdogan one of the first to call for then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's resignation, while taking so much longer with (Libyan leader) Moammar Gadhafi?

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Davutoglu: Because he saw that the Egyptian army was behaving neutrally. It was different in Libya. We had to look on as the country was divided, and we saw that there was no army to protect the people. We understood that there would be a bloodbath, so we tried to keep our channels of communication open on both sides. SPIEGEL: Isn't it mostly about money? After all, Turkish companies have construction contracts in Libya that are worth billions… Davutoglu: No, you're completely wrong. We had a humanitarian concern in Libya. We evacuated more than 10,000 people from 63 countries in the first few days of the Libyan crisis. If you are talking about economic interests -- I'm not mentioning any names, but you should ask yourself which capitals Gadhafi visited. Who kissed Gadhafi's hand? SPIEGEL: Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Davutoglu: No comment. SPIEGEL: And where is the criticism of Syrian President Bashar Assad? Why don't you demand his resignation? Davutoglu: We believe that Syria is the most important country in the Middle East peace process. It borders Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Besides that, Syria, unlike Libya or Tunisia, is a multi-faith country. Nevertheless, our criteria also apply there: Political change must take place, and it has to happen peacefully. SPIEGEL: But how is it supposed to happen peacefully, now that thousands are dead? Davutoglu: It would have been easier if the reform process had been initiated in January, when Prime Minister Erdogan flew to Damascus and spoke very openly with Assad. At the moment, the window is only slightly open. However, we will continue to talk to our Syrian friends. 'There Will be no Authoritarian Policy with Us' SPIEGEL: Your government has been trying for some time to settle conflicts in the Middle East. What exactly did you achieve before the Arab Spring began? Davutoglu: Oh, a great deal! At the height of the sectarian fighting in Iraq, we convinced the Sunni parties to become involved in the democratic process. In 2008, we mediated between the factions in Lebanon, and then between Hamas and Fatah and, in 2009, in the dispute between Iraq and Syria. We were unable to complete the Syrian- Israeli peace talks, but it was a success to have started them in the first place. SPIEGEL: Why did those talks fail? Davutoglu: At the end of 2008, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert visited Prime Minister Erdogan at his residence in Ankara. He stayed six hours, and we set up a telephone call between Olmert and Assad. A short time later, we were ready to begin direct talks. I called up the Syrians and made them an offer. They said: Okay, we will accept if the Israelis accept. We tried to talk to Olmert the next morning. But by then it was already clear that Israel had attacked the Gaza Strip. Everything changed after that. SPIEGEL: A new parliament will be elected in Turkey on June 12. What outcome do you expect for your party, the Islamic conservative AKP? Davutoglu: It could likely be between 45 and 50 percent. A clear majority is what's important. Turkey needs stable conditions.

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SPIEGEL: You want a two-thirds majority to be able to amend the constitution single- handedly. Davutoglu: Well, that would certainly make things easier. But we want to speak with all demographic groups first. We don't want to rush this through on our own. SPIEGEL: In that case, it would certainly be better if the governing party didn't capture such a large majority. Davutoglu: That's up to the people to decide. In the past, it was an unelected elite that wrote constitutions. This isn't our approach. We want democratic conditions. SPIEGEL: Do you appreciate that many Turks perceive Prime Minister Erdogan's growing power as a threat? Davutoglu: The prime minister always has a strong position in parliamentary democracies. But I have worked for Erdogan for a long time as a foreign policy advisor and then as foreign minister, and I can assure you that the prime minister is always open to advice. SPIEGEL: But there are fears that the system of checks and balances in your country may be eroding under the AKP -- concerns that Erdogan could become Turkey's Putin. Davutoglu: No. Every country has its own traditions. Democracy is firmly rooted in Turkey. There will be no authoritarian policy with us. Interview conducted by Daniel Steinvorth and Bernhard Zand URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767432,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • The Sultan of Istancool: Is Erdogan's Success Pulling Turks Away from Europe? (06/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767427,00.html • The Art of Turkish-Armenian Relations: Controversial Kars Monument Could Come to Berlin (05/05/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,760384,00.html • Turkey's 'Realm of Fear': A Former Judge Takes on Erdogan's Heavy Hand (04/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,758101,00.html • 'The Imam's Army': Arrested Journalist's Book Claims Turkish Police Infiltrated by Islamic Movement (04/06/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,755508,00.html • Digging too Deep: Journalist Arrests a Blow for Press Freedom in Turkey (03/15/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,751115,00.html

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06/09/2011 03:57 PM City of Gamblers Libya's Future to Be Decided on the Streets of Tripoli By Clemens Höges in Tripoli, Libya At night, NATO bombs strike strategic targets in Tripoli. During the day, pro- Gadhafi loyalists battle it out against pro-democracy insurgents. Amid the turmoil, a Frenchman is trying to save his business, and to get the two sides to the negotiating table in Paris. The oil executive leans back in the rear seat of the white government limousine as it travels along the corniche, headed for downtown Tripoli. For once, his iPhone is silent, and his other mobile phone isn't buzzing either. Waves crash onto the beach, sending plumes of spray into the air. Pierre Bonnard, a French national, has had a lot of experience in this city. He has sealed deals worth millions, witnessed his friend being mowed down by a contract killer, and once even met Moammar Gadhafi in his tent. That was seven years ago. Bonnard had just helped clean up an ugly mess. A group headed by Gadhafi's brother-in-law had blown up a French passenger jet in 1989, killing 170 people. Bonnard arranged a deal so that Gadhafi could talk with the French again: The victims' families received more than $200 million (€136 million) in compensation from Tripoli, and relations with Paris improved again. Now Bonnard is back in Tripoli. He heads the Paris-based French Chamber of Commerce for the Near and Middle East, which also has an office in Malta. At the moment, however, he has two of the most difficult jobs in the world. While French jets are bombing Libyan bunkers and tanks, Bonnard, representing French oil companies, is preserving contacts for the post-war period. At the same time, he and his Tunisian business partner, Ghazi Mellouli, are trying to secretly bring Libyan rebels and regime loyalists to Paris for peace negotiations. The Risk of Another Somalia War is bad for business, especially for the oil business in the region. Bonnard fears that blood will soon be flowing in the streets of Tripoli, and he believes that he and Mellouli have a window of only a few weeks before it will probably be too late. Everything is possible in Gadhafi's capital at the moment, and everyone is waiting for something to happen. The secret police are keeping things quiet, and Gadhafi's opponents are whispering in the side streets, while his supporters are singing in the squares. Buildings shake at night when NATO bombs blow up the regime's bunkers. Controlling this city is the key to governing Libya. But more is at stake than just Tripoli. The conflict revolves around the question of whether Libya could turn into another Somalia, with the West becoming embroiled in a war that it might not be able to win.

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"In this situation, I can't just stand on the sidelines," says Bonnard. "I couldn't afford to do that." While he and Mellouli negotiate with Gadhafi's representatives in Tripoli, one of his employees is setting up contacts in Benghazi, the rebels' stronghold in eastern Libya. A Gambler with Laugh Lines Bonnard has a sharply defined face, with bright eyes surrounded by laugh lines. He is wearing a wedding ring on his right hand, even though, as he says, he isn't made for marriage. The ring belonged to his father, a banker with good connections in politics and the world of intelligence agencies. Even as a boy, Bonnard heard stories of the behind-the-scenes battles in world politics at his family's dinner table. Now he has managed to turn his knowledge of the Arab world and its most powerful players into a lucrative business. Most of the time, he trades in futures contracts and agreements related to oil shipments. It's a business in which 20-percent profits are made just as quickly as entire fortunes are lost. One has to be a gambler to acquire laugh lines in this industry. Bonnard says he has respect for the German government because it is trying to keep itself out of the war. France, on the other hand, sided with the rebels much too quickly, in Bonnard's view. French President Nicolas Sarkozy made a pact with Benghazi, says Bonnard, without so much as informing his foreign minister. "It's ridiculous," he says. Of course, the West had to step in to avert a massacre in Benghazi, but it should also have had a plan for what was to happen after the initial attacks. "Just look around in Tripoli," he says. "There are Gadhafi opponents and Gadhafi supporters. His people will not disappear. They will take their chances. Those supporters, as well as the government machinery, the administration, must be part of a future arrangement. Life must go on. We need a plan." 'We Need Nothing but Gadhafi' Supporters of the dictator have tied down tents with thick ropes and wooden pegs on the sand on a traffic island across the street from Gadhafi's Bab Al-Aziziya command center, a large military base in the city. Music blares from loudspeakers, and portraits of the man his supporters call the "Leader" are leaning against plane trees. At night, when the bombers start falling, there are sometimes hundreds of people here to serve Gadhafi as human shields. Abd al-Daim Said, 21, a short and athletic man whose black eyes flash whenever he removes his sunglasses, has been studying medicine for the last three years. "Gadhafi tells us what is right and what is wrong," he says, adding that he will happily die for Gadhafi the next time the jets approach Bab Al-Aziziya, as they often do. When Said entered school at age six, he began learning stories about Gadhafi, like all Libyan schoolchildren. The teachers said that Gadhafi was a rebel and a freedom fighter. Throughout his later school years, Said read passages in Gadhafi's Green Book, a thin volume full of ideological platitudes, and he was constantly hearing about the Libyans' persecuted brothers in the Palestinian territories. "We need nothing but Gadhafi," says Said. "The university is free, and I'm treated for free at the hospital. There are lights at night. When I open the tap, water comes out. We drive expensive cars. We are brothers. Where else in Africa is it like this?"

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Loyal Sub-Saharan Supporters Mohammed Abdulkareem from Niger is standing next to Said. Aside from young men like Said, Gadhafi's most loyal supporters are the thousands of sub-Saharan Africans he has brought to the country. Abdulkareem is slim, quiet and tall. They used to call him "Obama," because he looks a little like the American president in his younger years. But he doesn't like the nickname anymore. Now that Tripoli is being bombed, it sounds derogatory. Abdulkareem, 26, came to Libya three years ago, fleeing poverty at home. Gadhafi's officials welcomed him with open arms, and he found work and a place to stay. "The Libyans treat us well," he claims. He also says that men from all countries in Africa would be happy to sacrifice themselves for the Leader here in front of the Bab Al- Aziziya base. Normal Daily Life Tripoli still doesn't look like a city involved in a civil war. The shop windows are full, and street vendors sell food, shoes, toys, gold jewelry and fake Rolex watches. Families trudge through the narrow alleys of the bazaar, while young men on Green Square outside the city walls run after girls wearing headscarves and tight jeans. Sweet smoke from water pipes billows from a café at the Roman triumphal arch. Goldfish swim in circles around the fountain beneath the arcades, and a portrait of Gadhafi hangs on the wall. At the port, a worker glances around and then quickly flashes the rebels' "V for Victory" sign and mutters "Gadhafi out." He was married shortly before the Arab Spring began. He and his wife had planned to go to Tunisia for their honeymoon, but then the Tunisians took the streets and ousted their dictator. Then the worker and his wife decided to rebook their trip, this time to Egypt. When that didn't work out, because of the Egyptian revolution, the couple decided to travel to Benghazi instead. But then, on Feb. 17, the rebellion against Gadhafi began in the eastern city, and the young couple stayed at home. Now bombs are falling on Tripoli, and yet, he says, he is pleased about every bomb that's dropped. After all, he adds, NATO isn't hitting any civilians. Official News from the Gadhafi Regime Last Wednesday, the Gadhafi regime announced its casualty figures, claiming that NATO had murdered 718 civilians and wounded more than 4,000 since March 19. The figures cannot be verified, but when pressed on the issue a government spokesman said that armed volunteers are also defined as civilians and are therefore counted as civilian casualties. But where could these people have been killed? Tripoli looks undamaged, even though bombs and missiles explode almost every night. With frightening precision, they are have struck bunkers and, again and again, Bab Al-Aziziya, ripping open the walls and turning buildings to rubble. The government spokespeople, however, are most interested in showing outsiders a destroyed private house. According to their account, Gadhafi's son Saif al-Arab lived in the villa, in an exclusive neighborhood. Saif al-Arab and three of his children were killed when bombs hit the house on May 1. The hands of a Junghans kitchen clock 129

hanging in the ruins point to 8:09 p.m., the precise time when Saif al-Arab died. An ordinary telephone hangs from a nearby wall, but the rest of the house was reduced to black and gray rubble. But there is another version of the same story: The ceiling of the house consisted of a one meter-thick layer of heavily sheathed reinforced concrete, which is unusual for a private luxury home. And why is the door to the basement as thick as the doors in Fort Knox? Why is the clock hanging so neatly on an iron girder, which was probably hardly protruding at all from the wall before the bombing? And how is that neither the clock, nor the plastic telephone burned? Could this have been a bunker hidden in a residential neighborhood? It just so happens that Libyans like to build houses with massive walls, says one of the press spokesmen. 'About More Than Good and Evil' Oil man Bonnard admits that the Gadhafi family presents a problem for any peace plan. After driving through the city, he sinks into an armchair in the lobby of the Hotel Rixos. The government is housing all foreign journalists in the hotel, which is near Gadhafi's fortress. NATO is hardly likely to bomb journalists, which makes the Rixos one of the safest places in Tripoli. Gadhafi is a gambler, says Bonnard, and he will fight to the end because the West leaves him no choice. And the rebels are only willing to negotiate once Gadhafi is dead or gone. "Should he allow himself to be driven out of the country, only to be locked up by the International Criminal Court?" Bonnard says. "We have to give him a way out, or he won't step aside." This conflict, says Bonnard, is about more than good and evil. Some of the leaders of the rebels in Benghazi are old friends of Gadhafi. In fact, Bonnard adds, the conflict is really about power and money. In the end, good and evil are just categories for children. The real goal should be to find a solution that could work. Arabs can go to war with each other and then come to terms with each other, he says, which is what he likes about them. But if the West only supports one side, that side will no longer be forced to talk to the other in the end. Bonnard wants to see Benghazi, Tripoli and France at the negotiating table, which would require two Libyan delegations to fly to Paris. 'Allah Can Turn Me into a Martyr' The rebels and a few reformers in the Gadhafi reform are, in fact, not that far apart, says Yussif Shakir. The portly man, with his salt-and-pepper beard, looks easygoing, but he is one of Gadhafi's sharpest propagandists. Some believe he is the Leader's spiritual advisor, because he usually carries a chain of prayer beads in his hand. But politics is Shakir's religion. He hosts a daily, two-hour program on state-owned television. Shakir, one of the most colorful figures in government circles, rose to prominence during turbulent political times. He opposed Gadhafi in the early 1980s and spent a long time in exile, both in Cairo and the United States. Shakir returned to Libya in the late 1980s, when Gadhafi liberalized his country somewhat and released prisoners. After the uprising in Benghazi began, he went on TV to explain his theory. Shakir claims that the American "democracy makers," which is

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what he calls the US government-funded National Endowment for Democracy, infiltrated Tunisia and Egypt, and now it's Libya's turn. He says that it's a proven fact that there are former al-Qaida members among the rebels in Benghazi. According to Shakir, the Gadhafi regime can try to approach the rebel committee, but Gadhafi will never step down. Shakir expects that when the end comes, he will probably be shot dead in the hallways of the Rixos hotel, where these days he prepares for his broadcasts and plays with his children. "I have told Allah that he can turn me into a martyr," he says. Late-Night Optimism Meanwhile, last Thursday night, Bonnard's plan moved a step closer to becoming a reality. His mobile phone rang, and he was told that his proposal had landed with the right people at the top in Paris. In Tripoli, people with ties to Gadhafi have started making lists of potential diplomats. Their negotiators in Paris? Bonnard doesn't want to say for sure, but he smiles. It's one in the morning. Almost an hour later the NATO bombs hiss through the sky over the city. At the Rixos, the walls start to shake. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,767166,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • United in Mutual Annoyance: What's Gone Wrong with German-US Relations? (06/06/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,766826,00.html • Aiding Fledgling Democracies: G-8 Leaders Pledge Billions to Egypt and Tunisia (05/27/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,765280,00.html • Death in the Mediterranean: Did European Soldiers Fail to Help Refugees in Distress? (05/25/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,764663,00.html • Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate: A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763537,00.html • Libya's Top Diplomat in Berlin: 'I Am No Longer Gadhafi's Ambassador' (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763839,00.html • Frozen Funds: The Complicated Hunt for Gadhafi's Billions (05/16/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,762748,00.html

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UK and France seek UN action on Syria as thousands flee Troops and tanks mass outside 'ghost town' after massacre amid mounting fears of slip towards Libyan-style civil war Ian Black and Nidaa Hassan guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 June 2011 21.44 BST UN ambassadors from Britain, France and the US are pushing for action on Syria. Link to this video Thousands of residents have fled the northern Syrian town of Jisr al-Shughour in fear of an imminent onslaught by government troops ordered to take vengeance on one of the centres of the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad. Anticipation of a violent response by the regime galvanised international diplomatic action, led by France and Britain at the UN, and fuelled a sense that a turning point may be approaching as disorder spreads and Syria slips closer to a Libyan-style civil war. The local co-ordinating committees, a network of activist groups, reported that 40 tanks and 50 troop carriers were 2½ miles (4km) from Jisr al-Shughour, and soldiers were in Idleb, the provincial capital. Amateur video also showed armoured units moving into the area. An independent activist in Damascus said that he had seen tanks leaving the capital. The forces are thought to be under the command of the president's brother, Maher, who commands the Republican Guard and other units, and is widely believed to be the man leading Syria's violent crackdown. "We believe they may send the 4th Division to attack, as they can be relied on to be loyal," said an activist who runs a Facebook page on the protests. "The conscripts, people like me, can't be relied upon when asked to be so brutal." Although more than 1,110 Syrians have reportedly been killed in nearly three months of unprecedented unrest, it is clear the crackdown has failed to crush the opposition – even without the sort of high-level defections suffered by Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader. Video clips showed Jisr al-Shughour deserted, nothing moving in the streets, and the market shuttered. Residents described it as a ghost town as people streamed towards the border with Turkey, which the government in Ankara said would remain open. "We are monitoring developments in Syria with concern," said Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. "Syria should change its attitude towards civilians and should take its attitude to a more tolerant level." The Turkish news agency said about 170 Syrians had crossed the border, and some wounded had been taken to local hospitals. The government in Damascus claims 120 troops and security personnel were killed in an ambush in Jisr al-Shughour on Sunday, but there is no independent confirmation of this, as no foreign journalists are allowed to operate in Syria. Speculation is rife that the incident may have been a mutiny by some security forces who refused to fire on protesters, and were themselves killed by loyalists. Syrian state TV reported that "armed terrorist organisations" used government vehicles and uniforms 132

to commit "a brutal massacre". They "filmed themselves … to manipulate the photos and videos and distort the reputation of the army," according to Syrian state TV. It showed pictures from the funerals of eight security personnel. Syria Comment, an influential blog based in the US, said: "Syria is slipping towards civil war. The government has met with no success in quelling the revolt despite an escalating death rate and an ever more ruthless crackdown." At the UN, European nations seeking to increase pressure on Assad's regime presented a revised resolution condemning Syria for its deadly crackdown on peaceful protesters. Britain, France, Germany and Portugal introduced the text at a closed Security Council meeting. UN diplomats said the new draft, which has strong US backing, is aimed at winning more support for the resolution in the council and avoiding a Russian veto. "We will be on the right side of history if and when this comes to a vote," said Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN. "If others are unable to, or unwilling to, then that will be their responsibility to bear." Russia's UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin reiterated that Moscow would not support the resolution, on the grounds that it would not promote dialogue. But he declined to say if Russia would veto it. "If anyone votes against that resolution or tries to veto it, that should be on their conscience," David Cameron told MPs in London. Diplomats admit privately that they are far less able to influence Syria than Libya, and that there is no prospect of military action against the Assad regime. In Paris the Syrian ambassador was forced to deny she had resigned in protest at attacks on civilians. Lamia Shakkour claimed she was the victim of a hoax to embarrass her country. She called the announcement "misinformation" and "identity theft". A woman identifying herself as the ambassador announced her resignation by phone on the TV news channel France 24 on Tuesday. "I can no longer continue to support the cycle of extreme violence against unarmed civilians," she said. "I recognise the legitimacy of the people's demands for more democracy and freedom." France 24 said it had called a phone number on which it had spoken to Shakkour previously. After the broadcast Reuters said it had received an email that came via the Syrian embassy website in Paris, confirming the resignation. But this step was immediately denied by news agencies in Syria. Shakkour appeared on another French television station, BFM TV, to deny she had resigned. France 24 said it did not rule out a "manipulation or a provocation" and promised to investigate the alleged hoax. Nidaa Hassan is the pseudonym of a journalist in Damascus Additional reporting: Kim Willsher, Paris http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/08/uk-france-un-action- syria?CMP=EMCGT_090611&

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June 8, 2011, 9:51 pm Sifting Syrian Fact From Syrian Fiction By ROBERT MACKEY As Syrians brace for more violence in the country’s northwest, where protests and clashes have been reported in recent days, reports produced by Syria’s state-run television channel and a network of opposition activists offer completely contradictory versions of events. This report from Britain’s Channel 4 News includes graphic video broadcast on Syrian state television, showing dead men in uniforms killed in what the government has called a massacre of soldiers by “armed gangs” in the city of Jisr al-Shughour, and video posted on YouTube described by activists as the eyewitness testimony of women from the city who say that it was members of the Syrian security forces who have been doing the killing: Since the Syrian government has repeatedly suggested that amateur video posted online by activists could have been staged, it is notable that the Syrian state television report backed its claim that soldiers had been massacred by broadcasting footage of the dead men posted on a new YouTube channel, set up just before the clip itself was posted online. Syria’s state-run media also claimed on Wednesday to have uncovered a plot by members of a domestic terrorist organization who planned to manufacture and distribute fake images of a mass grave in order “to undermine the army and tarnish its reputation.” According to the report, which was broadcast on Syrian state television (and translated into English by Syria’s official news agency), the plotters discussed their scheme in detail in a phone call that was intercepted and recorded by the authorities. A Syrian blogger in Lebanon who monitors Syria’s state news broadcasts reported that the voices in the recording could be heard referring to creating a video for Al Jazeera, which broadcasts across the Arab world. #Syria TV recorded conversation: You talk

to AlJazeera, they listen to you, they don’t Le4 Shaque

The report was impossible to verify because of a government ban on independent reporting in Syria, but it would fit well with a campaign by Syrian authorities to discredit both the protest movement inside its borders and foreign news organizations which have relied on information posted online by a network of activists and bloggers to report on the uprising. MORE ON THE REGION Syrian Refugees Flooding Into Turkey Sifting Syrian Fact From Syrian Fiction 134

Middle East June 8, 2011 In Saudi Arabia, Royal Funds Buy Peace for Now By NEIL MacFARQUHAR Related Saudi Arabia Scrambles to Limit Region’s Upheaval (May 28, 2011) RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — As one nation after another has battled uprisings across the Arab world, the one major country spared is also its richest — Saudi Arabia, where a fresh infusion of money has so far bought order. The kingdom is spending $130 billion to pump up salaries, build housing and finance religious organizations, among other outlays, effectively neutralizing most opposition. King Abdullah began wielding his checkbook right after leaders in Tunisia and Egypt fell, seeking to placate the public and reward a loyal religious establishment. The king’s reserves, swollen by more than $214 billion in oil revenue last year, have insulated the royal family from widespread demands for change even while some discontent simmers. Saudi Arabia has also relied on its unusually close alliance with the religious establishment that has long helped preserve the power of the royal family. The grand mufti, the highest religious official in the kingdom, rolled out a fatwa saying Islam forbade street protests, and clerics hammered at that message in their Friday sermons. But the first line of defense in this case was the public aid package. King Abdullah paid an extra two months’ salary to government employees and spent $70 billion alone for 500,000 units of low-income housing. As a reward to the religious establishment, he allocated about $200 million to their organizations, including the religious police. Clerics opposed to democratic changes crowed that they had won a great victory over liberal intellectuals. “They don’t care about the security of the country, all they care about is the mingling of genders — they want girls to drive cars, they want to go the beaches to see girls in bathing suits!” roared Mohamed al-Areefy, a popular young cleric, in a recent Friday sermon. Financial support to organizations that intellectuals dislike “was a way to cut out their tongues,” he said. Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the United States, has struggled to preserve what remains of a regional dynamic upended by the Arab Spring — buttressing monarchies and blocking Iran from gaining influence. While the United States has pressed other Arab nations to embrace democratic changes, it has remained largely silent on Saudi Arabia and the kingdom’s efforts to squelch popular revolts in neighboring Bahrain and Oman. Saudi Arabia’s efforts have succeeded in the short run, at home and in its Persian Gulf backyard. But some critics call its strategy of effectively buying off public opinion unsustainable because it fails to address underlying problems.

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“The problem is that some leaders do not understand what is going on and do not learn the lessons while these things are unfolding in front of their eyes; they do not learn the lessons of history,” said Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz, 79, a brother of the king. The prince, whose 14 living children include the billionaire investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, said: “These people want to preserve their power, their money and their prestige, so they want to keep the status quo. They are afraid of the word change. This is a problem because they are shortsighted, but the difficulty is I don’t know how to change their way of thinking.” The monarchy has not completely escaped calls for change. There have been at least three petitions, with a group of youths and even some members of the Sahwa, the staunchly conservative religious movement, calling for an elected consultative council. The only major street protest scheduled for March 11 largely fizzled — its organizers were anonymous, and its stated goal of toppling the government lacked broad appeal. In the largely Shiite eastern provinces, though, police officers arrested scores of protesters. The ruling princes have also moved against dissent in other ways, like imposing a new press law with punishments including a roughly $140,000 fine for vaguely defined crimes like threatening national security. Saudis of all stripes say that they are less concerned about democratic elections than about fixing chronic problems, including the lack of housing, unemployment that is officially 10 percent but likely 20 percent or more, corruption, bureaucratic incompetence and transparency on oil revenues. The demand for change in the kingdom long ago evolved into a struggle between puritans and progressives over the country’s future. So the debate prompted by the Arab uprisings is coursing through familiar battle lines here that pit Saudi against Saudi rather than Saudis against their government. The ruling Saud clan has maintained absolute power by ensuring it remains the sole referee in that tussle, so change must emerge from the top. But even senior princes doubt that the very top is interested. The four or five senior royals with real power have also been slowed by illness. “Unfortunately, there is a minority in the royal family who doesn’t want to change; they are a minority, but they are influential,” said Prince Talal, long the family gadfly, nicknamed the “Red Prince” in the 1960s. King Abdullah, 87, is personally widely popular as a kind of national grandfather. His government has put in place what Saudi activists describe as random acts of reform — like improving elementary school education to include English and better science. Elections for more than 200 municipal councils, postponed since 2009, have been rescheduled for Sept. 29. The councils have little power and half their members are appointed, so many Saudis consider them an empty democratic facade. Women who organized a campaign starting more than year ago to win the right to vote were particularly incensed when the government rolled out an old excuse to ban their participation — the difficulty of separating polling stations by gender, as custom dictates.

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But other groups hope to capitalize on the opening the election could provide. A group called Jidda Youth to the Municipal Council, designed to win a youth seat, has spread to other cities. Some 7,000 young people in Jidda turned out spontaneously as volunteers when floods devastated the city in January, killing 13 people. Fouad al-Farhan, a founder of Jidda Youth and a well-known blogger, said grass-roots action like that is the taproot of change, although forming public organizations remains illegal. “We want to say that we are a third voice; we are so bored of this game of liberals versus conservatives,” he said. The open question is what kind of impact they will have. Among a group of former political prisoners who gather regularly, there is a measure of bitterness that years of confronting the monarchy has not changed much. “They are frustrated and disappointed,” Mohammad F. Qahtani, a human rights activist, said of the men. “They feel that they made one sacrifice after another. They went to jail multiple times, and there has been no response from the public.” NEIL MacFARQUHAR In Saudi Arabia, Royal Funds Buy Peace for Now June 8, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09saudi.html?hp

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Middle East June 8, 2011 U.S. Is Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen Airstrikes By MARK MAZZETTI Related Yemen’s Opposition Aims to Strip President of Power (June 9, 2011) Yemen Uncertainty Grows; Leader’s Burns Called Severe (June 8, 2011) Times Topic: Yemen — Protests (2011) WASHINGTON — The Obama administration has intensified the American covert war in Yemen, exploiting a growing power vacuum in the country to strike at militant suspects with armed drones and fighter jets, according to American officials. The acceleration of the American campaign in recent weeks comes amid a violent conflict in Yemen that has left the government in Sana, a United States ally, struggling to cling to power. Yemeni troops that had been battling militants linked to Al Qaeda in the south have been pulled back to the capital, and American officials see the strikes as one of the few options to keep the militants from consolidating power. On Friday, American jets killed Abu Ali al-Harithi, a midlevel Qaeda operative, and several other militant suspects in a strike in southern Yemen. According to witnesses, four civilians were also killed in the airstrike. Weeks earlier, drone aircraft fired missiles aimed at Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical American-born cleric who the United States government has tried to kill for more than a year. Mr. Awlaki survived. The recent operations come after a nearly year-long pause in American airstrikes, which were halted amid concerns that poor intelligence had led to bungled missions and civilian deaths that were undercutting the goals of the secret campaign. Officials in Washington said that the American and Saudi spy services had been receiving more information — from electronic eavesdropping and informants — about the possible locations of militants. But, they added, the outbreak of the wider conflict in Yemen created a new risk: that one faction might feed information to the Americans that could trigger air strikes against a rival group. A senior Pentagon official, speaking only on condition of anonymity, said on Wednesday that using force against militants in Yemen was further complicated by the fact that Qaeda operatives have mingled with other rebels and antigovernment militants, making it harder for the United States to attack without the appearance of picking sides. The American campaign in Yemen is led by the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, and is closely coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency. Teams of American military and intelligence operatives have a command post in Sana, the Yemeni capital, to track intelligence about militants in Yemen and plot future strikes. Concerned that support for the campaign could wane if the government of Yemen’s authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, were to fall, the United States ambassador in Yemen has met recently with leaders of the opposition, partly to make the case for continuing American operations. Officials in Washington said that opposition leaders 138

have told the ambassador, Gerald M. Feierstein, that operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula should continue regardless of who wins the power struggle in Sana. The extent of America’s war in Yemen has been among the Obama administration’s most closely guarded secrets, as officials worried that news of unilateral American operations could undermine Mr. Saleh’s tenuous grip on power. Mr. Saleh authorized American missions in Yemen in 2009, but placed limits on their scope and has said publicly that all military operations had been conducted by his own troops. Mr. Saleh fled the country last week to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia after rebel shelling of the presidential compound, and more government troops have been brought back to Sana to bolster the government’s defense. “We’ve seen the regime move its assets away from counterterrorism and toward its own survival,” said Christopher Boucek, a Yemen expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “But as things get more and more chaotic in Yemen, the space for the Americans to operate in gets bigger,” he said. But Mr. Boucek and others warned of a backlash from the American airstrikes, which over the past two years have killed civilians and Yemeni government officials. The benefits of killing one or two Qaeda-linked militants, he said, could be entirely eroded if airstrikes kill civilians and lead dozens of others to jihad. Edmund J. Hull, ambassador to Yemen from 2001 to 2004 and the author of “High- Value Target: Countering Al Qaeda in Yemen,” called airstrikes a “necessary tool” but said that the United States had to “avoid collateral casualties or we will turn the tribes against us.” Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen is believed by the C.I.A. to pose the greatest immediate threat to the United States, more so than even Qaeda’s senior leadership believed to be hiding in Pakistan. The Yemen group has been linked to the attempt to blow up a transatlantic jetliner on Christmas Day 2009 and last year’s plot to blow up cargo planes with bombs hidden inside printer cartridges. Mr. Harithi, the militant killed on Friday, was an important operational figure in Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and was believed to be one of those responsible for the group’s ascendance in recent years. According to people in Yemen close to the militant group, Mr. Harithi travelled to Iraq in 2003 and fought alongside Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, the Jordanian operative who led the Qaeda affiliate in Iraq until he was killed in an American strike in 2006. Mr. Harithi returned to Yemen in 2004, those close to the militants said, where he was captured, tried and imprisoned in 2006 but released three years later. Even as senior administration officials worked behind the scenes with Saudi Arabia for a transitional government to take power in Yemen, a State Department spokesman on Wednesday called on the embattled government in Sana to remain focused on dealing with the rebellion and Qaeda militants. “With Saleh’s departure for Saudi Arabia, where he continues to receive medical treatment, this isn’t a time for inaction,” said the spokesman, Mark Toner. “There is a government that remains in place there, and they need to seize the moment and move forward.” Muhammad al-Ahmadi contributed reporting from Sana, Yemen, and Eric Schmitt and Scott Shane from Washington. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/middleeast/09intel.html?_r=1&emc=na&pagewanted=print 139

06/08/2011 08:36 AM Gun Shots and Contested Elections Divided Threatened with 'Paralyzing' Revolt By Jan Puhl Political tensions surrounding recent elections are hurting Albania's chances of joining the EU. The country is divided into two political camps, and angry protesters have taken to the streets promising a revolution. In front of the election commission's building in downtown Tirana, demonstrators have hung white sheets bearing a plea for help: "Where is Europe?" They are supporters of , and they are angry. The local elections took place four weeks ago, but they are still playing out among Albanians. Rama was re-elected mayor of the capital on May 8, but only by a margin of 10 votes. Then the election commission did a recount, and all of a sudden Rama trailed his opponent, the ruling Democratic Party's Lulzim Basha, by 81 votes. Rama took the matter to court, but his appeal was rejected over the weekend. Now his attorneys are preparing for their next lawsuit. Edi Rama stands about six and a half feet (two meters) tall and has the shadow of a beard. He is the head of the Socialist Party of Albania, the largest opposition party. The mayor's office in Tirana hasn't been enough for him for a long time, and he harbors hopes of becoming prime minister of his country, one of the poorest in Europe. Since the loss of his stronghold could mean the end of his ambitions, he is convinced that his archenemy, Prime Minister , manipulated the results. Rama says that Berisha's goal is "the annihilation of the democratic equilibrium in our country," and he predicts a popular revolt that would "paralyze the country." Berisha should take this threat seriously since Albania is deeply divided into pro-Rama and pro-Berisha camps. In the recent election, members of both parties got into brawls. One candidate from the Democratic Party was shot at, and an explosive device was detonated outside the home of one of the Socialist candidates. Political tensions in Albania recently prompted EU President José Manuel Barroso a planned trip to Tirana. Quest for EU Membership Albania is a member of NATO and would like to join the EU, but the questions surrounding the mayoral election in Tirana have reduced the chances that this dream will come true any time soon. Across the Balkans, governments are taking pains to finally be taken seriously as potential members of the EU. Serbia is working toward reconciliation with Kosovo. Macedonia wants to put aside its old feud with neighboring Greece, and Croatia has put its war criminals on trial. More than 20 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, only Albania lags far behind. Many observers consider the country to be a fortress of weapons, drugs and traffickers of women and home to a number of blood feuds. What's more, the fight between Rama and Basha has hindered any political progress for two years.

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Rama likes to flirt with the idea that he really isn't a politician. He painted his office dark red, and an oil painting of a morbid beauty hangs on one wall. Before he was first elected, in October 2000, he lived as a Bohemian exile in Paris. He was a successful painter, with exhibits in New York, São Paulo and Frankfurt. Then he set his sights on his shabby, dusty and dangerous hometown and carefully beautified the post-communist jungle. He let his friends paint the bleak cinderblock apartment buildings in bright colors -- orange, red, yellow and blue -- with white polka dots. "The colors were a signal that we wanted to change something," Rama said. The 'World's Mayor' For a while, it looked like it was working. Western nations celebrated the eccentric populist with the paint buckets as someone who could realize bold plans. On the Internet, some fans even gave him the title the "World's Mayor." And, in Albania, Rama was considered an outsider who confronted the corruption of the political establishment. These days, although you can't say that Tirana is beautiful, it is at least lively. The "Block," which was a once closed-off living quarter for the nomenclature, is now a hip area with restaurants and bars. The parks are clean, the main roads are freshly paved, and Skanderbeg Square, Tirana's main plaza, was renovated with funds from Kuwait. Although the capital has grown from a population of 220,000 to 1.5 million in 20 years, it is still considered a safe city. Much of this can be attributed to Rama, but for some time now, he has had a damaged reputation. His decline started in the election of June 2009. At that time, Berisha's Democratic Party, as part of a coalition with other smaller parties, won 70 of 140 parliamentary seats. The EU did not object to the election, and Rama felt cheated out of his victory. His Socialists boycotted the parliament for months. Every Friday, he marshalled his followers to protest in front of the office of the head of government. In January 2011, shots rang out when protests against a bribery affair involving the finance minister got heated. The Albanian Republican Guard opened fire on protesters outside Berisha's office, killing four Rama supporters. When the head public prosecutor wanted to arrest six officers, Berisha called her a "steet whore," and the arrest warrants went unenforced for weeks. Weak Sense of Democracy The rivalry between the two men highlights Albania's problem. The political elite aren't prepared to accept defeat at the ballot box, and the democratic organs of state lack the necessary authority. "It's Sali's Fault," was the only slogan the mayor used in his election campaign. Indeed, Rama has no political platform to speak of; all he has is himself and his hatred of Berisha. He has turned into just the kind of politician he used to detest. As his critics see it, he has stamped his authority on the party, stifles debate and only sees things in black and white. Fatos Lubonja isn't surprised at the artist's mutation into a demagogue. "We were friends," he says, "and I told him even back then that he was dangerous." Lubonja is sipping tea in a café on Skanderberg Square. The author was a dissident during the communist dictatorship of , who alienated Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and then China before leading Albania into complete isolation in 1978.

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The 13 years he spend in a Hoxha labor camp made Lubonja prone to sickness, but they also made him brave. He coughs a lot and gestures wildly. "Rama and Berisha are both backed by cliques of oligarchs," he says, describing them as corrupt businessmen who control the construction industry and the media. "Their fight is a fight over the spoils," he adds. "In the 20 years since the fall of communism, we have swapped one degenerate leadership for the next, except that today's is better dressed." But why do the Albanians put up with it? One reason could be that, unlike other former communist states, they lack a positive image of the EU. "Our neighbors are the Italians with their corrupt, trashy prime minister and, on the other side, we've got the bankrupt Greeks," Lubonja says. He also thinks Albanians still have an poorly developed democratic mind-set. Indeed, Albanians have never managed to identify themselves with the state. The Ottomans occupied today's Albania until shortly before World War I. The country was desperately poor, and 90 percent of the population was illiterate until well into the 20th century. National pride was a luxury that only a handful of middle-class intellectuals in Tirana or Shkodra could afford. 'To Albanians, the State is Worthless' Many Albanians still feel that their strongest ties are to their families and home villages. This explains why those in power think first of their friends and their clan. In World War II, foreign armies repeatedly marched across the country until the communist underground movement came to power in 1944. Its leader, Hoxha, had about 6,000 of his countrymen murdered and tens of thousands arrested. He died in 1985. After 1989, Albania slipped into anarchy. "Nowhere did communism wreck the political culture as thoroughly as it did here," says Lubonja. "To Albanians, the state is worthless. One has to protect oneself against it, and it's fine to exploit it." The author isn't especially hopeful about the future, either. "We have an authoritarian mentality and are incapable of compromise," he says. The few investors who have come to Albania have little alternative but to adapt to their surroundings. A German businessman who spoke to SPIEGEL in a Tirana hotel lobby declined to give his name for fear that it could damage his business in Tirana. "You've only got a chance here if you get on with those in power," he said. "It doesn't matter whether they're called Rama or Berisha. They take a cut of every major deal. The state can be bought." 'At Least as Many as in Egypt' The businessman has responded by only hiring women for his company. It's a practice often used by investors in Africa. Experience there has shown that women are less corrupt, harder-working and better at dealing with money. He has been here for five years and wants to stay. "The country has potential," he said. The businessman is banking on the many young people who want all the things people of their generation take for granted elsewhere in Europe: prosperity, a career and democracy. Many Albanians fled their country in the 1990s to work in Greece, Italy and the US, and many of them have since returned. "They have brought back European standards and are utterly sick of their parents' way of doing politics," the businessman said. "They're rebelling." They're protesting against the close ties between politics, business and organized crime, and against an economic 142

system where personal relations are more important for career advancement than job qualifications. "Rama and Berisha can't go on playing their little games forever," said the businessman. "There are many young people without prospects in Albania, at least as many as there were in Egypt." URL:http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,767175,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: Albania's Divide http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-68950.html • Facing the Past: What the Mladic Arrest Means for Serbia's Future (05/31/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,765748,00.html • The World From Berlin: Mladic Arrest 'Proof of Belgrade's Willingness to Confront its Past' (05/27/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,765277,00.html

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Under the cover of democracy

US and its allies assist will be using neoliberal economic policies to make sure new Arab governments stay in line. Joseph Massad Last Modified: 08 Jun 2011 14:17

In many Arab countries, especially Egypt, the World Bank makes sure that the country's wealth is in the hands of the governing elite [GALLO/GETTY] For decades during the Cold War, the rhetoric of US and Western European imperial power was one of promoting democracy around the world. Indeed, as the Soviet model became attractive to many countries in Asia and Africa (not to mention Latin America) ridding themselves of the yoke of West European colonialism, the US system of apartheid, known as Jim Crow Laws or racial segregation, was less than a shining example for people who just liberated themselves from European racial supremacy that was used to justify colonial rule. As is well known, it is this that prompted the United States to begin the road to end its apartheid system, signaled by the famous legal case of "Brown vs the Board of Education" in 1954, which set the stage to desegregate schools in the American South. But as US action around the world aimed at eliminating the recently won right to self- 144

determination for the peoples of Asia and Africa under the guise of "Western democracy" fighting "totalitarian communism", which left a trail of millions murdered by the US and its allies (starting with Korea and moving to the Congo, to Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and from Guatemala to Brazil to Argentina, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Chile, to Southern Africa and the Middle East), the cruel US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade have hardly changed this anti-democratic trend. Yet two important victories are always touted by supporters of US foreign policy on the democratic front: namely, the fall of the Soviet Union and the ensuing "democratisation" of Eastern Europe, and the end of Apartheid in South Africa. The US hopes that its policies in both places will guide it to achieve similar ends for those uprisings of the Arab world that it cannot crush. Profits and impoverishment The people of the Eastern bloc wanted to maintain all the economic gains of the Communist period while calling for democratisation. The US, however, sold them the illusion of "Western democracy" as a cover for their massive US-imposed impoverishment and the dismantling of the entire structure of social welfare of which they had been beneficiaries for decades. Thus in a few short years, and through what Naomi Klein has dubbed the "Shock Doctrine", Russia went from a country which had less than 2 million people living under the international poverty level to one with 74 million people languishing in poverty. Poland and Bulgaria followed suit. As billionaires increased and the margin of profit for US corporations skyrocketed in the former Eastern bloc, with the help of illustrious imperial organisations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the US, under international pressure, moved steadily to conclude a deal to end political apartheid in South Africa. If the people of the Eastern bloc had to sacrifice their welfare states and their livelihoods in exchange for the outright pillage of their countries by Mafia-style capitalism, the people of South Africa were sold political "democracy" in exchange for the intensification of economic apartheid and the complete surrender of the country's economic sovereignty. While the business class became infinitesimally more racially diverse (as its US precedent pretended to do since the 1970s), the impoverished classes remained racially uniform. Today's South Africa is so saddled by debt and is signatory to so many economic agreements and protocols, that it can neither redistribute the racialised private property of the country (protected by its constitution), anymore that it can provide wage increases under its obligations to the IMF, which insists on wage "restraint". The massive racialised poverty of the country has only deepened its economic apartheid under the cover of the "end" of political apartheid. In the Middle East, the Oslo agreements, signed around the same time that US-style democracy was being imposed on Eastern Europe and South Africa, were even worse. The Palestinian Authority moved (under US and Israeli instructions) to demobilise Palestinian civil society, which was enormously strengthened during the first intifada. Western-funded non-governmental organisations appeared on the scene in force. The NGOs co-opted the intelligentsia, the technocracy, and most of all erstwhile activists into the service of a Western agenda that rendered these foreign NGOs the new local "civil society", while Western governments financed the corrupt Palestinian Authority that continued to collabourate with the Israeli occupation. Poverty reigned supreme in much of the West Bank and all of Gaza and continues to destroy the lives of Palestinians there. Iraq, meanwhile, was being also transformed from its reduction to the 145

stone age by US bombs into a US-imposed mafia-style "democracy" while the entire welfare benefits that existed under Saddam were withdrawn. Iraqi oil was handed over to American corporations in the ongoing American pillage and destruction of that country. Other Arab countries, especially Egypt, were being flooded with Western-funded NGOs as the IMF and the World Bank were ensuring that local wealth is firmly in the hands of international capital and a small, local, subservient business class that supports the local dictatorships. A large number of women and labour activists, human rights and political activists, minority rights and peasants rights activists were no longer to be found defending the poor and the oppressed among whom they lived, but were now found on the payroll of these Western-funded NGOs, masquerading as civil society. While this demobilisation of Arab civil society ultimately failed to forestall popular Egyptian and Tunisian rage against two of the most corrupt regimes of post-independence Asia and Africa (or even Latin America), the US and its Saudi and Qatari allies are devising a new economic package to "support" the recent uprisings, especially Egypt's larger and much more important economy. Strengthening the rich We got wind of US magnanimity early on. Indeed on the first day of the ouster of Mubarak, whom the Obama administration supported till his very last day in office (and beyond), the New York Times reported that "the White House and the State Department were already discussing setting aside new funds to bolster the rise of secular political parties."A few days later, on 17 February, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared "I'm pleased to announce today that we will be reprogramming $150 million for Egypt to put ourselves in a position to support our transition there and assist with their economic recovery," she told reporters. "These funds will give us flexibility to respond to Egyptian needs moving forward." A month later on March 16, Clinton declared on behalf of the US government that "we also think there are economic reforms that are necessary to help the Egyptian people have good jobs, to find employment, to realise their own dreams. And so on both of those tracks - the political reform and the economic reform - we want to be helpful." Indeed preparations " to be helpful" were completed by the Obama administration and its European and Saudi-Qatari allies by May 19, the date Obama delivered his speech. He declared:

First, we've asked the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to present a plan at next week's G8 summit for what needs to be done to stabilise and modernise the economies of Tunisia and Egypt. Together, we must help them recover from the disruptions of their democratic upheaval, and support the governments that will be elected later this year. And we are urging other countries to help Egypt and Tunisia meet its near-term financial needs.

If this was not enough, Obama offered a laughable gimmick to ease the $35 billion debts of Mubarak's Egypt on the Egyptian people by "relieving"post-Mubarak Egypt "of up to $1 billion in debt and work with our Egyptian partners to invest these resources to foster growth and entrepreneurship."But relief of $1 billion must be countered with help to indebt Egypt further. So Obama, in the same breath and without irony, declares, "we will help Egypt regain access to markets by guaranteeing $1 billion in borrowing that is 146

needed to finance infrastructure and job creation…we're working with Congress to create Enterprise Funds to invest in Tunisia and Egypt." As the impoverishment of Eastern Europe created massive wealth for new local elites and their US and Western European corporate masters, Obama asserts that America's financial assistance "will be modeled on funds that supported the transitions in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a US government finance institution, will soon launch a $2 billion facility to support private investment across the region. And we will work with the allies to refocus the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development so that it provides the same support for democratic transitions and economic modernisation in the Middle East and North Africa as it has in Europe." But this is not all, the United States will also "launch a comprehensive Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa." Recognising that Saudi and American avarice was such that all oil profits have found themselves pumping the European and American economies since the 1970s to the detriment of the region itself which languished under IMF-imposed structural adjustment policies (cuts in subsidies and wage decreases for the poor, increase of subsidies for the rich, restricting the rights of the working class, ending protectionism and selling the country off to international capital, raising food prices), causing the ongoing upheavals, Obama now wants a portion of the oil profits to be reinvested within the Arab world. He explained that

We will work with the EU to facilitate more trade within the region, build on existing agreements to promote integration with US and European markets, and open the door for those countries who adopt high standards of reform and trade liberalisation to construct a regional trade arrangement. And just as EU membership served as an incentive for reform in Europe, so should the vision of a modern and prosperous economy create a powerful force for reform in the Middle East and North Africa.

Obama along with France and Britain moved quickly. At the end of May, leaders of the Group of 8 wealthiest industrialised nations pledged to send billions of dollars in aid to Egypt and Tunisia. France's Sarkozy declared that "he hoped the total aid package would eventually reach $40 billion, including $10 billion from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait". Meanwhile, Qatar has been talking to oil-rich Gulf partners about a new plan to create a Middle East Development Bank to support Arab states in transitions to democracy. Its plan has been inspired, according to newspaper reports, by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development "that helped to rebuild the economies and societies of eastern bloc countries at the end of the cold war." The projected Middle Eastern development bank reportedly envisages tens of billions of dollars of yearly lending for political transitions. Qatar is seeking the support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for the initiative. Indeed the Saudis had already made a $4 billion grant to the Egyptians and the IMF just announced a $3 billion loan to the country. Yet, Youssef Boutros-Ghali, Mubarak's finance minister, who had been lauded by none other than the IMF as a most efficient finance minister, and who was named in 2008 by the IMF itself as chairman of its International Monetary and Financial Committee, has fled the country and was just sentenced to 30 years in prison by an Egyptian court on corruption charges. A week before the fall of Mubarak last February and before his flight from the country, Boutros-Ghali resigned his IMF position. But the

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IMF is not deterred. Its "help" to Egypt will continue unhindered by such trivial matters. Moreover, as part of the effort to crush the popular demonstrations and the demands for democratisation in Jordan, Saudi Arabia also granted $400 million "to support Jordan's economy and ease its budget deficit". Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (recently dubbed the Gulf Counter-revolutionary Club) had also extended, a few weeks earlier, an invitation for the only two surviving monarchies outside the Gulf, Jordan and Morocco, to join as members. Neutralising the poor But if the US deal in Eastern Europe was to impoverish the majority of people under the cover of democracy so that US businesses can pillage their economies, and if its deal in South Africa was about safeguarding and maintaining the same level of racialised pillage of the country by South Africa's whites and the international business partners also under the cover of democracy, what is the form of political-economic exchange being transacted in the Arab world? Clearly in countries where the US-Saudi counterrevolutions have triumphed, the aim is to maintain the same level of imperial pillage led by the US while pacifying the mobilised population and strengthening local elites (Bahrain, Oman, and Jordan are the primary examples here) or rescue the retinue of collapsing dictatorships (whether allies of the US or not) to lead regime transition and resume their partnership with the US politically and economically (Libya, Yemen, and even Syria are primary examples). But what about Egypt and Tunisia where a substantial number of the entourage of the overthrown regimes are also targeted by the uprisings for their corruption and complicity in the violence unleashed by the anciens regimes? It is there where the US- Saudi axis wants to focus its efforts. Business elites who miraculously escaped formal charges in Egypt, and they are legion, have expressed much concern about demonstrations and strikes disrupting the economy (and their profits). Billionaire Naguib Sawiris, who fancies himself a supporter, if not a leader, of the uprising, and whose father and brothers were also transformed into billionaires in a few short years after they partnered with USAID during Sadat's "infitah"or "open door" policy, and especially following the US invasion of the region in 1990/91, along with many other "honest" businessmen and women are ready to carry the torch for the US in "democratic" Egypt as they had done faithfully under Mubarak. Sawiris founded a new political party and now refuses to join the ongoing Friday demonstrations, which, he claims, are weakening the economy. He recently declared that "it was wrong to accuse all of the country's businessmen of wrongdoing,"insisting that "many are honorable people who helped create jobs for Egyptians". The US and Obama have also been celebrating young business executives like the naive Stockholm Syndrome sufferer Wael Ghonim (Stockholm Syndrome is the only acceptable excuse for Ghonim's spending the majority of his famous TV interview crying and defending, rather than condemning, his secret police interrogators). Ghonim was touring the US speaking to international bankers as well as to World Bank economists, as a "leader" of the Egyptian uprising at the behest of the Google corporation itself. But most Egyptians and Tunisians, unlike East Europeans under Communist rule, are poor already. As the main form of apartheid that rules Egyptians and Tunisians, unlike their South African black and poor counterparts under political Apartheid, is an economic and class apartheid, what then would granting US-style democracy to them be

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in exchange for? The answer is simple. There is an increasing understanding among US policy makers that the US should ride the democratic wave in the region in those countries where it cannot crush it, and that in doing so, it should create political conditions that would maintain the continued imperial pillage of their economies at the same rate as before and not threaten them. Saudi money followed by American money and IMF and World Bank plans and funds are all geared to supporting the business elites and the foreign- funded NGOs to bring down the newly mobilised civil society by using the same neoliberal language of structural adjustment pushed by the IMF since the late 1970s. Indeed, Obama and his business associates are now claiming that it is the imposition of more neoliberal economic policies that is the main revolutionary demand of the people in Egypt and Tunisia, if not the entire Arab world, and which the West is lovingly heeding. That it is these same imperial policies, which were imposed on Poland by the IMF (and produced Solidarnosc in 1980), and ultimately led to the fall of the Soviet Union, as they marched onwards to impoverish the entire globe, with special attention to Africa, the Arab World, and Latin America, is glossed over as socialist whining. In this sense, the US will ensure that the same imperial economic policies imposed by international capital and adopted by Mubarak and Ben Ali will not only be maintained, but will be intensified under the cover of democracy. Moves to limit economic protests and labour strikes are ongoing in Egypt and Tunisia. Once elections are held to bring about a new class of servants of the new order, we will hear that all economic demands should be considered "counterrevolutionary" and should be prosecuted for attempting to "weaken" if not "destroy" the new "democracy". If, as is becoming more apparent, the US strikes alliances with local Islamist parties, we might even hear that economic protests and opposition to neoliberal imperial economic policies are "against Islam." The US-imposed "democracy" to come, assuming even a semblance of it will be instituted, is precisely engineered to keep the poor down and to delegitimise all their economic demands. The exchange that the US hopes to achieve by imposing some form of liberal political order on Egypt and Tunisia is indeed more, not less, imperial pillage of their economies and of the livelihoods of their poor classes, who are the large majority of the population. The ultimate US aim then is to hijack the successful uprisings against the existing regimes under the cover of democracy for the benefit of the very same local and international business elites in power under Mubarak and Ben Ali. How successful the US and its local allies will be will depend on the Egyptian and Tunisian peoples. Joseph Massad is Associate Professor for Modern Arab Politics and Intellectual History at Columbia University in New York. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily represent Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/2011689456174295.html

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Turkey at the ballot box: What is at stake?

The result of Turkey's vote is not in doubt but the parliamentary arithmetic holds crucial consequences for the country. Birol Baskan Last Modified: 08 Jun 2011 17:32

A new constitution for Turkey is Erdogan's top priority for the party's anticipated third term. [EPA]

Turkey is heading towards elections. Opinion polls overwhelmingly predict that Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the incumbent prime minister, is about to win another term in office. Actually, the signals for this victory came in September 2010 when Erdogan won a much more challenging battle. In a controversial referendum on constitutional changes, Erdogan almost single-handedly defeated some 20-odd political leaders who opposed the amendments his government suggested. Since then, the opposition has been too demoralised to wage a successful campaign to tarnish Erdogan's political invincibility. In fact, Erdogan has been so confident about his

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political fortunes that his election campaign set forth objectives for Turkey to be realised by 2023, the year the modern republic will mark the 100th year since its birth. The polls predict, and it is not a wild prediction, that Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) will get around 45 per cent of the votes. This will be enough for Erdogan to form a single-party government. Having been in power for the last eight years, his government is unlikely to introduce wild changes in many policy areas. In the provision of main public services, such as education, health and redistribution of wealth and income, for example, Erdogan's government will continue to pursue the same double strategy: the government will work to improve the quality of services provided by state institutions, on the one hand, and will facilitate the growth of private sector and non-governmental organisations in these fields, on the other. In foreign policy too, Turkey will most likely pursue the same dynamic and pro-active policy, and continue to involve itself in regional issues. The chief architect of that policy, Ahmet Davutoglu, will be in the parliament as an AKP deputy in the new parliamentary season, but it is unlikely that this will bring any serious change in Turkish foreign policy. Party politics Even though the AKP will surely emerge victorious from the elections, the results are still consequential. In particular, how the two main opposition parties fare will have critical repercussions for Erdogan in his third term.

The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) will enter the elections under its new leader, Kemal Kilicdarolglu. Even though not appreciated enough, Kilicdaroglu has already brought an enormous change in Turkish politics by radically changing the CHP's political discourse. The previous CHP leader, Deniz Baykal, used to rest his election campaign on an intangible fear element, accusing Erdogan of undermining the secular pillars of the Turkish Republic. Even though this accusation reflected the deep-seated fears of some groups in Turkey, it did not help the CHP expand its vote base beyond those who voted for the party anyway. Kilicdaroglu dropped this discourse, and instead began to criticise the AKP on much more tangible issues such as corruption, poverty and income inequality. Under Kilicdaroglu's leadership, the CHP is thus seeking to become the true social democratic party that Turkish politics has long desperately needed. We are yet to see how the voters will reward Kilicdaroglu for this transition. If Kilicdaroglu can increase his party's vote share to the 30 to 35 per cent range, which is not unlikely, Erdogan will face a tougher and more confident opposition leader in the new parliament. This is going to be a welcome development. How the other main opposition party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), fares in the elections will have more serious consequences for Erdogan in his third term. The MHP has recently gone through a troubled period. The party in fact has long suffered from an existential problem, its raison d'etre being reduced to objecting and blocking all attempts to solve Kurdish issues. Surpassing the threshold As the AKP has introduced changes once considered taboo in Turkish politics, the MHP has turned into a status quo party. The party offers no solution to the Kurdish problem and appears quite populist and banal on other issues. Furthermore, shortly after the party started its election campaign, a website published sex tapes of several high-ranking party members. 151

The scandalous tapes have raised serious questions about whether the party will achieve the 10 per cent vote share to enter the parliament. A broad sector of anti-AKP voters now fears that the failure of the MHP to cross this threshold, would give the AKP too much parliamentary power, allowing it to single-handedly amend the existing constitution. In order to avoid this unwelcome scenario, many anti-AKP voters may tactically vote for the MHP and help the party pass the 10 per cent electoral threshold. In this scenario, the leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, would join Kemal Kilicdaroglu in the new parliamentary session, and leave Erdogan facing a much tougher opposition. Most significantly, if the MHP passes the 10 per cent electoral threshold, the new parliament could effectively block the AKP's plans for reform to improve the quality of Turkish democracy. Erdogan has promised during the election campaign that his government will press ahead with democratisation reforms in the new parliament. Under AKP governments, Turkey has already made non-negligible progress toward liberal democracy. A prominent Washington DC-based international non-governmental organisation, Freedom House, also acknowledged this progress, and improved Turkey's scores for both political and civil rights, which has been a painfully slow progress.

There is still a long way to go in order for Turkey to become a full liberal democracy. For example, AKP supporters like to point out that Turkey's military is no longer as influential as it used to be. Indeed, there is no question that the military's influence over politics has systematically waned in the last eight years. But, this seems to be circumstantial, its sustainability being contingent on Erdogan's popularity. The institutional mechanisms are still left intact: in some near future, if the elections do not produce a leader as popular, the military may re-exert its influence over politics. Moreover, full civilian control over the armed forces are yet to be established as the military is still pretty much a self-regulating and self-running state institution. The problem is in large part constitutional. The existing constitution, drafted by the military and introduced in 1982, is rather long, having some 170 articles, and structures the political system in great detail. The constitution acknowledges many democratic political and civil rights and freedoms for citizens, but also introduces loopholes which help the Turkish state curtail those rights and freedoms if necessary. The constitution defines the nature of the Turkish state in quite general terms and forbids any change that will contradict the nature of that state, as understood by the military and the judiciary. It should be noted that these are not inconsequential features. The solution to the Kurdish "problem", for example, requires a full-scale amendment of these parts of the constitution. In a parliament with much more powerful CHP and MHP components, Erdogan would definitely not be in a position to amend the constitution without taking it to a referendum. Even though a referendum is a way out of potential parliamentary deadlocks, Erdogan may not want to take another risky venture. 'Parliamentary arithmetic' Seemingly aware of the potential problems with the tiresome process of constitutional amendments, Erdogan promises instead a whole new constitution. In fact, the new constitution will be at the top of the AKP agenda in the new term. In a recent interview with a prominent Turkish journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, Erdogan said, crafting "a new constitution is going to be 152

the step we will take in the first stage". But, he cautiously added, "this is an issue contingent on parliamentary arithmetic". Technically speaking, parliamentary arithmetic will have no bearing on the issue. The existing constitution describes the procedure of constitutional amendment, but not the procedure of replacing the constitution with a new one. There are historical precedents, however. In 1958, for example, Charles de Gaulle spearheaded such a replacement in France, inaugurating the Fifth Republic. This is indeed going to speed up Turkey's historical move toward liberal democracy. But, it is not going to be an easy task. In fact, it may prove the toughest task Erdogan has ever undertaken. To overcome parliamentary opposition, Erdogan must reach out to the broadest possible sector of Turkish society, intensely involve them in the preparation of a civilian constitution and then subject the resulting text to a referendum. The problem is that, as the MHP leader Bahceli has said, Erdogan is not specific about the content of the new constitution he dreams of. From one perspective, this is desirable, as it could mean that Erdogan is not going to impose a text on the others, but rather will engage them. To do the latter, however, Erdogan has to go beyond himself by adopting a whole new style of leadership. The question is not whether Erdogan can do this or not - I believe, he can. The question becomes how seriously Erdogan really wants to do this. It did not escape the attention of many that in the same interview with Birand, Erdogan justified the very 10 per cent electoral threshold that blocks the entry of a political party which has a large following in the Kurdish region - a sign perhaps that Turkey's prime minister is not yet ready to compromise with his political opponents. Birol Baskan currently teaches at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Doha, Qatar. His book, Crescent and the State, is forthcoming from Syracuse University Press. Baskan thanks Dr Omur Aydin of Istanbul University for clarifying how AKP can introduce a new constitution. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Birol Baskan Turkey at the ballot box: What is at stake? 08 Jun 2011 17:32 http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/06/201168125735270909.html

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Versión para imprimir

Erdogan busca perpetuar su poder con una gran victoria en las urnas

El primer ministro se fija como objetivo 2023, centenario de la Turquía moderna

JUAN CARLOS SANZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Estambul - 09/06/2011

Las calles de Estambul rinden culto a la personalidad de Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Miles de carteles electorales con su imagen evocan la figura de un padre de la patria, de un nuevo Atatürk. "Objetivo 2023", es su lema de campaña, en referencia al primer centenario de la fundación de la Turquía moderna. Todos los sondeos predicen que el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP, islamista moderado) del primer ministro turco alcanzará su tercera victoria electoral consecutiva en las legislativas del domingo. Los analistas políticos solo debaten sobre si el margen de su triunfo en las urnas le permitirá perpetuarse en el poder otra década más mediante un cambio de las reglas de juego constitucionales.

El dinamismo y la modernidad de las calles de Estambul muestran también por qué la economía turca se ha convertido en la 16ª del mundo (la sexta de Europa) desde que el AKP llegó al Gobierno, a finales de 2002, mientras Ankara emerge en los últimos años como potencia regional en el Mediterráneo oriental y Oriente Próximo. "No hay alternativa democrática al AKP de Erdogan, la oposición aún no se ha desprendido de un pasado de nacionalismo y tutela del Ejército", opina Akin Özçer, editor de la web hispano-turca Hispanatolia.

Encuestas recientes de los institutos demoscópicos Konsensus y Sonar muestran una intención de voto de hasta el 50% para el AKP, que ya en 2007 revalidó su mayoría electoral con el 47% de los sufragios. Pero el auge que ha cobrado durante la campaña el opositor Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP, socialdemócrata laico) con su nuevo líder, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, a la cabeza, ha permitido que los citados sondeos le asignen cerca de un 30% de intención de voto. Su sistemática crítica al autoritarismo de Erdogan y sus propuestas reformistas y de redistribución de la riqueza han supuesto un giro radical frente al nacionalismo de su predecesor, Deniz Baykal, apeado de la dirección del partido tras un escándalo sexual en 2010.

Precisamente la difusión en plena campaña de vídeos sexuales de dirigentes del Partido del Movimiento Nacionalista (MHP) ha forzado una decena de dimisiones en esta formación ultraconservadora. Las encuestas, sin embargo, le conceden más de un 10% de los votos nacionales, el riguroso listón que la ley electoral turca fija para acceder al Parlamento.

Erdogan confía en lograr el domingo 367 (dos tercios) de los 550 escaños del Parlamento para poder redactar una nueva Constitución, al menos 330 diputados (tres quintos), lo que le permitiría someter su propuesta constitucional a referéndum. El primer ministro turco reclama una nueva Carta democrática para Turquía, en línea con las exigencias de la UE. La vigente ley fundamental fue aprobada tras el golpe de Estado militar de 1980, y pese a que fue enmendada en varias ocasiones -la última, el pasado septiembre- sigue inspirada por principios autoritarios y centralistas.

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"A Turquía no solo se le ha quedado el traje constitucional pequeño, sino que amenaza con convertir al país en un bonsái político", argumenta Osman Can, que fue ponente del Tribunal Constitucional turco durante ocho años y que ahora encabeza la Plataforma para una Nueva Constitución, un grupo de expertos que prepara un texto marco que sirva para los futuros debates parlamentarios.

Erdogan parece decantarse en su proyecto por un modelo de Gobierno presidencialista, como el implantado en Francia o EE UU, en detrimento del vigente sistema parlamentario. Los analistas turcos lo explican como un cuento de la lechera minuciosamente calculado. Como los estatutos de su partido limitan su permanencia al frente del Gobierno a tres mandatos consecutivos, deberá dejar el cargo de primer ministro en 2015 si, como nadie duda, vuelve a ganar los comicios del domingo.

Pero para entonces ya habrá finalizado la presidencia de su correligionario en el AKP Abdulá Gül, designado por el Parlamento en 2007 para un periodo legal de siete años. Nada debería impedir que Erdogan, dueño y señor de su partido, pueda optar en 2014 a ser elegido directamente por los votantes presidente de Turquía, esta vez con plenos poderes ejecutivos constitucionales. Previsiblemente, el líder islamista turco podrá aspirar a dos mandatos consecutivos de cinco años. De ser así, el sueño implícito de los carteles de su campaña -seguir en el poder en el hito histórico de 2023- se cumpliría. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Erdogan/busca/perpetuar/poder/gran/victor ia/urnas/elpepiint/20110609elpepiint_8/Tes

Los indignados turcos se movilizan a cinco días de las elecciones generales El 15-M de Madrid inspiró a los jóvenes, que con un 20% de desempleo son los grandes olvidados del milagro económico turco BLANCA LÓPEZ ARANGÜENA - Estambul - 08/06/2011 ¡Basta! Esta palabra también está en la boca de los jóvenes turcos que desde hoy se encuentran acampados en la plaza de Taksim, en el centro de Estambul. Armados con sombrillas para cubrirse del sol del medio día, botellines de agua y mantas para pasar la noche, los indignados turcos planean tres días de protesta contra la precariedad laboral, el paro y el control de las universidades. Por ahora tan solo unas decenas acampan en la plaza. Sami Bayram, estudiante de cine e indignado, cuenta que no esperan la intervención de la policía, conocida en Turquía por sus modos violentos, ya que la manifestación es legal y que se retirarán el sábado, jornada de reflexión antes de la cita electoral de este domingo. Los indignados de Estambul deben su movimiento a las manifestaciones del mes pasado en España. Miguel León, estudiante de Erasmus en Estambul, explica que los jóvenes turcos les contactaron durante las jornadas de protestas que el movimiento 15-M Turquía organizó en esta ciudad hace unas semanas. "Nos preguntaron por el movimiento, la organización y las reivindicaciones, luego se pusieron ellos manos a la obra". Ahora Miguel desafía el sol del mediodía con una pancarta en español en la que se lee "España, mira, Estambul también se anima". El resto de las pancartas recuerdan que después de Túnez, Tahrir y la Puerta del Sol ahora es el momento de Estambul. "Representamos a los 350.000 nuevos graduados en paro, a los que no pueden costearse

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una educación por las tasas universitarias, al 20% de paro juvenil", explica uno de los organizadores. Turquía tiene una de las poblaciones más jóvenes del mundo. Cerca del 60% de sus habitantes tiene menos de 30 años, lo que significa que casi la mitad de los 50 millones de electores llamados a votar este domingo están en esta franja de edad. Sin embargo, los jóvenes turcos no se sienten representados por sus políticos. Según la columnista Ayse Karabat, el porcentaje de la juventud implicada en la política activa es mínima, y "sin embargo la juventud turca está lejos de ser apolítica". Muestra de ello son las constantes manifestaciones en Estambul y Ankara contra las últimas medidas del Gobierno, como la censura en internet o las restricciones en el consumo de alcohol. "Los partidos nos ofrecen soluciones a un problema determinado que concuerda con su ideario político, pero no tienen un programa consistente para la juventud", explica Fatih Durukan, graduado de la universidad de Estambul y actualmente en paro. Y es que como explica Durukan, los tres grandes partidos turcos exponen en sus programas propuestas muy concretas, aunque limitadas, para los menores de 30 años. La promesa de los socialdemócratas del Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP) es la abolición del servicio militar obligatorio y su transformación en un Ejército profesional. El partido nacionalista MHP, por su parte, planea convertir el Ejército turco en el tercer mayor del mundo, pero a cambio promete a los jóvenes suprimir los exámenes de acceso a la universidad. Esto haría que una mayor cantidad de sus votantes, por lo general gente de clase media baja, tuvieran acceso a estudios superiores, con lo que conseguirían reducir su servicio militar de 15 a seis meses. Finalmente el partido en el Gobierno, el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP), promete mejores programas para el estudio de lenguas extranjeras y un aumento en el número de titulados universitarios. Reivindicación por la autonomía universitaria Pero ninguno se atreve con el gran enemigo de los jóvenes: el paro. A pesar del crecimiento sostenido que ha experimentado Turquía en los últimos nueve años, el desempleo juvenil es del 20 %, casi el doble de la tasa nacional. Según el economista Emre Deliveli, la rigidez del mercado de trabajo turco y una enseñanza universitaria escasamente orientada al mercado laboral estarían en el origen de este problema. "Además, el coste de contratar a un trabajador es muy alto en Turquía, más que su sueldo, lo que hace que muchos jóvenes acepten trabajar sin contrato", explica. Las desigualdades educativas entre las escuelas públicas, sobresaturadas de alumnos y con pocos medios, y las privadas son otra de las preocupaciones de los indignados de Taksim, que también cargan contra la falta de autonomía de las universidades. Y es que en Turquía la educación superior está en manos del Consejo Superior de Educación (YÖK), que desde el golpe de estado de 1980 se encarga de supervisar los planes de estudios y velar por la aplicación de la prohibición del velo en sus establecimientos, entre otras competencias. Naciones Unidas, en su informe de 2008 sobre la juventud turca, instaba al país a "aprovechar con eficacia su oportunidad demográfica". El informe enfatizaba la importancia de la educación igualitaria y la puesta en valor de los jóvenes turcos bajo el peligro de que "el desempleo, la pobreza y el descontento social se instalen en la sociedad". Los indignados de Estambul representaran esta juventud a la que se le están privando de oportunidades y que durante tres días pedirá a sus gobernantes que no den la espalda a los problemas de casi 40 millones de jóvenes.

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BLANCA LÓPEZ ARANGÜENA Los indignados turcos se movilizan a cinco días de las elecciones generales El 15-M de Madrid inspiró a los jóvenes, que con un 20% de desempleo son los grandes olvidados del milagro económico turco 08/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/indignados/turcos/movilizan/dias/eleccion es/generales/elpepuint/20110608elpepuint_8/Tes

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John Vidal and Claire Provost US universities in Africa 'land grab' Institutions including Harvard and Vanderbilt reportedly use hedge funds to buy land in deals that may force farmers out o John Vidal and Claire Provost guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 June 2011 20.18 BST

US universities are reportedly using endowment funds to make deals that may force thousands from their land in Africa. Photograph: Boston Globe via Getty Images Harvard and other major American universities are working through British hedge funds and European financial speculators to buy or lease vast areas of African farmland in deals, some of which may force many thousands of people off their land, according to a new study. Researchers say foreign investors are profiting from "land grabs" that often fail to deliver the promised benefits of jobs and economic development, and can lead to environmental and social problems in the poorest countries in the world. The new report on land acquisitions in seven African countries suggests that Harvard, Vanderbilt and many other US colleges with large endowment funds have invested heavily in African land in the past few years. Much of the money is said to be channelled through London-based Emergent asset management, which runs one of Africa's largest land acquisition funds, run by former JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs currency dealers. Researchers at the California-based Oakland Institute think that Emergent's clients in the US may have invested up to $500m in some of the most fertile land in the expectation of making 25% returns. 158

Emergent said the deals were handled responsibly. "Yes, university endowment funds and pension funds are long-term investors," a spokesman said. "We are investing in African agriculture and setting up businesses and employing people. We are doing it in a responsible way … The amounts are large. They can be hundreds of millions of dollars. This is not landgrabbing. We want to make the land more valuable. Being big makes an impact, economies of scale can be more productive." Chinese and Middle Eastern firms have previously been identified as "grabbing" large tracts of land in developing countries to grow cheap food for home populations, but western funds are behind many of the biggest deals, says the Oakland institute, an advocacy research group. The company that manages Harvard's investment funds declined to comment. "It is Harvard management company policy not to discuss investments or investment strategy and therefore I cannot confirm the report," said a spokesman. Vanderbilt also declined to comment. Oakland said investors overstated the benefits of the deals for the communities involved. "Companies have been able to create complex layers of companies and subsidiaries to avert the gaze of weak regulatory authorities. Analysis of the contracts reveal that many of the deals will provide few jobs and will force many thousands of people off the land," said Anuradha Mittal, Oakland's director. In Tanzania, the memorandum of understanding between the local government and US- based farm development corporation AgriSol Energy, which is working with Iowa University, stipulates that the two main locations – Katumba and Mishamo – for their project are refugee settlements holding as many as 162,000 people that will have to be closed before the $700m project can start. The refugees have been farming this land for 40 years. In Ethiopia, a process of "villagisation" by the government is moving tens of thousands of people from traditional lands into new centres while big land deals are being struck with international companies. The largest land deal in South Sudan, where as much as 9% of the land is said by Norwegian analysts to have been bought in the last few years, was negotiated between a Texas-based firm, Nile Trading and Development and a local co-operative run by absent chiefs. The 49-year lease of 400,000 hectares of central Equatoria for around $25,000 (£15,000) allows the company to exploit all natural resources including oil and timber. The company, headed by former US Ambassador Howard Eugene Douglas, says it intends to apply for UN-backed carbon credits that could provide it with millions of pounds a year in revenues. In Mozambique, where up to 7m hectares of land is potentially available for investors, western hedge funds are said in the report to be working with South Africans businesses to buy vast tracts of forest and farmland for investors in Europe and the US. The contracts show the government will waive taxes for up to 25 years, but few jobs will be created. "No one should believe that these investors are there to feed starving Africans, create jobs or improve food security," said Obang Metho of Solidarity Movement for New Ethiopia. "These agreements – many of which could be in place for 99 years – do not mean progress for local people and will not lead to food in their stomachs. These deals lead only to dollars in the pockets of corrupt leaders and foreign investors." 159

"The scale of the land deals being struck is shocking", said Mittal. "The conversion of African small farms and forests into a natural-asset-based, high-return investment strategy can drive up food prices and increase the risks of climate change. Research by the World Bank and others suggests that nearly 60m hectares – an area the size of France – has been bought or leased by foreign companies in Africa in the past three years. "Most of these deals are characterised by a lack of transparency, despite the profound implications posed by the consolidation of control over global food markets and agricultural resources by financial firms," says the report. "We have seen cases of speculators taking over agricultural land while small farmers, viewed as squatters, are forcibly removed with no compensation," said Frederic Mousseau, policy director at Oakland, said: "This is creating insecurity in the global food system that could be a much bigger threat to global security than terrorism. More than one billion people around the world are living with hunger. The majority of the world's poor still depend on small farms for their livelihoods, and speculators are taking these away while promising progress that never happens." John Vidal and Claire Provost US universities in Africa 'land grab' 8 June 2011 20.18 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/08/us-universities-africa-land-grab/print

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Syria's Assad faces new sanctions by

UN and European Union8 June 2011 10.17 BST Draft resolution being promoted at security council by Britain and France stops short of Libya-style no-fly zone

Barry Neild, Martin Chulov in Beirut and agencies guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 8 June 2011 10.17 BST

Britain and France are pushing for a UN security council resolution condemning a crackdown on anti-government protesters in Syria. The foreign secretary, William Hague, told parliament that the security council had a "responsibility to speak out" and warned of new EU sanctions unless demands were met. Hague said diplomats were circulating a draft resolution to secure the necessary support from the nine council members. The French foreign minister, Alain Juppé, said it was "inconceivable" that the UN would remain silent while the situation in Syria worsened, and it was "a question of days, maybe hours" before the council voted on the draft resolution.

Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, faces a new UN resolution on sanctions and possible EU action. Photograph: Benoit Tessier/Reuters Diplomatic pressure on the regime of President Bashar al-Assad has increased amid concerns that the Syrian security forces are preparing an all-out assault on a town where more than 120 troops were reportedly killed over the weekend. Columns of government tanks have surrounded Jisr al-Shughour, near the Turkish border, and most of the town's 41,000 people are reported to have fled after armed clashes at the weekend. Witnesses had reported long lines of tanks and thousands of troops heading towards the town on Wednesday, according to opposition activist Mustafa Osso. Many of the troops were from the army's 4th division commanded by Assad's younger brother Maher, Osso told the Associated Press. The town has largely been abandoned. According to three men who stayed behind, the hospital stood empty and the intelligence headquarters, scene of an uprising on Sunday, was a looted and empty shell.

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"Most people have left the town because they are scared. They know the deaths will be high," an activist told Reuters. Hague said the proposed security council resolution would bring action against Syria in line with measures imposed on other countries in the region facing political upheaval. "We must show the same resolve and purpose in supporting change and democratic development elsewhere in the region," Hague said. The draft resolution falls short of the no-fly zone mandated against Libya that launched a Nato bombing campaign against Muammar Gaddafi's forces. Russia appears opposed to action against Assad and other security council members such as Brazil and India are reported to be wary of a resolution they fear could foreshadow military intervention Russia's envoy to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, said: "The prospect of a UN security council resolution that's along the same lines as resolution 1973 on Libya will not be supported by my country ... The use of force, as Libya shows, does not provide answers." The draft calls on Assad and his government to meet the demands of pro-democracy protesters, free "prisoners of conscience", lift internet restrictions and co-operate with UN human rights officials. It does not detail or threaten any UN sanctions. "We are working to persuade other countries that the security council has a responsibility to speak out," Hague said. "President Assad is losing legitimacy and should reform or step aside." Hague said an EU arms embargo, asset freeze and visa ban on 13 officials imposed against Syria last month had proved successful but tougher measures could follow. "We must show the same resolve and purpose in supporting change and democratic development elsewhere in the region, for example using the economic appeal of the EU to act as a magnet for positive change in the region. "Since my last statement our efforts to agree EU sanctions against President Assad and other individuals responsible for the violence and repression in Syria have been successful. We are exploring with our European partners the potential for further sanctions if the violence continues." Unlike Gaddafi in the early days of the Libya rebellion, Assad has managed to keep his government together. On Tuesday the network France 24 aired audio it said was of the Syrian ambassador to France issuing a stinging resignation; less than an hour later Syrian state television broadcast different audio of a woman's voice denying she had quit and threatening to sue the French network. It was not possible to reconcile the two accounts. More than 1,000 people have been killed in more than three months of demonstrations in Syria. Barry Neild, Martin Chulov Syria's Assad faces new sanctions by UN and European Union. Draft resolution being promoted at security council by Britain and France stops short of Libya-style no-fly zone. 8 June 2011 10.17 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/08/syria-assad-un-sanctions-resolution/print

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William Hague calls for UN security council to act against Syrian regime Foreign secretary says draft resolution is in circulation among council members following crackdown on protesters Barry Neild

Britain is to push for a UN security council resolution condemning a crackdown on anti- government protesters in Syria. The foreign secretary, William Hague, told parliament that the security council had a "responsibility to speak out" and warned of new European Union sanctions unless demands were met. Hague said diplomats were circulating a draft resolution to secure the necessary support from the nine council members. He said the proposals would bring action taken against Syria in line with measures imposed on other countries in the region facing political upheaval. However, they fell short of the no-fly zone mandated against Libya under a resolution passed earlier this year that launched a Nato bombing campaign against Muammar Gaddafi's forces. "We must show the same resolve and purpose in supporting change and democratic development elsewhere in the region," Hague said. The draft calls on Syria's president Bashar al-Assad and his government to capitulate to the demands of pro-democracy protesters, free "prisoners of conscience", lift internet restrictions and co-operate with UN human rights officials. It does not detail or threaten any UN sanctions. "We are working to persuade other countries that the security council has a responsibility to speak out," he said. "President Assad is losing legitimacy and should reform or step aside." Hague said an EU arms embargo, asset freeze and visa ban on 13 officials imposed against Syria last month had proved successful, but tougher measures could follow. "We must show the same resolve and purpose in supporting change and democratic development elsewhere in the region, for example using the economic appeal of the EU to act as a magnet for positive change in the region. "Since my last statement our efforts to agree EU sanctions against President Assad and other individuals responsible for the violence and repression in Syria have been successful. We are exploring with our European partners the potential for further sanctions if the violence continues." Human rights groups claim that more than 1,000 people have been killed in more than three months of demonstrations in Syria. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jun/08/syria-william-hague-un-security- council/print

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Syria says protesters killed security forces By Liz Sly, Published: June 6

BEIRUT — Syria’s government asserted Monday that 120 soldiers had been killed by armed protesters in the northern town of Jisr al-Shughour, amid indications that what began as a peaceful protest movement is turning into an armed rebellion in at least some parts of the country. While there had been earlier, isolated reports of armed clashes between protesters and security forces elsewhere in Syria, this is the first time the government has accused the protest movement of killing so many of its soldiers in a single incident. Activists and human rights groups said the number was almost certainly an exaggeration and was likely to be used as a pretext for an even harsher crackdown on the protest movement. Accounts from witnesses suggested that some form of violent confrontation had occurred, although there was no independent confirmation of the details or death toll. The state-controlled Syrian Arab News Agency said the government was dispatching reinforcements to the area after the killings. It blamed the attacks on “armed gangs,” a phrase the government often uses to describe the almost overwhelmingly peaceful protest movement that has emerged in recent weeks to present the Syrian regime with the biggest challenge to its survival in three decades. Jisr al-Shughour, which is near Syria’s border with Turkey, has become the latest focus of a harsh government campaign in response to the 11-week-old uprising against President Bashar al-Assad and his regime. Some Syrian activists said they believed the Syrian government was using the episode to justify even harsher measures against the town at a time when the United States is reported to be stepping up an effort to seek tougher sanctions against Syria at the United Nations.

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“The regime is determined to use more violence, and it is scared of growing international pressure,” said Wissam Tarif of the human rights group Insan. “So the regime strategy is to portray this as a violent rebellion.” Some Syrian activists who were interviewed by telephone confirmed that some residents of the town had taken up arms to defend themselves. A human rights activist outside the country said that he had spoken to people who told him that a swath of villages around Jisr al-Shughour is now outside government control. “It is something not like the protests we have seen before,” said the activist, who insisted that he not be named because of the sensitivity of the subject. “Something very sad is happening, and it is against the spirit of the peaceful protests.’’ The Syrian news agency said that soldiers had been killed in several attacks, including an ambush, a bombing attack and a storming of security posts. Some Syrian activists disputed the government’s version of events, and although those details given by officials could not be verified, it appeared that at least some protesters did fight back. A witness in Jisr al-Shughour said that several Syrian soldiers had been killed by protesters who took up arms to defend themselves against an onslaught of attacks by tanks and warplanes. He said the killings had taken place Sunday, when Syrian troops staged a major offensive against the town, which was repelled by armed protesters. “We do not deny shooting back,” said the witness, a participant in the protest movement who spoke by telephone on the condition of anonymity because he fears for his safety. “But you must know that we only shot back after they started killing us. They killed 35 in a few hours.” “We killed some,” he added. “The others were shot in the back for trying to defect. We took their weapons from them and turned the muzzles towards them. We shot and killed some. But not 80. They killed many more than we did.” Jisr al-Shughour lies on a sectarian fault line between the Sunni-dominated agricultural plains to the east and a concentration of villages in the mountains to the west that are populated by Alawites, the minority sect to which Assad and his regime belong. The government has been distributing weapons to Alawite villagers to fight the mostly Sunni protest movement, with the goal, human rights activists say, of provoking a sectarian conflict that would justify the use of full force against protesters. There have already been signs that Syrian protesters in the town of Tal Kalakh, on Syria’s borders with Lebanon, have acquired arms, and there have been reports of protesters firing back on scattered occasions in other areas of northwestern Syria where sectarian tensions are running high between Sunnis and Alawites. It would not be surprising, said Andrew Tabler, a Syria expert with the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, if more protesters in areas subjected to particularly brutal methods took up weapons to defend themselves. “The regime is being stretched thin and it’s losing its grip, and this is probably going to be the future of the conflict,” he said. “Once things take off like this, it’s hard to extinguish.” Some Syrian activists have expressed concern that the more violent turn might reflect a stronger hand by the Islamist movement in what has until now been a largely secular upheaval demanding democratic reforms. But it remains unclear what role, if any,

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Islamists might be playing in the unrest; the Muslim Brotherhood was almost completely eliminated from Syria during an earlier, armed uprising in the early 1980s, which was brutally suppressed by the current president’s father, Hafez al-Assad. There have been other indications in recent days that the Syrian authorities may be losing their grip in certain key protest flash points. After shooting dead more than 60 demonstrators in the town of Hama on Friday, the security forces retreated, for reasons that were unclear. A video posted online Sunday showed protesters apparently hanging a captured member of the Syrian security forces in a central square, with no attempt by the authorities to intervene. Another video posted on YouTube on Saturday showed uniformed Syrian security forces planting weapons on the bodies of dead civilians in the southern town of Daraa, the first town to openly rebel against the government and the first to be suppressed by tanks. The video illustrated, activists say, the lengths to which the government will go to portray the uprising as an armed revolt. A special correspondent in Beirut contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-claims-security-forces-killed-by- protesters/2011/06/06/AGJuYNKH_story.html?nl_headlines

Military to broadcast on its own television channel Author: Mahassen El Snousi Publishing Date: Tue, 07/06/2011 - 19:47 The National Information Council has approved the launch of an official television channel to report statements and news from the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The channel is to be called Al-Masdar [The Source], and will also broadcast information originating from various government institutions. One of the stated aims of the channel will be to prevent the spread of rumors and misinformation. The channel is expected to start a test broadcast of eight hours a day in a few weeks. Translated from the Arabic Edition

Source URL (retrieved on 08/06/2011 - 13:36): http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/465830

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June 6, 2011 The Spirit That Binds By ROGER COHEN VENICE — The United States is no longer interested in Europe per se. That’s not a bad thing. It reflects the fact that Europe is whole, free and at peace. But of course the deflection of American attention always prompts a measure of unease, as was evident at a meeting here of the Council for the United States and Italy. The question arises: Can some new galvanizing trans-Atlantic goal or institution be found? I doubt it. The lesson of Venice is that history moves on. Great decisions affecting far- flung lands were once taken where the idle now gaze at roseate facades and wander over stones smoothed by centuries. After the doges came the dolce vita. After statecraft came style, Flaubert’s “discharge from a deeper wound.” Trans-Atlantic relations are O.K. In the Obama administration’s measured hands they have recovered from the Bush buffeting. They do not transfix. They function. In so far as the United States is interested in Europe it is interested in what can be done together in the rest of the world. That’s a fair reflection of priorities. Resources have to be allocated. Bad allocation gives you two wars at once, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and domestic financial meltdown. America is now looking to the emergent powers, to its winding-down wars and to the places that affect national security as the Prussian plain once did. Europe is in an awkward phase, its integration on hold. The European bicycle was always unsustainable without forward motion. There is none. Helmut Kohl, the former German chancellor, said something startling last month. Speaking at the American Academy in Berlin, he declared: “Germany’s future is with its neighbors, our partners in the E.U. We will stand side by side with the Greek people. It is the most important thing.” It was startling because you don’t hear Chancellor Angela Merkel saying much about Germany’s European leadership. She has her finger to the wind. It tells her Germans are fed up with Greeks freeloading on their industry. A clear majority of Germans would much rather Greeks got a comeuppance for their profligacy than help. Europe, once its anchor, has become Germany’s albatross. Merkel bears it with a grimace. Combine German navel-gazing with an American president shaped not by Europe’s drama but by the Pacific’s allure and you find yourself in a trans-Atlantic relationship that has lost its emotional core. Still there is work to be done. Perhaps Europe can help America make the right call in Afghanistan and America can repay the favor in North Africa.

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The drawdown in U.S. troops in Afghanistan is about to begin. The question is: In what numbers? A cautious process maintaining maximum combat capability is being advocated by the outgoing secretary of defense, Robert Gates, as a “no-brainer.” Others in the administration favor a more rapid exit. Europeans are on the go-faster side of this debate. They are right. Osama bin Laden is dead, a grinding 10-year-old war is unwinnable in any conventional sense, and there may be no more than 100 Al Qaeda operatives left in Afghanistan. It’s time to switch from counterinsurgency to a counter-terrorism approach that reflects finite resources and the need to build an exit strategy around talks with the Taliban. Without a drawdown big enough to get the attention of the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, there will be no pressure on him to get more of his own forces — military and police — ready for prime time. He should also be made to see the need for a defense treaty with Western powers. As the former British defense secretary Malcolm Rifkind has written, this should “permit NATO, using air power and special forces, to be able, after 2015, to attack any new terrorist base or terrorist activity in any parts of the country not controlled by Kabul.” The United States in turn can help Europe ensure that decent societies emerge around the Mediterranean basin. The European strategic interest in the Arab Spring is overwhelming. It is political despotism and economic failure across North Africa that have fed instability, extremism and an immigrant tide northward. Yet Europe’s response has been hesitant. There are three priorities. End the war in Libya in short order with the departure of Muammar el-Qaddafi. Ensure democratic change equals opportunity for young societies: Europe needs to help create a regional investment bank similar to the one that helped fulfill the promise of the last spring — of 1989. And remember the Arab Spring’s bumper sticker, “It’s Egypt, stupid.” Egypt is the pivot. I’d argue that Egypt is now more important to America than Afghanistan. Its success in a democratic transition would be the best antidote to the frustrations in the Arab world that led to 9/11. Egypt’s successful emergence from despotism is as delicate and critical as German unification within the West was two decades ago. The Arab Spring reminds us of what does still bind the United States and Europe: values of human dignity and freedom. The trans-Atlantic relationship is an empty vessel if not used when the yearning of less fortunate peoples touches on what binds us most intimately. You can follow Roger Cohen on Twitter at twitter.com/nytimescohen . ROGER COHEN The Spirit That Binds June 6, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/opinion/07iht- edcohen07.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

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June 6, 2011 The View from Yemen’s Tahrir Square By YASIR ABDEL BAQI Aden, Yemen I WENT to Sana, the capital, to wander Tahrir Square. Protesters had set up a sea of tents, big and small, red and yellow, and as I entered I saw a sign: “Welcome to the square kilometer of freedom.” Everyone I passed, women, men and children, gave the victory sign and shouted, “Get out!” They weren’t yelling at me, but at President Ali Abdullah Saleh. A few days later, he would in fact get out; on Saturday, he went to Saudi Arabia for treatment for wounds he received when his compound was attacked. But he says he’s planning to return, and despite the celebrations, the protests go on. Sana’s Tahrir Square is more than just a platform for voicing anger against the regime; it is a meeting place, a center for art and literature and a market where Yemenis can buy food or trinkets. I bought mediocre tea from a young man with a small cart and a strip of cloth bound around his head, painted with the words “Get out!” I saw a wounded man with the words “We are sure to die, so why be afraid?” written on his arm. I was stopped by a young man wearing a first aid badge, who said he had treated many wounded demonstrators, some of whom had been shot in the head or neck. At the square’s field hospital I met a young pharmacist. The minister of health, he said, had sent the hospital expired medicine and birth control pills. He was in a towering rage. “What are we meant to do with birth control pills?” he asked. Children were everywhere. They stood in line to get their faces painted: the Yemeni flag on one cheek, the words “Get out!” on the other. A young boy shouted, “Get out so I can grow up and live!” A young activist asked me: “What about after Saleh’s regime falls? Will the youth still have a say?” No one knows what is going to happen, but no one is giving up the fight. In one corner of the square, a musician clutched his guitar, surrounded by young tribesmen who knew all the words and sang along in perfect harmony: “I’m staying here, staying/ Until the regime falls.” A man asked if I would photograph his arm. The words “Get out, murderer!” had been branded into his flesh. I am now back home in Aden. Its population is smaller than Sana’s but the protests here are even livelier. A few days ago I ran into my friend Amr Jamal, who has been in the streets demanding change ever since the protests were in their infancy. With Mr. Saleh gone, at least for now, he is ecstatic. Hugging me goodbye, he said, “Aden is paradise.” With the sound of bullets still echoing through Sana’s streets, I know that’s not yet true, that this is not the paradise Yemenis dream of. But I hope we’re getting closer. Yasir Abdel Baqi is a writer. This article was translated by Robin Moger from the Arabic. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/opinion/07baqi.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=th a212 169

06/06/2011 03:15 PM The World from Berlin Yemen Faces Abyss Despite President's Departure Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh may have left the country for medical treatment, but a peaceful transition of power is by no means assured. German commentators say that urgent action is required to prevent the country from sliding into civil war and chaos. Allies of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh have promised that he will return. Having been flown to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment on Saturday evening after he and several senior officials were injured in a rocket attack on the presidential compound, officials said Saleh will be back in the country he has ruled for 33 years within weeks. "Saleh will come back. Saleh is in good health," said Abdu al-Janadi, deputy information minister, according to the Associated Press. "He may give up authority one day, but it has to be in a constitutional way. Calm has returned. Coups have failed." There are plenty of people both within Yemen and abroad, however, who believe that Saleh's departure is permanent. Thousands of people gathered in the streets of the capital Sana'a on Sunday to celebrate and talks between opposition groups and government officials are continuing. The negotiations are a continuation of talks held on a United States-backed proposal which foresees the resignation of Saleh. The Yemeni president has agreed to the deal several times in recent weeks -- only to change his mind at the last moment. An opposition official told the AP that Saleh's departure to Saudi Arabia was delayed on Saturday evening as the US and Saudi Arabia both pushed him to sign a decree passing power to his vice president. The president refused. A Power Vacuum Anti-government protests have been ongoing for months in Yemen, with Saleh's security forces and military repeatedly using deadly force in an effort to put down the demonstrations. estimates that at least 166 people have been killed. The violence had increased in the last two weeks as the opposition gained support from a former tribal ally of Saleh. The chaos has many in the region fearful that Yemen could descend into a failed state. The country is deeply impoverished and its power structures are fragmented, with tribal conflict a constant. Furthermore, al-Qaida has a strong foothold in the country and there are concerns that a power vacuum could provide the terror group with more freedom to operate. Saleh underwent an operation in Saudi Arabia to remove splinters of wood from a mosque pulpit which became embedded in his chest after a rocket exploded as he and several senior officials were worshipping, medical officials told the AP. Eleven bodyguards were killed in the attack.

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German Chancellor Angela Merkel, together with her counterparts from France, Britain, Italy and Spain, issued an open statement on Sunday urging "the Yemeni people to find the way to reconciliation in a spirit of dialogue and national unity." German commentators on Monday are unified in their belief that Saleh's rule has now come to an end. The center-left Süddeutsche Zeitung writes: "Saleh may have said that he wants to return to Yemen in a few days. But he should think twice. Furthermore, the Saudis may be willing to provide the president medical treatment, but they are unlikely to allow him to return home." "External mediation would seem to be the only way forward. This is a role that Saudi Arabia would have to fill. The leading power on the Arabian Peninsula wants to see peace return to Yemen: The conflict in the region's poorest country could spread to the oil kingdom. But the Saudis also don't want democracy in the neighboring country: A reform virus could be just as dangerous for Saudi Arabia's sclerotic monarchy as a war would be on the other side of its 1,000-kilometer-long (621 miles) border with Yemen. As such, Saudi negotiators will attempt to forge an agreement between the rebellious tribes and Saleh's followers." "They are likely to have the support of the US. The Americans have only limited influence in Yemen, but they are afraid of the country's status as a stronghold of militant Islamism and of al-Qaida fighters. The democratic reforms that youthful protesters have for months been demanding could very well get left behind in the backroom diplomacy." The Financial Times Deutschland writes: "The West must not blindly trust that demonstrators in Yemen will now find success. ... The mountainous, poverty-stricken and austerely Muslim country is already virtually ungovernable. ... Absent a halfway orderly transition of power, Yemen could completely collapse. ... This political chaos would play into the hands of Islamist terrorists, as happened in Afghanistan at the beginning of the 1990s." "Via Saudi Arabia, the Western countries must now do whatever they can to exert pressure on all those involved to quickly agree on a clear transition of power. The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf has already worked out an acceptable plan. It calls for power to be initially transferred to the vice president prior to the creation of a unity government under the leadership of the opposition. Elections would then follow. It is the best chance that Yemen has. Saleh himself should recognize that. As such, he should not return home from Saudi Arabia." The left-leaning daily Die Tageszeitung writes: "At a time when the Saudi kingdom is essentially encircled by unrest -- and even sent troops to Bahrain to put down popular demonstrations there -- the rulers in Riyadh have apparently come to the realization that Yemini President Saleh is more of an obstacle to than a guarantee for stability." "As such, the Saudi leaders will be interested in seeing an 'orderly transfer of power,' a formulation which in Egypt, for example, meant that as many officials as possible managed to hold on to their positions in the new regime. Activists that have camped in public squares in Yemen will not be among them. Rather, the ruling family will do what

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it can to create a government out of the remnants of the old regime and some of those who defected to the opposition. The result may be a leadership with a broader foundation of support, thus splitting the opposition, but it will not be focused on introducing real change." "Saudi Arabia, after all, has never been a champion of democratic reform. There are good reasons for the activists to remain vigilant." The center-right Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung writes: "It could be that the celebrations in Yemen will soon come to an end. The forces for freedom which began protesting against the rule of President Saleh more than four months ago could fall victim to a power struggle between those who remain loyal to Saleh and those who defected. ... The most recent 'revenge' attack carried out by government opponents on the presidential palace in Taiz in addition to explosions in the capital show just how close Yemen is to the abyss of violence." -- Charles Hawley

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,766869,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: An Uncertain Future for Yemen http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-68869.html • Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate: A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763537,00.html • Has the Arab Spring Stalled?: Autocrats Gain Ground in Middle East (05/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762861,00.html • Interview with Head of German Intelligence: 'Al-Qaida Faces Difficult Times Ahead' (05/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,761374,00.html • The Dance of the Snakes: Brewing Civil War in Yemen Has All Sides Nervous (03/28/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,753602,00.html • The Plight of Northern Yemen: A Life of Conflict, Dust and Ruins (02/02/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,742954,00.html • 'Operation Scorched Earth': A US Hand in Yemen's Civil War (12/03/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,732734,00.html • East of Aden: A President Struggles to Keep Yemen Together (11/11/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,728361,00.html

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June 6, 2011 Yemen’s Women Hoping for a New Era By NADIA AL-KOKABANY Sana, Yemen THE shelling of Yemen’s presidential palace last Friday represented the end of the road for President Ali Abdullah Saleh — a decisive conclusion he had never expected, or even considered, when the youth revolt erupted four months ago. Yemen’s tribal society, its problems with Al Qaeda, its struggle with separatist movements, and its rate of gun ownership, one of the world’s highest, should have led him to react cautiously — and to realize that the people, having taken to the streets to demand freedom and dignity, would not return home until they achieved victory. Instead, Mr. Saleh resorted to sowing division among the Yemeni people. After realizing he could not suppress the rebellion, he found a pretext for taking up arms. He carried out attacks against the tribe, provoking widespread resentment and anger for senselessly spilling blood. He then tried to drag Yemen into a civil war by putting snipers on the roofs of buildings, killing many people and terrifying everyone else. He surrendered the southern city of Zinjibar to Al Qaeda. He cracked down hard in Taiz, where the uprising began. Dozens were killed and hundreds wounded, just to show the world what happens when the people stage sit-ins. Yet the demonstrators remained peaceful. Yemenis awoke on Sunday to news of Mr. Saleh’s departure to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. They are desperately hoping he has left for good. They raised Yemeni flags, sang and celebrated their victory. Already, some southern separatists have relinquished their demands for secession, and rebels in the restive northern province of have declared their support for the revolution and opposition to all forms of violence. Yemeni women joined their husbands and sons during the protests, after realizing that Mr. Saleh’s government was incapable of anything but bleeding the country dry and exploiting its resources for the benefit of a tiny minority, leaving the rest in grinding poverty. They are now celebrating his departure as a moment that will usher in a new era. Yemeni women want to be equals, participating fully in the life of a nation that provides them and their children with education, health care and a dignified standard of living — not to be evaluated based on their appearance, and seen as sitting around, taking up space. It will be difficult for Yemenis to repair what the Saleh regime has destroyed. But we will survive this ordeal, because the youth, political parties and many in the military realize that sacrifices will be necessary in the months to come, and that these sacrifices will be the basis for forging a modern Yemen built on the principles of citizenship and equal rights for all. Nadia al-Kokabany is a writer and a professor of architecture at the University of Sana. This article was translated by Nathaniel A. Miller from the Arabic. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/opinion/07kokabani.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212 173

SOCIEDAD ESPAÑA-TÚNEZ Una pequeña lección de democracia cansada 6 junio 2011 DE VOLKSKRANT AMSTERDAM

"Democracia. Orgullosos de ser tunecinos". Una mujer pasa frente a un cartel en el centro de Túnez, en abril de 2011. AFP | En Túnez, un periodista del Volkskrant fue testigo de una escena sorprendente: una serie de jóvenes "indignados" españoles se manifestaban ante su embajada. De su diálogo con los tunecinos surge una reflexión sobre nuestro sistema político. Leen Vervaeke "La democracia es algo más que el simple derecho al voto", explica una manifestante española a un transeúnte tunecino. Y le entrega un panfleto. "España tan sólo es una democracia de nombre, porque la ley electoral favorece a los grandes partidos. Una democracia formal no es una auténtica democracia, no basta con eso". El joven tunecino asiente dubitativo, inclina la cabeza y comienza a leer el panfleto. Esta manifestación ante la embajada de España en Túnez es una concentración sorprendente. El último domingo de mayo, unos cincuenta españoles (es decir, casi el 10 % del número total de españoles en Túnez) mostró su solidaridad con los indignados, que ocupan desde hace semanas las plazas españolas. Es asombroso, porque en un país en el que miles de ciudadanos recientemente arriesgaron sus vidas por la democracia, dan a entender que esta democracia no es tan maravillosa como parece. Cualquier cosa antes que una dictadura El transeúnte tunecino, un empleado de 23 años del club de tenis cercano, contempla a los manifestantes con una mirada soñadora. Tocan música con tambores y bailan. "Es más una fiesta que una manifestación", comenta con un tono un tanto envidioso. "Si nosotros nos hubiéramos manifestado así, Ben Ali seguiría en el poder". Dice que comprende las reivindicaciones de los españoles sobre la ley electoral. Pero al final concluye: "Si pudiéramos tener una democracia como la española, me daría por satisfecho".

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El joven tunecino está dispuesto a aceptar los fallos y los excesos de la democracia. La ley electoral desleal y el dominio de los grandes partidos. Los enredos y las artimañas políticas. La demagogia y la retórica populista. El trueque electoral tras las elecciones del Senado de sufragio indirecto, por citar un ejemplo. La falta de políticos con perspectivas que vayan más allá de las próximas elecciones. No es muy consciente de ello, pero está dispuesto a aceptarlo. Cualquier cosa antes que una dictadura. Ya lo decía Churchill: de todas las formas de Gobierno, la democracia es la menos mala. Aunque lo decía hace 54 años. Lo que me lleva a esta reflexión: ¿Por qué nos hemos quedado encasillados en esta forma de gobierno, que es la menos mala? ¿Por qué no aportamos cambios o al menos mejoras? Porque los ocupantes de las plazas españolas no son los únicos que indican que la democracia necesita una rehabilitación, también en el resto de Europa el avance del populismo, los votos de protesta y el creciente abismo entre el ciudadano y la política señalan los fallos de la construcción democrática. La juventud española, primera en despertarse Es comprensible que los tunecinos se conformen con estos fallos democráticos tras 50 años de dictadura. Pero después de las revoluciones árabes, es hora de que los ciudadanos europeos se despierten: ¿por qué no intentamos solucionar estos fallos? ¿Por qué no cuidamos más este régimen político, que claramente es tan valioso que los ciudadanos árabes están dispuestos a sacrificar su vida por él? La juventud española parece ser la primera en despertarse. Sus acciones son objeto de numerosas críticas, en parte justificadas. Los jóvenes no tienen objetivos precisos, no proponen alternativas concretas y a veces son un tanto demasiado lúdicas. Pero simbolizan una pregunta clave: ahora que se ha cambiado la dictadura por la democracia en Túnez y en Egipto, ¿acaso no ha llegado el momento de cambiar nuestra propia democracia por una versión mejorada? CONTEXTO La ira de la "generación sacrificada" Si bien los manifestantes de la Puerta del Sol en Madrid y los jóvenes griegos que se manifiestan todas las noches en Atenas no son millones, "este movimiento iniciado a mediados de mayo en España y cuyas primeras bases sentaron los portugueses en marzo, es ante todo un grito generacional que si nuestras élites políticas y económicas optan por ignorar, cometerían un grave error", escribe Mediapart. Para el diario en Internet, el movimiento se nutre del desastre social de los menores de 30 años en Europa, de esa "generación sacrificada" cuyo índice de paro ha aumentado dos veces más rápido que el de los adultos en los 34 países de la OCDE y más concretamente en los países del sur de Europa. "Esta protesta transnacional (con un poder de movilización muy superior a las manifestaciones europeas organizadas por la Confederación Europea de Sindicatos) no es sólo una respuesta a la crisis. La movilización de los Indignados, por desordenada que sea, es ante todo la expresión de una ira generacional. Ira contra el capitalismo, cuando lleva a los Estados a dar prioridad al rescate de los bancos y no al futuro de sus conciudadanos (los más jóvenes en especial) y que desarma a los políticos, convertidos en títeres sin margen de maniobra y condenados a llevar una única política. 175

Ira contra los sistemas sociales que, en los países del sur de Europa (incluida Francia), protegen demasiado a los 'insiders', los trabajadores o funcionarios con contrato de duración indeterminada, beneficiarios de los regímenes de seguridad social. Y que dejan fuera a los 'outsiders', los no cualificados, los precarios, los más jóvenes, abandonados a su suerte o a la limosna de sus padres, para los que quedan tan sólo "las migajas" del Estado del bienestar, según el sociólogo Louis Chauvel. Ira contra los sistemas políticos temerosos y centrados en sí mismos, herméticos ante la sociedad civil y su movilización. Furia al ver que el personal político se encuentra tan desconectado de la sociedad, que se supone que tiene que representar porque es demasiado viejo, mayoritariamente blanco, mayoritariamente surgido de entornos favorecidos, mayoritariamente masculino. Ira, por último, contra los sindicatos, a los que consideran demasiado conciliadores con el poder y obnubilados por la defensa de los intereses de su clientela, también demasiado mayor, mayoritariamente blanca, mayoritariamente del sector público". http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/696331-una-pequena-leccion-de- democracia-cansada

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Yemen, la finca del clan Saleh La familia del mandatario ha convertido el país árabe en su negocio privado 06/06/2011 Decenas de miles de yemeníes celebran la salida del país del presidente Á. ESPINOSA - Madrid - 06/06/2011 Durante los dos últimos meses el presidente yemení, Ali Abdalá Saleh, aceptó en tres ocasiones un acuerdo que le ofrecía inmunidad a cambio de que dejara el poder, para rechazarlo pocas horas después. Diplomáticos occidentales en Saná atribuyeron esos cambios de opinión a la influencia de su hijo Ahmed y de los tres hijos de su hermano Mohamed: Ammar, Yehya y Tarek. Esos cuatro hombres, que controlan los principales cuerpos armados y de seguridad, son la punta del iceberg del negocio familiar en el que Saleh ha convertido Yemen. El coronel Ahmed Ali Abdalá Saleh es el jefe de la Guardia Republicana, un cuerpo de élite del Ejército, y de las fuerzas especiales. Ammar es el vicerresponsable de la Seguridad Nacional; Yehya encabeza las fuerzas de la Seguridad Central y la unidad antiterrorista, y Tarek es el jefe de la Guardia Presidencial. Desde esos puestos, los cuatro constituyen el principal reto para cualquier acuerdo político. Sin su visto bueno, el peligro de guerra civil deja de ser una amenaza para hacerse realidad. Sin embargo, tal como recueda el politólogo Abdullah al Faqih, "los hijos y sobrinos de Saleh carecen del apoyo social de su padre". No son los únicos miembros de la familia en lugares clave. Cuentan con el apoyo de dos medio hermanos del presidente, los generales de brigada Mohamed Saleh y Ali Saleh, que dirigen la fuerza aérea y el mando general, respectivamente. Además, los generales al mando de las regiones militares de Adén y el Hadramut, Mehdi Makwala y Mohamed A. Mohsen, son miembros de su clan, Al Sahnan. En la plaza de la Universidad, un grupo de activistas contra el nepotismo y la corrupción trabajaban en una lista que vinculaba a cada uno de ellos con distintos intereses económicos. Desde el petróleo hasta el tabaco, pasando por la compañía aérea nacional, todos los grandes negocios yemeníes tienen a algún pariente de Saleh entre sus propietarios o principales accionistas. Ese control casi absoluto de la economía yemení ha exacerbado la rivalidad de los Al Ahmar, quienes tras la muerte del patriarca del clan, Abdalá, en 2007, han visto cómo el espacio para sus propios negocios se iba limitando. Las prebendas alcanzan también a la familia política. Un hermano de su tercera esposa, Abdul Rahman al Akwa, es el gobernador de Saná. El padre de la cuarta, Ahmed Kahlani, es ministro de Estado. Abdelwahad al Hajjiri, hermano de la segunda mujer de Saleh, es embajador en Washington. En esa representación diplomática también están acreditados como "agregados" dos hijos de Saleh, Jaled y Salah, y Kanaan, un hijo de su sobrino Yehya. Sin embargo, el general disidente Ali Mohsen, a quienes algunos identifican como hermanastro de Saleh, no está ligado a él por vínculos de sangre sino de camaradería militar. Á. ESPINOSA Yemen, la finca del clan SalehLa familia del mandatario ha convertido el país árabe en su negocio privado 06/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Yemen/finca/clan/Saleh/elpepiint/2011060 6elpepiint_6/Tes

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LLUÍS BASSETS Llega el verano árabe LLUÍS BASSETS 05/06/2011 Con el verano a la vista, época de grandes calores en África y Oriente Próximo, la primavera árabe no está terminando, sino que entra en una nueva fase. Hay dos transiciones en marcha, en Túnez y en Egipto, con horizonte electoral próximo. Tres países se hallan abiertos en canal en distintos grados: guerra civil en Libia con intervención de la OTAN; deriva guerracivilista en Yemen fomentada por el dictador a punto de ser desalojado; y martirio de la población en Siria, donde persiste la protesta a pesar de la durísima represión de Bachar el Assad. En el pequeño Bahréin de mayoría chiita la revuelta ha quedado ahogada por la invasión saudí en el mejor estilo soviético, y en el resto del mundo árabe han saltado las chispas de las movilizaciones, pero no ha prendido todavía la llama. En esta fase ya se atisba la entrada en la fase resolutiva en alguno de los tres países ahora en primera línea. Es fácil prever que caiga pronto la tercera pieza y regrese la atmósfera de un cambio de época como hemos visto pocos. Hay que entender que va para largo y llegará muy hondo: desde Pekín y desde las capitales africanas se observa todo esto con enorme inquietud. También se atisban algunos rasgos del nuevo mapa geopolítico. El papel del islamismo político será muy destacado en las nuevas democracias en construcción. Habrá que ver cómo lo encajamos desde Europa. Los Hermanos Musulmanes y sus filiales quieren ser el equivalente a la democracia cristiana en Europa y llevan buen camino para conseguirlo. El modelo de partido y de filosofía política viene de Turquía. También, aunque no solo, influencia y financiación. La medida de todos los progresos la darán las libertades individuales, sobre todo la religiosa y de conciencia. El voto y el pluralismo políticos no bastan. Hay otro polo que se está reforzando, alrededor de Arabia Saudí y de las monarquías del golfo Pérsico, una Santa Alianza islámica para preservar los regímenes hereditarios y los patrimonios de las amplias familias en el poder. Jordania y Marruecos han sido invitados a participar en este frente contrarrevolucionario. Su programa es lampedusiano: cambiarlo todo para que nada cambie. Irán acecha al otro lado del Golfo, con su proyecto nuclear y sus tentáculos en Gaza, Líbano, Irak y Siria. La crisis de este último país es también determinante para la guerra fría entre los saudíes y los ayatolás. Israel, en cambio, está encapsulada en su búnker, sin más oferta que resistirse al cambio. Todo lo que ha hecho Netanyahu ha sido reforzar el blindaje, buscando apoyos exteriores a su inmovilismo y cultivando en el interior la imagen idílica de un país irreal. Su capacidad de diálogo y de transacción en la zona es exactamente cero. Todo funcionaba mejor bajo el cerco de las dictaduras. El estío es tiempo de cosecha y fruta madura, que cae por su propio peso. Lluís Bassets Llega El Verano Árabe 05/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Llega/verano/arabe/elpepusocdgm/20110605elp dmgpan_7/Tes

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REPORTAJE: Economía global La primavera egipcia se congela La economía entra en caída libre con el freno del turismo y del tráfico por Suez El FMI calcula que el PIB crecerá este año apenas un 1%, tras el 5,1% en 2010 Los más optimistas recuerdan que el déficit llegó al 20% en los años ochenta

NURIA TESÓN 05/06/2011 El borboteo de la shisha y el humo ascienden al calor de la tarde en los cafés que, bajo distinguidas palmeras, jalonan el edificio de la Bolsa en el centro de El Cairo. La laxitud de los días posrrevolucionarios contrasta con la deriva frenética, en caída libre, que la economía ha emprendido desde que empezó la revuelta en Egipto, el pasado 25 de enero. 7.650 millones de euros de pérdidas, sin contar las que ocasionó el cierre de la Bolsa, en la industria, el turismo, la construcción y el canal de Suez, cuyos ingresos suponen una mayor fuente de divisas para el país, según un informe del Instituto de Planificación Nacional. La directora del instituto, Fadiya Abdel Salam, señala además que las reservas en moneda extranjera cayeron hasta 19.432 millones de euros en abril, frente a los 24.290 millones del mismo periodo de 2010, las cifras más bajas en cuatro años.

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Ante semejante sangría, la ayuda era imprescindible. El Banco Mundial ha ofrecido 3.123 millones de euros a desembolsar en los próximos dos años; el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) ha comprometido esta misma semana otros 2.082 millones, y los líderes del G-8, reunidos el último fin de semana de mayo en Deauville (Francia), aprobaron un paquete de ayudas por 13.880 millones para ayudar a las democracias árabes -Egipto y Túnez acudieron como invitados a la reunión-. Asimismo, el presidente de EE UU, Barack Obama, ha propuesto 2.080 millones en distintos tipos de ayuda para el que es su principal socio estratégico en la región y la cancelación de 694 millones en deuda, aproximadamente un tercio de lo que Egipto le debe. No faltan razones para tanta alarma. La industria ha perdido entre 1.800 y 3.636 millones de euros desde el inicio del proceso revolucionario, debido al cierre de fábricas, y la tasa de crecimiento este año será, "como mucho, de un 2%", según los datos aportados por Mahmoud Naser, responsable financiero del Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas -que gobierna el país desde que Hosni Mubarak dejara el poder el pasado febrero-. El FMI ha recortado su previsión al 1% [ver gráfico adjunto], frente al 5,5% anterior. El déficit supera los 118.000 millones, mientras que la deuda externa ya representa el 90% del PIB. Estas cifras han hecho que la junta militar haya advertido de que la economía egipcia "está al borde del colapso". Hace poco más de una semana, ese Consejo señalaba que el flujo de inversiones extranjeras directas en Egipto ha descendido a cero y que el nivel de calificación crediticia del país está en riesgo. También ponía de relieve que los ingresos provenientes del sector turístico han descendido un 80% y que el país pierde alrededor de unos 28 millones de euros diarios por el estancamiento de dicha actividad tras la revolución. Y lo cierto es que no se ven muchos extranjeros estos días por la ciudad. El Museo de Antigüedades, un hervidero de cuerpos en tirantes y sandalias con calcetines, ya no es la torre de Babel que acostumbraba, y por sus pasillos se arrastran estos días grupos escolares y egipcios, más sorprendidos ante la visión de un guiri intrépido parado ante Tutankamón que ante la propia máscara de oro del faraón niño. El turismo languidece. Ha ido cuesta abajo, hasta un 46% en el primer cuatrimestre del año. Y los recientes ataques de extremistas islámicos contra cristianos no han ayudado a los osados que empezaban a hacer reservas para el verano (estas han caído un 15%). La industria sigue afectada por los recientes acontecimientos en Egipto y el descenso en el número de turistas es ya de 1,9 millones, según la Agencia Central de Movilización Pública y Estadísticas (CAPMAS). Sin embargo, a pesar de los negros datos económicos, hay quien considera que se está exagerando la situación creando una alarma que aleja a los inversores extranjeros. "Es cierto que los ingresos del Gobierno se han visto duramente afectados por la desaceleración económica, que ha dado lugar a un aumento del déficit público", explicaba Amr Adly en un artículo publicado en el diario egipcio Al Masry Al Youm. "El déficit de este año se espera que ronde el 11% del PIB, en comparación con el 9% de 2010, lo que no supone un aumento dramático teniendo en cuenta que el déficit llegó a casi al 20% del PIB total durante la crisis de la deuda externa de la década de 1980", defiende Adly. En su opinión, esto se aplica también a la tasa de inflación, que ahora se sitúa en un 12%, una cifra que no difiere significativamente del incremento medio de precios desde 2006, debido a la subida de los precios internacionales de alimentos y combustible.

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La deuda pública ha sido un problema estructural heredado en su totalidad del largo reinado de Mubarak y no es una consecuencia de la evolución reciente. Lo mismo que el índice de pobreza, que ahora fija la Junta Militar en el 70% del total de la población. No es que antes fuera inferior -organizaciones no gubernamentales la situaban en una cifra no inferior al 60%-, sino que el Gobierno tan solo admitía un exiguo (e irreal) 19%. Además, las políticas de privatización de fábricas y empresas estatales iniciadas por el régimen de Mubarak en los años noventa (con el asesoramiento de EE UU, el FMI y el Banco Mundial), vendiendo a precios muy inferiores a los reales; o la venta de gas a Israel un 70% por debajo de su valor de mercado a cambio de sustanciosas comisiones -que ahora lleva al rais egipcio, a sus hijos, así como a varios ministros, a afrontar juicios por enriquecimiento ilícito- hacen pensar que las inversiones extranjeras dejaron bastante menos de lo que obtuvieron del corrupto régimen. Para Ratna Sahay, directora adjunta del FMI para Oriente Próximo y Asia Central, "en el corto plazo, la situación económica es difícil. Las remesas se reducirán y el desempleo aumentará a medida que los trabajadores egipcios regresen de Libia. Además, el aumento de precios de los alimentos y el combustible, que es un fenómeno global y sin relación con la revolución en Egipto, pero que se suma a los problemas nacionales, será un desafío". Dicho esto, en su opinión, "Egipto tiene muchas ventajas como una población joven y dinámica, un mercado grande, una posición geográfica privilegiada y el acceso a los mercados clave", por lo que augura un futuro esperanzador. Tal vez ayudaría que los Mubarak devolvieran sus activos, congelados por la Fiscalía egipcia fuera del país, de los que solo en Suiza se calculan 320 millones de euros. - http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/global/primavera/egipcia/congela/elpepuecon eg/20110605elpnegeco_1/Tes

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REPORTAJE: SIRIA POR DENTRO Demasiada sangre en Damasco Los sirios han alzado sus voces contra el régimen, uno de los más opresivos de Oriente Próximo. El régimen ha impuesto el bloqueo informativo y tratado de acallar con sangre los disturbios. La periodista Åsne Seierstad ha logrado entrar en Siria y narra cómo es la represión por dentro. La vigilancia, el espionaje, las torturas, las muertes. • La vigilancia domina todos los aspectos de la vida en Siria. La policía secreta tiene una red de agentes que cubre el país • Abid ha arriesgado todo por la 'primavera siria': "O ahora o nunca. El tren de la libertad está a punto de partir" • Tardaron una semana en dejar libres a los menores. Habían sufrido un trato terrible. Les despellejaron los nudillos • "Las muertes han cambiado a la gente. Demasiada sangre. No podemos permitir que continúen", dice Alia • Los francotiradores tiran a matar. Son los justos para atemorizar. Hay órdenes de que no haya más de 20 al día • Las chicas están rodeadas. Decenas de hombres vestidos de civil surgen de no se sabe dónde y les gritan: "¡putas!, ¡brujas!" http://www.elpais.com/fotografia/reportajes/Manifestante/herido/bala/durante/ma rcha/protesta/elpdiasoc/20110605elpdmgrep_1/Ies/ ÅSNE SEIERSTAD 05/06/2011 Camina descalzo por las calles. El aire tiene el frescor de la noche, el cielo está en su momento más oscuro. Estira las piernas e inhala el olor de la primavera. Circulan algunos coches que iluminan la acera al pasar. Las suelas de sus pies hinchados están cubiertas de arena y grava. Tiene intensos dolores en el estómago. Le molesta el cuello. "Esto no era más que unas vacaciones", le dijeron. "La próxima vez irá en serio". Llega a una puerta de metal en Yarmouk, a las afueras de Damasco, y llama al timbre. En el ventanuco aparece un rostro confundido, que exclama: "¡Te han cortado el pelo!". Abid entra en el apartamento de un empujón. Los que estaban durmiendo llegan arrastrando los pies. Las risas no parecen tener fin. Abid ha salido de la cárcel. El estudiante de ingeniería es uno de los miles de detenidos y encarcelados desde que comenzó la revuelta en Siria, en marzo pasado. Han arrestado a gente en escuelas y mezquitas, calles y plazas públicas. Las autoridades llegan enseguida a los lugares de manifestación. Unos hombres vestidos de civil, a los que llaman "los fantasmas", lo observan todo. La vigilancia domina todos los aspectos de la vida en Siria. La policía secreta -la Mujabarat- se divide en un complejo sistema de departamentos y subdepartamentos que permite que ningún sector de la sociedad quede sin examinar. Una red de agentes cubre el país. Algunos son funcionarios, otros trabajan contratados. ¿Qué mejor observador que el verdulero de al lado de la mezquita o el vigilante de noche en el hospital? ¿Quién mejor para seguir los pasos a una familia que el maestro de escuela que pregunta al niño qué dice su papá del hombre de los carteles? El hombre de los carteles tiene unos ojos pálidos, juntos, va arreglado y posee un cuello curiosamente largo. En una versión, lleva gafas de sol y uniforme. En otras, parece un banquero.

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Oftalmólogo de formación, regresó a la muerte de su padre para sustituirle como dictador de Siria. Se llama Bachar el Asad. El objetivo de la incipiente revolución es derrocarlo. Un viernes, Abid se armó de valor y se unió a una manifestación después de rezar. Apenas se dio cuenta de que estaban rodeados cuando sintió un agudo dolor en el cuello. Las descargas eléctricas recorrieron su cuerpo. Cayó inconsciente. Al despertarse, vio a otras personas tendidas a su alrededor. Habían aparecido de la nada los mujabarats, unos agentes vestidos de civil. Le arrastraron, junto con un centenar más, a unas camionetas blancas que aguardaban. Se llevaron a los manifestantes a las afueras de Damasco. "Nos sentaron en filas en un riad, un patio, rodeado de altos muros. Teníamos las manos atadas a la espalda y nos obligaron a ponernos de rodillas. Yo contaba las llamadas a la oración para conservar la noción del tiempo. Se nos durmieron las piernas. Cuando nos dijeron que nos pusiéramos de pie, después de la última llamada de la mezquita, no pudimos hacerlo. Yo me caí, me golpearon, me obligaron a levantarme y volví a caerme. Por la noche nos metieron en una celda. Estábamos de pie, 12 hombres en unos pocos metros cuadrados. A la mañana siguiente, volvieron a sacarnos al riad. Al cabo de tres días estábamos a punto, como deseaban, y empezaron los interrogatorios". A algunos los torturaban durante horas y volvían ensangrentados. Quien más sufrió fue un aluí, un hombre perteneciente a la misma minoría chií que los Asad, porque le consideraban un traidor. Abid tuvo más suerte. "Soy miembro del partido Baaz. Las palizas que recibí no fueron tan terribles". Abid entró en el partido cuando era niño en Daraa, la ciudad en la que comenzó la revuelta. A veces es necesario ser miembro para entrar en la Universidad, conseguir trabajo o ascender en las estructuras de poder. Pero Abid está harto. Le queda un solo curso de sus estudios de ingeniería, pero lo ha arriesgado todo para participar en la "primavera siria". "O lo hacemos ahora o no lo haremos nunca. El tren de la libertad está a punto de partir. Podemos subirnos a él o dejar que pase de largo". Se oye una voz desde el otro extremo del sofá: "¿Oís lo que dice? ¡Dos semanas en la cárcel y ya es Mandela!". El propósito de las autoridades es evidente: cortar las protestas de raíz. No hacer como en El Cairo, donde esperaron hasta ver las plazas abarrotadas. Mientras que las concentraciones en Túnez y Egipto crecieron rápidamente hasta agrupar a miles de personas, las autoridades sirias golpean sin piedad a grupos de 20, 50 o 100. "Sacar aquí a mil personas a la calle es como sacar a un millón en El Cairo", dice el anfitrión de Abid. Su salón es aproximadamente el doble de la celda de Abid. También aquí el aire es escaso. Todo el mundo fuma y enciende el cigarrillo con la colilla del anterior. Es medianoche. Fuera, los niños siguen en la calle. Algunos corretean por su cuenta, y hacen ruido al pisar la basura. Otros están medio dormidos en brazos de sus padres, de camino a la cama. Un par de tiendas siguen abiertas. También sigue abierto un kebab. La vida sigue. La vida política en Siria gira en torno a Bachar el Asad. Los verdaderamente poderosos son él y su hermano menor, Maher, comandante en jefe de la guardia presidencial, una fuerza de élite en manos de los alauíes, que es el único cuerpo autorizado dentro de la capital. Su padre, Hafez el Asad, el piloto del Ejército que se hizo con el poder en 1970, fue un político astuto. Pese a pertenecer a la minoría alauí, que no constituye más que el 12% de la población, construyó una amplia base de poder. Su hijo no ha sabido conservar esa base, y su poder se reduce a un pequeño clan alauí. 183

Vuelve a caer la noche. Alia tararea mientras se concentra en su mano y su caligrafía. Cuando se acerque el peligro, cántale. Varias jóvenes se reúnen alrededor de una mesa en un dormitorio de un edificio de apartamentos. Hay unas tijeras, hojas de papel negro, lápices y una caja de tizas. Alia traza una silueta con lápiz y la rellena con tiza. Las persianas de lamas están echadas. Toda seguridad es poca, incluso en un séptimo piso sin casas enfrente. Las palabras van cobrando forma bajo las uñas pintadas de morado de Alia. "Basta de matar". En otro cartel, escrito de derecha a izquierda: "Basta de violencia". Se suscita una discusión sobre el espacio entre palabras en el tercer cartel. No están acostumbradas a las tijeras, pero su mensaje está claro. "Basta de acosar a los niños en Daraa". Daraa, una ciudad somnolienta en el desierto, en la frontera con Jordania, fue el lugar en el que todo comenzó. Una tarde de marzo, unos muchachos escribieron pintadas contra el Gobierno en un muro. Las fuerzas de seguridad los detuvieron y los llevaron a la comisaría local. Y luego, el silencio. Sus padres los buscaron, preguntaron a todo el mundo. Nadie sabía nada. Acudieron a las autoridades, que les despacharon con cajas destempladas. El jeque local fue con los padres al despacho del jefe de seguridad de la ciudad. "Devolvednos a nuestros hijos", dijo el líder religioso. Se quitó el cordón del pañuelo de la cabeza -el ogal- y lo puso en la mesa, un gesto simbólico para indicar la importancia de la petición. Si pides algo, debes estar dispuesto a dar algo a cambio, dice el Corán. "Olvidaos de vuestros hijos. Conseguid otros", dijo, al parecer, el jefe de seguridad. El jeque le pidió que tuviera compasión, por Dios. "Si no podéis hacer más hijos, mandad a vuestras mujeres y nosotros nos encargaremos", dicen que exclamó el jefe de seguridad. Los niños desaparecidos. Los insultos increíbles. Se fue juntando gente alrededor del edificio. Les decían que se fueran, pero ellos volvían. Tardaron una semana en dejar en libertad a los menores. Habían sufrido un trato terrible. Les habían despellejado los nudillos. Parece que a algunos les arrancaron las uñas. Se distribuyeron vídeos de los chicos a través de YouTube. Las protestas se extendieron a otras ciudades. Damasco fue un islote de calma hasta finales de marzo, cuando empezaron a producirse manifestaciones espontáneas también allí. No había coordinación ni una dirección clara. La hora y el lugar de las concentraciones se transmitían a través del boca a boca, entre amigos. Y con la esperanza de que fueran verdaderos amigos. Las chicas de la séptima planta están preparando la primera manifestación solo de mujeres en el centro de Damasco. El lunes siguiente se reunirán en una de las mejores calles, en el barrio comercial de la capital. Permanecerán en las tiendas hasta las tres, y entonces se reunirán y desplegarán sus pancartas. Correrán cuando llegue la policía. Y se desvanecerán como sombras, si todo sale según lo previsto, por las callejuelas. Los terroristas, las bandas armadas, Al Qaeda e Israel están detrás de todo, según los medios de comunicación sirios. Algunos han confesado en la televisión estatal. "Mi misión era hacer vídeos llenos de mentiras", dijo uno. "El dinero venía de Arabia Saudí", dijo otro. "La gente sale a manifestarse obligada", dijo un tercero. Las chicas menean la cabeza al oír todo eso. "No quiero más que tener una buena vida", dice Alia. Trabaja en una productora especializada en telenovelas para el mercado palestino, y tiene mucho que perder. Su trabajo. Un novio. Las fiestas en la azotea. 184

"Una se siente muy pequeña bajo este régimen", dice en un francés vacilante. "Todo se decide en el Gobierno. Hasta ahora, he pedido a mis amigos que se mantuvieran al margen de las protestas. Les dije que esperásemos un poco. Pero las muertes han cambiado a la gente. Demasiada sangre. No podemos permitir que continúen". Elias, el único varón presente en el apartamento, tiene remordimientos. "Estoy muerto de miedo", dice. "Nunca he participado en ninguna manifestación. No soy un hombre valiente". Elias y Alia pertenecen a minorías religiosas. Elias es cristiano y Alia es drusa. "Tengo miedo del futuro", dice Elias. "El régimen tiene una buena política respecto a las minorías, mantiene el equilibrio en el país. Me da miedo el islam, que Siria se convierta en un nuevo Irak". Ese miedo es algo que el régimen aprovecha para sus propios fines. Intenta convencer a los dirigentes cristianos, que representan a la décima parte de la población, de que los islamistas radicales pueden adueñarse del poder. Al otro lado de la frontera, en Irak, la mitad de la población cristiana ha huido de las persecuciones. La tiza en la pancarta se emborrona, no se entiende bien lo que está escrito. Escritura blanca - inocencia- sobre un fondo negro, que es el poder. Era una buena idea. Alia sopla el polvillo y añade más tiza. Una de las chicas encuentra la solución. "¡Laca! ¡Podemos arreglarlo con laca!". El aerosol esparce su contenido por toda la habitación. La laca nunca ha olido tanto a revolución. "No aplico mi espada cuando el látigo es suficiente, ni el látigo cuando basta mi lengua", dice el primer califa de la dinastía Omeya en Damasco. Mu'awiyya era un maestro de la hilm -gracia y tolerancia- y no empleaba la fuerza más que cuando era absolutamente necesario. Cuando se proclamó califa en 661 frente a la oposición de Alí, yerno de Mahoma, la división del islam entre suníes y chiíes se hizo realidad. Este viernes, la mezquita de los Omeyas es el escenario de un drama contemporáneo. Es el único lugar en el que es legal reunirse, y está estrictamente vigilado por las fuerzas de seguridad. Toman nota de cada palabra que sale de la boca del imán. El bazar está vacío. Los puestos están cerrados. Las persianas de hierro están bajadas para proteger frascos y cestas. El aroma del cardamomo sobrevuela el mercado de especias. El artesano del cuero deja a su paso un débil tufillo a piel, y el fabricante de jabones, a lavanda. Los turistas se han ido, solo quedan los habitantes locales, niños en bicicleta, abuelos sentados en sus sillas. Unas unidades de la policía en motocicleta han cerrado varias calles. Algunos planean manifestarse después de la oración. El silencio es opresivo. La zona está llena de agentes de la Mujabarat. Todos saben quiénes son, aunque actúen como gente corriente. Se ponen en cuclillas en los bordillos de las aceras, se apoyan en las paredes, se sientan juntos en bancos junto a los portales. Van vestidos con pantalón de traje, como otros hombres, con camisa. Quizá son más anchos de espaldas que el sirio medio y, desde luego, tienen más propensión a llevar chaquetas de cuero. Pero no es la ropa lo que les distingue. Es su mirada. Tienen una forma de mirar que es inquisitiva, pero no curiosa. Miran en una sola dirección, con la intención de absorber lo que ven, no de entrar en contacto con nadie. Su conversación o, mejor dicho, su falta de conversación es otra pista inequívoca. Casi toda la gente charla por lo menos un poco. Estos hombres apenas hablan y, cuando lo hacen, es sin que su rostro exprese nada, sin un codazo, sin una palmada en el hombro. No hablan como hablan las personas. Están de servicio. Cuando las oraciones están a punto de terminar, se levanta un frío viento. El cielo sobre la mezquita se oscurece, se abre, y empieza a caer la lluvia. El agua cae sobre unos toldos endebles que ceden bajo su peso. Un hombre intenta evitar que entre agua en su casa con una escoba. De pronto, unas perlas blancas y heladas golpean los tejados y las lonas, hacen que las flores de jazmín se caigan de los árboles, salpican al caer sobre los adoquines y llenan los charcos. 185

"Dios es grande", dice un hombre que observa la granizada desde su puerta. "Nunca he visto esto en Damasco. Es Dios que nos protege. Los hombres permanecerán quietos. Así hoy no les matarán", suspira. Es como si la calle desierta, las tiendas cerradas y todo lo que empapa la tormenta diera valor a este hombre. Habla de su hermano, que el viernes pasado eludió por poco a un francotirador del Gobierno. "Le pasó por aquí", dice Tarek, señalándose la parte lateral del cuello. La bala le rozó y le quitó un poco de piel durante una manifestación en la zona de Zamelka. Murieron varias personas. Los francotiradores tiran a matar. No son muchos, los justos para atemorizar. Hay órdenes de que no haya más de 20 al día, pero muchos viernes las cifras han sido más altas. Igual que otros sirios, habla del Miedo. "Nos lo inyectan al nacer", dice en voz baja, mientras gesticula como si estuviera pinchándose con una aguja imaginaria. "Nos hace inclinar la cabeza, mirar hacia otro lado, desconfiar de los otros. Todo el mundo puede denunciar a cualquiera. Si contestas de mala manera a un policía o a él no le gusta tu cara, puedes desaparecer durante años. ¿Sabe cuándo he tenido más miedo? Cada vez que veía a los Asad en televisión. Ordenaba a mis hijos que se sentaran a escuchar con respeto. Había que tener cuidado con los niños. Pero todo cambió en marzo. Les conté lo que estaba sucediendo en nuestro país. El mayor fue conmigo a la manifestación de la semana pasada. En cambio, mi hija de cinco años lloró cuando dije que Bachar tenía que irse. "Quiero a Bachar", gritó, como le han enseñado. "No, tienes que odiarle", expliqué. "Pero yo le quiero", sollozó. Tarek indica el retrato en la pared y el cartel sobre la puerta. "Vinieron con él hace 10 días. Colgadlo", ordené. "Me dio miedo no hacerlo. Vivo de esto, al fin y al cabo. Otros también han puesto los carteles. No es extraño que mi hija esté confundida". En el barrio más comercial de Damasco, la atmósfera es sombría. Los maniquíes escasamente vestidos de los elegantes escaparates contemplan a los transeúntes con aire arrogante. Los cajeros también observan, lánguidos y con expresión resignada. Aquí no hay imágenes del presidente. Tal vez el régimen no quiere pegar carteles en los escaparates recién lavados de la clase alta. Cuanto más pobre es el barrio, más carteles se ven. Shirin se pasea por su tienda de moda, vestida con un vaquero ajustado y [calzando] unas UGG planas de ante. Tenía previstas unas rebajas de primavera, pero se produjo el baño de sangre en Daraa. "Anunciarme mientras estaban matando a la gente no me pareció bien", dice. Esta empresaria de éxito simpatiza poco con los manifestantes -"unos jóvenes rebeldes que se dedican a armar jaleo"- y apoya a Bachar el Asad. "Tenemos una política exterior excelente. Somos independientes y producimos todo lo que necesitamos, salvo algunas piezas de recambio de aviones. Las sanciones nos han enseñado a depender de nosotros mismos. No necesitamos una intervención extranjera, como en Libia. ¿Y qué tiene de malo Gadafi? Siempre me pareció que tenía mucho sentido lo que decía". Sin embargo, es madre de tres hijos, y le preocupan las detenciones de jóvenes en Daraa. "El presidente debería haber ordenado colgar al jefe de seguridad local", opina. "El trato que dio a los padres fue una declaración de guerra". "Allí son beduinos, divididos en clanes. Me preocupa que los extremistas exploten la situación y agiten a la gente". Suspira. "Quiero mucho a mi país. Es donde quiero vivir. Vivir ahora". En un café del centro, Mouna toma un sorbo de su cerveza Barada. Posee los ojos ardientes de una activista insomne, que pasa cada noche en un lugar distinto. La Mujabarat podría haberla detenido solo por los ojos. 186

Todo comenzó con su padre, un hombre de izquierdas, que escapó por los pelos a las depuraciones de los años setenta. Mouna recuerda la piel blanca de sus camaradas que habían sobrevivido a las cárceles de Hafez el Asad. Después de las manifestaciones de Egipto, Mouna fue a casa de sus padres. "Mi padre y yo nos sentamos con nuestro té de menta y hablamos durante horas. Me dijo: '¡Llegará aquí! Está extendiéndose. Ha llegado tu turno". Mouna respira hondo y mira alrededor. "Utilicé Internet, el correo electrónico, Facebook, como los egipcios. Pronto empecé a recibir amenazas. 'Vamos a por ti', dicen. Cuando les pregunto quiénes son, contestan: 'Ya sabes quiénes somos". La siguiente pregunta le irrita. "Hemos crecido pensando que no había nada que hacer con esta sociedad y usted me pregunta a quién queremos como nuevo líder. Todavía no se ha materializado ningún candidato entre marzo y abril. Lo que quiero es participar en la sociedad", dice en tono firme. Desenchufa el teléfono móvil del cargador cuando empieza a sonar una llamada. Es un teléfono muy viejo y necesita cargarse tres veces al día. Su cuerpo menudo empieza a temblar. Sostiene el teléfono con una mano y se agarra el cabello con la otra. "¿Cuándo? ¿Dónde?". Lanza la mirada al aire. "Tengo que irme", dice. "Han detenido a mi amigo. La policía secreta ha ido a su casa". Al día siguiente, hay más chicas de lo habitual en una calle comercial de Damasco. Caminan de dos en dos. Para quienes están al tanto, descubrir quién está ahí con una misión no es difícil. Miran a su alrededor, nerviosas. Hacen movimientos bruscos de cabeza. Llevan zapatos planos. Igual que los hombres junto a la mezquita, hablan sin ninguna expresión facial. Una pareja aquí, otra allí. Tres. Cuatro. Un pequeño grupo. Uno más grande. De pronto, abren los bolsos y sacan las pancartas. Algunas están escritas sobre tela, otras sobre papel. Cada mujer tiene su eslogan. Basta de muertes. Basta de violencia. Empiezan a andar en silencio hacia la plaza con la enorme estatua de bronce de Hafez el Asad. Ningún espectador dice una sola palabra. Todos prestan atención, incrédulos. Las chicas cruzan la glorieta para llegar a la estatua. Pasa un minuto. Dos. Quizá tres. Están rodeadas. Unas camionetas blancas y decenas de hombres vestidos de civil surgen de no se sabe dónde. Les arrancan las pancartas de las manos. Las arrojan al suelo. "¡Putas!", gritan los hombres. "¡Brujas!". Algunas yacen en tierra. Una se niega a que le quiten el cartel y grita de dolor cuando le rompen el dedo. Pero la mayoría ha huido. Han desaparecido por el otro lado de la plaza, hacia las bocacalles. Cada una por su cuenta. Como habían planeado. Todo se termina en cuestión de minutos. Un furgón blanco se aleja con cuatro chicas dentro. Los demás vehículos abandonan el lugar. La plaza está como si no hubiera pasado nada. Pero ha pasado algo. Algo ha comenzado. - En Damasco las palomas vuelan tras la valla de seda de dos ... en dos ... Mahmoud Darwish Corresponsal de guerra 187

Asne Seierstad, nacida en 1970 en Oslo, ha cubierto como corresponsal de guerra los conflictos de Kosovo, Chechenia Afganistán e Irak. Fruto de su experiencia afgana es El librero de Kabul (2002), con más de dos millones de ejemplares vendidos. Más recientemente ha publicado El ángel de Grözni. Ambos libros editados por Maeva. ÅSNE SEIERSTAD Demasiada sangre en Damasco 05/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/Demasiada/sangre/Damasco/elpepusocdmg/2 0110605elpdmgrep_1/Tes

REPORTAJE: ESCÁNDALO EN TURQUÍA Sexo, vídeos y chantajes políticos Las grabaciones sexuales de candidatos turcos pueden influir en los resultados de las elecciones BLANCA LÓPEZ ARANGÜENA 05/06/2011 Un nombre de mujer, Emine, podría convertirse en la mejor aliada del primer ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, en su intento de renovar, por tercera vez, su mandato en las elecciones generales turcas del próximo domingo. Las imágenes de Emine, joven, estudiante y turca, manteniendo relaciones sexuales con el vicepresidente del Partido Nacionalista (MHP), Bülent Didinmez, casado y con tres hijos, ha puesto en aprietos al segundo partido de la oposición en su carrera al Parlamento. Pero Emine no es la única. También están Kamelya, Selvi, Betül y Niva. Todo comenzó a principios de mayo, cuando un grupo chantajista autodenominado Idealismo Diferente anunció que poseía material comprometedor de los políticos del MHP y que lo haría público si el líder de la formación, Devlet Bahçeli, no dimitía. No lo hizo, y uno a uno, los vídeos fueron apareciendo en la red. Vicepresidentes, un consejero del comité ejecutivo, secretarios del partido, en compañía de varias jóvenes, algunas menores de edad y otras identificadas como prostitutas, fumando y bromeando sobre los privilegios de su cargo o lo envidiable del trabajo de una meretriz. Y así, uno a uno, los altos cargos fueron cayendo. Hasta 10 a finales del mes. La dimisión de la casi totalidad de la cúpula de un partido político es un hecho sin precedentes en la historia de la democracia turca. Sin embargo, el uso de vídeos sexuales para chantajear a políticos se está convirtiendo en todo un clásico. La primera vez ocurrió hace un año, cuando Deniz Baykal, el entonces líder de la segunda fuerza política de Turquía, el Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP), se vio obligado a dimitir por unas imágenes en las que mantenía relaciones sexuales con una diputada de su propia formación. Su caída supuso la llegada del actual líder de los socialdemócratas, Kemal Kiliçdaroglu. Unos meses más tarde le llegó el turno a Akif Hamzaçebi, otro cargo del mismo partido CHP. Hasta la fecha, el gobernante Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP), es la única gran formación política a la que el escándalo no le ha salpicado. Además, como se encargó de señalar Bahçeli tras las primeras imágenes, es el gran beneficiado de todo esto. Los turcos son muy dados a las teorías conspirativas, tengan o no fundamento, pero lo que a nadie se le escapa son las repercusiones que puede tener el escándalo para los resultados del próximo día 12. Según los analistas, la polémica podría hacer que el MHP no consiga el 10% de los votos necesarios para entrar en el Parlamento. Algo muy posible, ya que contaba con una intención de voto del 13% antes de desatarse el 188

escándalo, según un sondeo realizado por la agencia IKSara. Este mismo sondeo daba AKP el 45,5 % de los sufragios y al principal partido de la oposición, el socialdemócrata CHP, el 30,5 % La salida de los nacionalistas del Parlamento podría dar a los islamistas moderados del AKP el control de los dos tercios de la Cámara. Una mayoría suficiente para reformar la Constitución y, como se rumorea, llevar a cabo una reforma que implante un régimen presidencialista. "Quien se beneficia de un crimen da una buena idea de su autoría", escribió el analista Yusuf Kanli en su columna del diario Hurriyet. Para Osman Gür, uno de los líderes municipales del MHP en Estambul, la cosa está clara: "Quien quiera que fuera tenía un amplio conocimiento de la agenda política y quería impedir que el MHP llegara al Parlamento", asevera. Estas teorías, que habrían sido rechazadas de plano hace unos meses, cobran hoy fuerza ya que, como asegura la Fundación Europea por la Democracia, "hay una erosión de la confianza en la retórica democrática del AKP", tanto dentro como fuera de Turquía. Los escándalos de las escuchas ilegales, las recientes detenciones de periodistas y la censura en Internet hacen que para los detractores del primer ministro sea fácil dirigir el dedo acusador hacia el Gobierno. Aún así, como explica de forma anónima un diplomático, "buscar la verdad llenando los huecos, como se hace muchas veces en este país, no es la manera más adecuada de encontrar a los responsables". Por su parte, el primer ministro turco ha negado su implicación en la trama. "El MHP intentar echar la culpa al Gobierno de sus problemas internos. Lo que el país necesita es una política limpia y una investigación policial y judicial del asunto", advierte. Muchos se preguntan si es lícito hacer política con la vida privada de un diputado. Según Osman Gür, "se trata de un asunto personal que debería permanecer al margen del debate público". Sin embargo, no todo el mundo piensa igual. Algunos, como Erdogan, consideran que no se ha vulnerado la intimidad de los diputados porque "intimidad es cuando uno está con su esposa". Tanto nacionalistas como los islamistas moderados abogan por una ética basada en los valores tradicionales y la religión, lo que les han transformado en aliados en varias ocasiones. Los votantes nacionalistas del MHP, que son también conservadores y religiosos, podrían decantarse por el AKP el próximo domingo. El presidente de Turquía, Abdulá Gül, dijo esta semana: "Lo que ocurre hoy de esta forma puede repetirse mañana de otra. Hoy es contra una persona, pero puede volverse contra otra mañana. Debemos evitar que esto se instale [en el sistema político], unirnos, decir no e ir tras los autores". Pero el sistema político turco lleva cuatro décadas siendo víctima de conspiraciones y combates sucios: tres golpes de Estado con miles de muertos, asesinatos no resueltos de líderes de opinión, apasionados intentos del poder judicial para ilegalizar al AKP. En este contexto, los videos podrían llegar a ser vistos como una mejoría ya que no hay derramamiento de sangre, pero ponen en evidencia qué fácil es cambiar el curso de la política turca. Tal vez, las palabras del presidente llegan demasiado tarde. BLANCA LÓPEZ ARANGÜENA Sexo, vídeos y chantajes políticos05/06/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/Sexo/videos/chantajes/politicos/elpepusocdmg/20110605elpdm grep_2/Tes 189

Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe Los helicópteros de la OTAN entran en acción en Libia AGENCIAS - Trípoli - 05/06/2011 Lo reclamaban los dirigentes libios alzados contra el régimen de Muamar el Gadafi desde hace semanas y ayer recibieron satisfacción. El Reino Unido y Francia utilizaron por primera vez unos aparatos imprescindibles para atacar determinados objetivos y a las fuerzas terrestres del coronel que gobierna Libia desde 1969. Es, después del anuncio esta semana de que la misión de la OTAN se amplía tres meses más, una nueva medida de presión militar contra el tirano libio. Los helicópteros Gazelle franceses y Apache británicos, -confirmados por el ministro de Defensa del Reino Unido, Liam Fox- atacaron en la ciudad de Brega, una terminal petrolífera crucial que se ha convertido en la línea del frente entre las brigadas de Gadafi y las milicias rebeldes a las puertas de la región oriental de Cirenaica. Con la entrada en acción de los helicópteros, será posible disparar contra objetivos en zonas urbanas minimizando el riesgo de provocar bajas inocentes, como ya ha sucedido varias veces. Pero también supone un riesgo para los pilotos británicos y franceses porque esos aparatos son más vulnerables que los inalcanzables cazabombarderos. Mustafá Abdelyalil, jefe del Consejo Nacional Transitorio, el Gobierno de los rebeldes en Bengasi, dio la bienvenida a esta medida "que puede acelerar la salida de Gadafi y su régimen". Con los frentes estancados en el este y oeste del país -ayer continuaban combates en Misrata y Nalut- en una guerra que ya se prolonga más de tres meses, los reveses que está padeciendo el régimen se acumulan también en el campo diplomático. No es sorpresa que el ministro de Exteriores del Reino Unido, William Hague, visitara ayer Bengasi, pero más llamativo es que diplomáticos del Gobierno chino se reunieran por primera vez con representantes del Consejo Nacional. Un comunicado del Ministerio de Exteriores de Pekín confirmó ayer el primer contacto con los rebeldes en Catar: el embajador en Doha se reunió con Abdelyalil. No se ofrecieron detalles de la conversación, pero China tiene importantes intereses económicos en Libia y la reunión apunta a que Pekín -reacio a la intervención militar de la OTAN contra el régimen de Muamar el Gadafi- desea mantener los contactos con los rebeldes. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/helicopteros/OTAN/entran/accion/Libia/el pepiint/20110605elpepiint_7/Tes

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La violencia se intensifica en Yemen mientras Saleh busca tratamiento médico en Arabia Saudí El presidente cede interinamente el poder al vicepresidente, mientras Riad impulsa una tregua en el país vecino - Las embajadas extranjeras inician la repatriación de sus nacionales.- Al menos dos muertos y 15 heridos tras nuevos combates en la capital ÁNGELES ESPINOSA | Madrid 05/06/2011 El presidente de Yemen, Ali Abdalá Saleh, aterrizó anoche en Riad para ser tratado de las heridas sufridas durante el ataque lanzado el viernes contra su palacio en Yemen, que el Gobierno de Saná atribuye a un clan tribal opositor. Tras muchas horas de confusión, la noticia de la llegada del mandatario fue confirmada anoche por la Corte Real saudí. Según una nota oficial citada por la agencia Reuters, "el presidente llegó junto con ciudadanos y oficiales de su país que habían sido heridos para tratarse en Arabia Saudí" . La agencia precisaba que el mandatarios viajó en un avión médico saudí y que su familia llegó en un segundo vuelo como parte de una comitiva de 35 personas. Al menos dos personas han muerto y 15 han resultado heridas en la capital de Yemen, Saná, al estallar una granada en un cuartel de las fuerzas de oposición al presidente, en el marco del reinicio de los combates que han roto la frágil tregua mediada ayer por Arabia Saudí, según ha informado la cadena Al Yazira. En estos momentos se escucha en el ruido de explosiones e "intensos tiroteos" en el barrio de Hasaba, en la capital yemení, según ha explicado varios testigos. Informaciones contradictorias sobre Saleh Las informaciones contradictorias sobre el paradero del presidente de Yemen alentaron ayer las sospechas de que las heridas que sufrió el día anterior fueron más graves de lo que se reconoció inicialmente. Aunque la televisión yemení insistió a lo largo del día en que el mandatario no había salido del país, la noticia de que el vicepresidente, Abd- Rabbu Mansur Hadi, había asumido el mando reforzaba la idea de que la crisis de Yemen ha entrado en una nueva fase. Sobre la una de la madrugada (hora peninsular española), llegaba la confirmación de la monarquía saudí de que Saleh había aterrizado con un grupo de funcionarios y ciudadanos yemeníes heridos. Durante todo el día, Saná fue un hervidero de rumores. Arabia Saudí, que trataba de obtener una tregua entre los partidarios de Saleh y el clan rival de los Al Ahmar, presionó al presidente yemení para que aceptara ser tratado en su territorio, según explicaron a EL PAÍS un alto funcionario yemení y fuentes en Riad con acceso a responsables saudíes. Ante el riesgo de no poder regresar a Yemen, Saleh se estuvo resistiendo y pidió que le enviaran los cirujanos a Saná. Cuando al filo de la medianoche, Abdu Ganadi, el portavoz gubernamental, anunció que Hadi había asumido como presidente en funciones y comandante jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas, parecía claro que el hombre que durante casi 33 años ha regido los destinos de Yemen, había cedido. O su condición se había deteriorado hasta el punto de que alguien tomó la decisión por él. 191

Así las cosas, los responsables yemeníes necesitarían tiempo para decidir cómo llenar el vacío de poder. De ahí las reiteradas negativas a aceptar que había viajado a Arabia Saudí, cuyos centros hospitalarios se hallan mejor equipados que los de Yemen, el país más pobre de la región. No hay que olvidar que los hijos, sobrinos y otros familiares de Saleh controlan las principales fuerzas de seguridad del país. La cadena Al Arabiya señalaba anoche que familiares de Saleh también viajaban a Arabia Saudí. De todas formas, el mero hecho de que se planeara su traslado indicaba que Saleh sufrió algo más que los "rasguños", admitidos oficialmente. Varios responsables hablaban ayer de "heridas en la cara y el cuello", en tanto que la BBC citaba una fuente anónima según la cual tiene alojado bajo el corazón un trozo de metralla de 7,6 centímetros y quemaduras en la cara y el pecho. Durante la madrugada anterior, el primer ministro y otros cuatro dignatarios heridos junto al presidente fueron trasladados a Arabia Saudí. Saná también elevó el número de víctimas a 11 muertos y 124 heridos, aunque sigue sin estar claro el tipo de proyectil utilizado en el ataque. La mediación saudí parecía haber ralentizado los combates. "Hoy ha estado relativamente tranquilo", admitía un residente tras los bombardeos del día anterior con los que los militares respondieron al ataque contra el palacio presidencial. Al menos 10 tribales resultaron muertos y decenas heridos. La batalla hizo que desde primera hora de la mañana numerosos residentes abandonaran la capital. También las embajadas extranjeras han iniciado la repatriación de sus nacionales y el cierre temporal de sus oficinas.

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/violencia/intensifica/Yemen/mientras/Sale h/busca/tratamiento/medico/Arabia/Saudi/elpepuint/20110605elpepuint_6/Tes

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June 4, 2011 Citing Medical Needs, Yemeni Leader Goes to Saudi Arabia By ROBERT F. WORTH WASHINGTON — Yemen’s embattled president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, arrived in Saudi Arabia on Saturday for urgent medical treatment of wounds sustained in a bold attack on the presidential compound, Saudi officials said, abruptly shifting the political calculus that has allowed him to cling to power despite months of protest and violence. Mr. Saleh’s sudden departure stunned Yemenis and could pose a serious challenge for the United States, which has been deeply concerned about Yemen’s rising chaos, analysts say. The government has already lost control of some outlying provinces, and Al Qaeda and other jihadists appear to be exploiting the turmoil to solidify their base in the country. Saudi officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Mr. Saleh had agreed to leave only when his condition worsened after Friday’s attack. President Obama’s top adviser on Yemen, John O. Brennan, spoke by phone Saturday with the Yemeni vice president, Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi, who news reports said became acting president under the Yemeni Constitution. The Saudis are likely to make sure Mr. Saleh, who has been in power for 33 years, does not return as president, analysts said — a goal they and other regional Arab leaders have tried unsuccessfully to arrange for weeks. But even though his departure could ease tensions in Sana in the short term, there is no clear plan in place for a lasting political transition. In that vacuum, many fear that Yemen’s opposition factions and youth protesters might begin fighting among themselves, adding to the troubles of tribal violence in the north and secessionist efforts in the south. The threat of more political disorder puts tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia, the country’s powerful neighbor and patron, and on the United States, which had counted on Mr. Saleh as an ally against terrorists. The Saudis have seemed unsure about how to handle Yemen in recent months, as they struggled to calm the revolutionary energies across the region. For years, Mr. Saleh had kept the peace in a country riven by tribal jealousies, but the Saudis — prizing stability above all — have grown anxious as his control slipped in the face of protests inspired by the so-called Arab Spring. The brazen attack Friday, which Mr. Saleh blamed on longtime tribal rivals, the Ahmars, allowed the Saudis to intervene decisively. The Saudi leadership not only choreographed Mr. Saleh’s treatment and departure but also accepted six other high- ranking Yemeni officials wounded in the attack and brokered a cease-fire with the Ahmars’ powerful tribal militia. The militia and the government began fighting in the streets two weeks ago after Mr. Saleh reneged for the third time on a Saudi-led deal to leave office, though it remains unclear who initiated the hostilities. Although relations between Mr. Saleh and the 193

Ahmars soured several years ago, the rift widened recently as the Ahmars began supporting the street protesters, doling out payments to keep their movement alive despite a government crackdown. It was unclear Saturday night if the truce with the militia was holding, with some reports saying Sana, the capital, was mostly quiet and others saying the boom of artillery fire could be heard again in a neighborhoods that is an Ahmar family stronghold. The details of Friday’s attack, as well as information about Mr. Saleh’s health, remain somewhat murky. Yemeni official say either a rocket or mortar shell struck a mosque in the presidential compound where Mr. Saleh and other top officials were praying. Government officials insisted that Mr. Saleh suffered light injuries or “scratches,” even though the president himself noted that the blast was strong enough to kill seven guards. But Mr. Saleh delayed a speech to the nation for several hours Friday, then issued only a two-minute audio recording that ran on state television with an old photo of him. He sounded weary and sedated as he told the country the Ahmars were behind the strike. Since then, rumors about the nature of his wounds have abounded, and some Arab news reports said he had pieces of wood embedded in his body. Soon after the attack, government forces began firing rocket-propelled grenades and mortar shells on the house of Hamidh al-Ahmar, the Ahmar family’s political standard- bearer. A spokesman for Mr. Ahmar said that 19 people were killed in the attacks on his house on Friday. The Ahmars have denied any responsibility for the strike on the presidential compound. Sadeq al-Ahmar, the eldest of the Ahmar brothers, confirmed Saturday that the Saudis had arranged a cease-fire and said he would respect it. But he added that the government had not followed through on its promises to remove security forces from the area surrounding the Ahmar compound in the Hasaba neighborhood in northern Sana, where the fighting has been concentrated in the past two weeks. South of Sana on Saturday, government forces appeared to withdraw from Taiz, a major city in Yemen’s central highlands where protesters and tribesmen sympathetic to their cause have taken up arms against government troops. Tanks had been deployed in the city on Friday, and many residents feared a repeat of the brutal crackdown that took place last week, in which many protesters were killed. But after more clashes between armed tribesmen and troops, the military appeared to have retreated to their bases. “There are no soldiers in the streets today; no checkpoints inside the city. It’s only the armed tribesmen who came to protect us,” an activist, Riyadh al-Adeeb, said. Some analysts said that Saudi Arabia would not have agreed to allow Mr. Saleh to come to Riyadh without extracting a promise that he would finally resign as president. In recent weeks, King personally urged Mr. Saleh to sign the deal sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council, a six-nation body of Yemen’s Arab neighbors. The agreement called on him to cede power in exchange for immunity from prosecution for himself and his family. The United States has also pressed Mr. Saleh to step down, seeing an orderly departure as the start of a transition that would ease Yemen’s political crisis and allow authorities to regain control of Yemen’s outlying provinces and the jihadists there.

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Last week, President Obama sent Mr. Brennan to Saudi Arabia to try to help find a way to ease Mr. Saleh out. The visit underscored the United States’ lack of leverage with Mr. Saleh, who — despite his cooperation on counterterrorism — has for years been a frustratingly inconsistent partner. Now, Saudi Arabia finds itself in a position of power, with the wounded Yemeni president more dependent than ever on his oil-rich neighbors. But the Saudis — always uncomfortable with Yemen’s complex and poisonous politics — face difficult choices. If Mr. Saleh steps down, they are left with the responsibility of fostering a new political order in a country with democratic aspirations but few working institutions, even as they struggle to beat back the revolutionary currents in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Middle East. “It’s a real irony: the Saudis usually oppose change, but in Yemen they have become the midwives of change,” said Bernard Haykel, a scholar of Middle Eastern studies at Princeton who has written extensively on both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. “They will have to decide what change means in this context, and it will not be easy.” Reporting was contributed by Laura Kasinof from Hagerstown, Md.; Neil MacFarquhar from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Scott Shane from Washington; and Nasser Arrabyee from Sana, Yemen. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/05/world/middleeast/05yemen.html?nl=todaysheadlin es&emc=tha2

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El poder tribal ancestral frena la modernización del Estado Á. ESPINOSA - Madrid - 04/06/2011 Los yemeníes trazan sus ancestros hasta los Bani Hamdan, una tribu cuya existencia se remonta a varios siglos antes de nuestra era. Sin embargo, diferencias entre los hijos de Yashim bin Yubran bin Nawf bin Tubá bin Zayd bin Amro bin Hamdan dividieron el país entre los descendientes de Hashed y los de Bakil a partir del siglo III antes de Cristo. Al principio había otras tribus, pero los esfuerzos del imán Yahya, que gobernó con poder absoluto en la primera mitad del siglo XX, lograron reducirlas a esas dos grandes confederaciones. La mayoría de los clanes familiares yemeníes entroncan su linaje con una de ellas. La confederación Bakil, a la que pertenecen las tribus Abu Luhum o Nihm, es la más numerosa, pero la Hashed, que en la actualidad dirige el jeque Sadeq al Ahmar y a la que también pertenece el presidente Saleh, es la más influyente. Ello se debe en buena medida a que se han implicado más en la política. De hecho, Saleh contó con el respaldo del padre de los Al Ahmar, el jeque Abdalá, para hacerse con el poder en 1978. Las tribus fueron en sus orígenes un proto-Estado que organizaba la vida colectiva de sus miembros. Pero sus códigos y valores chocan con los del Estado nación. Muchos analistas consideran que sus estructuras frenan el desarrollo y que la modernización exige su desmantelamiento. Sin embargo, en Yemen la tribu se ha convertido en un concepto político. Ante la ineficacia de las instituciones y la corrupción de las élites gobernantes, los yemeníes recurren a su tribu para lograr los servicios que necesitan sea un pozo en una aldea o puestos de trabajo para los jóvenes. De ahí la legitimidad que alcanzan los jefes tribales que por sus recursos económicos o políticos son capaces de ofrecer servicios. Hasta ahora las tribus coexistían con el Estado. Los acontecimientos de los últimos meses han exacerbado la rivalidad entre ambos. Por un lado, la excesiva concentración del poder en manos de la familia del presidente ha reducido el reparto de prebendas. Por otro, la inevitable (aunque lenta) modernización de la sociedad y los medios de comunicación también ha mermado la autoridad de los jeques. En realidad, solo el noroeste del país y la zona de Maareb siguen bajo control tribal. En el sur, que pasó 23 años bajo un sistema comunista, e incluso en algunas zonas urbanas del norte, su peso es muy marginal. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/poder/tribal/ancestral/frena/modernizacion /Estado/elpepiint/20110604elpepiint_4/Tes

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Yemen The Republic of Tribes Part 1-6 Videos: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P20E0KJqdIE http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDbXiXD087Q&feature=related http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lk1U0THVN5Q&feature=related http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sva50e_7zZw&feature=related http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UMCaIzJmRzY&feature=related http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fDQeEe7Dao&feature=related GLOBAL 3000 | Yemen â “ A Land Armed to the Teeth http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoQvFxYR1W8&feature=related 4423 Subido por deutschewelleenglish el 07/01/2009 In Yemen, carrying weapons is a must for every man. So machine guns and bazookas are toted openly on the streets. In small shops, you can get all manner of weapons from all over the world at a reasonable price. Frequently, people die in disputes, tribal conflicts or in gun accidents. And so both the country and its residents pay a high price for these low-cost arms from the bazaar. The government is trying to stop the flow of weapons, but it has had little success so far. - Visitar periódicamente el portal: http://www.al-bab.com/ -Ver Dr Sarah Phillips , Dr Rodger Shanahan , “Al-Qa'ida, tribes and instability in Yemen”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Noviembre 2009: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1192

- “Yemen, the tribe and the state” by Elham M Manea, paper presented to the International Colloquium on Islam and Social Change at the University of Lausanne on 10-11 October 1996. It was later translated into French and published as "La tribu et l'Etat au Yémen" Kilani, Moudher (ed), Islam et changement social, Lausanne: Editions Payot 1998 (344 PÁGINAS) pp 205-218 http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/soc/manea1.htm

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06/03/2011 01:28 PM The Euro-Zone and Greece Trichet's Dream of a European Finance Ministry European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet envisions a future in which Brussels can veto the budgets of debt-ridden euro-zone countries. It's not likely to happen anytime soon, but the ongoing problems in Greece demonstrate the perils of business as usual.

When the European common currency was first conceived, there were plenty of skeptics. Without further integration of budgetary policy among countries belonging to the currency union, they said, the euro was doomed. The ongoing European debt crisis would appear to have lent credence to the naysayers -- and on Thursday, European Central Bank head Jean- Claude Trichet proposed the establishment of a European finance minister with veto power over the budgets of debt-stricken countries. "Would it be too audacious to imagine a European Union that not only has a unified market, a common currency and a common central bank, but also a common Finance Ministry?" Trichet said during his acceptance speech of the prestigious International Charlemagne Prize for distinguished service on behalf of European integration. In his talk, Trichet outlined an EU future in which a

DER SPIEGEL European Finance Ministry would have the power to veto the budgetary plans of euro-zone member states in certain situations. He emphasized that such a veto would only come after aid of the type received by Portugal, Greece and Ireland had failed. "The basis for this idea is that of striking a balance between national sovereignty on the one hand and the interdependence of member-state actions on the other, particularly in exceptional situations," he said. Little Appetite in the EU There have been several ideas floated in recent months for a deeper integration of European financial policy as a result of the ongoing debt crisis shaking the common currency. None, however, have called for the kind of EU veto power included in Trichet's vision. Trichet made it clear that he hardly expects such an institution to be created overnight and it would also require the significant alteration of the Lisbon Treaty, which governs the European Union. Furthermore, there would appear to be little appetite in the EU at the moment -- particularly in Berlin -- for a deepening of European integration. 198

The ECB president did, however, receive tepid support for his idea from German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. "It would be nice," he said of the idea. "But it is not possible in the foreseeable future." Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who is also head of the euro group, the 17 nations that use the common currency, told the Financial Times Deutschland that "it would certainly make sense. But the political prerequisites are not in existence." Still, the timing of Trichet's proposition is notable, given the increasing skepticism surrounding Greece's ability to emerge from the debt crisis. Doubts had grown so large in recent weeks that it was unclear whether the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would come to Athens' aid now that it has become apparent that the €110 billion aid package passed last year is insufficient. New Deal for Greece Furthermore, there has been disagreement in Europe over plans for a "soft debt restructuring" for Greece, which would involve extending the periods on loans made to the country, among other measures. On Wednesday, the ratings agency Moody's further downgraded Greek debt, deep into junk status. In the short term, there may be some relief in sight for Greece. According to Reuters, euro-zone officials in Vienna agreed in principle late on Thursday to the framework for a new aid package for Athens. While the exact amount of the deal has not been revealed, Reuters was told that €30 to €40 billion would come in the form of loans from the EU and the IMF, likely from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Additional billions would come from further austerity measures and Greece's privatization program. Furthermore, Athens hopes to get some private sector creditors to agree to swap their current bonds for new ones maturing 10 to 15 years later. In all, the Greek paper Kathimerini reported, the new package would be worth up to €85 billion and would carry Greece through until 2014. Trichet, for one, certainly hopes that will be enough. "The euro is a strong and credible currency," he said in his Thursday speech. "It has the trust of our citizens, of investors and of savers. There is no "euro crisis" as such." Time will tell. cgh -- with wire reports URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,766440,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • The Haircut War: Tensions Worsen Between Berlin and European Central Bank (05/30/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,765601,00.html • Interview with EU Currency Commissioner Rehn: 'There Is a Certain Aid Fatigue in Northern Europe' (05/30/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,765646,00.html • Consequences of Debt Restructuring: What Would a Greek Haircut Mean for Germany? (05/27/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,765318,00.html

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• The Hidden Cost of Saving the Euro: ECB's Balance Sheet Contains Massive Risks (05/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,764299,00.html • Interview with Euro Group President Juncker: 'Athens Is Not Broke' (05/23/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,764224,00.html • The Myth of a Lazy Southern Europe: Merkel's Clichés Debunked by Statistics (05/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,763618,00.html • Greece Reality Check: Euro Crisis Worsens as EU Leaders Play for Time (05/16/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,762769,00.html Related internet links • Kathimerini: PM To Unveil New Fiscal Plan, More Taxes http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_14_02/06/2011_393412 SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages.

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June 2, 2011, 5:00PM EST text size: TT Egypt: Not Just the Facebook Revolution Egypt's largest independent newspaper, Al-Masry Al-Youm, is showing Egyptians what a free press looks like. More than social media, that may be the key to the nation's future By Romesh Ratnesar

"The Martyrs of the Revolution" in the pages of Al-Masry Holly Pickett/Redux

"We prayed the revolution would succeed," says Magdy El Galad, the editor-in-chief of Al- Masry Al-Youm, the largest independent newspaper in Egypt. "Because if it failed, we would have been assassinated." A wry smile crosses his face. He's joking, sort of. It's Saturday afternoon, a working day in Cairo, and El Galad—who is 47 and reed-thin, with a sallow countenance and jet-black mustache that make him look a little like the old Saturday Night Live character Father Guido Sarducci—is seated at a table in his dimly lit office, sipping tea. He keeps three cell phones and a pack of cigarettes close at hand as he marks up pages about to go to press. The early edition of the Sunday paper goes on sale at 9 p.m., and El Galad has a little more than two hours to decide what to put on the front page. He became the editor of Al-Masry Al-Youm (which translates to "The Daily Egyptian") in 2005, the year after it started publishing. Since then the paper's circulation has jumped from 10,000 to over 500,000, more than double the largest state-run newspaper, Al-Ahram ("Pyramids"), which means that what was once the scrappy voice of opposition is now Egypt's largest daily. During the anti-government revolt earlier this year, allies of the embattled president, Hosni Mubarak, vowed to shut down the paper after order was restored. It turned out that it was the Mubarak regime that got shut down, and Al-Masry's early support for the revolution cemented its place as Egypt's most objective, important, and influential newspaper. It also placed the paper squarely in the middle of the ongoing struggle for the country's future. Al-Masry Al-Youm may not have figured out how to turn a profit publishing on newsprint, but it is showing Egyptian society something about what a free press looks like—and why the revolution's outcome hinges, in part, on preserving it. 201

One of El Galad's assistants hands him a cell phone. It's the Prime Minister, Essam Sharaf. El Galad grabs the nearest blank sheet of paper and starts scribbling. He had heard that Sharaf's upcoming trip to the Gulf was canceled; he asks about it during their five-minute interview. "The Prime Minister says that Saudi Arabia is an important stop for him. They're trying to work something out," El Galad says after he hangs up the phone. "We'll see what will happen in a couple hours." When Sharaf's office informs him that the trip is back on, Al-Masry touts the exclusive on the front page. This kind of access was unthinkable under Mubarak. "Because of the revolution," El Galad says, lighting another cigarette, "people in Egypt have realized the influence of the press." The demonstrations that ended Mubarak's 30-year rule have become known as "The Facebook Revolution," but the uprising had old-media roots. Over the last decade, the emergence of independent media organizations like Al-Masry Al-Youm provided Egyptians with a picture of the corruption, venality, and fecklessness of the Mubarak regime. When pro- democracy activists began converging on Tahrir Square in January, millions of fed-up Egyptians were primed to join them. "The social media obviously played a very important role," says Khaled Fahmy, a professor of history at the American University in Cairo, "but the more traditional media played a vital role, too—maybe not in triggering the revolution but in preparing the way for it." And yet four months later, the revolution's momentum has stalled and the press is again walking a delicate line—albeit one painted by a different authority. The comity that prevailed during the 18-day uprising has given way to spasms of violence on Cairo's streets. Leaders of the Tahrir Square revolution charge that the country's caretaker government, which is being run by the military until elections this fall, has been too lenient toward Mubarak, his sons, and their cronies. (Stung by the criticism, the military council announced on May 23 that Mubarak will be tried for the deaths of protestors.) With Egypt and much of the Middle East on the edge of political chaos, there's a growing possibility that conservative religious groups, such as the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, may end up seizing power. If that happens, the consequences for Egypt's nascent independent press could be dire. The media industry in Egypt is expected to grow to $1 billion in revenues by 2013, with newspaper advertising accounting for half of it, according to a 2010 study sponsored by the Press Club. Daily newspaper circulation in Egypt stands at more than 4.3 million, by far the highest in the Arab world. Occupying the fourth floor of a high-rise building in Cairo's Garden City district, buzzing with youthful, nicotine-fueled energy, Al-Masry Al-Youm embodies the spirit of the idealized new Egypt. The newsroom is populated by more than 100 reporters and Web producers, many in their twenties, wearing jeans and collaborating freely with members of the opposite sex. Editors meet around a circular conference table in the middle of the scrum to emphasize the paper's commitment to transparency. The two-week revolution was a professional crucible for Al-Masry's young journalists. Clashes between protestors and the police raged so close to the paper's offices that reporters had to dodge rubber bullets and outrun tear gas. Editorial meetings were interrupted by the rattle of gunfire and explosions. As security deteriorated in Cairo, El Galad instructed female employees to stay home, so they wouldn't be on the streets at night. Many women opted instead to sleep in the office, as did virtually all of the paper's male staff. The fact that a newspaper like Al-Masry Al-Youm existed to report on the revolution is almost as improbable as the event itself. Al-Ahram, Egypt's first daily newspaper, was founded in 1875, while Egypt was under British rule, and in the first half of the 20th century, it, along with other Egyptian press outlets, helped shape the middle class. But the revolution of 1952, which toppled the monarchy and catapulted Gamal Abdel Nasser to power, signaled the start of the Egyptian media's decline. Nasser nationalized the country's most prominent publications. Newspapers like Al-Ahram didn't exactly become mouthpieces of the state, but they were far from objective. 202

After Mubarak became President in 1981, state control of the media tightened. For the next two decades, nearly all Egyptian broadcast and print outlets were owned and controlled by the Mubarak government or the ruling National Democratic Party. State-run dailies, like Al-Ahram and Al-Akhbar, ballooned into public bureaucracies. Their top editors were appointed by the regime, and in return for favorable coverage of Mubarak and his family, they received massive subsidies to hire thousands of reporters, offset production costs, and maintain low newsstand prices—keeping potential private competitors out of the market. In 2002, Salah Diab, the founder of an oil-and-gas conglomerate called Pico Energy and grandson of a newspaper publisher from the pre-Nasser era, decided to launch an independent daily. "The business proposition was simple," says Sherif Wadood, Al-Masry Al-Youm's current chief executive officer. "There was no good paper in Egypt." Diab hired Hisham Kassem, a prominent publisher and intellectual, to run the paper, and convinced three other Egyptian executives to invest in it. Launched with $10 million, Al-Masry Al-Youm's first edition hit the streets on June 7, 2004. "We had 50 editors and reporters working out of one room," says Alaa AlGhatrifi, now the paper's chief investigative editor. "We had to go outside and use public pay phones to call sources." In Egypt's arid media landscape, Al-Masry's oversized banner, large display photos, and color advertisements stood out. It covered long-neglected social issues like crime, pollution, and the status of women. In 2005, Al-Masry published a front-page article by Noha al-Zeini, a high- ranking female judge, calling the results of that fall's parliamentary elections—won overwhelmingly by Mubarak's party—a fraud. The article put Al-Masry on the cultural radar, and within two years the paper's readership had quintupled. It also spawned imitators. Mubarak didn't allow the moment to last. State prosecutors twice detained El Galad for publishing articles deemed embarrassing to Mubarak and his allies. Investors behind Al-Masry Al-Youm found themselves cut out of government contracts. At one point the paper's owners rebuffed an attempt by Ahmed Ezz, a billionaire with close ties to Mubarak's son, Gamal, to buy a controlling stake in Al-Masry. A June 2010 Ministry of Information document, which was leaked after the revolution, detailed the government's plans to impose curbs on the media in the "coming period"—starting with the November 2010 parliamentary elections and continuing through the scheduled 2011 presidential vote, which most Egyptians believed would be rigged in favor of Gamal Mubarak. A columnist for one state-owned magazine reported that once Gamal became President, he would dismantle Al-Masry Al-Youm for good. In the fall of 2010, at a White House summit attended by the leaders of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, photographers captured President Barack Obama walking toward a podium in the East Room, with the four others trailing behind him. Al-Ahram ran the photo on its front page—Photoshopped so that Mubarak appeared to be leading the procession. The episode made Al-Ahram the object of ridicule and revealed the lengths to which the regime would go to protect Mubarak's image. In the last months of 2010, the President's men began to move further on the independent media, forcing unsympathetic TV hosts off the air, strong-arming newspaper editors to fire their best reporters, even seizing financial control of some pro-reform publications. The overthrow of Tunisia's longtime strongman, Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali, on Jan. 14, 2011, only heightened Mubarak's paranoia. Al-Masry Al-Youm braced for the crackdown to come. On the morning of Jan. 25, more than 100,000 Egyptians converged on Tahrir Square in central Cairo, and thousands more poured onto the streets of Alexandria, Suez, and other cities across the country. That evening, the police responded with force. Inside Al-Masry's newsroom, less than a mile from the heart of the action, El Galad and his team debated how to handle the story, the biggest ever public demonstration against Mubarak's rule. Throughout the day the paper had posted eyewitness reports and videos of the scene in Tahrir on its website. "Our reporters were calling back and telling us this was different from anything 203

they'd seen before," says El Galad. "There were completely different faces there, people who you would never have seen at demonstrations." That afternoon the head of the Ministry of Information called El Galad and warned him that the website's coverage of the protests might pose a threat to national security. He suggested the paper reconsider how it played things in its more influential print edition later that night. El Galad wanted to mark the significance of the day's events without giving them a categorical endorsement. Ahmed Mahmoud, the art director, designed a front page with the top half taken up by a single aerial image of the crowd in Tahrir Square, illuminated by street lights. Above it was a two-word, siren-red headline: The Warning. "The thought that ran through my head was, newspapers are made in these moments," says Al-Masry CEO Wadood. Hours after the Jan. 26 edition went on sale, people in Tahrir started grabbing copies of the front page and raising it above their heads. Al-Masry Al-Youm's coverage was all the more conspicuous because on the same morning, Al-Ahram, the largest state-run daily, chose not to mention the protests at all. On the afternoon of Jan. 26, El Galad received a call from the same minister who had admonished him the day before. "Since when does the President receive warnings from the media?" the minister demanded. He vowed that the protests would be crushed and that Mubarak would "punish the paper himself." After that, "our contact with the regime was cut off entirely," El Galad says. "We decided we couldn't yield," he continues. "We thought we were fighting for the rights of the protestors, but we were actually fighting for ourselves." On Jan. 28 the regime shut down local Internet and cell-phone service. Kismet El-Sayed, the head of Al-Masry's digital operations, posed as a foreign guest and talked her way into a room at the Inter-Continental Cairo hotel, which still had a connection to a server outside the country. Twenty staffers moved in and managed the paper's website from there. That afternoon, an Al- Masry video reporter shot footage from the room of a crowd of thousands leaving Friday prayers and attempting to cross a bridge leading into Tahrir Square, only to be repulsed by government tanks outfitted with water cannons. After Al-Masry posted the footage on its website, it was picked up and replayed by foreign networks like CNN and BBC, which the Egyptian authorities had prevented from broadcasting live images of the protests. Al-Masry was also the first publication to run individual photos of protesters killed by the police. The "Martyrs of the Revolution" feature became an icon, as demonstrators in Tahrir Square started pinning the page to their T-shirts. On Feb. 11, one day after Mubarak provoked more outrage by refusing to announce his resignation in an address to the nation, Egypt's military leadership finally intervened. At 6 p.m., Mubarak's deputy, Omar Suleiman, announced that the President had resigned. The front page of Al-Masry Al-Youm, published that night, featured an arc of head shots of the revolution's martyrs, framing the words, "I'm going to die so my country can live," a lyric from a famous Egyptian pop song. A glowing photo of the celebrations in Tahrir Square, fireworks exploding overhead, covered more than half the page. Beneath it was a two-word headline, again in red: The Beginning. Though happy to see Mubarak gone, many revolutionaries are suspicious of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which assumed control on Feb. 11 and will run the country until a new government is elected. Activists say that since the revolution, scores of demonstrators have been mistreated by members of the army—in one instance, protestors were allegedly detained and tortured inside the Egyptian National Museum—but the media has refused to investigate those claims. "We've gone to journalists and shown them the evidence," says Hossam Bahgat, executive director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. "The reporters file the stories, and then the editors kill them. We're not sure if it's self-censorship or if they're acting under instructions from the army."

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I met Bahgat at an outdoor cafe near his office in Cairo, where he was drinking tea and smoking a hookah pipe. He shared a letter sent by General Ismail Etman, a member of the ruling military council, to all working journalists, warning them against publishing without the military's permission "any articles/news/press/releases/complaints/advertising/pictures concerning the armed forces or the leadership of the armed forces." Bahgat sighed. "My concern is that [the media] is too willing to accept these kinds of orders," he said. The editors at Al-Masry Al-Youm say that the army occupies a unique place in Egyptian society and is the "red line" that most journalists refuse to cross. That reticence has become more pronounced in the last three months, in part because many Egyptians view the military as the only line of defense against the rising prevalence of crime, sectarian violence, and religious extremism. "What I'd say to the people criticizing us is, give me an example of any media outlet that is publishing stories about the military council the way you would like," says Ehab Zalaky, Al-Masry's managing editor. "You have different concerns when you're on the outside of the situation than you do when you're in the middle of it, like us." The biggest concern of all may be the growing assertiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been strengthened by the failure of the revolutionaries to form a cohesive political movement. When I met El Galad in late April, his anxiety about the prospect of an Islamist takeover in Egypt was palpable. "If the Muslim Brotherhood succeeds in winning a lot of political power," he said, "they will be a big threat to freedom of the press in Egypt." And yet it's hard to imagine the Egyptian media ever reverting to Potemkin, state-sponsored journalism. Egyptian readers simply won't stand for it. Perhaps the most enduring contribution of Al-Masry Al-Youm to Egyptian life has been to reestablish what qualifies as real news—and help make its competitors better in the process. In the last three months, the newsrooms at Al- Ahram and the other state-owned publications have undergone their own revolutions, turfing out the executives and editors who had allowed them to become extensions of the Mubarak regime. Yehia Ghanem, a longtime writer and editor at Al-Ahram, says, "The emergence of independent newspapers encouraged more people here to transgress forbidden ground. We owe that to them." And thanks to a recent easing of licensing restrictions, the country is in the midst of a publishing land rush, with at least a half-dozen new independent dailies preparing to launch by the end of the year. Far more than its competitors, Al-Masry has expanded its presence on other platforms, creating a video-heavy, interactive website, an iPad app, and an online English-language edition whose reporting is often more aggressive than that of the newspaper itself. A weekly print version of the paper's English-language edition is set to launch this month, and Wadood has ambitions to develop a nightly television program featuring Al-Masry's editors and reporters. Egypt's future is full of uncertainty, but as every savvy newsman knows, crises are also opportunities. "There's a lot of news in Egypt these days," Wadood says. Al-Masry Al-Youm still wants to make some of its own. Ratnesar is deputy editor of Bloomberg Businessweek.

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_24/b4232062179152.htm?campaign_id=m ag_Jun2&link_position=link25

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Middle East June 2, 2011 Chaos in Yemen Drives Economy to Edge of Ruin By ROBERT F. WORTH and LAURA KASINOF WASHINGTON — Even as Yemen’s political crisis deepens, the country is on the brink of an economic collapse so dire it could take years to recover, and hobble efforts to rebuild its fragmented society. After four months of mass protests and political deadlock, Yemen — already the poorest Arab country, a place where many people have become accustomed to mere subsistence — has had its domestic oil supplies and electricity network largely cut off by hostile tribes. Gas lines now extend for miles in the capital, Sana, provoking fights and new protests; electricity is available for only a few hours a day. Cooking gas and diesel for generators have also grown scarce, and with food prices rising fast, people have begun hoarding basic supplies, including water. As foreign currency supplies dwindle, the elaborate system of patronage and corrupt payoffs that maintained a modicum of stability in Yemen is starting to crack, with former loyalists breaking off and fights erupting over a smaller and smaller pool of cash. The embattled president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, desperate to keep his supporters happy, has demanded multimillion-dollar loans from Yemen’s top businessmen in recent weeks, according to Yemeni officials and members of the business elite. The most fundamental of Yemen’s diverse woes is lack of water. Since the political crisis began in January, the price of water has risen fivefold in some areas, tenfold in others. The drills that pump water from Yemen’s rapidly dwindling underground supplies are falling silent, because the diesel they require has grown so expensive and scarce. The area around Sana is especially arid, and it could become the first capital ever to run out of water, said experts at the World Bank. “The bigger challenge than the political mess is the economic mess,” said one Western diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity under standard diplomatic protocol. Even if the political situation stabilizes, the diplomat said, the opposition’s hopes of increasing foreign investment and changing Yemen’s endemic corruption will not be realized “in one month, six months or even the next year.” On Thursday, fighting still raged between government troops and opposition tribesmen in Sana. North of the city, government forces used tanks and artillery to repel a large group of armed tribesmen who were trying to reach Sana to aid Mr. Saleh’s rivals, the Ahmar clan. And south of Sana, in the city of Taiz, there were reports that young protesters had begun taking up arms against the government for the first time. Yemen’s minister of trade and industry, Hisham Sharaf, estimated last week that the crisis had cost the economy $5 billion, or about 17 percent of the country’s 2009 gross domestic product. Another minister, Amir al-Aydarous, said in May that Yemen was “on the verge of an economic catastrophe.”

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To make matters worse, Saudi Arabia in April ceased payments in its decades-old system of patronage to Yemeni tribal elders and other leading figures, according to tribesmen and a recent report issued by Chatham House, an international affairs institute based in London. Although the system was much criticized for its erosion of Yemen’s sovereignty, the cessation of payments left many around the country without a vital source of income. Signs of economic crisis are everywhere. Most restaurants in the capital have closed, along with many businesses. Those companies that remain open complain that banks refuse to lend money. Most businesses stopped paying taxes months ago, according to the Yemeni Chamber of Commerce. One importer, Anwar Abdullah Jarallah, said that he could no longer get dollars from the bank, and that his international partners wanted all their cash upfront because they were so nervous about being repaid. “I’m scheduling my order to have, for example, 100 metric tons or something,” Mr. Jarallah said. “I’m going to reduce it to a quarter because I need liquidity. I will import a small quantity just to keep business going.” Foreigners and the wealthy have moved their dollars offshore, forcing Yemen’s Central Bank to hold onto its declining foreign reserves. That in turn is causing the Yemeni riyal to slide in value. On the black market, the price of a dollar rose to 250 riyals from 217 in just a few weeks. Economists say that if the riyal reaches 300 to the dollar, an additional 15 percent of Yemen’s 23 million people will be under the poverty line, living on less than $2 a day. Already, an estimated 40 to 50 percent of Yemen’s people are under that line, though reliable statistics are difficult to obtain in Yemen and some economists put the figure even higher. Since mid-March, when tribesmen allied with the opposition blew up a pipeline and disabled one of Yemen’s two main oil-production facilities, the government has been forced to import almost all of its fuel. (The other main complex is used for exports.) That has further strained the government, which depends almost entirely on dwindling oil reserves for its revenues. Mr. Saleh’s own financial resources have become a constant source of speculation, since it seems clear that his political survival depends on his ability to keep paying supporters. One Yemeni official said he was approached recently by several foreign ambassadors who demanded to know if it was true that Mr. Saleh had plundered the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves for his own use. The official told the ambassadors it was just a rumor, he said. But most local economists say they have no idea how much money is left in the Central Bank, as they do not trust government figures. For the poor, life has grown measurably harder in recent weeks. Marwan Ghazali, a 36- year-old taxi driver, said that he spent three days trying to refuel but that several stations ran out by the time he arrived at the front of the line. “The black market is the only place to buy gas now,” he said, “but I don’t want to buy it there, because they sometimes mix it with water.” One Yemeni woman who works at an international aid agency said the growing scarcity of water was her greatest worry. 207

“Without water, everything in the house seems to shut down,” she said. “You cannot wash your clothes or wash the plates or cooking pots after dinner, and I am worried about my own personal hygiene and dignity. Even using the toilet has become a worry. I feel almost like a refugee in my own home.” Khaled Hammadi and Kawkab Thaibani contributed reporting from Sana, Yemen. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/world/middleeast/03yemen.html?_r=1&nl=tod aysheadlines&emc=tha2

Feud within key Yemen tribe could tear nation apart If Yemen collapses, the fuse will have been lighted by a war pitting President Ali Abdullah Saleh against his senior clansman, analysts say, not pro-democracy protests or other challenges to his rule.

Hashid tribal leader Sheik Sadiq Ahmar prays as he attends a funeral in Sana,… (Khaled Abdullah / Reuters)

June 02, 2011|By Jeb Boone, Iona Craig and Ned Parker, Los Angeles Times The unrest shaking Yemen began months ago as part of the idealistic movement for democracy and political reform sweeping the Middle East and North Africa. It is now a battle of money, power and egos within a single powerful clan that threatens to tear the country apart. The elite Republican Guard and special forces commanded by the son of President Ali Abdullah Saleh have been fighting for more a week with those who support the head of the president's own tribe, Sheik Sadiq Ahmar, and his businessman brother Hamid. The escalation in fighting has left up to 160 people dead, including 20 on Thursday as thousands of residents fled Sana, the capital, for tribal villages. Sana has become a battleground where government buildings are seized and torched. If poverty-stricken Yemen collapses, the fuse will have been lighted by this internal tribal war pitting the president against his senior clansman, analysts say. Al Qaeda sympathizers waiting in the shadows, or separatist movements in the north and south might benefit, but it will have been the feud between the Ahmars and Saleh that sent Yemen into a downward spiral. "The conflict between these groups is threatening to drag the country into civil war," said April Alley, an analyst on Yemen with the International Crisis Group think tank. 208

Until about two weeks ago, the effort to oust Saleh after nearly 33 years in power focused on a plan by international mediators to persuade him to step aside, and the lopsided street battle between Saleh's military and demonstrators. Then, a fragile peace between the president and Sadiq Ahmar, the head of the Saleh's own Hashid tribal confederation, broke down. The conflict changed. "Saleh and the Ahmars are fighting to see who gets Yemen next, like our country is a prize to be won. This fighting will continue and the Yemeni people will suffer greatly," said Sana resident Abdul Rahman Sunahi, speaking by telephone from his home in the Hasaba district while explosions and gunfire could be heard in the background. "Saleh's tanks have been firing on buildings and homes, but the tribesmen are heavily armed. They know what they're doing. I expect this to drag on for quite some time," Sunahi said. The Ahmar family has towered over Yemen's politics for decades. The brothers' father, Sheik Abdullah Ahmar, paved the way for Saleh, a young military officer with only an elementary school education, to become president. The older Ahmar remained loyal to his protege, but when Ahmar died in 2007, the familial ties crumbled. Sons Sadiq and Hamid Ahmar came to view Saleh's immediate family as rivals. Saleh has decided to take the brothers on directly. "It's about power, money and prestige. People's egos are involved, and it's a very messy situation," said Gregory Johnsen, a former Fulbright fellow in Yemen and a doctoral candidate in Near Eastern studies at Princeton University. Both Saleh and the Ahmars have been looking to lure other tribes around the country to their side, he said. "The longer this goes on, the more groups will be sucked in, and it will be a great deal harder to reverse," Johnsen said. The feelings are raw among supporters of both sides. One Ahmar tribal supporter who had fought Saleh's troops in Sana, seethed at the shelling last week of the home of the Ahmar brothers' father. "If you want to bomb Hamid's house, fine, bomb Hamid's house. But don't defile the memory of Sheik Abdullah, God rest his soul, by attacking his home," said tribesman Mohammed Qumayni. Saleh's supporters painted the Ahmars in similarly crude terms. A manager at Yemen's state-run Saba news agency, who was nearly killed on Thursday when Ahmar tribesmen opened fire on his car, called the Ahmars the worst that Yemeni society has to offer — "ignorant, uneducated hicks." "How can you deal with such ignorant people? You have to fight them," he said. The rift has been looming for several years. Saleh has been trying to arrange a hand-over of power to his son, Ahmed, the head of the Republican Guard and special forces. The Ahmar brothers and their eight male siblings, some of whom once worked in happier times on Saleh's security detail, bristled at the president's efforts to hoard power. "The sons of Sheik Abdullah have a rich family tradition of leadership and influence, and they feel that they have a right to play a prominent role in Yemen's future," said 209

Alley, the Yemen analyst. "They feel that the sons and nephews of Saleh are robbing them of this inheritance." Since Saleh's troops shelled a mediation effort in Sadiq's home May 24, the normally mild-mannered sheik has stepped up his rhetoric against Saleh. In the minds of his supporters, it was a declaration of war. "Ali Abdullah Saleh is a liar, liar, liar," Sadiq said in an interview with Al Jazeera satellite television a week ago. "We are firm. He will leave this country barefoot.... I say to all tribes: Do not be late." A day later, he announced a cease-fire, but it fell apart almost as quickly as it started. Sadiq, who is in his mid-50s, has a wrinkled face and sunken eyes. He carries a traditional ceremonial dagger strapped to his bulging stomach. In contrast, his brother Hamid is a flashy and charismatic businessman who is fluent in English and owns Yemen's largest cellphone provider, a string of fast-food restaurants and an Islamic bank. He has held a seat in parliament for 17 years with the Islah party, which includes the Muslim Brotherhood. Some observers say the party has ties to Al Qaeda. Hamid backed Saleh's opponent in 2006 elections, but denies he now is riding the coattails of Yemen's protest movement. Some observers believe he funded the pro- democracy demonstrations; a 2009 U.S. Embassy cable posted by WikiLeaks quotes him as saying he was planning demonstrations to bring Saleh down. In an interview recently at his palatial residence, surrounded by hundreds of armed men, he denied having aspirations to replace Saleh. "It is not appropriate for a businessman such as myself to accept such a lofty political office," he said. Speaking in a booming voice, he smiled and laughed often — but remained calm, even when making an apparent threat in comparing Saleh with Egypt's deposed President Hosni Mubarak. "If Saleh refuses to leave, well, we don't have a Sharm el Sheik in Yemen," he said, referring to the Red Sea resort where Mubarak took refuge. [email protected] Special correspondents Boone and Craig reported from Sana and Times staff writer Parker from Baghdad.

http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/jun/02/world/la-fg-yemen-tribe-20110603

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June 2, 2011 The Depravity Factor By DAVID BROOKS By now you have probably heard about Hamza Ali al-Khateeb. He was the 13-year-old Syrian boy who tagged along at an antigovernment protest in the town of Saida on April 29. He was arrested that day, and the police returned his mutilated body to his family a month later. While in custody, he had apparently been burned, beaten, lacerated and given electroshocks. His jaw and kneecaps were shattered. He was shot in both arms. When his father saw the state of Hamza’s body, he passed out. The family bravely put video evidence of the torture on the Internet, and Hamza’s martyrdom has rallied the opponents of President Bashar al-Assad’s Baathist regime. But, of course, his torture didn’t come out of nowhere. The regime’s defining act of brutality was the Hama massacre in 1982 when then-President Hafez al-Assad had more than 10,000 Syrians murdered. The U.S. government has designated Syria a state sponsor of terror for 30 consecutive years. The State Department’s Human Rights Report has described the regime’s habitual torture techniques, including pulling out fingernails, burning genitals, hyperextending the spine, bending the body around the frame of a wheel while whipping the victim and so on. Over the past several weeks, Bashar al-Assad’s regime has killed more than 1,000 protesters and jailed at least 10,000 more, according to Syrian human rights groups. Human Rights Watch has described crimes against humanity in the town of Dara’a, where boys have been mutilated and men massacred. All governments do bad things, and Middle East dictatorships do more than most. But the Syrian government is one of the world’s genuinely depraved regimes. Yet for all these years, Israel has been asked to negotiate with this regime, compromise with this regime and trust that this regime will someday occupy the heights over it in peace. For 30 years, the Middle East peace process has been predicated on moral obtuseness, an unwillingness to face the true nature of certain governments. World leaders have tried sweet-talking Syria, calling Bashar al-Assad a friend (Nancy Pelosi) or a reformer (Hillary Clinton). In 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy invited Assad to be the guest of honor at France’s Bastille Day ceremonies — a ruthless jailer celebrating the storming of a jail. For 30 years, diplomats and technocrats have flown to Damascus in the hopes of “flipping” Syria — turning it into a pro-Western, civilized power. It would be interesting to know what they were thinking. Perhaps some of them were so besotted with their messianic abilities that they thought they had the power to turn a depraved regime into a normal regime. Perhaps some of them were so wedded to the materialistic mind-set that they thought a regime’s essential nature could be altered with a magical mix of incentives and disincentives. Perhaps some of them were simply morally blind. They were such pedantic technocrats, so consumed by the legalisms of the peace process, that they no longer possessed the

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capacity to recognize the moral nature of the regime they were dealing with, or to understand the implications of its nature. In any case, their efforts were doomed. In fact, the current peace process is doomed because of the inability to make a categorical distinction. There are some countries in the region that are not nice, but they are normal — Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia. But there are other governments that are fundamentally depraved. Either as a matter of thuggishness (Syria) or ideology (Hamas), they reject the full humanity of other human beings. They believe it is proper and right to kill innocents. They can never be part of a successful negotiation because they undermine the universal principles of morality. It doesn’t matter how great a law professor or diplomat you are. It doesn’t matter how masterly you sequence the negotiations or what magical lines you draw on a map. There won’t be peace so long as depraved regimes are part of the picture. That’s why it’s crazy to get worked into a lather about who said what about the 1967 border. As long as Hamas and the Assad regime are in place, the peace process is going nowhere, just as it’s gone nowhere for lo these many years. That’s why it’s necessary, especially at this moment in history, to focus on the nature of regimes, not only the boundaries between them. To have a peaceful Middle East, it was necessary to get rid of Saddam’s depraved regime in Iraq. It will be necessary to try to get rid of Qaddafi’s depraved regime in Libya. It’s necessary, as everybody but the Obama administration publicly acknowledges, to see Assad toppled. It will be necessary to marginalize Hamas. It was necessary to abandon the engagement strategy that Barack Obama campaigned on and embrace the cautious regime-change strategy that is his current doctrine. The machinations of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators are immaterial. The Arab reform process is the peace process. DAVID BROOKS The Depravity Factor June 2, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/opinion/03brooks.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc= tha212

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6 A Marshall Plan for Egypt Author: Anders Aslund · June 2nd, 2011 · The promising Arab Spring has left North Africa in limbo. Now the task is to build a new political and economic system that is sustainable. President Barack Obama’s speech on the Middle East on May 19 outlines most of the right economic features. When communism ended two decades ago, the Soviet Union fared much more poorly than Eastern Europe, partially because the West did so much more for Eastern Europe. The lesson from the end of communism is that the international community needs to make a maximum effort early on, as the United States did during the postwar Marshall Plan, to mobilize large financial resources for Egypt to help it get its policy right. In order to be effective, aid must be timely, that is, it must come early. Even if early aid appears of little use (as was the case in Romania in the early 1990s), it costs little and usually helps the country get on the right track, while sins of omission are expensive. Russians were alienated by the West’s failure to help two decades ago. From the outset, the international community offered Poland large amounts of aid. As a consequence, Polish policymakers could do what was right, and they did. In Russia, the reformers never received sufficient international credits and thus had no chance. Soon, they were ousted and their reforms fell apart. It is vital to focus on one key country. In Eastern Europe, the West concentrated on the biggest country in need, Poland. In the former Soviet Union, however, warnings against the dangers of a—Russia first policy—resulted in Western slowness in helping Russia, a failure that condemned the whole post-Soviet region. Today, we cannot afford to repeat that mistake. We need to focus on assisting Egypt. Then, Tunisia and the rest will follow. Most financial assistance consists of credits rather than grants, and the aid is usually conditional on good economic policy imposed by international financial institutions. Conditions are necessary to provide a reform government with the right incentives and promote beneficial causes. The post-communist lesson is that the most dangerous resistance is not social unrest but the usurpation of wealth by the old elite. The worst parasites are not the old rulers, who have been beaten, but the seemingly benevolent opportunists who switched to the revolutionaries’ side. In Eastern Europe, they were state enterprise managers. In Egypt the much admired military are the key suspects. The old rent-seeking regime in Egypt needs to be broken up, as President Obama so rightly emphasized. Politically, that means full democratization with the introduction of maximum transparency and checks and balances. In the post-communist world, parliamentary systems have proven far more effective, reformist and democratic than presidential systems, and the fewer concessions the new democratic regime makes to the old elite the better.

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Now, as then, partial deregulation left monopolies in the hands of modern members of the old regime. These monopolies need be broken up through comprehensive deregulation of prices and markets. In particular, small traders and craftsmen should be given complete economic freedom, as happened in Poland, so that they can form a force for economic and political freedom. Macroeconomic destabilization usually follows a democratic breakthrough, and in Egypt this looks inevitable. The old regime defended itself by raising wages and pensions before it departed, while controlling retail prices. The new rulers seem unable to enforce budget discipline, while tourist revenues and foreign direct investment plunge in the face of political unrest. Egypt’s pegged exchange rate appears untenable and inflation is rising. The International Monetary Fund is rightly setting up a stabilization program. But Egypt needs more: a full-scale program of political and economic transformation. The World Bank has much to contribute. The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development is sensibly interested in promoting private business in Egypt. A new US- sponsored enterprise fund can do so as well, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation can support private investment in the region. The big actor, however, should be the European Union. This great elephant nextdoor has made little of its European Neighborhood Policy of 2003 and its Union for the Mediterranean of July 2008. For the European Union, this is the big opportunity to pursue a deep and broad economic integration with its southern neighborhood. It should launch negotiations of a free trade agreement with Egypt, as it already has with Tunisia. Sensibly, President Obama proposed a comprehensive Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa. But it should also be more generous. From its own experience of enlarging its membership, the European Union has plenty of wisdom about how to reform legislation and promote education, and it should put up substantial funds. The European Union also needs to regulate the large flows of illegal immigrants from North Africa. The best way to do that is to allow more legal migration and improve conditions in countries from which immigrants are escaping to find a better life. These efforts would cost some money, but not as much as one might suppose. Depending on the ambitions of those in a position to help, it could be $20 billion for a three year period, and most of this sum would come from international financial institutions. The United States is already writing off $1 billion of Egypt’s debt, and the Gulf states could contribute substantially. For the European Union, only a few billion euros remain to complete the package. The United States has stated its strategy. It is time for Europe to follow. For Europe and the world, a successful transformation of Egypt’s democratic and economic systems is vital and can show the rest of the Arab world the road forward. This post originally appeared at the Peterson Institute and is reproduced here with permission. Anders Aslund A Marshall Plan for Egypt June 2nd, 2011 http://www.economonitor.com/piie/2011/06/02/a-marshall-plan-for-egypt/

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Los combates entre partidarios del jeque Al Ahmar y fuerzas gubernamentales siembran el caos en Saná Leales al líder tribal, que tratan de derribar al presidente yemení, toman varios edificios públicos en la capital.- Los enfrentamientos causan al menos 62 muertos en dos días ÁNGELES ESPINOSA | AGENCIAS 02/06/2011 El empecinamiento de Ali Abdalá Saleh en aferrarse al poder está sumiendo Yemen en el caos. La frágil tregua alcanzada la semana pasada entre la milicia del jefe tribal Sadeq al Ahmar y las fuerzas aún leales a Saleh se rompió en la madrugada de ayer. El enfrentamiento tiene poco que ver con el movimiento popular de oposición al presidente que se manifestaba de forma pacífica en las plazas de las principales ciudades del país. Se trata de una guerra entre familias que, incluso si acaba con el control de los Saleh, hará muy poco por la modernización y cohesión del país. Esta madrugada 15 personas, entre ellas una niña de siete años, han muerto en los combates entre fuerzas gubernamentales y partidarios del jeque Sadeq al Ahmar, con lo que número de muertos asciende a al menos 62 en dos días de enfrentamientos. Según líderes tribales que han informado a AFP, miles de combatientes tribales se dirigen hacia Saná a prestar apoyo a Al Ahmar. Como consecuencia de los disturbios, los vuelos en el aeropuerto de la capital han sido suspendidos, algo que ya ocurrió la semana pasada, también por motivo de la situación de inestabilidad. "Están luchando por las calles con artillería. Desde la plaza de Tahrir hacia el norte de Saná está impracticable", relata por teléfono un residente que, como muchos de los que viven en esa parte de la capital, pasó de nuevo la noche en blanco. Observadores occidentales estiman que 200.000 personas han abandonado la ciudad. "Se trata de una nueva guerra que no tiene que ver con la oposición, sino con una lucha de intereses entre la familia Al Ahmar y la familia de Saleh", explican fuentes diplomáticas europeas. Entretanto, en la ciudad meridional de Taiz, policías y soldados han disparado al aire para dispersar a cientos de manifestantes opositores al presidente que se encontraban en la calle principal de la localidad. Tras los disparos, algunos soldados han detenido a asistentes que intentaban huir por la calles adyacentes. Según Naciones Unidas, al menos 50 personas han sido asesinadas en Taiz desde el domingo. Después de cuatro meses de contestación popular, que Saleh ha reprimido a sangre y fuego, el conflicto dio un inesperado giro la semana pasada cuando las fuerzas leales al presidente y las del jeque Sadeq se enfrentaron a cañonazos en el barrio de Al Hasaba. Sadeq es el jefe de la confederación tribal Al Hashed, la mayor del país y que desde marzo se puso de lado del movimiento de protesta inspirado por las revueltas de Túnez y Egipto. Los Al Ahmar, una poderosa familia política y de empresarios, vieron una buena ocasión para minar el poder económico de sus rivales, el hijo y los sobrinos de Saleh.

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"Pensábamos que las fuerzas del presidente iban a recuperar las posiciones que perdieron la semana pasada, pero [las milicias de] Al Ahmar son más fuertes y han tomado varios ministerios e incluso la sede del partido de Saleh", declara un diplomático. La web del Ministerio de Defensa confirma que los insurrectos han capturado el edificio del Congreso General del Pueblo y otro edificio cercano a la presidencia. "Están ganando los tribales", resume la misma fuente. Tal es el temor del politólogo Abdulá al Faqih. "Esta guerra va a reforzar el poder de las fuerzas tradicionales", señala en un correo electrónico. "La situación es peor de lo que parece desde el exterior", explica. Al Faqih, que vive en el norte de la ciudad, cuenta que en su zona solo hay electricidad dos horas al día. Ayer la mayoría de las tiendas estaban cerradas y se formaron colas ante las gasolineras, donde el precio del combustible se ha triplicado. "La situación se vuelve caótica por momentos", apunta por su parte Javier Hergueta, el embajador español en Yemen. "Nuestra mayor preocupación es la protección de la colonia española y la defensa de la Embajada", añade. Hergueta ha organizado la salida de la mayoría de los españoles y acogido a los tres o cuatro que quedan en su residencia. A la vista de las circunstancias, Italia ha anunciado el cierre temporal de su Embajada y la repatriación de sus ciudadanos. Holanda también se plantea una medida similar. También Kuwait y Qatar han retirado a sus diplomáticos. Ambos países forman parte del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo, que durante los dos últimos meses ha intentado sin éxito una mediación. Saleh ha agotado la paciencia de sus vecinos árabes después de que en tres ocasiones aceptara retirarse a cambio de la inmunidad para echarse atrás en el último momento. La secretaria de Estado norteamericana, Hillary Clinton, reiteró ayer que Saleh había recibido "una muy buena oferta" y que la crisis no iba a resolverse si no dejaba el poder. Pero fuentes diplomáticas occidentales en Yemen consideran que "la opción política se ha cerrado". http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/combates/partidarios/jeque/Ahmar/fuerzas /gubernamentales/siembran/caos/Sana/elpepuint/20110602elpepuint_2/Tes

Una guerra de familias Los negocios se mezclan en la lucha que mantiene el clan de Al Ahmar y el que lidera el presidente Saleh ÁNGELES ESPINOSA 02/06/2011 Los últimos combates en Saná, la capital de Yemen, han marginado el movimiento de protesta popular que desde hace cuatro meses pide la salida del presidente Ali Abdalá Saleh. No son los pacíficos manifestantes de la plaza del Cambio quienes están disparando obuses de mortero contra los soldados leales a Saleh. Los contendientes son milicianos de un poderoso jeque tribal, Sadeq al Ahmar, cuyos intereses económicos chocan con los de la familia del presidente. Resulta tentador atribuir el conflicto a un choque de tribus, algo que refuerza la imagen exótica de Yemen. Si bien hay un elemento tribal en la composición de la milicia de los Al Ahmar, no hay que olvidar que la tribu de Saleh, Al Sahnan, también pertenece a la

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confederación Hashed, que dirige el jeque Sadeq desde la muerte de su padre en diciembre de 2007. Aunque Hashed no es la más numerosa de las tribus (honor que reclaman los Bakil) tiene mayor peso político. De hecho, Saleh contó con el apoyo del fallecido Abdalá al Ahmar que llegó a presidir el Parlamento y alguno de sus diez hijos han tenido puestos oficiales hasta esta última crisis. El reparto de prebendas entre los más importantes jeques tribales ha sido una de las tácticas de Saleh para mantenerse en el poder durante casi 33 años. La rivalidad entre el clan Al Ahmar y la familia Saleh no es nueva, pero se ha intensificado en los últimos años a medida que la modernización de Yemen introducía nuevas fuentes de influencia económica y política. La punta de lanza de ese pique la representa Hamid Al Ahmar, que milita en Al Islah (la oposición islamista) y ya dejó clara su oposición a Saleh en las últimas elecciones presidenciales al apoyar a un candidato rival. El jeque Hamid, que estudió en Estados Unidos y a su regreso a Saná se licenció en económicas, dirige Al Ahmar Group, un conglomerado de empresas que incluye la principal compañía privada de telefonía móvil de Yemen, Sabafon, el Islamic Bank of Saba y otra decena de compañías. En el desarrollo y expansión de esos negocios, los Al Ahmar han chocado con las ambiciones de los hijos y los sobrinos del presidente Saleh. Los negocios delos Saleh Además de dirigir los principales cuerpos militares y policiales, Ahmed, Ali y sus primos Tareq, Yahya y Amar, también controlan buena parte de la economía yemení. Aunque no se conocen todas sus participaciones, una lista que circula entre los medios de oposición les atribuye monopolios de importación de maquinaria pesada y coches (Ahmed a través de la compañía Al Haj), de distribución de gas y derivados del petróleo (Ali asociado con Tawfick Abul-Raheem) y empresas similares. Fuentes diplomáticas occidentales atribuyen a esta generación y otros parientes de Saleh lascoacciones para que no ceda a las presiones internacionales para que abandone la presidencia a cambio de inmunidad. Los observadores también auguran que, habida cuenta de los intereses económicos que comparten, ambos clanes podrían llegar finalmente a un acuerdo para una redistribución del poder. Tal posibilidad dejaría en agua de borrajas las aspiraciones de los movilizados para cambiar el sistema. Frente a su deseo de reforma, la nueva guerra que se libra en las calles de Saná reforzaría el poder de las fuerzas tradicionales, tal como advierte el politólogo yemení Abdullah al Faqih. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/guerra/familias/elpepuint/20110602elpepu int_12/Tes • Los combates entre partidarios del jeque Al Ahmar y fuerzas gubernamentales siembran el caos en Saná • El presidente de Yemen resulta herido en un ataque con proyectiles contra su palacio • La violencia se intensifica en Yemen mientras Saleh busca tratamiento médico en Arabia Saudí • El presidente de Yemen resulta herido en un ataque contra su palacio • El gran manipulador • La violencia se intensifica en Yemen mientras Saleh busca tratamiento médico en Arabia Saudí

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe La oposición siria se une contra El Asad 360 delegados de grupos disidentes crean en Turquía el Consejo de la Revolución ENRIC GONZÁLEZ (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Antalya - 02/06/2011 Llevaban meses trabajando juntos contra Bachar el Asad, pero la mayoría no se conocían personalmente. Ayer se encontraron en Antalya, una localidad turística de la costa turca, para discutir sobre el futuro de Siria y para formar un Consejo de la Revolución en el exilio. Más de 360 ciudadanos muy diversos decidieron constituirse en "cuerpo diplomático provisional" para que los Gobiernos del mundo tuvieran un interlocutor alternativo al régimen de Damasco. Hubo unanimidad en que cualquier reforma que emprendiera El Asad era ya inútil y en que solo cuando el presidente y su familia dejaran el país podría empezar el cambio político. Hoy, en la segunda y última sesión del encuentro, debería formarse el Consejo de la Revolución (ese era el nombre que se barajaba ayer) y publicarse una declaración con los puntos de acuerdo, centrada en tres principios: unidad nacional, democracia parlamentaria y Estado laico. Se descartó por completo formar un Gobierno provisional, porque, en palabras de un delegado vinculado a los Hermanos Musulmanes, "cuando llegue el momento el Gobierno provisional se creará en Siria con la misión de convocar elecciones libres". "El protagonismo debe corresponder a quienes están sufriendo dentro de nuestro país", añadió. Pese al imaginable caos de una reunión a la que la gente acudió por autoinvitación y con muchas ganas de hacerse oír, los presentes, desde los Hermanos Musulmanes hasta los activistas de izquierda, pasando por los jeques beduinos, coincidieron en que la supervivencia de Siria pasaba por evitar los conflictos religiosos y sectarios. "Desde el principio hemos reclamado unidad y desde el principio hemos dejado aparte la religión; últimamente vienen muchos cristianos a las mezquitas, porque desde ellas parten las manifestaciones", explicó Omar Mohamed al Musdael, un joven periodista de Deraa que abandonó Siria de forma clandestina a principios de mayo. Medio centenar de delegados procedían de territorio sirio, conscientes de que por el momento estaban condenados al exilio. "Sabemos que en esta reunión hay bastantes infiltrados del régimen que no conseguiremos descubrir y quedaremos todos fichados; sería una locura volver", dijo Al Musdael. Tres presuntos miembros o colaboradores de los muhabarat, los servicios secretos sirios, fueron expulsados del hotel donde se celebraba la reunión. A otro no le expulsaron porque era tan conocido que resultaba inofensivo: a nadie se le iba a ocurrir hacerle una confidencia o pasarle un correo electrónico secreto. El hombre parecía saberse identificado, porque permanecía discretamente en un rincón. Pese al riesgo, varios activistas salieron de Siria hacia Turquía con la intención de volver luego. Se ocultaron en un lugar seguro cerca del hotel para no ser fotografiados y siguieron los debates a través de Internet, como los activistas en Siria. Nadie esperaba un desenlace inminente de la crisis. Quienes habían visitado recientemente Damasco y Alepo, las dos mayores ciudades del país, sabían que en ellas Bachar el Asad contaba aún con amplios apoyos. "La propaganda del régimen acerca de la sublevación islamista, las bandas armadas y el supuesto caos que sobrevendría sin El 218

Asad ha calado en ciertas capas de la población que no ha visto manifestaciones, no ha escuchado nuestros gritos y no ha comprobado que las únicas armas son las que policías y soldados disparan contra la gente", dijo Ammar Abdulhamid, un activista basado en Maryland (Estados Unidos) que desempeña un importante papel en la coordinación de los movimientos opositores a través de Internet. En eso coincidió Amr al Azm, profesor de historia en una universidad de Ohio (Estados Unidos): en cuanto alguien contemplaba personalmente la violencia de la represión policial, se alejaba del régimen. Eso explicaría el hecho de que en Deraa, la ciudad donde comenzaron las protestas y donde las tropas de Maher el Asad, hermano del presidente, actúan con más dureza, hubieran desaparecido las instituciones oficiales y las empresas de la familia El Asad-Majluf y solo quedara el Ejército. "Deraa está bajo ocupación militar, pero ya fuera del régimen", aseguró Omar Mohamed al Musdael. En otras ciudades "rebeldes", como Homs o Hama, la represión también había conseguido el paradójico efecto de fomentar nuevas manifestaciones. Cerca de Homs, en Rastan, bombardeos de las fuerzas sirias dejaron 41 civiles muertos el martes. La represión y su consecuencia, el odio a Bachar el Asad, un presidente relativamente popular hasta pocos meses atrás, eran el denominador común de la reunión de Antalya. La sala donde se congregaban los delegados estaba decorada con imágenes espeluznantes de sirios muertos a golpes o a tiros. En el estrado no había presidencia, solo un micrófono que iba pasando de mano en mano y una fotografía de Hamza al Jatib, el chico de 13 años presuntamente torturado y asesinado en Deraa por las fuerzas de seguridad. En pocos días, Hamza se ha convertido en un símbolo tan potente como Mohamed Bouazizi, el frutero tunecino cuya autoinmolación desató la revolución de Túnez. Un símbolo de las protestas - La imagen del niño de 13 años Hamza Ali al Khateeb es ya un símbolo de la lucha de los sirios. Muestran su foto tanto en pancartas como en webs como Facebook. Fue torturado y asesinado de tres balazos en Deraa. Hillary Clinton, secretaria de Estado de EE UU, mostró su preocupación por el caso y dijo esperar que su muerte "no fuera en vano". - La policía y el Ejército sirios han matado a 887 personas en todo el país y al menos a 418 en la provincia de Deraa, donde prendieron las protestas contra el régimen el 18 de marzo. La ONG Human Rights Watch publicó ayer estas cifras en el informe No hemos visto un horror como este: crímenes contra la humanidad en Deraa. - La organización ha documentado minuciosamente (con fechas, lugares y 50 entrevistas a víctimas y testigos) las matanzas sistemáticas, la tortura con descargas eléctricas y la detención de civiles heridos en el hospital. Asegura que se han cometido crímenes contra la humanidad en Deraa. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/oposicion/siria/une/Asad/elpepiint/201106 02elpepiint_1/Tes

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June 1, 2011 When the Nile Runs Dry By LESTER R. BROWN Washington A NEW scramble for Africa is under way. As global food prices rise and exporters reduce shipments of commodities, countries that rely on imported grain are panicking. Affluent countries like Saudi Arabia, South Korea, China and India have descended on fertile plains across the African continent, acquiring huge tracts of land to produce wheat, rice and corn for consumption back home.

Some of these land acquisitions are enormous. South Korea, which imports 70 percent of its grain, has acquired 1.7 million acres in Sudan to grow wheat — an area twice the size of Rhode Island. In Ethiopia, a Saudi firm has leased 25,000 acres to grow rice, with the option of expanding. India has leased several hundred thousand acres there to grow corn, rice and other crops. And in countries like Congo and Zambia, China is acquiring land for biofuel production. These land grabs shrink the food supply in famine-prone African nations and anger local farmers, who see their governments selling their ancestral lands to foreigners. They also pose a grave threat to Africa’s newest democracy: Egypt. Egypt is a nation of bread eaters. Its citizens consume 18 million tons of wheat annually, more than half of which comes from abroad. Egypt is now the world’s leading wheat importer, and subsidized bread — for which the government doles out approximately $2 billion per year — is seen as an entitlement by the 60 percent or so of Egyptian families who depend on it. As Egypt tries to fashion a functioning democracy after President Hosni Mubarak’s departure, land grabs to the south are threatening its ability to put bread on the table because all of Egypt’s grain is either imported or produced with water from the Nile River, which flows north through Ethiopia and Sudan before reaching Egypt. (Since rainfall in Egypt is negligible to nonexistent, its agriculture is totally dependent on the Nile.) 220

Unfortunately for Egypt, two of the favorite targets for land acquisitions are Ethiopia and Sudan, which together occupy three-fourths of the Nile River Basin. Today’s demands for water are such that there is little left of the river when it eventually empties into the Mediterranean. The Nile Waters Agreement, which Egypt and Sudan signed in 1959, gave Egypt 75 percent of the river’s flow, 25 percent to Sudan and none to Ethiopia. This situation is changing abruptly as wealthy foreign governments and international agribusinesses snatch up large swaths of arable land along the Upper Nile. While these deals are typically described as land acquisitions, they are also, in effect, water acquisitions. Now, when competing for Nile water, Cairo must deal with several governments and commercial interests that were not party to the 1959 agreement. Moreover, Ethiopia — never enamored of the agreement — has announced plans to build a huge hydroelectric dam on its branch of the Nile that would reduce the water flow to Egypt even more. Because Egypt’s wheat yields are already among the world’s highest, it has little potential to raise its agricultural productivity. With its population of 81 million projected to reach 101 million by 2025, finding enough food and water is a daunting challenge. Egypt’s plight could become part of a larger, more troubling scenario. Its upstream Nile neighbors — Sudan, with 44 million people, and Ethiopia, with 83 million — are growing even faster, increasing the need for water to produce food. Projections by the United Nations show the combined population of these three countries increasing to 272 million by 2025 — and 360 million by 2050 — from 208 million now. Growing water demand, driven by population growth and foreign land and water acquisitions, are straining the Nile’s natural limits. Avoiding dangerous conflicts over water will require three transnational initiatives. First, governments must address the population threat head-on by ensuring that all women have access to family planning services and by providing education for girls in the region. Second, countries must adopt more water-efficient irrigation technologies and plant less water-intensive crops. Finally, for the sake of peace and future development cooperation, the nations of the Nile River Basin should come together to ban land grabs by foreign governments and agribusiness firms. Since there is no precedent for this, international help in negotiating such a ban, similar to the World Bank’s role in facilitating the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, would likely be necessary to make it a reality. None of these initiatives will be easy to implement, but all are essential. Without them, rising bread prices could undermine Egypt’s revolution of hope and competition for the Nile’s water could turn deadly. Lester R. Brown is the president of the Earth Policy Institute and the author of “World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse.” Lester R. Brown When the Nile Runs Dry June 1, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/opinion/02Brown.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc= tha212

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Middle East June 1, 2011 Fighting Spreads in Yemen, Raising Fear of Civil War By NASSER ARRABYEE and ROBERT F. WORTH SANA, Yemen — Yemen edged closer to civil war on Wednesday, as fighting spread to new parts of the country and government troops waged increasingly bloody street battles with opposition tribesmen for control of crucial areas in the capital. The violence here has transformed a largely peaceful uprising into a tribal conflict with no clear end in sight. The United States and Yemen’s Arab neighbors like Saudi Arabia, which have tried and failed to mediate a peaceful solution to the country’s political crisis, are reduced to sitting on the sidelines and pleading for restraint. The bloodshed also threatens to unleash a humanitarian catastrophe, as Yemen, already the poorest country in the Arab world, runs desperately low on gasoline, cooking oil and other basic supplies. It also raises fears that Islamic militants who use Yemen as a base will have even freer rein to operate in the country. The rising chaos has become a major concern for the White House, which announced Wednesday that John O. Brennan, President Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser, would be traveling to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates this week to discuss “the deteriorating situation in Yemen.” On Wednesday afternoon, tanks and armored vehicles could be seen rolling into Sana, the capital, from the south. The streets of Sana were largely empty, as residents fled for the safety of surrounding villages. Exploding artillery shells and sporadic machine-gun fire could be heard across the city. Despite his repeated public offers to step aside to ease the crisis in the country, Yemen’s authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, appeared to be gearing up for a major assault on the Ahmar family, the tribal rivals and political opposition leaders he has been battling for 10 days. “This is the worst fighting we have seen since 1994,” when Yemen fought a two-month civil war, said one Yemeni official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under diplomatic protocol. “And it’s the worst fighting in Sana since the civil war of the 1960s.” Some estimates of the death toll in fighting late Tuesday and early Wednesday ranged as high as 41 on both sides. All told, at least 120 people have been killed since the violence began early last week. A brief cease-fire struck over the weekend collapsed on Tuesday, with each side blaming the other. In recent days, the government’s tenuous hold has slipped further outside the capital, as tribal fighters and Islamist militants seized a major coastal town in the south, and tribesmen took over critical checkpoints east of Sana. The city of Taiz, south of the capital, remained in a state of lockdown, days after government forces and plainclothes gunmen opened fire on a vast crowd of peaceful protesters who had been holding a sit-in for months. Dozens of people were killed, according to witnesses and human rights groups, and the episode provoked condemnations from the United States and other countries. In the capital, government security forces have tried in recent days to disrupt a similar peaceful sit-in by protesters that has lasted for months. But Maj. Gen. Ali Moshin al-Ahmar’s troops have protected them. Most of the protesters in Sana and in cities across Yemen have held fast to

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their belief in nonviolent resistance, but some have begun to call for war against Mr. Saleh, especially after the massacre in Taiz. “For me and others like me here in the square, we are convinced that peaceful means would not work, since they did not work over these last four months,” said Ahmed Obadi, a young protester and teacher. The forces arrayed against the government have diverse and sometimes conflicting agendas, but the rising chaos appears to have emboldened them all, including the Yemen-based group that calls itself Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has become a major concern for the United States. In the northern province of Jawf, a battle broke out Wednesday between opposition tribesmen and the rebels who now control much of northern Yemen, known as Houthis after the family of their leader. At least five tribesmen were killed, said Abdullah al-Jamili, a senior tribal figure in the area. The latest round of fighting in Sana broke out on May 23, a day after Mr. Saleh refused for a third time to sign an agreement for him to leave power in exchange for immunity from prosecution for himself and his family, who hold key positions in Yemen’s intelligence and security services. The agreement was brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council, a six-nation body of Yemen’s Arab neighbors, and the United States had lobbied hard for Mr. Saleh to sign it, to no avail. So far, the fighting in the capital has been mostly limited to the Hasaba district, the site of the Ahmar family compound and a cluster of adjacent government buildings. General Ahmar, who defected to the opposition in March but is not related to the other Ahmars, has so far kept his forces on the sidelines, leaving open the question of whether the fighting will spread into a much deadlier and broader conflict. But as Mr. Saleh moved more tanks and heavy weapons into the capital, some Yemenis warned that Mr. Saleh could be planning an effort to crush the Ahmars and consolidate control. That strategy would carry enormous risks in Yemen, where tribal leaders outside the capital have repeatedly threatened to join the battle and avenge dead relatives. “In effect, Saleh is dragging the country into civil war,” said Abdulghani al-Eryani, a political analyst in Sana. “I think he wants to try to defeat the Ahmar forces and bring them back into the fold. But any miscalculation could turn this into open war.” Already on Wednesday there were signs that the fighting was spreading, with reports of a mortar attack on General Ahmar’s military base, and witnesses saying that his troops were assisting opposition tribesmen. And the fighting in Sana has begun to spread beyond the northern Hasaba district; on Wednesday, opposition tribesmen seized the office of the city’s public prosecutor in the city’s northwest section, witnesses said. Many Yemenis were girding themselves for more bloodshed. “People think that a civil war has started so they are fleeing from Sana,” said Gamila al-Kamaly, a mother of six who has so far refused to leave. “There are missiles flying around in Hasaba. So this has made people realize that the regime has to go. He is trying to make us feel like we are Gaza.” Nasser Arrabyee reported from Sana, and Robert F. Worth from Washington. J. David Goodman contributed reporting from New York, Laura Kasinof from Washington and Khaled Hammadi from Sana. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/world/middleeast/02yemen.html?nl=todaysheadlin es&emc=tha2

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Collage del dibujante del diario francés Le Monde, Jean Plantu, sobre las protestas del 15-M. / PLANTU

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Pensadores por el Movimiento 15-M Escritores, humanistas, cineastas y sociólogos prestan su respaldo a los acampados y defienden la protesta como un “necesario toque de atención” al sistema Samira Saleh Madrid 1 JUN 2011 - 14:26 CET

Collage del dibujante del diario francés Le Monde, Jean Plantu, sobre las protestas del 15-M. / PLANTU La oleada de protesta e indignación que se vive en la Puerta del Sol de Madrid y en otras ciudades españolas desde el pasado 15 de mayo, ha encontrado una importante fuente de apoyo en pensadores, divulgadores, escritores y cineastas, no solo de España, sino también del extranjero, que se han acercado hasta los campamentos para conocer y animar a los que con su participación se han convertido en protagonistas del denominado Movimiento15-M. El economista y pensador José Luis Sampedro, el sociólogo Manuel Castells, el escritor uruguayo alineado con la izquierda y autor de Las venas abiertas de América Latina, Eduardo Galeano, el dibujante del diario francés Le Monde Jean Plantureux (Plantu), o el escritor y divulgador Eduard Punset son algunas de las figuras del mundo científico y cultural que han celebrado el golpe en la mesa con el que españoles y europeos han salido del conformismo y la resignación para pedir, no una solución a sus problemas, sino participar activamente en la búsqueda de esa solución. Punset aprovechó su estancia en Oviedo como jurado del Príncipe de Asturias de Investigación Científica para visitar a los acampados en la plaza de la Escandalera de la 225

capital asturiana. El divulgador científico matiza: “Fueron los acampados los que me invitaron a hablar con ellos. Fue más gratificante que si hubiera sido por iniciativa propia”. Galeano visitó el campamento de la Puerta del Sol y el “entusiasmo” que vio le hizo repetir la visita en la plaza de Catalunya de Barcelona. “Entusiasmo es una palabra que viene del griego y que quiere decir tener a los dioses adentro, y yo cada vez que como ahora veo ese tener a los dioses adentro me convenzo de que vivir vale la pena”, afirma el autor de El libro de los abrazos.

MÁS INFORMACIÓN Vídeo de Eduard Punset en la acampada de Oviedo Vídeo del sociólogo y autor de 'La Era de la Información' Entrevista con Eduardo Galeano en la plaza de Catalunya Entrevista con Javier Sampedro sobre la manifestación de Democracia Real Ya! Sobre el origen de las protestas, Plantu acusa a la democracia española, pero también a la francesa, de “estar dormidas”. Una definición que puede equipararse a la que Punset señala como motivación de las acampadas, que en su opinión, nacen de la frustración de los ciudadanos “ante el hecho de que no salgan iniciativas desde dentro del sistema para que puedan elegir ellos mismos a sus representantes, cese la interferencia en el sistema judicial y se preserve la separación de poderes. El movimiento de los jóvenes constituye un toque de atención que no se generaba dentro del sistema”. José Luis Sampedro fue uno de los primeros en prestar su opinión a favor de las manifestaciones de Democracia Real Ya! que el 15 de mayo se convocaron en 50 ciudades de España y que desencadenó el posterior campamento de Sol. En una entrevista el 14 de mayo, un día antes de la marcha, el economista, humanista y escritor alentaba a los jóvenes a unirse para “enderezar las cosas” y aseguraba que las batallas “se ganen o se pierdan, hay que darlas por el hecho mismo de darlas”. Punset comparte la afirmación: “Aunque la protesta sirva solo para llamar la atención sobre la situación injusta e inaceptable de la juventud habrá valido la pena”. Este mundo está embarazado de otro mundo posible ” Eduardo Galeano Las palabras de ánimo han sobrepasado la barrera de los creadores y pensadores españoles. El escritor y periodista uruguayo Eduardo Galeano defiende que las manifestaciones son la muestra de que “este mundo de mierda está embarazado de otro mundo posible, diferente y difícil de parir pero que ya está latiendo”. Frente a la opinión de que un mundo mejor está surgiendo, el dibujante de Le Monde destaca el movimiento como “el principio de una toma de consciencia europea”, y el cineasta iraní en el exilio Mohsen Makhmalbaf, que se paseó por Sol antes de impartir una conferencia sobre Cine y cambio social en Irán, insta a los jóvenes que están en la plaza a ser “los ojos de la democracia”. Plantu insta a los partidos a preguntarse por qué no conectan con los jóvenes, una desconexión que tanto él como Galeano atribuyen a la burbuja en la que viven los políticos que olvidan que en Europa hay 60 millones de personas pobres. Galeano critica que en política hay muchos “redondos”, es decir personas que “no hacen más que darse vueltas” y mirarse el ombligo. Uno de los mayores retos a los que en estos momentos se enfrentan los miembros de la protesta es dirimir de qué forma las reivindicaciones pueden saltar del papel a la realidad. Cómo mantener el espíritu de Sol cuando las lonas dejen de cubrir la plaza. En 226

mayo de 1968 Plantu tenía 17 años pero de su experiencia en el despertar francés no saca ningún consejo esperanzador. “Muchos de mis compañeros que pedían la revolución en las manifestaciones del 68 luego han acabado siendo notarios”, afirma. Ante la misma cuestión Eduard Punset defiende “la renuncia a la violencia” y “la introducción del aprendizaje emocional en el sistema educativo”, al que responsabiliza en gran parte de la situación actual con “niveles exagerados de impotencia, desencanto y desánimo que podrían poner en peligro el equilibrio social”. Galeano rechaza preguntarse por el futuro de la protesta: “No me importa qué va a pasar, me importa lo que está pasando. Este movimiento es como el amor, infinito mientras dura”. Las redes sociales nos hacen únicos” Eduard Punset #acampadasol, #spanishrevolution, #tomalaplaza,#nonosvamos, #barriosdespiertos. Estos cinco términos son solo algunos de los que han utilizado miles de personas en la red social Twitter para informar y para ser informados sobre las protestas en toda España. Estas etiquetas, que han alcanzado el trending topic (lista de los 10 temas más repetidos en esa red social) nacional y en algunos casos mundial -en el caso de #spanishrevolution por ejemplo- también han servido para pedir voluntarios, unificar el mensaje de las diferentes protestas, debatir y lanzar bulos, como ocurrió con el supuesto desalojo de la acampada de Granada. En su intervención en Oviedo, Punset señaló que las redes sociales aceleran los procesos que crean una nueva forma de pensar. El escritor y divulgador asegura que la comunidad científica acepta que el ser humano es único y diferente del resto de animales gracias a las redes sociales, y las equipara con la ruta de la seda (la ruta comercial que conectaba Europa y Asia), ya que en ellas podemos “intercambiar conocimientos, chismorreos y genes hasta generar una nueva civilización que no necesitara 2.000 años para cristalizar, sino unos pocos”. La red, de hecho, ha servido a otros muchas figuras del mundo de la cultura para respaldar el movimiento. El director de cine Álex de la Iglesia ha utilizado una vez más su cuenta de Twitter para expresar su respaldo. “Me siento orgulloso. Siento orgullo. Creí que ya no era posible” o “Olvida Cannes, Sol es mucho más grande”. Preguntado por los peligros que estos foros abiertos y, a veces anónimos, pueden comportar, Punset afirma: “Las redes sociales confieren un gran peso a la manada; el peligro estaba cuando ese gran peso podía ejercerlo un solo individuo”. http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/06/01/actualidad/1306928640_473456.html

01 junio, 2011 - Lluís Bassets Lo viejo y lo nuevo en el uso de la fuerza Tenemos muy pocos datos de los Navy Seals que asaltaron la mansión de Bin Laden en Abbotabad, pero hay numerosos indicios que nos permiten sospechar que este tipo de soldados usan cámaras de video en sus acciones y que así lo hicieron las dos docenas de militares que penetraron en la casa. Al parecer, las imágenes que no hemos visto no son únicamente las de Bin Laden muerto, sino probablemente de toda la acción, rodada en infrarrojos desde los móviles prendidos del cuerpo o del casco de los militares. Es muy probable también que estas imágenes estuvieran monitorizadas desde el mando de la operación, que pudo seguir así, paso a paso, cada uno de los movimientos y de las 227

acciones. Por lo que se nos ha dicho sobre la famosa foto de la Situation Room, en la que se ve al presidente Obama y a sus colaboradores durante la operación, las imágenes que se recibían en la Casa Blanca eran las del director de la CIA que les iba retransmitiendo los acontecimientos. Pudiera ser, sin embargo, que hubiéramos sido todos objeto de un engaño o intoxicación informativa para no desvelar algo de más difícil digestión como sería que el comandante en jefe estaba viendo en directo lo que hacían sus soldados pie en tierra en Pakistán. Es una mera conjetura, ciertamente. Pero muy difícil de excluir vista la vertiginosa evolución de la tecnología. Lo que es seguro es que si hay alguien que esté utilizando las tecnologías más punteras esos son los Navy Seals, una de las fuerzas mejor entrenadas y equipadas del mundo, capaces de realizar acciones tan difíciles y delicadas como el asalto de Abbotabad. La captación de imágenes en directo durante una acción militar es un instrumento inapreciable de dirección, pero además permite, posteriormente, analizar y mejorar la actuación de los soldados, con precisión de detalle en los movimientos y en las posiciones de cada uno de los participantes en las acciones. Tiene, además, repercusiones éticas indiscutibles: pensemos por un momento cómo debe ser la preparación y la actitud de un soldado que sabe que todas sus acciones, incluidas las reflejas y por tanto involuntarias, estarán al alcance de la visión directa y del posterior análisis de sus jefes, y que incluso podrán constituirse en pruebas de valor jurídico ante hipotéticas investigaciones que quieran realizar los distintos poderes del Estado. El uso de cámaras en el transcurso de acciones militares es una gran novedad en los asuntos bélicos, que está en perfecta correlación con la grabación de la detención de combatientes enemigos y los interrogatorios correspondientes. La tecnología, en esta cuestión y en todo, tiene dos caras, que en este caso son buenas las dos: sirve para mejorar la actuación militar, pero también sirve como garantía de la corrección jurídica y ética de los militares durante la realización de su trabajo. Todo esto es aplicable también a la policía. Un consejero del Interior momentáneamente célebre ha propuesto que las fuerzas antidisturbios estén dotadas de cámaras de vídeo en sus cascos. Es una excelente idea, por lo demás contradictoria con que el mismo gobierno al que pertenece haya quitado las cámaras de video instaladas en las comisarías para grabar los interrogatorios de los detenidos. Con estas imágenes, la policía podría constituir más fácilmente pruebas con valor judicial sobre la actuación de quienes estén perturbando el orden público. Documentaría también mucho mejor las agresiones que suelen sufrir los antidisturbios en sus enfrentamientos con los revoltosos. Pero, sobre todo, la policía se vería obligada a comportarse con mayor contención y proporcionalidad cuando entra en contacto con manifestantes pacíficos y pasivos como sucedió el pasado viernes en Barcelona. El consejero catalán cree que con estas cámaras contaría con las pruebas de que su policía fue atacada por los manifestantes, en vez de encontrarse como ahora con lo contrario, con las grabaciones de las cargas realizadas por las televisiones presentes en la plaza de Catalunya o por los propios manifestantes con sus móviles. Pero no se da cuenta de que una policía sometida a este control videoscópico no hubiera realizado las actuaciones lamentables que se vieron la pasada semana. Vamos a ver cuánto tiempo tardamos en contar con videopolicías en las calles de Barcelona. Esperemos que sea pronto, y que mientras tanto no se siga enmascarando

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con palabras vacías la crudeza de unas imágenes tomadas en directo y sin manipulación alguna. http://blogs.elpais.com/lluis_bassets/2011/06/lo-viejo-y-lo-nuevo-en-el-uso-de-la- fuerza.html

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4166b360-8c5d-11e0-b1c8- 00144feab49a.html#ixzz1O2aWWLkb Doubts raised over post-revolution aid By Sarah Mishkin Published: June 1 2011 15:58 | Last updated: June 1 2011 15:58 Members of the G8 group of leading industrial nations last week pledged at their summit in France more than $20bn in a combination of debt relief and aid to Tunisia and Egypt. Qatar had previously pledged $10bn in the form of unspecified “investments” in Egypt while Saudi Arabia had promised $4bn, including a deposit at the Egyptian central bank and bond purchases. EDITOR’S CHOICE Islamic bonds display signs of recovery - May-25 Questions remain on bourse upgrades - Apr-20 Tunisian bourse awaits July elections - Apr-13 Egypt bourse set for fragile recovery - Mar-30 Turmoil fails to dent growth expectations - Mar-27 Bourses rally but risks remain - Mar-09 Scepticism abounds, however, about whether the pledges are either sufficient or structured to deal with the two countries’ pressing financing needs. One critical source of funding has fallen away. Foreign direct investment into the Arab world stands at $20.9bn so far this year, down from $28.7bn in the same period in 2010, according to FDI Markets, a sister company of the Financial Times. Much of the investment has flowed to the Gulf, where $5bn of projects has been announced for the United Arab Emirates and $3.8bn for Saudi Arabia, predominantly in the oil, gas, energy and chemicals sectors, says FDI Markets. In contrast Samir Radwan, Egypt’s finance minister, reported that declines in FDI contributed to an expected $2bn deficit in the country’s balance of payments between April and June. In the first quarter of last year, the country managed to record a foreign investment surplus of $4.3bn. In the same period this year, it suffered an outflow of $164m. “We had expected that FDI inflows would decrease significantly, but we did not expect to see existing FDI getting out of Egypt,” wrote analysts from Beltone, a Cairo brokerage. In Tunisia, FDI has fallen 22 per cent year on year, says Standard Chartered. To compound matters, support from multilaterals, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, is linked to political and economic reforms that new governments may be unable or unwilling to enact, analysts say. “The whole issue of aid is crucial. Finding financing through the regular channels or the international markets seems to be out of the question, hence the absolute need for foreign aid,” says Philippe Dauba-Pantanacce, a senior economist with Standard Chartered in Dubai. 230

Farouk Soussa, Citigroup’s Middle East economist, says the support as pledged is unlikely to help Egypt and Tunisia overcome their deteriorating public finances, a pressing problem as both countries face difficulties in accessing markets. Yields on Egyptian external debt are 200 basis points higher than before the crisis, Citi says. The US is due to guarantee a planned $1bn Eurobond, but Egypt faces a cumulative gross financing requirement of $56bn between 2011 and 2013, assuming existing debt holders roll over their debt, writes Mr Soussa in a research note. While Gulf nations have a political interest in seeing Egypt stabilise, analysts say the time frame of outside investment remains vague. “Historically the Gulf makes a lot of pledges,” says Said Hirsh, Middle East economist at Capital Economics. “If you look at the Palestine situation and other places in the Middle East, they have a big Arab summit and everyone says: ‘I’m giving $2bn, I’m giving $3bn.’ And a few years down the line no one has seen anything.” Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2011. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web. June 1 2011 15:58 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4166b360-8c5d-11e0-b1c8- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1O2ZsbeeR

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May 31, 2011 The Bin Laden Decade By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Visiting the Middle East last week, and then coming back to Washington, I am left with one overriding impression: Bin Laden really did a number on all of us. I am talking in particular about the Arab states, America and Israel — all of whom have deeper holes than ever to dig out of thanks to the Bin Laden decade, 2001 to 2011, and all of whom have less political authority than ever to make the hard decisions needed to get out of the holes. Let’s start with the Arabs. In 2001, Osama bin Laden attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Just a few months later, in 2002, the U.N. issued the “Arab Human Development Report,” which described the very pathologies that produced Al Qaeda and prescribed remedies for overcoming them. The report, written by Arab experts, said the Arab states suffered from three huge deficits: a deficit of freedom and respect for human rights as the bases of good governance, a deficit of knowledge in the form of decent schooling and a deficit of women’s empowerment. Instead of America and the Arab world making that report their joint post-Bin Laden agenda, they ignored it. Washington basically gave the Arab dictators a free pass to tighten their vise grip on their people — as long as these Arab leaders arrested, interrogated and held the Islamic militants in their societies and eliminated them as a threat to us. It wasn’t meant as a free pass, and we really did have a security problem with jihadists, and we really didn’t mean to give up on our freedom agenda — but Arab leaders, like Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, sensed where our priorities were. That is why Mubarak actually arrested the one Egyptian who dared to run against him for president in his last election, and he and the other Arab autocrats moved to install their sons as successors. As the Arab leaders choked their people that much tighter, along came Facebook, Twitter and cellphone cameras, which enabled those people to share grievances, organize rebellions, lose their fear and expose their leaders: “Smile, your brutality is on Candid Camera.” That’s the good news. The challenging news is that because of the Bin Laden decade, these newly liberated Arab states are in an even deeper hole in terms of economic development, population growth and education. They each have a huge amount of catch-up to do that will require some painful economic and educational reforms. But as one can quickly detect from a visit to Cairo, right now Egypt has a political vacuum and, if anything, is tending toward more populist, less-market-oriented economics. Yet, in return for infusions of cash, Egypt will probably have to accept some kind of I.M.F.-like austerity-reform package and slash government employment — just when unemployment and expectations are now sky high. Right now, no Egyptian party or leader has the authority that will be required to implement such reforms. 232

In America, President George W. Bush used the post-9/11 economic dip to push through a second tax cut we could not afford. He followed that with a Medicare prescription drug entitlement we cannot afford and started two wars in the wake of 9/11 without raising taxes to pay for them — all at a time when we should have been saving money in anticipation of the baby boomers’ imminent retirement. As such, our nation’s fiscal hole is deeper than ever and Republicans and Democrats — rather than coming together and generating the political authority needed for us to take our castor oil to compensate for our binge — are just demonizing one another. As the Israeli political theorist Yaron Ezrahi points out, governance is based on authority “that is generated in one of two ways — by trust or by fear. Both of those sources of authority are disintegrating right now.” The Arab leaders governed by fear, and their people are not afraid anymore. And the Western democracies governed by generating trust, but their societies today are more splintered than ever. Israel has the same problem. The combination of Yasir Arafat’s foolhardy decision to start a second intifada rather than embrace President Bill Clinton’s two-state peace plan, followed by the rise of Bin Laden, which diverted the U.S. from energetically pursuing the peace process, gave the Israeli right a free hand to expand West Bank settlements. There are now some 500,000 settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Absent some amazing Palestinian peace overture, and maybe even with one, I do not see any Israeli leader with enough authority today to pull Israel out of the West Bank. So, for now, Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu and Bin Laden both win: In the short run, Bibi gets to keep the West Bank, with 300,000 Jews occupying 2.4 million Palestinians. And in the long run, Bin Laden helps to destroy Israel as a Jewish democracy. For all these reasons, I find myself asking the same question in Cairo, Washington and Jerusalem: “Who will tell the people?” Who will tell the people how deep the hole is that Bin Laden helped each of us dig over the last decade — and who will tell the people how hard and how necessary it will be to climb out? THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN The Bin Laden Decade May 31, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/opinion/01friedman.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlin es&emc=tha212

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Teenage victim becomes a symbol for Syria's revolution Mutilated body of Hamza al-Khatib given to family as state TV says injuries were faked by conspirators Shiv Malik, Ian Black and Nidaa Hassan in Damascus guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 31 May 2011 20.42 BST The US state department says reports of the torture of a 13-year-old Syrian boy are horrifying Link to this video Syria condemned by US over human rights abuses - video The US state department says reports of the torture of a 13-year-old Syrian boy are horrifying, and dismisses the credibility of an amnesty offered by Syrian president Bashar al-Assad The new face of the Syrian revolution is chubby, has a winning smile and belongs to a 13-year-old named Hamza al-Khatib. The boy, from a village called al-Jizah near the southern city of Deraa, has become the most famous victim yet of Syria's bloody chapter of the Arab spring. Hamza was picked up by security forces on 29 April. On 27 May his badly mutilated corpse was released to his horrified family, who were warned to keep silent. According to a YouTube video and human rights activists, Hamza was tortured and his swollen body showed bullet wounds on his arms, black eyes, cuts, marks consistent with electric shock devices, bruises and whip marks. His neck had been broken and his penis cut off. Like Neda Agha-Soltan, the young woman who was shot dead in street protests after Iran's disputed presidential elections two years ago, Hamza has come to symbolise the innocent victims in a struggle for freedom against tyranny and repression. In the YouTube video, a picture of Hamza is held above his coffin. It shows his angelic grin and thick head of black hair. He is dressed in a polo shirt. Below the gold-framed photo lies his body. "He was taken alive and he was killed because he called for freedom," says the voice-over. Other grainy clips show crowds holding a banner saying: "The martyr Hamza al-Khatib, killed under torture by Assad's gangs." Cries of "Allahu Akbar" (God is greatest) were heard at his funeral and pro-democracy protesters have designated this Friday as "Children's Friday" in his memory." Hamza's violent death is being discussed all over Syria as citizens struggle to come to terms with the brutality that has accompanied the two-month uprising against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The official media are focusing on troops and police who have been killed by "armed terrorist gangs". 234

Videos of protests on Saturday show crowds chanting for Hamza in towns as far away as Latakia, home to the Assad clan. "The case has upset all of us," said a former security officer and father of four from Homs. "The brutality, especially to children, is only causing more people to come out – as it did in Deraa at the start of the protests." Several Facebook pages have been started, including one with more than 61,000 followers called "We are all Hamza al-Khatib". "Hamza has become a poster boy for the Syrian revolution," said Malik al-Abdeh, whose London-based Barada TV broke the story by broadcasting the YouTube clip last Thursday, before it went global on al-Jazeera Arabic on Friday. "It's the same thing that happened with Mohammed Bouazizi [the vendor who burned himself to death in protest] in Tunisia and Khaled Said [who was killed by police] in Egypt. But this was not another young man. He was just a boy." Syria's official media have accused al-Jazeera and other satellite channels of peddling propaganda. State television aired an hour-long programme on Tuesday night on the death of Hamza. Accompanied by a doctor, Akram Shaar, and a psychological doctor, Majdee al-Fares, the presenter promised to expose the "whole truth" of the affair. The doctors said the marks on Hamza's body were not signs of torture, as activists have alleged, but were faked by conspirators. The doctors said Hamza died from bullet wounds but that conspirators created the marks on his body, trying to give the people a Syrian equivalent to Bouazizi in order to agitate them. The programme also showed a pre-recorded conversation with Hamza's father and an uncle who said they trusted a pledge made by Assad to look into the circumstances of Hamza's death. The interior ministry said it would set up a committee to look into the tragedy. None of Hamza's relatives could be reached for comment. Hamza's father, Ali, 65, was detained on Saturday, according to activists in Damascus. Wissam Tarif, the director of the human rights group Insan, said Hamza's uncle was picked up on Monday and his brother had also been detained. The Syrian government has not allowed foreign journalists into the country since the uprising began in March. Demands for UN access have been rebuffed. Syrian activists and rights organisations say more than 1,100 people have been killed and thousands rounded up and tortured in the past 10 weeks, but Hamza's is the most brutal case yet. The fact that the body was returned to the family rather than disposed of was intended to warn off other people, they said. "This is a message from the state to all protesters," said a human rights expert who runs the Monitoring Protests Facebook page which focuses on abuses during the protests. "They are trying to say, 'We don't spare anyone and if you continue protesting this what we are going to do to you and your kids.' " The Local Co-ordinating Committees of Syria, the best-organised grassrootsopposition network, said at least 25 children under 18 had been killed since mid-March.

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The death toll includes a seven-year-old girl, Majd Ibrahim Airfaee, from Deraa, who was shot in the abdomen on 26 April, and Tamam Hamza Al-Saidawi, aged five, from Homs, who was shot dead in the car he was travelling in with his family in a case that has incensed the city. Rime Allaf, an associate fellow at the London thinktank Chatham House, said the Syrian government's decision to broadcast a response demonstrated it was aware of how deeply Hamza's case has angered Syrians. "Even people who have previously not taken sides, or who have been leaning towards the regime, have found this intolerable," she said. Nidaa Hassan is a pseudonym for a journalist in Syria

Shiv Malik, Ian Black and Nidaa HassanTeenage victim becomes a symbol for Syria's revolution Mutilated body of Hamza al-Khatib given to family as state TV says injuries were faked by conspirators31 May 2011 20.42 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/31/syria-unrest-teenage- victim-hamza?CMP=EMCGT_010611&

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Gaddafi wants truce in Libya, says Zuma, but terms unclear Leader appears in public to meet South African president on peace mission as more senior officials defect regime Julian Borger and Martin Chulov Tuesday 31 May 2011

South African president Jacob Zuma, left, discusses the prospects for peace with Muammar Gaddafi inside the presidential compound in Tripoli. Photograph: Reuters Tv/Reuters South Africa's president, Jacob Zuma, said on Monday night that Muammar Gaddafi was ready for a truce but gave no indication whether the Libyan leader was ready to give up power, as rebels and much of the international community are demanding. Gaddafi made a rare public appearance for the meeting with Zuma, the South African's second attempt to broker a ceasefire on behalf of the African Union. Libya's leader, who has been turned into a fugitive in his own capital by the ongoing Nato air strikes, welcomed Zuma at the Bab al-Aziziyah presidential compound wearing his trademark dark glasses. But he appeared healthy, dispelling rumours he had been injured in the air strike that killed his son Saif al-Arab at the beginning of this month. Gaddafi is reported to have shown Zuma the site of that attack. Zuma said later Gaddafi was "ready to implement the road map" – a reference to an AU peace plan involving a ceasefire and agreement on humanitarian supplies and reforms. The roadmap has already been rejected by the Benghazi-based rebels, and by Nato. Zuma said Gaddafi had insisted that "all Libyans be given a chance to talk among themselves" to determine the country's future, but made no mention of the Libyan leader's possible departure. His office denied rebel claims that the South African president had raised the subject. The rebels' morale was boosted by the dramatic defection of more senior Libyan officials. Eight officers – five generals, two colonels and a major – told a news conference in Rome organised by the Italian government that they were among 120 to have abandoned Gaddafi in the past few days.

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The officers said they had defected in protest at Gaddafi's actions against his own people, citing killings of civilians and violence against women. One of the eight accused pro-Gaddafi forces of genocide. They claimed Gaddafi's campaign against the rebels was rapidly weakening. General Melud Massoud Halasa told reporters that Gaddafi's forces were "only 20% as effective" as before the rebellion, as "not more than 10" generals remained loyal to him. The defections come at a time of intense military pressure on the regime, with the use of British and French helicopter gunships expected in the next few days. Meanwhile, armed westerners have been filmed on the frontline with rebels in the first apparent confirmation that foreign special forces are playing an active role in the Libyan conflict. A group of six westerners are clearly visible in a report by al-Jazeera from Dafniya, described as the westernmost point of the rebel lines west of Misrata. Five of them were armed and wearing sand-coloured clothes, baseball caps and cotton Arab scarves. The sixth, apparently the most senior of the group, was carrying no visible weapon and wore a pink, short-sleeve shirt. He may be an intelligence officer. The group is seen talking to rebels and quickly leaving on being spotted by the television crew. There have been numerous reports in the British press that SAS soldiers are acting as spotters in Libya to help Nato warplanes target pro-Gaddafi forces. In March, six special forces soldiers and two MI6 officers were detained by rebel fighters when they landed on an abortive mission to meet rebel leaders in Benghazi, in an embarrassing episode for the SAS. The group was withdrawn soon afterwards and a new "liaison team" sent in its place. Asked for comment on Monday, a Ministry of Defence spokeswoman said: "We don't have any forces out there." The subject is sensitive as the UN security council resolution in March authorising the use of force in Libya specifically excludes "a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory". Despite more than two months of bombing by Nato, rebels have remained unable to advance west of Misrata, or west of Brega, 300 miles to the east. The capital, Tripoli, also remains in the grip of Gaddafi. In April, William Hague announced that an expanded military liaison team would be dispatched to work with the Benghazi-based Transitional National Council, which is positioning itself as a democratic alternative to Gaddafi's rule. The foreign secretary said the team would help the rebels improve "organisational structures, communications and logistics" but stressed: "Our officers will not be involved in training or arming the opposition's fighting forces, nor will they be involved in the planning or execution of the [TNC's] military operations or in the provision of any other form of operational military advice." There were unconfirmed reports at the time that Britain would send former SAS members and other experienced soldiers to Libya under the cover of private security companies, paid for by Arab states, to train the anti-government forces.

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Julian Borger and Martin ChulovGaddafi wants truce in Libya, says Zuma, but terms unclear Tuesday 31 May 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/31/gaddafi-wants-truce-in- libya/print

Why no mention of a ceasefire for Libya, Obama?

The best way to protect desperate Libyan civilians is for Nato to reverse its mistake of taking sides

Jonathan Steele guardian.co.uk, Friday 27 May 2011 23.00 BST

Barack Obama with other G8 leaders at the Deauville summit this week, where the conflict in Libya was on the agenda. Photograph: Remy De La Mauveniere/AP Beware ministers' claims that a military campaign is making slow but steady progress. It nearly always means the opposite. If "progress" was really being made in Libya, why would it be necessary for Britain and France to send attack helicopters? Why would General Sir David Richards, the chief of the defence staff, call for Nato to bomb infrastructure in Tripoli? Above all, why has Barack Obama used his European tour this week to abandon his public caution and make it clear that regime change is now the western objective in Libya? The more Nato escalates in word and deed, the clearer it is that the campaign has stalled. What is going on in Libya is civil war but one that is stalemated, and has been so for at least a month. Gaddafi's forces will not be able to recapture Benghazi and the other major cities of eastern Libya just as the rebels will not be able to capture Tripoli. In light of this, Nato is doing all it can to assassinate Gaddafi in the fragile hope his death will lead to his regime's implosion and rebel victory by a different route. It is true Gaddafi and his family have done their best to suppress the building of independent political and administrative institutions during their decades in power. 239

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, where the army was able to break from supporting the dictator and real political parties existed, the Gaddafis have kept the state in their pocket. But even in this vacuum it does not follow that Gaddafi's death would suddenly bring peace and end the many conflicts in Libyan society. The word absent from Obama's remarks this week, as well as from Sarkozy and Cameron, is "ceasefire". An "immediate ceasefire" was one of the main demands of the UN security council resolution, which also authorised a no-fly zone at the start of the crisis, but it has been consistently ignored by Nato. On Thursday, almost unreported anywhere, an African Union summit called for a halt to Nato's airstrikes as well as a ceasefire and negotiations on transforming Libya into a democracy. The same evening the Libyan prime minister, Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi, said for the first time that his government was ready to talk to rebel leaders to prepare a new constitution. Meanwhile, Abdul Ilah al-Khatib, the UN secretary general's special envoy on Libya, has been quietly shuttling between Tripoli and Benghazi, trying to broker a ceasefire and talks. The obstacles are mainly on the rebels' side. Flushed with military support from Nato, they insist that Gaddafi must leave power before any ceasefire. Sending Apache helicopters and escalating Nato's offensive role only hardens the rebels' intransigence and further delays a political resolution. A ceasefire will have to be accompanied by an independent monitoring mission on the ground, preferably from the UN or the African Union, though Nato will no doubt keep up surveillance from the air. There has to be full access for humanitarian aid to civilians, as al-Khatib has been insisting. Close to a million people have fled the country. Tens of thousands have been displaced from their homes and are in dire need. Nato officials promptly kicked the Libyan government's offer of a ceasefire into the long grass, insisting it is "not credible". How can they know that? They claim previous ceasefire offers were shams since Gaddafi's forces never acted on them. But if they are to stick, ceasefires have to be mutual and the rebel side has never offered one. First, they wanted to be saved from defeat, and the initial Nato strikes achieved this for them. Then they thought Nato would help them win so they saw no value in stopping fighting. The time has come to test the latest ceasefire offer by accepting it in principle and working out a monitoring mechanism. The best way to protect Libya's desperate civilians is for Nato to reverse its mistaken policy of taking sides. It should declare support for the talks on transition that the Libyan government now says it favours. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/27/ceasefire-libya-obama-nato- mistake

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EUROPA Y EL MUNDO PRIMAVERA ÁRABE Las revoluciones árabes y nosotros 30 mayo 2011 MLADÁ FRONTA DNES PRAGUE

Manifestantes egipcios en la Plaza Tahrir de El Cairo, el pasado 18 de marzo. AFP Tras unos meses de revoluciones árabes ¿qué ha aprendido Europa de ellas? Según Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, catedrático de la Universidad de Londres, no debe sucumbir al mito de un conflicto entre el Islam y Occidente y sí entablar una diplomacia más ambiciosa e independiente. Jan Fingerland Imagine que vengo de Marte, que acabo de aterrizar en este planeta y no sé nada de Oriente Próximo. ¿Cómo me explicaría lo que está ocurriendo actualmente en el mundo árabe? Se está produciendo un levantamiento por la democracia y la libertad, por la independencia y los derechos humanos. Y está ocurriendo por primera vez desde la caída del Imperio Otomano. Todos los países árabes fundamentalmente surgieron de la desintegración de este imperio. Algunos cuentan con una historia separada como Estado-nación, como es el caso de Irán, Turquía y Arabia Saudí hasta cierto punto, pero la era colonial tuvo un gran impacto en la política interna. De este modo surgieron estructuras estatales autoritarias, porque los nuevos Estados intentaron crear una idea de lo que significa ser sirio, iraquí, jordano, etc. Los levantamientos tienen sus raíces en las sociedades en sí mismas y demandan un nuevo tipo de política. Las nuevas cadenas de televisión emiten con mucha independencia y es algo nuevo en esta región. Gracias a ellas, ha surgido un nuevo tipo de concienciación política, una nueva comprensión de la política y por consiguiente, nuevas demandas. Exigen responsabilidad a los que ocupan el poder y justicia social. ¿Significa que las sociedades árabes están superando ahora este legado de autoritarismo? ¿Qué ha ocurrido realmente? Para entender el fenómeno del autoritarismo en esta región, debemos ser conscientes de que estos países son herederos de un periodo violento de colonialismo y posteriormente de la resistencia post-colonial. Los líderes militares ocuparon los puestos superiores, no fue ninguna estructura estatal desarrollada orgánicamente. En Europa, estas estructuras evolucionaron a lo largo de los siglos. Se produjo la Revolución Francesa,

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hubo dos Guerras Mundiales, Hitler, las guerras de Mussolini y las guerras de Franco. La sociedad civil en Europa se desarrolló muy lentamente y así surgió una democracia probada y viable. Sin embargo, el mundo árabe nunca tuvo ese "privilegio de tener una historia". Pero ahora, las estructuras que crecieron desde la parte inferior hacia arriba se han rebelado contra la autoridad estatal y su soberanía. Y ya no hay vuelta atrás.

¿Qué significan las revoluciones árabes para Europa? Se plantean numerosos retos estratégicos y de seguridad, porque el terreno político está cambiando. Hay Gobiernos emergentes que escucharán más a sus sociedades y sociedades emergentes que demandarán una política exterior independiente de Occidente. No es ninguna coincidencia que Egipto y Túnez no apoyaran la intervención en Libia. Egipto además se está preparando para renovar sus relaciones con Irán, algo que hasta hace poco era un tabú total. La UE y Estados Unidos tendrán que prepararse para las situaciones que surgirán en la región y sobre las que tendrán mucho menos control del que tenían tan sólo hace un año. Aquí observamos similitudes con Latinoamérica, donde los regímenes antes eran mucho más dóciles con respecto a Occidente. Al igual que allí ya no son posibles las intervenciones imperialistas en sus asuntos, tampoco lo serán en Asia Occidental. ¿Se podría decir que es algo similar a una segunda oleada de descolonización? ¿Una menor influencia política directa de Occidente, pero una mayor influencia de las ideas occidentales? Sin duda. Después de todo, no se ha mostrado ninguna postura anti-estadounidense en las revoluciones árabes. Además, Turquía coopera con Europa, aunque también persigue sus propios objetivos. Personalmente, creo que es algo positivo. Es decir, contribuye a la causa de la paz en la región. En Oriente Próximo necesitamos una estrategia de seguridad que no sirva a los intereses de partes externas. ¿De qué modo evalúa las políticas de Occidente con respecto a las revoluciones árabes? La Unión Europea debe aplicar una política mucho más independiente de Estados Unidos de lo que ha mostrado hasta ahora. Ha sido patente en muchos aspectos, como Irak, el conflicto israelí-palestino, y más recientemente, el caso de Irán. Europa debe luchar por sus propios intereses. Será necesario que Irán se siente en la mesa de negociaciones. La política de marginación y sanción con respecto a ese país ha fracasado. El proyecto nuclear de Irán es imparable y no existe ninguna solución militar. Todo el mundo lo sabe. Y la Unión Europea es mejor socia en este diálogo que Estados Unidos, porque no pesa sobre ella ningún bagaje histórico. En este sentido, también importan las consideraciones estratégicas. Por ejemplo, ¿cómo transportaremos en el futuro el petróleo y el gas de Afganistán? ¿No sería mejor llevar el oleoducto a través de India, Pakistán e Irán que a través de Rusia? De igual modo, la operación libia ha sido un error. Europa está estrechamente ligada con el mundo islámico y árabe y tiene que admitirlo. Si la operación libia ha sido un error, ¿cree que hubiera sido preferible que Europa no interviniera en Libia? ¿Aunque supusiera tener que ver cómo Gadafi masacraba a la oposición? Si al inicio del conflicto hubiera sido posible organizar una conferencia para reunir a las diferentes partes regionales, en la que tanto Gadafi como la oposición se hubieran 242

sentado, habría sido mejor. Si hubiera habido una iniciativa diplomática al comienzo, entonces creo que Gadafi no habría reaccionado del modo que lo hizo al final. Al ver que hay otra solución, surgirían dudas sobre si debe o no masacrar a su propia población. Por el contrario, la intervención militar empeoró la violencia en Libia. No se puede someter a las personas bombardeándolas, ni intervenir militarmente para crear una nueva situación. ¿Quién cree que está defendiendo el régimen de Gadafi? Aún cuenta con algo de apoyo. No se trata simplemente de contratar mercenarios. ¿Qué ocurrirá con los restos de ese régimen? La diplomacia estratégica podría resolver este punto muerto. Entonces, ¿Libia es otro Irak para Occidente, pero más cerca de las fronteras de Europa? Nadie conoce exactamente cuál es el movimiento en el este de Libia. Está lejos de ser simplemente una cuestión de liberales y demócratas. Existen muchas fuerzas tribales distintas con sus propios objetivos y también yihadistas. Al-Qaeda celebra esta situación, porque estos eventos se pueden integrar en su visión mundial del conflicto entre el Islam y Occidente. Una solución militar sería contraproducente.

PERFIL Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam nació en el seno de una familia iraní, aunque se crió principalmente en Alemania. Actualmente imparte clases en la prestigiosa School of Oriental and African Studies en la Universidad de Londres. Es también autor de varios libros, el más reciente A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilizations (Una metahistoria del Choque de Civilizaciones), en el que revisa los conflictos culturales de la historia europea desde las guerras greco-persas, pasando por las Cruzadas, hasta acabar en la actual guerra contra el terrorismo. Jan Fingerland, “Las revoluciones árabes y nosotros”, MLADÁ FRONTA DNES, Praga, 30 mayo 2011 http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/article/684651-las-revoluciones-arabes-y-nosotros

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Middle East May 29, 2011 Islamists Seize a Yemeni City, Stoking Fears By NASSER ARRABYEE and LAURA KASINOF SANA, Yemen — Islamist militants consolidated control over a second city in southern Yemen on Sunday, seizing banks, government offices and the security headquarters as government forces responded with mortar fire. The fall of the coastal city of Zinjibar to self-styled holy warriors who claimed to have “liberated” it from “the agents of the Americans” fed into Western fears that militants sympathetic to Al Qaeda could exploit the breakdown of authority to take control of territory. Political opponents of Yemen’s embattled president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, portrayed the takeover as a ploy by Mr. Saleh to prove to wavering allies why they needed to keep him in power. While Mr. Saleh, who has faced months of massive street protests demanding his ouster, has frequently warned that militants would take over the country if he left, there was no evidence on Sunday that he had any role in allowing Zinjibar to fall. The fighting in the south came after a week in which tribal fighting in the capital, Sana, pushed the country to the brink of civil war. That front seemed to quiet on Sunday as the government struck a cease-fire deal with its tribal rivals, bringing relative calm here after days of fierce fighting in which more than 100 people were killed. Violence broke out between the two sides last Monday after Mr. Saleh refused to follow through on his promise to sign an agreement leading to his resignation. It was the third time since the uprising began in January that Mr. Saleh had agreed to transfer power, and the third time he reneged on the promise. Officials described the truce as tenuous, and gun fire and shelling were heard in the capital late on Sunday night. The protests that have drawn hundreds of thousands of people into the streets in cities across Yemen continued, and at the largest one, in the central city of Taiz, security forces fired at protesters from a government building on Sunday, killing four, according to a local doctor, Abdul Rahim al-Samie. Early on Monday, protesters there said that plainclothes men were setting their tents on fire and destroying others with bulldozers. The United States has until recently backed Mr. Saleh as an ally in the fight against Al Qaeda, whose Yemeni branch is considered one of the most active terrorist threats against the United States and Europe. The militants who took over the town of Jaar in March and Zinjibar this weekend are not known to have ties to Al Qaeda, but the volatile province of Abyan, where both cities are located, is filled with citizens who are sympathetic to the group. Residents said that despite the efforts of a handful of soldiers, who mounted a brief defense, the town fell quickly and easily to several hundred militants. Most of the

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military quickly abandoned the town on Friday, residents said, but it was impossible to determine whether they had been ordered to do so. They also said that the militants had been driving around the city in cars with loudspeakers blaring, “We declare that Zinjibar fell in the hands of mujahedeen after it was liberated from the agents of the Americans.” A security official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the news media, said that five soldiers had been killed in the fighting there since Friday. The former defense minister, Abdullah Ali Eliwa, accused Mr. Saleh of ordering his forces “to hand over Zinjibar” to the militants in order to “frighten people that if he goes, Yemen will become Somalia.” He offered no proof of that claim, and by Sunday government forces were firing artillery at the militants, which experts said suggested they were either not complicit or that the demonstration had run its course. Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen analyst at Princeton University, said that Mr. Saleh “has certainly exaggerated the Al Qaeda threat throughout the years,” finding that foreign aid increases when the threat appears to be higher. Mr. Saleh warned in a speech a week ago that Abyan would fall to Al Qaeda if he were forced from office. And when militants took over Jaar, Mr. Saleh in several speeches claimed that Al Qaeda was running the entire province of Abyan, a stark exaggeration. Mr. Johnsen said it had not been determined conclusively whether the militants there have ties to Al Qaeda. The Yemeni branch of Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has commented on the takeover of Jaar, but has not claimed responsibility for it, he said. Clearly the terrorist organization has taken advantage of the chaos to raise its profile, and the fighting in Zinjibar was another example of militants using the lack of authority to advance their own causes. In the north, Houthi rebels established themselves as the rulers of Saada Province in March after government officials fled the area. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has a stronghold in southeastern Yemen, which is believed to be the base of Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical American-born cleric whose efforts as a Qaeda propagandist and plotter have gained prominence in the organization. American officials have expressed alarm that the group has been allowed a freer hand in Yemen since the turmoil began, and have reported a stream of Qaeda operatives making their way to Yemen from other parts of the world to join the fight there. The United States, which had refrained from criticizing Mr. Saleh even as his supporters fired on demonstrators, quietly dropped its support for him two months ago, viewing his position as no longer tenable and his value as a counterterrorism asset diminished by his declining power. Nonetheless, American officials have pressed for a resolution that would allow its counterterrorism operations in Yemen to continue. In Sana, Yemeni officials said Mr. Saleh had agreed to a truce with his historic tribal rivals the Ahmar family, and there were tangible signs of a reduction in tensions on Sunday.

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Tribesmen from the Hashid tribal confederation loyal to the Ahmar family began Sunday to hand over to the authorities government buildings that they had occupied last week. “We will hand over the other ministries one by one gradually,” Hashem al-Ahmar, one of the 10 Ahmar brothers, told reporters on Sunday. “There is a truce and it is still holding,” said Abdul Karim Aleryani, a prominent governing party official and an adviser to Mr. Saleh. But a spokesman for Sadiq al- Ahmar, Abdulqawi Qaisi, told local reporters that the Ahmars would fully comply with a cease-fire only if the government removed its security forces from their posts in houses near the Ahmar compound in the Hasaba district in northern Sana. Nasser Arrabyee reported from Sana, and Laura Kasinof from Hagerstown, Md. N. Arrabyee Y L. Kasinof, “Islamists Seize a Yemeni City, Stoking Fears May 29, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/world/middleeast/30yemen.html?_r=1&nl=todays headlines&emc=tha2

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Brotherhood sheikh to run for president 29/05/2011 Hany ElWaziry Sun, 29/05/2011 - 14:02

Photographed by other Muslim Brotherhood Sheikh Hazem Abu Ismail announced his intention to run in Egypt’s upcoming presidential elections. He said that if elected he would implement Islamic sharia law and cancel the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Ismail was the Brotherhood’s candidate in 2005 parliamentary elections for Dokki in Giza. The group announced earlier that it would not take part in the presidential elections and confirmed that it would compete for only half the seats in Parliament. But Ismail is the second Brotherhood member to have announced his intention to run for president in defiance of the group's leadership. The other Brotherhood candidate is Abdel Moneim Abouel Fotouh, a liberal-minded Islamist.( Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh: A Witness to the History of Egypt’s Islamic Movement; Brotherhood won’t support Fotouh for president, says Saleh) Abu Ismail said Saturday during a speech in a Dokki mosque that he will sweep the elections. Since he is an ordinary man, he said, the masses will support him. Abu Ismail said that his platform revolves around Islam, while "Mohamed ElBaradei, Amr Moussa, and Hamdeen Sabahi, the liberal candidates, will be unable to present a clear vision” for the country. “If I could apply sharia in Egypt, all people, including non-Muslims, would applaud me four years later,” said Abu Ismail. The sheikh said that no current presidential candidate represents the Egyptian people.“We seek to apply Islamic law, but those who don’t want it prefer cabarets, alcohol, dancers and prostitution, as the implementation of Islamic law will prohibit women to appear naked in movies and on beaches,” Abu Ismail added. For his opinion on Brotherhood, he said, “They are chaste people and my opinion would not change even if they don’t support me.” Concerning the peace treaty with Israel, he said, “The Camp David peace treaty is insulting to the Egyptian people, so it must be canceled, and I will do my best to convince people to cancel it.” Translated from the Arabic Edition http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/455693

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EDITORIAL Yemen, en el abismo 29/05/2011 Lo que comenzó hace cuatro meses como una prolongación de las revueltas de otros países árabes en busca de libertad, amenaza en Yemen, varios cientos de muertos después, con convertirse en guerra civil. La causa fundamental de esta deriva -de gravedad multiplicada por la situación geográfica del país (tres millones de barriles de petróleo pasan diariamente frente a sus costas) y el enraizamiento en su suelo de una audaz rama de Al Qaeda- es el incumplimiento del presidente Ali Abdalá Saleh de sus promesas de abandonar el poder que ejerce despóticamente desde hace 33 años. Yemen es un país aislado, misérrimo, roto y corrompido desde la cúspide, sostenido básicamente por Arabia Saudí y marginalmente por EE UU, que paga con 300 millones de dólares anuales la cooperación antiterrorista de Saná. Su débil tejido social está apuntalado por clanes y tribus. La más importante de ellas se ha alzado ahora contra Saleh y hecho causa común con quienes desafían en la calle la tiranía. El enfrentamiento, con armas pesadas, está causando decenas de muertos en los últimos días. De todos los males que afligen a Yemen, el más agudo hoy es la permanencia del dictador. Saleh, abandonado por una parte de los suyos, ha traicionado hasta por tres veces su promesa de marcharse -pese a la inmunidad que le garantiza la iniciativa de los países del Golfo- y utiliza a sus soldados y pistoleros para matar a sus compatriotas. El G-8 acaba de exigirle que deje el poder. El apoyo prometido en París a las primaveras árabes debe incluir a los yemeníes que luchan por su libertad, pero si fuera necesario añadir un argumento egoísta a una cuestión elemental de dignidad, Occidente lo tiene a mano. Saleh en el poder acerca su país a la descomposición total y la guerra; vale decir a una mayor inseguridad en la puerta del primer productor petrolífero del mundo y a un caldo de cultivo insuperable para Al Qaeda. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Yemen/abismo/elpepuopi/20110529elpepiopi_3 /Tes

ENRIC GONZÁLEZ Manifiesto de personalidades de Israel por un Estado palestino27/05/2011 ENRIC GONZÁLEZ - Jerusalén - 27/05/2011 Un grupo de personalidades israelíes publica hoy un manifiesto en el que se pide a la Unión Europea que reconozca en septiembre un Estado palestino independiente. “La horrorosa exhibición del primer ministro Benjamín Netanyahu en Washington y el inequívoco apoyo que ha recibido del Congreso de Estados Unidos pueden marcar el fin del proceso de paz”, dice el texto. “Las únicas alternativas en este momento son un impulso palestino hacia la independencia o el riesgo de un nuevo estallido de violencia”. Los firmantes de la declaración están vinculados al movimiento de solidaridad con Sheik Jarrah, uno de los barrios de Jerusalén Oriental más afectados por la colonización, y entre ellos figuran Daniel Kahneman (premio Nobel de Economía), Michael Ben Yair (ex fiscal general de Israel), Avrum Burg (expresidente del Parlamento), Ilan Baruch

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(embajador), Alon Liel (ex director general de Asuntos Exteriores), Menachem Yaari (expresidente de la Academia Israelí de las Artes y las Ciencias) y los escritores Ronit Matalon y Nir Baram. El manifiesto señala que “el fracaso de la comunidad internacional y en especial de Estados Unidos en la renovación de las negociaciones de paz refleja una innegable y desconcertante realidad: la paz ha sido secuestrada por el proceso de paz. Maniobra de distracción La continua construcción de colonias en Cisjordania y Jerusalén Oriental y el rechazo israelí a detener las construcciones en beneficio de la negociación indican que los actuales líderes de Israel usan el proceso de paz como una maniobra de distracción, y no como un medio para resolver el conflicto”. Y añade: “Una declaración de independencia palestina no solo es legítima, es también un paso positivo para ambas naciones”. Los firmantes del manifiesto anuncian su intención de pedir entrevistas con los embajadores europeos para solicitarles que sus Gobiernos reconozcan el Estado palestino cuando, en septiembre, la Autoridad Palestina lo demande formalmente ante la Asamblea General de la ONU. A juzgar por los sondeos, el manifiesto refleja una opinión minoritaria en la sociedad israelí. El enfrentamiento de Netanyahu con el presidente Barack Obama, y su posterior discurso ante el Congreso, en el que afirmó que la paz solo podría hacerse bajo condiciones impuestas por Israel, han disparado la popularidad del primer ministro. Su intransigencia es respaldada por su coalición conservadora de nacionalistas y religiosos y por la mayoría de los electores. ENRIC GONZÁLEZ Manifiesto de personalidades de Israel por un Estado palestino27/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Manifiesto/personalidades/Israel/Estado/p alestino/elpepiint/20110527elpepiint_10/Tes

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ENTREVISTA: STÉPHANE HESSEL "La indignación debe ir seguida de compromiso"

"Progreso no significa acelerarse, sino tender a un mundo mejor"

"El final del siglo XX fue prometedor. Luego se rompió el orden mundial" Con 93 años, este diplomático francés, escritor y activista del progreso, ha inspirado a los jóvenes europeos, y con mucha fuerza a los españoles, bajo el lema de su libro: '¡Indignaos!'. JESÚS RUIZ MANTILLA 29/05/2011 Sobre la mesa de su salón parisiense, Stéphane Hessel guarda un ejemplar de EL PAÍS en el que aparece una foto con jóvenes españoles indignados. Pertenece a los primeros días de la convocatoria de una ola de manifestaciones bajo el título de su libro, que va camino de vender 400.000 ejemplares en España y que ha alcanzado los dos millones en Francia. Este chaval de 93 años apareció en el momento justo, con la palabra justa. Su único mérito ha sido recapitular. Colocar en alza valores que hoy están amenazados y que han costado años y décadas de lucha y sacrificio. Libertad, igualdad, justicia, legalidad, compromiso, derechos humanos. Palabras labradas a base de sangre y fuego, en su caso no con demagogia barata. Porque Hessel tiene sus razones para indignarse cuando vislumbra la amenaza de verlas desaparecer. No es un charlatán, ni un panfletario, aunque reivindique el género en el que Marx y Engels redactaron el Manifiesto comunista -él no comulga con ello- o Zola lanzara su Yo acuso sobre el caso Dreyfus. Nacido en Berlín en 1917, se convirtió en francés después de que sus padres huyeran de la amenaza nazi y se instalaran en París. Se enroló en la Resistencia, fue condenado a muerte y torturado por la Gestapo, pasó temporadas en varios campos de concentración y fue testigo de excepción en la histórica redacción de la Declaración de Derechos Humanos. Una vida y una altura moral más que suficientes para sacudir conciencias a nivel global. Un héroe civil, un agitador pacífico y con las ideas claras. Miles de personas manifestándose en España al grito de "¡Indignaos!". Estará satisfecho. Su mensaje ha calado. Ya lo he visto. Me alegro. Cuando empezamos con la idea de este pequeño libro teníamos a Francia en la cabeza. Ocurrió que en pocas semanas se produjeron varios acontecimientos. La popularidad de Sarkozy se fue hundiendo, lo mismo ocurrió en Italia con Berlusconi, e incluso en España con Zapatero, y en Portugal con Sócrates. Antes de que se produjeran las revueltas del norte de África, la idea de que los Gobiernos de varias partes del mundo rozaban comportamientos que provocaban la indignación de la gente era algo que raramente habíamos visto. Y le dio por escribir este discurso y convertirlo en libro. No es un trabajo literario, en absoluto. Queríamos lanzar algo corto y estimulante. Puede que hasta tenga faltas de sintaxis. La editora se sentó justo donde está usted ahora, yo empecé a hablar, lo redactó, me lo dio, lo corregimos y lo lanzamos.

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Como una entrevista. Una pena para mí, podía haberme tocado, ya que estamos. Exactamente, así ocurrió. Lo digo porque surgió de manera natural, como una conversación. Y una vez en la calle corrió como la pólvora. Es que hay mucha gente esperando un discurso que aglutine ciertos sentimientos. La palabra justa, la expresión que todos tienen en la cabeza. Esa indignación. Lo he podido comprobar, efectivamente. Pero el libro está basado en dos textos: el programa de la Resistencia, no muy bueno, pero escrito en el momento y en el lugar justos; cuando los franceses se sentían acorralados por un enemigo como los nazis. El otro es la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos. De la que usted fue testigo de excepción. Estuve allí cuando se redactó. Yo era demasiado joven para formar parte de ese grupo de 12 sabios, pero fui asistente. Les ayudé a organizar las reuniones, a redactar las actas. Los que estaban allí eran figuras de primer nivel en la esfera de la política y el derecho como la viuda del presidente Roosevelt, Eleanor. Se encontraban en Nueva York y en Ginebra y yo me encargaba de prepararles los papeles y asegurarme de que hacían el trabajo. ¿Vigilándoles? Como secretario. Yo era un joven diplomático, carecía de autoridad, pero me sobraba curiosidad. Tenía motivaciones muy profundas para que el trabajo saliera de la mejor manera. El hecho de haber acabado la guerra en tres campos de concentración era suficiente impulso para mí. Estuvo usted en Buchenwald. Allí conocí a Jorge Semprún. Un gran amigo; guardo una anécdota de él importante. Cuando llegó al campo y le preguntaron a qué se dedicaba respondió: estudiante. "Si pongo eso", dijo el que tomaba el registro, "le matarán inmediatamente, voy a dejar las primeras letras y lo voy a transformar en estucador. Así, por lo menos, le asignarán trabajos manuales". Era lo único que buscaban. Pero volvamos a ¡Indignaos! Me gustaría que contara el significado que para usted lleva ese término. Es una palabra que utiliza con un sentido positivo. Apela a aquellos que la sienten para contagiársela a quienes no la llevan dentro. Contiene su lado positivo, pero también sus partes oscuras. Y si es así, ¿cómo cree que se puede contagiar su parte de luz? Le confieso que el título fue propuesto por la editora, Sylvie Crossman. Pero lo acepté inmediatamente. ¿Con su llamada imperativa? Sí, señor, y con su signo de exclamación. Es fuerte. Mucho más de lo que yo hubiera propuesto, porque no me considero un revolucionario, soy diplomático que cree en la no violencia. Busco poner a la gente de acuerdo, más que enfrentarla. Eso es bastante radical para los tiempos que corren. Estamos rodeados de políticos que nos llevan a la guerra. ¿El diálogo es hoy revolucionario? Puede ser. Pero si nos atenemos a los significados, le diré que lo que más me convence de la palabra es que contiene otro término fundamental: dignidad. Por eso lo acepté. Cuando la dignidad se pone en cuestión es necesario reaccionar. La indignación viene del pisoteo de la dignidad que cada ser humano lleva consigo. Por eso siempre me remito a la Declaración de Derechos Humanos. En su artículo primero ya dice: Todos los seres humanos somos iguales en dignidad y en derechos. Y ahora viene a apelar al compromiso. El nuevo libro se titula precisamente Comprometeos. Es el paso moral siguiente a la indignación. Nadie puede molestarse por 251

que el prójimo se comprometa con algo. Puede molestarse si se rebela, si se remonta impulsivamente, eso es hacer el caldo a otros como Marine Le Pen [líder de la ultraderecha en Francia]. Lo que ella proclama es eso, pero yo apoyo la indignación en el sentido contrario. La que me sacude cuando los derechos básicos son atacados, perseguidos. Enfadarse y ya, para mí no tiene sentido. La ira no conduce a ninguna parte, debe ir seguida de compromiso. Difícil. No propongo a la gente que se enfade sin más, sino que se pregunte cuáles son las razones que ponen en peligro esos valores fundamentales que hemos heredado y que ahora tiemblan. No es fácil, no. Sobre todo, aclararnos en toda esta confusión. Un caldo de cultivo para diferentes indignaciones, para diferentes intereses. Al leer el libro quedan claros los valores, los peligros y los retos. Son tres o cuatro. Empezando por los de la Revolución Francesa. Por algunos de ellos. Otros, insisto, la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos. ¿Los ve en la picota? Bastante, pero no olvidemos que en el tiempo en que fue redactada aquella declaración, el mundo todavía estaba amenazado por algunos totalitarismos. El fascismo había sido derrotado. Pero el comunismo pervivía. Luego se ha ido imponiendo otra ideología perversa basada en el mercado y nada más que en el mercado. Hoy, usted y yo, sufrimos sus consecuencias, las de un grupo privilegiado que busca sus beneficios a nuestras expensas. ¿Qué proponer como alternativa? La democracia real. Bonita palabra. Confiar en depositar cada vez más poder en la gente común para que sus necesidades sean la prioridad a resolver por los Gobiernos, el primer deber. Los Gobiernos deben asegurar libertad, hermandad, igualdad y justicia social. Y progreso. Otro concepto en crisis. Lo confundimos con progreso técnico, científico, pero no con bienestar. Absolutamente. Es algo muy sencillo, progresar significa tender a la mejoría. La palabra mejor es importante. ¿Cuál es la diferencia entre el bien y el mal? ¿Es mejor ganar dinero a cualquier precio o preservar la decencia y el honor? ¿Es mejor entrar en la espiral de un progreso científico a toda costa o guardarnos de descubrimientos que superen la dignidad del ser humano? Progreso no significa acelerarse, sino ser consciente de cuáles son los valores que ayudan a crear un mundo mejor y cuáles no. La democracia es exigente en sí. Demanda más a los políticos y logra tejer un sistema del que es difícil salir bien parado si actúas mal. Volvamos a los claroscuros de la palabra indignación. Hubo un tiempo en que aquel sentimiento le llevó a un camino violento. ¿Qué sentía dentro, en sus tripas? No soy un tipo violento. Puedo entender qué lleva a la gente a la violencia. Pero a mí no me convence. Mi primera indignación tenía un nombre: los nazis. El fascismo de Franco y Mussolini, incluso Stalin, de quien ya tuvimos noticias de sus purgas en 1935. El totalitarismo. Además, teníamos el ejemplo de los republicanos españoles como contraposición a los comunistas más cerrados. Yo siempre me consideré demócrata, y cuando este sistema estaba en peligro me indignaba. Pero incluso dudé. Los estragos de la I Guerra Mundial nos hacían pensar a muchos que había que agotar todas las vías antes de entrar en otro conflicto. Negociar y dar la palabra a la gente de los diferentes países. Solo cuando vi claro que esta gente lo único que quería hacer era conquistar Europa con métodos violentos me convencí de que había que enfrentarse a ellos por las armas. 252

Pero esa indignación, físicamente, ¿era equiparable a la que siente ahora? No, entonces era joven y con ganas de luchar. Cuando llegó la hora, cuando vi que era necesario levantarme y enfrentarme a ellos, me invadió un deseo de lucha. Me enrolé en el ejército sin dudarlo. Y cuando se firmó el armisticio con los alemanes me volví a indignar. Sentí que era una deshonra y una deslealtad con los británicos. Me opuse; era inaceptable. ¿Qué podía hacer? ¿Luchar en Francia? ¿Unirme fuera a De Gaulle? Eso es lo que hice. Y tuvo una relación intensa con él, han contado algunos. No. Yo era muy joven y un oficial de bajo rango. Pero tuve el privilegio al llegar a Londres de cenar con él en la intimidad. Me convocó. Quería saber qué pensaba de él un joven estudiante de la Escuela Normal Superior, muy prestigiosa entonces en Francia. Deseaba conocer lo que opinábamos de él los estudiantes de ese nivel. Por lo menos, y gracias a la fortuna, también De Gaulle se indignó. Cosa que no ocurría entre una enorme parte de los franceses. Aquello fue tan extraño en un país que había levantado las banderas de la democracia en todo el mundo... ¿Qué ocurrió? Francia había sido tremendamente golpeada. Lo que había ocurrido entre mayo y junio de 1940 es algo muy raro en la historia. No solo fue una victoria militar. Fue una enorme derrota, humillante, en la que la gente tuvo que huir de sus casas hacia lugares insospechados. A muchos, el armisticio les supuso un respiro. La paz era tentadora para mucha gente, pero aquello no era paz. ¿Era una humillación? Además, había otros factores. La amenaza de los soviéticos aterrorizaba a la burguesía, mientras que los fascismos no tanto, creían que no atentaban tanto a su modo de vida. Además, los nazis garantizaban el freno a los comunistas más que nadie. Luego, en su caso particular vino otra nueva indignación. ¡La Gestapo! Ahí sufrió en sus propias carnes el peligro. ¿Cómo fue su detención? En el momento en que me arrestaron estaba seguro de que no sobreviviría. Me detuvieron bajo cargos de delitos criminales graves. Sabían que había llegado de Londres para reforzar la Resistencia. Incluso, que usted era judío. Eso no lo sabían. Me conocían poco. Si se hubiesen enterado de que mi padre era un judío emigrado de Berlín, me habrían tratado de otra forma. Pero lo hicieron como a un espía de nivel. Y, ¿qué haces con un espía? Obviamente, sacarle información. ¿Bajo torturas? Efectivamente. En la bañera, ahogándome. Pero no consiguieron que delatara a nadie, y eso fue una satisfacción para mí. Después me condenaron a muerte. Afortunadamente, la justicia era lenta y me internaron en Buchenwald y la orden de ahorcarme llegó muy tarde. Ya entonces pude cambiar mi identidad con alguien que había fallecido sin que se dieran cuenta. Era una persona que no estaba condenada a muerte. Así me libré. Me imagino que en aquellos días la indignación se había convertido en terror. No exactamente. Se transformó en algo que solo un joven patriota puede sentir. Ese convencimiento henchido en el que crees que has cumplido con tu deber y te has sacrificado por tu país. ¡Un héroe! [Risas] Le cuento algo Cuando me detuvieron cogí un trozo de papel y escribí un soneto de Shakespeare que sabía de memoria: "No longer morn for me when I 253

am dead...". Como diciendo, si me fusilan mañana, que mi esposa sepa que no quiero luto, sino que sea feliz. Ridículo, esto siempre resulta ridículo. Es una manera noble de enfrentarse a la muerte. La vida está llena de ironías. Si le hubieran dicho entonces que cumpliría 93 años... ¡Y tanto! Mi siguiente indignación llegó en los campos de concentración. Yo sabía que la guerra era violenta. Pero lo que nunca pude sospechar es el grado de brutalidad al que podíamos llegar los seres humanos. Pasó de sentirse un héroe a otro estado: el de víctima. No solo una víctima individual, sino parte de una colectividad. Porque yo, personalmente, tuve suerte. Me salvé entre un grupo de 36 condenados a muerte. Yo y dos personas más. Me enviaron a otro campo y me escapé. Cuando lo logré me volvieron a capturar y me internaron en Dora. Allí se debatían entre colgarme o darme 25 latigazos. Pero me libré de ambas cosas porque le dije al oficial que me interrogaba: Estoy seguro de que usted, que es valiente, como yo, habría intentado escapar. Lo hice, pero fallé, con lo que no les puedo causar daño. Todo eso se lo expliqué en alemán, que es mi idioma materno. Si no hubiese hablado su lengua, seguramente nadie me habría librado del castigo. En su vida han existido también momentos de alegría. Como el de la Declaración de Derechos. Poner de acuerdo en una posición común a países tan distintos como Francia, EE UU, la URSS o Arabia Saudí sería un esfuerzo titánico. ¿Costó? Lo atestigüé de primera mano. Si no se hubiera conseguido en 1948, las tensiones posteriores lo habrían hecho imposible después. En ese momento histórico, los soviéticos se abstuvieron, Arabia, también, y así permitieron su aprobación. Fue el momento. Un texto ambicioso para la historia de la humanidad. Supongo que en aquellos momentos su indignación dio paso a la esperanza. Pues sí. Ese momento fue de auténtica, de verdadera y gran esperanza en el entendimiento de las naciones tras la guerra. Estábamos convencidos de que aquel texto encarrilaría a buena parte del mundo en el camino de la libertad y la justicia. Pero aquello duró poco, porque después llegó otro sentimiento: la ansiedad que producía el peligro de una tercera guerra, que no sería como las otras, sino que traería consigo la catástrofe nuclear. El mundo había conocido dos horrores: el Holocausto e Hiroshima, y eso nos producía un enorme temor. Era un mundo complicado e inseguro. Sentíamos que si la ONU no conseguía éxitos en sus programas de desarrollo y respeto a los derechos humanos, todo se iría derrumbando. ¿Le queda algo del optimismo de entonces? Todavía creo que existen pequeños y lentos pasos adelante y que continuarán, con retrocesos y avances. La última década del siglo XX fue muy prometedora. Después de la caída del Muro estábamos convencidos de habernos adentrado en una nueva era. En 2000 se llegó a un acuerdo bajo la presidencia de Kofi Annan de los objetivos del milenio. Pero cayeron las Torres Gemelas... Y empezamos el siglo XXI muy mal. Con la amenaza terrorista, pero también con la ruptura de las reglas internacionales por parte de Bush, Blair y Aznar. ¿Qué supuso aquello para el orden mundial? Aquello es parte de mi indignación presente. El hecho de que los ciudadanos sean conscientes de que estábamos dando grandes pasos adelante y esos líderes los frenaran en seco y nos colocaran en la dirección equivocada. ¿No fue aquello una especie de paripé de cruzados por la democracia que en realidad representaban una especie de fascismo travestido? Desde luego. Una de las reglas 254

básicas a respetar en ese nuevo orden mundial que empezaba a configurarse a finales del siglo XX era el derecho internacional. Romperlo era adentrarse en lo peor. Contra gobernantes de ignorancia supina, ¿qué se puede hacer? ¡Indignarse! Necesitamos otros gobernantes, y también, compromiso de la sociedad para aupar a los más decentes. No podemos caer en esa desazón de la juventud, ni en pensar que todos los políticos son iguales, porque no es cierto. La rabia y la indiferencia no nos llevan a ninguna parte. En su vida ha existido otra indignación persistente: Palestina. De nuevo, la ruptura de las reglas internacionales, la brutalidad impuesta, la situación en Gaza y Cisjordania aúnan todo lo que más he detestado en mi vida. Parecida a la que sentí en los campos de concentración. Siento un gran aprecio por el Estado de Israel, pero cuando su Gobierno se comporta de una manera similar a los peores Gobiernos que yo he tenido que soportar en mi vida, no puedo admitirlo y me rebelo y denuncio esos abusos cometidos por ellos con el permiso de Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y algunas empresas involucradas en la situación. Es lo mismo que siento respecto a la incapacidad para ponerse de acuerdo sobre el cambio climático. Espero que ahora Obama, tras haber acabado con Bin Laden y ganado popularidad, pueda avanzar en ciertas cosas. Por cierto, ¿qué opina de ese episodio? Bueno, yo me alegro de que se haya acabado con él. Era un asesino capaz de cosas espantosas. Sobre todo, de haberle dado al islam una imagen siniestra en el mundo. Y no es así. La gente de los países árabes se ha encargado en pocos meses de hacernos saber que aspiran al sentido común con sus revueltas. Pero, volviendo a Bin Laden, hubiera sido deseable otro método: la detención, un juicio. ¿Dónde queda Europa con esas amenazas de políticas antiinmigración? Justo ese es el objetivo de mi libro. Concienciar a la gente para afrontar los nuevos retos con valores dignos. No son nuestras ínfimas naciones las que están en peligro, es nuestro mundo, cada vez más amenazado por corrientes como los neocons o quienes no se mentalizan en el trato al medio ambiente. La fe en el compromiso es clave. No estamos condenados al fracaso, pero para evitarlo hay que dar un paso adelante. AUTORIDAD MORAL Toda una vida de lucha por el progreso, de resistencia frente a los totalitarismos, de autoridad moral, y este francés nacido en Alemania en 1917 se ha ganado el éxito y el aplauso mundial con un pequeño libro panfleto, '¡Indignaos!' (Editorial Destino, con prólogo en español de José Luis Sampedro), que ha sacudido el descontento en los países desarrollados frente a un sistema económico-político lleno de goteras. Este judío, muy crítico con la política de Israel hacia Palestina, participó en la resistencia francesa contra los nazis, estuvo preso en varios campos de concentración y participó en la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/portada/indignacion/debe/ir/seguida/compromiso/elpepu tec/20110529elpepspor_8/Tes

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ENTREVISTA: PRIMAVERA ÁRABE Rachid Ghanouchi Líder del Movimiento Islamista de Túnez "Mi sueño es conjugar islam y modernidad" • "Con 30.000 detenidos, nuestro partido fue la principal víctima de la matraca del régimen de Ben Ali" • "La corrupción se combate con una prensa libre, una justicia independiente; pero también con la religión" • "Somos un movimiento no violento y apoyamos la paridad de hombres y mujeres en las listas de candidatos electorales" • "Ya es difícil disponer de recursos para fundar un hogar con una sola mujer. Así que olvidemos a las demás" IGNACIO CEMBRERO 29/05/2011

Rachid Ghanouchi, Líder del Movimiento Islamista de Túnez FETHI BELAID/AFP | 29-05-2011 Ghanouchi habla con la prensa en enero de 2011, en Túnez, tras 22 años de exilio. Hace 16 años Rachid Ghanouchi fue expulsado de España cuando asistía, en Córdoba, a un congreso sobre "el islam ante el desafío de la modernidad": al parecer se le consideraba sospechoso de ideología extremista. Es probable que dentro de poco regrese y tenga derecho incluso al salón de autoridades del aeropuerto, porque sea ya ministro en el primer gobierno democrático de Túnez. Ghanouchi, de 69 años, es el líder del movimiento islamista tunecino En Nahda (Renacimiento) que fundó, con otro nombre, hace 30 años y cuyas actividades le valieron dos condenas a prisión y a trabajos forzados -la primera en 1981 y la segunda en 1987- y una estancia de más de tres años en la cárcel. Formado en teología en la universidad de Túnez, y en filosofía en Damasco, Ghanouchi también estudió en la Sorbona (París), pero como otros tantos opositores musulmanes eligió Londres, en 1991, para ponerse a salvo de la dictadura de Ben Ali derrocado en enero pasado por la primera de las revoluciones árabes. Se le considera afín a los Hermanos Musulmanes egipcios con los que mantiene estrechos lazos. Tras 20 años de exilio regresó a Túnez el 30 de enero, donde fue acogido por más de 3.000 militantes. Fue el exiliado que tuvo el recibimiento más multitudinario. Acaso por eso muchos temen que sea también el que coseche más votos en las elecciones democráticas, las de la Asamblea Constituyente, fijadas para el 24 de julio. Sus palabras revelan el pensamiento de los islamistas que, junto con otras corrientes políticas, se han echado a las calles del mundo árabe para acabar con la autocracia. Pregunta. Se ha salido con la suya y finalmente habrá elecciones dentro de menos de dos meses, según decidió el Gobierno esta semana.

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Respuesta. Llamé al primer ministro y le pedí que respetase la fecha a la que se había comprometido. La transición democrática es un periodo propenso a los disturbios. Empezó hace cuatro meses y medio y si se alarga la situación puede empeorar. La seguridad deja que desear. Sé que es difícil organizar las elecciones en menos de dos meses sin contar, además, con el Ministerio del Interior, pero no es imposible. P. ¿Qué resultado espera lograr en el estreno democrático? R. Somos el mayor partido y seremos el más votado. Confío en obtener un 30% de los sufragios. No solo ganaremos allí donde se cree que estamos mejor implantados, en el interior del país, donde arrancó la revolución, sino en la costa. En Sfax, la segunda ciudad, hubo 25.000 personas en mi primer mitin. Vamos a cosechar los frutos de nuestra larga y abnegada lucha contra la dictadura. Somos las primeras víctimas de la represión. Le daré un dato entre otros muchos: en las dos últimas décadas tuvimos 30.000 detenidos. En este país pequeño con familias amplias no hay familia alguna que no haya sufrido la represión, de lejos o de cerca. No hay una familia que no sepa que fuimos las principales víctimas de la matraca del régimen. P. En las únicas elecciones a las que pudieron presentarse, en 1989, solo alcanzaron el 17% de media y un 30% en la capital. ¿Tanto van a subir? R. Estuvieron manipuladas y todo el mundo lo reconoce hoy en día. Obtuvimos más del 60%. Algún día se sabrá con precisión porque Interior guarda aún en sus archivos el verdadero recuento. P. ¿Entrarían en el Gobierno si ganan? ¿Con qué intenciones? R. Claro que sí. Lo haríamos con una primera prioridad: ganar la guerra a la corrupción. La Administración, el país en general, están enfermos de corrupción. Es una lacra que perjudica al desarrollo. Nuestro principal problema socio-económico es el paro con más de 700.000 desempleados, muchos de ellos licenciados, en un país con una población activa que apenas rebasa los tres millones. Para espolear el crecimiento y crear empleo hay que acabar con la corrupción. Nuestra segunda prioridad es fomentar el desarrollo de las zonas más desheredadas del interior del país. Hay que acabar con los desequilibrios regionales. Si no se hace la revolución continuará. P. ¿Qué significará ese programa anticorrupción para el inversor extranjero? R. Son bienvenidos y podrán hacer negocios con mayor seguridad jurídica. Ya no tendrán que sobornar a nadie para instalarse en Túnez. Se acabaron las "comisiones" a la familia presidencial. Dicho esto, la corrupción no es una exclusividad del mundo árabe. Por culpa de otra modalidad de corrupción el capitalismo estuvo a punto de hundirse hace dos o tres años y aún no salió del todo de la crisis. P. ¿Qué papel atribuye al islam en el Túnez del futuro? R. La corrupción se combate con una prensa libre, una justicia independiente, pero también con la religión. Hay que utilizar la religión para luchar contra la corrupción y fomentar el trabajo bien hecho. Ser honrado y trabajar bien son deberes religiosos de primordial importancia. ¿Cómo se consigue que el pueblo lo interiorice? Pues con educación, apoyándose también en las mezquitas y con gobernantes que sean ejemplares. Ben Ali y su familia eran corruptos. Daban un pésimo ejemplo que facilitó la propagación de la corrupción a todos los niveles.

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P. La Asamblea Constituyente que saldrá de las urnas decidirá si en Túnez se implanta un sistema presidencialista o parlamentario. ¿Aspira a ser presidente? R. Creo que los tunecinos están escaldados del presidencialismo y prefieren un sistema parlamentario. Es la mejor solución. Si no fuese así me doy por satisfecho, a mi edad, con que Túnez sea una democracia. Pero el partido sí presentaría un candidato a las presidenciales. P. ¿Hasta qué punto la nueva Constitución de Túnez y las leyes deben inspirarse en la sharia (cuerpo de derecho islámico)? R. Hasta algunos académicos musulmanes se equivocan con relación a la sharia. No es un código que estipula castigos. Es más bien una manera de prevenir el delito. Los delincuentes deben ser considerados, exceptuando los casos patológicos, como víctimas de la sociedad a las que hay que ayudar a reinsertarse. La actual Constitución estipula que el Estado tunecino es islámico. Con mantener ese primer artículo basta. P. ¿Hay algún modelo? ¿Y un ejemplo que reprueben? R. La Turquía gobernada por el Partido de la Justicia y del Desarrollo nos inspira en muchos aspectos. Viajo con cierta frecuencia a Turquía desde 1995. He aprendido de ellos y ellos también algo de mí. ¿Sabe usted que se me ha leído más en Turquía, donde mis obras fueron traducidas, que en Túnez? Mi sueño es convertir a Túnez en un modelo que conjugue islam y modernidad. El ejemplo a no seguir es el de Argelia con todos los errores que allí se cometieron hace 20 años. P. ¿Es decir, el extremismo que asoló el país en los noventa y causó cerca de 200.000 muertos? R. Luchamos contra el extremismo. Es una enfermedad que han padecido todas las civilizaciones en algún momento, incluida la nuestra. Nació en las cárceles de Egipto y se desarrolló en un entorno insano. La imagen del islam resultó muy dañada. Se equipara a nuestra religión con la antidemocracia, la violencia, el terrorismo. Se nos supone enemigos del arte, de la belleza, de los derechos de la mujer. Falso. P. Sus detractores dicen que usa un doble lenguaje, que no cree en lo que dice. R. Me combaten con malas artes. No utilizan argumentos sino que difunden sospechas. Se asemejan en eso a Ben Ali. Él empleó la policía. Ahora nuestros adversarios utilizan los medios de comunicación. Solo les pido una cosa si no se creen nuestro discurso: que nos juzguen por los hechos. Somos un movimiento no violento y apoyamos la paridad de hombres y mujeres en las listas de candidatos a las elecciones. P. ¿Hay que creerse también que respetarán el "estatuto personal" que consagra una cuasi igualdad entre hombres y mujeres en Túnez desde 1956? R. Sí. Mire, tengo cuatro hijas. Todas han estudiado muchos años, en Quebec, en Cambridge, en la Universidad de Londres. Son profesionales que trabajan e investigan en centros de prestigio. Una de ellas, Soumaya, colabora con regularidad con el diario The Guardian. Así las he educado. ¿Qué más tengo que demostrar? P. El "estatuto personal" prohíbe la poligamia en Túnez mientras que la ley islámica permite a un hombre tomar hasta cuatro mujeres. ¿Cómo resuelve esa contradicción?

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R. Túnez es un país golpeado por el paro y con bajos salarios. Es ya de por sí harto difícil, para un hombre, disponer de recursos para fundar un hogar con una sola mujer. Así que olvidemos a las demás mujeres. P. ¿Se sigue torturando en las comisarías? ¿Qué hacer con todos los policías que cometieron exacciones? R. Ya no es sistemática la tortura aunque las malas costumbres no se acaban de un día para otro. Durante la revolución pedimos a nuestros militantes que no cayeran en la venganza personal, que no aprovecharan el desorden para ajustar cuentas. Ahora preconizamos que perdonen a sus verdugos, pero si optan por denunciarles y sentarles en el banquillo también lo aprobamos. Están en su derecho. Anhelo una solución global a la surafricana en la que los verdugos pidan perdón a las víctimas y estas se lo concedan. También deseo para ellas que reciban una compensación pecuniaria. P. ¿Sigue habiendo un problema de seguridad en Túnez como lo repite el Gobierno? R. Sí, pero en parte causado por la policía. Antes reprimía brutalmente en la calle sin respetar la ley, a lo Rambo. Ahora se le ha exigido que su actuación sea proporcionada. Su primera reacción fue de negarse a colaborar: si no me dejan hacer mi trabajo como sé hacerlo allá se las arreglen ustedes con gamberros y violentos. Ahora, gracias a la labor de Interior, han recapacitado y mantienen el orden con mesura. - IGNACIO CEMBRERO "Mi sueño es conjugar islam y modernidad" Entrevista con Rachid Ghanouchi, Líder del Movimiento Islamista de Túnez 29/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/sueno/conjugar/islam/modernidad/elpepusocd mg/20110529elpdmgrep_4/Tesç REPORTAJE: PRIMAVERA ÁRABE Túnez: laicos frente a 'barbudos' Intentos de agruparse ante el peligro de una marea de voto islamista "Cuando me reprochen tener vino o amigos gais, echaré de menos la anterior dictadura" I. C. 29/05/2011 Si ganan los barbudos, los más adinerados de mis amigos cogerán el primer avión para París, y los más humildes, la primera barcaza para Lampedusa", la isla italiana cerca de Túnez en la que, desde enero, han desembarcado 22.000 inmigrantes tunecinos sin documentación. Medio en broma, medio en serio, Omar hace este pronóstico sobre lo que sucederá en el ambiente en el que se mueve si los islamistas de En Nahda resultan vencedores de la primera elección democrática en Túnez. Ingeniero informático, regresó recientemente de Canadá, donde estudió la carrera, encontró trabajo y frecuenta a jóvenes profesionales como él tachados de laicos en este país musulmán. "Y lo malo es que van a ganar", vaticina Salah Zghridi, un veterano luchador que pasó tres años en la cárcel durante la dictadura de Ben Ali por ataques contra el presidente, difusión de falsas informaciones y constitución de asociación ilegal. Desde hace 17 años es miembro de la dirección de la más prestigiosa asociación de resistencia, la Liga Tunecina de Derechos Humanos.

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Zghridi, un ejecutivo jubilado de la banca pública, calcula que los islamistas obtendrán la cuarta parte de los 200 escaños de la Asamblea Constituyente. "Es una catástrofe, nos retrotraerá muchos años", advierte. "No es la mayoría", reconoce, "pero tendrán enfrente a un montón de minúsculos partidos divididos a los que les será fácil imponerse". Entre las formaciones de oposición toleradas y otras ilegales, apenas existían en Túnez media docena de partidos en tiempos de la dictadura, pero desde su caída han sido legalizados más de 70 y otros muchos se encuentran a la espera de serlo. De ahí que se prevea una Asamblea Constituyente muy fragmentada. A ojos de Zghridi, solo hay una manera de hacer frente a la "amenaza islamista": unirse. Por eso, con otros militantes laicistas, ha lanzado una iniciativa, que será presentada en público el martes, para crear un Frente de la Modernidad que presente una candidatura única en las urnas frente a En Nahda. A ella se han sumado ya algunos pequeños partidos y una retahíla de intelectuales, pero no las formaciones más conocidas de la oposición. No es la única idea esgrimida para contener a unos barbudos a los que atribuyen los peores designios. Chawki Gaddes, secretario general de la asociación de constitucionalistas tunecinos, propone, por ejemplo, elaborar un pacto que recogería los valores comunes de la república. Se colocaría como preámbulo de la futura Constitución. El que fue ministro de Interior hasta marzo, Farhat Rajhi, no cree que se lleguen a poner en marcha estos mecanismos si de verdad ganan. "Si En Nahda llega al poder, habrá un golpe de Estado", pronosticó en un vídeo colgado en mayo en Facebook. El Ministerio de Defensa se apresuró a desmentirle. ¿Tanto hay que temer a unos islamistas que ahora se declaran demócratas? "Recuerdo el discurso de En Nahda en los años ochenta", respondía Gaddes en una entrevista en una web tunecina. "No tenía nada que ver con el actual", añadía. "No creo que se pueda cambiar tan radicalmente". "Buscan ser populares y cosechar más votos". "Es legítimo sospechar que cuando estén en la Asamblea se apartarán del discurso moderado". "Ante usted, periodista extranjero, se hacen pasar por corderos, pero sus auténticos propósitos los formulan en los mítines, en su prensa y con los medios de comunicación en árabe", sostiene Zghridi. "Queda claro que a medio y largo plazo quieren instaurar la sharia". "Entonces, cuando se metan en mi vida privada, me reprochen tener vino en mi comedor o amigos gais, le aseguro que echaré de menos la anterior dictadura, la de Ben Ali", anuncia Zghridi. "Coartaba las libertades públicas, pero la policía de Ben Ali no fisgaba lo que hacía en mi casa ni con quién me iba a cenar". Zghridi sostiene que, antes incluso de la victoria de En Nahda en las urnas, ya ha empezado a padecer la animosidad islamista desde que organizó, en febrero, una manifestación por un "Túnez laico". "Algunos de los imanes que ha impuesto En Nahda al frente de las mezquitas que controla me tachó, ante los fieles, de homosexual deseoso de casarme con un hombre", se lamenta. "Esto es solo el principio". - Túnez: laicos frente a 'barbudos' Intentos de agruparse ante el peligro de una marea de voto islamista http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/Tunez/laicos/frente/barbudos/elpepusocdmg/20110529elpdmgr ep_5/Tes 260

May 28, 2011 Pay Attention By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Cairo I had some time to kill at the Cairo airport the other day so I rummaged through the “Egyptian Treasures” shop. I didn’t care much for the King Tut paper weights and ashtrays but was intrigued by a stuffed camel, which, if you squeezed its hump, emitted a camel honk. When I turned it over to see where it was manufactured, it read: “Made in China.” Now that they have decided to put former President Hosni Mubarak on trial, I hope Egyptians add to his indictment that he presided for 30 years over a country where nearly half the population lives on $2 day and 20 percent are unemployed while it is importing low-wage manufactured goods — a stuffed camel, no less — from China. That’s an embarrassment for Mubarak and America, which has donated some $30 billion in aid to modernize Egypt’s economy over the last 30 years — and President Obama just promised a couple billion more. Egypt’s economy has nose-dived since the uprising, and the new government really does need the money to stay afloat. But I only hope that Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton understand that right now — right this second — Egypt needs something more from Washington than money: quiet, behind-the-scenes engagement with Egypt’s ruling generals over how to complete the transition to democracy here. Here’s why. After the ouster of Mubarak in February, his presidential powers were shifted to a military council, led by the defense minister. It’s an odd situation, or as the Egyptian novelist Alaa Al Aswany, author of “The Yacoubian Building,” put it to me: “We have had a revolution here that succeeded — but is not in power. So the goals of the revolution are being applied by an agent, the army, which I think is sincere in wanting to do the right things, but it is not by nature revolutionary.” To their credit, the Egyptian generals moved swiftly to put in place a pathway to democracy: elections for a new Parliament were set for September; this Parliament will then oversee the writing of a new Constitution, and then a new civilian president will be elected. Sounds great on paper, and it was endorsed by a referendum, but there’s one big problem: The Tahrir Square revolution was a largely spontaneous, bottom-up affair. It was not led by any particular party or leader. Parties are just now being formed. If elections for the Parliament are held in September, the only group in Egypt with a real party network ready to roll is the one that has been living underground and is now suddenly legal: the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. “Liberal people are feeling some concerns that they made the revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood can now take it. This is not true,” Esam el-Erian, one of the party’s leaders, insisted to me. But that is exactly what the urban, secular moderates, who actually did spearhead the Tahrir revolt, fear. They are only now forming parties and trying to build networks that

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can reach the millions of traditional Egyptians living in the countryside and persuade them to vote for a reform agenda and not just: “Islam is the answer.” “The liberal parties need more time to organize,” said Naguib Sawiris, an Egyptian billionaire who’s heading the best organized of the liberal parties, and is urging all the liberal groups to run under a single banner and not divide their vote. If elections happen in September and the Muslim Brotherhood wins a plurality it could have an inordinate impact on writing Egypt’s first truly free Constitution and could inject restrictions on women, alcohol, dress, and the relations between mosque and state. “You will have an unrepresentative Parliament writing an unrepresentative Constitution,” argued Mohamed ElBaradei, the former international atomic energy czar who is running for president on a reform platform. “Because the Muslim Brotherhood is ready, they want elections first,” adds Osama Ghazali Harb, another reform party leader. “We as secular forces prefer to have some time to consolidate our parties. We must thank the army for the role it played. But it was our revolution, not a coup d’état. ... If there are fair elections, the Muslim Brotherhood will only get 20 percent.” Free elections are rare in the Arab world, so when they happen, everybody tries to vote — not only the residents of that country. You can be sure money will flow in here from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to support the Muslim Brotherhood. America, though, cannot publicly intervene in the Egyptian election debate. It would only undermine the reformers, who have come so far, so fast, on their own and alienate the Egyptian generals. That said, though, it is important that senior U.S. officials engage quietly with the generals and encourage them to take heed of the many Egyptian voices that are raising legitimate concerns about a premature runoff. In short, the Egyptian revolution is not over. It has left the dramatic street phase and is now in the seemingly boring but utterly vital phase of deciding who gets to write the rules for the new Egypt. And how Egypt evolves will impact the whole Arab world. I just hope the Obama team is paying attention. This is so much more important than Libya. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Pay Attention May 28, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/opinion/29friedmanOpEd.html?nl=todaysheadline s&emc=tha212

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Obama: Poland a model for democratic change; says Eastern European nation is strong US ally By Associated Press, Published: May 28 WARSAW, Poland — Capping an extensive trip abroad, President Barack Obama said Saturday that the United States must always “leave room” to throw financial and moral support behind nations fighting for freedoms even during times of employment troubles and high gas prices at home. In Poland, hailed by Obama as world model of democratic transition, Obama said it is the responsibility of the U.S. to support the sometimes wrenching, roiling push for democracy and human rights around the globe. He did so while defending Poland’s security against any threats in its neighborhood, leaving no doubt about the NATO code of members: “We defend each other.” The president sought to build his case that America and the international community have a vested stake in the Arab revolt that is defining much of North Africa and the Middle East. He said the U.S. cannot dictate outcomes but can help, and he cited Poland as inspiration. “Poland’s story demonstrates how a proud and determined and enthusiastic people can overcome extraordinary challenges and build a democracy,” the president said at a brief news conference as his six-day trip to Ireland, England, France and Poland neared its end. Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/looking-to-boost-arab-uprisings-obama-asks- poland-for-lessons-learned-from-political- change/2011/05/28/AGFvDHDH_story.html?nl_headlines

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May 28, 2011 The Weak Foundations of Arab Democracy By TIMUR KURAN Durham, N.C.

Guy Billout THE protesters who have toppled or endangered Arab dictators are demanding more freedoms, fair elections and a crackdown on corruption. But they have not promoted a distinct ideology, let alone a coherent one. This is because private organizations have played only a peripheral role and the demonstrations have lacked leaders of stature. Both limitations are due to the longstanding dearth, across the Arab world, of autonomous nongovernmental associations serving as intermediaries between the individual and the state. This chronic weakness of civil society suggests that viable Arab democracies — or leaders who could govern them — will not emerge anytime soon. The more likely immediate outcome of the current turmoil is a new set of dictators or single-party regimes. Democracy requires checks and balances, and it is largely through civil society that citizens protect their rights as individuals, force policy makers to accommodate their interests, and limit abuses of state authority. Civil society also promotes a culture of bargaining and gives future leaders the skills to articulate ideas, form coalitions and govern. The preconditions for democracy are lacking in the Arab world partly because Hosni Mubarak and other Arab dictators spent the past half-century emasculating the news media, suppressing intellectual inquiry, restricting artistic expression, banning political parties, and co-opting regional, ethnic and religious organizations to silence dissenting voices. 264

But the handicaps of Arab civil society also have historical causes that transcend the policies of modern rulers. Until the establishment of colonial regimes in the late 19th century, Arab societies were ruled under Shariah law, which essentially precludes autonomous and self-governing private organizations. Thus, while Western Europe was making its tortuous transition from arbitrary rule by monarchs to democratic rule of law, the Middle East retained authoritarian political structures. Such a political environment prevented democratic institutions from taking root and ultimately facilitated the rise of modern Arab dictatorships. Strikingly, Shariah lacks the concept of the corporation, a perpetual and self-governing organization that can be used either for profit-making purposes or to provide social services. Islam’s alternative to the nonprofit corporation was the waqf, a trust established in accordance with Shariah to deliver specified services forever, through trustees bound by essentially fixed instructions. Until modern times, schools, charities and places of worship, all organized as corporations in Western Europe, were set up as waqfs in the Middle East. A corporation can adjust to changing conditions and participate in politics. A waqf can do neither. Thus, in premodern Europe, politically vocal churches, universities, professional associations and municipalities provided counterweights to monarchs. In the Middle East, apolitical waqfs did not foster social movements or ideologies. Starting in the mid-19th century, the Middle East imported the concept of the corporation from Europe. In stages, self-governing Arab municipalities, professional associations, cultural groups and charities assumed the social functions of waqfs. Still, Arab civil society remains shallow by world standards. A telling indication is that in their interactions with private or public organizations, citizens of Arab states are more likely than those in advanced democracies to rely on personal relationships with employees or representatives. This pattern is reflected in corruption statistics of Transparency International, which show that in Arab countries relationships with government agencies are much more likely to be viewed as personal business deals. A historically rooted preference for personal interactions limits the significance of organizations, which helps to explain why nongovernmental organizations have played only muted roles in the Arab uprisings. A less powerful business sector also hindered democracy. The Middle East reached the industrial era with an atomistic private sector unequipped to compete with giant enterprises that had come to dominate the global economy. Until then, Arab businesses consisted exclusively of small, short-lived enterprises established under Islamic partnership law. This was a byproduct of Islam’s egalitarian inheritance system, which aimed to spread wealth. Successful enterprises were typically dissolved when a partner died, and to avoid the consequent losses Arab businessmen kept their enterprises both small and transitory. Arab businesses had less political clout than their counterparts in Western Europe, where huge, established companies contributed to civil society directly as a political force against arbitrary government. They also did so indirectly by supporting social causes. For example, during industrialization, major European businesses financed political campaigns, including the mass education and antislavery movements. Since the late 19th century, commercial codes transplanted from abroad have enabled Arabs to form large, durable enterprises like major banks, telecommunications giants 265

and retail chains. Still, Arab companies tend to be smaller relative to global norms, which limits their power vis-à-vis the state. Although large Western corporations have been known to suppress political competition and restrict individual rights, in Arab countries it is the paucity of large private companies that poses the greater obstacle to democracy. Despite these handicaps, there is some cause for optimism when it comes to democratization in the Middle East. The Arab world does not have to start from scratch. A panoply of private organizations are already present, though mainly in embryonic form. And if the current turmoil produces regimes more tolerant of grassroots politics and diversity of opinion, more associations able to defend individual freedoms will surely arise. Moreover, the cornerstones of a modern economy are in place and widely accepted. Economic features at odds with Shariah, like banks and corporations, were adopted sufficiently long ago to become part of local culture. Their usefulness makes them appealing even to Islamists who find fault with other features of modernity. Over the last 150 years, the Arab world has achieved structural economic transformations that took Europe a millennium. Its economic progress, whatever the shortcomings, has been remarkable. If political progress has lagged, this is partly because forming strong nongovernmental organizations takes time. Within a generation or two, as the economic transformations of the past century-and-a-half continue to change the way citizens interact with organizations, insurmountable pressure for democracy may yet arise even in those corners of the Arab world where civil society is weakest. A stronger civil society alone will not bring about democracy. After all, private organizations can promote illiberal and despotic agendas, as Islamist organizations that denounce political pluralism and personal freedoms demonstrate. But without a strong civil society, dictators will never yield power, except in the face of foreign intervention. Independent and well-financed private organizations are thus essential to the success of democratic transitions. They are also critical to maintaining democracies, once they have emerged. Indeed, without strong private players willing and able to resist undemocratic forces, nascent Arab democracies could easily slip back into authoritarianism. Timur Kuran, a professor of economics and political science at Duke, is the author of “The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East.” TIMUR KURAN The Weak Foundations of Arab Democracy May 28, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/opinion/29kuran.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=t ha212

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TRIBUNA: TIMOTHY GARTON ASH Hacia un mundo libre: del G-8 al G-20 Cumbres como la de Deauville son un residuo anacrónico del viejo Occidente de la guerra fría, una pérdida de tiempo y dinero. La gestión del mundo no puede discutirse sin sentar también a China, India y Brasil TIMOTHY GARTON ASH 28/05/2011 Occidente ha muerto, viva Occidente. Así podríamos resumir el mensaje del viaje de Barack Obama a Europa hasta ahora, y su discurso en Westminster Hall. Hubo un instante retórico que solo Obama podía ofrecer. Un elocuente fragmento sobre la idea de que la diversidad bien integrada es una ventaja para las sociedades estadounidense y británica culminó en la observación de que esa era la razón por la que "el nieto de un keniano que sirvió como cocinero en el Ejército británico" podía "hablar ante ustedes como presidente de Estados Unidos". La frase le granjeó el primer y único aplauso espontáneo de los parlamentarios británicos allí reunidos. Sin embargo, este discurso tan bien redactado podía haberlo pronunciado cualquier presidente de Estados Unidos del último medio siglo: las referencias a la Carta Magna y el Día D; el mito-historia de la larga lucha común de ingleses y estadounidenses por la libertad; un canto a la OTAN, a la que calificó de "la alianza de más éxito en la historia humana" (eso sí, nada más que una referencia de pasada a la Unión Europea); la obligatoria cita de Winston Churchill. En todo el texto, como halago seductor que tenía en cuenta una de las obsesiones británicas desde 1945, estuvo presente el leitmotiv del "liderazgo" compartido, una mención conjunta de Reino Unido y Estados Unidos, como si fueran socios en condición de igualdad. Tony Blair sonreía, sentado en primera fila. Y lo que ha ocurrido con el discurso ha ocurrido con todo el viaje. Ha tenido muy pocas cosas que no hubieran podido hacer igual de bien Ronald Reagan o John F. Kennedy; todas menos la parada final en Polonia, en otro tiempo un satélite de la Unión Soviética y ahora un firme aliado de Estados Unidos Los enemigos y los retos han cambiado, pero los amigos y los rituales siguen siendo los mismos. Al beberse su jarra de Guinness en Moneygall, Irlanda, el recién celtificado O'Bama trata de conquistar 30 millones de votos de estadounidenses de origen irlandés. En el tradicional festín amoroso de británicos y estadounidenses que se celebra en Londres están presentes la reina (la misma que recibió a Reagan y Kennedy), las salvas de honor, la cordialidad y el estallido habitual de superlativos injustificados: la relación entre los dos países se califica de especial, esencial, histórica. A puerta cerrada, se habla, como siempre, del reparto de las cargas militares y económicas. De allí va a Francia, y al ceremonial más anticuado de todos: una reunión del G-8. El presidente cultiva viejos aliados, socios establecidos y valores comunes. No es de despreciar. Obama ha aprendido, en los últimos dos años y medio, a valorar más que cuando llegó al poder la relación con los aliados tradicionales. Más vale pájaro en mano que ciento volando. A la hora de tratar con Pakistán, el país que, según Obama, es fundamental para combatir el terrorismo islámico, Gran Bretaña posee una experiencia y unas conexiones sin igual. Y este Gobierno británico, como su predecesor, ha sabido jugar bien esa baza. 267

En Westminster, el presidente dijo que "vivimos -Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y Occidente en general- en una economía globalizada que, en gran parte, hemos creado nosotros mismos". Desde un punto de vista histórico, es verdad. También dijo que "seguimos siendo el mayor catalizador para la acción en el mundo". Tal vez siga siendo así, si con eso se refiere a una actuación global coordinada y cooperativa. Pero también es cierto que las potencias no occidentales, que actúan por su cuenta y en defensa de sus propios intereses, tienen cada vez más influencia en la agenda de la política mundial. Aparte de la importante declaración de que el anhelo de libertad y dignidad humana "no es inglés, americano ni occidental, es universal", fue decepcionante lo poco que dijo el discurso de Westminster sobre esta transformación crucial de nuestra época. De no producirse un vuelco en las tendencias actuales, el siglo XXI será testigo de un mundo cada vez más posoccidental. China, India y Brasil serán, tarde o temprano, más poderosos y más importantes para Estados Unidos que Gran Bretaña, Francia y Alemania. La tarea de Estado que afrontan los estadounidenses y los europeos es convertir el viejo Occidente, revivido y ligeramente ampliado -lo que yo llamo pos- Occidente-, en un marco más extenso que englobe el orden internacional. Es una tarea para la que Obama, cuya familia representa a la mitad de la ONU, resulta especialmente adecuado. Como dije hace varios años, nuestro objetivo debe ser pasar del artículo definido al indefinido: de "el mundo libre", que quería decir el Occidente de la guerra fría, al ideal de un mundo libre. Uno de los escasos cimientos institucionales de los que disponemos para realizar esta transición es el grupo G-20, que incluye a las grandes potencias emergentes de fuera de Occidente y que cobró vida propia durante la crisis financiera mundial. Sin embargo, en vez de acudir a una reunión del G-20, Obama y Cameron han ido a Deauville a una reunión del G-8. Obama tendrá que volver al país vecino, en concreto a Cannes, a principios de noviembre, para una reunión del G-20, que también preside Francia. Todo eso significa un gran volumen de atención para Nicolas Sarkozy en pleno esfuerzo para ser reelegido presidente, pero, por lo demás, carece de sentido. El G-8 es un residuo anacrónico del viejo Occidente de la guerra fría. Tiene sus orígenes en las reuniones de los ministros de Economía y los dirigentes nacionales de siete economías occidentales desarrolladas en los años setenta. En los noventa se sumó Rusia, cuando se suponía que el anciano país de Eurasia estaba incorporándose al nuevo Occidente ampliado. Hoy, si no existiera el G-8, nadie pensaría en inventarlo. El asunto que constituye su tarea fundamental, la gestión de la economía mundial, no puede discutirse si no están sentados a la mesa países como China, India y Brasil. Después de examinar el orden del día de la reunión de Deauville, estoy más convencido que nunca de que es una pérdida monumental de tiempo y dinero. Solo el gasto en seguridad, que incluye a más de 12.000 policías, gendarmes y soldados, habría servido para hacer una aportación considerable a la consolidación de la democracia en Túnez. Y todo ese circo, con las reuniones preparatorias de unos funcionarios conocidos como sherpas, más otros a los que los franceses dan el maravilloso nombre de sous-sherpas, volverá a repetirse en los días previos a la reunión de noviembre del G-20.

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No es que el G-20 esté funcionando tampoco muy bien. Pero es un grupo mucho más en sintonía con las realidades económicas, políticas y culturales del siglo XXI. Los líderes occidentales o posoccidentales deben hacer todo lo posible para que funcione mejor. La mejor forma de empezar sería abolir el G-8, y Obama va a tener pronto una oportunidad de hacerlo. El año próximo, está previsto que Estados Unidos acoja el G-8 y México el G-20. Obama debería alcanzar un acuerdo privado con los demás miembros del G-8 y con México para incorporar el G-8 a la reunión del G-20 y centrar todos los esfuerzos en que este último sea más serio y eficaz que hasta ahora. Cuando alguien suprime un comité o institución inútil, debería concedérsele una medalla, y en este caso la medalla tendría que ser enorme, una especie de Medalla Mundial de Honor. El actual presidente de Estados Unidos está más autorizado que ningún otro de sus predecesores para dejar atrás la anticuada noción de "líder del mundo libre", propia de la guerra fría, y convertirse en líder del movimiento hacia un mundo libre. Llegada la hora, aparecerá el hombre necesario. En este caso, tenemos las dos cosas. Solo hace falta que coincidan. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/mundo/libre/G-8/G- 20/elpepuopi/20110528elpepiopi_12/Tes

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Thousands protest against Egypt’s military rulers in return to downtown Cairo’s Tahrir Square By Associated Press, Published: May 27 CAIRO — Thousands of protesters returned to downtown Cairo’s Tahrir Square Friday for what they called a “second revolution,” pressing Egypt’s military rulers to speed up the pace of democratic reforms in a country that is still charting its political future. Protesters carried banners reading the “Egyptian revolution is not over” and chanted the slogan. Christians and Muslims took turns praying in Tahrir Square, as they did during the protests that forced the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in February. Sectarian clashes have turned deadly since the revolution. They also called for the speedy trial of Mubarak and high-ranking members of his regime. “Our biggest fault is that we left Tahrir Square before seeing Mubarak inside a courtroom being tried,” 24-year-old salesman Ahmed Shawqi said. Turnout was lower than expected after the ruling military warned that “dubious” elements may try to cause chaos during the protests and said it would stay clear of the protest area to avoid friction. The lack of a security presence made some protesters feel unsafe. Two days before the protest, the prosecutor general ordered Mubarak and his sons to be tried on charges of ordering the killing of protesters during the uprising, along with other charges. That move likely tamped down the number of protesters returning to Tahrir Square. Some 850 Egyptians were killed during the uprising, many shot by security forces, rights groups say. Thousands were injured. Protesters formed checkpoints at the square’s entrances, body-searched visitors and asked for identification. Some protesters vowed to stay all night. The military’s leadership of the country’s democratic transition has left many protesters dissatisfied. “I came here because I didn’t feel that Egypt changed,” technician Raafat Hendi said, under huge posters calling for a new constitution. Some critics accuse the military rulers of collaborating with the former regime and being too lenient in its prosecution of Mubarak, his family and regime members. The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s best organized political force, opposed the protest and called it an attempt to drive a wedge between the military and the people. The Brotherhood’s absence will test the ability of liberal and secular groups to launch their own sustained opposition movement. 270

Some liberal groups are calling for planned parliamentary elections, now set for September, to be pushed back so that they will have more time to prepare. The Brotherhood, however, stands to make major gains and wants the vote to go ahead. The protest movement wants to oust the ruling Armed Forces Council and replace it with a civilian council. Protesters accuse the army of using excessive force in cracking down on peaceful protesters since Mubarak’s ouster, sending thousands to military tribunals and detaining young protesters. A joint statement by four liberal and secular groups called for postponing the September elections, drafting basic principles that guarantee that Egypt is a civil state and ending military tribunals. The statement reflects worries of many political groups that the Brotherhood is poised to win a big portion of parliament. Some protesters are demanding a new constitution prior to elections, a divisive issue. “We can’t go to elections without having a constitution first,” said 29-year-old accountant Ezz Eldin Hamid. “You put the plan first then go to the game, not the other way around.” A referendum that passed in March with the backing of the military and the Brotherhood paved the way for parliamentary and presidential elections. It mandated that the country’s new constitution will be written by a committee selected by the new parliament. The protest movement fears a growing convergence of opinions between the Islamists and the military. The Brotherhood, banned in 1954, became a political force after renouncing violence in the 1970s. Eventually it became the most formidable opponent to Mubarak’s regime, though it was still banned as a political party. When Mubarak fell, the Brotherhood stood ready with a huge network of social services and supporters. Thousands of protesters marched in other Egyptian cities like Alexandria and Suez, which also saw deadly clashes with security forces during the uprising. The army and police withdrew all their forces and vehicles from Suez before Friday’s protest began. In front of the hospital in the Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh where Mubarak remains under house arrest, more than 200 Egyptians rallied, calling for his transfer to the Cairo’s Tora prison, where his sons and other members of his regime await trial. “Leave, leave, Mubarak! The Tora prison awaits!” they chanted. Bedouin tribesmen elsewhere in the Sinai blocked traffic on two main roads leading to the resort town to support the protests and call for the release of members of their tribes imprisoned under Mubarak. Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/protesters-gather-in-downtown-cairos-tahrir-square-for- demonstration-against-egypts-military/2011/05/27/AGr7McCH_story.html

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May 27, 2011 Aid Pledge by Group of 8 Seeks to Bolster Arab Democracy By LIZ ALDERMAN DEAUVILLE, France — Leaders of the Group of 8 wealthiest industrialized nations pledged on Friday to send billions of dollars in aid to Egypt and Tunisia, hoping to reduce the threat that economic stagnation could undermine the transition to democracy. At a series of working sessions that lasted until the early morning hours Friday, representatives of the Group of 8 expressed concern that the democracy movement in the Arab world could be “hijacked” by Islamic radicals if the West did not help stabilize the economies of the two countries that touched off the Arab Spring, according to two European diplomats who were present during the discussions. Comparing the uprisings that are sweeping the region to the fall of the Berlin Wall, which eventually paved the way for a historic shift to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, the group said in a communiqué that its aim was “to ensure that instability does not undermine the process of political reform.” How much aid the Western powers would ultimately provide, and how effective any aid would be during volatile political transitions in the two countries, remained uncertain. The group’s official communiqué promised $20 billion, which would be a major infusion of funds. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, the meeting’s host, said the total could be double that. But he and other officials did not specify how much each country and international development agency would provide, and the Group of 8 countries have in the past made commitments that they did not ultimately fulfill. Even so, the incomplete transition in the Middle East was a dominant worry at the meeting. Democracy, the leaders said, could be rooted only in economic reforms that created open markets, equal opportunities and jobs to lower staggeringly high unemployment rates, especially among restless youths. “We’re seeing growth slow, budget deficits rise, in the case of Egypt, some foreign exchange reserves being lost,” said David Lipton, a senior director for international economic affairs at the National Security Council. “We and the countries both see the very high priority of keeping the countries stable so that the backdrop of democratization is one of economic stability rather than instability and chaos.” That challenge has grown acute in Egypt since the fall of President Hosni Mubarak. Revenues from tourism, a mainstay of the economy, have plummeted by 40 percent, the new military government says. Foreign investment has dried up. Factories are paralyzed by strikes. Meanwhile, prices for food and energy have surged, leaving people feeling deeply insecure ahead of crucial parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall.

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“We members of the G-8 strongly support the aspirations of the Arab Spring, as well as those of the Iranian people,” the leaders, who discussed the situation with the prime ministers of Egypt and Tunisia here, said in the communiqué. Officials said the aid would come from the member states of the Group of 8, which includes the United States, Japan, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia, and from international organizations, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Investment Bank. Officials cautioned that the projected $20 billion in aid from international financial institutions would come in phases and be contingent on democratic and economic reforms. The pledge, an aide to President Obama said, was “not a blank check” but “an envelope that could be achieved in the context of suitable reform efforts.” There is a fear, shared by both the American administration and democracy activists, that plunking down large dollar pledges upfront would risk funneling money into the hands of institutions, including the Egyptian military, which could misuse or simply siphon it off. Even such a large infusion is dwarfed by the scale of the two economies — $500 billion in Egypt and $100 billion in Tunisia. Mr. Sarkozy said that he hoped the total aid package would eventually reach $40 billion, including $10 billion from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. Qatar is also urging its Persian Gulf partners to consider creating a Middle East development bank to help Arab states making a transition to democracy. The economies of the Middle East and North Africa have been weak for years, and per capita growth over the past three decades was only half a percent, a fraction of the average for emerging economies, according to the International Monetary Fund. Weak growth and poor job opportunities are among the major factors that prompted the outpouring of unrest among young people in Egypt and Tunisia. But political change has, if anything, brought more economic pain. In Egypt, many people are again complaining of soaring food prices, just as they did last fall before the revolution. Many are now also wrestling with exaggerated expectations about how much the revolution will lift their personal fortunes. Labor unrest has swept the country as workers everywhere demand more pay. Newspapers report rumors of vast illicit fortunes to be recovered from Mr. Mubarak and his associates that many mistakenly believe will change the Egyptian economy. Old leftist political parties are re-emerging as though they have been frozen in time for the 30 years of the Mubarak police state to demand that the government again expand its role in the economy to help the poor, even at the price of discouraging foreign investors. In Tunisia, the revolution that ousted former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali began in the country’s impoverished interior as a revolt against dismal economic conditions; it only later took on demands for political democracy and freedom as it reached the more affluent, educated and Westernized coast. Now many inlanders are complaining that the resulting upheaval has not brought development or opportunity.

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Resentment of the coastal elite runs high, and some say they feel so disappointed they have soured on participating in the democratic process. In Tunisia, too, old leftist parties are trying to come back, and parts of the country’s strong labor movement are stepping up their demands or returning to radical roots. In both countries, unrest has led to security problems that have scared away tourists, an important source of revenue. Tourist demand has fallen so much that many airlines have canceled or scaled back flights. The Group of 8 leaders want their aid to help address those issues by broadening economic opportunity and breaking down trade barriers; Egypt, seeking to protect state industries, has some of the highest in the world. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development developed expertise in overhauling centrally planned economies in Eastern and Central Europe, which is why officials said its role would be central in the Arab world. Masood Ahmed, the Middle East director of the International Monetary Fund, said that to ensure stability Egypt needed to generate up to 10 million jobs over the next decade and Tunisia about 1 million. Turning to Libya, the Group of 8 leaders reiterated calls for its leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, to step aside, saying he and his government “have failed to fulfill their responsibility to protect the Libyan population and have lost all legitimacy. He has no future in a free, democratic Libya. He must go.” The leaders also backed Mr. Obama’s call for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, but conspicuously left out a mention of his call for negotiations to be based on the 1967 borders. The group generally operates by consensus, and Canada opposed a reference to the borders. If the statement was going to mention the 1967 border, said Stephen Harper, Canada’s conservative prime minister, it should also cite other elements of Mr. Obama’s speech, including that Israel be recognized as a Jewish state and that the Palestinian state be demilitarized. “I would support any statement on finding peace in the Middle East that was balanced,” he told reporters. “I would not support any statement that was not balanced.” David D. Kirkpatrick contributed reporting from Cairo, Mark Landler from Warsaw and Ian Austen from Ottawa, Canada. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/world/europe/28g8.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha2&pagewant ed=print

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Middle7 East May 27, 2011 Saudi Arabia Scrambles to Limit Region’s Upheaval By NEIL MacFARQUHAR

Ed Ou for The New York Times Saudis perched on the Faisaliah Tower in Riyadh. The kingdom is aggressively emphasizing the relative stability of monarchies. Related • The Lede Blog: More Saudi Women Record Driving Videos (May 26, 2011) • The Lede Blog: Saudi Woman's Driving Video Preserved Online (May 24, 2011) RIYADH, Saudi Arabia — Saudi Arabia is flexing its financial and diplomatic might across the Middle East in a wide-ranging bid to contain the tide of change, shield other monarchies from popular discontent and avert the overthrow of any more leaders struggling to calm turbulent nations. From Egypt, where the Saudis dispensed $4 billion in aid last week to shore up the ruling military council, to Yemen, where it is trying to ease out the president, to the kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco, which it has invited to join a union of Persian Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia is scrambling to forestall more radical change and block Iran’s influence. The kingdom is aggressively emphasizing the relative stability of monarchies, part of an effort to avert any drastic shift from the authoritarian model, which would generate uncomfortable questions about the pace of political and social change at home.

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Saudi Arabia’s proposal to include Jordan and Morocco in the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council — which authorized the Saudis to send in troops to quell a largely Shiite Muslim rebellion in the Sunni Muslim monarchy of Bahrain — is intended to create a kind of “Club of Kings.” The idea is to signal to Shiite Iran that the Sunni Arab monarchs will defend their interests, analysts said. “We’re sending a message that monarchies are not where this is happening,” Prince Waleed bin Talal al-Saud, a businessman and high-profile member of the habitually reticent royal family, told the editorial board of The New York Times last week, referring to the unrest. “We are not trying to get our way by force, but to safeguard our interests.” The range of the Saudi intervention is extraordinary as the unrest pushes Riyadh’s hand to forge what some commentators, in Egypt and elsewhere, brand a “counterrevolution.” Some Saudi and foreign analysts find the term too sweeping for the steps the Saudis have actually taken, though they appear unparalleled in the region and beyond as the kingdom reaches out to ally with non-Arab Muslim states as well. “I am sure that the Saudis do not like this revolutionary wave — they were really scared,” said Khalid Dakhil, a Saudi political analyst and columnist. “But they are realistic here.” In Egypt, where the revolution has already toppled a close Saudi ally in Hosni Mubarak, the Saudis are dispensing aid and mending ties in part to help head off a good showing by the Muslim Brotherhood in the coming parliamentary elections. The Saudis worry that an empowered Muslim Brotherhood could damage Saudi legitimacy by presenting a model of Islamic law different from the Wahhabi tradition of an absolute monarch. “If another model of Shariah says that you have to resist, this will create a deep difficulty,” said Abdulaziz Algasim, a Saudi lawyer. Saudi officials are also concerned that Egypt’s foreign policy is shifting, with its outreach to the Islamist group Hamas and plans to restore ties with Iran. The Saudi monarch, King Abdullah, also retains a personal interest in protecting Mr. Mubarak, analysts believe. The Arab Spring began to unravel an alliance of so-called moderate Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which were willing to work closely with the United States and promote peace with Israel. American support for the Arab uprisings also strained relations, prompting Saudi Arabia to split from Washington on some issues while questioning its longstanding reliance on the United States to protect its interests. The strained Saudi posture toward Washington was outlined in a recent opinion article by Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi analyst, in The Washington Post that suggested Riyadh was ready to go it alone because the United States had become an “unreliable partner.” But that seems at least partly a display of Saudi pique, since the oil-for-military aid arrangement that has defined relations between the two for the past six decades is unlikely to be replaced soon. Saudi Arabia is negotiating to buy $60 billion in advanced American weapons, and President Obama, in his speech last week demanding that Middle Eastern autocrats bow to popular demands for democracy, noticeably did not mention Saudi Arabia. The Saudi ambassador, Adel al-Jubeir, sat prominently in the front row.

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Saudi Arabia is taking each uprising in turn, without relying on a single blueprint. In Bahrain, it resorted to force, sending troops to crush a rebellion by Shiites because it feared the creation of a hostile government — a kind of Shiite Cuba — only about 20 miles from some of its main oil fields, one sympathetic to Iran, if not allied with it. It has deployed diplomacy in other uprisings, and remained on the fence in still others. It is also spending money, pledging $20 billion to help stabilize Bahrain and Oman, which has also faced protests. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia joined the coalition seeking to ease out President Ali Abdullah Saleh because it thinks the opposition might prove a more reliable, less unruly southern neighbor. But Arab diplomats noted that even the smallest Saudi gestures provided Mr. Saleh with excuses to stay, since he interpreted them as support. This month, for example, the Saudis sent in tanker trucks to help abate a gasoline shortage. On Syria, an initial statement of support by King Abdullah for President Bashar al- Assad has been followed by silence, along with occasional calls at Friday Prayer for God to support the protesters. That silence reflects a deep ambivalence, analysts said. The ruling Saudi family personally dislikes Mr. Assad — resenting his close ties with Iran and seeing Syria’s hand in the assassination of a former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, a Saudi ally. But they fear his overthrow will unleash sectarian violence without guaranteeing that Iranian influence will be diminished. In Libya, after helping push through an Arab League request for international intervention, Saudi Arabia sat out and left its neighbors, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, to join the military coalition supporting the rebels. It has so far kept its distance publicly from Tunisia as well, although it gave refuge to its ousted president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. There are also suspicions that the kingdom is secretly providing money to extremist groups to hold back changes. Saudi officials deny that, although they concede private money may flow. In 1952, after toppling the Egyptian king, Gamal Abdel Nasser worked to destabilize all monarchs, inspiring a regicide in Iraq and eventually the overthrow of King Idris of Libya. Saudi Arabia was locked in confrontation with Egypt throughout the 1960s, and it is determined not to relive that period. “We are back to the 1950s and early 1960s, when the Saudis led the opposition to the revolutions at that time, the revolutions of Arabism,” said Mohammad F. al-Qahtani, a political activist in Riyadh. Neil Macfarquhar Saudi Arabia Scrambles to Limit Region’s Upheaval May 27, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/world/middleeast/28saudi.html?nl=todaysheadline s&emc=tha2

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El G-8 crea un fondo para apoyar la democracia en el mundo árabe Las grandes potencias ofrecen 14.000 millones, ampliables hasta los 28.000.- Obama concluye su viaje a Europa sin hablar de Europa ANTONIO CAÑO (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Deauville (Francia) - 27/05/2011 El G-8 ha anunciado la creación de un fondo de 20.000 millones de dólares (unos 14.000 millones de euros), ampliable hasta 40.000 millones de dólares, para ayudar a las incipientes democracias en el mundo árabe y se comprometió a aprobar cantidades suplementarias en la medida en que otros países se sumen a las reformas emprendidas en Egipto y Túnez en condiciones de respeto a los derechos humanos, libertad y una gestión transparente del poder. "Los cambios que se están produciendo en Oriente Próximo y el Norte de África son históricos y tienen el potencial de abrir la puerta al tipo de transformaciones que ocurrieron en Europa del Este y Europa Central después de la caída del Muro de Berlín", afirmó la declaración final (inglés) de los presidentes de Estados Unidos, Rusia, Alemania, Francia, Japón, Reino Unido, Canadá e Italia, reunidos en la ciudad francesa de Deauville, en las costas de Normandía. El fondo acordado, cuyos primeros destinatarios serán Egipto y Túnez, será repartido a lo largo de los próximos tres años en los términos y plazos que próximamente fijen los ministros de finanzas, en coordinación con los países afectados y adoptando garantías de que sirven efectivamente para la construcción de sistemas democráticos. Posible ampliación del fondo Según declaró después de la reunión el ministro de Finanzas de Túnez, Jaloul Ayed, el presidente francés, Nicolas Sarkozy, les ha comunicado que ese fondo podría ser ampliado hasta los 40.000 millones de dólares si la situación lo precisa. El Banco Mundial y los diferentes bancos regionales de desarrollo se encargarán de distribuir la ayuda que, aunque no llega a las necesidades reclamadas por Túnez y Egipto, representa un gran alivio para encarar las reformas políticas necesarias. Los gobiernos de esos dos países participaron ayer en las reuniones de Deauville, así como el secretario general de la Liga Árabe, Amr Mussa. La declaración final de esta cumbre respalda igualmente el inicio urgente de conversaciones de paz entre israelíes y palestinos y apoya la campaña militar de la OTAN en Libia, a cuyo líder, Muamar el Gadafi, le exige la renuncia inmediata. "No tiene un futuro en una Libia libre y democrática; tiene que irse", afirma el comunicado. Las ocho grandes potencias critican también, en términos más duros de lo esperado, dada la resistencia de Rusia, la represión ejercida por el régimen sirio contra los manifestantes pacíficos. Siria tiene que "dejar de usar la fuerza y la intimidación", advierte la declaración. De no hacerlo voluntariamente, se amenaza con aplicar "otras medidas" para evitarlo.

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Diplomacia más dinámica La cumbre abordó, con resultados menos concretos, otros asuntos de la seguridad internacional, la estabilización económica y el medio ambiente. El intercambio fue, según lo describieron portavoces norteamericanos, franco y enriquecedor. Los líderes no leyeron discurso escritos sino que cruzaron ideas y propuestas en un clima de gran cooperación. Fue un nuevo modelo de diplomacia más dinámica con el que se trata de recuperar la eficacia de esta organización. Aparte del éxito que esta reunión representa para su anfitrión, la ocasión permitió también para consolidar el liderazgo internacional de Barack Obama, que fue quien introdujo las principales propuestas sobre el mundo árabe. Obama abandonó la cumbre con destino a Polonia, donde mañana concluye una gira europea en la que de lo que menos ha hablado es de Europa. Durante cinco días, el presidente norteamericano ha mostrado su solidaridad con Irlanda, un país unido por fuertes lazos sentimentales a EE UU. Ha resucitado, sobre todo, con un enorme vigor los lazos especiales con el Reino Unido. Su discurso en Westminster Hall se recordará como una de las mayores loas jamás pronunciadas a los valores de la democracia anglosajona. En Varsovia ofrecerá garantías sobre la seguridad de Europa del Este. Pero no ha habido una sola referencia a Europa como entidad política y mucho menos a la Unión Europea como organización. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/G- 8/crea/fondo/apoyar/democracia/mundo/arabe/elpepuint/20110527elpepuint_6/Tes EDITORIAL Los ricos y la revuelta El G-8 da un fuerte espaldarazo a la 'primavera' árabe, pero no genera alternativas económicas 28/05/2011 El Grupo de los ocho países más ricos del mundo cerró ayer su cumbre en Deauville con un espaldarazo a la revuelta democrática de los países árabes. La solemnidad, la concreción y el apoyo institucional otorgado a esa primavera era algo que correspondía a una deuda del mundo globalizado respecto a unos procesos de transformación social y política que, como dicen las conclusiones, no deben ser asfixiados por la difícil coyuntura económica de la región. La constitución, a estos efectos, de un fondo (por tres años) de unos 14.000 millones de euros, el apoyo político a las transiciones, las severas advertencias a Siria o Libia y la adecuación de instrumentos como el Banco Europeo de Desarrollo constituyen un programa a la altura del envite. Solo cabe esperar que no quede en meros enunciados, como ha pasado con iniciativas anteriores, por ejemplo, sobre África y sobre la pobreza. La resurrección, con Barack Obama, del multilateralismo norteamericano y la irrupción del G-20 han dejado al G-8 en un cierto vacío, como si fuera un ovni desinstitucionalizado y descolgado de responsabilidades, capacidad de seguimiento e impacto real. La función que algunos le atribuyen, como órgano preparatorio del G-20, es dificultosa, por no ser lo suficientemente representativo. De modo que le queda la

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salida de legitimarse por la acción: es lo que intenta, con cierta habilidad, mediante la iniciativa árabe. Claro que para lograrlo necesitará acopiar resultados tangibles. Significativamente, esta cumbre no ha producido ni una sola idea nueva para afianzar la creciente recuperación económica mundial, más allá de la insistencia ritual sobre el control del déficit. No solo eso: no ha ofrecido ni siquiera un balance detallado de lo acontecido en los tres últimos años, como base para relanzar el programa del propio G-8 y del G-20. ¿Acaso no es un reconocimiento implícito de que el espontaneísmo de los mercados le está ganando la partida al imperio de los Gobiernos democráticos? Todas las nuevas ideas básicas de Deauville las ha formulado Obama: notoriamente su plan Marshall para el norte de África y Oriente Próximo. Algo por lo que se le debe reconocimiento. Tanto como merecen desaprobación los políticos europeos, incapaces de movilizarse rápidamente y generar iniciativas a largo plazo para una región tan próxima. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/ricos/revuelta/elpepuopi/20110528elpepiopi_2/ Tes

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JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA Cumbre del G-8 Tres olas, muchos desafíos JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA 27/05/2011 La primavera árabe se ha partido en tres: la democrática, la reformista y la represora Si la primavera árabe se ha caracterizado por el desbordamiento de las ilusiones, el verano árabe se definirá por las incertidumbres. Transcurridos cinco meses del estallido de las revueltas, la ola de cambio se ha partido en tres olas menores. Túnez y Egipto han roto radicalmente con el pasado, pero su futuro dista de estar asegurado: son la ola democrática. Argelia, Marruecos, Jordania y Arabia Saudí han optado por abrir la espita de las reformas para así quitarse la presión popular de encima: son la ola reformista. Libia, Siria, Yemen y Bahréin han optado por la fuerza: son la ola represora. Gestionar un panorama como el que presentan estas tres olas es sumamente complicado: la comunidad internacional está concentrándose en los casos extremos (de democracia o de violencia) y dejando de lado los casos intermedios (los reformistas). Esto tiene sentido, pues lo prioritario en este momento es conseguir, a un extremo, asegurar que se celebren unas elecciones democráticas limpias y justas en Túnez y Egipto y, al otro, poner fin tanto al conflicto bélico en Libia como a las matanzas en Siria. Por un lado, nada nos interpela más que la extensión de la democracia a Túnez y Egipto: son dos faros que pueden iluminar todo el mundo árabe y poner fin a la anomalía democrática que allí ha venido rigiendo. Por otro, nada nos divide y pone más a prueba nuestra coherencia que la respuesta ante el uso de la violencia: en el recorrido que va del envío por Francia de material antidisturbios a Ben Ali al ofrecimiento de helicópteros de ataque a los rebeldes libios hay un trecho tan largo en lo conceptual como escaso en el tiempo. No obstante, como se desprende de la tibiedad con la que Europa y Estados Unidos tratan a los escasamente ejemplares países del golfo Pérsico, o como se adivina en las dudas sobre si exigir la salida del poder de Bachar el Asad en Siria, ni Washington ni Bruselas las tienen todavía todas consigo a la hora de dar una respuesta unificada y coherente a casos que en el fondo son bastante similares. Cerrar la herida en la continuidad de las reformas democráticas que supone Libia y poner fin al oprobio que significa la salvaje represión siria es crucial, de ahí que la UE se haya por fin lanzado a abrir una representación en Bengasi y a incrementar la presión sobre El Asad. Pero no conviene olvidar a los regímenes reformistas: si algo hemos aprendido en los últimos meses es a sospechar de las manifestaciones de estabilidad que vienen de países no democráticos con importantes déficits sociales. Además, las dificultades que la comunidad internacional está teniendo a la hora de actuar sobre aquellos que, como Gadafi en Libia, El Asad en Siria o Saleh en Yemen, optan por la violencia contra sus ciudadanos proporcionan una razón adicional para asegurarse de que aquellos que, como Marruecos o Argelia, han optado por la vía reformista (en distintos grados) no lo hagan de forma puramente táctica, sino realmente comprometida y sin posibilidad de marcha atrás. Con razón, Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y los organismos internacionales se están volcando en asegurar el éxito de las reformas en Túnez y Egipto: en las últimas semanas hemos visto, sucesivamente, importantes anuncios de ayuda provenientes de Washington y Bruselas (condonación de deuda, créditos, asistencia técnica y acceso a mercados), a los que se ha sumado el Banco Mundial, el G-7/G-8 y pronto lo hará el 281

Fondo Monetario Internacional. Aunque ambos países celebrarán pronto elecciones, no son las urnas las que darán de comer a tunecinos y egipcios: con un turismo hundido, los inversores internacionales en compás de espera y unas fronteras con Libia por donde se filtra la inestabilidad y los refugiados, las perspectivas de crecimiento económico en la región ya han sido revisadas a la baja, de un 5% estimado originalmente a un 3,5%. Aunque desde Europa parezcan cifras de crecimiento aceptables, no lo son para estos países, pues esos ritmos de crecimiento no permiten cubrir el inmenso déficit social, ni crear el suficiente número de empleos para el ingente número de jóvenes desempleados que hay en dichos países. La democracia es un proyecto frágil e incierto: de la última ola democratizadora, las revoluciones de las rosas en Georgia, naranja en Ucrania o de los tulipanes en Kirguizistán han acabado empantanadas en la mediocridad de unas élites corruptas y con resabios autoritarios y unas instituciones frágiles y de baja calidad democrática. Es precisamente lo que se trata de evitar ahora. [email protected] JOSÉ IGNACIO TORREBLANCA Tres olas, muchos desafíos La primavera árabe se ha partido en tres: la democrática, la reformista y la represora 27/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/olas/muchos/desafios/elpepiint/20110527e lpepiint_8/Tes Cumbre del G-8 El G-8 incentiva el cambio en el mundo árabe con un plan de ayudas Obama discute en la reunión sobre el relevo en el FMI y el escudo antimisiles Los delegados de Egipto y Túnez en la reunión piden 12 millones de dólares Rusia reclama prudencia en el grado de condena del club a Siria ANTONIO CAÑO (ENVIADO ESPECIAL) - Deauville - 27/05/2011 Los líderes del G-8 decidieron respaldar el levantamiento a favor de reformas democráticas en el mundo árabe y pusieron en marcha un plan para estimular esos cambios a través de incentivos económicos. La cumbre de esa organización en Deauville (Francia) discutió también el modo de coordinar sus acciones para castigar a los regímenes de esa región que han optado por reprimir a su población y sentaron las bases de lo que debería de ser un nuevo orden en Oriente Próximo y el norte de África. Los ministros de Finanzas de las ocho mayores potencias mundiales (Estados Unidos, Rusia, Alemania, Japón, Francia, Reino Unido, Italia y Canadá) se reunirán en las próximas semanas con representantes de países árabes para determinar las necesidades específicas de cada uno de ellos, empezando por Egipto y Túnez, que ya se encuentran en fase de transición hacia la democracia. "La política es importante, la diplomacia es importante, pero en última instancia los pueblos tienen que ver las ventajas concretas de los cambios por los que luchan", declaró ayer el asesor de seguridad de la Casa Blanca Ben Rhodes. Los presidentes negociaban ayer los últimos detalles sobre la declaración que será hecha pública hoy, sobre la que persisten algunas dudas en relación con el grado de condena a 282

algunos de los regímenes que han recurrido a la violencia, particularmente Siria, país sobre el que Rusia apuesta por ser más prudentes. El presidente ruso, Dmitri Medvédev, abordó ayer ese asunto en una reunión bilateral con el presidente Barack Obama. Medvédev considera que la OTAN está haciendo una interpretación agresiva de la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU sobre Libia y teme que ocurra algo similar con Siria si Rusia da luz verde. Esas discrepancias no impedirán, en todo caso, que esta cumbre concluya con el mensaje contundente de que el club más poderoso del mundo decide romper con el statu quo y apostar por una nueva era de democracia en el mundo árabe. Obama ha sido el líder que con mayor energía ha traído este asunto a la reunión. La Administración norteamericana se anticipó hace dos semanas con el anuncio de un plan de salvamento económico para un área en la que la inestabilidad actual puede agravar la situación económica. El Banco Mundial ha reducido las perspectivas de crecimiento en el mundo árabe del 5% al 3,5%. Estados Unidos ha aprobado ya una reducción de un millón de dólares de la deuda de Egipto y un millón en garantías de préstamos. El Banco Mundial añadirá 4,5 millones de dólares para ese país y 1,5 millones para Túnez. Parte de esas cantidades están condicionadas a la certificación del respeto a los derechos ciudadanos y a la transparencia en la gestión de los Gobiernos. Los países europeos y el FMI sumarán otras cantidades próximamente. Esto no satisface por completo las necesidades expresadas por Egipto y Túnez, cuyos representantes en esta reunión han reclamado alrededor de 12 millones de dólares para evitar un deterioro mayor de sus economías. Pero, a juicio de la Administración norteamericana, sienta unas bases de cooperación que servirá para que otros países se sientan alentados a seguir ese camino. Obama venía a Deauville con la misión principal de sacar adelante ese proyecto. Pero esto no es Dublín ni Londres, donde en los días anteriores fue aclamado y agasajado sin fin por irlandeses y británicos. Aquí se tuvo que encontrar con un anfitrión siempre renuente a jugar un papel secundario y, sobre todo, con un presidente ruso que puso sobre la mesa el obstáculo más grave de las relaciones ruso-norteamericanas en estos momentos: el sistema de defensa europeo. Obama eliminó el proyecto de escudo europeo diseñado por su antecesor. Pero Moscú tampoco está satisfecho con la alternativa que está poniendo en marcha Estados Unidos, un sistema móvil de detección de misiles preparado para interceptar cohetes de Irán o Corea del Norte, pero inútil frente al armamento ruso. Medvédev cree esa versión pero sospecha que, en un futuro, los norteamericanos podrían mejorar su tecnología para hacerla válida frente a los misiles rusos. Los dos presidentes se comprometieron a seguir trabajando en este asunto para no crear tensiones innecesarias. El presidente norteamericano fue objeto también de la presión de los cuatro países europeos para que respalde la candidatura de la ministra francesa de Finanzas, Christine Lagarde, a la dirección del FMI. EE UU no ha dado aún su apoyo a esa candidatura aunque podría hacerlo en breve. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/G- 8/incentiva/cambio/mundo/arabe/plan/ayudas/elpepiint/20110527elpepiint_7/Tes

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05/27/2011 02:02 PM Aiding Fledgling Democracies G-8 Leaders Pledge Billions to Egypt and Tunisia Leaders of the world's top industrialized nations pledged $20 billion in international aid Friday to Arab countries on the path to democratization. They also united in the demand that Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi "must go" and called for Syria's regime to stop using force against protesters. The heads of government of the world's eight leading industrialized nations, the G-8, and Russia moved Friday to support further democratization in Arab countries in northern Africa following the uprisings there this spring. Meeting in France at their annual summit, the G-8 leaders pledged that Egypt and Tunisia could receive more than $20 billion (€14 billion) in aid from international banks from now until 2013. The leaders issued a statement at the conclusion of their two-day summit in which they said their countries will also "mobilize substantial bilateral support to scale up this effort." How much they would contribute, and how the aid from international banks would be broken down, remained unclear. About €3.5 billion was expected to come from the European Investment Bank. The leaders of several African nations, including Tunisia and Egypt, took part in the meeting at the French seaside resort of Deauville in Normandy. G-8 leaders encouraged oil-rich Arab nations to help support the Egyptian and Tunisian economies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned of growing financial difficulties in the Arab world. The IMF has estimated that the countries pushing for democracy in the Middle East and northern Africa would need more than $160 billion (€112.9 billion) over the next three years to help their economies in a time when they are suffering, among other things, from rising commodity prices. The G-8 leaders also developed a plan to shift the focus of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, once aimed at helping Eastern European economies transition from Communism, to aiding Arab democracies. The ongoing fighting in Libya and government-backed violence against protestors in Syria were also addressed in the G-8 leaders' final statement. The G-8 leaders, representing the United States, Canada, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia, said Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi "must go" and said they are pushing for Syria's government to "stop using force and intimidation" against the protestors. URL: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,765280,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • The World from Berlin: 'End the Epoch of Atomic Madness' in the EU (05/26/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,765066,00.html • G-8 in Deauville: Internet and Crises to Top Agenda at French Summit (05/25/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,764845,00.html • eG8 Summit in Paris: Activists Fear Sarkozy's Efforts to Tame Web (05/24/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,764305,00.html • Obama's Marshallette Plan: Baby Steps for a Tentative Statesman (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763791,00.html • Has the Arab Spring Stalled?: Autocrats Gain Ground in Middle East (05/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762861,00.html

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Markets & Finance May 26, 2011, 11:00AM EST text size: TT The Man Behind Egypt's Real Estate Rebellion Lawsuits brought by Hamdy El Fakhrany have uncovered an array of corrupt land deals By Zainab Fattah and Mahmoud Kassem Hamdy El Fakhrany didn't set out to strike a blow against Egyptian government corruption when he traveled to a state land auction in 2007. All he wanted was a quarter of an acre to build a house. The auction was canceled, as were the others he tried to attend over the next six months, the 53-year-old engineer says. Finally, an employee at the Housing Ministry took him aside and told him how things worked in then-President Hosni Mubarak's Egypt. "'You are not Hisham Talaat Moustafa,' he told me," referring to the billionaire whose family founded the country's biggest property developer, Talaat Moustafa Group Holding. "'If you were, you would have been given 33 million square meters [355 million square feet] of land without an auction, and for nearly nothing.'" El Fakhrany left the meeting determined to learn as much as he could about the Talaat Moustafa purchase, which occurred in 2005. He was initially barred from reading the contract. Even so, by relying on handwritten notes slipped to him by someone else at the ministry, El Fakhrany was able to build a case that persuaded a court in September to annul the land sale underpinning the 120,000-home Madinaty project on Cairo's outskirts. An appeals court is set to review the ruling on June 21. The size of the Madinaty deal and the government's attempts to override the September court ruling fed into broader public criticism directed at Mubarak, his family, and corruption in Egypt. A popular uprising forced Mubarak to resign in February after 30 years in power. The publicity surrounding Madinaty, Egypt's biggest property development, prompted people to provide El Fakhrany with evidence of other suspicious land deals. He says he's now the plaintiff in more than a dozen lawsuits targeting state officials and developers. "I'm not against private companies working, but why can't they pay fair prices?" he says. "Those companies should not be an excuse to loot Egypt." El Fakhrany has already scored another legal victory. On Apr. 26 a court reversed a 966,000-square-meter land sale to Palm Hills Developments, Egypt's fourth-biggest publicly traded developer, based on a suit brought by El Fakhrany that claimed the price was significantly less than the market value. The panel of judges that annulled the transaction said that former Housing Minister Ahmed El Maghraby signed the Palm Hills sale document. El Maghraby owned a 4.6 percent stake in Mansour & Maghraby Investment & Development, which in turn holds 55 percent of Palm Hills, according to a company filing. El Maghraby has been arrested 285

on charges of squandering public funds and profiteering in connection with the case. He could not be reached for comment. El Fakhrany is preparing additional lawsuits, saying he has received enough documents to file 76 cases that challenge 126 projects. The contracting business owner says he is working with his daughter, Yasmin, a dermatologist, and using his own income to cover legal costs. El Fakhrany's campaign, along with the uncertainty stemming from the toppling of the Mubarak regime, has thrown Egypt's real estate industry into turmoil. Stocks of publicly traded developers have tumbled as sales plummet and customers cancel deals. Shares of Talaat Moustafa are down 50 percent this year. In December, El Fakhrany was named "Egypt's First Fighter of Corruption" for 2010 in an event organized in part by the syndicate of journalists in Egypt. He received a prize of 5,000 Egyptian pounds ($840). As for the Madinaty project that started El Fakhrany on his quest, a court order finally made the development's land contract available for review. While El Fakhrany knew some of the details, he was shocked when he read the document closely. Under the 2005 deal, which was completed without a public auction, El Fakhrany says, the state was entitled to 7 percent of the residential properties built, while Talaat Moustafa would get 93 percent. The government also agreed to exempt the developer from all taxes and fees incurred during construction, including import duties on construction materials, and relinquished rights to any commercial or retail space. "The deal couldn't have been any more slanted on the side of the developer and against Egypt," El Fakhrany says. "It was like it was drafted by an enemy of the state." While investigating the Madinaty case, El Fakhrany discovered that a Cayman Islands-based fund called Horus Private Equity Fund III was a shareholder in Talaat Moustafa Group and lists Mubarak's son Gamal as one of its owners. Jihad Alsawaftah, chief financial officer at Talaat Moustafa, didn't respond to calls and e-mails seeking comment. Construction on the site continues while the case is in court. Hisham Talaat Moustafa, the former chairman of Talaat Moustafa, was convicted in May 2010 of paying a former police officer to kill his former girlfriend, Lebanese pop singer Suzanne Tamim. His sentence was reduced from death to 15 years in prison after a retrial that ended in September. During an interview in a Cairo cafe, a woman approached El Fakhrany and asked if she could contact him and provide some documents to review. She thanked him for his work. "All the land, which was acquired through corruption, must be returned to the country, or those companies must pay the fair value for it," El Fakhrany says. "Only then we will settle and let the projects go on." The bottom line: El Fakhrany's challenges to land deals in Egypt are uncovering corruption and upending the real estate market. Zainab Fattah and Mahmoud Kassem The Man Behind Egypt's Real Estate Rebellion Lawsuits brought by Hamdy El Fakhrany have uncovered an array of corrupt land deals May 26, 2011 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_23/b4231041996189.htm?campaign_id=mag_May2 6&link_position=link24

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Gaddafi is paranoid and on the run, MI6 tells David Cameron Libyan leader said to be hiding in hospitals by night, and many senior commanders appear to have stopped using phones Patrick Wintour in Deauville and Martin Chulov guardian.co.uk, Thursday 26 May 2011 22.10 BST

David Cameron has been told by UK intelligence that Muammar Gaddafi is increasingly paranoid, on the run, and hiding in hospitals by night, and that his senior commanders in the regime are unable to communicate with one another. The reports from MI6 relayed to the cabinet's national security council this week prompted Cameron to authorise a high-risk escalation of attacks by agreeing to deploy four Apache helicopters into Libya with orders to gun down regime leaders and assets hiding in built-up areas. The French had leaked that Britain was likely to deploy helicopters, but the Whitehall ministerial decision was only made today. The taking of the decision was confirmed by British officials attending the G8 summit of world leaders. Diplomatic sources, sounding more confident than at any point since the air assaults, claimed: "He is on the run." Gaddafi's regime made its most plaintive plea yet for a ceasefire, by offering to talk to anti-government rebels, move towards a constitutional government, and compensate victims of the three-month conflict. The Apaches' deployment from HMS Ocean touring off the Albanian coast was confirmed by government sources. They will be joined by French helicopters under Nato command. The Apaches can fly as low as 1,000 feet and fire heat-seeking missiles to destroy a vast array of targets; they will require close on-the-ground co-ordination probably using UK special forces and rebel leaders. Their use has in part been necessitated by Gaddafi trying to hide his military assets in built-up areas that can only be attacked by Tornados at the risk of massive civilian casualties. British diplomatic sources explained: "There's clearly a link between the upping of the military pressure and what we assess is his state of mind. The more he thinks things are moving against him the better. There is a picture building up of this man who is very paranoid and a regime that's increasingly feeling under pressure and beginning to fracture. "The judgment we are making is that it is the right time to turn up the heat and try to make it tell. "What he is doing is moving from a place we won't bomb to another place we won't bomb. The fact that he is moving the whole time shows he is worried about people knowing where he is staying. 287

"One striking thing is the fact that Gaddafi appears to be moving from hospital to hospital and spending each night in a different hospital. We are getting the sense that a lot of senior commanders have stopped using their phones. They are clearly worried they are being listened to and that is having an impact on their ability to communicate." Some of the growing UK pressure may be designed to see if it can extract a more serious ceasefire offer from the regime. So far Sarkozy, Cameron and President Obama have not viewed the repeated offers of an immediate ceasefire as credible. The implicit threat in the use of the helicopters is that it will be easy to assassinate Gaddafi. But the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, insisted this was not the plan. "We don't want to kill him," he said. "Because we are not killers." As Nato made more airstrikes on Tripoli last night, Sarkozy admitted at the G8 summit that conflicts over the Nato attack on Libya were having a diplomatic spill-over. Russia's ambassador to France, Alexander Orlov, said the Nato campaign has gone "too far." As a result, he said, Russia did not intend to support a UN resolution warning Syria about its crackdown on protesters. The offer from the Libyan regime represents an advance on previous ceasefire bids, which had focused largely on implementing a proposal by the African Union calling for international monitors to observe a negotiated ceasefire. Libya's prime minister Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi acknowledged that the revolt paralysing Libya was "part of a series of events that are taking place throughout the Arab world"; officials had previously linked the groups who now control the east of the country to al-Qaida and foreign backers, and steadfastly refused to acknowledged a pro- democracy current among the rebels. Asked about the new willingness to talk to rebels, Mahmoudi said: "We are ready for dialogue with all structures that represent the whole of Libya. Any Libyans can sit on the round table." The plan was greeted with scepticism by the US and some European states. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/26/gaddafi-paranoid-run-cameron/print

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05/26/2011 03:59 PM Desertec and Democracy Arab Spring Boosts Dream of Desert Power By Alison Kilian Desertec is a multi-billion-dollar energy initiative that hopes to meet Europe's energy needs with solar power from the Sahara. The recent upheavals in North Africa have put the project in question. But many experts argue that the Arab Spring will actually help Desertec's grand vision become reality. The images projected on the wall of the conference hall were familiar shots of Egyptian protesters, with youthful faces juxtaposed by the harsh countenances of dark-clad security forces. But for once this wasn't a discussion about the causes of the Arab Spring or the revolutionary potential of the Internet. Instead, it was a conference on solar power: more specifically Desertec, the hugely ambitious energy initiative that hopes to exploit the Saharan sun to produce abundant clean solar power. Desertec may have been labeled the energy megaproject of the 21st century, but some critics argue that the Arab Spring unrest will put an end to dreams of desert solar energy. But at a major conference on Desertec and the uprisings in the Arab world held this week in Berlin, experts expressed optimism about the revolutions' impact on the project's future. Many see the recent push for democracy as a step towards the stability necessary to establish projects like Desertec in the region. "Many critics are saying that the Desertec project is dead because of the unrest in the region. But I would say the exact opposite is true," Kirsten Westphal, an energy expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), told SPIEGEL ONLINE. She argues that a pro-democracy movement can open up opportunities and lay the foundations for long-term economic development. Meeting Europe's Energy Demands The Desertec project first got energy experts and the public buzzing back in 2009, when the plans were announced. The grand -- some would say grandiose -- idea is to construct a network of concentrating solar-thermal power systems in North African deserts to produce green electricity that can be used at the local level -- and ultimately exported to European countries. Proponents of the project argue that the amount of solar energy falling on the Sahara is so enormous that plants covering 90,000 square kilometers of the desert -- a tiny fraction of its total area of 9 million square kilometers -- could meet the energy needs of the entire world. Desertec hopes that the project will cover a significant amount of North African and Middle Eastern electricity demand by 2050, as well as providing at least 15 percent of Europe's electricity. The project, which is expected to cost around €400 billion ($566 billion) and which is still at the planning stage, is being pushed forward by the nonprofit Desertec Foundation together with the Desertec Industrial Initiative (DII). The latter is an industrial consortium that includes such major German players as Deutsche Bank, Siemens, E.on

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and Munich Re. It aims to create the "legal, regulatory, economic and technical framework" that will allow the Desertec vision to become reality. Stability Needed The DII plan has been met with enthusiasm by some, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel. But others have derided the project as unrealistic, arguing that it is too expensive or too challenging technically. Others point out the political problems associated with carrying out a huge multinational project in such an unstable part of the world. Indeed, participants in the Berlin conference argued that, given the current upheaval in the region, a certain level of stability is needed before Desertec can act on its plans. "I cannot put 1,000 men on duty to guard every solar panel," said Abdelaziz Bennouna, formerly of the National Center for Science and Technology in Morocco. "Social peace is a must." Unrest in the region also has the drawback of scaring off investors, points out Greenpeace Germany's Andree Böhling. Nevertheless, Böhling believes that democratization is still a step in the right direction, both for the people of the region and for Desertec. But does democracy need to be established in the region before Desertec even stands a chance of success? No, says the SWP's Kirsten Westphal: "Socioeconomic development and the development of democracy go hand-in-hand." Projects such as Desertec promote the kind of economic development that is an essential prerequisite for consolidating democratic structures in a country, the researcher argues. 'White Elephant in the Desert' Despite the general optimism regarding the Arab Spring's impact on Desertec's future, other issues serve as a reminder that Desertec and DII still have a great deal of work to do before setting up shop in the Sahara. European-driven investment in North African energy resources inevitably brings up accusations of neocolonialism. And after fighting for democracy, it's uncertain whether young people in countries like Egypt will be keen to let European companies get their hands on local resources. "It's a white elephant in the desert," said Marc Jedliczka, the general director of Hespul, a French nonprofit devoted to renewable energy and energy efficiency. He argued that a European-initiated project that intends to harvest -- and eventually export -- African energy resources is deeply problematic. Desertec representatives are quick to counter any accusations of a neocolonialist agenda. They emphasize that the project first plans to secure solar power for the people of North Africa before exporting the energy to Europe or elsewhere. But many share Jedliczka's concerns. Kirsten Westphal of the SWP feels that it is essential to have an open discussion on the issue of neo-colonialism. "The common opinion coming out of (the Middle East and North Africa) is that Desertec has a hidden agenda rather than producing a win-win situation," she says. Greenpeace's Andree Böhling also pointed to the need to confront fears of neocolonial motives head-on, through open dialogue. Promoting Transparency

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The Desertec conference held in Berlin this week was intended to initiate exactly that kind of public dialogue and promote transparency. What is perhaps more important is carrying on that discussion in the countries of North Africa. With that in mind, DII plans to hold a conference in Cairo at the beginning of November, with heavyweight speakers such as former German Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer and the European Union's energy commissioner, Günther Oettinger. Desertec is hoping that public forums like these can help to convince skeptics that its motives are honorable. Until the project takes concrete shape, however, doubts are likely to remain. "Desert Power for the People" was the title of the Berlin event. But it's perhaps understandable if stakeholders in North Africa and the Middle East find themselves asking the question: Which people? URL: Alison Kilian Desertec and Democracy. Arab Spring Boosts Dream of Desert Power 05/26/2011 03:59 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,764877,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Image Gallery: How Solar Thermal Power Plants Work http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-68478.html • Desertec Dreams: Can Saharan Solar Power Save Europe? (12/03/2009) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,664842,00.html • The World From Berlin: New Energy Projects 'Not a Magic Bullet' (07/14/2009) http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,636090,00.html • Interview with Siemens CEO on the Desertec Project: 'On the Brink of a New Era in Energy' (07/13/2009) http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,635914,00.html • The World from Berlin: Desertec Solar Project 'an Encouraging Economic Sign' (06/17/2009) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,630948,00.html • SPIEGEL 360: Our Full Coverage of Energy and Natural Resources http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/natural_resources/ Related internet links • Desertec Foundation http://www.desertec.org • Desertec Industrial Initiative http://www.dii-eumena.com SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages.

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La UE condiciona la ayuda a los países árabes a la democracia La Comisión destina 7.000 millones de euros hasta 2013 R. MARTÍNEZ DE RITUERTO - Bruselas - 26/05/2011 La primavera árabe sorprendió a la Unión Europea aliada con los dictadores derrocados. La estrategia con gobernantes como el egipcio Hosni Mubarak o el tunecino Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, era comprarles seguridad a cambio de entregar millones de euros a sus regímenes. La Comisión Europea se propone ahora dar un nuevo enfoque a la relación con los 16 países de la vecindad -lo que incluye a los del este de Europa-, anteponiendo el desarrollo democrático de esas sociedades a todo lo demás y supeditando las ayudas económicas a los intereses que definan las propias sociedades. "Potenciar la democracia, ayudar al desarrollo de la sociedad civil y conseguir una economía que funcione va en el interés de Europa", afirmó ayer Catherine Ashton, coordinadora de la política exterior comunitaria. En la mesa, la Comisión pondrá unos 7.000 millones de euros de aquí a 2013. La Política Europea de Vecindad fue creada en 2004 para lanzar programas en campos como la energía, la educación, el transporte o la investigación. Los cambios vividos en esta primera mitad del año han demostrado que "se hace necesario reforzar la relación entre la UE y los países y sociedades de la vecindad para construir y consolidar democracias sanas, lograr un crecimiento basado en el desarrollo sostenible y gestionar los flujos fronterizos", señala el documento con la nueva estrategia, presentado ayer por Ashton y Stefan Füle, comisario de Ampliación y Política de Vecindad. "Antes trabajábamos con las autoridades, con Ben Ali y los demás, y teníamos que hacer concesiones para que los programas de cooperación funcionaran", reconoció Füle. "Ahora se va a pedir a las autoridades que mantengan una relación estrecha con la población. Si un país no va hacia la democracia, reconsideraríamos la asistencia y podríamos reducirla". Es lo que el documento etiqueta como responsabilidad mutua. "Nuestro contribuyente quiere que gastemos bien el dinero y la gente de esos países espera que nosotros invirtamos el dinero en lo que ellos quieren", explicó Ashton. Los parámetros para medir la vertiente de profundización democrática serán elecciones libres, libertad de expresión y de prensa, justicia independiente, lucha contra la corrupción y fuerzas de seguridad y armadas controladas democráticamente. "El documento ha sido discutido con ellos", apuntó Füle. "No es una imposición". El plan incluye también estrategias para controlar los flujos migratorios. Ashton negó que se trate de un intercambio: dinero a cambio de que no haya emigración. "La gente quiere vivir en su propio país y se trata de darles la oportunidad de desarrollarse como deseen", dijo. "Si se desarrollan política y económicamente, nosotros nos beneficiaremos de ello", añadió Ashton. El previsto paquete de 6.942 millones para 2011-2013 se reparte en dos tercios para los países de la otra orilla del Mediterráneo y Oriente Próximo y un tercio para países del este de Europa como Bielorrusia o Moldavia. Además, hay otros 18.000 a disposición en el Banco Europeo de Inversiones o en el Banco Europeo de Reconstrucción y Desarrollo. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/UE/condiciona/ayuda/paises/arabes/democ racia/elpepiint/20110526elpepiint_3/Tes?print=1

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15 June 2

Last Update 14/06/2011 Total visits

Reframing the Libyan Narrative (ARI)

Ronald Bruce St John ARI 96/2011 - 23/5/2011

Theme: The rebel movement in Libya is slowly building on its limited military capacity and experience and is making good progress in achieving domestic and international legitimacy, but much remains to be done before it is a functional state. Summary: In recent weeks, the balance of power in Libya has shifted steadily in favor of the rebels. Although the Gaddafi family may not surrender anytime soon, it is only a matter of time before they are forced from power. Consequently, it is time to begin thinking long and hard about a post-Gaddafi Libya. Revolutionary change is often chaotic, unpredictable and violent, and in a Libya in which civil organisations and political institutions are absent, these dangers loom large. Analysis: The Transitional National Council (TNC) derives its legitimacy from the various local councils established by the rebels in the course of the 17 February Revolution. As towns and cities like Al Baida and Benghazi have been liberated, they have formed committees to manage local government responsibilities, like traffic control, rubbish removal and the supply of electricity and water. Reminiscent of the country-wide system of congresses and committees organised by the Gaddafi regime, the important difference is that local people in rebel- controlled areas are organising and operating these committees themselves without the oppressive central government direction and control imposed by Gaddafi. On 29 March 2011 the Transitional National Council issued its vision for a ‘modern, free, and united’ Libya, ‘espousing the principles of political democracy’. To replace the 1969 constitutional proclamation issued by the Gaddafi regime, it called for the drafting of a constitution which would balance executive, legislative and judicial powers. It also provided for the formation of political parties and other civil institutions and organisations. The monarchy outlawed political parties in 1952 and the Gaddafi regime continued the ban after 1969. Viewing civil organisations as potential centres of resistance to the regime, Gaddafi systematically destroyed civil society in Libya, allowing only organisations officially approved by his regime. The last one to be approved was the Gaddafi International Development and Charity Foundation, created years ago and headed by the Libyan leader’s second son, Saif al- Islam al-Gaddafi. The March TNC statement also called for free and fair elections and freedom of speech and assembly, all of which were also banned under Gaddafi. Finally, it called for the creation of a diversified economy supported by effective financial institutions. This last point addressed one of the most important lapses of the Gaddafi regime, its failure after four decades to diversify the Libyan economy. Political Legitimacy In mid-April, 61 tribal representatives met in Benghazi where they issued a call for a ‘free, democratic, and united’ Libya. Rejecting suggestions by Gaddafi that his regime was the only thing keeping the tribes from engaging in internecine violence, the tribal leaders in attendance called for him to end his attempts to divide Libya along tribal lines and to step down. In what 295

amounted to tribal theatre, the Gaddafi regime later convened its own tribal gathering in Tripoli with regime spokesmen claiming that some 2,000 tribal chiefs representing 851 tribes and tribal factions were in attendance. Given there are only 140 tribes in Libya, the real size and actual composition of the Tripoli gathering remained in doubt. Clearly, some tribes have joined the rebel movement while others have remained loyal to the regime; however, it would appear many, if not most tribes, have tried to remain neutral, waiting to see which side gains the upper hand. The Warfalla, the largest tribe in Libya and a long-time supporter of the regime, are a good example of how different factions within a tribe are taking different positions. After a senior member of the tribe had declared for the rebels in mid- February, the regime later claimed that it had the support of most of the Warfalla, and representatives of different Warfalla factions attended both the tribal gathering in Benghazi and the one in Tripoli. The Warfalla representative at the tribal meeting organised by Gaddafi in Tripoli expressed support for the regime; however, he also made clear that he would not send tribal members to fight the rebels. The Transitional National Council describes itself as the only legitimate body representing the Libyan people and has called upon the nations of the world to recognise it and deal with it on this basis. In support of these objectives, the TNC in early May unveiled a detailed ‘road map’ to democracy at a meeting of the 22-nation International Contact Group on Libya. In an effort to be inclusive, an important step in ensuring the future stability of the country, the road map presented at the Rome meeting called for the start of the transition to begin with the installation of an interim government made up of TNC members, select technocrats from the Gaddafi regime, senior military and intelligence officers, and a Supreme Court judge. Some observers immediately questioned the inclusion of former regime officials; however, the involvement of technocrats –as distinguished from the ideological stalwarts of the dictatorship– would benefit the country. It would also send an important message of national unity and healing as opposed to factional interests and petty retribution. Under the plan, the interim government will hold municipal elections in rebel-held areas under UN supervision. Once the Gaddafi regime is overturned, it will then organise a national council of municipal representatives to elect a committee to draft a new constitution which will be submitted to a referendum. Once the charter is approved, it will be followed by parliamentary elections in four months, followed two months later by presidential elections. While the immediate future may be uncertain, the democratic foundation underlying the proposed road map appears clear and has helped to bolster the legitimacy of the rebel movement both at home and on the international stage. In the wake of the Rome meeting, local councils from 25 towns, including Tripoli, convened in Benghazi in an attempt to unify rebel ranks and to forge a common vision for the future of Libya. At the outset of the meeting, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Chairman of the Transitional National Council, told the participants that the membership of the 31-member council would be expanded to better represent all regions and interests in Libya. The meeting included an open exchange on the military and political situation throughout the country and concluded with the participants reiterating their support for the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Billed as a ‘town hall’ meeting to discuss the uprising, the meeting was in reality part of a broader effort by the TNC to buttress its democratic credentials and to cultivate legitimacy by portraying itself as the functioning, legitimate, and transparent representative of the Libyan people. To date, only a few countries –France, Gambia, Italy, Kuwait, Maldives and Qatar– have recognised the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people although several other governments have extended some form of unofficial recognition. The reasons why other countries, notably the UK and the US, have not done so are not always clear but appear centred on related issues, notably questions about the ability of the rebel movement to govern Libya once the Gaddafi regime is overthrown and the presence of Islamists in the rebel’s ranks. The 296

first concern has been addressed above, and as for the second, there is only a very limited prospect for significant Islamist or al-Qaeda involvement in a post-Gaddafi Libya. Overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, the Libyan people are conservative in outlook and practice and have never shown any appetite for the radical Islam advocated by al-Qaeda or its North African affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. In the mid-1990s the Gaddafi regime defeated a determined challenge from Islamist forces like the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, largely comprised of mujahideen who returned to Libya after the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan, but since then, there has been little evidence of organised Islamist activity in Libya. Granted, Libyan nationals made up the second-largest group of foreign fighters in Iraq after the Saudis; however, their opposition to the invasion and occupation of Iraq does not in itself foretell an Islamist threat in Libya, especially if the international coalition refrains from putting ‘boots on the ground’. Much has also been made of the presence of several former Guantánamo detainees in the rebel ranks, but they appear to be fighting as individual citizens and not as an organised group. In the end, the risk of al-Qaeda gaining a foothold in Libya stems more from a rebel defeat than a rebel victory. Military Capability After a disappointing start in which rebel forces retreated as often as they advanced, they have shown an increasing ability in recent days to hold their own against the better trained and better equipped forces of the Gaddafi regime, thanks, in large part, to NATO air support. Following weeks of moving back and forth between Ajdabiya and Brega, the rebels have consolidated their control of Ajdabiya and advanced on Brega. In central Libya, the rebels breached the government lines west of Misurata and pushed to Qaryat az Zurayan, 20 km towards Tripoli, strengthening the prospect of an eventual linkup with rebel forces in Zlitan. If the rebels can occupy Zlitan, they will be in a position to attack Sirte, Gaddafi’s home town. The rebels have also pushed regime forces out of the area around the Misurata airport, making it more difficult for the latter to shell the city centre and the neighbouring port area. In the Nafusa Mountains south-west of Tripoli, rebel forces have learned from the early mistakes of their rebel brethren in eastern Libya. In an area pro-Gaddafi forces are desperate to control, both because of its impact on oil exports from the western oil fields and its access to Tunisia, rebel forces have succeeded from time to time in occupying the Dehiba-Wazzin border post on the Tunisian frontier. They have also held their own in often fierce fighting with government forces in towns like Nalut and Zintan. From the standpoint of the rebels, control of the Nafusa Mountains and the roads that run parallel to them puts rebel forces in a position to move on to the oil terminal and refinery at Zawiya and then on to Tripoli. With government troops increasingly on the defensive, Gaddafi’s forces have been unable to mount a sustained attack anywhere in Libya for some time and may no longer be capable of doing so. This is not to suggest that the rebels will be capable of storming Tripoli on their own any time soon. The recent rebel success in many parts of the country is tied closely to NATO support, and rebel forces will likely remain dependent on that support for some time to come. Consequently, the optimum scenario for an end to the fighting would be for the Gaddafi regime to disintegrate from within with the Gaddafi family removed from the equation. Until this happens, it must be recognised and emphasised that the rebels throughout Libya have demonstrated that they are in this fight for the long haul, and the strength and effectiveness of their fighting forces appears to be growing on a weekly basis. Economic Self-sufficiency When Libya first achieved independence in 1951, it was widely considered to be the poorest state in the world. Following the discovery of oil in exportable quantities in 1957, Libya developed into a classic example of a rentier state, one in which income from a single resource, in this case hydrocarbons, enables the state to act as the distributor of this income in the form of education, housing and other social services. While the Gaddafi regime made token attempts to

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diversify the economy, after almost 42 years of revolutionary rule Libya remains a rentier state. One of the least diversified countries in North Africa, it also has the strongest demographic growth and the highest unemployment level in the region. Given the failure of the regime’s diversification policies, it is hardly surprising that the genesis for the current rebellion lay in public protests in mid-January which denounced corruption and incompetence, called for enhanced economic opportunities and more jobs, and demanded decent housing and a dignified life. It was only after the regime responded to those protests with deadly force that the protesters began to demand regime change. Libya has around 46 billion barrels of known oil reserves, the largest in Africa, and close to 55 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. Approximately 80% of its proved oil reserves are located in the Sirte basin which accounts for around two-thirds of the country’s oil production. Another 25% comes from the Murzuq basin with most of the remainder coming from offshore. Over the last decade, the mix of Libya’s energy consumption remained relatively constant, with approximately 72% of energy demand met by oil and 28% by natural gas. In 2010, the hydrocarbon industry accounted for 95% of export earnings and total oil production (crude plus liquids) approached 1.8 million barrels a day. Five months later, the rebel-controlled areas, which accounted for two-thirds of pre-rebellion production, are producing virtually no oil, and production in regime-controlled areas has been reduced to a trickle. The key to the long-term economic health of the rebel government is the resumption of oil and gas production throughout Libya. In the interim, the rebels are almost totally dependent on grants or loans from the international community. In early May, the Transitional National Council asked international donors for up to US$3 billion in loans, warning that it would be unable to provide medicine and food to civilians and to pay public sector salaries if it failed to receive a cash infusion. At the early May meeting of the International Contact Group on Libya, the participants responded to the TNC request, creating a special fund managed by a five-member steering board to channel cash to the rebel government. The board consisted of three Libyans chosen by the TNC, a representative of Qatar and a representative from either France or Italy on a six-month rotating basis. Before the meeting ended, both Qatar and Kuwait pledged to donate several million dollars each to the fund. Most other participants agreed that their financial support would largely be in the form of loans, not grants, on the assumption that the rebels could repay the loans once they had ousted the Gaddafi regime and consolidated their control of the entire country. In addition, the US and other governments that have frozen Libyan assets agreed to look at freeing some of those funds for humanitarian aid. At the Rome meeting, Qatar also tabled for the first time the question of arming the rebels; however, no joint agreement was reached on this subject. Longer term, the key to the financial solvency of the rebel government will be the resumption of oil and gas production. In addition to offshore deposits, Libya has five major oil and gas basins (Sirte, Ghadames, Murzuq, Cyrenaica-Batnan and Kufra). Of the five onshore basins, two are under the tenuous control of the rebel government and the other three contested or controlled by the Gaddafi regime. The various international oil companies operating in these basins have estimated it will take weeks to months to get their production facilities up and running once the rebel government can ensure the security of their operations and workers. As the rebels continue to make gains, a priority of the international community should be to facilitate the return of the international oil companies to their facilities so they can resume the production of the hydrocarbons necessary to fund the rebel government. As for Libya’s oil terminals and refineries, the Tobruk oil terminal and refinery is controlled by the rebels, but the terminals at Es Sider, Marsa al-Brega and Ras Lanuf, and the refineries at Sarir, Marsa al-Brega and Ras Lanuf are located in contested areas and are not operating at the present time. The Az Zawiya refinery, located in regime-controlled territory west of Tripoli at the Zawiya terminal, is a relatively modest contributor at the best of times to Libya’s total capacity, and while it is operable, it is operating at 50% or less of capacity. As both sides

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grapple with drops in oil production, refinery capacity and crude oil imports, energy supplies are becoming an increasingly important factor in the conflict. The UN coalition is squeezing Gaddafi, preventing him from selling or importing oil while it has given the rebels permission to import oil from outside Libya. With the regime’s survival closely linked to fuel, this ‘perfect storm’ of petrol supply problems could become a decisive contributor to Gaddafi’s fall. The reported mid-May defection of Shokri Ghanem, head of the National Oil Corporation, a former Prime Minister (2003-06) and long-time supporter of Gaddafi, could be taken to suggest that the regime’s energy supplies are running out. Hoping to take advantage of the situation, the Transitional National Council is lobbying to represent Libya at the next OPEC meeting, scheduled for 8 June in Vienna. In the past, Ghanem has normally represented Libya at such meetings. Conclusions: The month of May has marked considerable diplomatic, military, and political success for the rebels. Militarily, they have checkmated regime troops in most areas of the country and pushed them back in Ajdabiya-Brega and around Misurata. Politically, the Transitional National Council has proposed a road map for the country with its initial stages scheduled to commence before the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Diplomatically, TNC representatives have continued to meet with senior officials in France, the UK and the US in continuing efforts to attract financial, military and political support from the international community. That said, it is not the war but the peace which will define how post-Gaddafi Libya is governed. When the fighting ends, the rebels will likely find that winning the war was the easy part. The harder part will be to construct a civil order with supporting political institutions that will encourage and sustain popular empowerment and participation in a free, open and democratic society. While this will not be easy, the early steps of the Transitional National Council, combined with the work of the popular committees which have sprung up in rebel-controlled areas, are positive developments which should be encouraged and supported. Ronald Bruce St John Former member of the international advisory board of The Journal of Libyan Studies and the Atlantic Council Working Group on Libya and author of five books on Libya, including Libya: Continuity and Change (2011)

Ronald Bruce St John Reframing the Libyan Narrative (ARI) ARI 96/2011 - 23/5/2011http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_G LOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/mediterranean+arab+world/ari96- 2011

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Democrats join Republicans in questioning Obama’s policy on Israel By Peter Wallsten, Wednesday, May 25, 3:38 AM Top Democrats have joined a number of Republicans in challenging President Obama’s policy toward Israel, further exposing rifts that the White House and its allies will seek to mend before next year’s election. The differences, on display as senior lawmakers addressed a pro-Israel group late Monday and Tuesday, stem from Obama’s calls in recent days for any peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians to be based on boundaries that existed before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, combined with “mutually agreed swaps” of territory. Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.), House Minority Whip Steny H. Hoyer (Md.) and other Democrats appeared to reject the president’s reference to the 1967 lines in his latest attempt to nudge along peace talks, thinking that he was giving away too much, too soon. White House officials say Obama’s assertion did not reflect a shift in U.S. policy. But the president’s comments touched a nerve among pro-Israel activists, drew a rare Oval Office rebuke from Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and instantly became a litmus test in domestic American politics. Now Obama — whom critics often accuse of employing a play-it-safe governing style in which he waits for others to take the lead — is largely isolated politically in raising the issue of boundaries. By this week, White House aides were reaching out to Israel supporters in the Jewish community to try to ease concerns, according to people familiar with the effort. The White House has arranged a conference call with Jewish leaders and contacted others for advice on repairing ties. The political uproar, coming as Netanyahu received a bipartisan hero’s welcome Tuesday for a speech to Congress, underscored the careful calculations being made by leaders in both parties. Democrats and Obama must balance the need to pursue delicate international diplomacy while retaining the party’s traditional support among Jewish campaign donors and voters, particularly in competitive states such as Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania. The party’s liberal base, however, is divided, with many on the left urging more concessions by Israel. Republicans increasingly consider Israel a core issue that can unify sometimes disparate party factions, with evangelical voters and foreign policy hawks alike emerging as some of the Jewish state’s most vocal U.S. backers. Netanyahu, who since Thursday has repeatedly called the 1967 borders “indefensible,” helped set the stage for the torrent of White House criticism.

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His response was quickly followed by criticism from Republicans vying to take on Obama next year. Former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney, the presumed GOP front-runner, accused the president of throwing Israel “under the bus.” Former Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty said Obama had made a “mistaken and very dangerous demand.” The pressure from Republicans and fellow Democrats leaves the White House and top political aides with the added task of making amends with Israel backers by touting Obama’s history of support for that nation. Among the prominent Israel supporters upon whom Obama has relied for advice are Lee Rosenberg, president of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and Alan Solow, who will leave his post as chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations next month. Both have been key behind-the- scenes advocates for Obama in reassuring skeptical backers. This week, the president’s newly chosen national Democratic Party chairman, Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz, signaled that she, too, will serve as an emissary. Her South Florida district is home to one of the country’s biggest Jewish populations, a place where Obama’s 2008 campaign tapped prominent Jewish lawmakers and local elected officials to visit synagogues and community centers and debunk rumors that Obama is a Muslim and anti-Israel. “As a Jewish member of Congress who cares deeply about preserving Israel as a Jewish, democratic state, I am proud that President Obama spoke forcefully about continuing the United States’ strong and stalwart support of Israel,” Wasserman Schultz said in a written statement. As part of their defense, a number of White House allies said Tuesday the political row had been fueled by Netanyahu, who seized on Obama’s reference to the 1967 lines but glossed over his additional point regarding land swaps. Appearing irritated by the controversy, Obama said in his own speech to AIPAC on Sunday that his views had been “misrepresented several times.” “Let me reaffirm what ‘1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps’ means,” Obama said, sounding exasperated. “By definition, it means that the parties themselves — Israelis and Palestinians — will negotiate a border that is different than the one that existed on June 4, 1967. That’s what ‘mutually agreed-upon swaps’ means. It is a well-known formula to all who have worked on this issue for a generation.” Obama went on to play down his remarks, saying “there was nothing particularly original in my proposal.” Even so, he tried to portray his position as a sign of political courage, while also offering a subtle reminder that two of his closest advisers, Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod, are Jewish. “I know very well that the easy thing to do, particularly for a president preparing for reelection, is to avoid any controversy,” he said. “I don’t need Rahm to tell me that. Don’t need Axelrod to tell me that.” But between his Thursday speech, which was aimed in part at an Arab audience, and his Sunday address to AIPAC, Obama shifted some of his rhetoric toward the Israeli position. For instance, he referred to the Islamist militant group Hamas more directly as a “terrorist organization.” Several experts said the president’s stance on boundaries was in line with past U.S. policy, albeit stated more bluntly. But some said it marked a significant shift, at least in 301

tone, that Obama seemed open to an even swap of territory while deferring the more emotional questions of dealing with Jerusalem and the future rights of Palestinian refugees. “He has shown a willingness to use political capital in pushing forward ideas that are not always going to be what people want to hear,” said David Makovsky, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who co-wrote a book in 2008 with Obama adviser Dennis Ross that suggested a land swap and waiting on Jerusalem and refugees. Makovsky noted that Obama received about eight in 10 Jewish votes in 2008, and that “many of those people who voted for him understand some of the positions that he has articulated,” such as his argument that further delays risk undermining Israel’s security and emboldening extremists. Still, some Jewish Democrats said they remain concerned. One major party donor who attended AIPAC described a sense of “disappointment” in the hall about Obama’s remarks. Reid said late Monday night at AIPAC that “no one should set premature parameters about borders, about building or about anything else.” Hoyer said negotiations must begin “without preconditions.” And Sen. Robert P. Casey Jr. (D-Pa.), drew applause Tuesday when he said Israel’s borders “ must be determined by parties on the ground.” Peter Wallsten, Democrats join Republicans in questioning Obama’s policy on Israel May 25, 3:38 AM http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-join-republicans-in-questioning-obamas-policy-on- israel/2011/05/24/AFkEJpAH_story.html?nl_headlines

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May 24, 2011 Lessons From Tahrir Sq. By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Cairo Being back in Cairo reminds me that there are two parties in this region that have been untouched by the Arab Spring: the Israelis and the Palestinians. Too bad, because when it comes to ossified, unimaginative, oxygen-deprived governments, the Israelis and Palestinians are right up there with pre-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia. I mean, is there anything less relevant than the prime minister of Israel going to the U.S. Congress for applause and the leader of the Palestinians going to the U.N. — instead of to each other? Both could actually learn something from Tahrir Square. To the Palestinians I would say: You believe the Israelis are stiffing you because they think they have you in box. If you resort to violence, they will brand you terrorists. And if you don’t resort to violence, the Israelis will just pocket the peace and quiet and build more settlements. Your dilemma is how to move Israel in a way that won’t blow up in your face or require total surrender. You have to start with the iron law of Israeli-Arab peace: whichever party has the Israeli silent majority on its side wins. Anwar Sadat brought the Israeli majority over to his side when he went to Israel, and he got everything he wanted. Yasir Arafat momentarily did the same with the Oslo peace accords. How could Palestinians do that again today? I can tell you how not to do it. Having the U.N. General Assembly pass a resolution recognizing an independent Palestinian state will only rally Israelis around Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, giving him another excuse not to talk. May I suggest a Tahrir Square alternative? Announce that every Friday from today forward will be “Peace Day,” and have thousands of West Bank Palestinians march nonviolently to Jerusalem, carrying two things — an olive branch in one hand and a sign in Hebrew and Arabic in the other. The sign should say: “Two states for two peoples. We, the Palestinian people, offer the Jewish people a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders — with mutually agreed adjustments — including Jerusalem, where the Arabs will control their neighborhoods and the Jews theirs.” If Palestinians peacefully march to Jerusalem by the thousands every Friday with a clear peace message, it would become a global news event. Every network in the world would be there. Trust me, it would stimulate a real peace debate within Israel — especially if Palestinians invited youth delegations from around the Arab world to join the marches, carrying the Saudi peace initiative in Hebrew and Arabic. Israeli Jews and Arabs should be invited to march as well. Together, the marchers could draw up their own peace maps and upload them onto YouTube as a way of telling their leaders what Egyptian youth said to President Hosni Mubarak: “We’re not going to let you waste another day of our lives with your tired mantras and maneuvering.”

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Crazy, I know. Bibi is reading this and laughing: “The Palestinians will never do that. They could never get Hamas to adopt nonviolence. It’s not who the Palestinians are.” That is exactly what Mubarak said about the Egyptian people: “They are not capable of being anything but what they are: docile and willing to eat whatever low expectations I feed them.” But then Egyptians surprised him. How about you, Palestinians, especially Hamas? Do you have any surprise in you? Is Bibi right about you, or not? As for Bibi, his Tahrir lesson is obvious: Sir, you are well on your way to becoming the Hosni Mubarak of the peace process. The time to make big decisions in life is when you have all the leverage on your side. For 30 years, Mubarak had all the leverage on his side to gradually move Egypt toward democracy — and he never used it. Then, when Mubarak’s people rose up, he tried to do it all in six days. But it was too late. No one believed him. So his tenure ended in ruin. Israel today still has enormous leverage. It is vastly superior militarily and economically to the Palestinians, and it has the U.S. on its side. If Netanyahu actually put a credible, specific two-state peace map on the table — not just the same old vague promises about “painful compromises” — he could get the Americans and Europeans to toss in anything Israel wanted, including the newest weapons, NATO membership, maybe even European Union membership. It could be a security windfall for Israel. Does Bibi have any surprise in him or do the Palestinians have him right: a big faker, hiding a nationalist-religious agenda under a cloak of security? It may be that Israeli and Palestinian leaders are incapable of surprising anyone anymore, in which case the logic on the ground will prevail: Israel will gradually absorb the whole West Bank, so, together with Israel proper, a Jewish minority will be ruling over an Arab majority. Israel’s enemies will refer to it as “the Jewish apartheid state.” America, Israel’s only true friend, will find itself having to defend an Israel whose policies it does not believe in and whose leaders it does not respect — and the tensions between the U.S. and Israel displayed in Washington last week will seem quaint by comparison. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/opinion/25friedman.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlin es&emc=tha212

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05/24/2011 10:30 AM Cautious Optimism Germany Mediates Secret US-Taliban Talks By Susanne Koelbl and Holger Stark The German government is mediating secret talks on German soil between the US government and representatives of the Taliban. Berlin is cautiously optimistic that the negotiations will deliver progress, but observers warn that the insurgents' morale remains high. It's still unknown where exactly in Germany the American and Afghan negotiators met, but when they met can be pinpointed fairly exactly: at the turn of the year and on the second weekend in May. It's also fairly clear who attends these talks on peace in the Hindu Kush. On the American side, representatives of the State Department and the CIA are taking part. At this stage, it is mid-ranking officials from the Obama administration who are involved -- a diplomatic ploy to play down the Taliban's importance. The key figure on the Afghan side is described on the list of negotiators as a "relative" of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. This appears to refer to Tayyab Agha, a man in his mid- 30s with a long, thin beard, who used to work as office manager for Mullah Omar when he was the so-called emir of Afghanistan. Today, Agha is something along the lines of Mullah Omar's personal spokesman. A high-ranking Afghan official in Kabul indicated around a month ago that Agha was in talks with the US on behalf of his boss. Similarly, the Afghan daily newspaper Weesa reported on direct contact between the Taliban and the US government for the first time a little more than a month ago. Talks between the two sides, which continue to engage in daily skirmishes in Afghanistan, began last fall. The Americans chose the Gulf state of Qatar for the first meeting, but Germany had become the host country by the second session. Berlin treats these meetings as a top-secret matter. Only a handful of people in the German Foreign Ministry are aware of the negotiations, as are a number of officials at the Chancellery. Otherwise, the business is kept hushed up. Nothing can be allowed to jeopardize the success of this delicate mission. Top Secret The talks are moderated by Michael Steiner, Germany's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and one of the country's most experienced diplomats. Steiner is very optimistic about the current situation in the region and considers a political solution in Afghanistan possible. Following the death of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, these secret meetings could develop a new momentum. For many Americans, bin Laden's death has taken care of the original reason for the war in Afghanistan. The time for revenge is over. "We went there to get Osama bin Laden," Barney Frank, a Democrat in the US House of Representatives, said after the completion of Operation Geronimo, making the case for a withdrawal. "We have now gotten Osama bin Laden."

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Many Americans want to end the war as quickly as possible. President Barack Obama is also committed to the promise he made to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in July 2011. Germany is hosting a major Afghanistan conference at the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn in December and wants successes to show there. It is also working hard to move the peace process forward. The result of those efforts was a third round of talks two weeks ago between American representatives and Mullah Omar's spokesman, who was flown in by an aircraft belonging to the intelligence services. High Morale According to sources close to the negotiations, the talks offer cause for cautious optimism, but nothing more. Despite heavy losses at the command level, morale within the Taliban remains high. The American withdrawal from heavily contested areas, such as the Pech Valley in the east of the country, has increased the organization's confidence, as has the escape of around 500 Taliban prisoners in Kandahar in April. And thanks to the United States' numerous drone attacks, there are fewer and fewer "politically" minded Taliban leaders left who want to put an end to the bloodshed. Young men who are more radical often step up to take the place of those who are killed. The current negotiations revolve around the question of how security and stability can be guaranteed after Western troops withdraw. The central issue is the possible establishment of permanent American military bases in the country, a development the Taliban fears and categorically rejects. Germany's Foreign Ministry hopes to get the Taliban to renounce violence, recognize the Afghan constitution and sever its ties to al-Qaida. Thomas Ruttig, from the Kabul- based Afghanistan Analysts Network, believes achieving the latter point isn't an unrealistic possibility. After all, he says, the US is speaking with the right people -- the so-called Quetta Shura, the innermost circle of leaders in the tightly organized militant group. "Taliban leaders say their agenda is purely regional," Ruttig explains. "Unlike al-Qaida, they don't want to establish an emirate in Washington." Translated from the German by Ella Ornstein URL:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,764323,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Deadly Clashes in Afghanistan: German Soldiers Fired Deliberately at Protesters (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763937,00.html • A Peaceful City?: Scratching Beneath the Surface in Abbottabad (05/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762763,00.html • Drone Killing Debate: Germany Limits Information Exchange with US Intelligence (05/17/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,762873,00.html • US-Pakistani Relations: A Forced Marriage Plagued by Ever-Deepening Distrust (05/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,761190,00.html • SPIEGEL 360: Our Complete Afghanistan Coverage http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/afghanistan/ 306

05/24/2011 04:39 PM EU Backs Obama's Mideast Offensive 'Netanyahu's Rejection Is Self-Important and Arrogant' The European Union is backing US President Obama's call for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn says in an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE. He also argues that, if the Israelis remain stubborn, the EU must consider taking political action. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has rejected plans by US President Barack Obama for a Palestinian state based on the borders as they existed before the Six Day War in 1967. Is the Mideast peace process now dead? Asselborn: Netanyahu's rejection of peace based on the 1967 borders is self-important and arrogant -- especially given that Obama explicitly stated that a variation from the 1967 borders would be possible under a mutual land swap. Netanyahu is suppressing the political reality and betting on a stalemate instead. For the peace process, that is deadly. SPIEGEL ONLINE: The European Union constantly reiterates that Israel has a guaranteed right to exist. So shouldn't Europeans take more seriously Netanyahu's concern that Israel wouldn't be able to defend itself inside the 1967 borders? Asselborn: As one of my counterparts correctly stated, the sole security guaranty for Israel is a peace treaty with the Palestinians and the Arab world. No government in the EU questions Israel's right to exist. Nor does Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas or his prime minister, Salam Fayyad. The only people who refuse to recognize Israel are the extremists of Hamas. SPIEGEL ONLINE: It is precisely with this Hamas that Abbas and Fayyad recently signed a reconciliation treaty. Can you not understand why this has made the Israelis even more concerned? Asselborn: Abbas' Fatah party and Prime Minister Fayyad want to hold elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the moment, though, this is being blocked by Hamas, which came to power in Gaza by force. In order to overcome this division, Fatah and Hamas have signed a treaty. It frees the way for a transition government that includes all Palestinian groups. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Netanyahu has said that Abbas must choose between a peace with Hamas and a peace with Israel. Asselborn: This is not about an either-or choice. The plan is that the transitional government should sit down with the Israelis as soon as possible to negotiate a two-state solution. In this way, Fayyad wants to prevent a vote at the United Nations General Assembly in September on the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state. If Abbas negotiates with Israel and Hamas is part of this transitional government, then Israel will implicitly recognize it. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Should the European Union hold talks with Hamas?

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Asselborn: Four years ago, when the first attempts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas took place, I harbored reservations myself. Today, I ask myself if it was a mistake not to have provided stronger support for reconciliation at the time. I can understand that it requires a lot of strength to sit down at the table with people who only promote violence. But time hasn't stood still. We need to make an attempt to draw Hamas into a democratic process and bring it on to the path of freedom -- just as we succeeded in doing with Fatah during the 1990s. That would also include informal talks with Hamas. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Israel is not alone in demanding that Hamas forswear the use of violence. The Middle East Quartet, of which the EU is a member, is also calling for that. Asselborn: And that's a position we Europeans are going to maintain. Still, you can't just put conditions on the Palestinian side, as they're not the only source of the violence. Israel has turned the Gaza Strip into a prison. There, 1.7 million people live in an area one-seventh the size of Luxembourg. To shut its borders and to only allow certain goods into the country and hardly any out -- this is also a form of violence. In the West Bank, Israelis continue to build settlements on expropriated land. It is a constant provocation. SPIEGEL ONLINE: How can the EU apply additional pressure on Israel? Asselborn: The first thing the EU needs to do is be more courageous and united in its support of Obama. Large parts of the Republican Party -- and particularly the Tea Party movement within it -- are opposed to a two-state solution. That (sentiment) can't be allowed to cross over to Europe. The only way for us to have a chance at bringing the Israelis back to the negotiating table is if we present a united front. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Still, this unity simply doesn't exist. In September, the UN General Assembly is scheduled to vote on whether to recognize a Palestinian state. But Chancellor Angela Merkel has already hinted that Germany might vote against it. Asselborn: Now is the time for us to focus on getting the talks back into gear. If Germany's chancellor publicly rules out voting for a Palestinian state in the UN General Assembly, it takes all kinds of pressure off the Israeli government. And if the French president speaks out in favor of recognition, then the EU's two largest states will be standing on opposite sides of an important foreign-policy issue. As a result, we won't be taken seriously. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Can the Europeans really exercise any pressure anyway? It seems like Israel can only really be influenced by its most important ally, the United States. Asselborn: Obama is saying and doing the right thing. But there will be elections next year in the United States, and experience tells us that, in such situations, American presidential candidates grow less bold about taking a stance against the Israeli government. The pro-Israel lobby in the United States is very strong. We Europeans aren't exposed to the same amount of pressure. SPIEGEL ONLINE: So far, it's only been the Israelis' desire to upgrade relations with the EU that have been put on ice. Should the EU also consider downgrading relations? Asselborn: In 2008, we wanted to honor Israel's wishes to have an upgrade. But we made such an upgrade contingent upon progress being made in the peace process. That unfortunately didn't happen. Now we find ourselves in a situation in which the Israeli government is doing all it can to stand in the way of new talks. For that reason, we in 308

the EU should think about whether we can allow our relations with Israel to carry on as they have been. If the Israelis continue to dig their heels in and we just let them do what they want, it could lead to a new war. We Europeans need to send a signal -- not only with words but, if necessary, with actions as well. We need to consider political action if need be. Interview conducted by Christoph Schult URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,764642,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Obama's Marshallette Plan: Baby Steps for a Tentative Statesman (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763791,00.html • The World from Berlin: 'Nothing But Bad News for the Middle East Peace Process' (04/29/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,759751,00.html • SPIEGEL 360: Our Full Middle East Coverage http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/middle_east/

ARTOON ESPAÑA Contagio 24 mayo 2011 LE TEMPS GINEBRA

VIÑETISTA Caricaturista suizo de origen libanés, nacido en Pakistán en 1967, Patrick Chapatte creció en Singapur y en Suiza. Colabora con el International Herald Tribune, Le Temps y Neue Zürcher Zeitung. "Revolución" "¿por dónde ha entrado?" Inspirados por la "Primavera arabe", miles de jóvenes españoles han acudido a las plazas de las principales ciudades para protestar contra el paro, la precariedad y la ausencia de perspectivas.

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Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu tells US: Palestinians blocking peace deal Mahmoud Abbas must be prepared to accept Jewish state alongside Palestinian state, Israeli PM says in hardline speech Chris McGreal in Washington guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 24 May 2011 19.35 BST

Israel's PM Binyamin Netanyahu told Congress: 'It’s time for President Abbas to stand before his people and say: "I will accept a Jewish state" … With those words, I will be prepared to make a far-reaching compromise.' Photograph: Jason Reed/Reuters Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, has spurned American pressure to make a significant gesture towards peace to stave off international support for a declaration of Palestinian independence by telling the US Congress that the Palestinians want a country in order to continue the conflict, not end it. Netanyahu had been under pressure from the White House to outline immediate and practical steps towards peace after Barack Obama warned him that the US was increasingly unable to shield it from growing frustration over what is seen as Israel's intransigence. But while Israeli officials had billed the speech as intended to "garner major international attention" and shift the ground from under the Palestinians' attempts to win UN recognition for a state at a vote in September, Netanyahu remained largely uncompromising. The Israeli PM told an overwhelmingly sympathetic Congress that it is the Palestinians, led by Mahmoud Abbas, who are the main obstacle to peace.

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"Why has peace not been achieved? Because so far the Palestinians have been unwilling to accept a Palestinian state if it meant accepting a Jewish state alongside it," he said. "President Abbas must do what I have done. I have stood before my people and I have said I will accept a Palestinian state. It's time for President Abbas to stand before his people and say: I will accept a Jewish state. Those six words will change history … With those words, I will be prepared to make a far-reaching compromise." Palestinian officials accused Netanyahu of grandstanding for Congress, and said his demands for an immediate recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, rather than as part of an overall peace deal, was yet another obstacle to an agreement. "What came in Netanyahu's speech will not lead to peace," said Abbas's spokesman, Nabil Abu Rdainah. Netanyahu said he recognised that a peace agreement would require Israel to give up some of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, known to Israelis as Judea and Samaria. But he rejected the contention that Israelis had no legitimate claim to the West Bank. "In Judea and Samaria, the Jewish people are not foreign occupiers," he said, to a standing ovation. "We're not the British in India. We're not the Belgians in [the] Congo. This is the land of our forefathers. "But there is another truth. The Palestinians share this small land with us. We seek a peace in which they will be neither Israel's subjects nor its citizens." Netanyahu repeated assertions that he was prepared to make what he called "painful sacrifices" that would involve a partial pullout from the West Bank while retaining control of larger Jewish settlements that he described as suburbs of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. He said Israel recognised that a Palestinian state had to be large enough to be politically and economically viable, but added that Israel "will not return to the indefensible boundaries of 1967". "Israel will be generous on the size of the Palestinian state, but will be very firm on where we put the border with it," he said. Netanyahu's at times belligerent tone is not likely to persuade countries considering how to vote at the UN on Palestinian statehood, particularly European governments. He said support for any such move would undermine not further the cause of peace. "The Palestinian attempt to impose a settlement through the United Nations will not bring peace. It should be forcefully opposed by all those who want to see this conflict end," said Netanyahu. "Peace cannot be imposed; it must be negotiated." Netanyahu addressed the dramatic changes in his region by saying that "an epic battle is now under way in the Middle East between tyranny and freedom" that "holds out the promise of a new dawn of freedom". But he said the world should remember how quickly the hope of freedom was snuffed out after the in 1979. "The Middle East stands at a fateful crossroads and I pray that the people of the region choose the path less travelled, the path of liberty," he said. Netanyahu's speech, and particularly his emphasis on no return to the 1967 borders, was not only a snub to Obama, but a recognition that he has largely outmanoeuvred the White House in recent months.

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At Obama's first meeting as president with Netanyahu two years ago, the US president demanded an immediate halt to settlement construction as a first step to a swift and comprehensive peace settlement. The Israeli prime minister openly defied the pressure to the alarm of some in his own country, who feared that he could not afford to alienate Washington. But the stand paid off for Netanyahu. Obama has since backed away from the demand on settlements. The resignation of Obama's Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, this month marks the reemergence of a traditional and more cautious White House approach to the conflict. Mitchell had pressed the administration to outline its own plan for a peace settlement if there was no progress between the two sides, a strategy that initially won favour among senior officials keen to break the deadlock that permitted Israel to continue expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and tightening its grip on Jerusalem. In Mitchell's place has reemerged his deputy, Dennis Ross, who has served three US presidents as Middle East envoy. Ross has been criticised as being too close to Israel. His deputy at earlier negotiations, Aaron David Miller, once described him as acting as "Israel's lawyer". Bassam Abu Shareef, a political adviser to the last Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, has said that Mitchell quit because of the "extreme bias" and obstructiveness of Ross. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/24/binyamin-netanyahu-israel-palestinians- congress/print CARTOON ESPAÑA ¡Basta! 23 mayo 2011

VIÑETISTA Jaume Capdevilla – más conocido por su nombre artístico Kap – es un dibujante y caricaturista español nacido en 1974. Sus viñetas son publicadas en varios periódicos de Barcelona, entre ellos La Vanguardia y El Mundo Deportivo. En plena crisis económica, las elecciones municipales y autonómicas españolas del 22 de mayo han estado marcadas por las manifestaciones y concentraciones organizadas por los "indignados" del movimiento 15-M.

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May 23, 2011 Cameron’s America By ROGER COHEN LONDON — Prime Minister David Cameron came into office seeking relations with the United States that were “solid” but not “slavish.” That was a not-so-subtle allusion to the perceived poodle complex of his predecessor, Tony Blair. As President Obama arrives here for a state visit, I’d say the Cameron team can declare mission accomplished — although preferably not from the flight deck of a warship. They might also mutter: Careful what you wish for. I’ll get to that in a moment. Cameron has been most conspicuously un-slavish on the Middle East. Along with France and Germany, Britain voted in favor of a U.N. resolution in February condemning Israeli settlements, while the United States vetoed it despite Obama’s repeated criticism of said settlements. Score one for British consistency over American contortionism. He’s also been un-slavish on the economy. Britain has tackled its fiscal crisis head-on with draconian cuts while the Obama administration has left those hard choices for another day. The British recovery is austerity-clouded, but Cameron cannot be accused, like Obama, of having no plan for getting public finances under control. The U.S. deficit is a time bomb aimed at future generations. The required political trade-off in the United States is obvious: Republicans must accept rising taxes while Democrats must accept falling entitlements. Obama could do worse than listen to Europeans, who have grappled with such issues — particularly bringing runaway entitlements under control — for a long time. There’s also been British un-slavishness on war and peace. The diplomatic push for the Libyan intervention came principally from Britain and France while Obama, with reason, fretted over a third U.S. military front in a Muslim country. Having seen just how close the forces of Muammar el-Qaddafi got to Benghazi (the carcasses of abandoned tanks stand just 20 miles south of the city), and having understood the full cruelty of Qaddafi’s maniacal tyranny, I am certain Cameron and President Nicolas Sarkozy averted a massacre. But the Libyan operation has been plagued by hesitations. My condition for going in was ruthlessness: It’s not been met. First there was the curious American “handover” to NATO, as if NATO were not the United States and the rest. Then there was the American pause in combat sorties. The result has been a mission that often gives the impression of being halfhearted and division-prone. The Libyan operation has been a strategic shock to Europe — and here we get to the careful-what-you-wish-for side of un-slavishness. You can’t pretend to strut your stuff as Europe and at the same time slash defense budgets to the point that, a couple of

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months into a military operation, you find yourself running out of jet fuel and munitions. Libya has underscored the unique U.S. capacity to project power and the heavy European dependence on that projection. I don’t see a European public ready to bolster defense spending, but the need is there. Un-slavishness means little if it does not mean assumption of responsibility. NATO, having gone in, has to prevail in Libya. Prevailing means Qaddafi’s departure in short order. Stalemate is a Qaddafi victory. His bet is that he can hang on longer than NATO can remain united. The longer stalemate goes on, the more Libya fractures and the higher the risk that Libya will distort the Western approach to an Arab transformation whose bumper sticker should be, “It’s Egypt, stupid.” Only if the Arab world’s largest state, cultural heart and political reference can achieve a stable transition to representative government will the Arab Spring move forward. Libya cannot be the tail that wags the Egyptian dog. So the immediate test of the redefined U.S.-British relationship is the ability of Obama and Cameron to deliver change in Tripoli fast and stop the conflict festering. I think it’s doable. But the condition is no more wavering. The European strategic interest in the Arab Spring is immense. If North African economies take off now that they are no longer at the service of ruling families and their coteries, the flow of desperate immigrants into Europe will diminish. But the European Union has split again, with Germany rejecting the Libyan mission. A semi-isolationist Germany has reduced European strategy to an oxymoron. That in turn has relieved Cameron of the old British dilemma: Should it favor its European or American ties? With the European Union going AWOL, the answer is obvious. Still, it’s imperative that Obama’s European trip serve to focus Europe on debt relief, trade incentives, credit and private investment in Egypt and beyond. A condition of the Arab transformation is that reform must equal opportunity. Another is that Saudi anger over Obama’s pro-democracy tilt not be reflected in Saudi funding of counterrevolution from Cairo to Tunis. Like the Pakistanis, the Saudis could also show their irritation by tilting toward China, which needs its oil. The Saudi capacity for mischief is never to be doubted. With Arab reform now “not a secondary interest,” in the words of Obama, but U.S. dependence on Riyadh for oil and Yemeni counterterrorism still great, the Saudi dilemma has intensified. It’s one that demands solid, un-slavish U.S.-British unity to avoid the mother of explosions. You can follow Roger Cohen on Twitter at twitter.com/nytimescohen . http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/opinion/24iht- edcohen24.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

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May 23, 2011 Russian Justice By JOE NOCERA By the time you read this column, you may already know the fate of Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky and Platon L. Lebedev. Moscow, after all, is eight hours ahead of New York, and let’s be honest here: It’s not going to take the Moscow City Court very long to conclude that the two men deserve another seven years in prison — on top of the eight they’ve already served — on laughably trumped-up charges. Chances are, the three-judge panel knew going in how it planned to rule. That’s the way it works in Russia when somebody crosses the country’s ruling plutocrats. They get sent to Siberia on phony charges. In China, when the country’s rulers want to get rid of a troublesome dissident, they just lock him up. There is not a lot of pretense. But Russia wants the world to believe that it abides by the rule of law. “It has a Constitution, courts, judges and established procedures,” said Pavel Ivlev, one of Khodorkovsky’s lawyers. But, Ivlev adds, “You also have the reality that everything is controlled by Putin and his friends.” So when someone starts making trouble for Russia’s premier, Vladimir Putin, and his corrupt cronies, things play out a little differently. An “investigation” is begun, which leads to a series of criminal charges, which, in turn, leads to a lengthy trial. The illusion of justice is created. But the ending never varies: The defendants wind up in prison for crimes they never committed. No one illustrates this better than Khodorkovsky, who in less than a decade has gone from being Russia’s richest man — an oligarch among oligarchs — to being its most prominent political prisoner. The founder of Yukos, the country’s best-run oil producer, Khodorkovsky undoubtedly played fast and loose in building the company in the early 1990s. The plutocrats had no problem with that. But then Khodorkovsky did two things that made him intolerable. He began transforming Yukos into a legitimate company that played by the rules of Western capitalism. Worse, he began to challenge Putin — and put up money to back opposition parties. Yukos was taken from Khodorkovsky and the shareholders in a bogus transaction, and handed to Rosneft, a more pliable oil company run by executives aligned with Putin’s cronies. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, his longtime business partner, were arrested, convicted of trumped-up tax fraud charges and sentenced to eight years in prison that began in 2003. In prison, Khodorkovsky became, if anything, even more of a threat to Putin than he had been when he was running Yukos. His imprisonment came to symbolize the stench emanating from Russia’s corrupt ruling class, the impunity with which it lined its own pockets, and its utter disregard for the rule of law. The Russian public, which originally

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viewed Khodorkovsky as a rich crook who had gotten his due, began to see him as a martyr. Not surprisingly, as their sentence neared its conclusion, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev became the targets of a new investigation. Which led to new charges and another trial. The crime they were accused of was absurd on its face: They were alleged to have stolen every drop of Yukos oil between 1998 and 2003. But never mind. During the trial, Putin declared that Khodorkovsky should be sent back to prison. Late last December, the two men were once again found guilty — though not before Khodorkovsky gave an eloquent speech that cemented his role as the modern heir to the great Russian dissidents of the past. “It is hard to live in prison, and I do not want to die here,” he said. “But, if I have to, I will have no hesitation. What I believe in is worth dying for.” When he finished speaking, the crowd in the courtroom yelled “Freedom” while the judge declared the trial over. The Moscow City Court, where Tuesday’s hearing is taking place, is Russia’s equivalent of the court of appeals. This hearing is no more real than anything else in this case. Not long after the original trial judge read his verdict, one of his aides said publicly that he had been under constant pressure from his superiors to find the two men guilty. And who were these superiors? The judges of the Moscow City Court — the very ones who are now sitting in judgment today. And so it goes. Soon, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev will be safely back in Siberia. Then the plutocrats can then turn their attention to a new nemesis, Alexei Navalny. An outspoken lawyer, Navalny has devoted the past few years to exposing corruption at Russian big state- owned companies, even posting fraudulent contracts on his blogs. In some cases, deals have been scotched as a result of his efforts. Recently, prosecutors opened an investigation into Navalny, claiming that he may have tricked a state-run company into paying an inflated price while serving as a consultant to a regional governor. It’s preposterous, of course, not that that matters in modern Russia. He’s up next. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/opinion/24nocera.html?gwh=A032FD0507AA72 C15179975D1CE94642&src=recg&pagewanted=print

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Apache helicopters to be sent into Libya by Britain Use of helicopters, which can attack small targets, represents significant escalation of conflict

• Richard Norton-Taylor guardian.co.uk, Monday 23 May 2011 18.16 BST

British army Apache helicopter. The UK is to send helicopters to Libya following similar announcements by France. Photograph: Ministry of Defence/EPA Britain and France are to deploy attack helicopters against Libya in an attempt to break the military stalemate, particularly in the important coastal city of Misrata, security sources have told the Guardian. In a significant escalation of the conflict, the Apaches – based on HMS Ocean – will join French helicopters in risky operations which reflect deepening frustration among British and French defence chiefs about their continuing inability to protect civilians in Libya. Apaches, which are being used in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, can manoeuvre and attack small targets in relatively built-up areas. Heavily armed Apaches and French Tiger helicopters are equipped with night vision equipment and electronic guidance systems. Forces loyal to the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, have shed their uniforms, are using civilian vehicles and hiding armour near civilian buildings, including hospitals and schools. The decision to deploy the helicopters is a clear recognition that high-level bombing from 15,000 feet cannot protect civilians who continue to be attacked by rocket and mortar shells. It brings the Nato offensive much closer to the ground at a time when Britain and other Nato countries are insisting they have no intention of sending in troops. However, the helicopters could be vulnerable to handheld rocket-propelled grenades and even rifle fire. Hospital officials said two people were killed and several wounded during Monday's fighting in Misrata. Later, heavy explosions outside the city were heard, lasting about an hour. 317

Reuters quoted a rebel spokesman as saying that forces loyal to Gaddafi also shelled the rebel-held town of Zintan and moved troops close to the mountainous region bordering Tunisia, intensifying operations on the war's western front. On Monday Nato warplanes bombed Tripoli in what appeared to be the heaviest night of bombing since the start of the air campaign against Gaddafi's forces and his sprawling compound. More than 20 airstrikes in less than half an hour set off thunderous booms that rattled windows around the city. Britain and France clearly hope that the use of attack helicopters, and the fact of revealing the intention to use them, will deter pro-Gaddafi forces and assuage Libyan rebels who have been demanding more effective military action from Nato countries. The sight of Nato forces actually on the ground would be strongly opposed by most countries in the alliance, including the US and also those Arab countries in favour of the air campaign against Gaddafi's forces. The foreign secretary, William Hague, attending an EU ministerial meeting in Brussels, said: "We are very much behind the intensification of the military campaign and ... so is France." He added: "We certainly agree with France, and indeed with all our partners, including all our partners at the EU meeting here today, that it is necessary to intensify the military, economic and diplomatic pressure on the Gaddafi regime." Alain Juppé, France's foreign minister, confirmed that Paris has dispatched a dozen helicopters to add greater strike force to the campaign against Gaddafi in Libya. He said that the 12 Tiger and Gazelle helicopters sent from Toulon on 17 May would enable "us to better adapt our ground attack capacity with more precise means of striking". He added: "Our strategy is to step up the military pressure in the weeks ahead while pushing at the same time for a political solution." According to French sources, the battleship Tonnerre, carrying the helicopters, left Toulon last week. The vessel combines the roles of helicopter carrier, hospital ship, and troops transporter. Juppé said the helicopters would not be used to deploy ground forces in Libya and that the decision to send them was fully in line with the UN security council resolution mandating attacks in Libya. The French newspaper Le Figaro said the helicopters would be assisted by target identification from French special forces who have been on the ground in Libya since the start of the allied operation there. The Ministry of Defence does not comment on special forces' operations. Jim Murphy, the shadow defence secretary, said: "This is a significant development. It is right that the alliance is intensifying military pressure on Gaddafi's forces, but the British government needs to be clearer about a political strategy for Libya and whether the military commitment to Libya is an open-ended one." The first international stabilisation response team has arrived in Libya, the international development secretary Andrew Mitchell has confirmed . He said Britain would continue to provide medical and emergency food supplies, adding that "the international community also needs to start thinking strategically about what is needed now to help lay the foundations for a stable, secure Libya". This article was updated on 23 May 2011, to add greater detail http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/23/apache-helicopters-libya-britain/print

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Indignados: el porqué de la fatiga democrática Los expertos analizan este novedoso fenómeno y los efectos pueden tener a medio plazo en la democracia CAROLINA MARTÍN MADRID 22/05/2011 08:30 Actualizado: 22/05/2011 16:18

NOTICIAS RELACIONADAS • Una multitud de indignados abarrota Sol en el día de reflexión • "Sol apunta los déficits de la Transición" • Los 'indignados' continúan en Sol una jornada de reflexión pacífica • "¡Esto es democracia, no la de Sol", grita el PP • Miles de reflexiones inundan la Puerta del Sol tras el grito mudo • La mecha de Sol prende de Valencia a Tokio • El Gobierno de la República de Sol • Carteles consensuados de los 'Indignados' en Sol • La policía frena el intento del partido 'Regeneración' de entrar en Sol • Los acampados en Sol instalan placas solares • "Pobrecillos los de Sol, seguro que tienen hambre" • La Junta Electoral de Madrid también prohíbe la concentración de hoy en Sol La chispa encendida por la plataforma Democracia Real Ya (DRY) el pasado domingo, que llamó a los ciudadanos a salir de su apatía, ha prendido. Y de una manera tan inesperada y potente, que pocos se atreven a calibrar hasta dónde llegará el movimiento de regeneración democrática que persiguen los miles de jóvenes que acampan y se concentran en diferentes plazas españolas desde hace siete días. Varias generaciones, pero con protagonismo indiscutible de los jóvenes, han quedado interconectadas al grito de protesta ¡Indignáos!, que ha popularizado Stephan Hessel a sus 93 años con la publicación de un opúsculo (algunos lo califican de panfleto) con ese título. Su objetivo central: los políticos y los banqueros. Casi la mitad de los ciudadanos están insatisfechos con la democracia Los expertos consultados por Público analizan la evolución de esta semana de movilizaciones, en la que el cabreo ciudadano ha aumentado día a día al grito de "¡No nos representan!", en alusión a los políticos, y "¡Lo llaman democracia y no lo es!". Politólogos y sociólogos avanzan también las posibles consecuencias que estas protestas pueden tener para la democracia española. 01. Las causas: Crisis económica y más El espíritu de esta protesta puede llegar a las elecciones generales

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"Una de mis mejores alumnas de hace unos años estaba el domingo 15 de mayo en la Puerta del Sol. Es pasante en un bufete de abogados por 300 euros", relata la doctora en Ciencia Política de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM) Irene Martín, que acudió a la cita en la capital acompañada de varios colegas y se sorprendió de ver allí a varios de sus otrora estudiantes más aventajados. Este caso no es excepcional sino representativo del problema de los jóvenes españoles, que de sobra conocen la precariedad laboral. Y eso que son los afortunados, ya que la tasa de desempleo juvenil alcanza el 43% en España. "Su situación es la peor de toda Europa, incluso peor que en Grecia", subraya la politóloga, que ha estudiado en profundidad la situación en ambos países. Martín señala a los jóvenes como el grupo más relevante del Movimiento del 15-M y destaca dos rasgos de ellos: "Pertenecen a organizaciones que no son muy conocidas y es gente que no estaba especialmente politizada". En realidad, comparten una situación "objetiva, calamitosa, que probablemente vaya a peor". Aunque las condiciones económicas son cruciales para explicar el fenómeno, no son las únicas. Para el profesor de sociología de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, el malestar por la crisis es evidente: "Las condiciones estaban claras desde mayo de 2010, cuando hizo el viraje en la política económica José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero". Sin embargo, como verdadero desencadenante de estas muestras de descontento apunta a "la percepción que tiene mucha gente de la impotencia del Gobierno para hacer frente a la situación". La plataforma DRY critica que los ciudadanos sean vistos como "mercancías por los políticos y banqueros". En opinión de Sánchez-Cuenca, el Movimiento del 15-M está poniendo demasiado énfasis en la clase política cuando, en realidad, los gobernantes y los partidos tienen las manos atadas. "Los gobiernos están incapacitados para dar una respuesta autónoma a la crisis que no venga dictada por la UE o Alemania", explica. Una dependencia que, sin embargo, el politólogo Juan Carlos Monedero pone en cuestión. En estas movilizaciones, los indignados "han lanzado el mensaje de No queremos pagar la crisis que han generado otros' con la idea clara de que sí hay alternativas. Se ha producido una ruptura de la rutina", apunta, remarcando que ha habido elementos que han agravado el cabreo de la gente como el ERE de Telefónica, o que los colchones anticrisis léase los 400 euros o incluso la prestación de desempleo se están agotando. A mayores, el profesor de Ciencias Sociales de ESADE y exdiputado del PSC Toni Comin celebra este movimiento espontáneo. "Era incomprensible que no hubiera una movilización. Es lo que esperábamos, una protesta orientada a denunciar los fundamentos del sistema". 02. Los fines: Mejorar la democracia Una de las críticas del Movimiento 15-M se dirige de lleno contra el actual sistema democrático, donde la voluntad ciudadana ha quedado completamente desdibujada por los políticos"¡No nos representan!" es uno de los mensajes más repetidos, y el sistema de partidos. El catedrático de Ciencia Política y expresidente del CIS Fernando Vallespín resalta el carácter simbólico de la movilización y subraya que "lo más relevante es que se haya producido porque hay unas deficiencias en el funcionamiento de la democracia, en la relación política-sociedad".

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Estos fallos se detectan en las encuestas. Desde hace más de un año, los políticos y los partidos son vistos por los ciudadanos como el tercer problema del país. Según el estudio del CIS del pasado mes de abril, un 21,5% de los encuestados tenía esa percepción. Tampoco parecen muy a gusto con la democracia. Un 47,1% de los consultados en noviembre de 2010 decía estar poco o nada satisfecho con el funcionamiento del sistema, un 12,3% más que en 2005. "Los jóvenes ven a los partidos como unas estructuras que se guían por unos intereses que no responden a los de los ciudadanos", explica Vallespín. Para Comín, estas movilizaciones demuestran la distancia con las instituciones clásicas partidos y sindicatos que son muy rígidas al estar profundamente integradas en la dinámica del sistema. "Deberían expresar lo que convenga en cada momento histórico. Ahora, [partidos y sindicatos] tendrían que expresar un grado de antagonismo más potente con la actual situaciónporque la gente no se siente representada". El Movimiento 15-M supone que "el cheque en blanco de cuatro años para los políticos tras las elecciones se ha acabado", anuncia Monedero, que apela a la rendición de cuentas horizontal que deberán empezar a hacer los políticos después del 22-M. Para el profesor titular de Ciencia Política de la UNED Jaime Pastor este movimiento, que se define apartidario, "no es apolítico, la mayoría de la gente que se manifiesta pide otra política y otra izquierda". 03 El ejemplo: Efecto contagio del sur Los expertos consultados creen que los aires de las revoluciones en el mundo árabe han llegado a España. Pero con matices. "Las propuestas más novedosas están viniendo del Sur", dice Monedero, que resalta que en la cabeza de la gente está lo que se ha vivido en el norte de África". Para el politólogo de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Ignacio Criado el único punto en común entre ambos movimientos es el uso de las redes sociales. "Han permitido aglutinar a grupos y personas muy variadas", sostiene, remarcando que eso es lo que ha permitido engendrar un movimiento como este en poco tiempo y en tantas ciudades de España y el extranjero. Irene Martín, investigadora de la cultura política de los jóvenes, resta importancia a la posible similitud por el uso de Internet y diferencia claramente la situación de partida: "Aquí hay democracia y allí, no". No obstante, sí ve nexos entre ambos escenarios. "Es más fácil que nos movilicemos cuando el mundo está más revuelto", explica. En este sentido, recuerda que España mira a El Magreb con mucha simpatía. De alguna forma, el resultado en estos países ha contribuido a que los jóvenes estén más predispuestos a salir a la calle. 04 Las consecuencias: Lecciones para políticos Aunque es pronto para ver la proyección de este movimiento, aún incipiente, algunos de los expertos apuntan los posibles cambios a los que se verán abocados en los partidos tradicionales. "Los partidos no tendrán más remedio que sacar lecturas", apunta Monedero. Para Vallespín hay dos modificaciones que se producirán a medio plazo como consecuencia de "la fatiga democrática" que parece existir en España, tal y como pone de manifiesto el Movimiento 15-M. De una parte, señala "la reforma del sistema electoral por la vía de ampliar el Congreso hasta los 400 diputados que permite la Constitución" y de otra, "la apertura de las listas" de los partidos políticos. El catedrático, sin embargo, advierte un peligro en la situación actual. "Puede derivar en un 321

populismo de izquierdas", apunta, reconociendo tres paralelismos: la desconfianza hacia las élites políticas, la apelación al pueblo y la simplificación o generalización de los problemas, de los políticos y de los partidos. El dirigente de IU Fran Pérez, sin embargo, no ve esa condena a los políticos en general desde el Movimiento 15-M. De hecho, afirma no sentirse aludido por ninguno de los gritos que corean los indignados. "Muchos de los manifestantes censuran las políticas neoliberales", tanto de los partidos que las defienden como de aquellos que las implementan. Sin embargo, la atención no recae sólo en los partidos sino también en los sindicatos. El exdiputado autonómico Toni Comín confía en que "estas movilizaciones sirvan de estímulo para que los actores institucionalesrecojan las demandas y se sientan más cargados de fuerza negociadora". Algo más escéptico se muestra el catedrático de Ciencia Política de la Universidad de Valencia Pablo Oñate sobre el futuro del 15-M. "Es fácil movilizar a la gente, pero difícil mantenerla activa". Aún así, espera que las formaciones políticas tradicionales no hagan oídos sordos a esta llamada de atención que explotó la semana pasada : "Harían bien en reaccionar y abrir los cauces de participación a los ciudadanos", señala. 05. El futuro: Cómo lograr cambios A la vista de lo deslabazadas que resultan las propuestas de los diferentes grupos que han dado forma a este movimiento, los expertos dudan de su continuidad. Según el profesor de Derecho y Ciencia Política de la Universidad Oberta de Catalunya (UOC) Ismael Peña "o se genera un partido o será muy difícil que las formaciones tradicionales cambien las cosas". De momento, algunos de los portavoces de la plataforma DRY se han mantenido prudentes al respecto, insistiendo en que es muy pronto. En este sentido, Comin remarca que "la movilización espontánea, si no hay alguien que la canaliza, apenas consigue cambiar algo. Actúa de detonante, pero luego hace falta la mecánica". Dada la fuerza que están alcanzando las acampadas y las concentraciones en España, Vallespín sostiene que el espíritu de este movimiento, previsiblemente, "volverá a estar vivo en las próximas elecciones generales". Esto no significa, aclara, que vayan a estar acampados ininterrumpidamente sino que habrá protestas puntuales". En esta dirección, Criado resalta el papel de las redes sociales: "Si el debate continúa y se amplifica en estos canales, puede que tenga alguna influencia en las generales". El poder de las redes sociales y los medios El mundo on line: Seguimiento en la red No sólo la convocatoria de la concentración del 15-M fue hecha por internet, que también ha hecho de foro de debate, sino que las movilizaciones han sido seguidas mundialmente por la red. "Ante el vacío generado por el descrédito de los viejos canales, el protagonismo de los nuevos favorece la emergencia de otros actores que conectan con otras organizaciones", explica Ismael Peña. Los medios off line: Más allá de las fronteras Los medios tradicionales "amplifican el movimiento", afirma Ignacio Criado. En un principio siguieron las protestas con cierta distancia, pero tras el desalojo del lunes en la Puerta del Sol empezaron a ganar espacio. También en los medios internacionales.

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Sánchez-Cuenca resalta que algunos mensajes son en inglés, para que los extranjeros recojan lo sucedido. http://www.publico.es/espana/377681/indignados-el-porque-de-la-fatiga-democratica- elecciones2011/version-imprimible PAÍSES MIEMBROS ESPAÑA Solo la democracia puede reformar la democracia 23 mayo 2011 Recordando las numerosas comparaciones que se están haciendo en la prensa entre el movimiento 15-M y las "revoluciones árabes", el editorialista de El País, Lluís Bassets, reconoce que, aunque existen elementos comunes- "un cambio generacional, la tecnología de las redes sociales y la crisis económica que quita trabajos, viviendas y esperanza ", los actores del movimiento español no están claramente definidos, y tampoco lo están sus objetivos. "Para que esta revolución tenga objeto necesita unos objetivos tan claros, difíciles pero tangibles como era echar a Ben Ali o a Mubarak. Aquí esto ya se experimentó, de otra forma, aunque su impulso aparece agotado para las nuevas generaciones. los jóvenes árabes querían votar como nosotros y los nuestros quieren que no se vote.Ahí está la diferencia. Cuando una revolución lo impugna todo, al final pierde foco y no impugna nada. Se queda sin objeto." Bassets examina las reivindicaciones de los manifestantes : ¿Cambiar la ley electoral? Muy bien. ¿Que los partidos organicen primarias? Perfecto. ¿Que los corruptos se vayan de la política? Albricias. ¿Más impuestos para los ricos y más servicios sociales para los pobres? ¡Qué bien! ¿Que la crisis no la paguen los de siempre? Más que encomiable", escribe, pero "nada que ver con echar al dictador". "¿Cómo se hace? ¿Quién prepara y decide todas estas reformas? ¿Cuáles son los reconstituyentes concretos y eficaces para una democracia con síntomas de anemia?" Finalmente, si Bassets afirma que esta revolución no tiene un objeto, admite sin embargo que tiene "un sentido" : La respuesta está bien sintetizada: la democracia real, una forma adjetiva de la democracia que denuncia lo que ahora echamos en falta. No sirve la democracia directa, bellísima en la utopía y en la idealización del ágora griega, pero coartada para la dictadura (véase la república asamblearia de Gadafi). Tampoco la democracia popular que, cuando existió, indicaba exactamente lo contrario: dictadura de un pequeño grupo de burócratas. La democracia real denuncia la idea de una democracia de ficción o virtual, que ya no es efectiva. Pero sería peligroso que toda democracia fuera tachada de ficticia y que se propugnara una democracia arcangélica cuya esencia y sistema de funcionamiento nadie conoce. La protesta (...) es síntoma y a la vez estímulo.(...). Los organizadores, partidarios de la conversación democrática y del combate por medios pacíficos, ejercen sus derechos de manifestación y de expresión. Quieren perfeccionar el sistema aunque tengan la apariencia de atacar al sistema. Hacen política en estado puro aunque se la tache de antipolítica. Sus protagonistas quieren rentabilizar el malestar y la desafección. Y pueden estar satisfechos, porque ya lo han conseguido. Pero la respuesta a los numerosos interrogantes que plantean deben responderla antes y después de las elecciones los dirigentes y los partidos políticos.(...)Debemos elegirlos con más tiento y someterlos a mayor control y escrutinio, en vez de dejarlos sueltos, es verdad. Pero ellos son los que pueden cambiar esas cosas que no nos gustan: la ley electoral, las primarias, los impuestos, el Estado de bienestar. Para que lo puedan hacer, finalmente, hay que votarles." http://www.presseurop.eu/es/content/news-brief/669951-solo-la- democracia-puede-reformar-la-democracia 323

05/23/2011 01:06 PM Voters Punish Zapatero Spain's 'Lost Generation' Vows to Fight On Mass demonstrations and a historic defeat for the ruling Socialists in regional and local elections this Sunday have put unprecedented pressure on Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. He has refused to bring forward national elections, but members of the young protest movement vow they won't give up until they're heard.

REUTERS Demonstrators raise their hand to vote in favor of continued protests at their campout in Madrid's Puerta del Sol. Spain's youth have often been accused of laziness, but over the last week tens of thousands of disillusioned young people took the initiative to camp out in squares across the nation to protest crippling unemployment, corruption and tough austerity measures by the government after the economic crisis. Activists also defied a ban on protests set last Friday by the country's Central Electoral Board, which feared they could disrupt regional and local elections. But angry voters still managed to make themselves heard on Sunday amid the ongoing demonstrations, toppling Zapatero's Socialists (PSOE) in favor of the center-right opposition People's Party (PP) in most of the 8,000 municipal and 13 regional elections, even in the PSOE's traditional strongholds. While Zapatero admitted the results were the penalty for Spain's dismal economy and high unemployment, he declined to bring forward the general election, which must be held before March 2012. "It is justifiable that the Socialist Party was punished at the ballot boxes today. We accept and understand that," said the prime minister, who had already announced he would not run for a third term in the next national poll.

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Protesters Pledge Perseverance Though Zapatero failed to acknowledge the mass protests in the run-up to the election in his remarks at the PSOE's headquarters, their shadow is unlikely to fade quickly. Organizers have pledged to continue for at least another week.

AFP Despite the protest ban enacted by the Spanish government on Friday, May 20, thousands of young protestors continued to demonstrate in Madrid's central Puerta del Sol square ahead of the country's elections this Sunday. The protests have been compared to those in Cairo's Tahrir Square. One demonstrator, 33-year-old Oscar Morales Padro, has been looking for a steady job since finishing his psychology degree. "In Spain you can forget it," he said. Padro is like millions of other young Spaniards who have taken to the streets in the last week. Well- educated, but with no hope of finding a job -- a member of the so-called " Lost Generation." Their movement symbolizes the mounting frustration over unemployment in Spain -- 45 percent among those under 25, and 21 percent overall, the highest rate in the European Union. Many allege the situation has worsened due to government austerity measures to reduce the national deficit and prevent a Greece-style EU and International Monetary Fund bailout. Discontent is so widespread that even Spaniards living abroad have set up protest camps outside the country's embassies in Berlin, Paris, London and Amsterdam. Most of the events at home and abroad have been organized online by the Real Democracy Now movement, which became a household name virtually overnight after calling for demonstrations in around 50 cities last Sunday.

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SPIEGEL ONLINE "These are our weapons" reads this sign bearing protesters' handprints. Participants emphasized the peaceful nature of the demonstrations. "I hope that the movement hangs on for a long while still," said 35-year-old Xiomara Cantera Arranz on Sunday after voting, though she hadn't yet taken part in any of the protests. Unlike many of the demonstrators, she has a job. But it remains uncertain what will become of the protest movement. People still camped out at Madrid's central Puerta del Sol square -- where gatherings have been compared to those at Cairo's Tahrir Square earlier this year -- seem determined to stay. Activists voted to continue demonstrating until May 29. "I'm very proud of what's going on here," said Carolina Smith de la Fuente, who has been at the square every day since demonstrations began. When the number of activists began to swell on Sunday despite the ban on demonstrations, many wearing t-shirts that read "Spanish Revolution," de la Fuente nearly wept, she said. But how long will it go on? "Until they listen to us," another woman said. kla -- with wire reports

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,764281,00.html

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AFPParticipants taped their mouths shut in protest crippling unemployment, corruption and tough austerity measures by the government after the economic crisis.

DPA Thousand of people came to the Real Democracy Now meeting last Friday, May 20. Some 25,000 took to Madrid's Puerta del Sol square for the event.

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REUTERS A festive atmosphere continued in the square even after the protest ban took effect at midnight on Saturday, May 21.

Getty Images People waited anxiously to see if police would attempt to end the demonstration but they made no attempt to do so and the scene remained peaceful. Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Fears of Disruptions: Spain Bans Protests Ahead of Sunday Vote (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,763836,00.html • Tahrir Square in Madrid: Spain's Lost Generation Finds Its Voice (05/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,763581,00.html • The Myth of a Lazy Southern Europe: Merkel's Clichés Debunked by Statistics (05/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,763618,00.html • Photo Gallery: Spanish Protests Continue http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-68370.html 328

Middle East May 22, 2011 Seeking to Disrupt Protesters, Syria Cracks Down on Social Media By JENNIFER PRESTON The Syrian government is cracking down on protesters’ use of social media and the Internet to promote their rebellion just three months after allowing citizens to have open access to Facebook and YouTube, according to Syrian activists and digital privacy experts. Security officials are moving on multiple fronts — demanding dissidents turn over their Facebook passwords and switching off the 3G mobile network at times, sharply limiting the ability of dissidents to upload videos of protests to YouTube, according to several activists in Syria. And supporters of President Bashar al-Assad, calling themselves the Syrian Electronic Army, are using the same tools to try to discredit dissidents. In contrast to the Mubarak government in Egypt, which tried to quash dissent by shutting down the country’s entire Internet, the Syrian government is taking a more strategic approach, turning off electricity and telephone service in neighborhoods with the most unrest, activists say. “They are using these tactics to cut off communication for the people,” said Dr. Radwan Ziadeh, director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies. He said the Facebook pages of at least two close friends had been recently hacked and now featured conspicuously pro-government messages. With foreign journalists barred from the country, dissidents have been working with exiles and using Facebook, YouTube and Twitter to draw global attention to the brutal military crackdown on protesters that has killed more than 700 people and has led to mass arrests in the last nine weeks. The Syrian Revolution 2011 Facebook page, which now has more than 180,000 members, has been a vital source of information for dissidents. “The only way we get information is through the citizen journalists,” said Ammar Abudlhamid, a Syrian activist based in Maryland who was one of several Syrian exiles to help organize delivery of satellite phones, cameras and laptops into the country earlier this year. “Without them, we would not know anything.” While Facebook has proved to be a powerful platform for activists to help mobilize protests and broadcast their struggle in Tunisia, Egypt and now in Syria, it can also pose considerable risks to dissidents. There are about 580,000 Facebook users in Syria, a 105 percent increase since the government lifted its four-year ban on Feb. 9, according to Fadi Salem, director of the Governance and Innovation Program at the Dubai School of Government. Though Syrian officials sought to portray the decision as a sign of openness, human right advocates warned that the government could use Facebook to closely monitor regime criticism and ferret out dissidents as nearby countries erupted in revolt. A man in his 20s living in Syria said that the police demanded his Facebook password late last month after arresting him where he worked and taking his laptop. “I told him, at first, I didn’t have a Facebook account, but he told me, after he punched me in the face, that he

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knew I had one because they were watching my ‘bad comments’ on it,” he said. “I knew then that they were monitoring me.” The man, who asked that his name not be used because he fears that talking openly could cost him his life, gave up his password and spent two weeks in jail. After he was released, he said that he found pro-regime comments made in his name on his Facebook account. “I immediately created a new account with a fake name and so did most of my friends,” he said. Another man living in Syria, who is in his early 30s, said security officials also demanded his Facebook password. He is a software developer working to support a small group of digital activists who distribute video of the protests to television and media companies outside of Syria. He said that he was able to avoid detention recently because he had created multiple Facebook accounts with fake identities. Under Facebook’s terms of service, users are required to use their real identity online or risk losing their account. He said it was the only way for him and others to keep safe. “I was called down to security headquarters and told to bring my laptop,” said the man whose identity is also being withheld because he fears that he will be jailed or killed for supporting the dissidents. “They told me to give them my password so they could verify an account. They wanted me to open it in front of them. I actually opened up the other account that had nothing on it. They went through the messages trying to find comments that are related to the revolution. But there were none.” He said people now shared passwords with friends so that if they mysteriously vanished, their friends would delete regime criticisms on their Facebook pages, which are considered enough evidence to detain someone under the country’s strict freedom of expression laws. To help counter the protesters’ successful online narrative, pro-government supporters in Syria have created Facebook pages, Twitter accounts and YouTube channels to disseminate pro-regime messages on pages in Syria and around the world, including pages run by the White House and Oprah. The Syrian Electronic Army group is also working to disrupt dissident efforts. Their Facebook page, with 60,000 members, was shut down by Facebook this month for outlining detailed instructions on how to attack opponents online, a violation of Facebook’s terms of service. For now, activists in Syria said they would not know whether using Facebook had helped or hurt them until the revolt came to an end. “Using it for activism is a risky gambit,” said Peter Eckersley, a staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital privacy group that is looking into reports of an anonymous effort to hack into people’s Facebook accounts in Syria. “It may be effective if the regime that you are campaigning against is insufficiently ruthless or powerful. If you win quickly, Facebook is the right tool to use. If not, it becomes much more dangerous.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/middleeast/23facebook.html?src=ISMR_AP _LO_MST_FB&gwh=FE90D3AB4C67B69C74F9D6B031842940

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Middle East May 22, 2011 Obama Challenges Israel to Make Hard Choices Needed for Peace By HELENE COOPER WASHINGTON — President Obama, speaking on Sunday to the nation’s foremost pro- Israel lobbying group, repeated his call for Palestinian statehood based on Israel’s pre- 1967 borders adjusted for land swaps, issuing a challenge to the Israeli government to “make the hard choices that are necessary to protect a Jewish and democratic state for which so many generations have sacrificed.” ’In his remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the president, while offering fulsome praise for the relationship with Israel, did not walk back from his speech on Thursday, which had infuriated Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. Rather, the president took indirect aim at Mr. Netanyahu, first by repeating what the Israeli prime minister so objected to — the phrase pre-1967 borders — and then by challenging those whom he said had “misrepresented” his position. “Let me repeat what I actually said on Thursday,” Mr. Obama said in firm tones at one point, “not what I was reported to have said.” “I said that the United States believes that negotiations should result in two states, with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine. The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states.” The president emphasized the “mutually agreed swaps,” then went into an elaboration of what he believes that means. Mr. Netanyahu, in his critique of Mr. Obama’s remarks, had ignored the “mutually agreed swaps” part of the president’s proposal. “Since my position has been misrepresented several times, let me reaffirm what “1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps” means,” Mr. Obama said. “By definition, it means that the parties themselves — Israelis and Palestinians — will negotiate a border that is different than the one that existed on June 4, 1967. It is a well known formula to all who have worked on this issue for a generation. It allows the parties themselves to account for the changes that have taken place over the last 44 years.” “There was nothing particularly original in my proposal,” he said. “This basic framework for negotiations has long been the basis for discussions among the parties, including previous U.S. administrations.” Mr. Netanyahu’s furious reaction last week to what many administration officials viewed as a modest compromise from the more dramatic all-encompassing American peace plan that some of Mr. Obama’s advisers had been advocating, infuriated the White House. In particular, administration officials were angry by Mr. Netanyahu’s lecturing tone during statements the two leaders gave on Friday. American officials were also irritated by Mr. Netanyahu statement directly after Mr. Obama’s speech that used the phrase “expects to hear” in saying that Mr. Netanyahu expected to hear certain assurances from Mr. Obama during their meeting. 331

Mr. Obama also assured the group that the administration was steadfast in its “opposition to any attempt to de-legitimize the state of Israel,” but he warned that Israel would face growing isolation without a credible Middle East peace process. Sunday’s audience, which had been quiet, cheered Mr. Obama, although the cheers were far more muted than the standing ovation they had given at other points of Mr. Obama’s speech, like when he talked about Iran and when he reiterated that his opposition to a looming United Nations vote on Palestinian statehood. “I know very well that the easy thing to do, particularly for a president preparing for re- election, is to avoid any controversy,” Mr. Obama said. “I don’t need Rahm” — former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel — “to tell me that.” But, Mr. Obama added, “as I said to Prime Minister Netanyahu, I believe that the current situation in the Middle East does not allow for procrastination. I also believe that real friends talk openly and honestly with one another.” Others close to the administration have also pushed back against the notion that Mr. Obama was signaling a major shift in American policy on Thursday. “No, he wasn’t,” said his newly departed special envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, when asked that question on Sunday. “The president didn’t say that Israel has to go back to the ’67 lines,” Mr. Mitchell said on ABC’s “This Week”. “He said ‘with agreed swaps.’ Those are significant.” Mr. Mitchell went on: “ ‘Agreed’ means through negotiations; both parties must agree. There’s not going to be a border unless Israel agrees to it, and we know they won’t agree unless their security needs are satisfied.” It was a quietly delivered speech that lasted 20 minutes, and at the end, the packed hall of at the Washington Convention Center stood up for Mr. Obama and clapped — some even cheered. There were no boos or hisses, as some of the president’s allies had feared. Mr. Obama’s arrival on stage, before a backdrop collage that meshed fragments of the Israeli and American flags, was met with loud applause. But that was at least partly because it followed an introduction by Lee Rosenberg, the group’s president, that ended with a guaranteed applause line: “Thank you, Mr. President, for ridding the world of Osama bin Laden.” HELENE COOPER Obama Challenges Israel to Make Hard Choices Needed for Peace May 22, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/middleeast/23aipac.html?_r=1&hp

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Israel’s leader denies crisis with US over future of peacemaking with the Palestinians By Associated Press, Published: May 22 WASHINGTON — Israel’s leader, trying to defuse reports of a crisis with the U.S. over his rejection of President Barack Obama’s proposed foundation for future Israeli- Palestinian peace talks, said Saturday that media accounts of the disagreement have been “blown way out of proportion.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had bluntly criticized Obama’s call earlier this week to base future negotiations on Palestinian statehood on Israel’s boundaries before it captured the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in the 1967 Mideast war. He publicly reiterated that opposition while sitting beside Obama in the Oval Office on Friday. On Saturday, Netanyahu stood firm by his insistence that Israel could not withdraw to its prewar lines, negotiate with a Palestinian government including violently anti-Israel Hamas militants or repatriate allow millions of Palestinians to homes in Israel that they or their families fled or were driven from during the fighting over Israel’s 1948 creation. But he told The Associated Press that media accounts of the disagreements “have been blown way out of proportion.” “It’s true we have some differences of opinion, but these are among friends,” Netanyahu said. “There should be no doubt about the strength of the American-Israeli relationship and President Obama’s commitment to Israel and its security,” he added. In a Mideast policy speech on Thursday, Obama gave unprecedented prominence to Washington’s long-held stand on the future borders of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza and east Jerusalem. Although his comments did not substantively differ from previously articulated U.S. positions, he sent shudders through the Israeli leadership by acceding to Palestinian pressure to explicitly enunciate this stance. An essential part of what Obama proposed was that Israelis and Palestinians would also have to agree to land swaps that would allow Israel to hold on to major Jewish settlements, a point Netanyahu failed to mention when he declared the 1967 lines to be militarily “indefensible.” From the very first days of his presidency, Obama has been pushing hard to wring an elusive peace agreement from Israel and the Palestinians, who stopped negotiating in late 2008, save a brief period this past September. The Palestinians have not yet indicated whether his public statement on their hoped-for state’s borders would be enough to bring them back to the negotiating table and drop their campaign to have the U.N. recognize their state unilaterally in September, a move both the U.S. and Israel oppose.

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The Palestinians have refused to talk to Israel as long as it continues to build homes for Jews in east Jerusalem and the West Bank. Israel has refused to reinstate and expand a 10-month settlement construction slowdown that expired in late September. In the meantime, the two sides are mired in mutual distrust and divided by more than just the border dispute. Should they ever return to the negotiating table, even bigger problems loom with regard to resolving disputes over the status of contested Jerusalem, and a solution for the refugees. Netanyahu has said he would not share Jerusalem with the Palestinians, who want the eastern sector of the holy city for the capital of a future state. No Israeli government has been willing to consider anything but a token repatriation of Palestinian refugees, for fear a mass return would dilute the Jewish character of the state. Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/israels-leader-denies-crisis-with-us-over- future-of-peacemaking-with-the- palestinians/2011/05/21/AFhrCl8G_story.html?nl_headlines

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Viñeta de El Roto sobre el Movimiento 15-MEL ROTO | 22-05-2011 REPORTAJE: #SPANISHREVOLUTION El 15 -M sacude el sistema Ni Ni-Nis, ni violentos, ni ciudadanos solo a golpe de ratón. Jóvenes concienciados con las libertades civiles se levantaron para encabezar una protesta que persigue un gran cambio. Un reportero de EL PAÍS vivió la semana en Sol, el corazón de la #spanishrevolution "Los políticos, nuestros supuestos representantes, actúan en connivencia con los poderes económicos" Paco López llega con una bolsa a pasar la noche: "¡Las personas están por encima de la rentabilidad de las empresas!" Miércoles: la lluvia se ceba con la Puerta del Sol. "Llueva o nieve, aquí nadie se mueve". Los acampados aguantan Lunes, 16.00. Acaban de montar el primer toldo en Sol. Está naciendo la minirrepública de los acampados Martes mágico. A las ocho de la tarde, donde ayer había 400, hoy hay 6.000. "Tenemos el poder ahora, ¡nos mira todo el mundo!" Ayer eran 300 las peticiones de dominio de tomalaplaza.net. Había 200 abogados apuntados en Acampada Sol JOSEBA ELOLA 22/05/2011 Jon Aguirre Such abrazaba con los dientes apretados. No podía contener la emoción, la rabia acumulada, la indignación compartida. Estaba viviendo un sueño. Un sueño que se ha hecho realidad. El sueño de muchos. Este joven de discurso articulado y fluido, 335

estudiante de arquitectura de 26 años, y portavoz de Democracia Real Ya, abrazaba con fuerza y con rabia. Sucedió el martes 17. El martes mágico. A las ocho de la tarde. En la Puerta del Sol. Sí, porque el martes apareció la magia de lo espontáneo. El milagro de la comunicación. La potencia de difusión del mensaje a través de las redes sociales. La fuerza de una nueva generación. El ahogado sentimiento de la indignación reventaba todas las costuras. Jon ya se había emocionado el domingo, cuando encabezaba la manifestación del 15 de mayo. Al llegar a la altura del Círculo de Bellas Artes, en la madrileña calle de Alcalá, echó la vista atrás: todo lleno de gente hasta Cibeles. "Casi me pongo a llorar. Veía a todo el mundo con cara de ilusión: '¡Es posible!". Jon cuenta su historia con orgullo, con pasión: "Acabamos de escribir Historia. No hay marcha atrás". Jon Aguirre Such, con su camisa de flores y su americana negra, con su bigote fino y sus impecables botines negros, no obedece al perfil clásico del antisistema. Como la abrumadora mayoría de los que de modo espontáneo se sumaron a la protesta que fagocitó la campaña y convirtió el marketing electoral en plástico. Gente. Mucha gente. Gente colorida. De todos los colores. Así los retrató El Roto, el maestro. Portando una gran bandera blanca: "Los jóvenes salieron a la calle y súbitamente todos los partidos envejecieron...". Difícil expresar más con menos. Difícil sintetizar mejor la lectura del deseo y del sentir del común de los indignados. La viñeta se publicó el miércoles 18 de mayo en EL PAÍS. Al día siguiente del martes mágico. Los indignados la hicieron suya. Saltó esa misma noche, ampliada, a las farolas de la Puerta del Sol. ¿Quién se lo iba a decir a Carlos, a Carlos III, El Político, que dirigiría con gesto impasible a las huestes de semejante protesta cívica, a lomos de su caballo, con largas faldas azules y coloridos globos volando? Bajo su egregia estatua se cocinó la revuelta, Acampada Sol, la concentración heredera del 15-M; la que generó movimientos espejo en Barcelona, Valencia y Vigo; en Bruselas, Londres y Nueva York. Los ojos de jóvenes de todo el mundo mirando a las inusitadas huestes de Don Carlos. El martes 17 fue mágico. Mágico porque no había nada preparado. Brotó una concentración espontánea, vitaminada por las redes sociales. La manifestación del 15- M, sin embargo, fue el fruto de un concienciado y concienzudo trabajo. Tres meses de preparación. Lo del martes, fue otra cosa. Algo nuevo. Distinto. Fabio Gándara, la cara más visible de Democracia Real Ya, lo tuvo claro desde el principio, allá por diciembre. En el grupo de Facebook en que empezó a nacer el Movimiento 15-M había prisas por convocar movilizaciones. "Algunos dijimos: 'Vamos a esperar. Organizar una protesta como esta es difícil. La sociedad civil está dormida. Vamos a esperar tres meses, vamos a trabajar". La sociedad civil ha despertado. O más bien, una parte de esta. Con los más jóvenes al frente. Con los que quieren ser presente y no futuro. Con los millones de desempleados, los parados de larga duración, los hipotecados al borde del desahucio, los que temen la llegada de un nuevo recibo, los afectados por los recortes, los decepcionados por la pobreza del discurso político, los indignados por el marketing electoral. Una generación muy preparada, crecida a la sombra de San Google, ha decidido ponerse en marcha.

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¿Cómo es posible que se haya producido tan brusco despertar en tan poco tiempo? A ciertos mundos analógicos les cuesta comprender las dinámicas de la Red. La propagación instantánea y viral de mensajes. La realimentación, el efecto de contagio, los efectos multiplicadores. A ciertos mundos analógicos les cuesta entender cómo es posible que funcione una estructura horizontal, sin líderes, sin jerarquías. Donde todos aportan. Donde todos se sienten parte. Pues, por lo que se ve, funciona. "Son asambleas de 24 horas al día, siete días a la semana". Así explica el proceso asambleario on line Olmo Gálvez, uno de los cracks de las redes sociales de Democracia Real Ya. "La información se va actualizando, las ideas se van sumando, de forma caótica, pero funciona, da resultados. Es como si las redes tuvieran un cerebro propio que piensa. Se hacen propuestas, se llega a un acuerdo y a trabajar". Olmo Gálvez, granadino de 30 años, colaborador de empresas tecnológicas, no había acudido nunca a una manifestación hasta ahora. Estudió en un colegio del Opus. Cursó Ciencias Empresariales en el ICADE. Hoy es parte de Democracia Real Ya, DRY para los amigos, pronunciado a la inglesa. "Nunca entendí lo de salir a la calle solo para el pataleo. Lo importante es que las movilizaciones sean punto de encuentro, conectar con la gente y que de ahí salgan cosas". Cosas, lo que viene a ser cosas, han salido. "Unos 18 o 20 mataos con un presupuesto de 1.000 euros". Así empezó todo. Con media sonrisa lo cuenta Chema Ruiz, portavoz madrileño de la Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH), comercial, de 47 años. Su organización su sumó a DRY hace dos meses. "Nos encontramos con un movimiento asambleario, sin líderes, a un grupo de gente variopinta, con ilusión por cambiar las cosas". Así arrancaron. Fabio Gándara, el hombre en el origen de la que se ha montado, abogado de 26 años, arrancó el proyecto de movilización social junto a dos amigos: Eric Pérez y otra persona que prefiere permanecer en el anonimato. A principios de diciembre ya eran unas diez personas con una misma idea. Miraban a Islandia. A una sociedad de sólido recorrido democrático que era capaz de encarcelar a algunos de los responsables de la crisis, de promover reformas constitucionales. "Vimos que la ciudadanía podía cambiar las cosas", cuenta, con la mirada despierta, este joven que vino a Madrid, procedente de Santiago de Compostela, para estudiar Derecho y Ciencias Políticas. Miraron hacia el mundo árabe y observaron cómo sociedades desestructuradas articulaban protestas a través de las redes sociales. Crearon un grupo en Facebook, Juventud en Acción, y un blog. En enero, ampliaron la base, se abrieron a organizaciones sociales. Horizontalizaron aún más su propuesta. Crearon un nuevo grupo en Facebook a cuyo bautismo no acudió el espíritu de síntesis: Plataforma de Coordinación de Grupos por la Movilización Ciudadana. Se fueron sumando espontáneos, blogueros, gente del movimiento ciudadano Estado del Malestar, la plataforma No les votes -que preconiza que no se vote a los partidos que apoyaron la Ley Sinde, PSOE, PP y CiU-... La lista fue creciendo, creciendo, creciendo. El debate en las redes les llevó a compartir una serie de ideas: indignación, los ciudadanos están siendo olvidados en esta crisis, la perversión del sistema democrático conduce a un modelo bipartidista, los mercados están imponiendo recortes antisociales. ¿Conclusión? "Son dos los principales culpables: los políticos, nuestros supuestos 337

representantes, que actúan en connivencia con los grandes poderes económicos; y los poderes económicos, que mediatizan a los grandes partidos políticos, imponen un marco de desregulación y especulan con los bonos de los países", resume Gándara. Y así se llegó al lema, una de las claves para aunar tantas sensibilidades: "Democracia Real Ya: No somos mercancías en manos de políticos y banqueros". El lema tardó poco en convertirse en el nombre de la plataforma. Se creó la web. Se descentralizó el movimiento. La lista de organizaciones que apoyaban la iniciativa iba engordando día a día. Todo se cocía en la Red. A mediados de marzo se convocaban las primeras asambleas locales. La Casa de Granada fue el lugar en que se celebró la primera reunión en Madrid. "Fueron momentos de mucha ilusión. Era raro verse cara a cara. Todo esto ya se convertía en algo real", relata Gándara. "Comprobamos que éramos gente muy distinta pero que estábamos de acuerdo en lo básico". El 2 de mayo celebraban una asamblea en el Retiro. Acudían unas 300 personas. Se establecían prioridades, todo aquel que se acercaba podía hablar. "Aquello parecía el Speaker's corner", recuerda en alusión al célebre espacio londinense para la libre expresión Merche Negro, colaboradora de DRY en temas de comunicación y cabeza de la plataforma audiovisual ciudadana Vudeo.org. Juventud sin futuro, la Asociación de Desempleados ADESORG, No les votes y la plataforma ATTAC se convertían en motores del movimiento. Intermón Oxfam y blogueros como Enrique Dans también aparecerían en el largo listado de adhesiones. Multitud de webs estampaban su URL en la plataforma de DRY. A una semana de la manifestación, las vibraciones no podían ser mejores. Las piezas empezaban a cuadrar, milagrosamente, como en un Tetris. Si hacía falta una pancarta, alguien aparecía con ella. Y en eso amaneció el 15 de mayo de 2011, fecha que pasará a la Historia como uno de los grandes éxitos de la movilización ciudadana ajena a partidos políticos y sindicatos. Más de 80.000 indignados tomaban las calles de toda España. El movimiento se convertía en realidad andando. Juan Cobo, fotógrafo de 26 años, regresa esa noche a casa con una sonrisa de oreja a oreja. Lo que ha vivido es increíble. Ha escuchado a la gente de Democracia Real Ya y ha reconocido su voz.Cuando llega a casa y oye hablar de los disturbios, tiene un momento de bajón moral. Vaya, una vez más, lo de siempre. Pero no, esto no ha sido lo de siempre. Esto ha sido algo nuevo. Algo distinto. Son las cuatro de la madrugada. Juan Cobo está tan inquieto que decide volver a la Puerta del Sol a dar las gracias a los que se han quedado ahí a pasar la noche. Gracias por aguantar. Llega a Sol y hay unas 35 personas. No están durmiendo, se están organizando. Como han venido haciendo todas las noches de esta semana. Trabajando cuando los demás duermen. Debatiendo, acordando, actuando. No puede apartarse de esto. Nunca ha estado vinculado a movimientos sociales. Pero esto es algo único. Hay diálogo, capacidad de escuchar. No hay líderes, uno se siente parte del proceso. Acampada Sol está naciendo.

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Sobre las dos de la madrugada del domingo, esas 35 personas, veinteañeros y treintañeros, deciden que se quedan a dormir en Sol. A las cuatro empiezan a redactar un manifiesto. En la asamblea de las 08.00 queda aprobado. Democracia Real Ya se echa a un lado. Siguen apoyando lo que allí se empieza a gestar, pero ceden el testigo a los acampados. Juan Cobo es uno de ellos. Será portavoz. Lunes, cuatro de la tarde, Puerta del Sol. Acaban de montar un pequeño chiringuito, un toldo. Está situado cerca del oso y el madroño, al noreste de la plaza. Se gesta el nacimiento de la minirrepública de Acampada Sol. Hay revuelo, mucho movimiento: aguas y zumos bajo la minicarpa, documentos que circulan de mano en mano. En la otra punta de la plaza, un candidato del PP suelta su pequeño mitin de campaña, cerca de la calle Preciados, en una carpa de diseño azul que poco tiene que ver con la de los indignados. Apenas una quincena de personas le escuchan. Pareciera que clama en el desierto. A las ocho de la tarde comienza la asamblea. Hay una centena de personas sentadas en el suelo. Gente de todo pelaje. Mayoritariamente jóvenes. Los hay con polo Ralph Lauren, los hay con camiseta vieja sin mangas, desgarrada. El chico aseado intercambia ideas con el perroflauta. Dialogando. Son distintos, pero hay algo que les une. Están hartos de esta engañifa, están hartos del guiñol de la política, de los eslóganes facilones, de los imputados en las listas. Coro: "Lo llaman democracia y no lo es". Discuten sobre la posibilidad de que les desalojen si se quedan a dormir una noche más. Sobre si merece la pena mantener la carpa, que puede ser el motivo por el que les echen. Coro: "No tenemos miedo". Un joven pide el megáfono. "Que no somos Ni-Nis, que yo tengo dos carreras". Arrancan los aplausos. "Hay acampados en Sevilla y Valencia", se anuncia, "¡hay que aguantar!". Uno de los organizadores procede a leer el manifiesto que han aprobado. Esta es la mejor manera de saber quiénes son, algo que la gente se ha estado preguntando a lo largo de toda la semana: "¿Quiénes somos?: Somos personas que hemos venido libre y voluntariamente, que después de la manifestación decidimos reunirnos para seguir reivindicando la dignidad y la conciencia política y social. No representamos a ningún partido ni asociación. Nos une una vocación de cambio. Estamos aquí por dignidad y por solidaridad con los que no pueden estar aquí". "¿Por qué estamos aquí? Estamos aquí porque queremos una sociedad nueva que dé prioridad a la vida por encima de los intereses económicos y políticos. Abogamos por un cambio en la sociedad y en la conciencia social. Demostrar que la sociedad no se ha dormido y que seguiremos luchando por lo que nos merecemos mediante la vía pacífica. Apoyamos a los compañer@s que detuvieron tras la manifestación, y pedimos su puesta en libertad sin cargos. Lo queremos todo, lo queremos ahora, si estás de acuerdo con nosotros: ¡ÚNETE! Es mejor arriesgar y perder que perder por no haber arriesgado". La asamblea prorrumpe en gritos de júbilo. Acampada Sol ya se ha unido en torno a este texto. La gente que por allí pasa se queda y escucha. Cada vez se van sumando más miradas, más oídos. Un veterano, que asiste de pie a la asamblea, pide el megáfono. "Amigos, amigas, os quiero felicitar porque estáis haciendo un gran ejercicio de ciudadanía", dice, "el artículo 23 de la Constitución os ampara". Los jóvenes aplauden entusiasmados. El movimiento ya tumba barreras generacionales.

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Ha caído la noche y hay unas 400 personas en la Puerta del Sol. Se quedarán a dormir esta noche. De aquí no hay quien les mueva. Paco López llega con una bolsa grande para pasar la noche en Sol. Tiene 47 años, está en paro. Es oficial marmolista de 2ª, actor, hombre concienciado. En su bolsa: un libro, Reacciona; dos botellas de agua; una esterilla verde y una almohadilla azul como las de los aviones. Está indignado. "La gente está harta de tanto cinismo, de tanta hipocresía, de tanta manipulación de los políticos. Antes había unos principios. En los políticos había una vocación de servicio, de humildad, no un sistema para generar privilegios. Para esto, ¡restauremos el sistema de marquesados!". Paco se va calentando. Vive con los 426 euros al mes de la prestación por desempleo. "Hay cinco millones de parados. Los mayores de 45 años estamos desahuciados. ¡Las personas están por encima de la rentabilidad de las empresas!". El lunes se cierra con un dato que es el preludio de lo que se avecina. Hay poca gente en Sol, pero las redes hierven. La etiqueta #spanishrevolution se convierte en el tema del momento en Twitter. Pero no solo en España: #spanishrevolution es trending topic a nivel mundial. En la madrugada del lunes al martes se produce la intervención policial. Desalojan a los acampados. Los que allí pasaron la noche denuncian el uso de violencia por parte de los agentes de policía. Aseguran que hubo patadas, puñetazos, porrazos. Martes, 16.45, Puerta del Sol. Ni rastro de la acampada. Diez camionetas de la Policía se han desplegado en la plaza. Sobre las seis de la tarde, hay unos cien indignados en la plaza, dispersos. Fabio Gándara, cabeza visible de Democracia Real Ya, revisa sus mensajes sentado en el suelo, a la sombra. La tarde va transcurriendo. Poco a poco, de manera sostenida, la gente se va sumando, sumando, sumando. A las 20.00 de la tarde, la Puerta del Sol está llena. Donde ayer a las ocho había 400, hoy han acudido 6.000. "Parece que va a ser complicado llevar a cabo esta asamblea", dicen con sorna desde megafonía, colocada bajo Carlos III. La euforia se dispara. "Nos quedamos en la plaza, no tenemos casa", dice el coro. "No estamos en Facebook, estamos en la calle". A las 21.29 megafonía proclama: "Tenemos el poder ahora y ¡nos está mirando el mundo!". El sueño se ha hecho realidad. La #spanishrevolution ha arrancado. A las 23.30 los voluntarios pegan cartones por los suelos para que todo el mundo que pueda haga noche. Circulan chinos vendiendo cervezas. A la estatua de Carlos II le empiezan a crecer faldones, los toldos azules se despliegan a su alrededor. Hay quien ya se ha traído un sofá. Megafonía: "Esto no es un botellón, no beban alcohol. No estamos en una fiesta, estamos aquí para reivindicar nuestros derechos". A las 3 de la madrugada se celebra una nueva asamblea. El miércoles por la mañana la minirrepública de los indignados funciona a pleno rendimiento. Hay asambleas por todas las esquinas. Los concentrados tapizan la boca del Cercanías con mensajes en folios en blanco. Queda constituido el mural de las indignaciones. Mapas colgados en la ciudadela que se va tejiendo indican donde está cada una de las comisiones. Cada una en una de las farolas de la plaza: Alimentación, Acción, Extensión, Coordinación interna, Legal, Cuidados/Limpieza, Infraestructuras 340

(materiales, objetos perdidos), Comunicación. La enfermería está repleta de medicinas, tiritas, remedios varios. Bares y restaurantes de la zona dan cada noche a los acampados todo aquello que les sobra. Al puesto de alimentación llegan amas de casa con el carro de la compra repleto. Un restaurador trae perolas de fabada. La web tomalaplaza.net recoge todas las plazas de España que se suman a la revuelta. La Red no para de hervir. Se crean nuevos hashtags, nuevas etiquetas para que la protesta siga viva en Twitter, para seguir siendo tema del momento. Usar un solo hashtag implica que el algoritmo de los trending topics se canse de la etiqueta y abra paso a otras nuevas. Los hashtags de los indignados van mutando: #spanishrevolution, #acampadasol, #nonosvamos, #yeswecamp, #democraciarealya, #notenemosmiedo, #tomalaplaza, #pijamabloc. Los hashtag también se descentralizan: #acampadabcn, #acampadavalencia. La protesta se extiende por toda España. Y por otras ciudades del mundo. Frente a las Embajadas españolas de Londres y Bruselas se concentran jóvenes españoles en apoyo de la #spanishrevolution. El miércoles, la Junta Electoral Provincial de Madrid prohíbe las concentraciones. Por la tarde, la Policía se hace presente en la plaza. Los agentes cargan las rejas sobres sus camionetas, hacen controles en los accesos revisando mochilas. Pero el movimiento es imparable. Sigue creciendo, desafiando las prohibiciones. Acuden a la cita de las ocho de la tarde cada vez más adultos, mayores, inmigrantes, abueletes. "Que no, que no, que no nos representan", se grita en la plaza. El efecto multiplicador de la protesta no tiene barreras. "Esto no termina con las elecciones", claman. La lluvia se ceba con la Puerta del Sol esa noche. Pero eso no disuade a los indignados. "¡ Llueva o nieve, aquí nadie se mueve!". Cientos de manifestantes aguantan bajo las improvisadas carpas azules vencidas por el peso del agua. La viñeta de El Roto cuelga de varias farolas de la plaza. La elaboración de un manifiesto es uno de los escollos que deben resolver los concentrados. En las asambleas es difícil poner de acuerdo a todo el mundo. Se lanzan muchas ideas: reformar la ley electoral para hacerla más proporcional; revisar la financiación de los partidos; redistribuir mediante impuestos más progresivos; establecer la Tasa Tobin sobre movimientos de capitales; listas electorales libres de imputados, listas abiertas; supresión de sueldos vitalicios de los políticos, supresión de la Ley Sinde, la Ley de Extranjería, del Plan Bolonia. La minirrepública sigue creciendo y el efecto contagio por toda España cobra fuerza. En Valencia, el número de asistentes se triplica a cada día que pasa. El jueves, a las 19.30, son ya un total de 82 ciudades las que han solicitado un espacio en la página tomalaplaza.net. La prensa internacional mira a España. The Washington Post coloca las protestas españolas en su portada. Viernes, 12.25 del mediodía. La minirrepública es una miniciudad. Se han multiplicado las tiendas de campaña, los sofás. "¿Sabéis dónde queda Respeto?", pregunta un joven en el taller de Artes Gráficas. "No sé, vete a Acción y pregunta". Los carteles cada vez ofrecen mejor aspecto. Hay un tupper de plástico repleto de rotuladores para dotar de plasticidad a los mensajes. Las largas faldas azules de Carlos III se siguen extendiendo. Junto al oso y el madroño se ha abierto una tribuna popular. Son ya 166 las ciudades de todo el mundo que convocan protestas. El número de seguidores del twitter @democraciareal supera, con 40.000 seguidores, la suma de @ppopular y @psoe. En un cartel negro y naranja de Sol, de los que se usan para 341

vender o alquilar pisos, se puede leer: "Se alquila esclavo laboral. 600 euros al mes". Alguien ha borrado el 600 y ha superpuesto un 400. El viernes por la noche llega el gran momento, el del minuto de silencio para dar paso a la jornada de reflexión. La gente no cabe en Sol, todas las calles que desembocan en la plaza revientan. A las 00.00 se hace el silencio. Más de 25.000 personas, muchas con la boca tapada con precinto, se callan al unísono. Silencio. Se oyen las campanas del reloj de la Puerta del Sol. El minuto no dura un minuto. El grito sale desbocado, antes de tiempo. Las manos se alzan girando las muñecas, es el símbolo de aprobación que se usa en las asambleas. Desconocidos se abrazan, algunos con lágrimas en los ojos. En Valencia, los números de la protesta también se desbocan: más de 10.000 personas en la Plaza del Ayuntamiento. Cada día más gente, los números se multiplican. Ayer ya eran 300 las peticiones de dominio en tomalaplaza.net. Había 200 abogados apuntados en la Acampada de Sol. Un total de 15 enfermeros. Siete placas solares, 15 ordenadores. Las plazas volvieron a abarrotarse el sábado por la noche. A pesar de la prohibición por la jornada de reflexión. El fenómeno seguía creciendo, sumando a más ciudadanos, imparable. "Se ha producido una desestructuración muy acelerada de la sociedad", sostiene Miguel Martínez, sociólogo experto en movimientos sociales, profesor de la Universidad Complutense e investigador Ramón y Cajal. "La precariedad ha emanado de las élites políticas, han ido apretando las tuercas cada día más. Los gobiernos han llevado a cabo políticas muy agresivas para la mayoría de la población. El panorama es muy triste. Tenía que surgir una válvula de escape. La gente siente que su vida se volatiliza. Cuando llega la indignación, ya no pueden ir más allá, porque te hacen desaparecer como persona. Si pierdes la dignidad ya solo eres mano de obra". La movida portuguesa renace ante las elecciones generales Por qué se queja la generación perdida No me traiga octavillas La democracia soñada

Klaudia Álvarez. Portavoz Democracia Real Ya Barcelona Luis Fernández. Asociación Nacional de Desempleados Olmo Gálvez. Coordinador redes sociales DRY Chema Ruiz. Preparación movilizaciones 15-M Eva Botella. Voluntaria Comisión Legal Madrid Fabio Gándara. Portavoz de Democracia Real Ya Matilde Cano. Coordinadora Acampada Valencia Jon Aguirre Such. Portavoz Democracia Real Ya Adriana Mateos. Comisión de Infraestructuras Sol Juan Cobos. Portavoz de Acampada Sol Klaudia Álvarez. Portavoz Democracia Real Ya Barcelona Edad: 35 años. Profesión: Profesora de Formación profesional. Funciones: Portavoz de Democracia Real Ya en Barcelona. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Sentía la necesidad de hacer algo y pensé que podía ser útil".

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¿Adónde conduce todo esto?: "A una movilización de la gente que estaba deseando hacer algo y no sabía cómo. Al cambio hacia un modelo de gestión abierta, transparente, participativo e igualitario". Luis Fernández. Asociación Nacional de Desempleados Edad: 45 años. Profesión: Coordinador de la Asociación Nacional de Desempleados (ADESORG). Funciones: Preparación de las movilizaciones del 15-M. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Es necesario cambiar esto. En España también hay hambre, ahí está la gente buscando en las basuras. Entre 10 y 13 millones de españoles están en una situación en que les pueden cortar la luz, el gas o les echan de su casa". ¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: "Al despertar de la sociedad. En democracia se pueden hacer más cosas que votar cada cuatro años". Olmo Gálvez. Coordinador redes sociales DRY Edad: 30 años. Profesión: Emprendedor tecnológico. Funciones: Coordina la acción en redes sociales de Democracia Real Ya. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Siempre lo he buscado, estaba esperando esto desde hace mucho tiempo. Cuando apareció, vi la luz y me metí de cabeza". ¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: "A conseguir que cada vez más ciudadanos tengan una conciencia colectiva clara. A más transparencia, a mejores partidos políticos. Lo ciudadanos decidirán". Chema Ruiz. Preparación movilizaciones 15-M Edad: 37 años. Profesión: Comercial, sector Construcción. Portavoz madrileño de la Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca. Funciones: Preparación de las movilizaciones del 15-M. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Hay que cambiar. Los políticos que se arrodillan ante los financieros nos están dando patadas". ¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: "A que por fin los políticos nos escuchen. Que asuman que la soberanía nos pertenece. Cuando eso suceda, decidiremos". Eva Botella. Voluntaria Comisión Legal Madrid Edad: 40 años. Profesión: Profesora de Historia en la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Funciones: Voluntaria colaboradora en la Comisión Legal Acampada Sol. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Porque tengo que estar aquí, porque lo que aquí está ocurriendo sí responde a mi idea de democracia". ¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: 343

"Hacia una democracia más directa. El pueblo debe tener el control de la soberanía. No se puede vender la soberanía a bancos e instituciones que el ciudadano no puede alcanzar". Fabio Gándara. Portavoz de Democracia Real Ya Edad: 26 años. Profesión: Abogado en paro. Funciones: Portavoz de Democracia Real Ya. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Porque estoy indignado, porque es necesario un cambio en las políticas de este país. Tiene que haber un gobierno con participación del pueblo". ¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: "A articular la voz de la sociedad española, a que se organice de forma independiente y a luchar por aquello que nos afecta a todos". Matilde Cano. Coordinadora Acampada Valencia Edad: 37 años. Profesión: Enfermera. Funciones: Coordinación Comité de Acción Acampada Valencia. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "El Estado de Derecho no es igual para todos. Quiero que se haga real para el ciudadano. Estoy aquí por amor a la humanidad". ¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: "Hemos tenido que madurar mucho en una semana. Vamos a mantener las estructuras dinámicas y a extenderlas al resto de la población. A un movimiento pacífico, social y apartidista, que no apolítico". Jon Aguirre Such. Portavoz Democracia Real Ya Edad: 26 años. Profesión: Estudiante de Arquitectura. Funciones: Portavoz de Democracia Real Ya. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Hay mucho que cambiar, es posible cambiarlo. Estoy harto de abrir el periódico y ver el panorama actual". ¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: "Al cambio del sistema político y socioeconómico. A un viraje rotundo. Que los políticos sean los ejecutores de las demandas ciudadanas, eso debería ser la democracia". Adriana Mateos. Comisión de Infraestructuras Sol Edad: 26 años. Profesión: Fotógrafa, iluminadora de cine. Funciones: Comisión de Infraestructuras/Alimentación, Acampada Sol. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Por la necesidad física de gritar en la calle. Observo una corrupción absoluta, se respira un estado de podredumbre". 344

¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: "Es el principio de algo. No he visto nunca nada así". Juan Cobos. Portavoz de Acampada Sol Edad: 26 años. Profesión: Fotógrafo. Funciones: Portavoz de Acampada Sol. ¿Por qué está aquí?: "Hace tiempo que tengo la sensación de que una democracia es mucho más que lo que estamos viviendo ahora. Podemos hacer un mundo mejor". ¿Adónde conducen las movilizaciones?: "A conseguir reformas constitucionales. Que la ley caiga sobre los responsables de hacer mal las cosas, sobre los corruptos. A un cambio de la Ley Electoral". http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/- M/sacude/sistema/elpepusocdmg/20110522elpdmgrep_1/Tes REPORTAJE: #SPANISHREVOLUTION Por qué se queja la generación perdida EVA CAVERO 22/05/2011 Uno de cada tres menores de 30 años se encuentra en paro en España. Y entre los que no han alcanzado los 25, casi la mitad. En las improvisadas concentraciones del 15-M, las voces se alzan para gritar lo que ya clamaban las estadísticas: la generación que más oportunidades de formación ha tenido es carne de paro y precariedad. En el caso de los más jóvenes, la tasa de desempleo (45,3% entre los de 16 a 25 años, según la última EPA) es el doble que en la Unión Europea. Ese porcentaje se reduce al 34,7% si nos fijamos en toda la población activa hasta los 30 años. Los que trabajan tienen empleos precarios en una proporción amplísima: el 45,4% de los contratos son temporales. Es difícil evaluar el peso de una educación mejor en la búsqueda de una colocación. Entre los jóvenes de 20 a 24 años que han completado la educación secundaria superior, el desempleo es 10,7 puntos porcentuales menos que entre los que no alcanzan ese nivel. Sin embargo, los titulados superiores menores de 30 años no encuentran fácilmente un trabajo acorde con su formación. No es un problema exclusivamente español: según la OCDE, el 23% de los contratados trabaja en empleos inferiores a su cualificación; pero en España esa cifra se dispara hasta casi el 40%, según el informe Panorama de la educación 2010, realizado por la OCDE. Los esfuerzos en formación son notables. Aunque el fracaso escolar se acerca todavía al 30% -el doble de la media europea-, no estamos ante una generación poco preparada. Al contrario: el problema es que la juventud mejor preparada de la historia, al menos teóricamente, no consigue ganarse la vida como debería permitirle su formación. El porcentaje del PIB dedicado a educación ha crecido en los últimos años, hasta aproximarse a la media de la OCDE y la UE. Y aunque el conjunto de la población española cuenta con menos licenciados superiores que la media europea, la mejora se nota en la generación que hoy tiene entre 25 y 34 años, con muchas más licenciaturas en el bolsillo. En esa franja de edad, el 39% ha terminado una carrera, frente a la media del 345

35% en el conjunto de la OCDE. Pero los salarios de quienes han estudiado son menores que en Europa. Un varón con titulación superior en España cobra 58.173 euros más respecto al que carece del graduado escolar; en cambio, la diferencia media en los países de la OCDE es de 102.040 euros. Los resultados son poco halagadores para un sistema que ha convertido la educación universitaria en una apuesta casi única: la formación profesional es todavía la gran olvidada. Las tasas de matriculación en FP aumentaron del 15% al 22% entre 2000 y 2008, pero en conjunto es notablemente inferior tanto respecto de la media de la OCDE (47,4%) como de la UE (52,9%). Hasta el estallido de la crisis financiera, la hostelería era la mayor fuente de empleo en España; el 23,6% de las personas de entre 16 y 34 años se colocaban en restauración, servicios personales, seguridad y como vendedores en comercios. La construcción ha sido otro de los grandes suministradores de empleo a los jóvenes, junto a diversos trabajos no cualificados. Son datos del módulo de Incorporación de los jóvenes al mercado laboral que el INE publicó en 2009. Desde entonces las cosas han cambiado mucho en el mundo laboral español, para peor. La construcción se ha hundido, y con ella los empleos de muchos chicos que dejaron prematuramente la escuela tentados por un mercado en ebullición que ofrecía buenos sueldos y un montón de trabajo. Pero si el paro juvenil es una de las lacras de la sociedad actual, cuando se analiza la situación por sexos, se llega a otro descubrimiento desalentador: las mujeres sufren cifras más altas de trabajo temporal y desempleo, pese a que el informe de la OCDE sobre educación deja claro que las jóvenes han invertido más tiempo en los estudios que sus compañeros varones y llegan más lejos que estos en la universidad. En todo caso, la situación es explosiva para ambos sexos, y estallaría de no ser por el colchón familiar. Solo se emancipa la mitad de los que cuentan entre 18 y 34 años. Y una vez fuera de casa, los padres les siguen apoyando. Según la OCDE, más de la mitad de los jóvenes entre 25 y 29 años reciben dinero de sus familias, porcentaje que sube al 80% entre los de 20 a 24 años. – http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/queja/generacion/perdida/elpepusocdmg/2011 0522elpdmgrep_4/Tes REPORTAJE: #SPANISHREVOLUTION No me traiga octavillas El movimiento crecido en la Red pasa por encima de los mensajes electorales DELIA RODRÍGUEZ 22/05/2011 El plan de los partidos políticos para estas elecciones era el habitual: utilizar la Red como un lugar donde esparcir octavillas en forma de mensajes de YouTube, Twitter, Facebook o los blogs. Pero algo salió mal. Como no estaba invitado a la fiesta, Internet entró en ella airado y la reventó. Por primera vez en nuestro país, un movimiento ha salido de los ordenadores para llenar las calles. La campaña de estas elecciones autonómicas y municipales será recordada como una anticampaña en la que los ciudadanos se dirigieron a los políticos y no al revés. La plataforma que convocó las movilizaciones del 15-M, Democracia Real Ya, nació hace apenas tres meses, y aunque había aprendido de grupos universitarios madrileños como Juventud Sin Futuro, se organizó a través de Internet y las redes sociales. En la

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Red se colgó su manifiesto, sus propuestas, y allí se coordinaron las múltiples adhesiones que la componen. La convocatoria funcionó. Ni los más optimistas sospechaban que iba a ser justo esa mecha minoritaria y virtual la que encendiera el descontento social. Los expertos en cultura digital creen que ese salto en apariencia pequeño de lo virtual a lo físico es histórico. "Recordaremos este momento como aquel en el que nos dimos cuenta de que somos digitales, de que todo se trata de un mismo mundo, un mismo espacio. De que Internet es una parte esencial de nosotros", opina el biólogo y profesor universitario Juan Freire. El ciberactivismo se convierte en activismo a secas. A cambio, la novedad es difícil de entender. Lo natural en la Red (movimientos formados por grupos variopintos, distribuidos, escurridizos, descabezados y unidos entre sí por lazos cambiantes) resulta extraño fuera, en forma de asambleas que en la práctica han acabado funcionando de forma autónoma. "Han llevado a las plazas lo que es habitual online", dice Freire. "Internet ha sido clave como un instrumento que ha facilitado la coordinación y la producción de contenidos, pero también ha sido clave en la cultura de la gente y en su forma de organizarse". Pero ¿por qué así y por qué ahora? Quizá una de las razones haya que buscarla en las protestas sobre la ley Sinde, que lleva abonando las movilizaciones de Internet en España desde mucho antes de su aprobación. Usando palabras del periodista Juan Varela, la gente "vio que se podía discutir en red". "Eso disparó movimientos como #nolesvotes o Democracia Real Ya que hace dos o tres años no hubieran salido de un ámbito muy pequeño. Pero creo que la pieza clave ha sido Juventud Sin Futuro, que son los que movilizaron a la gente real y tenían experiencia organizativa [fueron promotores de una manifestación anterior mucho más pequeña]". #nolesvotes es un buen ejemplo de cómo funcionan los movimientos modernos. Miembro de la plataforma Democracia Real Ya, fue lanzado hace un centenar de días para pedir el voto de castigo a los partidos que votaron la ley Sinde y, más adelante, a todos los implicados en casos de corrupción. Tiene un inventor (el abogado defensor especializado en Internet Carlos Sánchez Almeida) y media docena de promotores, entre los que se encuentran algunos de los nombres más influyentes de la Red. Pero ahí acaban las referencias convencionales. Su nombre es una etiqueta de Twitter. Su manifiesto se escribió en un documento compartido en una noche. El apoyo de sus 80 grupos regionales se organizó en un día vía Twitter. Su wiki lo montó un voluntario en su servidor. La comunidad creó vídeos, material propagandístico y empezó a usar la etiqueta en las redes sociales de forma espontánea. En las últimas horas se han unido a ellos webs de peso de la red hispana. Sin embargo, "el mérito de salir a la calle es de Democracia Real Ya", explica Ricardo Galli, que además es fundador del agregador Meneame.net. "Aunque #nolesvotes ha ayudado a las protesta, fue uno más de los ejercicios que siguió la gente para aprender a movilizarse en Internet". El momento también ha sido decisivo. Democracia Real Ya ha reconocido su inspiración en las revueltas árabes, que demostraron que utilizar Internet para el cambio político era posible. "Aunque el gran entrenamiento fue la ley Sinde, la gente vio la primavera árabe y descubrió que ya no sería la primera vez. Tienes a la mitad de la gente en Internet, a todos los usuarios en las redes sociales, a los jóvenes con problemas comunes, tienes todas las herramientas y la experiencia usándolas... y la llama prende". 347

Podía haber sucedido de otro modo. "Las redes se basan en modelos que no son predecibles, y eso quiere decir que a veces es difícil saber la causa de las cosas, existe un componente de azar muy importante", justifica Freire. Pero Internet también ha irrumpido en estas elecciones revolucionando la comunicación. Ha sido su medio, como otras veces lo fueron los periódicos o la radio. Desde los grandes digitales como elpais.com hasta pequeños blogs, las páginas con información sobre las protestas han disparado sus visitas por la voracidad de los usuarios. Y además ha sido un medio activo, no solo pasivo. Un ejemplo: un solo usuario que retransmitió el miércoles vídeo en directo desde su móvil en la Puerta del Sol consiguió que 5.000 personas a la vez observaran lo que emitía. Otro ejemplo: la web Actuable logró recoger 150.000 firmas en menos de dos días contra la decisión de la Junta Electoral Central de prohibir las concentraciones ciudadanas. Por mucho que se viera venir, nadie se lo imaginaba hace solo una semana. - http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/traiga/octavillas/elpepusocdmg/20110522elpdmgrep_3/Tes ANÁLISIS: #SPANISHREVOLUTION La democracia soñada LLUÍS BASSETS 22/05/2011 Nada hay más inquietante para los estados mayores políticos que un fenómeno fuera de control y de agenda. No cabe responder con encuestas ni consultar a los expertos y a los focus group. No hay campaña de publicidad que sirva. Ni siquiera se sabe a quién puede beneficiar o quién puede sacar tajada. Todos los partidos temen como al granizo que sean los otros quienes lo aprovechen. El PP dice que lo está organizando el PSOE, y el PSOE asegura que va a contribuir a la abstención y a la victoria del PP. Todos estamos indignados y casi ya no sabemos quiénes son los indignantes. ¿Será al final un solo hombre, un banquero o un presidente de Gobierno por ejemplo? Cuidado, porque si así fuera, se trataría de otra cosa: un chivo expiatorio. Esta indefinición señala una revolución sin sujeto. Si caben los parados y los empresarios, los mileuristas y los profesionales, los revoltosos de hoy y los revoltosos de hace 40 años, entonces es un movimiento que no se identifica con un grupo definible, sino con todos. Es entonces una revolución sin sujeto revolucionario. Pero es una revolución, adjetivada como española y surgida de un mimetismo perfectamente explicable. Si los jóvenes árabes se levantan, ¿por qué no se pueden levantar los jóvenes españoles? Si la democracia se constituye frente a la dictadura, ¿por qué no se puede reconstituir frente al anquilosamiento y la disfuncionalidad? Ahí están los tres elementos del cóctel: un cambio generacional, la tecnología de las redes sociales y la crisis económica que quita trabajos, viviendas y esperanzas. Para que esta revolución tenga objeto necesita unos objetivos tan claros, difíciles pero tangibles como era echar a Ben Ali o a Mubarak. Aquí esto ya se experimentó, de otra forma, aunque su impulso aparece agotado para las nuevas generaciones. Como ha señalado Felipe González, los jóvenes árabes querían votar como nosotros y los nuestros quieren que no se vote. Ahí está la diferencia. Cuando una revolución lo impugna todo, al final pierde foco y no impugna nada. Se queda sin objeto. ¿Cambiar la ley electoral? Muy bien. ¿Que los partidos organicen primarias? Perfecto. ¿Que los corruptos se vayan de la política? 348

Albricias. ¿Más impuestos para los ricos y más servicios sociales para los pobres? ¡Qué bien! ¿Que la crisis no la paguen los de siempre? Más que encomiable. Nada que ver con echar al dictador. Y algunos pequeños problemas de solución difícil. ¿Cómo se hace? ¿Quién prepara y decide todas estas reformas? ¿Cuáles son los reconstituyentes concretos y eficaces para una democracia con síntomas de anemia? La respuesta está bien sintetizada: la democracia real, una forma adjetiva de la democracia que denuncia lo que ahora echamos en falta. No sirve la democracia directa, bellísima en la utopía y en la idealización del ágora griega, pero coartada para la dictadura (véase la república asamblearia de Gadafi). Tampoco la democracia popular que, cuando existió, indicaba exactamente lo contrario: dictadura de un pequeño grupo de burócratas. La democracia real denuncia la idea de una democracia de ficción o virtual, que ya no es efectiva. Pero sería peligroso que toda democracia fuera tachada de ficticia y que se propugnara una democracia arcangélica cuya esencia y sistema de funcionamiento nadie conoce. No tiene sujeto ni objeto, pero sí tiene sentido. La protesta, a pesar de las conspiraciones que quieran imaginar unos u otros, es síntoma y a la vez estímulo. Demuestra la funcionalidad de la indignación y la encauza. Los organizadores, partidarios de la conversación democrática y del combate por medios pacíficos, ejercen sus derechos de manifestación y de expresión. Quieren perfeccionar el sistema aunque tengan la apariencia de atacar al sistema. Hacen política en estado puro aunque se la tache de antipolítica. Sus protagonistas quieren rentabilizar el malestar y la desafección. Y pueden estar satisfechos, porque ya lo han conseguido. El foco del último tramo de la campaña electoral ha sido entero para ellos. Pero la respuesta a los numerosos interrogantes que plantean deben responderla antes y después de las elecciones los dirigentes y los partidos políticos. La democracia real es la que tenemos. No hay otra. El sueño debe ser que funcione y que funcione bien, a satisfacción, si no de todos, de cuantos más mejor. Para cambiarla solo hay un método: no se conoce otro. Como dice el tópico, el menos malo de todos los sistemas, aunque se halle en crisis. Se trata precisamente de la democracia representativa: escogemos de vez en cuando a unos representantes que se organizan en partidos para gobernar y legislar. Debemos elegirlos con más tiento y someterlos a mayor control y escrutinio, en vez de dejarlos sueltos, es verdad. Pero ellos son los que pueden cambiar esas cosas que no nos gustan: la ley electoral, las primarias, los impuestos, el Estado de bienestar. Para que lo puedan hacer, finalmente, hay que votarles. - http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/democracia/sonada/elpepusocdmg/20110522e lpdmgrep_5/Tes LLUÍS BASSETS La elipsis saudí LLUÍS BASSETS 22/05/2011 Los silencios pueden ser más valiosos que las palabras. En el segundo discurso de Barack Obama sobre la nueva política árabe de Estados Unidos no hubo ni una sola mención a Arabia Saudí, país crucial en el mapa dinámico de esta amplia región sometida desde hace cinco meses a un terremoto geopolítico. 349

Hubo advertencias al presidente sirio, Bachar el Asad, para que lidere la transición o se vaya. Las hubo también para Yemen y Bahréin, el pequeño emirato donde las tropas saudíes han actuado como el ejército soviético en los países satélites durante la guerra fría. Uno de los tramos más solemnes del discurso fue para palestinos e israelíes, advertidos severamente para que dejen de echarse los trastos a la cabeza en vez de sentarse a negociar la paz y el reconocimiento mutuo de los dos Estados soberanos, viables y seguros para cada uno de los dos pueblos. Pero no hubo ni una sola palabra para la autocracia saudí, régimen corrupto y cruel donde los haya, financiador durante décadas de las corrientes más reaccionarias y peligrosas del islam y patria de Osama Bin Laden, el emir del megaterrorismo que organizó Al Qaeda en reacción precisamente a la estrecha alianza histórica entre su país y Estados Unidos. Arabia Saudí tiene todos los motivos para enemistarse con Obama e incluso está organizando discretamente una alternativa a las revoluciones árabes. Su extensa familia real quedó traumatizada con la caída de Mubarak, de la que dedujeron que no podían seguir confiando en el apoyo de Washington. Los saudíes están tan apegados al statu quo como la derecha israelí, y por eso les produce urticaria el mensaje de simpatía de Obama con las revoluciones democráticas y su idea de que precisamente este statu quo es insostenible. El silencio de Obama refleja cuánto queda de la alianza entre Washington y Riad, rubricada por Franklin D. Roosevelt y el fundador del reino, Abdelaziz Ibn Saud, en 1945, en un célebre encuentro en el crucero USS Quincy anclado en el canal de Suez. El acuerdo ha dejado las manos libres a los déspotas saudíes en la península arábiga durante estos 65 años a cambio de la garantía sobre el suministro y el precio mundial del petróleo. El espacio vacío que ocupó Arabia Saudí en el discurso de Obama es la gran novedad de esta nueva política exterior de la Casa Blanca, que todavía no ha podido articular una sola palabra respecto al principal muro conservador y modelo de todos los males que han padecido los países árabes durante los últimos 70 años. La elipsis en algunos casos equivale al máximo significado: también con el silencio se amenaza. Pero en otras indica la incapacidad para formular una sola idea. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/elipsis/saudi/elpepusocdgm/20110522elpdmgpa n_6/Tes JAN MARTÍNEZ AHRENS Me bajo en Sol JAN MARTÍNEZ AHRENS 22/05/2011 Arranquemos con un problema matemático. Todos sabemos que bajo el asfalto de la Puerta del Sol no se oculta ninguna playa. Sólo una estación de metro, profunda y vertiginosa, de la que salen diariamente miles de personas. Si a este gentío anónimo se le aplica no ya la metáfora sino la estadística, resulta que aproximadamente un tercio de los que suben las escalerillas son jóvenes, de los cuales uno de cada tres no tiene trabajo y del resto, más de la mitad ocupa un empleo temporal o precario muy por debajo de sus posibilidades y títulos. Vistas así las cosas, viene la pregunta: ¿cuántos de esos desempleados y mileuristas cree usted que, al llegar

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a la superficie, querrán sumarse a una concentración pacífica, formada por sus iguales y que pide, no una playa, sino un empleo digno y un ambiente político más respirable? La respuesta a la incógnita da la medida del éxito de la autodenominada #spanishrevolution, ese movimiento que, en menos de una semana, ha logrado hacerse con las simpatías de cientos de miles de personas y arrebatar el relato de la actualidad a la política tradicional. Unos partidos enfrascados en una campaña extremadamente aburrida y que hoy se resuelve sin haber atendido a la reflexión fundamental que, apartando toda la hojarasca, se les ha planteado desde el kilómetro 0. A saber: ¿por qué la generación mejor preparada de la historia siente que ha perdido el tren? Sea cual sea el resultado electoral, los balbuceos de la mayoría de los partidos frente a esta cuestión, oscilantes entre el temor y la aversión, han dejado en evidencia algunas de sus deficiencias. Quizá la más patente, pero en la que pocos han reparado, es que ninguno de los grandes dirigentes habituados a encontrar maravillosas playas en lugares insospechados, ha tenido el valor (ni siquiera metafórico) de coger el metro, bajar en la estación Sol, subir las escalerillas, mirar a su alrededor y pararse a hablar con los contestatarios. La única respuesta oficial que han recibido los acampados ha procedido paradójicamente de la Junta Electoral Central. Y no deja de ser discutible, porque, como señala la propia doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional, extender el carácter de acto de campaña a todo aquello que pueda incidir en la voluntad de los votantes y someterlo a las restricciones de la legislación electoral implica, a la postre, abrir una puerta a que en periodo de elecciones se prohíba toda manifestación ideológica que no sea la efectuada por candidatos y partidos. Es decir, impone una mordaza a la expresión política de la sociedad civil. La suerte, de todos modos, ya está echada. Y el ganador ha sido el Movimiento del 15- M. Ahora falta ver en qué queda esta ola y si sobrevivirá al 22-M. En Portugal, donde en marzo pasado surgió el precedente más claro, un colectivo similar ha cristalizado en una estructura sólida (M12M) que se ha puesto como objetivo volver a salir a la calle en las elecciones del 5 de junio. Posiblemente otro tanto ocurra aquí con las elecciones generales. Veremos. Pero sea lo que sea, la #spanishrevolution habrá tenido la facultad de descubrir a mucha gente que en otras épocas fue utópica también, que bajo el asfalto de la Puerta del Sol no había ninguna playa tropical, cierto, sino una estación de metro poblada de desempleados y mileuristas indignados, capaces de subir las escalerillas para exigir un futuro mejor. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Sol/elpepusocdgm/20110522elpdmgpan_5/Tes

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Política El movimiento 15-M acampará una semana más en Sol Miles de personas abarrotan plazas en numerosas ciudades de España La policía no disolverá Vídeo: Lo que mueve el 15-M Los expatriados también se indignan Inés Santaeulalia / Samira Saleh / Miguel González Madrid 22 MAY 2011 - 00:03 CET1657

Un grupo de personas, este mediodía, en Sol / CRISTÓBAL MANUEL 7.941 El movimiento 15-M no desmantelará sus campamentos esta noche como estaba previsto. La asamblea de la concentración de la Plaza del Sol en Madrid ha decidio permanecer, de momento, una semana más. El sábado que viene votarán en los barrios y el próximo domingo volverán a decidir qué hacer. A mediodía ha comenzado la asamblea de Sol. Todas las comisiones coincidían en continuar más allá de este domingo. Lo que había que votar, por tanto, era alguna de las tres opciones mayoritarias que estas habían planteado: continuar una semana como mínimo; permanecer hasta articular el movimiento y conseguir un cambio social real o hasta fijar unos objetivos concretos. Finalmente la acampada se prolongará otros siete días más. El movimiento 15-M sigue demostrando las fuerzas horas después de que se hayan abierto las urnas para las elecciones municipales y autonómicas. Tras una jornada de reflexión marcada por actividades lúdicas y simbólicas en las zonas donde los manifestantes están concentrados desde el lunes, miles de personas en toda España

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siguen en las palzas para exigir “democracia real”. El 22-M se desarrolla bajo el síndrome del 15-M. Aunque ayer los acampados de Barcelona ya decidieron continuar la concentración hasta mediados de junio, hoy los manifestantes del resto de ciudades de España han pedido a Sol que antes de adoptar una decisión esperen a lo que voten el resto. "La revolución tiene que ser de todos", les han recordado. Algo que ha sido recibido con aplausos desde el Kilómetro 0. En Valencia, los indignados de la Plaza del Ayuntamiento están invitando a acudir a las urnas con camisetas del movimiento 15-M bajo el lema: "Nuestros sueños no acaban en sus urnas. 15-M". A las 12 y a las 17 harán performances sobre los políticos. La concentración

Cadena humana ante el Ayuntamiento de Valencia / EFE Los políticos que ya han acudido a votar no han podido eludir las cuestiones sobre el efecto que el movimiento 15-M puede tener en los resultados electorales. El presidente del Gobierno ha pasado de puntillas y ha recalcado que los ciudadanos expresan el voto libre e individualmente y que "esta es la grandeza de la democracia". El líder de la oposición Mariano Rajoy no se ha referido directamente a las reivindicaciones de los concentrados pero sí ha puntualizado que "lo más importante que tiene una persona "lo más importante que tiene una persona a la hora de decidir los asuntos generales que les afectan es el voto" porque es "donde el ciudadano da confianza y donde la quita". El ministro de Justicia, Francisco Caamaño ha depositado su voto esta mañana en el municipio coruñés de Padrón y ha expresado su respeto "como demócrata" por las concentraciones del movimiento 15-M durante la jornada electoral. Las concentraciones en toda españa se están conviertiendo en un espacio lúdico. En Valencia los niños asumen el lenguaje del movimiento 15-M. Uno que tenía sed ha dicho: "Vamos a por agua, viva la revolución", informa Pablo Ferri. En la Plaza de 353

Cataluña, en Barcelona, decenas de críos bailan en un espectáculo infantil. Antes ha habido chocolatada, informa Rebeca Carranco.

Alejandro cambia el cartel de la plaza del ayuntamiento valenciano / JACOBO MÉNDEZ DÍEZ Sábado de "reflexión" El vicepresidente primero del Gobierno y ministro del Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, se reunió el sábado por la mañana con la cúpula de las Fuerzas de Seguridad y constataron el desarrollo pacífico de las concentraciones y la actuación correcta de la policía, que se ha limitado hasta ahora a vigilar, pero sin desalojar a los manifestantes. Los agentes incluso han confraternizado con los manifestantes, que esta mañana en Sol les han servido chocolate con churros. En la Puerta del Sol de Madrid el día de ayer arrancó activo que los anteriores con una completa agenda de actividades, en la que se incluyen dos pasacalles, un concierto y talleres de payasos, 354

Miles de personas habían dormido en tiendas de campaña. Los manifestantes ocuparon prácticamente toda la plaza tras una noche “tranquila”, según la califican los responsables de la recién creada “comisión de respeto” del Movimiento 15-M. Un total de 12 personas tuvieron que ser atendidas por el Samur, principalmente por lipotimias y mareos. Los servicios de limpieza destacan que las aceras están “tres veces más limpias” que cualquier fin de semana en el que se practica botellón. Ya el día de reflexión por la mañana, cuando la gente se ha levantado, la actividad ha sido muy viva. Tras las primeras actividades, los concentrados han celebrado una asamblea desde la una de la tarde, en la que se ha recordado que no debe haber consignas políticas. Los acampados intercambian ideas en un escenario que quieren que sea lo más alegre posible, y han decidido teñir de amarillo los carteles y llevar ropa de ese color. Poco a poco mejoran su organización y se definen como una "Ciudad-Estado con vocación de permanencia, dispuesta a pervivir más allá del 22 de mayo", según uno de sus portavoces. Para hermanarse con el resto de concentrados en España, los acampados en Sol han extendido un lienzo sobre un quiosco de prensa para proyectar imágenes de la situación de las plazas de otras ciudades. Los organizadores han recibido más de 300 peticiones desde España y otros países para ampliar sus dominios tomalaplaza.net, informa Carmen Pérez- Lanzac. En Valencia, la asamblea celebrada a última hora de la tarde de ayer en la plaza del Ayuntamiento fue la más numerosa de los últimos días. Los asistentes rebasaron la isleta central de la plaza (4.000 metros cuadrados) y cortaron el tráfico de algunos de los carriles circundantes debido a la gran afluencia gente concentrada, informa Pablo Ferri. Los simpatizantes del Movimiento 15-M acampados en las ciudades andaluzas han celebrado durante el sábado actos simbólicos y actividades culturales, en una jornada en la que se han acercado multitud de personas a interesarse por sus reivindicaciones, informa EFE. El movimiento 15 de Mayo "no tiene intención de hablar de votos ni de nada que distraiga" el día de reflexión, pero sí ha invitado a los ciudadanos de "todas las ideologías" a informarse de sus reivindicaciones, ha explicado uno de sus portavoces en Sevilla. Lo mismo ha ocurrido en Barcelona, donde miles de personas participaban por la tarde en una asamblea en la plaza Catalunya de Barcelona, mientras familias con niños y turistas incluían la visita a los "indignados" en sus paseos del día de reflexión, cuenta Rebeca Carranco. Los centenares de concentrados han debatido hoy sobre si ir o no a votar mañana, hacerlo en blanco o emitir un voto nulo, y otros se han preguntado: ¿y el lunes qué?. También se han planteado propuestas como retirar el dinero de los bancos tradicionales, promover una democracia asamblearia o que los países deudores devuelvan al Fondo Monetario Internacional el capital prestado, pero no los intereses. En otras ciudades españolas, este ha sido el balance de las protestas durante la jornada de reflexión: ZARAGOZA Cientos de personas han alzado por la tarde sus paraguas en la Plaza del Pilar de la capital como símbolo de resistencia ante la que "está cayendo" y para exigir cambios en la política española, con lemas irónicos como "estamos reflexionando". 355

ALICANTE Los "indignados" que han participado en las asambleas de la concentración de la Plaza de la Montañeta han tratado de evitar tratar asuntos políticos para respetar la jornada de reflexión, aunque sí han hablado sobre educación, sanidad o cualquier otro asunto que se propusiera no directamente relacionado con el 22-M. Por su parte, los alrededor de 120 "indignados" que ocupaban la pasada medianoche la plaza de España de Alcoy desmantelaron el campamento esta madrugada después de que la Policía Nacional les advirtiera de una posible multa de 6.000 euros. MURCIA En la Plaza de La Glorieta de España, protegidos del calor por toldos, medio centenar de personas han permanecido concentradas y han comentado que no piensan retirar su acampada pese a la decisión de la Junta Electoral Central porque, según ellos, están haciendo lo que toca: reflexionar. BILBAO En Bilbao no había convocada asamblea, pero a las ocho de la tarde, como en días anteriores, cerca de 3.000 personas se concentraron frente al Teatro Arriaga. Durante toda la jornada, cientos de ciudadanos indignados tomaron parte en los talleres organizados para mantener viva una acampada que ganó color con la colocación de nuevas pancartas, informa Karim Asrhi. OVIEDO En la Plaza de La Escandalera, donde se acumulan pancartas con lemas como "No tenemos miedo a las utopías" o "No somos antisistemas sino cambiasistemas", se han celebrado asambleas sobre diversos temas del manifiesto promovido por la plataforma cívica "Democracia real ya" y se ha recordado que quienes quieran sumarse eviten consumir alcohol o drogas en la zona. LEÓN Un centenar de personas mantienen la acampada del Movimiento 15-M en la Plaza de Botines, donde se han llevado a cabo talleres de teatro o de percusión y una charla sobre cultura libre, respetando la jornada de reflexión sin hacer referencias a las elecciones. TARRAGONA Integrantes de los colectivos AcampadaTarragona y "Democracia real ya" se han mantenido concentrados en la Plaza de la Font, tras pasar la noche allí, muy cerca de los expositores de la Feria de Comercio Justo y la Banca Ética que se celebra en el mismo emplazamiento, y han exhibido pancartas con lemas como "Quédate, hay que mover el mundo". PAMPLONA Los concentrados en la Plaza del Castillo, después de que ayer se trasladaran desde la Plaza Consistorial, han conseguido hasta el momento 4.000 firmas de apoyo al manifiesto "Democracia real ya" y, durante la jornada de reflexión, su iniciativa ha continuado con normalidad y a la espera de unirse a la posible celebración esta noche de un triunfo del equipo de fútbol del Osasuna. SAN SEBASTIÁN

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Los centenares de acampados en el Boulevard han organizado una cadena humana, talleres infantiles y monólogos denominados "Club de una comedia", y sus organizadores han insistido en que no quieren que este movimiento se quede solo "en palabras y discursos", ya que su planteamiento es "avanzar hacia algún lugar, no quejarnos". VITORIA Una "oleada amarilla" de indignados han paseado esta tarde por la capital vasca para protestar de forma pacífica por la actual situación política y económica y "promover una reflexión razonada y responsable a favor del voto consciente y consecuente". En la Virgen Blanca de Vitoria se dieron cita más de 1.500 personas que previamente habían participado en una manifestación improvisada que, ante la advertencia de la Ertzaintza sobre posibles denuncias, acabó reconvertida en paseo. CÁDIZ En la Plaza del Palillero se han retirado hoy todos los carteles que colgaban de las paredes en un gesto de respeto a la jornada de reflexión, y está prevista por la tarde una manifestación "sin banderas". PALENCIA Una veintena de personas han permanecido acampadas y reflexionando en corros en la Plaza Mayor, mientras que en la localidad de Aguilar de Campoo abandonaron la concentración tras recibir información sobre su prohibición pro parte de la Guardia Civil. ÁVILA Los "indignados" continúan en la Plaza de Santa Teresa, pegados a la muralla, donde una treintena de personas han portado carteles señalando: "No me molestes, estoy reflexionando", "Esta democracia es nuestra desgracia" o "Más educación y menos corrupción". GALICIA En Galicia, los actos lúdicos y la ausencia de incidencias caracterizaron las acampadas de indignados. La participación bajó significativamente con respecto al momento de mayor afluencia, el viernes por la tarde, cuando se concentraron más de 3.000 personas. Los principales focos fueron Vigo, Santiago, A Coruña y Ferrol, donde el movimiento va creciendo desde el jueves, cuando acamparon por primera vez. En la plaza del Obradoiro compostelana, los organizadores prepararon un día lleno de actividades festivas: expresión corporal, conciertos, payasos y magos se intercalaron en los “espacios de reflexión”, en los que los asistentes no pedían el voto para ningún partido. En Santiago, la relación con la policía fue incluso “cordial”, según algunos jóvenes que pasaron allí la noche del viernes. Ni siquiera hubo una notificación oficial de desalojo por parte de los pocos agentes que vigilaron la concentración. En otras ciudades la policía sí les informó sobre la prohibición de estas reuniones. PALMA DE MALLORCA Los acampados en la Plaza de España han dedicado la jornada de reflexión a definir cómo mantendrán la actividad reivindicativa más allá del 22-M, han detallado más su organización para asegurarse la continuidad del movimiento y se han celebrado actuaciones de grupos musicales. 357

LAS PALMAS DE GRAN CANARIA Un centenar de personas pasan la jornada de reflexión en el parque de San Telmo, donde hoy han mejorado su infraestructura, ampliando la zona destinada a alimentación e información a los ciudadanos y han establecido una guardería para los niños de quienes se unen a la protesta. SANTA CRUZ DE TENERIFE Unos 500 acampados en la Plaza de la Candelaria han participado en una asamblea, seguida de una concentración silenciosa, para decidir el futuro de esta "carrera de fondo", como la definía uno de los jóvenes, mientras se consolida el funcionamiento de sus nuevas comisiones -jurídica, logística, de textos, acción, prensa y difusión- y se estrena su sistema de guardería infantil. CUENCA A la acampada de la Plaza de la Hispanidad se ha sumado una cadena de más de 200 personas, sobre todo jóvenes, que recorre el centro de la ciudad con la boca tapada con esparadrapo y un folio en el pecho en el que se lee "estoy reflexionando". http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/05/20/actualidad/1305920877_763863.html

Política La ola de protestas sacude el 22-M España elige 70.000 cargos públicos en medio de las movilizaciones Carmen Pérez-Lanzac / Pablo Guimón Madrid 22 MAY 2011 - 09:39 CET86

Aspecto de la Puerta del Sol durante la tarde del sábado. / SAMUEL SÁNCHEZ 353 España acude a votar dividida en dos planos políticos. En el primer plano, el oficial, los políticos profesionales se enredan en discusiones sobre si las espontáneas concentraciones que han llenado las plazas de toda España son legales o no. El Gobierno supervisaba el sábado las concentraciones prohibidas el viernes por la Junta Electoral Central. Interior ha confirmado que no se produjo ningún incidente durante las concentraciones celebradas la noche del viernes, en las que calcula que participaron unas 58.000 personas. A las nueve de la mañana han abierto los colegios electorales. El vicepresidente primero y ministro del Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, se reunió en la mañana del sábado con la cúpula de su departamento para analizar las concentraciones y el dispositivo policial desplegado para garantizar el orden público. Los efectivos desplegados para el 22-M, precisó Rubalcaba, son los mismos que durante cualquier jornada electoral. El Cuerpo Nacional de Policía recibió el viernes la consigna 358

de no desalojar las concentraciones de la Puerta del Sol ni las de las demás ciudades españolas mientras no se produjeran incidentes. Los políticos profesionales se enredan en discusiones sobre si las concentraciones son legales o no El Tribunal Supremo rechazó un recurso al veto de las concentraciones interpuesto por Izquierda Unida, que el sábado elevó un recurso de amparo al Constitucional. Líderes de los partidos estudian si la protesta favorecerá a unos o a otros, si la policía debería o no desalojarlos. Y algunos tratan torpemente de apuntarse a un discurso cuyo origen no parecen capaces de comprender. Un discurso común Miles de ciudadanos ponen en común sus quejas y propuestas en asambleas ciudadanas y tratan de elaborar un discurso común Y mientras tanto, en el otro plano político, aquel cuyo epicentro está en el kilómetro cero de la capital, miles de ciudadanos ponen en común sus quejas y propuestas en asambleas ciudadanas, en comisiones y subcomisiones, y tratan con paciencia de elaborar un discurso común. Con sus propias reglas de juego, que van creando sobre la marcha. Sin jerarquías, de manera horizontal. Sol vive prácticamente ajeno a las discusiones de unos políticos que consideran que no les representan. Que no han sabido gobernar para ellos, la generación mejor preparada de la historia abocada a un horizonte deprimente. ¿Que la Junta Electoral declara ilegal la concentración? Pues los concentrados declaran ilegal la Junta. Cualquiera que se haya paseado esta semana por Sol comprende que el propio debate sobre si habría que haberlo desalojado o no es absurdo. ¿Que la Junta Electoral declara ilegal la concentración?Pues los concentrados declaran ilegal la Junta “Necesitamos un fluorescente de 58 watios”. “Diego, de la comisión de Respeto, que vaya al punto de encuentro de Respeto”. Los mensajes se suceden por la megafonía. ¿Hace falta gasolina para el generador? Se crea una comisión para conseguirla. Los concentrados reparten crema solar, botellines de agua. La comisión de Alimentación no da abasto con todas las donaciones de comida. Los niños juegan en la zona de guardería. En la biblioteca, llena de prensa y libros, la gente descansa leyendo en los sofás. “Aquí se puede”, reza el cartel, “leer el periódico y contrastar información, sentarse a leer y reflexionar”. Así se vive la jornada de reflexión en Sol. Los servicios de limpieza municipales destacaban este sábado que las aceras están “tres veces más limpias” que cualquier fin de semana en el que se practica botellón. Esto, en palabras de unos de los portavoces, es una “Ciudad-Estado con vocación de permanencia, dispuesta a pervivir más allá del 22 de mayo”. Lejos de debilitarse, el organismo vivo de Sol no deja crecer y de generar más información y cambios Lejos de debilitarse, tras una semana de insolaciones, lluvia y falta de sueño, el organismo vivo que forman los acampados de Sol no deja crecer y de generar más información y cambios de los que ellos mismos son capaces de digerir. No hay nadie que tenga una visión de conjunto. Hacer una puesta a punto de lo que está sucediendo bajo la mirada de miles de curiosos requiere ir -una por una- a todas las ya célebres

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comisiones en las que se han organizado los acampados y que, como las ramas de un árbol hiperactivo, no paran de multiplicarse y crecer. De estas comisiones, que quieren canalizar el debate de los temas que preocupan a los simpatizantes de este movimiento, depende la continuidad de este revulsivo colectivo en que se ha convertido Sol. A la veintena ya existente, en las últimas horas se han sumado los grupos de Pymes, Lenguaje y Pensamiento, Exterior o Inem. Pero cuando lean estas líneas habrá surgido alguna nueva. El sábado por la tarde las asambleas se extendían ya por las plazas adyacentes a Sol. Al menos se celebró una docena, de hasta 500 personas cada una. En las Descalzas, los integrantes de la comisión de Política a Corto Plazo debatieron sobre la necesidad de limitar los cargos políticos a 12 o 16 años. En otra plaza, los de Educación intentaban generar propuestas para mejorar la calidad de la enseñanza. En la plaza de Pontejos, los que se han apuntado al grupo de Política a Largo Plazo intentaron encontrar vías para desarrollar asambleas de barrio. Esta comisión ha convocado asambleas de vecinos en todos los barrios de Madrid para el próximo sábado 28 a las 12.00. Y el domingo 29 se invita a representantes de todas estas asambleas a participar en una Asamblea del Pueblo de Madrid que, por supuesto, también se ha acordado celebrar en Sol, a las 12.00.

Extender el movimiento La concentración no vulnera la legislación electoral porque prevalece el derecho de reunión y manifestación Eric Sanz de Bremond, abogado Que los acampados quieren tener una vida más allá de esta semana no lo duda ya nadie. El sábado, además de crear una secretaría que centralizará toda la información que genere este movimiento, la organización ultimaba la creación de una web en la que todas las comisiones puedan poner sus avances y propuestas en común (se baraja bautizarla Tu voz en la calle). Los acampados en Madrid también están intentando tejer lazos con el resto de los acampados de otras ciudades. “¿Conoces a organizadores de las demás acampadas? ¿Nos puedes dar su contacto?”, se lee en un folio de los muchos que cuelgan por los diversos puestos. La cuestión política, de la que llevan toda la semana intentando desvincularse, es otra de las grandes dudas de cara al futuro del movimiento. La comisión legal, que consta de 40 miembros activos (estudiantes de derecho y abogados en activo que simpatizan con la causa), ha logrado mantener al movimiento alejado de posibles demandas y han elaborado un discurso colectivo para explicar por qué, a pesar de la resolución de la Junta Electoral, miles de personas han optado por seguir reunidos en Sol. Lo explica Eric Sanz de Bremond, especialista en derecho penal, que estaba de guardia el sábado en la acampada: “Nosotros entendemos que la concentración no vulnera la legislación electoral porque prevalece el derecho de reunión y manifestación. La Junta Electoral Central no tiene competencia para limitar el derecho a participar en la vida pública y porque con nuestra convocatoria precisamente estamos invitando a la reflexión colectiva”. Unas de las dudas que quedan abiertas es si el movimiento aprovechará la simpatía que ha despertado para erigirse en organismo político o asociación. Sanz niega la mayor:

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“Ya tenemos entidad: somos una gran asamblea, eso es lo que somos”. El sábado sus integrantes debatían si pronunciarse de forma colectiva el 22-M, cuando se sepan los resultados electorales. “De momento va ganando el no”, explica Juan Cobo, uno de los portavoces. MÁS INFORMACIÓN ¿Qué quiere Sol? La República del Sol reflexiona ¿Y después de Sol? "Somos apartidistas" Fotogalería: Las imágenes de las protestas Que los acampados han ganado simpatías en todas España es un hecho. Sus dominios tomalaplaza.net y takethesquare.net ya han recibido 300 solicitudes de adhesión desde otras ciudades españolas así como desde el extranjero, con simpatizantes en Leeds (Gran Bretaña), Copenhague (Dinamarca) o Vancouver (Canadá). Internet ha sido una de las claves del movimiento 15-M, que está intentando centralizar toda la información que están generando. El departamento de información y documentación ya cuenta con cuatro terabytes de archivos almacenados. Pero sin duda, quienes más trabajo han tenido en los últimos días han sido los voluntarios de la comisión de Respeto (que antes se llamaban de Seguridad). Ellos son los encargados de que no se celebren botellones que desvirtúen a todos los acampados, de que el tráfico que atraviesa Sol pueda seguir su curso sin atropellar a nadie y de que no haya pancartas partidistas que se adueñen de una movilización que no quiere tener dueño. http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/05/21/actualidad/1306009412_323114.html

Mensaje desde la Puerta del Sol MOKHTAR ATITAR | 21-05-2011 Una cámara polaroid; un rotulador; y un mensaje desde la acampada en la Puerta de Sol.

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El Roto 21 - 05 - 2011 El Roto 20 - 05 - 2011 El Roto 18 - 05 - 2011

El Roto 17 - 05 - 2011 El Roto 16 - 05 - 2011 El Roto 15 - 05 - 2011

El Roto 09 - 05 - 2011 El Roto 14 - 05 - 2011 El Roto 13 - 05 - 2011

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How corruption, cuts and despair drove Spain's protesters on to the streets Young protesters in Madrid and beyond have many different demands, but they are united in opposing the government

Giles Tremlett in Madrid guardian.co.uk, Saturday 21 May 2011 12.59 BST

Protesters in Madrid's Puerta del Sol square, where around 25,000 defied a ban on demonstrations before elections on 21 May. Photograph: Pedro Armestre/AFP/Getty The arrival of the table, a battered piece of Formica bashed on top of four rough, oversized legs, raised a cry of joy. Never mind that anyone on a normal chair would barely be able to see over the top – here was another small triumph of the new Spanish revolution, the gathering of angry Spaniards of all colours, ages and persuasions that is sweeping across the country and beyond its borders. The table that arrived in Madrid's Puerta del Sol square was part of the swirl of creative chaos, naive enthusiasm and pent-up frustration that has transformed it into a makeshift camp for thousand of protesters who call themselves los indignados, the indignant ones. Tents and mattresses, armchairs and sofas, a canteen, portable toilets and solar panels have sprung up in a remarkable display of organisational prowess. And the mass of people jostling around, each pursuing their own dream or demand, or just watching others doing the same, seemed more like something transported from the Arab spring in north Africa than from Europe. As the protests continued to swell on Friday, with 60,000 people defying authorities to obey the campaign's "Take over the square!" slogan in dozens of Spanish cities, and with copycat demonstrations across Europe, the question was whether this was the new

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May 1968 – a youth-led popular revolt against an establishment deemed to have failed an entire generation. Esther Gutiérrez, an elfin 26-year-old, wandered through the crowd with a battered shopping cart full of fruit. "We've got so much food we don't know what to do with it. People just bring it to us for free and it's wonderful stuff," she said. "We want real democracy. Not just freedom for bankers. You're not from the Spanish press, are you? We don't speak to them." Cynical and ingenuous by turns, the Madrid protesters and those who refused to budge from the city squares have torn up the rule book of Spanish public politics. The heavyweights of old – political parties, trade unions and media commentators – are not wanted here. "I was sacked when the Madrid regional government closed down a women's centre last year when it imposed cuts," explained Beatriz García as she bashed a small frying pan with a wooden spoon. "The unions didn't even bother to turn up." The political parties were worse still, she said. "There is no renovation. There is nothing new or different, just two parties who take it in turn to govern because our electoral laws favour them." Just a week ago the Spanish had seemed stoical about one of the most depressing eras in recent economic history. Despite unemployment hitting 21% – rising to 41% for the young – widespread spending cuts and a socialist government bound to obey the diktats of Germany's chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the financial markets, they had refused to show their pain. Marches, sit-ins or riots were for the French – or British students. The real drama, anyway, was in north Africa. Spaniards stayed at home. All that changed as demonstrations organised via Facebook and Twitter became static protests in city squares, mushrooming into something that caught politicians, unions and the media by surprise. While journalists were following the dull routine of campaigning for Sunday's municipal and regional elections, the steam was beginning to escape from a pressure cooker of discontent. Many Spaniards had told pollsters they were tired of the same well-known political faces – especially those who were due to be re-elected despite being mired in corruption scandals. Politicians have rarely been held in such disregard, with the prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, and opposition leader, Mariano Rajoy, of the conservative People's party, rating lowest. Rajoy seems set to take over after a general election next March. When police evicted the Madrid demonstrators on Tuesday morning, they came back in even greater numbers later that day. By Friday night authorities had lost the battle to impose rules banning public politics on the day before elections. Police could only look on. "Join us, police officers!" the demonstrators shouted. By the early hours of Friday, it was already elbow-room only in the Puerta del Sol – the square which prides itself on being Spain's "kilometre zero", the spot from which all other distances are measured. On the statue of King Carlos III, somebody had pinned a sign that read: "We are anti- idiots, not anti-politicians." Other placards read: "We aren't against the system, we want to change it", "Democracy, a daily fight", and "Take your money out of the bank!"

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"We've brought tents, food and even Trivial Pursuit to keep us entertained," said Pablo Cantó, a 23-year-old journalism student. Like many younger protesters, and the movement as a whole, he had trouble expressing exactly why he was here. "We want change," he said. "Things just can't carry on as they are." The heavy clouds of cannabis smoke suggested others had brought their own form of entertainment. "I've been protesting for decades," said 60-year-old schoolteacher Rosa Marín. "I'm glad to see so many young people here. The questions is this: Is this another May 1968, or are they just here for the party?" A gang of drunken skinheads, mindlessly chanting football terrace slogans, were there for the latter. But a neat, disciplined circle of people intently debating social reform showed many were here in earnest. They took turns to stand up and make their proposals, the audience listening and using the sign language applause of the deaf – by shaking their hands above their heads – to show approval without drowning the speakers out. The proposals, due to make their way through a laborious process of committees, working parties and general assemblies, varied from calls for less spending on the military to helping businesses. "Because it is not just money for the owners. They are the ones who give people like us jobs," said one young man wearing combat-print shorts. For some younger protesters, it was a political baptism. "I don't know what will come out of this, but it is enough just to show everyone how upset we are," explained Javier de Coca by phone from the protest camp in Barcelona's Plaza de Catalunya, where there was a surprising absence of the nationalist or separatist symbols of protest movements in recent years. "It's as if they've realised they have more serious problems to deal with," said one protester. One of those problems is youth unemployment. On a wall beside the tarpaulin-covered command centre in what some were calling Madrid's "Republic of Sol" – home to a press office, an infirmary and a legal centre – a list of needs had been pinned up. Toilet paper and food were scratched off the list. Bookshelves, wood, rubber gloves and bottles of cooking gas were on it. Volunteers were needed for a crèche. "We process the proposals and try to turn them into something that makes legal sense," explained a volunteer at the legal centre. However, the open assemblies are painfully slow. Some last for hours, as everybody is given their turn to speak. After almost a week of protests, the demonstrators have failed to come up with a coherent set of demands. Electoral reform to end the two-party system and action to punish corrupt politicians and limit their privileges were the main areas of agreement. So is the Arab spring spreading to southern Europe? "You can't really compare us to people who were risking their lives by protesting," said 23-year-old computer engineer Jaime Viyuela. "But yes, you can say that we are inspired by the courage of the Arab spring." http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/21/spain-reveals-pain-cuts-unemployment/print 365

Middle East May 21, 2011 Promise of Arab Uprisings Is Threatened by Divisions By ANTHONY SHADID and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK BEIRUT, Lebanon — The revolutions and revolts in the Arab world, playing out over just a few months across two continents, have proved so inspirational to so many because they offer a new sense of national identity built on the idea of citizenship.

Khaled Elfiqi/European Pressphoto Agency Egyptian protesters displayed giant flags, one representing all Arab countries, during a unity rally in Cairo's Tahrir Square on May 13. But in the past weeks, the specter of divisions — religion in Egypt, fundamentalism in Tunisia, sect in Syria and Bahrain, clan in Libya — has threatened uprisings that once seemed to promise to resolve questions that have vexed the Arab world since the colonialism era. From the fetid alleys of Imbaba, the Cairo neighborhood where Muslims and Christians have fought street battles, to the Syrian countryside, where a particularly deadly crackdown has raised fears of sectarian score-settling, the question of identity may help determine whether the Arab Spring flowers or withers. Can the revolts forge alternative ways to cope with the Arab world’s variety of clans, sects, ethnicities and religions? The old examples have been largely of failure: the rule of strongmen in Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen; a fragile equilibrium of fractious communities in Lebanon and Iraq; the repressive paternalism of the Persian Gulf, where oil revenues are used to buy loyalty.

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“I think the revolutions in a way, in a distant way, are hoping to retrieve” this sense of national identity, said Sadiq al-Azm, a prominent Syrian intellectual living in Beirut. “The costs otherwise would be disintegration, strife and civil war,” Mr. Azm said. “And this was very clear in Iraq.” In an arc of revolts and revolution, that idea of a broader citizenship is being tested as the enforced silence of repression gives way to the cacophony of diversity. Security and stability were the justification that strongmen in the Arab world offered for repression, often with the sanction of the United States; the essence of the protests in the Arab Spring is that people can imagine an alternative. But even activists admit that the region so far has no model that enshrines diversity and tolerance without breaking down along more divisive identities. In Tunisia, a relatively homogenous country with a well-educated population, fault lines have emerged between the secular-minded coasts and the more religious and traditional inland. The tensions shook the nascent revolution there this month when a former interim interior minister, Farhat Rajhi, suggested in an online interview that the coastal elite, long dominant in the government, would never accept an electoral victory by Tunisia’s Islamist party, Ennahda, which draws most of its support inland. “Politics was in the hands of the people of the coast since the start of Tunisia,” Mr. Rajhi said. “If the situation is reversed now, they are not ready to give up ruling.” He warned that Tunisian officials from the old government were preparing a military coup if the Islamists won elections in July. “If Ennahda rules, there will be a military regime.” In response, protesters poured back out into the streets of Tunis for four days of demonstrations calling for a new revolution. The police beat them back with batons and tear gas, arrested more than 200 protesters and imposed a curfew on the city. In Cairo, the sense of national identity that surged at the moment of revolution — when hundreds of thousands of people of all faiths celebrated in Tahrir Square with chants of “Hold your head high, you are an Egyptian”— has given way to a week of religious violence pitting the Coptic Christian minority against their Muslim neighbors, reflecting long-smoldering tensions that an authoritarian state may have muted, or let fester. At a rally this month in Tahrir Square to call for unity, Coptic Christians were conspicuously absent, thousands of them gathering nearby for a rally of their own. And even among some Muslims at the unity rally, suspicions were pronounced. “As Muslims, our sheiks are always telling us to be good to Christians, but we don’t think that is happening on the other side,” said Ibrahim Sakr, 56, a chemistry professor, who asserted that Copts, who make up about 10 percent of the population, still consider themselves “the original” Egyptians because their presence predates Islam. In Libya, supporters of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi acknowledge that his government banks on fears of clan rivalries and possible partition to stay in power in a country with deep regional differences. Officials say that the large extended clans of the west that contribute most of the soldiers to Colonel Qaddafi’s forces will never accept any revolution arising from the

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east, no matter what promises the rebels make about universal citizenship in a democratic Libya with its capital still in the western city of Tripoli. The rebels say the revolution can forge a new identity. “Qaddafi looks at Libya as west and east and north and south,” said Jadella Shalwee, a Libyan from Tobruk who visited Tahrir Square last weekend in a pilgrimage of sorts. “But this revolt has canceled all that. This is about a new beginning,” he said, contending that Colonel Qaddafi’s only supporters were “his cousins and his family.” “Fear” is what Gamal Abdel Gawad, the director of the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, called it — the way that autocrats win support because people “are even more scared of their fellow citizens.” Nowhere is that perhaps truer than in Syria, with a sweeping revolt against four decades of rule by one family and a worsening of tensions among a Sunni Muslim majority and minorities of Christians and heterodox Muslims, the Alawites. Mohsen, a young Alawite in Syria, recounted a slogan that he believes, rightly or not, was chanted at some of the protests there: “Christians to Beirut and the Alawites to the coffin.” “Every week that passes,” he lamented, speaking by telephone from Damascus, the Syrian capital, “the worse the sectarian feelings get.” The example of Iraq comes up often in conversations in Damascus, as does the civil war in Lebanon. The departure of Jews, who once formed a vibrant community in Syria, remains part of the collective memory, illustrating the tenuousness of diversity. Syria’s ostensibly secular government, having always relied on Alawite strength, denounces the prospect of sectarian differences while, its critics say, fanning the flames. The oft- voiced formula is, by now, familiar: after us, the deluge. “My Alawite friends want me to support the regime, and they feel if it’s gone, our community will be finished,” said Mohsen, the young Alawite in Damascus, who asked that only his first name be used because he feared reprisal. “My Sunni friends want me to be against the regime, but I feel conflicted. We want freedom, but freedom with stability and security.” That he used the mantra of years of Arab authoritarianism suggested that people still, in the words of one human rights activist, remain “hostage to the lack of possibilities” in states that, with few exceptions, have failed to come up with a sense of self that transcends the many divides. “This started becoming a self-fulfilling myth,” said Mr. Azm, the Syrian intellectual. “It was either our martial law or the martial law of the Islamists,” he added. “The third option was to divide the country into ethnicities, sects and so on.” Despite a wave of repression, crackdown and civil war, hope and optimism still pervade the region, even in places like Syria, the setting of one of the most withering waves of violence. There, residents often speak of a wall of fear crumbling. Across the Arab world, there is a renewed sense of a collective destiny that echoes the headiest days of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and ’60s and perhaps even transcends it. President Obama, in his speech on Thursday about the changes in the Arab world, spoke directly to that feeling. “Divisions of tribe, ethnicity and religious sect were

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manipulated as a means of holding on to power, or taking it away from somebody else. But the events of the past six months show us that strategies of repression and strategies of diversion will not work anymore.” But no less pronounced are the old fears of zero-sum power, where one side wins and the other inevitably loses. From a Coptic Christian in Cairo to an Alawite farmer in Syria, discussions about the future are posed in terms of survival. Differences in Lebanon, a country that celebrates and laments the diversity of its 18 religious communities, are so pronounced that even soccer teams have a sectarian affiliation. In Beirut, wrecked by a war over the country’s identity and so far sheltered from the gusts of change, activists have staged a small sit-in for two months to call for something different, in a plea that resonates across the Arab world. The Square of Change, the protesters there have nicknamed it, and their demand is blunt: Citizenship that unites, not divides. “We are not ‘we’ yet,” complained Tony Daoud, one of the activists. “What do we mean when we say ‘we’? ‘We’ as what? As a religion, as a sect, as human beings?” Anthony Shadid reported from Beirut, and David D. Kirkpatrick from Cairo. Heba Afify contributed reporting from Cairo, and an employee of The New York Times from Damascus, Syria. ANTHONY SHADID and DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK Promise of Arab Uprisings Is Threatened by Divisions May 21, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/world/middleeast/22arab.html?_r=1&nl=toda ysheadlines&emc=tha2

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May 21, 2011 They Shoot Horses, Don’t They? By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN BEIRUT, Lebanon There is a story making the rounds among Lebanese Facebook users about a Syrian democracy activist who was stopped at a Syrian Army checkpoint the other day. He reportedly had a laptop and a thumb drive on the seat next to him. The Syrian soldier examined them and then asked the driver: “Do you have a Facebook?” “No,” the man said, so the soldier let him pass. You have to feel sorry for that Syrian soldier looking for a Facebook on the front seat, but it’s that kind of regime. Syria really doesn’t know what’s hit it — how the tightest police state in the region could lose control over its population, armed only with cellphone cameras and, yes, access to Facebook and YouTube. You can see how it happened from just one example: Several Syrian dissidents have banded together and from scratch created SNN — Shaam News Network — a Web site that is posting the cellphone pictures and Twitter feeds coming in from protests all over Syria. Many global TV networks, all of which are banned from Syria, are now picking up SNN’s hourly footage. My bet is that SNN cost no more than a few thousand dollars to start, and it’s become the go-to site for video from the Syrian uprising. Just like that — a regime that controlled all the news now can’t anymore. I don’t see how Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, can last — not because of Facebook, which his regime would love to confiscate, if it could only find the darn thing — but because of something hiding in plain sight: Many, many Syrian people have lost their fear. On Friday alone, the regime killed at least 26 more of its people in protests across the country. This is a fight to the death now — and it’s the biggest show on earth, for one very simple reason: Libya implodes, Tunisia implodes, Egypt implodes, Yemen implodes, Bahrain implodes — Syria explodes. The emergence of democracy in all these other Arab countries would change their governments and have long-term regional implications. But democracy or breakdown in Syria would change the whole Middle East overnight. A collapse or democratization of the Syrian regime would have huge ramifications for Lebanon, a country Syria has controlled since the mid-1970s; for Israel, which has counted on Syria to keep the peace on the Golan Heights since 1967; for Iran, since Syria is Iran’s main platform for exporting revolution into the Arab world; for the Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah, which gets rockets from Iran via Syria; for Turkey, which abuts Syria and shares many of its ethnic communities, particularly Kurds, Alawites and Sunnis; for Iraq, which suffered from Syria serving as a conduit for jihadist suicide bombers; and for Hamas, whose leader sits in Damascus.

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Because Syria is such a keystone nation, there is a tendency among its neighbors to hope that the Assad regime could be weakened — and therefore moderated — but not broken. Few dare trust the Syrian people to build a stable social order out of the ashes of the Assad dictatorship. Those fears may be appropriate, but none of us get a vote. Only the Syrians do, and they are voting with their feet and with their lives for the opportunity to live as citizens, with equal rights and obligations, not pawns of a mafia regime. More than in any other Arab country today, the democracy protestors in Syria know that when they walk out the door to peacefully demand freedom they are facing a regime that has no hesitancy about gunning them down. Lebanese have been surprised by their sheer bravery. “We have an obligation of solidarity with people in distress who are fighting for their freedom and their dignity with nonviolent means,” said Michel Hajji Georgiou, a writer at Beirut’s L’Orient Le Jour newspaper and one of the drivers of the Cedar Revolution here in 2005. “There can be no stable democracy in Lebanon if there is no democracy in Syria.” Of course, the million-dollar question hanging over the Syrian rebellion, and all the Arab rebellions, is: Can the people really come together and write a social contract to live together as equal citizens — not as rival sects — once the iron fist of the regimes is removed? The answer is not clear, but when you see so many people peacefully defying these regimes, like Syria’s, it tells you that something very deep wants to rise to the surface. It tells you that while no Arabs are really citizens today with full rights and obligations, said Hanin Ghaddar, editor of NOWlebanon.com, a Web site tracking the revolutions, “they want to be” and that’s what these uprisings are largely about. Ghaddar added that she recently returned from New York City, where she ran into rival demonstrations in Central Park between people who insisted that horse-drawn carriages there were just fine and animal-rights activists who argued that these street carriages endangered horses: “I thought, ‘Oh, my God! I just want to live in a country where you have the luxury to worry about animal rights,’ ” not human rights. “We are still so far from that luxury.” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/opinion/22friedman.html?nl=todaysheadlines &emc=tha212

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Las protestas en Marruecos llegan a oídos de Mohamed VI "El pueblo quiere trabajo", gritan decenas de jóvenes que esperaron al monarca en la puerta de una mezquita IGNACIO CEMBRERO | Madrid 21/05/2011

Mohamed VI, el monarca alauí, escuchó ayer, por primera vez, directamente, las reivindicaciones que desde finales de febrero esgrimen los jóvenes en las calles de Marruecos. Decenas, quizá varios centenares, de licenciados en paro exigieron a gritos trabajo ante el soberano poniendo muy nervioso al servicio de seguridad, obligando a alterar el protocolo e interrumpiendo la retransmisión del acto por televisión. El monarca participó en la oración del viernes en la mezquita Assouna, en el centro de Rabat, y como es costumbre a la salida le esperaba una multitud que daba entusiastas vivas al rey. Decenas de licenciados en paro, uno de los grupos más activos en las protestas, lograron colarse en las primeras filas de la muchedumbre agolpada detrás de unas vallas, según varias webs informativas marroquíes.

Cuando Mohamed VI salió del templo los jóvenes revistieron los chalecos amarillos con los que se singularizan los parados y que llevaban escondidos. Empezaron entonces a corear: "¡El pueblo quiere trabajo!", "Majestad, estamos en apuros", y a cantar el himno nacional. En ningún momento increparon al rey. Desconcertadas, las demás personas concentradas en la puerta de la mezquita enmudecieron y no dieron sus tradicionales vivas al soberano. Los eslóganes coreados por los parados crisparon al servicio de seguridad que, junto con el protocolo, decidieron que el rey debía irse de inmediato del lugar sin dar la mano, como suele ser habitual, a algunos de sus súbditos allí congregados. La televisión pública, que había retransmitido en directo la oración del viernes y los primeros pasos que dio Mohamed VI al salir de Assouna interrumpió la emisión alegando problemas técnicos. La policía no practicó ninguna detención, pero, por la tarde, cuando los licenciados en paro se volvieron a concentrar en la capital, como lo vienen haciendo desde hace años, sí les reprimió. "Nos dio más palos que de costumbre", asegura Ahmed, un joven intérprete en paro que participó en la protesta ante la mezquita. "Es como si se hubiera querido vengar por lo que pasó a mediodía", concluye.

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Diversas estimaciones independientes señalan que un tercio de los licenciados están en paro en Marruecos y otros muchos ocupan empleos, muchas veces en el sector informal, que no se corresponden con su formación. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/protestas/Marruecos/llegan/oidos/Mohame d/VI/elpepuint/20110521elpepuint_7/Tes

Nuevas dimisiones en la oposición turca por vídeos sexuales Seis miembros del partido nacionalista se ven obligados a renunciar a escasos 20 días de las elecciones generales BLANCA LÓPEZ ARANGÜENA | Estambul 21/05/2011

"No dimitiré de mi puesto como líder del partido. No habrá más dimisiones". Entre estas palabras pronunciadas el miércoles por el líder del partido nacionalista turco (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, y la dimisión de seis de sus integrantes, casi todos de la cúpula directiva, solo han pasado tres días. Suficientes para hacer cambiar de opinión a Bahçeli, salvar de la vergüenza a seis políticos y poner en un duro aprieto a la formación política, que ahora ve muy negro su futuro en las elecciones generales del próximo 12 de junio. Todo comenzó a principios de mayo, cuando varios vídeos de contenido sexual protagonizados por cuatro altos cargos del MHP fueron publicados en Internet y provocaron la dimisión de sus protagonistas. En el caso de esta semana, ha bastado la amenaza de un grupo chantajista autodenominado Idealismo Diferente (Farkli Ülkücülük en turco), que advirtió esta semana de que poseía material comprometido de 373

seis altos cargos, a los que identificó con nombres y apellidos, y que lo haría público si Bahçeli no dejaba su puesto. A pesar de su enfado y su determinación a no dejar sus puesto, los seis miembros presentaron el viernes sus cartas de renuncia, que fueron aceptadas este sábado por el líder del partido, según informa la agencia Efe. Entre ellos figuran tres vicepresidentes y un secretario general. Se desconoce todavía el contenido o la existencia real de los vídeos, pero parece que ninguno quiso correr riesgos dado el material que la organización poseía de sus anteriores compañeros de partido. En uno de los publicados a principio de mayo se puede ver a Emine, una estudiante según los subtítulos, manteniendo una relación sexual con el vicepresidente del MHP, Bülent Didinmez, casado y con tres hijos. En los otros aparecen dos altos cargos hablando de política con varias mujeres, una de ellas identificada como prostituta, y más tarde en compañía de otras jóvenes, supuestamente menores de edad. Teorías conspirativas La dimisión de casi toda la cúpula de un partido es un hecho sin precedentes en la historia de la democracia turca. Lo que no lo es tanto es el uso de vídeos sexuales como chantajes a políticos. La primera vez ocurrió hace un año, cuando Deniz Baykal, el entonces líder de la segunda fuerza política de Turquía, el Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP), se vio obligado a dimitir por una cinta en la que se le veía mantenía relaciones sexuales con una diputada de su propia formación. Luego, en agosto, le llegó el turno a Akif Hamzaçebi, otro cargo de mismo partido CHP. Hasta la fecha, el AKP es el único gran partido al que el escándalo no le ha salpicado. Además, como se encargó de señalar Bahçeli el pasado miércoles, es el gran beneficiado de todo esto. Los turcos son muy dados a las teorías conspirativas, tengan o no fundamento, pero lo que a nadie se le escapa son las repercusiones que puede tener el escándalo, que ocurre a escasos 20 días de las elecciones generales del 12 de junio. "El AKP está usando esto en su beneficio político. La prensa está sesgada. La justicia calla. La fiscalía es lenta y la Organización Nacional de Inteligencia pasiva", aseguró Bahçeli. Por su parte, el primer Ministro turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, acusó al partido nacionalista de "intentar echar la culpa al Gobierno de sus problemas internos". Estos problemas podrían hacer que el MHP no consiga el 10% de los votos necesarios para entrar en el Parlamento, algo muy posible ya que su intención de voto era del 13 % antes de desatarse el escándalo, según un sondeo realizado por la agencia IKSara. Esta misma encuesta daba al grupo de gobierno, el islamista moderado Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP), el 45,5 % de los sufragios, y al principal partido de la oposición, el socialdemócrata CHP, el 30,5 %. La salida del MHP del Parlamento podría suponer, según los analistas, que los islamistas moderados llegaran a obtener el control de los dos tercios de la Cámara. Una mayoría suficiente para reformar la Constitución y, cómo se rumorea, llevar a cabo la reforma del sistema político e implantar un sistema presidencialista. BLANCA LÓPEZ ARANGÜENA Nuevas dimisiones en la oposición turca por vídeos sexuales21/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Nuevas/dimisiones/oposicion/turca/videos /sexuales/elpepuint/20110521elpepuint_6/Tes

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"Una vez que el pueblo se embarca en un cambio, no hay fuerza que lo pare" Benigno Aquino III, el presidente de Filipinas, hace balance de los 25 años pasados desde la revolución contra el dictador Marcos

JOSE REINOSO | Manila (Enviado especial) 21/05/2011 De 51 años y nacido en Manila, Benigno Aquino III es presidente de Filipinas desde junio de 2010. Decidió presentarse a los comicios tras ser reclamado por un amplio sector de la población después del fallecimiento de su madre, Corazón Aquino. Titulado en economía, de confesión católica y soltero, pertenece a una familia de raigambre política. Su padre, Benigno Aquino Jr., ferviente opositor al dictador Marcos, fue asesinado en Manila en 1983 al descender del avión en el que regresaba del exilio en Estados Unidos, donde se refugió tras haber pasado siete años encarcelado en su país. Su madre, conocida como Cory Aquino, presidió Filipinas entre 1986 y 1992, tras la pacífica Revolución del Poder del Pueblo, que puso fin a los 20 años de poder de Marcos (1966-1986). Benigno Aquino III resultó herido por varias balas en un intento golpista en 1987. Aficionado al tiro como ejercicio físico, confiesa que apenas tiene tiempo para leer libros o ver películas. Recibió a EL PAÍS en el palacio de Malacañang, un complejo de edificios blancos de estilo colonial español entre jardines en el corazón de Manila. Habló bajo un gran óleo con el retrato de su madre. Pregunta. ¿Cuál es la lección de 25 años desde la revolución? Respuesta. La lección central es que, una vez que el pueblo se embarca en un cambio, no hay fuerza que lo pare, y que un Gobierno que olvida que su mandato proviene del pueblo no sobrevivirá. En el periodo posrevolucionario, buscamos dar derechos especialmente a aquellos que se oponen a nosotros, porque esa es la prueba de la democracia. Pero hay muchos temas que no se han cerrado, como la reforma judicial. Nuestro lema es "sin corrupción, no debería haber pobres". P. ¿Es más complejo dirigir una democracia que una dictadura? R. Algunas escuelas de pensamiento en Asia aseguran que la mentalidad asiática es más proclive a un sistema paternalista de gobierno, pero la democracia es el mejor de los sistemas existentes. Puede llevar más tiempo cuando intentas establecer un consenso, 375

pero, una vez que lo alcanzas, tienes una base sólida para llevar a cabo incluso transformaciones revolucionarias. P. Filipinas sufre una gran brecha social entre ricos y pobres. ¿Qué hacen para reducirla? R. Tenemos el programa de transferencia de dinero condicionada para los 4,6 millones de familias que viven bajo el umbral de la pobreza. Solo el 14% de quienes entran en el sistema educativo acaban la universidad. El programa promete a las familias un dinero si mantienen a los niños en la escuela, los vacunan y las embarazadas acuden a los chequeos. Queremos corregir la mortalidad infantil, incrementar la escolarización y universalizar la sanidad. P. El 10% de la población filipina ha emigrado. ¿Le gustaría que regresaran? R. El objetivo último es que vuelvan. Ir a otro país debería ser una elección, no una necesidad. P. ¿Es posible erradicar la corrupción? R. Hay corrupción porque la gente tiene una razonable seguridad de que no será perseguida. Estamos luchando también contra la evasión fiscal y el contrabando. Queremos acabar con la cultura de la impunidad. P. Filipinas se acerca a los 100 millones de habitantes. ¿Ha llevado esto a su Gobierno a impulsar el controvertido proyecto para dar educación sexual en los colegios y facilitar el acceso a métodos anticonceptivos, que ha sido rechazado por la Iglesia católica? R. Cada año se producen en Filipinas 2,5 millones de nacimientos. En 1986, éramos 50 millones y ya somos más de 95. Hay una escasez de 140.000 aulas, y el 40% de la población no puede visitar a un médico en toda su vida. El Estado debe advertir a los padres de que cuando tienen un hijo adquieren una responsabilidad. Pero no puede imponer los métodos de planificación familiar. P. ¿Cómo ve la situación del separatismo en Mindanao y el sur de Filipinas -donde operan el Frente Nacional de Liberación Moro, el Frente Islámico de Liberación Moro, el Nuevo Ejército del Pueblo (comunista) y el grupo de Abu Sayyaf- y el proceso de paz en marcha? R. Somos optimistas. Esperamos tener un acuerdo completo en un año. Luego, podremos acelerar el desarrollo económico en Mindanao. Hemos tenido relativa paz durante un tiempo con la insurgencia musulmana, y la amenaza comunista está siendo marginada. Abu Sayyaf solo se dedica a secuestrar y extorsionar. Tras el acuerdo, habrá grupos que recurrirán al bandidaje, pero no tendrán un gran apoyo. Lo que lleva a unirse a la insurgencia es la falta de oportunidades económicas más que las creencias ideológicas o religiosas. P. ¿Cómo están las relaciones con Estados Unidos? R. Tenemos un tratado de defensa mutua. Es un importante socio comercial. Necesitamos cooperar más en cambio climático, terrorismo y blanqueo de dinero. P. ¿En qué estado está la investigación de la matanza de Mindanao (en noviembre de 2010, en la que fueron asesinadas 57 personas, entre ellas 30 periodistas)?

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R. Buscamos aún a 100 implicados, tenemos a 89 bajo custodia. Hemos cambiado a gran parte de los jefes de las fuerzas de seguridad en la zona. Este caso será clave para probar si tenemos un sistema judicial creíble. P. ¿Cómo ve las relaciones con España? R. Me impresiona la forma en que está organizada la comunidad filipina en España y las buenas relaciones que tiene con las autoridades municipales. En Filipinas, hay un programa para potenciar la enseñanza del español, y esperamos incrementar los intercambios comerciales. P. China y Filipinas han tenido fricciones recientes: disputas territoriales en el mar del Sur en China, el asalto al autobús de turistas de Hong Kong secuestrado en agosto del año pasado en Manila en el que murieron ocho viajeros, y la ejecución en China de tres traficantes de droga filipinos pese a peticiones de clemencia. ¿Cómo ve las relaciones mutuas? R. En el mar del Sur de China hay un potencial de conflicto, pero, si cooperamos, todos podemos beneficiarnos de los recursos. Agradecemos que China considere el incidente de los turistas un asunto aislado. En Filipinas hemos renunciado a la pena de muerte y esperábamos que fuera más sensibles a nuestras demandas. Pero China tiene sus leyes. JOSE REINOSO "Una vez que el pueblo se embarca en un cambio, no hay fuerza que lo pare"21/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/vez/pueblo/embarca/cambio/hay/fuerza/pa re/elpepuint/20110521elpepuint_8/Tes MANUEL RIVAS Silencio mudo MANUEL RIVAS 21/05/2011 ¿Por qué la Junta Electoral ha entendido de este asunto? No se interfiere en la votación. No hay pronunciamientos partidarios. Todo parece dictado para empeorar las cosas. Sol y otras plazas son justamente lugares de reflexión crítica. Todo demócrata debería estar orgulloso de esta pacífica insurgencia, que pide más democracia. Durante años se ha ido construyendo una imagen caricaturesca y despectiva de la juventud española. Una panda estupefaciente, empotrada en el hogar paterno, enganchada a la play station, empachada de comida basura, y sumida en la vulgaridad iletrada. Por otro lado, la realidad de una generación perdida como destino inevitable, en un mundo dominado por el gangsterismo de mercado, qué le vamos a hacer, y donde toda alternativa ha sido borrada del futuro. El sistema no se asocia con el hábitat democrático sino con su usurpación, con una deriva inhóspita, donde el hombre vuelve a ser un lobo para hombre. La marea de mierda que nos invade tiene su descarado origen en una gran estafa internacional, acatada por los gobernantes. Esa estafa ha puesto contra las cuerdas el mercado honesto y las políticas decentes. España, como otros países, es la víctima y no la causa. Hay responsabilidades de Gobierno, pero tal vez no las que le atribuyen. Facilitar el despido, en una medida que los conservadores consideran pacata, ha sido un desastre. Ha arrinconado más a las familias y al consumo de bienes necesarios. Pero, ¿qué alternativa se ha ofrecido? Rajoy, no sus lugartenientes, hizo una campaña inteligente hasta que sucumbió en el infame fotoshop del coso taurino donde se prestó

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como padrino a la transmigración de almas. Acabó luciéndose: "Nos gustan los chiringuitos". ¡La democracia chiringuito! Entre la incompetencia y la desvergüenza, ¿cómo no desviar la mirada hacia Sol? Levantar la mano contra Sol es suspender las conciencias. ¿Quién teme a la libertad? http://www.elpais.com/articulo/ultima/Silencio/mudo/elpepuopi/20110521elpepiult_1/T es EDITORIAL Reflexión y prudencia Disolver las protestas a la fuerza pese a su carácter pacífico hubiera sido una grave irresponsabilidad 21/05/2011 En el conflicto entre derechos fundamentales -el de ejercicio libre del voto y el de reunión- que parecen haber provocado miles de ciudadanos acampados en la Puerta del Sol, en Madrid, y en otros lugares de diversas ciudades españolas, con su decisión de continuar su protesta hasta el día de las elecciones, la Junta Electoral Central (JEC) ha optado por garantizar al máximo el primero y suprimir radicalmente el segundo. Tanto el Tribunal Supremo como el Constitucional rechazaron ayer los justificados recursos que se presentaron ante la resolución del JEC. La decisión ha sido adoptada por mayoría de un solo voto. Este periódico cree que su sentido debería haber sido el contrario. Argumentos jurídicos debía de haberlos, como se deduce de los distintos pareceres de las juntas electorales provinciales y de la división muy ajustada de la propia JEC. La resolución que ha adoptado se remite acertadamente a la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional sobre el derecho de reunión en periodo electoral, que establece que ese derecho debe interpretarse de manera extensiva y favorable a su ejercicio y su restricción o limitación deben basarse en motivos relevantes y en criterios jurídicamente fundados. Unos y otros se echan en falta en la resolución de la JEC. El único dato tenido en cuenta para tomar una decisión tan grave como impedir el derecho de reunión pacífica a miles de ciudadanos, es que estos piden el voto para unas candidaturas e invitan a no apoyar a otras. Además de no estar claro que sea esa la petición de los manifestantes, la ocasión merecía un análisis aunque fuera somero de la naturaleza de la protesta, de su amplitud y de su transfondo político. De haberlo hecho es posible que la resolución hubiera sido otra pues es difícil deducir tanto de los mensajes genéricos como de los que se han lanzado de manera concreta -desde la desconfianza hacia los políticos a la reforma de la ley electoral o la exclusión de imputados en las candidaturas- un riesgo de perturbación de la neutralidad política de las jornadas de reflexión y voto. No sólo los políticos deben mostrarse sensibles a los mensajes de descontento y de crítica de la sociedad. También deberían hacerlo los responsables de las instituciones, cuya tarea es aplicar e interpretar las normas y cuyas resoluciones pueden contribuir a dar salida a esos reclamos o a silenciarlos y emponzoñarlos. Además, conviene ser sumamente prudentes a la hora de tomar decisiones de difícil cumplimiento o cuya ejecución entraña riesgos más graves de los que se pretende evitar y que, encima, se endosan a otros.

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Ante la difícil tesitura de disolver o no a los concentrados, ha sido acertado el criterio del Gobierno de atenerse a una estricta proporcionalidad de la actuación de la policía y el auténtico riesgo que representan unas concentraciones pacíficas. Si lo que la JEC pretendía con su resolución era garantizar el tranquilo desarrollo de la jornada electoral, el efecto que puede provocar es exactamente el contrario. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Reflexion/prudencia/elpepuopi/20110521elpepi opi_1/Tes TRIBUNA: IGANCIO URQUIZU El Mayo de la generación del 78 Una generación, según Jefferson, no puede imponer a las siguientes las reglas del juego democrático IGANCIO URQUIZU 21/05/2011 Los que nacimos a partir de 1978 en España representamos casi el 40% de la población. Hace unos años, Francisco Rubio Llorente nos bautizó como los hijos de la Constitución (EL PAÍS, 2-12-2008). Estos días, muchos de estos jóvenes han tomado las calles. Se sienten insatisfechos con los sistemas político y económico. Una gran parte de analistas, políticos y periodistas están centrando toda su atención en las repercusiones que puede tener esta movilización en los resultados electorales del domingo. La experiencia nos puede ayudar. La última vez que se produjo un acontecimiento inesperado en vísperas electorales fue en 2004. Tras los atentados del 11-M, numerosos ciudadanos tomaron las calles gracias a las nuevas tecnologías. La encuesta poselectoral del CIS demostró que, a diferencia de lo que sostiene el PP, las movilizaciones de entonces tuvieron efectos limitados. Solo un 3,8% de los ciudadanos cambió su voto y de ellos casi el 40% no apoyó al PSOE. Sí que tuvieron consecuencias más relevantes sobre la participación. Poco más del 6% de los españoles fue a votar cuando inicialmente no tenía pensado hacerlo. No obstante, entre estos, solo la mitad acabó apoyando al PSOE. La inmensa mayoría de los ciudadanos que admitieron que los atentados del 11-M les influyeron en su comportamiento político, acabaron votando lo que inicialmente querían hacer. Por todo ello, es difícil afirmar que las movilizaciones actuales van a variar los resultados electorales del domingo. La opinión pública no cambia dramáticamente en tres días. Además, analizar de esta manera este movimiento revela una visión cortoplacista. El éxito de las movilizaciones actuales no puede medirse en términos electorales instantáneos. Para saber si este movimiento cuaja y si realmente persigue cambiar las cosas, deberemos esperar a la semana que viene. Si siguen movilizándose, realmente hay algo más. Estas últimas conclusiones tampoco deben inducir al error. Sería una inmensa equivocación dar la espalda a sus reivindicaciones. Detrás de sus protestas hay argumentos que deben hacernos reflexionar. El primero de ellos está relacionado con el dato presentado inicialmente. Contando los que no habíamos nacido en 1978 y los que entonces eran menores de edad, el 70% de

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los españoles de hoy está sujeto a unas reglas de juego que no ha votado. En El Federalista, Jefferson se preguntaba hasta qué punto una nueva generación puede estar atada por aquello que decidió la anterior. Las deudas o hipotecas son obligaciones individuales, no colectivas. Así, una generación posterior no es responsable de todo lo que hizo la anterior. Esto le lleva a concluir a Jefferson que ninguna sociedad puede realizar constituciones perpetuas o leyes perpetuas. El segundo de los puntos está relacionado con el funcionamiento de las democracias contemporáneas. En la Fundación Alternativas venimos realizando todos los años el Informe sobre la democracia en España. En él analizamos el funcionamiento de nuestro sistema político. Año tras año, tanto en las encuestas que realizamos a expertos como a ciudadanos, hemos observado que el principal problema radica en la enorme influencia que tiene el poder económico sobre el poder político. La solución a esto no son tanto reformas en la fórmula electoral, la limitación de mandatos o las listas abiertas como cambios mucho más profundos. Por ejemplo, resulta complicado entender por qué muchas decisiones económicas se toman por instituciones que están muy alejadas del control de los ciudadanos, como si la economía fuese algo meramente técnico y la política no importase. También sería un error apropiarse del movimiento. Lo que deben hacer los partidos políticos es escuchar. Y en esto los progresistas parten con ventaja. Al igual que los manifestantes, también les mueve el cambio social. Por ello, no deberían tener muchas dificultades para incorporar muchas de sus propuestas. La derecha, en cambio, no anda muy preocupada con uno de los principales lemas: "Democracia real ya". Para ellos, lo realmente importante es la petición de otros de "no les votes". Saben que si baja la participación, la principal perjudicada será la izquierda. Por ello, la derecha mediática está dedicándoles un espacio muy especial en sus tertulias. Es prematuro hablar del Mayo de una nueva generación, la del 78. Lo único cierto es que muchos de estos jóvenes acabarán decidiendo nuestro futuro. Esperemos que tengan mucho más éxito que la generación del 68. Pocos años después de aquellas revueltas, acabó llegando una de las olas más conservadoras que se recuerdan, con Reagan y Thatcher. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/Mayo/generacion/78/elpepuopi/20110521elpepi opi_5/Tes

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El Ejército sirio mata a 11 asistentes a los entierros de muertos del viernes Las víctimas eran amigos y familiares de los fallecidos en la violenta represión de las protestas de la ciudad de Homs AGENCIAS | Amán 22/05/2011 La cifra de fallecidos en la manifestación de este sábado en favor de la democracia en Siria ha aumentado a 11, según ha informado a Reuters un activista pro Derechos Humanos. Las fuerzas de seguridad sirias han abierto fuego contra las personas allí concentradas, y la cifra de muertos aún no es definitiva. El abogado Razan Zaitouna ha sido quien ha establecido la cifra de muertos en el cementerio de Nasra de Homs, en donde se enterraba a 10 manifestantes que murieron en enfrentamientos con el Ejército sirio en las protestas contra el presidente Bachir Al Asad de el viernes. Otro ciudadano que se ha puesto en contacto con la agencia de noticias ha declarado que los asistentes al funeral estaban fuera del cementerio de manera pacífica. La represión de una nueva protesta también se cobró ayer la vida de una persona en Saqba, un suburbio de Damasco. El régimen sirio no permite la entrada de periodistas al país, por lo que es imposible verificar de manera independiente las cifras de fallecidos y heridos. Estas muertes se suman a las entre 30 y 45 que se registraron el viernes. Ese día, para prevenir que los ciudadanos se concentraran en las mezquitas antes de salir a la calle como venía haciéndose desde que comenzaron las protestas a mediados de marzo, la policía estableció controles a la entrada de muchas de ellas. Karim Rajeh, imán de la mezquita suní de Al Hassan en Damasco, anunció que dejaría de pronunciar el sermón de los viernes porque las fuerzas de seguridad impedían el acceso a los fieles. El hecho de que los ataques militares lanzados en días pasados contra Deraa, Homs y Banias carecieran de efecto disuasorio sobre las protestas parece demostrar que El Asad no tiene la situación tan controlada como viene afirmando y que la crisis siria podría durar un tiempo indefinido, con posibles consecuencias para los países vecinos. El volumen de refugiados sirios en Líbano empieza a inquietar a la ONU, que por el momento ha contabilizado unas 5.000 personas instaladas en Wadi Khaled, una localidad libanesa separada de Siria por un pequeño riachuelo fácilmente vadeable. Representantes del Alto Comisionado de la ONU para los Refugiados y del Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales de Líbano trabajan en un plan para hacer frente a una posible oleada de fugitivos de la represión de El Asad. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ejercito/sirio/mata/asistentes/entierros/mu ertos/viernes/elpepuint/20110522elpepuint_1/Tes

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El conflicto de Oriente Próximo El Asad lanza otra oleada de represión a pesar de la advertencia de Obama El Ejército sirio causa más de 30 muertos al abrir fuego contra los manifestantes Patrullas sirias sellan la frontera para evitar el éxodo de refugiados Unas 5.000 personas han huido a Líbano, según la ONU ENRIC GONZÁLEZ - Jerusalén - 21/05/2011 Barack Obama lanzó el jueves una advertencia a Bachar el Asad: o dirigía una transición democrática o se iba. El presidente sirio no parece dispuesto ni a una cosa ni a otra. Ayer utilizó al Ejército para una nueva oleada represiva que causó más de 30 muertos, según activistas locales. Pese al alto número de víctimas mortales por disparos de las fuerzas de seguridad, más de 800 en dos meses, miles de ciudadanos sirios volvieron a salir a la calle tras los rezos del viernes para exigir libertad. El Asad ya había despreciado como "irrelevantes" las sanciones impuestas por Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea sobre él mismo y otras figuras del régimen. Su Gobierno acusó ayer al presidente Obama de "injerencia en los asuntos internos de los países de la región" y anunció que las presiones estadounidenses no quebrarían "la voluntad y la independencia de Siria". El Asad mantiene que bandas "islamistas y terroristas" fuertemente armadas protagonizan una sublevación con el objetivo de establecer en Siria un régimen integrista y que las protestas son instigadas y financiadas desde el extranjero. "El Gobierno sirio debe dejar de disparar a los manifestantes y permitir las protestas pacíficas", dijo Obama en su discurso sobre Oriente Próximo y la llamada "primavera árabe". A eso, El Asad respondió con hechos. Sus tropas dispararon nuevamente contra la multitud en numerosas ciudades: Homs (seis muertos, incluido un niño de 10 años), Sanamein (seis muertos), Boukamal, cerca de la frontera con Irak (tres muertos) y Daraya, un suburbio de Damasco (dos muertos). La cifra de víctimas fue proporcionada por el activista Mustafá Osso y resultaba imposible confirmarla, por la prohibición de prensa extranjera en el país y las restricciones impuestas sobre los movimientos de los periodistas locales. En otras ciudades, como Banias y Hama, las manifestaciones fueron disueltas con porras, gases lacrimógenos y disparos al aire. La Coordinadora de Comités que organiza las protestas hizo saber a través de su página en Facebook que en Maaret-al-Numan, una localidad al norte del país, las tropas disparaban de forma indiscriminada. Había docenas de heridos, según esa fuente, y el hospital había hecho un llamamiento para recibir donaciones de sangre. Mustafá Osso y Rami Abdul-Rahman, del Observatorio Sirio de los Derechos Humanos y exiliado en Londres, coincidieron en declarar que Maher el Asad, hermano del presidente y ejecutor directo de las operaciones represivas como jefe de la Guardia Presidencial y de la Cuarta División Acorazada, había vuelto a utilizar carros de combate y artillería para dispersar a los manifestantes.

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Para prevenir que los ciudadanos se concentraran en las mezquitas antes de salir a la calle, como venía haciéndose desde que comenzaron las protestas a mediados de marzo, la policía estableció controles a la entrada de muchas de ellas. Karim Rajeh, imán de la mezquita suní de Al Hassan en Damasco, anunció que dejaría de pronunciar el sermón de los viernes porque las fuerzas de seguridad impedían el acceso a los fieles. El hecho de que los ataques militares lanzados en días pasados contra Deraa, Homs y Banias carecieran de efecto disuasorio sobre las protestas parece demostrar que El Asad no tiene la situación tan controlada como viene afirmando y que la crisis siria podría durar un tiempo indefinido, con posibles consecuencias para los países vecinos. El volumen de refugiados sirios en Líbano empieza a inquietar a la ONU, que por el momento ha contabilizado unas 5.000 personas instaladas en Wadi Khaled, una localidad libanesa separada de Siria por un pequeño riachuelo fácilmente vadeable. Representantes del Alto Comisionado de la ONU para los Refugiados y del Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales de Líbano trabajan en un plan para hacer frente a una posible oleada de fugitivos de la represión de El Asad. El Ejército sirio, en cooperación con el Ejército libanés, ha desarrollado sin embargo sus propios planes, y ayer consiguió sellar casi completamente la frontera desplegando numerosas patrullas. Vecinos de Wadi Khaled confirmaron al diario de Beirut Daily Star que el flujo de refugiados se había interrumpido y que se escuchaban numerosos disparos en territorio de Siria. ENRIC GONZÁLEZ El Asad lanza otra oleada de represión a pesar de la advertencia de Obama21/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Asad/lanza/oleada/represion/pesar/a dvertencia/Obama/elpepuint/20110521elpepiint_2/Tes

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Manu Brabo llega hoy a Madrid El fotógrafo detenido por Gadafi se encuentra en Túnez preparado para volar a Madrid hacia el mediodía EL PAÍS - Madrid - 20/05/2011 El fotógrafo español Manuel Varela de Seijas Bravo, que firma como Manu Brabo, se encuentra en Túnez, y si no hay retrasos en los vuelos, podría llegar al aeropuerto de Barajas en torno al mediodía de hoy, en el primer vuelo comercial del día. Brabo llegó a Túnez en coche tras permanecer detenido desde el 5 de abril por el régimen de Gadafi. Tras ser liberado por las autoridades libias, el cónsul Enrique Conde ha recogido en la frontera a Brabo y se va a quedar con él hasta que consiga embarcar con destino a Madrid. El periodista se encuentra bien de salud, según ha confirmado el Ministerio de Exteriores. Brabo fue condenado por un tribunal libio a 108 euros y un año de cárcel tras ser detenido, junto los también periodistas James Foley, Clare Gillis y Nigel Chandler, quienes están ya en libertad. El padre del periodista ha destacado que se encuentra bien. "Muy cuerdo, centrado y consciente, aunque algo aturdido por la expectación que había despertado su liberación, y con muchas ganas de volver a casa", según explicó a EL PAÍS. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Manu/Brabo/llega/hoy/Madrid/elpepuesp/201105 20elpepiint_10/Tes

Brabo: "Si perdía la esperanza sabía que iba a acabar como un andrajo en una celda" El fotógrafo Manu Brabo, prisionero de las tropas de Gadafi durante mes y medio, relata su cautiverio "El día que nos capturaron la cagamos" "Cuando me capturaron estaba realizando el sueño de mi vida, y lo estaba haciendo bien" EVA SÁIZ - Madrid - 20/05/2011 Con camiseta azul y flanqueado por sus padres, Manuel y Victoria, entre gritos de bravo -o Brabo-, visiblemente cansado pero con una tímida y animada sonrisa. Así se ha presentado el fotoperiodista Manu Brabo, pasada la una de la tarde, ante la prensa y amigos que lo aguardaban en el aeropuerto de Barajas. El miércoles fue liberado por el Gobierno libio tras haber permanecido arrestado por las tropas de Gadafi desde el pasado 5 de abril. 384

El primero en romper el hielo ha sido su padre, que exultante y muy emocionado ha querido agradecer el apoyo de todos los compañeros y amigos de su hijo que se han movilizado -pidiendo su liberación con concentraciones y a través de Internet-, durante los 44 días que ha durado su cautiverio en Libia, y especialmente el de Diego Ruiz, el representante de la Embajada y el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, "que nos ha mantenido con la esperanza viva tanto tiempo". Luego le ha llegado el turno a Brabo. Entre lágrimas ha mostrado su reconocimiento a sus compañeros. "No sé ni cuando cojones voy a merecer todo lo que habéis hecho por mí". Luego, con gesto fatigoso, los ojos enrojecidos parapetados tras un rizo lacio y rebelde que no se ha apartado de la cara, el fotoperiodista ha relatado cómo ha sido su cautiverio en Libia. Directo y conciso, como si quisiera abreviar con las palabras su duro y extenuante mes y medio de encierro, Brabo ha suavizado la crudeza de su particular odisea con dosis de cinismo, e incluso de humor negro. Con esta retranca asturiana Brabo ha restado protagonismo a su persona, ha limado el drama de su experiencia y le ha dado mayor relevancia, al mismo tiempo. "El día que nos capturaron la cagamos", ha comenzado su relato Brabo. El periodista ha explicado cómo los rebeldes -"el ejército de Pancho Villa", los ha llamado él- los abandonaron a él y a los periodistas James Fowley, Claire Morgane y Antón Hammerl al comenzar un contraataque de las tropas de Gadafi -"los Gadafos"-. Comenzaron a disparar contra él y sus otros tres compañeros -Hammerl resultó malherido y su familia lo da por muerto-, luego los capturaron, los ataron y empezaron a darles "culatazos". En Brega los sometieron por separado y con los ojos vendados a un interrogatorio y tras dos días en un calabozo los "arreglaron" para una "especie" de entrevista para la televisión Libia. Después los trasladaron a Trípoli junto con un equipo de la NBC. Esa fue la primera vez en la que Brabo pensó que podían liberarles, ya que durante el trayecto les ofrecieron te y bocadillos y el equipo de la NBC -al que también habían capturado- estaba seguros de que iban a soltarlos en breve. Los del equipo de televisión sí fueron repatriados. Brabo y sus compañeros permanecieron 12 días en un centro militar de detención solos en una celda de aislamiento. Luego los trasladaron a un juzgado. De nuevo pensaron que los iban a liberar, pero entonces fue cuando les acusaron de haber entrado ilegalmente en el país y de ejercer el periodismo sin permiso. A continuación los llevaron a una celda con ocho presos. "Por lo menos estás hablando, mucho mejor que solo en una celda", ha apostillado con ironía Brabo. Fue en la cárcel cuando el alcaide le facilitó un teléfono para contactar con su familia. "Estaba muy preocupado, porque tú sabes que estás vivo, pero no sabes lo que ellos pueden estar pensando. Luego resulta que mis padres sabían más que yo". Volvió a acudir al juzgado en varias ocasiones pero sin sacar nada en claro. Luego los llevaron a una villa de la capital Libia, "con cama, espejo y platos de gambas. Justo entonces se le ocurre a la OTAN bombardear Trípoli", ha resumido Brabo. Lo cambiaron a otra villa "con tele, cama y Coca Cola". Los periodistas la llamaban la Granja de engorde: "Nos tuvieron allí comiendo hasta lograr que pareciéramos personas". Ese hecho reavivó su esperanza. Una esperanza que Brabo ha confesado que nunca perdió. "Decidí que si lo hacía acabaría siendo un andrajo en una celda". Por fin, el lunes de la semana pasada les llevaron de nuevo a los juzgados "y el fiscal que el primer día nos había acusado se puso una toga y se convirtió en juez". El nuevo magistrado le aseguró que quedaría libre. Algo que sucedió 10 días después. El miércoles lo llevaron en un lujoso Mercedes hasta un hotel donde estaba la prensa. "Allí

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nos ofrecieron volver o quedarnos a trabajar legalmente porque nos daban la visa", ha concluido en una media sonrisa. Brabo se ha referido a su compañero Antón Hammerl. "No tengo ni idea de su paradero. La última vez que lo ví estaba pálido y con las tripas fuera", ha dicho. El fotógrafo ahora quiere descansar, disfrutar y estar con su familia y los suyos. De momento no se plantea regresar a Libia -"si me vuelven a cazar me van a joder bien"-. Sin embargo, no descarta volver pronto a la aventura. "El día que me pillaron estaba realizando el sueño de mi vida, y lo estaba haciendo bien". De momento tendrá que esperar. Ni siquiera va a regresar inmediatamente a su Gijón natal. "Ahora lo que me apetece es tomar unas cervezas con los colegas de aquí, y si puedo me quedaré", ha dicho Brabo, aunque acto seguido ha consultado con sus padres. "¿Vosotros qué queréis hacer?". De nuevo entre bravos, -o Brabos-, se ha ido acompañado de los suyos. EVA SÁIZ Brabo: "Si perdía la esperanza sabía que iba a acabar como un andrajo en una celda" Madrid - 20/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Brabo/perdia/esperanza/sabia/iba/acabar/andrajo/ celda/elpepuesp/20110520elpepunac_15/Tes

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In meeting with Obama, Netanyahu rules out Israeli withdrawal to 1967 boundaries By Scott Wilson, Published: May 20 Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu suggested Friday that President Obama holds an unrealistic view of how to achieve peace in the Middle East, saying that Israel would never pull back to the boundaries that the American president said a day earlier must be the basis for negotiations. 1967 Israeli pre-war boundary President Obama suggested yesterday that final peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians be based on Israel’s boundaries in 1967 on the eve of the Arab-Israeli war.

Gene Thorp/The Washington Post. Published on May 19, 2011, 9:49 p.m. The unusual Oval Office exchange, following a nearly two-hour meeting, laid bare the fundamental differences between Obama and the hawkish leader of the chief U.S. ally in the Middle East. Republicans on Capitol Hill, meanwhile, injected partisan politics

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into the debate by vowing to formally condemn Obama’s position toward Israel in a resolution next week. Obama and Netanyahu are allies only by tradition, and their relationship lacks personal warmth and is tested often by their differing political views. As they acknowledged their divisions in an appearance before reporters at the White House, it was clear that the split would not be easily resolved at a time when the Middle East and North Africa are undergoing historic political change. “Israel wants peace. I want peace. What we all want is a peace that will be genuine, that will hold, that will endure,” said Netanyahu, addressing Obama next to him but also an evening television audience in Israel. “The only peace that will endure is one that is based on reality, on unshakable facts. I think for there to be peace, the Palestinians will have to accept some basic realities.” Netanyahu, in a lecturing tone, then ruled out an Israeli withdrawal to the nation’s boundaries on the eve of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which ended with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and other territories under Israel’s control. Only a day earlier, Obama called for those 1967 lines to be the basis for Israeli- Palestinian peace negotiations over final borders, adding that negotiated land swaps would also be needed. His predecessor, George W. Bush, had called Israel’s withdrawal to those lines “unrealistic,” given the large Israeli settlements that have been built in the West Bank over more than four decades of occupation. Israel “cannot go back to the 1967 lines, because these lines are indefensible,” Netanyahu said Friday. “They don’t take into account certain changes that have taken place on the ground, demographic changes that have taken place over the last 44 years.” Administration officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the private meeting, said that Obama, like Bush before him, knows Israel will almost certainly not return to the 1967 lines in a final peace agreement. But the officials said Obama chose to stress a different starting point for talks, even though the negotiated outcome might be the same, to introduce a new element into what has been a stalled process. “The positions are consistent,” one official said, referring to Obama’s and Bush’s policies toward negotiations. “We certainly know what the president’s position doesn’t mean — a return to the 1967 lines.” Obama’s reference to the 1967 lines as a basis for talks, which took Israeli officials by surprise, prompted debate within the administration over how much pressure — or how little — he should apply to Israel at this time of political uncertainty across the Middle East, including in the Arab countries that are Israel’s neighbors. In choosing to outline his position on future borders but not on the more emotionally charged issues of dividing Jerusalem or resettling Palestinian refugees, Obama opted for a middle ground between those who advocated for a specific blueprint for peace and those who favored giving Israel more time. Among those in the former camp were Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, who phoned Netanyahu before Obama’s speech to tell him what the president would say — and received an angry response. Others, such as Middle East adviser Dennis Ross and

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national security adviser Thomas E. Donilon, argued that Obama should generally encourage both parties to return to the negotiating table. “Obviously there are some differences between us in the precise formulations and language, and that’s going to happen between friends,” Obama said in his appearance with Netanyahu. “But what we are in complete accord about is that a true peace can only occur if the ultimate resolution allows Israel to defend itself against threats, and that Israel’s security will remain paramount in U.S. evaluations of any prospective peace deal.” Obama spoke more briefly than Netanyahu, and he listened with his hand on his chin as the prime minister toured Israeli history, modern and ancient. But Obama did make several points that Netanyahu was hoping to hear. Obama declared that Israel’s security as “a Jewish state” was the “ultimate goal” of any peace negotiation. He also said that “it is very difficult for Israel to negotiate in a serious way with a party that rejects its right to exist” and that Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, “is not a partner for a significant, realistic peace process.” Hamas and Fatah, the Palestinians’ secular nationalist party, recently signed a pact to end years of sometimes violent confrontation and govern together. Netanyahu called Hamas “the Palestinian version of al-Qaeda” and said the leader of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, would have to choose whether “to keep his pact with Hamas or make peace with Israel.” The White House meeting began a busy few days for Netanyahu in Washington, where he will address a joint session of Congress on Tuesday. Republicans, in particular, appeared to take his side Friday in criticizing Obama on Israel. In a statement, Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) said he would introduce a congressional resolution next week “disapproving the president’s new policy towards Israel.” Hatch said the resolution would “affirm Israel’s right to maintain its territorial integrity.” While in town, Netanyahu will attend the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s annual convention. For the first time, Obama will also speak to AIPAC, the conservative pro-Israel lobby, in an address scheduled for Sunday. American Jews are an important constituency within the Democratic Party and play a major role in fundraising. A year and a half before the next election, some American Jewish activists and voters are wary of Obama after his early pressure on Israel to stop settlement construction in the West Bank. The most recent Gallup polling shows Obama with 65 percent approval among U.S. Jews. Democratic officials believe Obama will have no trouble winning the Jewish vote in 2012, but even a small dip in his popularity in Florida — a notoriously competitive state — could create problems for him. Until just a few days ago, Obama was expected to make a trip to Israel this summer, perhaps at the end of June. Some White House officials had said they believed Obama would make a Middle East trip around then. But the lack of progress in the talks has made the prospect of such a visit seem less likely. “Obama is under a lot of pressure to go to Israel,” said one Democratic adviser who consults with the White House on Middle East issues. Staff writer Anne E. Kornblut contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-meeting-with-obama-netanyahu-rules-out-israeli-withdrawal- to-1967-borders/2011/05/20/AFSWQx7G_story.html?nl_headlines 389

May 20, 2011 Obama Draws the Line By ROGER COHEN LONDON — On the eve of an election year, with Jewish donors and fund-raisers already restive over his approach to Israel, President Obama made a brave speech telling Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that “the dream of a Jewish and democratic state cannot be fulfilled with permanent occupation” and urging him to accept Israeli borders at or close to the 1967 lines. The president got 78 percent of the Jewish vote in 2008. Perhaps those words will cost him some of those votes — although sentiment toward Israel among American Jews is slowly shifting. But true friends are critical friends. And the American and Israeli national interest do not lie in the poisonous Israeli-Palestinian status quo. Netanyahu, who will address the U.S. Congress next week, will certainly attempt in response to go over the president’s head to those restive donors and fund-raisers. He’s Israel’s leader, but knows that a core constituency lies in the United States. He will try to outlast Obama, noting that Republican hopefuls like Mitt Romney are already talking of the president throwing “Israel under the bus.” He will try to kick the can down the road. Process without end favors Israel. Therein lurks the political fight of the next several months. The best Obama and Netanyahu will ever be able to do is position a fig-leaf of decorum over their differences. The worst poison is distrust. These two men have it aplenty for each other. Obama, in a first for an American president, has now said the border between Israel and Palestine should be “based on the 1967 lines.” Yes, it should. Netanyahu still talks of “Judea and Samaria,” a lexicon that, true to his Likud party’s platform, does not acknowledge those lines but sees one land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. Each leader believes Israel’s long-term security depends on his view prevailing. A Republican-dominated Congress awaits Netanyahu with open arms. So does the powerful pro-Israel lobby, Aipac. Netanyahu is no less susceptible to adulation than the average man. These are not backdrops that encourage tough choices. But he must make them or watch Israel’s isolation and instability grow. Does Netanyahu, with democratic change and movement coursing through the region, have it in him to move beyond short-term tactics to a strategy for his nation that ushers it from its siege mentality? I doubt it. I do know he will be judged a failure if he refuses, now, to make a good-faith effort to see if Israel’s security can be squared with Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza. That involves revealing Israel’s hand on borders with the same frankness the president has just shown. As Obama noted, occupation is “humiliation.” It was humiliation as experienced by a young Tunisian fruit vendor that sparked the unfurling of the Arab Spring. There is no 390

reason to believe this quest for dignity and self-governance will stop at Palestine’s door or that Israel’s quest for security can be sustained by walls alone. Arabs by the tens of millions have been overcoming the paralysis of fear. It is past time for Israel to do the same. A specter — Iran, Hamas, delegitimization campaigns — can always be summoned to dismiss peace. These threats exist. But I believe the most corrosive is Israeli dominion over another people. That’s the low road. Obama got it right. The essential trade-off is Israeli security for Palestinian sovereignty. Each side must convince the other that peace will provide it. Israeli security begins with a reconciled Fatah and Hamas committing irrevocably to nonviolence, with Palestinian acquiescence to a nonmilitarized state, and with Palestinian acceptance that a two-state peace ends all territorial claims. Palestinian sovereignty begins with what Obama called “the full and phased withdrawal of Israeli security forces” — including from the Jordan River border area — and with the removal of all settlements not on land covered by “mutually agreed swaps.” This is difficult but doable. The 1967 lines are not “indefensible,” as Netanyahu declared in his immediate response to Obama’s speech. What is “indefensible” over time for Israel is colonizing another people. That process has continued with settlements expanding in defiance of Obama’s urging. The president was therefore right to pull back from President George W. Bush’s acceptance of “already existing major Israeli population centers” beyond the 1967 lines. Palestinians have been making ominous wrong moves. The unilateralist temptation embodied in the quest for recognition of statehood at the United Nations in September must be resisted: It represents a return to useless symbolism and the narrative of victimhood. Such recognition — and of course the United States would not give it — would not change a single fact on the ground or improve the lot of Palestinians. What has improved their lot is the patient institution-building of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad on the West Bank, his embrace of nonviolence, and his refusal to allow the grievances of the past to halt the building of a future. To all of this Netanyahu has offered only the old refrain: Israel has no partner with which to build peace. It does — if it would only see and reinforce that partner. Beyond siege lies someone. You can follow Roger Cohen on Twitter at twitter.com/nytimescohen . http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/opinion/21iht- edcohen21.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha212

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05/20/2011 12:21 PM Obama's Marshallette Plan Baby Steps for a Tentative Statesman An Analysis by Gregor Peter Schmitz in Washington US President Barack Obama took a long time to come up with his response to the wave of revolution in the Arab world. In a keynote speech, he announced a kind of Marshall Plan for the region. But his goals are modest in comparison to the US's vision in 1947. When United States President Barack Obama strode up to the podium in the State Department to address the nation on Thursday, one was reminded of George Marshall -- at least a little bit. Just as Secretary of State Marshall did in his June 1947 speech, Obama focused on vital foreign policy fundamentals. Marshall delivered his speech from the steps of Memorial Church at Harvard University. His remarks were brief and sober -- and focused on the need for the US to help Europe get back on its feet after the terrible violence of World War II. He didn't come prepared with numbers and a detailed plan, but he did have a vision. And less than a year later, reality followed in the form of the first installments of an aid package that would ultimately reach $13 billion -- the equivalent of $120 billion in today's money. The Marshall Plan, announced almost discretely on that June day, went on to become one of the greatest successes ever in economic history. Appearances by Barack Obama, of course, can never be quite as modest -- he is, after all, the president of the United States. Furthermore, by the time he began speaking on Thursday, his aides had already ratcheted up expectations. It was to be a keynote speech on the Arab world -- and perhaps even a new beginning for his administration's foreign policy. Aides had even referenced the Marshall Plan during background briefings. The US, it would seem, is fond of comparing itself to successes from the past. Obama now would like to be a bit like Marshall. He even announced concrete financial aid on Thursday. But the sums pales in comparison to the Marshall Plan: just $2 billion for Egypt and a few million for Tunisia. Soaring Rhetoric Still, Obama's rhetoric was at least as soaring as that of his predecessor. "Politics alone has not put protesters into the streets. The tipping point for so many people is the more constant concern of putting food on the table and providing for a family," he said. "The greatest untapped resource in the Middle East and North Africa is the talent of its people." With the help of America, that is now to change. But no matter how much he would like to, Obama is unable to present a Marshall Plan for the Arab world. That isn't a consequence of the paltry sums of money or a lack of rhetorical effort. It is a consequence of the decidedly unambitious goals he set forth. Back in 1947, America knew exactly what it wanted. Marshall said that the consequences of a non-functioning economy in Europe for the United States were 392

"apparent to all." Europe should become strong once again, so that America would remain strong. That's why Marshall's plan was effective even without much fanfare. But what exactly does the US want in the Middle East today? Even Obama had to think long and hard about that question. His speech came months after the beginning of the Arab Spring. Which Side Is America On? The president tried to conceal his uncertainty with grand rhetoric. He spoke of an "historic opportunity" for change in the region, especially after the death of the "mass murderer" Osama bin Laden. The US president celebrated the Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi as a freedom fighter who sparked the protest movement with his self-immolation in December 2010, comparing him to American civil rights icons like Rosa Parks, who famously refused to give up her seat on a bus. "We have embraced the chance to show that America values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator," Obama said. But is America finally on the right side? It all depends on where you look. In Egypt, Washington no longer wanted dictator Hosni Mubarak in power, but it doesn't want to see the Muslim Brotherhood in government, either. In Syria, it would like to see Bashar Assad go and has already frozen the Syrian president's assets in the US. But Obama did not directly call for regime change in his speech. Similarly, Washington clearly wants to see Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi finally toppled, but it is unwilling to send in ground forces to achieve that aim. Addressing America's allies in the region, Obama said: "Our message is simple: If you take the risks that reform entails, you will have the full support of the United States." But he also said that the US would keep its "commitments to friends and partners." In other words, Bahrain's rulers can continue with their harsh crackdown on protests -- after all, the US Fifth Fleet is anchored there. Jordan's autocratic King Abdullah had to listen to a few words of admonition during his visit to Washington on Tuesday, but he also left the White House with the promise of a billion-dollar loan guarantee. And, in his speech, Obama did not even mention Saudi Arabia -- an autocratic regime that also happens to be one of the world's largest oil producers. Lose-Lose Issue He has also been neglecting the Mideast peace process. As a presidential candidate, Obama described the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians as a "constant sore," and he made it the central focus of his Cairo speech in 2009. Since then, though, there has been no movement. On top of that, Obama's Mideast envoy, George Mitchell, just stepped down. "A lasting peace will involve two states for two peoples," Obama is now saying. He is calling for a solution based on the borders established before the Six Day War in 1967, after which Israel annexed the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. His statement astounded diplomats. Still, the president avoided using any clear words about a new Middle East initiative. It's a lose-lose issue for Obama. If he is too aggressive in his dealings with the Israelis, he will anger loyal Jewish voters at home whose support he will need for re-election in 2012. At the same time, if he shies away from a tougher approach, he will also weaken his intention of creating a Marshall Plan for the Arab world. 393

Back when Washington implemented the Marshall Plan to rebuild the European continent, Europe knew that America needed it. Today, though, many Arabs see the US more as a country that shares responsibility for the suffering they have experienced under dictatorships in recent decades than as any kind of liberator. Many despots in the region even received financial aid from Washington. For many of those who suffered under those regimes, America's help is no longer important. "The Arab Spring will happen with or without the US," is arguably the region's new maxim. Divided Washington Still, Obama can't simply issue an apology for his country's past policies in the region. If he did, he would come under strong criticism at home, with some accusing him of not believing in America's primacy in the world. That, perhaps, is the most important historical difference: At the time of the Marshall Plan, Washington was also divided. The Democrats were in the White House and the Republicans controlled Congress. Nevertheless, the parties were able to reach an agreement on foreign policy. In today's Washington, even when America's interests are at stake, politicians don't seem capable of moving in lockstep. The House of Representatives -- currently controlled by a Republican Party that, in light of the massive budget deficit, is obsessed with savings measures -- doesn't want to provide any more money, so the White House will have to make do with $2 billion. Right after Obama's speech, right-wing news channel Fox News blasted the words "Obama Shocker." His demands on Israel were simply too radical, it said. Indeed, Obama may be able to act the part of the marshal, but he doesn't have much by way of a plan.

URL: Gregor Peter Schmitz Obama's Marshallette Plan Baby Steps for a Tentative Statesman05/20/2011 12:21 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763791,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Has the Arab Spring Stalled?: Autocrats Gain Ground in Middle East (05/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762861,00.html • Frozen Funds: The Complicated Hunt for Gadhafi's Billions (05/16/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,762748,00.html • Outdated Ideologies: Does Bin Laden's Death Mark the End of Jihadism? (05/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,761177,00.html • Are Assad's Days Numbered?: Syria's Neighbors Fear Regime Change (05/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,760113,00.html

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05/20/2011 04:43 PM Rising Literacy and a Shrinking Birth Rate A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution In a SPIEGEL interview, French social scientist Emmanuel Todd discusses the demographic roots of the Arab revolution, which he argues was spurred by rising literacy and rapidly shrinking birth rates. He also muses on the ghost of Osama bin Laden, arguing "al-Qaida was already dead," and on why he believes Germany is not a part of the "core West." SPIEGEL: Monsieur Todd, in the middle of the Cold War, in the days of Leonid Brezhnev, you predicted the collapse of the Soviet system. In 2002, you described the economic and imperial erosion of the United States, a global superpower. And, four years ago, you and your colleague Youssef Courbage predicted the unavoidable revolution in the Arab world. Are you clairvoyant? Todd: The academic as fortune-teller -- a tempting idea. But Courbage and I merely analyzed the reasons for a possible -- or let's say likely -- revolution in the Arab world, an inexorable change, which could also have unfolded as a gradual evolution. Our work was like that of geologists who compile the signs of an imminent earthquake or volcanic eruption. But when exactly the eruption takes place, and its form and severity -- these things cannot be predicted in an exact way. SPIEGEL: On what indicators do you base your probability calculation? Todd: Mainly on three factors: the rapid increase in literacy, particularly among women, a falling birthrate and a significant decline in the widespread custom of endogamy, or marriage between first cousins. This shows that the Arab societies were on a path toward cultural and mental modernization, in the course of which the individual becomes much more important as an autonomous entity. SPIEGEL: And what is the consequence? Todd: That this development ends with the transformation of the political system, a spreading wave of democratization and the conversion of subjects into citizens. Although this follows a global trend, it can take some time. SPIEGEL: The impression we have at the moment is of a breathtaking acceleration of history, similar to the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989. Todd: At this point, no one can say what the liberal movements in these countries will turn into. Revolutions often end up as something different from what their supporters proclaim at the beginning. Democracies are fragile systems that require deep historic roots. It took almost a century from the time of the French Revolution in 1789 until the democratic form of government, in the form of the Third Republic, finally took shape after France had lost a war against the Germans in 1871. In the interim, there was Napoleon, the royalist restoration and the Second Empire under Napoleon III, the "little one," as Victor Hugo said derisively. SPIEGEL: Can the crises of transition that usually follow revolutions benefit the Islamists? 395

Todd: This cannot be completely ruled out when the power lies in the streets. Chaos creates the desire for a return to stability, for a sense of direction. But I don't believe that will happen. The Islamists did not play a role in Tunisia and in Egypt the course of events seems to have taken the Muslim Brotherhood by surprise. The Islamists are now trying to organize as political parties within a pluralistic system. These freedom movements are not anti-Western. On the contrary, in Libya, the rebels are calling for more support from NATO. The Arab revolution has set aside the cliché of a cultural and religious uniqueness that supposedly makes Islam incompatible with democracy and supposedly destines Muslims to be ruled by at best enlightened despots. SPIEGEL: It's noticeable that you downplay the significance of the religious and economic factor in your interpretation. What makes you so sure? Todd: I don't disregard it; I just think it's secondary. I am a statistician, a "cosine academic," should you find the expression amusing. The condition for any modernization is demographic modernization. It goes hand-in-hand with a decline in experienced and practiced religiosity. We are already experiencing a de-Islamization of Arab societies, a demystification of the world, as Max Weber called it, and it will inevitably continue, just as a de-Christianization occurred in Europe. SPIEGEL: But appearances contradict your assumption. Women are not removing their headscarves, and Islamist terrorism hasn't been defeated by any stretch of the imagination. Todd: The Islamist convulsions are classic companion elements of the disorientation that characterizes every upheaval. But according to the law of history that states that educational progress and a decline in the birth rate are indicators of growing rationalization and secularization, Islamism is a temporary defensive reaction to the shock of modernization and by no means the vanishing point of history. For the Muslim world, that vanishing point is far more universal than people are willing to admit. The notion of unchanging Islam and the Muslim essence are purely intellectual constructs of the West. The tracks along which the world's various cultures and religions move are converging toward an encounter rather than the battle that Samuel Huntington believed would take shape. SPIEGEL: Osama bin Laden sought to conduct this clash of civilizations with spectacularly staged acts of terror. Does his death mark the political end of al-Qaida? Todd: His ghost may continue to fascinate people. His admirers can try to keep the flame alive. But the horribly brutal action taken by the United States actually came at the worst possible moment. Al-Qaida was already politically dead before the death of Bin Laden. The organization never became a mass movement. It existed solely through the propaganda of the deed, like the European anarchists of the 19th century. Bin Laden shared with them the romantic dimension of the lone hero, the avenger of the disenfranchised. SPIEGEL: He also called for the overthrow of Arab despots. Todd: He failed. The popular movements of the Arab Spring have nothing in common with mythical visions like pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism. The basic fallacy consists in seeing the ideological or religious crises in the Islamic countries as phenomena of regression. On the contrary, these are crises of a modernization that destabilize the ruling regimes. The fact that the turmoil in the region and the advance of fundamentalism are coinciding is a classic phenomenon. Doubt and fanaticism are two 396

sides of the same development. Examples can also be found in European intellectual history. Descartes, the founder of methodological doubt, gave himself the urgent task of proving the existence of God. And Pascal, a mathematician and physicist, perceived such a strong religious need that he made a bet that was as famous as it was questionable, arguing that one can lose nothing but gain everything by believing in God. He became a follower of Jansenism, a fundamentalist version of the Christianity of his day. Unemployment and Social Frustration Foment Unrest SPIEGEL: Aren't poverty or affluence also crucial? Tunisia, Syria, Egypt and Yemen don't have bubbling oil revenues. Todd: Of course, one can placate the people with bread and money, but only for a while. Revolutions usually erupt during phases of cultural growth and economic downturn. For me, as a demographer, the key variable is not the per capita gross domestic product but the literacy rate. The British historian Lawrence Stone pointed out this relationship in his study of the English revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries. He saw the critical threshold at 40 to 60 percent. SPIEGEL: Well, most young Arabs can now read and write, but how is the birth rate actually developing? The population in Arab countries is extremely young, with half of its citizens younger than 25. Todd: Yes, but that's because the previous generation had so many children. In the meantime, however, the birth rate is falling dramatically in some cases. It has fallen by half in the Arab world in just one generation, from 7.5 children per woman in 1975 to 3.5 in 2005. The birth rate among female academics is just below 2.1, the level needed to maintain a population. Tunisia now has a birth rate similar to that of France. In Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt, it has dropped below the magic threshold of three children per woman. This means that young adults constitute the majority of the population and, unlike their fathers and mothers, they can read and write, and they also practice contraception. But they suffer from unemployment and social frustration. It isn't surprising that unrest was inevitable in this part of world. SPIEGEL: Is that why angry young men are taking the revolution into the streets, while there is a lack of recognized older forward-looking thinkers and leaders? Todd: That isn't surprising. Young men led the revolutions in England and France. Robespierre was only 31 in 1789, and he was 36 when he was sent to the guillotine. His adversary Danton and his ally Saint-Just were also young men, one in his early 30s and the other in his mid-20s. Although Lenin was older, the Bolshevik shock troops were made up of young men, as were the Nazi storm troopers. It was young men who faced off against the Soviet tanks in Budapest in 1956. The explanation is banal: Young men have more strength and more to gain. SPIEGEL: Why has it taken so long for the values of the modern age to reach the Islamic world? After all, the golden age of Arab civilization ended in the 13th century. Todd: There is a simple explanation, which has the benefit of also being applicable to northern India and China, that is, to three completely differently religious communities: Islam, Hinduism and Confucianism. It has to do with the structure of the traditional family in these regions, with its debasement and with the disenfranchisement of women. And in Mesopotamia, for example, it extends well into the pre-Islamic world. 397

Mohammed, the founder of Islam, granted women far more rights than they have had in most Arab societies to this day. SPIEGEL: Does that mean that the Arabs conformed to older local circumstances and spread them across the entire Middle East? Todd: Yes. The patrilinear, patrilocal system, in which only male succession is considered valid and newlyweds, preferably cousins in the ideal Arab marriage, live under the roof and authority of the father, inhibits all social progress. The disenfranchisement of women deprives them of the ability to raise their children in a progressive, dynamic fashion. Society calcifies and, in a sense, falls asleep. The powers of the individual cannot develop. The bourgeois achievement of marriage for love, and the free choice of one's partner, replaced the hierarchies of honor in Europe in the 19th century and reinforced the desire for freedom. SPIEGEL: Is female emancipation the prerequisite for modernization in the Arab world? Todd: It's in full swing. The headscarf debate is missing the point. The number of marriages between cousins is dropping just as spectacularly as the birth rate, thereby blasting away a barrier. The free individual or active citizen can enter the public arena. When more than 90 percent of young people can read and write and have a modicum of education, no traditional authoritarian regime will last for long. Have you noticed how many women are marching along in the protests? Even in Yemen, the most backward country in the Arab world, thousands of women were among the protesters. SPIEGEL: The family is the private sphere par excellence. Why do changes in its structure necessarily spread to the political sphere? Todd: The relationship between those at the top and those at the bottom is changing. When the authority of fathers begins to falter, political power generally collapses, as well. This is because the system of the patrilinear, endogamous extended family has been reproduced within the leadership of nations. The family patriarch as head of state places his sons and other male relatives in positions of power. Political dynasties develop, as in the case of the senior and junior Assad in Syria. Corruption flourishes because the clan runs things for its own benefit. The state is of course privatized as a family business. The power of obedience is based on a combination of loyalty, repression and political economics. Arab Spring More Like "European Spring of 1848" than Collapse of Communism SPIEGEL: The statistics reveal considerable differences. Tunisia can't be compared with Yemen. How is it that the spark of revolution still managed to jump to Yemen? Todd: There is also an example of that in European history. SPIEGEL: You mean the revolutions of 1848-49? Todd: Yes. The Arab Spring resembles the European Spring of 1848 more closely than the fall of 1989, when communism collapsed. The initial spark in France triggered unrest in Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria, Italy, Spain and Romania -- a classic chain reaction, despite major regional differences. SPIEGEL: If the Arab world now enters the modern age, will the universal Western values -- such as freedom, equality, human rights and human dignity -- triumph once and for all? 398

Todd: I would be cautious in that regard. Democratic movements can take on highly different forms, as we can see with the example of Eastern Europe after 1990. (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir) Putin undoubtedly has the support of the majority of the Russian people, but does that make Russia a flawless democracy? SPIEGEL: Where do you draw the boundary of the West? Todd: In fact, only Great Britain, France and the United States, in that historic order, constitute the core of the West. But not Germany. SPIEGEL: Are you serious? Todd: Oh, it's fun to provoke a representative of "the German news magazine." What I'm saying is that Germany contributed nothing to the liberal democratic movement in Europe. SPIEGEL: What about the Hambach Festival in 1832, the March Revolution in 1848, the national assembly in St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt, the 1918 November Revolution, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, (former Chancellor Konrad) Adenauer's integration with the West and the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 brought about peacefully by the people? Todd: Okay, the postwar history is all very well and good, but it had to be put into motion by the Western Allies. Everything that happened earlier failed. Authoritarian government systems consistently prevailed, while democratic conditions had already predominated in England, America and France for a long time. Germany produced the two worst totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century. Even the greatest philosophers, like Kant and Hegel, were, unlike David Hume in England or Voltaire in France, not exactly beacons of political liberalism. No, Germany's immense contribution to European cultural history is something completely different. SPIEGEL: And now you're going to say something nice? Todd: The Reformation -- and, with it, the strengthening of the individual, supported by his knowledge -- and the spread of reading through the printing press -- that's the German contribution. The fight over the Reformation was waged in a journalistic manner, with pamphlets and flyers. The spread of literacy among the masses was invented in Germany. Prussia, and even the small Catholic states, had a higher literacy rate than France early on. Literacy came to France from the east, that is, from Germany. Germany was a nation of education and a constitutional state long before it became a democracy. But Martin Luther also proved that religious reforms did not by any means require the support of a spirit of liberalism. SPIEGEL: But Germany's Sonderweg, or "special path," has now come to an end. Todd: Well, I believe that the Germans still feel a secret and, at the same time, slightly narcissistic fear, as if they sensed that they are not quite part of the West. It seems to me that their preferred form of government is the grand coalition, not the abrupt change of power that occurs in France and the Anglo-Saxon countries. Perhaps Germany would rather be like a large Switzerland or a large Sweden, a consensus democracy in which the ideological camps come to resemble one another and the political extended family in the government takes care of everything. SPIEGEL: What's wrong with that?

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Todd: Nothing. The cultural difference between Germany and France shouldn't be buried under avowals of friendship. France is individualistic and egalitarian, at least far more so than Germany, where the tradition of the unequal, authoritarian tribal family still has an impact today, as in the debate over the right maternal image. Perhaps this also explains why Germany, despite its catastrophic birth rate, has so much trouble with immigration, and yet vastly outpaces France with its technical and industrial capabilities. SPIEGEL: Does that mean that the German-French friendship is merely an illusion? Todd: No, but the relationship is certainly shaped by an unspoken rivalry. However, if the European Union recognizes its diversity, even its anthropological differences, instead of trying to force everyone into the same mold with the false incantation of a shared European civilization, then Europe will also be able to treat the pluralism of cultures in the world in a reasonable and enlightened way. I'm not sure that the United States can do that. SPIEGEL: Monsieur Todd, we thank you for this interview. Interview conducted by Romain Leick; Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL: Emmanuel Todd A Look at the Root Causes of the Arab Revolution05/20/2011 04:43 PM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763537,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Has the Arab Spring Stalled?: Autocrats Gain Ground in Middle East (05/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762861,00.html • SPIEGEL Interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy: 'We Lost a Great Deal of Time in Libya Because of the Germans' (03/30/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,753797,00.html Related internet links • Wikipedia: Sonderweg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonderweg SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages. ABOUT EMMANUEL TODD

Myr Muratet Emmanuel Todd, 60, studied political science in Paris and history in Cambridge. He has coducted research at the National Institute of Demographic Studies in Paris since 1984. Todd sees himself as an "empirical Hegelian" who recognizes a universal course of history. For Todd, family structures, population and educational policy factors are more important than the economic system. He has published many respected studies, such as "The Final Fall: An Essay on the Decomposition of the Soviet Sphere" (1976), "The Fate of Immigrants" (1994)," "The Economic Illusion" (1998), "After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order"(2002) and "A Convergence of Civilizations: The Transformation of Muslim Societies Around the World" (2007), about the changes in the Islamic world. An English translation of the book was published this month.

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DER SPIEGEL Graphic: Endogamy in Muslim countries

DER SPIEGEL Graphic: A Region of Youths

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05/20/2011 03:01 PM Libya's Top Diplomat in Berlin 'I Am No Longer Gadhafi's Ambassador' Libya's ambassadors to the United Nations, the US and India renounced the Gadhafi regime long ago. But the country's ambassador to Germany, Jamal El- Baraq, kept quiet. Now he has distanced himself from the dictator in a SPIEGEL ONLINE interview. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Mr. Baraq, former Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa fled the country in March. Oil Minister Shukri Ghanem is reported to have defected. And now there are even rumors that Moammar Gadhafi's wife and daughter have arrived in Tunisia. What is your position regarding the regime in Tripoli? Baraq: It will collapse. The regime is fighting against its own people. It fires on defenseless people with heavy artillery. I come from Misrata -- my whole family comes from there. Every day, acquaintances and friends of ours are being killed there. A school friend of my son Rawad has just died. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why are you only making such critical remarks now? Why did you not renounce the regime long ago, like your fellow ambassadors in Delhi and in Washington? Abdurrahman Shalgham, Libya's former ambassador to the United Nations, did so right at the beginning of the crisis. Baraq: I called Shalgham at the time. He was the person who originally sent me to Berlin as ambassador. He told me: Continue with your work for now. And that's what I did. Libya's people's bureaus (ed's note: Libya' s official name for its embassies) abroad represent, as the name suggests, the people. I am no longer Gadhafi's ambassador. I am a representative of the Libyan people. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Are you hereby dissociating yourself from the regime in Tripoli? Baraq: I will no longer accept what this regime is doing. I hate what the regime is doing. A government has to protect its people, not kill them. SPIEGEL ONLINE: If you now see things that way, how can you stay in your position? Baraq: Because Shalgham advised me to do so. Ever since the UN adopted Resolution 1973, I have not done any more political work. I only come into the office occasionally. But we have over 700 Libyan students in Germany. I make sure that they get their €1,800 allowance each month and that their health insurance and tuition fees are paid. SPIEGEL ONLINE: So you are still receiving money from Libya? Baraq: We have enough money to last us until June. The last transfer arrived just over a month ago. But Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt has not released the funds. Our branch in Berlin is now trying to find out if this is perhaps possible. SPIEGEL ONLINE: How much money do you actually get? Baraq: At the end of each quarter we receive our budget for the next three months: about €1.6 million per month for the students and a smaller amount, about €150,000 per month, to cover the salaries of the embassy staff.

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SPIEGEL ONLINE: Do you really have no other funds on top of that? Were you not the person who acquired the properties in Munich where Gadhafi's son Saif al-Arab Gadhafi lived before he returned to Libya, before reportedly being killed during a NATO air strike two weeks ago? Baraq: That is correct. I was responsible for buying the house where he lived. But I had no personal dealings with him. SPIEGEL ONLINE: What are your current plans? Baraq: I am currently trying to get the German Foreign Ministry to issue visas for 11 seriously injured people from Misrata who are currently in hospitals in Turkey and Tunisia. Nothing more can be done for them there. SPIEGEL ONLINE: The German authorities would probably find it easier to accommodate your wishes if you had publicly expressed your position earlier. Baraq: The German Foreign Ministry knows my position. SPIEGEL ONLINE: The Foreign Ministry summoned you in early April and expelled five of your diplomats from Germany. Baraq: I had no problem with that. Some of them had already left the country anyway. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why did you not at least use that opportunity to distance yourself from the Gadhafi regime? Baraq: Let me repeat what I said earlier. I followed the advice of my former foreign minister, Abdurrahman Shalgham, who is a very experienced diplomat. SPIEGEL ONLINE: But he took a risk and distanced himself from the regime right at the beginning of the war. Baraq: In his case that also meant something. It was a sign that was recognized all over the world. My situation is somewhat different. I have to take care of the Libyan community living in Germany. Interview conducted by Bernhard Zand URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763839,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Obama's Marshallette Plan: Baby Steps for a Tentative Statesman (05/20/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,763791,00.html • Has the Arab Spring Stalled?: Autocrats Gain Ground in Middle East (05/18/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762861,00.html • Frozen Funds: The Complicated Hunt for Gadhafi's Billions (05/16/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,762748,00.html

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05/20/2011 01:33 PM Fears of Disruptions Spain Bans Protests Ahead of Sunday Vote With the protest movement in Spain growing, Spanish authorities on Friday banned demonstrations this weekend as regional and municipal elections take place. Youth are protesting in the country against high unemployment and austerity measures, with protests in Madrid even being compared to Tahrir Square in Cairo. Mass protests have flared up across Spain during the past week over rampant youth unemployment and austerity measures imposed because of the economic crisis. On Friday, though, the government moved to put the lid on what has become the largest protest movement in Europe at the moment. Spain's Central Electoral Board has banned protests planned for this weekend in the run-up to Sunday's elections. The authority fears demonstrations could disrupt regional and communal elections being held on Sunday or influence voters, a statement issued early Friday morning said. In this instance, officials argued, the right to vote takes precedence over freedom of assembly. The Real Democracy Now movement had called on Spaniards to return to the streets on Saturday to protest against social and political reforms in the crisis-plagued country. Demonstrations had also been planned for Sunday. The ruling still permits protests on Friday and demonstraters continued to gather. The activists organizing the protests had called on voters to boycott the country's two leading political parties, the Socialists (PSOE) and the center-right opposition People's Party (PP) in Sunday's elections. Over 8,000 municipal and 13 regional elections are being held in Spain on Sunday. Over night, thousands of mostly young protesters converged again on Madrid's central Puerta del Sol square, where they protested against the ban on demonstrations this weekend with a chorus of whistles. "They call it democracy, but it isn't one," the protesters chanted. Several hundred protesters have been camped out on the square in a tent city this week. Despite the tense atmosphere, the protests have so far remained peaceful. A Protest Movement Develops Overnight The protesters have occupied the square for days now, with some comparing the gatherings to those that took place on Cairo's Tahrir Square earlier this year, and demonstrations also continued for the fifth day in a row on Thursday in Barcelona, Valencia, Bilbao and Santiago de Compostela. Spaniards living abroad have also set up protest camps outside the country's embassies in Berlin, Paris, London and Amsterdam. Most of the events have been organized online. After organizing demonstrations in around 50 cities last Sunday, the Real Democracy Now movement became a household name virtually overnight. The movement symbolizes the frustration of the so-called "Lost Generation" in Spain, where unemployment among under-25 year olds is 45 percent and the overall unemployment rate is 21 percent, the highest in the European Union. Many feel the situation has been exacerbated by the austerity measures implemented by the country to

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reduce the national deficit and prevent a Greece-style EU and International Monetary Fund bailout. Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero said Friday that the protests were "understandable," expressing his sympathies for the protesters. "We have to listen and be sensitive, because there are reasons why they are expressing their unhappiness and their criticism," the prime minister said one day earlier, admonishing politicians to listen to the protesters' message. At the same time, he said that Spain's painful austerity measures and reforms must continue. The prime minister called on members of the Socialist party participating in the protest movement to cast ballots in Sunday's elections, saying that only those who cast votes can actually change things. The Central Electoral Board that imposed the ban on protests is comprised of justices from the country's highest court as well as university professors in law, politics and social sciences. Spanish radio has reported that the authority only had a one-vote majority for the ban. dsl -- with wires

URL: • http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,763836,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Photo Gallery: Protests in Madrid's Puerta del Sol http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-68235.html • Tahrir Square in Madrid: Spain's Lost Generation Finds Its Voice (05/19/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,763581,00.html • Labor Markets in Flux: Spanish Youth Part of the Lost Generation (06/08/2010) http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,699467,00.html

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Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe El escuadrón de la muerte rebelde La Brigada 17 de Febrero, una mezcla de milicia y policía política, acumula cada vez más poder en el este de Libia e inquieta a las autoridades de Bengasi MAITE RICO (ENVIADA ESPECIAL) - Bengasi - 20/05/2011 El tránsito de furgonetas, algunas provistas de ametralladoras, es incesante en la base de Gar Yunis. El antiguo cuartel de las temibles milicias de Muamar el Gadafi en Bengasi está ahora ocupado por la Brigada 17 de Febrero, el brazo armado de la revolución libia. Integrado por unos 2.000 voluntarios, este grupo ejerce tareas militares y de seguridad. Uno de sus principales cometidos es la captura de funcionarios y células gadafistas. El creciente poder de la brigada, que actúa con total autonomía, empieza a inquietar a algunas autoridades rebeldes. "Nosotros nacimos antes que el Consejo Nacional de Transición", dice Mustafá el Saguisli, número dos de la milicia, dejando caer el principio de veteranía. El embrión fueron los grupos de civiles que se organizaron para asaltar el cuartel general de Gadafi o inutilizar con toneladas de basura las pistas del aeropuerto de Bengasi en los primeros días de la revuelta. El Saguisli era hasta entonces un programador informático sin ninguna experiencia militar. La pistola en la cintura, que no se quita ni durante el almuerzo en sus oficinas, es un buen indicio de que las cosas han cambiado. En tres meses, aquellas caóticas brigadas se han convertido en un cuerpo jerarquizado e instruido por militares profesionales. Al mando está Fauzi Bukatef, un ingeniero petrolero que se mantiene en la penumbra. "Entrenamos a todo el que quiere y luego los filtramos", explica El Saguisli. "Unos van al frente, otros se destinan a la seguridad de Bengasi, en colaboración con lo que queda de la policía, y otros se unen al Departamento de Seguridad". Esta nueva policía política es la encargada de dar caza a esa "quinta columna" que obsesiona a la población. "Los gadafistas siguen activos, pero hemos detenido a muchos. Nosotros tenemos en la base a unos 200, entre exfuncionarios de seguridad, miembros de los comités revolucionarios o simples traidores. Algunos son peces gordos". Preocupadas por su reputación internacional, las autoridades rebeldes han permitido el acceso de la Cruz Roja y otros organismos a los centros de detención. Pero la persecución de gadafistas ha suscitado tensiones entre el Consejo rebelde y la Brigada 17 de Febrero. "Ellos dicen que no es el momento de detenciones ni procesamientos", explica Mustafá el Saguisli. "Nos han pedido incluso que soltáramos a algunos porque había presiones de sus tribus y no quieren problemas. Pero nosotros pensamos que el poder de la revolución debe prevalecer sobre el poder de la tribu. Y liberar a esa gente va a alentar las venganzas". En Bengasi se han dado ya al menos cuatro asesinatos selectivos de miembros de los aparatos represores de Gadafi. Sobre los autores de los crímenes nada se sabe, aunque, en uno de los casos, un familiar aseguró que los asaltantes iban en un vehículo con el emblema de la Brigada.

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No es este, sin embargo, el único motivo de roce con los gobernantes interinos, enredados ellos mismos en un complejo organigrama. Resulta patente, en conversaciones con varios funcionarios civiles y militares, que la Brigada 17 de Febrero es vista con sumo recelo, quizás -y esto no se dice- porque puede ser decisiva en la lucha por el poder que tarde o temprano se va a desatar tras la caída de Gadafi. "Nosotros somos autónomos. Tenemos una buena relación con el jefe del Estado Mayor, general Abdulfatah Yunis, y nuestras unidades militares están bajo un mismo mando en el frente. Pero somos independientes", subraya Mustafá el Saguisli. La brigada ha vuelto a estar en el punto de mira a raíz de la muerte, el pasado miércoles, de Pierre Marziali, director de Secopex, una empresa francesa de seguridad que negociaba con el Gobierno rebelde un contrato de asesoría. Marziali recibió un balazo en la espalda y sus cuatro compañeros fueron detenidos por un grupo del que, hasta ahora, nadie daba cuenta. "Fue nuestra unidad, con la policía", afirma el número dos de la Brigada. "Eran espías pagados por Gadafi, muy peligrosos. Los tenemos nosotros. Están bien. Reciben la visita del embajador francés. En unos días habremos concluido la investigación". Las circunstancias de la muerte de Marziali y sus propias contradicciones han puesto en apuros a las autoridades de Bengasi. El Gobierno francés, uno de sus grandes valedores, hace todo lo posible por mantener el asunto con sordina. La Brigada 17 de Febrero no es la única milicia en la capital rebelde. El vacío de poder tras el desplome del régimen y el asalto a los arsenales alentaron el surgimiento de pequeños grupos armados que hoy circulan sin control alguno. MAITE RICO El escuadrón de la muerte rebelde.. La Brigada 17 de Febrero, una mezcla de milicia y policía política, acumula cada vez más poder en el este de Libia e inquieta a las autoridades de Bengasi 20/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/escuadron/muerte/rebelde/elpepuint/20110 520elpepiint_5/Tes Ola de cambio en el mundo árabe Médicos sin Fronteras pide a Zapatero que protega a las víctimas de la guerra de Libia En una misiva enviada al presidente del Gobierno le exigen que sea prioritaria su responsabilidad de auxiliar a los desplazados por el conflicto armado EL PAÍS - Madrid - 20/05/2011 En una carta reimitida por José Antonio Bastos, presidente de Médicos Sin Fronteras (MsF), a José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, presidente del Gobierno, la ONG de ayuda médica exige al Ejecutivo español que asuma su responsabilidad con los desplazados por el conflicto armado en Libia, en el que España participa junto a otros Estados miembros de la Unión Europea para derrocar al régimen de Muamar el Gadafi. "Hoy le corresponde concretar su voluntad de proteger a los civiles libios. La suerte de las víctimas de guerra y el respeto de sus derechos, cuya responsabilidad le atañe, debe ser prioritaria para su Gobierno", exige la misiva.

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Como se explica en el escrito, el conflicto ha provocado el desplazamiento de más de 750.000 civiles, que huyen de la violencia. Señala que "mientras Túnez y Egipto ya han acogido en difíciles condiciones a más de 630.000 de estas personas, los Estados europeos se debaten actualmente en una lucha de egoísmos, que ha derivado en la práctica en una restricción del acceso de estas víctimas de guerra al territorio europeo, alegando la lucha contra la inmigración irregular". Médicos sin Fronteras considera que se trata no solo de una responsabilidad moral, sino "un deber legal, al amparo de los convenios internacionales de los que España es signataria". La carta, que también ha sido enviada a los jefes de Estado o de Gobierno de los países miembros de la Unión Europea, a los presidentes de las instituciones europeas, a los Altos Comisionados de Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados y para los Derechos Humanos y a la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones, urge a la Unión Europea y a sus Estados miembros "a respetar los derechos de todos los civiles que huyen del conflicto en Libia, garantizando el principio de no-devolución a una zona de guerra, el acceso al proceso de petición de asilo cuando así lo soliciten y que les sean aseguradas unas condiciones de acogida dignas en Europa". "Cientos de hombres, mujeres y niños que intentaban llegar a Europa -o fueron forzados a salir por las autoridades libias, que no han perdido la oportunidad de demostrar su capacidad de represalia- ya han perdido la vida en el mar. Otros miles han desembarcado en las costas italianas estas últimas semanas y están siendo acogidos en condiciones inhumanas y totalmente inadecuadas a sus necesidades, como atestiguan los equipos de Médicos Sin Fronteras en Lampedusa", concluye el escrito. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Medicos/Fronteras/pide/Zapatero/protega/victim as/guerra/Libia/elpepuint/20110520elpepunac_2/Tes

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Published on Al-Masry Al-Youm: Today's News from Egypt (http://www.almasryalyoum.com) Home > Special from Libya: Rebels use Qadhafi's resources against him

Special from Libya: Rebels use Qadhafi's resources against him Brian Dabbs Author: Brian Dabbs Benghazi - In the chief stronghold of the Libyan revolutionaries, Benghazi authorities are converting former icons of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi’s brutal repression into vital tools of the new country they envision freed from despotic rule. They’re not being discreet about it either. The president’s former internal security headquarters and Supreme Court complex, located in Benghazi’s vibrant downtown seaside section, is now the city’s press center and home to various political reformist organizations. The walls of the center’s atrium are filled with artwork ridiculing Qadhafi. One painting depicts the strongman of 42 years peeking out of a large green book, a reference to his political indoctrination literature, while toting an AK-47. Another shows Qadhafi being crushed by a large hiking boot while blurting out “Wait…I’ve decided to negotiate.” But the relatively light tone of the criticism doesn’t dismiss the horrid persecution that took place mere meters away. The former security building, adjacent to the center, was once the location of subterranean torture chambers. Today it lies in rubble, filled with deteriorating concrete, heaps of ashes of incriminating documents, broken glass, and burnt and mangled bed frames. “Indisputably, particularly from the residents of Benghazi and east Libya, this was a black spot, a mark of terrorism and oppression,” says the facility’s new warden Rajab al-Vatouri, former Air Force Sergeant and one of the first officers in Benghazi to defect. “Anyone suspected of not being loyal to the regime would be taken here… you’d be lucky to come out alive.” Vatouri says the establishment of a press center at this location sends a message that suppressive rule is a thing of the past in Libya. “I want to see more of that,” says Vatouri. “All Benghazis want to see this whole place turned 180 degrees with gardens and people talking about religion and politics.” But in the past few weeks and months, this facility, according to Vatouri, has been used for purposes directly linked to the armed struggle to depose the president. After protesters stormed the building in the early days of the revolution and Qadhafi’s security fled, authorities in the rag-tag rebel army began using the former internal security headquarters as a weapons depot. All arms confiscated from loyalists and mercenaries were brought here for distribution to the front-lines in areas like Brega and Misrata. Al-Vatouri says he was charged with that allocation. 409

A few kilometers outside of Benghazi, the Platoon of the Martyrs of 17 February training center is a much more visible example of a regime facility being utilized for the rebel combat effort in the divided country. After passing through large concrete arches and sandbag barriers draped with camouflage leaf nets marking the facility’s entrance, the words “Free Revolutionaries Platoon,” scrawled on an office façade to the right, are riddled with four bullet holes. Burnt-out cars and buses litter the premises. But towards the rear of the facility, dozens of Libyans, defected soldiers and other combatants with no military experience prior to the uprising perform quality checks on artillery and other weaponry. They modify weapons, whether sent from abroad or seized on the battlefield, to fit the particular needs of a dynamic conflict. The revolutionaries oil ammunition and send anti-artillery test shots into the sky. According to supermarket employee-turned-soldier Hisham Laojale, 22, rebels on 15 February seized control of a property that was formerly the primary educational facility for Green Book instruction under Qadhafi. The Green Book, published first in 1975, was Qadhafi’s primary nationalist and socialist propaganda instrument. It is viewed by the revolutionaries of Benghazi as a tool of repression. Four days after the seizure, on 19 February, Qadhafi’s forces mounted a reprisal attack, Laojale recounts, which devastated the rebel ranks at the facility but ultimately lent victory to the rebels. “At first we let them come in. And then we fought,” explains Laojale, pointing to a skeletal pick-up he says he drove during the fight. “It was the big day. We were 30. We came back two.” Laojale says his fellow combatants still desperately need weapons from NATO and other foreign allies. But from an instructional standpoint, he claims, Libya is well equipped. “The teachers in here are perfect,” says Laojale. “They teach us everything… from the handgun to the grenade.” The Platoon of the Martyr’s of 17 February has had foreign military advisers, such as Qatari soldiers, on site in past weeks. The facility has also drawn in former members of Qadhafi’s elite divisions. “I make use of all the military trainers who used to be Special Forces,” says Fawzi Mukatif, commander of the brigade who previously worked with an oil firm in the gulf. “Now they’re teaching the volunteers.” Fighting along Libya’s coastal highway has reached stalemate, but clashes continue to rage in the western mountains and areas around the rebel held port city Misrata. The weapons that pass through the facility here in Benghazi boost the revolutionary forces but no less important, Mukatif says, they hearken a new era in Libyan history. “This is the exact opposite of what he did. We are freeing people from his teachings,” says Mukatif. “In the same place where he taught the Green Book, we are training the revolutionaries.” Fri, 20/05/2011 - 13:16 http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/445093

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EL LARGO CAMINO QUE AGUARDA A TÚNEZ

EL LARGO CAMINO QUE AGUARDA A TÚNEZ Mayo 2011 [3] Barah Mikail [4] El Gobierno de transición y sus partidarios deben tener cuidado de no caer en políticas torpes que puedan desaprovechar la oportunidad democrática del país y que conlleven consecuencias negativas para el resto de la región.

FETHI BELAID/AFP/Gettyimages En medio de la agitación que domina Oriente Medio, en particular la situación en Siria y Libia, Túnez puede parecer hoy un país pacífico que avanza hacia la democracia. Mientras se dispone a organizar las elecciones previstas para el 24 de julio, muchas personas están tratando de constituir partidos con la esperanza de preparar el terreno para un futuro prometedor. El Gobierno de transición ha prohibido a los miembros del régimen del derrocado Ben Alí y el antiguo partido gobernante que se presenten a algún cargo durante diez años, y el primer ministro interino, Beji Caid Essebsi, ha confirmado que el Ejecutivo respalda la paridad obligatoria entre hombres y mujeres para las listas electorales, con unas reglas que garanticen la colocación de las mujeres en puestos en los que puedan salir elegidas. La comunidad internacional también ha expresado su pleno compromiso con el país. No obstante, un examen más detallado indica que a Túnez le queda mucho para lograr una transición democrática fácil y pacífica. La inestabilidad sigue siendo un problema grave, existe una dicotomía socioeconómica y los tunecinos tienen diferentes puntos de vista sobre las líneas generales de su futuro común. A Túnez le queda mucho para lograr A diferencia de Libia, Siria e incluso una transición democrática fácil y Argelia y Yemen, Túnez ha vivido pacífica tradicionalmente libre de tribalismos y otras formas de comunitarismos. Sin embargo, la sociedad tunecina no es homogénea, ni mucho menos. Existe una gran diferencia entre las zonas costeras y las interiores, y la coexistencia de esos dos mundos suele crear tensiones que podrían perjudicar a las elecciones, porque alguna de las partes podría negarse a reconocer los resultados. Bajo el Gobierno de Ben Alí, las inversiones se destinaron sobre todo al litoral, que era 411

asimismo donde acudían la mayoría de los turistas. Por consiguiente, mientras el 70% de la población veía cómo se desarrollaban sus ciudades y sus barrios, el otro 30% tuvo que soportar malas políticas agrarias, un pobre desarrollo industrial y escasas mejoras en materia de servicios sanitarios e infraestructuras. Con la desaparición del dictador, muchos ciudadanos del interior exigen ahora garantías para su futuro. Que el desarrollo les llegue a ellos es la condición que imponen para reconocer o no el proceso político nacional. Tampoco parece que puedan ponerse de acuerdo los tunecinos sobre qué tipo de futuro debe tener su país. Aunque los habitantes de las grandes ciudades costeras miran con desconfianza el probable ascenso del partido islamista En Nahda, recién legalizado, otros sectores de la sociedad pueden inclinarse más hacia sus posiciones. La población joven y desempleada que encabezó la revolución sólo ha vivido la experiencia de una dictadura de partido único. La caída del régimen y la eliminación de la Agrupación Constitucional Democrática han dejado un vacío político que debe llenarse. Si bien todos están de acuerdo en que los islamistas, seguramente, obtendrán más votos que ninguna otra formación en los comicios (alrededor del 28-30%), nadie sabe cómo sería posible construir un puente entre quienes consideran que ése sería el resultado de un proceso democrático normal y quienes piensan que sería una catástrofe en un país de tradición laica. Hasta ahora, no se ve demasiada luz al final del túnel a corto plazo. El malestar puede aumentar de aquí a las elecciones legislativas de julio. El Gobierno de transición y sus supuestos partidarios deben tener cuidado para no caer en políticas torpes que puedan contribuir a agrandar la brecha existente en el país. La prioridad debe ser dedicar todos los esfuerzos posibles a lograr que las ciudades y regiones más pobres de Túnez lleguen a ser tan prósperas como la costa, proporcionar asesoramiento y ayuda técnica al Ejecutivo de transición para que las elecciones sean lo más transparentes y democráticas posible e instar al Estado a que se comprometa a llevar a cabo políticas capaces de garantizar la seguridad, la igualdad, la representación política y una mejor distribución de la riqueza. De lo contrario, la revolución tunecina puede correr el riesgo de desaprovechar su oportunidad democrática, con consecuencias negativas para el resto de la región. Artículos relacionados • Lecciones desde Túnez. [5] Oladiran Bello • El mito de un Túnez moderado. [6] Rasha Moumneh • Aromas a jazmín y libertad en el Magreb. [7] Antonio Navarro • Luchas en la red: la primera dama de Túnez. [8]

Source URL: http://fp-es.org/el-largo-camino-que-aguarda-a-tunez Links: [1] http://fp-es.org/temas/conflictos [2] http://fp-es.org/regiones/africa-magreb [3] http://fp-es.org/mayo-2011 [4] http://fp-es.org/autor/barah-mikail [5] http://www.fp-es.org/lecciones-desde-tunez [6] http://www.fp-es.org/el-mito-de-un-tunez-moderado [7] http://www.fp-es.org/aromas-de-jazmin-y-libertad-en-el-magreb [8] http://www.fp-es.org/luchas-en-la-red-la-primera-dama-de-tunez http://fp-es.org/el-largo-camino-que-aguarda-a-tunez

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20 de mayo de 2011

Del cambio social a la transformación del régimen: individualización y acción colectiva de una nueva generación de jóvenes en Marruecos (ARI) Thierry Desrues ARI 85/2011 - 06/05/2011 Tema: Desde hace varias semanas, las movilizaciones que miles de jóvenes protagonizan en Marruecos hacen que se pueda hablar de una nueva generación, la del “Movimiento del 20 de Febrero”. Resumen: En posiciones desaventajadas, propias de una sociedad caracterizada por el peso del patriarcado y las desigualdades sociales y económicas, los jóvenes marroquíes son, al mismo tiempo, el producto del cambio social y uno de los principales actores de dicho cambio. En este análisis se presentan las representaciones y concepciones dominantes de estos jóvenes sobre las principales instituciones sociales, como son la familia y la religión, y sobre la política. Asimismo, se insiste en el factor educativo como motor del cambio social y, en particular, en la condición de las nuevas generaciones de mujeres. Por último, se resalta la participación de los jóvenes en el ámbito cultural como posible antesala de las movilizaciones actuales. Análisis: Los jóvenes marroquíes de entre 18 y 29 años representan el mayor grupo de edad de la población marroquí (24%). Desde hace varias semanas, las movilizaciones que miles de ellos protagonizan hacen que se pueda hablar de una nueva generación, la del “Movimiento del 20 de Febrero”. Ésta se compone de los hermanos pequeños y los hijos de los adultos que tienen hoy entre 35 y 55 años y que en su momento fueron identificados con la generación del rey Mohamed VI. El contexto actual de efervescencia social y política se nos presenta como una oportunidad para reflexionar sobre las condiciones de los jóvenes en el país vecino. La familia: transformación de la morfología y los valores La juventud se define a menudo como una fase transitoria en la que la persona se va desligando del hogar en el que ha crecido y del que terminará yéndose para fundar su propia familia. Esta dimensión transitoria hace que las relaciones en el seno de la familia se conviertan en un indicador para apreciar la existencia o no de cambio social por parte de una determinada generación de jóvenes. A lo largo del último cuarto de siglo, la familia en Marruecos está experimentando un doble cambio: en su dimensión, con la reducción del número de hijos; y en su composición, con el paso del hogar pluri- generacional (37,3%) al hogar nuclear (60,3%). La familia que el adulto funda actualmente es la mitad de numerosa (dos a tres hijos) de lo que fue la suya (cuatro a seis hijos). Con esta reducción, la dimensión afectiva de los niños en la familia se incrementa y la convicción de la necesaria escolarización y formación de los hijos tiende a generalizarse en detrimento de su temprana contribución a la economía doméstica. Además de los cambios en su morfología, su composición y en la percepción del papel 413

de los hijos, la familia se enfrenta a otro fenómeno como es la presencia cada vez más duradera de jóvenes adultos en su seno. Tanto la prolongación de los estudios de los jóvenes como la situación del mercado de trabajo, caracterizada por el paro de este grupo generacional, y en particular de los diplomados,[1] hacen que en su mayor parte éstos dependan de sus familias y aplacen su salida del hogar familiar. En las encuestas consultadas, la familia aparece como una institución fundamental con la que los jóvenes pueden contar, pero su permanencia en el hogar familiar no está exenta de conflictos entre las distintas generaciones. Las discrepancias entre unos padres, que desean inculcar valores de obediencia, y sus hijos, que buscan una mayor autonomía, se perciben en la resistencia de los varones a la hora de seguir las directivas de una figura paterna percibida como autoritaria según una encuesta del diario L’Économiste.[2] Ante esta situación de dependencia, lógicamente, los jóvenes se casan más tarde y el número de adultos jóvenes solteros crece (el 54,1% de los jóvenes entre los 25 y los 29 años). El retraso de la edad del matrimonio (27 años para las chicas y 31 para los chicos), motivado por la escolarización de las chicas y la prolongación de los estudios, es una de las principales causas del aumento del celibato. Entran en juego también los cambios en los valores de los jóvenes, que en su mayoría desean elegir su cónyuge sin interferencias paternales. De ahí que las relaciones amorosas constituyan otra de las fuentes de tensión entre generaciones y hermanos en el seno de la familia marroquí. Independientemente de que el matrimonio se considere una norma universal, la condición de soltero ya no es siempre transitoria, como lo evidencia el hecho de que en 2004 había tres veces más mujeres que llegaban a los 49 años solteras que en 1994. Esta condición de los jóvenes modifica las antiguas certidumbres. Aunque para los adalides de la moral conservadora e islámica, el matrimonio temprano constituye la solución a la problemática presencia de las jóvenes fuera de la esfera doméstica, como son las instancias educativas y los lugares de trabajo o de ocio, lo cierto es que entre muchas solteras se encuentran voces que esperan encontrar en el matrimonio una mayor autonomía o que al estar disfrutando de cierta autonomía por haberse marchado del hogar familiar por motivos educativos o profesionales están poco dispuestas a renunciar a la libertad que disfrutan. El acceso a la educación y la presencia de las mujeres en el espacio público En las dinámicas analizadas hasta ahora, el factor educativo y la movilidad geográfica que supone la escolarización, al conllevar la salida del hogar e incluso de la localidad de origen, se imponen de forma acusada en las transformaciones que afectan a la posición de los jóvenes, y, sobre todo, de las mujeres. A pesar de las altas tasas de analfabetismo que siguen existiendo en Marruecos y de las dificultades que encuentran las chicas en el medio rural para mantenerse en el sistema escolar tras el primer ciclo (6-11 años), los progresos en materia de educación realizados desde la independencia son reales.[3] Hoy en día, la generalización de la escolarización en primaria está cerca de cumplirse y la enseñanza superior pública ha conocido un desarrollo exponencial del número de estudiantes, pasando de tener alrededor de 7.000 estudiantes en 1963 para alcanzar la cifra de 290.000 en 2003. Así, es importante señalar que las jóvenes representaban el 46,5% de los estudiantes de la enseñanza superior pública en 2007 (HCP, 2008) o que el número de diplomadas se ha triplicado entre 1990 y 2004, pasando de 46.000 a 146.000. Tras haber logrado su presencia en los ciclos educativos, las nuevas generaciones de mujeres luchan ahora por incorporarse al mercado de trabajo formal y al espacio público, en particular en el campo político. En esta lucha cotidiana están acompañadas 414

por las organizaciones en pro de los derechos de las mujeres y el impulso del rey Mohamed VI que, desde su entronización en 1999, considera una prioridad la reducción de las desigualdades por razón de género y el incremento de la presencia de las mujeres en la vida pública. La reforma del Código de la Familia en 2004 representa un cambio normativo al introducir la elevación de la edad mínima de las mujeres para contraer matrimonio de 15 a 18 años, equiparándola con la del varón (art. 19), la autonomía por parte de las mujeres mayores de edad a la hora de contraer matrimonio y el principio de igualdad entre los cónyuges (art. 4 y art. 51). Con los resultados de las últimas elecciones de junio de 2009 se ha empezado a poner fin a la situación de extrema marginalización de la representación política de las mujeres en el ámbito local. En los comicios comunales de 2003, sólo fueron elegidas 127 mujeres de un total de 23.286 ediles. En 2009, 3.406 mujeres entraron en los consejos comunales (12,3%) y de las 20.458 candidatas que se presentaron entonces, más de la mitad tenía menos de 35 años (52,5%). Por tanto, la feminización del panorama político ha contribuido a rejuvenecer la militancia política. Evidentemente, se puede discutir la validez de la política de cuotas y el interés de las mujeres por la política, en particular, en el mundo rural.[4] No obstante, este escenario ha creado un precedente que ha permitido y legitimado la presencia de una nueva generación de mujeres que, tras haberse incorporado a la educación formal y al mercado de trabajo, ve legitimada su reivindicación de una representación política en términos de igualdad. El rechazo del campo político actual La falta de integración política de los jóvenes ha sido planteada de forma recurrente por el Rey como un problema público. La mayor parte de los jóvenes declara no confiar en la política y, de hecho, el porcentaje que menciona en las encuestas haber participado en las últimas elecciones comunales de junio de 2009 (30%) se sitúa por debajo de la tasa global de participación (51%). El compromiso partidista de los jóvenes es un fenómeno minoritario y, por lo tanto, atípico (lo que en sí mismo no es exclusivo de Marruecos). Entre la veintena de partidos políticos existentes, solamente el islamista Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (PJD) y, en menor medida, la Unión Socialista de Fuerzas Populares y el Istiqlal, cuentan con juventudes lo suficientemente numerosas y vertebradas para poder pretender influir en la vida del partido. Estas secciones de juventud son a menudo una fuerza discrepante frente a la tibieza de las direcciones nacionales, a las que reprochan su acomodo poco glorioso con un régimen autoritario que quieren transformar o la falta de democracia que rige el funcionamiento interno de sus respectivos partidos.[5] En los partidos que cuestionan abiertamente la naturaleza del régimen, el factor miedo es otro obstáculo a la militancia ante la sombra de la represión. En suma, el desinterés por la política marroquí y la abstención de muchos jóvenes son, a menudo, una muestra consciente de su inconformidad con la realidad política reinante en el país. La religión: conformismo público y tolerancia privada En contraposición con el desinterés expresado por la política, los jóvenes marroquíes entrevistados por los antropólogos El Ayadi, Rachik y Tozy valoran muy positivamente el islam.[6] Si bien son menos practicantes, menos ortodoxos y más tolerantes ante las desviaciones o el incumplimiento de algunas prescripciones que los grupos de mayor edad, cuando se compara con estudios anteriores, los jóvenes de hoy en día son más 415

practicantes que los jóvenes de las generaciones precedentes. Siguiendo con dicho estudio, los jóvenes encuestados parecen recelar de la transgresión explícita de los preceptos religiosos en público, pero se muestran más tolerantes con los comportamientos no-conformistas en el ámbito privado.[7] Ello evidencia una tendencia entre los jóvenes (45%) a concebir la relación hacia la religión como un asunto personal. En esta dirección se enmarcan las motivaciones que inducen a las jóvenes a llevar el velo. Para unas jóvenes, llevar velo supone la prolongación de un compromiso religioso, para otras, una militancia política, y, para un último grupo, el conformismo con el entorno familiar o social (amistades, vecindario, entorno profesional, etc.). Asimismo, la mayor parte de los analistas coincide en que la adopción del velo por parte de las mujeres de las nuevas generaciones parece mayor que unos decenios atrás, lo que estaría en sintonía con una mayor presencia de las mujeres en el ámbito público. En este sentido, el velo refleja el cambio social del que hablamos. Así lo confirma la funcionalidad del velo para que las jóvenes puedan existir de forma autónoma en el espacio público y contornar el acoso masculino o la dimensión sumamente estética del uso del hiyab en detrimento de los criterios de modestia que impone la moral islámica.[8] La nueva ola cultural: ¿antesala de la contestación social y política? En el ámbito cultural, la constitución de la juventud como categoría social se plasma en la efervescencia de Nayda,[9] un movimiento de cultura urbana que ha sido impulsado por la multiplicación de los festivales y el acceso a las nuevas tecnologías de información y comunicación. Este movimiento ha sido portador de dos importantes cambios simbólicos: la apropiación del espacio público, de las plazas y las calles por los jóvenes con ocasión de concentraciones multitudinarias, y la legitimación de la cultura urbana juvenil. Esta cultura ha importado aspectos propios de los grandes flujos globales al tiempo que los fusiona con elementos locales, por lo que el resultado es fundamentalmente marroquí, pero abierto al mundo. El hip hop es el estilo que ha calado con mayor fuerza, quizá por la sencillez de las formas musicales o el lugar privilegiado que este estilo otorga a la palabra, en una sociedad en la que la tradición oral sigue muy vigente. Si bien no todos los textos son portadores de mensajes o de protestas que denuncian el paro o la corrupción, sí que cuentan las vivencias de la juventud con sus problemas y esperanzas. Este auge musical es también el reflejo y el producto de la transformación de los medios de comunicación. Con la introducción de las antenas parabólicas, al inicio de los años noventa, irrumpieron los video-clips, mientras que más tarde, a partir de 2000, con el acceso a Internet, la “blogósfera”, “Youtube” y “Daily Motion” tomaron el relevo y transformaron el horizonte de difusión, producción o acceso a la música u otro tipo de creación artística. En paralelo a la música, el cine aparece estos últimos años como el testimonio visual de las experiencias vitales de los jóvenes, en particular de las generaciones urbanas, con películas que han suscitado polémicas y sufrido la amenaza de la censura, tanto por parte de conservadores e islamistas como de ciertos funcionarios del gremio. No obstante, la calidad de las realizaciones y la conexión con la realidad de muchos jóvenes ha garantizado cierto éxito comercial y el reconocimiento internacional a películas como Marock (2005), Casanegra (2008) y Amours voilés (2009).

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Las acusaciones de satanismo a bandas de heavy metal,[10] de “anti-marroquinidad” y libertinaje a los participantes en macro-conciertos, o de injurias a la religión y pornografía a algunas películas,[11] no han conseguido mermar el entusiasmo de los miles de jóvenes que se sienten identificados con este movimiento, ciertamente más hedonista que revolucionario, pero más contestatario que resignado. “El Movimiento del 20 de Febrero”: impertinentes y ciudadanos En la senda de las manifestaciones que se produjeron en Túnez y Egipto a principios de 2011, el “Movimiento del 20 de Febrero” ha revelado algunos aspectos de las transformaciones sociales en curso en Marruecos desde hace algunos años. Algunos jóvenes se han dirigido al Rey vía Facebook para hablar de reformas democráticas, de la destitución del gobierno y la disolución del parlamento, de la independencia de la justicia, de la oficialización de la lengua tamazigh, de la liberación de los prisioneros políticos y de la lucha contra las desigualdades sociales y la garantía de una vida digna para todos. En consecuencia, los promotores de estas reivindicaciones se muestran impertinentes para los guardianes de la etiqueta majzení, al tiempo que evidencian una sensibilidad próxima a la izquierda con la que tienen que acomodarse los islamistas de al-Adl Wal Ihsan (Justicia y Espiritualidad). El movimiento no tiene un centro de gravedad, sino que está deslocalizado y diseminado por todo el país. Se vertebra de forma horizontal y reticular, a medida que progresa la experimentación del día a día. En su seno, el individuo se convierte en actor y mantiene su centralidad dentro de la acción colectiva mediante la interconexión, casi continua, con las diversas redes involucradas en la movilización. Heterogéneo en su composición, las coordinaciones locales funcionan de un modo asambleario y deliberativo, por lo que se observa cierta autonomización de los activistas hacia las direcciones políticas de las distintas organizaciones sociales y políticas que les acompañan. Si bien parece prematuro efectuar un balance de las movilizaciones iniciadas hace varias semanas, cabe resaltar, no obstante, que éstas han proporcionado voz en el espacio público a un colectivo desoído, los jóvenes, y que han publicitado una agenda reformista en ruptura con la confidencialidad y la tibieza a las que nos tenían acostumbrados los memorándums que los partidos políticos entregaban a Palacio. Asimismo, han transgredido las distancias ideológicas con el establecimiento del diálogo entre sectores laicos, islamistas, izquierdistas y amazigh. Teniendo en cuenta el contexto internacional, el riesgo de una inminente crisis gubernamental y el reinicio de las negociaciones con las partes implicadas en el contencioso del Sáhara Occidental, las movilizaciones han empujado a la Monarquía a abrir un proceso de revisión constitucional que, independientemente de su alcance definitivo, modificará la configuración del régimen en la dirección de una mayor democratización. Estos apuntes sobre el éxito del “Movimiento del 20 de Febrero” no impiden que haya que reconocer que no ha conseguido –aún– arrastrar a la mayor parte de la población joven, la cual sigue resignada, a la expectativa o se pronuncia en contra. Así, llama la atención la escasa presencia de la militancia sindical y de los jóvenes de las clases populares.[12] Parece ser que los años de represión han permitido interiorizar los recelos hacia la política y la acción colectiva en amplias capas de la población. Esto lo han comprendido los adversarios del movimiento que han agitado el espectro de la manipulación (las acusaciones de servir a los intereses de Argelia y del Frente Polisario), la violencia (los destrozos de bienes por algunos elementos incontrolados y 417

la represión de manifestaciones) y el extremismo (la presencia del islamismo ilegal de al-Adl wal Ihsan). Conclusiones: Los límites del “Movimiento del 20 de Febrero”, desde un punto de vista cuantitativo, no deben hacernos perder de vista ni sus logros ni el hecho de que sus reivindicaciones representan la vanguardia de la agenda reformista y la punta del iceberg de unos cambios sociales que atraviesan la sociedad marroquí desde hace algunos años. En efecto, ese movimiento es revelador de una verdadera ruptura generacional que cuestiona las jerarquías tradicionales inspiradas en el modelo patriarcal. Dicha ruptura se plasma a distintos niveles. En primer lugar, en el proceso de individualización que, si bien se entiende como la afirmación del individuo, muestra la posibilidad de su reconexión con la acción colectiva para la promoción y defensa de bienes públicos. Eso se diferencia del individualismo volcado en exclusiva hacia la búsqueda de la felicidad privada. En segundo lugar, en el manejo de las nuevas tecnologías de la información y la comunicación por una generación que sabe aprovechar el poder de instrumentos disponibles en Internet, como Facebook, para crear redes sociales de autocomunicación en el ciberespacio, y sabe conectar estas redes con múltiples blogs y páginas web. En tercer lugar, la constitución de los jóvenes como grupo social y político autónomo con voz legítima ante unos mayores que han desistido, que poco les pueden enseñar y que poco tienen en su haber activista para glorificarse. En cuarto lugar, en el protagonismo y la visibilidad de las mujeres en las movilizaciones, aunque sean minoritarias, que se convierten así en un símbolo de la lucha inter e intrageneracional, por la redefinición de los papeles de varones y mujeres. En quinto y último lugar, el patriotismo como síntesis de una ciudadanía responsable, activa y altruista dentro del descubrimiento de renovadas afinidades panarabistas, conectada con los grandes flujos de la globalización, pero alérgica a cualquier rebufo neocolonial. Cuando el ascensor social no funciona y se pone fin a la esperanza de un futuro mejor que el de los padres, cuando el destino social parece incierto, se impone la lucha por ser reconocido. Por ello, detrás de la reforma política global que moviliza a una parte de la juventud marroquí subyace una misma demanda: la recuperación de la dignidad inherente al estatus de ciudadano en un país de súbditos en el que las relaciones sociales siguen mediatizadas, con demasiada frecuencia, por la sumisión o por el conformismo de una parte de la relación a la otra. La recuperación de la autoestima va acompañada del derecho a participar, opinar y deliberar en pie de igualdad, ya que entre esta nueva generación de jóvenes nada se impone por sí mismo: ni la tradición, ni las normas del grupo de pertenencia. En la sociedad que desea esta nueva generación, todo puede someterse al debate, a la discusión y a la experimentación. Thierry Desrues Científico titular del Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (IESA), Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Córdoba http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CO NTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/mediterraneo+y+mundo+arabe/ari85-2011

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Versión para imprimir Nueva cetrería para Oriente Próximo VICENTE PALACIO 20/05/2011 Barack Obama habló ayer al mundo como el Premio Nobel de la Paz que es, y apenas nada como Comandante en Jefe del Ejército. El Presidente voló ligero como una paloma, por encima del riesgo estratégico que comporta su apoyo incondicional a los procesos democráticos del mundo árabe, sin red que lo proteja de una caída aún mayor de su influencia en esa región del mundo. En ningún momento mencionó Obama cómo la marea democrática va a amortiguar los posibles contratiempos que se produzcan por los movimientos sísmicos en Egipto, Siria, o las dictaduras del Golfo. Lo confió todo a la fuerza de arrastre de los valores universales que se retrotraen a 1787, el nacimiento de la República norteamericana; valores que en lo sucesivo EEUU renuncia a imponer por vía militar. Oriente Próximo es un lugar con larga tradición en la cetrería, el noble arte de cazar con aves rapaces. Pues bien: parece confirmarse el momento de un cambio de rol, y también de hábitat, de esos animales tan políticos como son palomas, halcones o águilas. Tras el mensaje de ayer, los "halcones" neocon y realpolitik quedan completamente fuera de juego - ¿por cuánto tiempo? - de la política norteamericana para el norte de África y Oriente Próximo. Los halcones han emigrado y ahora anidan en algunos reductos extremistas de toda laya: en las filas de Hamás, entre los acólitos de Bashar el Asad, de Ahmadeniyad, o del eterno Netanyahu. Los Bush -padre e hijo- algo tenían de águilas, con aquellos ojos pequeños y cierta mirada rapaz. Pero Obama es de otro pelaje, mucho más sofisticado; bajo su liderazgo, el águila norteamericana predica con vuelo majestuoso, pero ya no quiere volar sola. Es el buen amigo americano que aprecia a Israel y le repite la verdad: sólo habrá paz si hay Estado palestino. El esperado discurso servirá quizá para acercar de nuevo a EEUU a la calle árabe. Pero probablemente no aplacará el nerviosismo de los altos mandos del pentágono, la CIA o el propio Departamento de Estado, ni tampoco de los estrategas electorales del Presidente de cara a la reelección de 2012. Obama está pidiendo un tiempo para las palomas, y eso significa reinventar el arte de la cetrería en Oriente Medio. Ahora se trata de cómo cazar voluntades para la libertad y la dignidad en las calles de El Cairo, Gaza, Damasco o Teherán. Quién dice que el mundo no puede cambiar así, de un plumazo. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Nueva/cetreria/Oriente/Proximo/elpe puint/20110520elpepuint_3/Tes

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Middle East May 19, 2011 Obama Sees ’67 Borders as Starting Point for Peace Deal By MARK LANDLER and STEVEN LEE MYERS WASHINGTON — President Obama, seeking to capture a moment of epochal change in the Arab world, began a new effort on Thursday to break the stalemate in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, setting out a new starting point for negotiations on the region’s most intractable problem. A day before the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, Mr. Obama declared that the prevailing borders before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war — adjusted to some degree to account for Israeli settlements in the West Bank — should be the basis of a deal. While the 1967 borders have long been viewed as the foundation for a peace agreement, Mr. Obama’s formula of land swaps to compensate for disputed territory created a new benchmark for a diplomatic solution. Mr. Obama’s statement represented a subtle, but significant shift, in American policy. And it thrust him back into the region’s most nettlesome dispute at a time when conditions would seem to make reaching a deal especially difficult. The Israeli government immediately protested, saying that for Israel to return to its pre- 1967 borders would leave it “indefensible.” Mr. Netanyahu held an angry phone conversation with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Thursday before the speech, officials said, in which he demanded that the president’s reference to 1967 borders be cut. Israeli officials continued to lobby the administration until right before Mr. Obama arrived at the State Department for the address. White House officials said he did not alter anything under Israeli pressure, though the president made changes in the text that delayed his appearance by 35 minutes. Mr. Obama’s reference to Israel’s borders came toward the end of a somber, 45-minute address that sought to articulate an overarching framework for the disparate American responses to the Arab Spring, which has taken a dark turn as the euphoria of popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt has given way to violent crackdowns in Bahrain and Syria, a civil war in Libya and political stalemate in Yemen. The president offered a blunt critique of Arab governments and, without promising any changes in policy to confront repressive ones more aggressively, sought to assure protesters that they were squarely aligned with democratic American values in a region where the strategic interests of the United States have routinely trumped its values. Those issues are delicate enough, but the diplomatic row with Israel highlighted the acute sensitivities that Mr. Obama faces as he seeks to link the changes in the Middle East with the conflict at the region’s heart.

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“At a time when the people of the Middle East and North Africa are casting off the burdens of the past, the drive for a lasting peace that ends the conflict and resolves all claims is more urgent than ever,” he said. At one level, by putting the United States on record as supporting the 1967 borders as the starting point for negotiations over a Palestinian state, Mr. Obama was simply endorsing reality: Middle East analysts say a new state would inevitably be drawn on the basis of Israel’s boundaries before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which created the contours of today’s Middle East. Israel’s victory over Egypt and other Arab neighbors in that war expanded its control over territory in the West Bank and Gaza inhabited by millions of Palestinians, creating a greater Israel — including all of the capital, Jerusalem — but one that oversees a resentful occupied population. Mr. Obama also noted that Israel and the Palestinians would have to swap territory on either side of that border to account for large Jewish settlements that have taken root in the West Bank since 1967. But the shift moves the United States a step closer to the position of the Palestinians, and is viewed as vital to them because it means the Americans implicitly back their view that new Israeli settlement construction will have to be reversed, or compensated for, in talks over the borders for a new Palestinian state. Some analysts said Mr. Obama’s shift was less strategic than tactical, seeking to lure the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, as a way of heading off their campaign to seek international recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations General Assembly in September. “He’s moving into a crisis-management mode, laying out principles to preserve the two- state solution and to prevent a U.N. resolution on a Palestinian state,” said Martin S. Indyk, the director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Obama expressed opposition to the Palestinian statehood effort, saying, “Symbolic efforts to isolate Israel at the United Nations in September won’t create an independent state.” He also made several other gestures to Mr. Netanyahu, highlighting the security threats to Israel. Mr. Obama’s reference to a “nonmilitarized” Palestinian state is likely to dismay Palestinians, who have long said that such matters should be decided in negotiations. The president also said that the recent unity agreement between the two main Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, raised “profound and legitimate questions for Israel.” “How can one negotiate with a party that has shown itself unwilling to recognize your right to exist?” he said, referring to Hamas, which the United States has designated as a terrorist organization. “In the weeks and months to come, Palestinian leaders will have to provide a credible answer to that question.” Mr. Obama’s emphasis on territory and security seemed calculated to segregate the issues on which the United States believes the Israelis and Palestinians can bargain. He said they should leave aside for now more deeply emotional questions like the status of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees, which he suggested could be dealt with after border and security issues.

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But Mr. Obama spoke with palpable frustration that his peacemaking efforts so far had failed. “The international community is tired of an endless process that never produces an outcome,” he said to an audience that included George J. Mitchell, who was his special envoy to the Middle East until resigning last week. Beyond the stalled peace process, Mr. Obama celebrated “a moment of opportunity” after six months of political upheaval that has at times left the administration scrambling to keep up. Mr. Obama bluntly warned President Bashar al-Assad of Syria that he would face increasing isolation if he did not respond to demands for a transition to democracy. “President Assad now has a choice,” Mr. Obama said. “He can lead that transition, or get out of the way.” He was no less blunt in the case of Bahrain, a close ally that has brutally cracked down on protests there. “The only way forward is for the government and opposition to engage in a dialogue, and you can’t have real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail,” he said in one of the few phrases that drew applause from an audience that included diplomats from a dozen Arab countries. While he conceded that the United States had not been a central actor in the uprisings, he sought to cast America’s role in a new context now that the war in Iraq is winding down and Osama bin Laden has been killed. In such a world, Mr. Obama said, strategic interests must not trump values. “We must acknowledge that a strategy based solely upon the narrow pursuit of these interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their mind,” Mr. Obama said. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20speech.html?nl=todaysheadlin es&emc=tha2

Middle East May 19, 2011 Obama and Netanyahu, Distrustful Allies, to Meet By HELENE COOPER WASHINGTON — As Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel heads to the White House on Friday for the seventh meeting since President Obama took office, the two men are facing a turning point in a relationship that has never been warm. By all accounts, they do not trust each other. President Obama has told aides and allies that he does not believe that Mr. Netanyahu will ever be willing to make the kind of big concessions that will lead to a peace deal. For his part, Mr. Netanyahu has complained that Mr. Obama has pushed Israel too far — a point driven home during a furious phone call with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton on Thursday morning, just hours before Mr. Obama’s speech, during 422

which the prime minister reacted angrily to the president’s plan to endorse Israel’s pre- 1967 borders for a future Palestinian state. Mr. Obama did not back down. But the last-minute furor highlights the discord as they head into what one Israeli official described as a “train wreck” coming their way: a United Nations General Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood in September. Mr. Netanyahu, his close associates say, desperately wants Mr. Obama to use the diplomatic muscle of the United States to protect Israel from the vote, not only by vetoing it in the Security Council, but also by leaning hard on America’s European allies to get them to reject it as well. Mr. Obama has indicated that he will certainly do the first. But it remains unclear how far Mr. Obama can go to persuade Britain, France and other American allies to join the United States in rejecting the move, particularly as long as Mr. Netanyahu continues to resist endorsing the pre-1967 lines. From one of their first meetings, at the King David Hotel on July 23, 2008, when Mr. Obama, then the presumptive Democratic nominee for president, visited Israel, the two men have struck, at most, an intellectual bond. Mr. Netanyahu, as the leader of Israel’s conservative Likud Party, was far more comfortable with the Republican Party in the United States than with Mr. Obama, the son of a Muslim man from Kenya whose introduction to the Arab-Israeli conflict was initially framed by discussions with pro- Palestinian academics. “Their relationship is correct at best,” said Judith Kipper, director of Middle East programs at the Institute of World Affairs. Mr. Netanyahu “likes the status quo, and he particularly identifies with conservative Republicans.” Abraham H. Foxman, national director of the Anti-Defamation League and a friend of Mr. Netanyahu’s, recalled that after the first meeting, Mr. Netanyahu walked out of the hotel and told him that he had been impressed with Mr. Obama’s intellect, and that the American presidency “was his to lose.” But things went downhill soon after Mr. Obama took office and, within months, called for a halt in Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank. Mr. Netanyahu refused, handing the president his first foreign policy humiliation when Mr. Obama had to abandon the demand in the face of Israel’s refusal to comply. Compounding the problem, Mr. Netanyahu delivered a fiery speech to a pro-Israel lobbying group in Washington declaring that “Jerusalem isn’t a settlement, it’s our capital.” A furious White House promptly denied him all the trappings of a presidential meeting with Mr. Obama the next day, refusing to allow photographers to take pictures of the two men in the Oval Office, as is usually the case for meetings with foreign leaders. Things got so bad, Mr. Foxman recalled, that Mr. Netanyahu “told me, ‘Abe, I need two hours just alone to talk to him.” Late last year, Mr. Netanyahu got his two hours at the White House with Mr. Obama, a meeting which, both American and Israeli officials say, helped clear the air. “The relationship now is very cordial,” a senior White House official said. But the easing of tensions ended this spring when, Israeli and American officials said, Mr. Netanyahu got wind of Mr. Obama’s plans to make a major address on the Middle East, and alerted Republican leaders that he would like to address a joint meeting of 423

Congress. That move was widely interpreted as an attempt to get out in front of Mr. Obama, by presenting an Israeli peace proposal that, while short of what the Palestinians want, would box in the president. House Speaker John A. Boehner issued the invitation, for late May. So White House officials timed Mr. Obama’s speech on Thursday to make sure he went first. “You get so many reports that Bibi is playing politics in your backyard that eventually you’ve got to draw the conclusion that there’s nothing there to work with with this guy,” said Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator who is now a fellow with the New American Foundation, referring to Mr. Netanyahu by his nickname. Administration officials said that they were determined not to allow Mr. Netanyahu to get out in front of Mr. Obama. In a statement after Mr. Obama’s speech on Thursday, Mr. Netanyahu’s office pointedly said that the prime minister would raise his concerns about Mr. Obama’s language about the pre-1967 borders during Friday’s meeting. “While there were many points in the president’s speech that we appreciate and welcome, there were other aspects, like the return to the 1967 borders, which depart from longstanding American policy, as well as Israeli policy, going back to 1967,” Michael B. Oren, Israel’s ambassador to the United States, said in an interview. “The prime minister will raise the issue with the president. As the president said, the United States and Israel are great friends, and friends have to be able to talk frankly to one another.” But both men will have to manage any additional irritation as they prepare for the United Nations vote that is headed their way, American and Israeli officials said. Neither side wants to see an overwhelmingly lopsided United Nations vote for Palestinian statehood, with Britain, France and Germany joining the rest of the world and isolating Israel further, with only the United States and a few others voting against it. “I think the Europeans are sliding” toward voting for Palestinian statehood “because they don’t see a peace strategy coming out,” said David Makovsky, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He said that the two leaders had to figure out a way to work together to stop a United Nations vote that could harm both the United States and Israel. “If they are incapable of being able to translate a common interest into a common strategy, then it’s a very sad commentary on both countries,” Mr. Makovsky said. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20policy.html?nl=todaysheadlin es&emc=tha2

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The Guardian Barack Obama throws full US support behind Middle East uprisings President unveils shift in US policy towards Arab countries 'Status quo not sustainable,' he warns region's autocracies Sets out two-state solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict Tells Syria's Assad to lead transition or 'get out of way' Ewen MacAskill in Washington Friday 20 May 2011

Barack Obama has sought to realign American policy on the Middle East, pledging to shift from decades of support for autocratic regimes to backing for pro-democracy movements, and setting out the shape of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. Facing criticism that the US has repeatedly been behind the curve in response to the Arab spring, Obama promised a "new chapter" in US diplomacy. He placed Washington on the side of popular uprisings not only in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya but also in Syria and, for the first time, in Bahrain – a longtime American ally. "The status quo is not sustainable," Obama said, referring to Arab autocracies and to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. On the eve of a visit by the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, to the White House, Obama showed frustration with the lack of any progress towards peace by setting out broadly what a future Palestinian state may look like, based on the border that existed before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. "The dream of a Jewish and democratic state cannot be fulfilled with permanent occupation," he said. While his speech might be seen to tilt the US marginally towards the Palestinians, he tempered this by rejecting a Palestinian attempt to seek de facto independence at the UN in September, dismissing it as merely a "symbolic" move. Netanyahu said he appreciated Obama's peace message but rejected the "indefensible" 1967 borders, expressing his unhappiness at the prospect of Israel not having control of security extending over the West Bank to Jordan. A Palestinian state should not be established at the "expense of Israel's existence", he said. The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, welcomed Obama's effort to instigate fresh negotiations with Israel. Elsewhere in the Arab world, the reaction was mixed, with some commentators saying Obama had gone beyond his Cairo speech and others judging it uninspired. Conservatives in the US denounced it, with Mitt Romney, who is seeking the Republican presidential nomination to take on Obama for the White House next year, saying the president "has thrown Israel under the bus". The tone of the speech at the state department in Washington, the first major one on the Middle East since Cairo in 2009, was intended to suggest that the US is turning its back on its long-term policy of supporting dictatorships in the Middle East to guarantee oil supplies and instead will embrace democracy and commitment to human rights. 425

Obama spoke of the extraordinary changes in the Middle East over the past six months and lined the US up behind the popular movements that began with the death of a Tunisian street vendor. "So we face an historic opportunity. We have embraced the chance to show that America values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator ... After decades of accepting the world as it is in the region, we have a chance to pursue the world as it should be," he said. But there is a limit to how much the US is prepared to shift, with not a single line about Saudi Arabia, an autocracy that has made no significant attempt at reform but which is one of America's main oil suppliers. The speech was timed so that it could be watched live in the Middle East, with the state department offering simultaneous translations in Arabic and Farsi. "For six months, we have witnessed an extraordinary change take place in the Middle East and North Africa," Obama said. "Square by square, town by town, country by country, the people have risen up to demand their basic human rights. Two leaders have stepped aside. More may follow." One of these could be Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad. The day after the US imposed sanctions directly on Assad, Obama stopped short of calling on him to leave office, as he has done with the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. He did, however, increase pressure on him. "The Syrian people have shown their courage in demanding a transition to democracy. President Assad now has a choice: he can lead that transition, or get out of the way," Obama said. The US president has been accused of inconsistency in engaging in military action in Libya but standing back in Syria. Accusations of inconsistency were also applied over Bahrain, where the US has a big naval base and which Washington has largely refrained from criticising, in spite of a bloody crackdown on protesters. "We have insisted publicly and privately that mass arrests and brute force are at odds with the universal rights of Bahrain's citizens, and will not make legitimate calls for reform go away," Obama said. On the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Obama set out the parameters of a possible peace settlement. The White House has been waiting for the Israelis and Palestinians to come forward with a deal but, frustrated at the lack of movement, Obama proposed the outline of an agreement. "The United States believes that negotiations should result in two states, with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine," he said. "The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognised borders are established for both states," he said. The mention of the border with Jordan is significant. Israel has long argued that any peace deal must include it having military control up to the Jordan border. Jeremy Ben-Ami, president of J Street, the Washington-based liberal lobbying group, said: "J Street wholeheartedly endorses the approach to resolving the conflict outlined today by the president, namely, to address borders and security first." Ewen MacAskillBarack “Obama throws full US support behind Middle East uprisings.President unveils shift in US policy towards Arab countries. 'Status quo not sustainable,' he warns region's autocracies Sets out two-state solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict-. Tells Syria's Assad to lead transition or 'get out of way'” 20 May 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/19/barack-obama-us-support-middle- east-uprisings/print 426

E-Notes EGYPT’S REVOLUTION FORESEEN IN FICTION: BEFORE THE THRONE BY NAGUIB MAHFOUZ By Raymond Stock May 2011 Raymond Stock, Visiting Assistant Professor of Arabic and Middle East Studies at Drew University (2010/2011), is writing a biography of Naguib Mahfouz for Farrar, Straus & Giroux; for many years, Mahfouz cooperated in his research. He has translated numerous stories and seven books by Mahfouz, including Before the Throne (2009) and most recently, The Coffeehouse (2010), all for The American University in Cairo Press, many also published by Random House. A twenty-year resident of Egypt, Stock was detained and deported at Cairo Airport on a return visit last December, apparently due to a 2009 article critical of then-Culture Minister Farouk Hosni’s bid to head UNESCO for Foreign Policy Magazine. He has also published in The Financial Times, Harper’s Magazine, The International Herald Tribune and many other venues. This E-Note is partly based on and updates a lecture he delivered for FPRI at the Union League in Philadelphia on June 5, 2007, entitled, “From before King Tut to Hosni Mubarak: Egypt’s Past, Present and Future in a Novel by Naguib Mahfouz.” It also draws from Stock’s Translator’s Afterword to Before the Throne (publisher’s link: http://www.aucpress.com/pc-3593-26-before-the-throne.aspx), and from his doctoral dissertation, A Mummy Awakens: The Pharaonic Fiction of Naguib Mahfouz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 2008). This note is dedicated to the late Harvey Sicherman. • PDF Version of bulletin. (8 pages, 137K ) A rebel firebrand defends the revolution that he led against the ruler and his system—in Egypt’s ancient past. Many of his words, however, could almost be heard today: "History remembers the elite, and we were from the poor--the peasants, the artisans, and the fishermen. Part of the justice of this sacred hall is that it neglects no one. We have endured agonies beyond what any human can bear. When our ferocious anger was raised against the rottenness of oppression and darkness, our revolt was called chaos,

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and we were called mere thieves. Yet it was nothing but a revolution against despotism, blessed by the gods." Change “thieves” to “foreign agents,” make the revolt not one of just the poor, but of people from all classes and walks of life, replace “gods” with God, and we are in Cairo’s Tahrir Square of the last few months. But the speech is delivered by a probably apocryphal persona called Abnum, the purported leader of an uprising of that may never have happened at the end of Egypt’s Old Kingdom (about 2125 B.C.). And it comes not from some dry-as-dust historical annals, but from a brief but riveting novel in dialogue by Egypt’s greatest modern writer, 1988 Nobel laureate in literature Naguib Mahfouz (1911-2006). There has never been a revolt in Egypt quite like the current one, which has not ended with the stunningly rapid downfall of President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011 after more than twenty-nine years atop the nation’s power pyramid. Yet Mahfouz, who did not live to see it—and who backed Mubarak in his last election, in 2005--in a way, actually foresaw it. Five years before his Swedish prize, he published a peculiar novel, Before the Throne—largely forgotten but for a recent translation into English--that both justifies and gives the historical background to what is happening now (though some of his other works also point toward it). In it, Mahfouz provides not only the precedents for the revolt itself, but also the arguments for maintaining one of the greatest achievements of the order just overthrown, which itself is now threatened: that is, the peace between Egypt and Israel. The only thing he didn’t leave us is the ending. JUDGING PASHAS, PHARAOHS, PRIME MINISTERS AND PRESIDENTS In Before the Throne: Dialogs with Egypt’s Great From Menes to Anwar Sadat (published as Amam al-‘arsh: hiwar ma`a rijal Misr min Mina hatta Anwar al-Sadat in 1983), Mahfouz takes three score of Egypt’s rulers, from Menes, who unified Upper and Lower Egypt in one kingdom at the start of the First Dynasty (roughly 2950 B.C.), up to Mubarak’s immediate predecessor before the Osiris Court, the ancient Egyptian tribunal of the soul. There, in the gilded Hall of Justice, he has them defend their rule before a panel of the gods and of those kings and queens, viziers and wise men, rabble- rousers and statesmen, who had been acquitted before them, and thus made Immortals. Crucially, Mahfouz uses the careers of several key figures—especially the 19th Dynasty kings Seti I and his son, Ramesses II—to justify the 1979 Camp David Treaty signed by Sadat. With more than thirty novels to his credit, Mahfouz hadn’t produced a piece of fiction set in ancient Egypt since 1944, and had never written one that sought to cover all of Egypt’s recorded history. Two years earlier, in 1981, Sadat—Egypt’s bold, flamboyant, and ultimately tragic president—was gunned down in Cairo during the parade marking the eighth anniversary of his victory over the Israelis at the Suez Canal, by Islamist extremists in the army who reviled him as “Pharaoh.” Sadat was beloved outside of Egypt for his initially-popular, visionary peace treaty with Israel and avuncular love of pipes. But mainly due to economic policies that left the poor feeling vulnerable, he was not much mourned at home—though there has been real nostalgia for him in recent years. Soon after his death, Muslim militants in the Upper Egyptian district of Assiut rose up in a rebellion that took many days of violence to put down. Revolution was in the air.

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Like all other attempted revolutions in Egypt’s history, the Islamist uprising failed, as did the Islamist terror war against the regime of President Mubarak, Sadat’s vice- president and successor, which targeted government officials and tourists in the 1990s. So too did the nationalist uprising led by Colonel Ahmed Urabi in 1882 (which backfired to invite seventy-four years of subsequent British occupation). Also unsuccessful, arguably, was the 1919 Revolution headed by Sa`d Pasha Zaghlul against that British presence, though it did lead to partial independence in 1922 and paved the way for much of the resistance that followed until Britain’s final departure after the Suez Crisis in 1956. But even then the British, along with their French and Israeli allies, were ordered out by a foreign leader, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (who later regretted it)—not really by the Egyptian people. Perhaps the closest, and now nearly forgotten, precedent was actually Muhammad Ali Pasha’s cleverly-packaged coup against Khurshid, the Ottoman wali (governor) in Cairo in 1805, in order to seize personal power (which Before the Throne covers in the trials of Shaykh Umar Makram, who opposed Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt, and of Muhammad Ali). The Albanian adventurer “appealed to the right of the common people, the ahl al-balad, to depose an unjust ruler,” writes J.C.B. Richmond of the affair. Richmond also noted that it was the common people who provided Muhammad Ali with the force necessary for the move. [1] Just as the people in Tahrir Square arguably provided the Egyptian armed forces the cover needed to remove Mubarak, whose apparent plan to install his non-military son after him had dismayed them. Neither was Egypt’s last, and only successful, “revolution” actually born of a mass movement. Rather it was a movement of tanks around Abdin Palace on the night of July 23, 1952, the work of a small number of officer-conspirators, whose ideological (and, in some cases, genetic) descendants still control the all-powerful Egyptian military elite. True, most Egyptians were glad to see the king and his corrupt circle go. In euphoric gratitude, one of Egypt’s then most-respected authors and Mahfouz’s mentor, Tawfiq al-Hakim (1898?-1987) naively hailed their clique as “the Blessed Movement.” Al- Hakim and many others later cursed the regime it founded for its own corruption, lack of democracy and destruction of the economy after its charismatic great dictator, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, died a literally heartbroken has-been, though still on the throne, in 1970. Mahfouz, who at age seven watched Egyptian nationalist demonstrators shot down in front of his comfortable middle-class home in Islamic Cairo during the 1919 revolt, grew up fiercely loyal to Sa`d Zaghlul, who died in 1927 after a brief sojourn as Prime Minister (in 1924), and his party, the Wafd. Devoted to the cause of Egyptian independence, the olive-and-honey skinned Mahfouz also detested what he regarded as the arrogant Egyptian monarchy, seen as of the same blood as the pallid Turkic aristocracy that had ruled Egypt in various guises since the fall of Salah al-Din’s (Saladin’s) dynasty in 1250. Though he cheered the abolition of royal rule and the privileged titles of “pasha” and “bey,” Mahfouz was appalled by the Free Officers’ cavalier killing of the limited liberal democracy that survived under the king and the British, the suppression of free expression, the expulsion of the nation’s vital foreign communities and the reckless seizure and plunder of private business and property, despite his own socialist leanings. Most of all, he resented Nasser’s attempt to bury the memory of 1919, a true popular uprising, and especially of its patriotic leader, Sa`d Zaghlul. And, though it cost him

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enormously for years through the Arab world boycott of his books and the many films made from them, he also came to reject Nasser’s legacy of permanent war with Israel. Ironically, two of the principles that Mahfouz trumpets so clearly in Before the Throne—the people’s right to rise up against tyranny and the need to make mutually beneficial peace with one’s neighbors—are most likely set to clash in the aftermath of today’s Egyptian revolution, whomever it finally brings to power. This is true because all of the likely future leaders of the country, both secular and religious, want to annul or emasculate the Camp David Treaty: a recent Pew poll shows that 54% of Egyptians want to scrap it altogether—and not a single major voice speaks out for keeping it. WHAT IS GOOD FOR EGYPT? The most important question asked in Before the Throne is clearly the one most crucial to Mahfouz’s own worldview. That is, what is good for Egypt? How Mahfouz defines what is good for his country, and even who is really Egyptian, provides a fascinating glimpse not only into the author’s psyche, but into the historical consciousness of Egypt herself—one that is clearly relevant today. The Osiris Court, carved and painted in tombs, and depicted on papyrus in the Book of the Dead, is the most vivid and enduring image from old Egyptian beliefs regarding the fate of the individual after death. God of the netherworld and chief of the tribunal that judges the souls of the deceased, Osiris is one of ancient Egypt’s oldest known deities, with roots deep in the clay of the northeastern Delta. [2] An ancient folk belief held that he was an actual—and prodigious—king in Predynastic times (a view still debated by Egyptologists). Yet the first known image of him dates to the Fifth Dynasty, one of many minor deities grouped around the king, “with a curled beard and divine wig in the manner of the traditional ancestral figures.” [3] In the Old Kingdom, he was associated with the royal dead only, mainly in the great necropolis of Abydos in Upper Egypt, though gradually his popularity, and his dominion over the afterlives of more and more Egyptians, including commoners, grew. His nemesis was Seth, who eventually became an Egyptian prototype of Satan, the Evil One. In one of pharaonic Egypt’s most famous myths, Seth twice attacks Osiris, the second time cutting him into sixteen pieces and throwing them into the Nile, all but one of which recovered by his sister-wife, Isis, for burial—and resurrection. [4] One should note that, to the ancient Egyptians, “the dying of Osiris does not seem to be a wrong thing,” as Herman Te Velde says, “for death is ‘the night of going forth to life.’” [5] Crucial to Before the Throne is the role Osiris plays in the passage of the dead into the next world—or into nonexistence. In the ancient myth, Osiris, in the shape of a man wrapped in mummy bandages, bearing the symbols of royal power (the elaborately plumed atef crown on his head, the false beard on his chin, the crook and flail in his hands crossed over his chest), presided. Meanwhile, the jackal-headed god of embalming, Anubis, weighed the heart of the deceased on a great double-scale against a feather representing Ma`at, the principle of divine order and justice. If the defendant had committed no grave sins on earth, the heart would balance with the feather—and the deceased would be pronounced “true of voice” (a concept that resonates strongly through all of Mahfouz’s work) and given the magic spells necessary to enter the underworld, Duat. But if there was no balance with the feather, the heart was fed to “the devourer,” Ammit, a terrifying female beast with the head of a crocodile, the body of a lion, and the

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hind legs of a hippo. As all of this transpired, the ibis-headed Thoth, god of writing and magic, supervised and recorded the judgments and reported them to Osiris. (Another representation of Thoth, a baboon, sat atop the scale.) Meanwhile, Isis (a radiantly beautiful woman with either a throne—which was her emblem—or a solar disk and horns upon her head), her son, the falcon-headed Horus (who introduced and pleaded for each defendant), and other deities looked on. [6] Mahfouz seized upon this timeless and quintessentially Egyptian device as the framework for one his strangest and most explicitly ideological books. In it he dramatically presents his views on scores of Egypt’s political bosses from the First Dynasty to the current military regime—the deep structure of which has survived not only Mubarak, but will probably outlive his successors as well. He does by putting words in their mouths as they defend their own days in power to the sacred court. Those whom Mahfouz sees as the greatest leaders of ancient Egyptian civilization, under the aegis of the old Egyptian lord of the dead, judge those who follow them, from the unification of the Two Lands through late antiquity and the Middle Ages, right down to his own times. This continuum of Egyptian history showcases his essentialist vision of a sort of eternal Egyptian ka—the living person’s undying double who, in the afterlife, receives mortuary offerings for the deceased, thus ensuring their immortality. [7] From pharaohs to pashas, and from prime ministers to presidents, only those who serve that great national ka—according to Mahfouz’s own strict criteria are worthy of his praise—and a seat among the Immortals. The rest are sent to Purgatory or even to Hell—not the ancient Egyptian conception of the afterlife, but a concession to Mahfouz’s modern, mainly monotheistic, readership—and perhaps his own personal beliefs as a Muslim. Yet that he used an ancient Egyptian mode of judgment (albeit his own version of it) to hold these leaders to account, rather than a more conventional setting speaks loudly of his conviction that Egypt is different and must look to herself for wisdom—as well as offer it to the world. The final chapter even presents a sort of “Ten Commandments” [8] which Egypt must follow in order to fulfill her sacred mission as “a lighthouse of right guidance, and of beauty,” in the parting words of Isis. In that sixty-fourth (and final) chapter, ten of the key figures who had faced and survived trial offer their own advice to their homeland. The rebel leader Abnum, whose rousing speech in defense of the ancient revolt is quoted above, admonishes Egypt “to believe in the people and in revolution, to propel her destiny toward completion.” Abnum initially emerges as the leader of the “rebels of the Age of Darkness that fell between the collapse of the Old Kingdom and the creation of the Middle Kingdom” (the First Intermediate Period) in the book’s fifth chapter. Introduced as “a group of people of varying shapes and sizes,” Mahfouz makes them seem disreputable as well as uncouth: “These are the leaders of the revolution: they directed the angry people in a bloody, destructive revolt. They then ruled the country for the long period that lasted from the fall of the Old Kingdom to the start of the Middle Kingdom. Afterward, they left behind them nothing to mark their former presence but ruined temples, plundered tombs and monstrous memories.”

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When asked by Osiris to choose someone from among themselves to speak for them, “they all pointed to a tall, gaunt man with a stony face.” This is Abnum, a character whom Mahfouz insisted was real, but of which I have found no trace in any of the available sources that one can be sure he consulted—or any others. Abnum tells the court that in the chaos and lawlessness of Egypt under the aged, long- reigning King Pepi II, he urged the people to rise up, and “quickly they answered the call.” This recalls Mubarak’s own seemingly interminable rule, and the general sense of things falling apart in the final few years, as well as the underlying tension that long promised an eventual explosion. The last film by famous Egyptian filmmaker Youssef Chahine, released in what no one knew were the waning years of the Mubarak era, was “Heya Fawda” (It’s Chaos, 2008). Despite a booming economy that could not keep pace with the burgeoning population, there was a general sense of dysfunctionality, corruption and stagnation. That is always a dangerous combination, and not entirely dissimilar to the slow, anarchic decline at the end of the Sixth Dynasty as nonagenerian Pepi II resolutely refused to “fly to his horizon,” in the ritual obituary phrase for the departed king. Yet the book does not preach revolution alone. Many of its heroes are pharaohs who believe in their divine right to rule, and who view popular movements against authority as an obscene threat to justice (i.e., order) as well as peace. For example, in the trial of six nearly forgotten kings who each ruled briefly and ineffectually in the period before the great Hyksos invasion at the end of the Middle Kingdom, Abnum laments the lack of a popular uprising against their incompetence. But a fellow member of the tribunal, the Twelfth Dynasty monarch Amenemhat I, himself murdered in a harem intrigue, rebukes him: “All you think about is revolution,” Amenemhat I upbraided him. “When I was governor of a nome [province], I found the country drowning in chaos. I did not therefore call for greater disorder, but trained my own men and took over the throne, saving the land and the people, without violating our sacred custom, and without giving up either lives or honor.” Yet again and again, Abnum the revolutionary raises his voice in praise of the people’s right to rebel, and puts a premium on making heads roll, to boot. Addressing Gamal Abdel-Nasser in the book’s penultimate trial, Abnum opens with admiration but closes with a chilling admonition: “Permit me to hail you in my capacity as the first revolutionary among Egypt’s poor,” began Abnum. “I want to testify that the wretched did not enjoy such security in any age—after my own—as they did in yours. I can only fault you for one thing: for insisting that your revolution be stainless, when in fact the blood should have run in rivers!” This arouses the ire of King Khufu (Cheops), for whom the Great Pyramid was built. “What is that butcher raving about now?” Khufu exclaims. This outburst gets him only a tongue-lashing from an indignant Osiris, who demands that he apologize for being so rude to a fellow member of the panel. EGYPTIAN EXCEPTIONALISM Of course, the Lotus Revolution (the flower itself a symbol of Egypt from ancient times), despite pitched battles (mainly with stones, though many died of gunfire) at Tahrir Square, seemed to follow in the (initially) bloodless footsteps of the 1952 coup— 432

especially in those euphoric days around Mubarak’s fall. Yet there were soon calls that the deposed president, members of his family and his corrupt insider entourage should be put on trial, some—including Mubarak--for their lives. In the case of Mubarak himself, that reportedly will soon happen, an event which, whatever the now-helpless old man’s transgressions, will only sully the nobility to which the movement at first aspired, and the glory that it could, for a brief moment, claim so credibly. Meanwhile, on Facebook and elsewhere, those who express doubts about the direction in which the country is now headed are often insulted, sometimes even called “scaremongers” or even traitors or enemies of the revolution, as well. This, despite the once easily- dismissed rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies, the Salafis, and the army’s own alarming brutality toward both demonstrators and Christians on occasion becomes harder and harder to deny. Nonetheless, that Egypt’s current revolution has set a unique example to all nations is already part of its rapidly evolving mythology. Its roots lie in the same deeply ingrained view of Egypt as “Umm al-Dunya”—“Mother of the World”--common among the Egyptians, and fiercely held by Mahfouz. As a nation, Egypt long ago may have invented the very idea of “exceptionalism.” Wherever Egypt’s 2011 revolution—or was it really an army coup assisted by an exceptionally enlightened mob?—ultimately leads, be it to a democratic, harmonious civil society or a bloody civil conflict, it might well lead to war. Yet Before the Throne, while trumpeting Egypt’s imperial past (both ancient and modern, as in Mohamed Ali’s adventures in Arabia, Greece, the Levant and the Sudan) most of all preaches against going to war. Mahfouz is justly lauded in the West for his early backing of Arab-Israeli peace—a position he began to edge toward as early as winter 1973, when he asked Mu`ammar al- Qaddafi--then meeting with the writers at al-Ahram--if the Arabs could beat Israel? When the otherwise irrational Libyan dictator answered, “No,” Mahfouz declared that the Arabs must therefore negotiate with Israel for peace. This opinion led to much abuse at the time, and later to boycotts of his books and films. It was largely in response to the huge split that the 1979 treaty with Israel caused among Egypt’s intellectuals (most of them opposing it, Mahfouz and a few others endorsing it) that he wrote two key chapters about ancient Egypt, as well as the two final trials—those of Nasser and Sadat—in Before the Throne. Curiously, Mahfouz’s view of international relations seems to be based on ancient Egyptian logic. Though he praises his hero Sa`d Zaghlul as well as several pharaohs, such as the doomed Seqenenra (who fell resisting the invading Hyksos) and Psamtek III (executed by the vanquishing Persians), and others for bravely fighting foreign occupation, Mahfouz paradoxically loves Egypt as an empire, lauding such conquerors as Amenhotep I and Thutmose III, even the 18th century rogue Mamluk ruler Ali Bey al-Kabir (the Great). Here Mahfouz demonstrates the divide between what the ancient Egyptians saw as ma`at and its opposite, isfet (chaos, hence injustice). In their conception, foreigners were always inferior to Egyptians (though an Egyptianized foreigner would be accepted among them). Thus Egypt’s control and even seizure of neighboring lands in the Near East and Nubia were considered a fulfillment of ma`at, while an alien power invading Egypt was the triumph of evil over the proper cosmic order. [9] Hence Mahfouz bars all but a few non-native rulers who had either become Egyptian or otherwise acted in Egypt’s best interest from the right to trial and thus the

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chance for immortality in Before the Throne. Indeed, the work as a whole seems but an expression of Mahfouz’s own personal version of ma`at as embodied in his nation’s history. This paradoxical attitude toward empire and occupation is remarkably similar to that of “the Pharaonists,” a group of intellectuals in the 1920s and 1930s whose ideas Mahfouz admired. Led by such luminaries as Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1963), first rector of the Egyptian university, Taha Husayn (1889-1973), the great blind Egyptian belles- lettriste and novelist, and Mahfouz’s “spiritual father,” the Coptic thinker and publisher Salama Musa (1887-1958)-the Pharaonists held that Egypt was both much older and much closer to Europe and the Mediterranean in culture than her Arab and African neighbors. [10] A sensitive and problematic issue is the treatment of Jews (who are mentioned only three times as a group, none in the trials of figures from later than the 18th century), as well as Egypt’s often rocky relations with both ancient and modern Israel. Mahfouz, who as an adolescent grew up in a largely Jewish area of suburban Abbasiya, once told me (and visiting Israeli expert on Egyptian Jewry, Yoram Meital), “I really miss” the Jews of Egypt, all but a very few of whom were dispersed from the country in the 1950s and 60s. Though the king (Merneptah, son of Ramesses II) most often theorized to be the pharaoh of the Exodus—a story found in similar form in both the Testament and the Qu’ran—is given his own trial in Before the Throne, the tale itself is neither told nor even mentioned. Israel by name appears only twice (both in the trial of Pharaoh Apries), briefly (and fatally) aligned with Egypt against the Babylonians—while Judah is captured by Egypt in the trial of Pharaoh Nekau II. In the novel, the current state of Israel does not exist at all except as the formidable but unnamed enemy whose presence dominates much of the proceedings in the final two trials (62 and 63). These are of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, champion of the Arab masses who led them into the catastrophic defeat of 1967. But these chapters would lose their force if not for the arguments advanced in the trials of two seemingly totally dissimilar monarchs, the iconic 19th Dynasty father and son duo, Seti I and his son, Ramesses II. These back-to-back approving portraits of pharaonic potency—and peace-making sagacity—begin with the following classic lines: Next Horus called out, “King Seti the First!” In came a man tall of stature and powerfully built. He walked, wrapped in his winding sheet, until he stood before the throne. Then Thoth, Scribe of the Gods, read aloud, “He assumed the throne upon the death of his father. He subdued Nubia, returned Palestine to Egypt, then focused his energies on building and construction.” During his opening speech in self-defense, Seti I explains that he took “Palestine” (a term, like Nubia and even Egypt, not used in his time) back from the Hittites who had seized it, a victory “sealed with a pact of peace.” But when asked by his mighty predecessor, Thutmose III, why he had not continued the war anyway, Seti I replies, “I felt my army was exhausted,” adding, “while at the same time the Hittites as a nation are extremely tough in battle.” Challenged that there is no

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glory in not pressing on the fight, Seti I answers, “A treaty of peace is preferable to a war without glory.” His son, Ramesses II, after his overblown triumph of Qadesh—in which he barely beat off a massively superior Hittite force that had tricked him into crossing the Orontes ahead of most of his troops—also got down to making peace with the same enemy nation to the northeast. Some years after withdrawing back to Egypt, leaving the enemy in his original objective, Qadesh, but with no further encroachments on Egyptian buffer states or territory, he signed a peace pact with the Hittite king—whose daughter he also married in an imperial celebration. Again, Thutmose II takes up a prosecutorial tone. When Ramesses vainly asks him, “What do say about my routing the enemy’s army,” his much more martially talented remote predecessor skewers him: “I say that you won a battle but lost a war, while your enemy lost a battle but won the war. He enticed you to make peace in order to reorganize his ranks. He welcomed your relationship by marriage in order to fix your friendly attitude before making good his losses. He was content to keep Qadesh as a place from which to threaten any point in your empire in future.” “During all of my long reign, the security of my homeland was not disturbed for even one hour,” Ramesses II responded. “Nor was there a single violent rebellion anywhere in our vast empire, while no enemy dared cast an aggressive glance at our borders.” NASSER, SADAT, AND ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE An entirely different pair of rulers—though again, one succeeds the other in power— faces the tribunal in trials of Nasser and Sadat, the last two in the book. Nasser is attacked not only for wasting Egypt’s limited resources on efforts to win every war of liberation around (while spectacularly failing to defend his own territory in 1967), but also for destroying any traces of democracy left by the ancient regime. Mustafa al- Nahhas, Zaghlul’s successor as head of the Wafd Party, thus the chief initial target of Nasserist repression, berates Nasser for what he has done to Egyptian democracy: “You were heedless of liberty and human rights,” al-Nahhas resumed his attack. “While I don’t deny that you kept faith with the poor, you were a curse upon political writers and intellectuals, who are the vanguard of the nation’s children. You cracked down on them with arrest and imprisonment, with hanging and killing, until you had eradicated their optimism and smashed the formation of their personalities—and only God knows when their proper formation shall return. Those who launched the 1919 Revolution were people of initiative and innovation in the various fields of politics, economics and culture. How your high-handedness spoiled your most pristine depths! See how education was vitiated, how the public sector grew depraved? How your defiance of the world’s powers led you to horrendous losses and shameful defeats! You never sought the benefit of another person’s opinion, nor learned from the lessons of Muhammad Ali’s experience. And what was the result? Clamor and cacophony, and an empty mythology—all heaped on a pile of rubble.” During his trial, Sadat has a prolonged verbal duel with Nasser, much of which is worth quoting here: Then Gamal Abdel-Nasser asked Sadat, “How could it have been so easy for you to distort my memory so treacherously?” 435

“I was forced take the position that I did, for the essence of my policy was to correct the mistakes I inherited from your rule,” rebutted Sadat. “Yet didn’t I delegate power to you in order to satisfy you, encourage you, and treat you as a friend?” “How tyrannical to judge a human being for a stand taken in a time of black terror, when fathers fear their sons and brothers fear each other?” shot back Sadat. “And what was the victory that you won but the fruit of my long preparations for it!” bellowed Abdel-Nasser. “A defeated man like you did not score such a triumph,” retorted Sadat. “Rather, I returned to the people their freedom and their dignity, then led them to an undeniable victory.” “And you gave away everything for the sake of an ignominious peace,” bristled Abdel- Nasser, “dealing Arab unity a fatal thrust, condemning Egypt to exclusion and isolation.” “From you I inherited a nation tottering on the abyss of annihilation,” countered Sadat. “The Arabs would neither offer a friendly hand in aid, nor did they wish us to die, nor to be strong. Rather, they wanted us to remain on our knees at their mercy. And so I did not hesitate to take my decision.” “You exchanged a giant that always stood by us for one who had always opposed us!” Abdel-Nasser upbraided him. “I went to the giant who held the solution in his hand,” pointed out Sadat. “Since, then, events have confirmed that my thoughts were correct.” One may wonder if, given the way the Barack Obama administration so quickly encouraged Mubarak’s fall, and then spoke warmly of cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood (which, in Arabic if not in English, has always said—and recently reaffirmed--that it would terminate the treaty with Israel), that Mahfouz would still write such dialogue now. At any rate, in the end, the tribunal apparently feels that Sadat has won the debate. Osiris invites Sadat to sit with Immortals--though he had only permitted Nasser to do so. The presiding deity had sent Nasser (who had incensed the court by declaring, “Egyptian history really began on July 23, 1952”) on to the final judgment with but what he termed an “appropriate” (“munasiba”) recommendation. Sadat’s testimonial, however, was qualified as “musharrifa,” or “conferring honor.” Mahfouz’s defense of Arab-Israeli peace would cost him a great deal, including boycotts of his books and films for many years in the Arab world. And it may have contributed, at least symbolically, to the attempt on his life by Islamist militants on October 14, 1994, roughly the sixth anniversary of the announcement of his Nobel. Though it is believed the attack was in punishment for his allegedly blasphemous novel, Children of the Alley (Awlad haratina, 1959), it fell on the same day that Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Rabin were revealed to have won the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo. [11] Then, and even now, accused by some of selling out to Israel (which has no discernible influence over the Swedish Academy) for the sake of his prize—devoting most of his Nobel lecture, cited above, to a defense of Palestinian rights, and even endorsing Palestinian suicide bombings during the (much-misreported) 2002 Jenin incursion—he nonetheless never renounced his support for Camp David. Nor did he give up the dream of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace accord someday. 436

Yet the question remains, how will this history really end? How would Mahfouz try Mubarak, who will probably be facing judgment both on earth and in the hereafter soon? After five millennia of mainly authoritarian rule, will the new Egyptian democracy be a real one—or at least the sort of secular liberal version that was the heady, widely touted goal of the January 25th Revolution? Will it go back to war with that other, more established democracy watching nervously from across the oft- bloodied sands of Sinai? Of course, we cannot answer for Mahfouz (or anyone) with certainty now how all this will turn out. Yet, to be sure, more than just Egypt’s fate alone shall turn on it. Notes 1. [Text] J.C.B. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952: Her Advance toward a Modern Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 39. Though dated, this remarkable work is a still-valuable and beautifully written reference that has sadly been forgotten. 2. [Text] Herman Te Velde, Seth, God of Confusion (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1967), 85; and David P. Silverman in his article, “Divinity and Deities in Ancient Egypt,” in Religion in Ancient Egypt: Gods, Myths and Personal Practice, ed. Byron E. Shafer, authors John Baines, Leonard H. Lesko and David P. Silverman (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 44. However, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt, ed. Donald B. Redford (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2001), Vol. 2, 615-19, places Osiris’ origins in Upper Egypt, as most early images of the god depict him wearing the White Crown of the southern kingdom, though this seems a minority view. 3. [Text] Bojana Mojsov, Osiris: Death and Afterlife of a God (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 33. 4. [Text] For Seth’s prominence in the development of this concept in monotheistic religion, see Peter Stanford, The Devil: A Biography (New York, Henry Holt, 1996), 20-23. More on the sinister aspect of Seth in Marc Étienne, Heka: magie et envoutement dans l’Égypte ancienne (Paris: Reunions des Musées Nationaux, 2000), 22-39. 5. [Text] Te Velde, Seth, 6. 6. [Text] R.H. Wilkinson, Complete Gods and Goddsses of Ancient Egypt (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 148, describes Isis’ iconography. For a harrowing account of the ordeal before the scales of ma`at, see Dimitri Meeks and Christine Favard-Meeks, Daily Life of the Egyptian Gods, translated from the French by G.M. Gosharian (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 142-50. 7. [Text] The description of the ka is largely in the words of David P. Silverman, Eckley Brinton Coxe. Jr., Professor and Curator of Egyptology at the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology. 8. [Text] This comparison belongs to the late Akef Ramzy Abadir, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, New York University (1989), Najib Mahfuz: Allegory and Symbolism as a means of social, political and cultural criticism, 1936-1985 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International), 166-7. For a brilliant overall analysis of Before the Throne, see Menahem Milson, Najib Mahfuz:The Novelist-Philosopher of Cairo (New York and Jerusalem: St. Martin's Press and The Magnes Press,1998), Chapter 9, "In the Courtroom of History.” 9. [Text] David O’Connor, “Egypt’s View of Others,” in ‘Never Had the Like Occurred:’ Egypt’s View of its Past, ed. John Tait (London: UCL Press, Institute of Archaeology, University of London, 2003), 155-85.

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10. [Text] For the Pharaonists’ views of Egypt as an empire, see Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image, from its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1972), 236-7. For the movement as a whole and Mahfouz’s connection to it, see Stock, A Mummy Awakens (cited in the introductory note, above), 40-61. 11. [Text] Raymond Stock, “How Islamist Militants Put Egypt on Trial,” The Financial Times, Weekend FT, March 4/5, 1995, III, on the military trial of sixteen defendants charged in the stabbing of Naguib Mahfouz. You may forward this email as you like provided that you send it in its entirety, attribute it to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and include our web address (www.fpri.org). If you post it on a mailing list, please contact FPRI with the name, location, purpose, and number of recipients of the mailing list. If you receive this as a forward and would like to be placed directly on our mailing lists, send email to [email protected]. Include your name, address, and affiliation. For further information, contact Alan Luxenberg at (215) 732-3774 x105. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201105.stock.egypt.html

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El escuadrón de la muerte rebelde La Brigada 17 de Febrero, una mezcla de milicia y policía política, acumula cada vez más poder en el este de Libia e inquieta a las autoridades de Bengasi MAITE RICO (ENVIADA ESPECIAL) - Bengasi - 20/05/2011

El tránsito de furgonetas, algunas provistas de ametralladoras, es incesante en la base de Gar Yunis. El antiguo cuartel de las temibles milicias de Muamar el Gadafi en Bengasi está ahora ocupado por la Brigada 17 de Febrero, el brazo armado de la revolución libia. Integrado por unos 2.000 voluntarios, este grupo ejerce tareas militares y de seguridad. Uno de sus principales cometidos es la captura de funcionarios y células gadafistas. El creciente poder de la brigada, que actúa con total autonomía, empieza a inquietar a algunas autoridades rebeldes. "Nosotros nacimos antes que el Consejo Nacional de Transición", dice Mustafá el Saguisli, número dos de la milicia, dejando caer el principio de veteranía. El embrión fueron los grupos de civiles que se organizaron para asaltar el cuartel general de Gadafi o inutilizar con toneladas de basura las pistas del aeropuerto de Bengasi en los primeros días de la revuelta. El Saguisli era hasta entonces un programador informático sin ninguna experiencia militar. La pistola en la cintura, que no se quita ni durante el almuerzo en sus oficinas, es un buen indicio de que las cosas han cambiado. En tres meses, aquellas caóticas brigadas se han convertido en un cuerpo jerarquizado e instruido por militares profesionales. Al mando está Fauzi Bukatef, un ingeniero petrolero que se mantiene en la penumbra. "Entrenamos a todo el que quiere y luego los filtramos", explica El Saguisli. "Unos van al frente, otros se destinan a la seguridad de Bengasi, en colaboración con lo que queda de la policía, y otros se unen al Departamento de Seguridad". Esta nueva policía política es la encargada de dar caza a esa "quinta columna" que obsesiona a la población. "Los

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gadafistas siguen activos, pero hemos detenido a muchos. Nosotros tenemos en la base a unos 200, entre exfuncionarios de seguridad, miembros de los comités revolucionarios o simples traidores. Algunos son peces gordos". Preocupadas por su reputación internacional, las autoridades rebeldes han permitido el acceso de la Cruz Roja y otros organismos a los centros de detención. Pero la persecución de gadafistas ha suscitado tensiones entre el Consejo rebelde y la Brigada 17 de Febrero. "Ellos dicen que no es el momento de detenciones ni procesamientos", explica Mustafá el Saguisli. "Nos han pedido incluso que soltáramos a algunos porque había presiones de sus tribus y no quieren problemas. Pero nosotros pensamos que el poder de la revolución debe prevalecer sobre el poder de la tribu. Y liberar a esa gente va a alentar las venganzas". En Bengasi se han dado ya al menos cuatro asesinatos selectivos de miembros de los aparatos represores de Gadafi. Sobre los autores de los crímenes nada se sabe, aunque, en uno de los casos, un familiar aseguró que los asaltantes iban en un vehículo con el emblema de la Brigada. No es este, sin embargo, el único motivo de roce con los gobernantes interinos, enredados ellos mismos en un complejo organigrama. Resulta patente, en conversaciones con varios funcionarios civiles y militares, que la Brigada 17 de Febrero es vista con sumo recelo, quizás -y esto no se dice- porque puede ser decisiva en la lucha por el poder que tarde o temprano se va a desatar tras la caída de Gadafi. "Nosotros somos autónomos. Tenemos una buena relación con el jefe del Estado Mayor, general Abdulfatah Yunis, y nuestras unidades militares están bajo un mismo mando en el frente. Pero somos independientes", subraya Mustafá el Saguisli. La brigada ha vuelto a estar en el punto de mira a raíz de la muerte, el pasado miércoles, de Pierre Marziali, director de Secopex, una empresa francesa de seguridad que negociaba con el Gobierno rebelde un contrato de asesoría. Marziali recibió un balazo en la espalda y sus cuatro compañeros fueron detenidos por un grupo del que, hasta ahora, nadie daba cuenta. "Fue nuestra unidad, con la policía", afirma el número dos de la Brigada. "Eran espías pagados por Gadafi, muy peligrosos. Los tenemos nosotros. Están bien. Reciben la visita del embajador francés. En unos días habremos concluido la investigación". Las circunstancias de la muerte de Marziali y sus propias contradicciones han puesto en apuros a las autoridades de Bengasi. El Gobierno francés, uno de sus grandes valedores, hace todo lo posible por mantener el asunto con sordina. La Brigada 17 de Febrero no es la única milicia en la capital rebelde. El vacío de poder tras el desplome del régimen y el asalto a los arsenales alentaron el surgimiento de pequeños grupos armados que hoy circulan sin control alguno. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/escuadron/muerte/rebelde/elpepiint/2 0110520elpepiint_5/Tes

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May 19, 2011 Obama’s Middle East Speech Posted by Amy Davidson

What did President Obama ask for in his speech, and whom was he asking? He wanted a cheer for Tunisia, one for Egypt, and a quick one, himself, for the death of Osama bin Laden. He told, rather than asked, Syria to “stop shooting demonstrators,” and said of its President, Bashar Assad, “He can lead that transition, or get out of the way.” He asked the President of Yemen “to follow through on his commitment to transfer power.” He was more muddled on Bahrain (“We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate interest in the rule of law”) but said that the government had to talk to protesters, and that it couldn’t do so while locking them up. He told Iran’s leaders that they were hypocrites. And he asked everyone to be more supportive of women’s rights. Saudi Arabia wasn’t mentioned. In the largest single section of the speech, he asked the Palestinians and the Israelis “to take action,” by which he meant that they should sit down and work out some “swaps” of territory, in the context of the 1967 border, that would leave both people with a state—which is, he said, “what everyone knows” a lasting peace will require. He did not bring up Guantánamo, although it has tinged the view of our country in the region he spoke to; or that yesterday a prisoner there was found dead, in what a Pentagon spokeswoman called an apparent suicide, “hanging from his neck by what appears to be bed linen.” It was also striking that, when it came to the countries in which our military is actively, directly committed, Obama’s words were among the least straightforward of the speech. On Afghanistan, he asked that we accept ambiguous terms about indefinite actions—breaking momentum, beginning to come home, continuing a transition—as meaningful ones. Iraq is variously a success story, a cautionary tale, and, oddly, an example of how ” sectarian divides need not lead to conflict.” On Libya, he asked for credit for stopping a massacre and the spread of “the 441

message” that force could keep one in power; this had to be artfully said, however, as people are still being killed and Qaddafi has not fallen. Obama did it this way: Now, time is working against Qaddafi. He does not have control over his country. The opposition has organized a legitimate and credible Interim Council. And when Qaddafi inevitably leaves or is forced from power, decades of provocation will come to an end, and the transition to a democratic Libya can proceed. “Time is working against Qaddafi”—how much time? That phrase, and the “inevitably” that followed, gave a very different sense of the length of our commitment than the old line about “days, not months.” Through it all, though, he was asking us in America to see that there was something in the region’s transformation for us. In part, it was about being happy for the people there (“Those rights that we take for granted are being claimed with joy”) and not running screaming from the room at the sight of angry crowds on our televisions: For the American people, the scenes of upheaval in the region may be unsettling, but the forces driving it are not unfamiliar. Our own nation was founded through a rebellion against an empire. Our people fought a painful civil war that extended freedom and dignity to those who were enslaved. After telling the story of Mohamed Bouazizi, the street vendor in Tunisia whose self- immolation set a revolution in motion, Obama said, In America, think of the defiance of those patriots in Boston who refused to pay taxes to a king, or the dignity of Rosa Parks as she sat courageously in her seat. Obama was not claiming that Bouazizi had the Sons of Liberty in mind when he set himself on fire; nor was he giving any Tunisians who might be listening a civics lesson about the Montgomery bus boycott. (And he treated our history in the Middle East, and any self-criticism that might imply, fairly gingerly.) Rather, he was urging us to see their ghosts when we looked at the market in Tunisia. The title the White House gave the speech was “A Moment of Opportunity”: the clearest statement of what that meant was this: So we face a historic opportunity. We have the chance to show that America values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator. There must be no doubt that the United States of America welcomes change that advances self-determination and opportunity. Yes, there will be perils that accompany this moment of promise. But after decades of accepting the world as it is in the region, we have a chance to pursue the world as it should be. The vignettes in the speech were narrowly drawn, as when he offered to forgive some of Egypt’s debts, and secure help for it from the International Monetary Fund (no longer, as of this morning, led by Dominique Strauss-Kahn) or told the Palestinians not to try anything funny at the General Assembly meeting in the fall. But the panorama, to the extent that there was one, seems to have been painted for American eyes. Photograph: White House Photo/Pete Souza.

Amy Davidson Obama’s Middle East Speech May 19, 2011 http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2011/05/the-presidents-middle-east- speech.html 442

05/18/2011 11:01 AM Has the Arab Spring Stalled? Autocrats Gain Ground in Middle East By Alexander Smoltczyk and Volkhard Windfuhr Burning churches in Cairo, dead and wounded in Syria, Libya and Yemen, and a deathly silence in Bahrain. The Arab protest movement has come to a standstill, and the kings, emirs and sultans are rallying to launch a counterrevolution. According to the "Fundamental Law of Revolution," regimes fall when those at the bottom are fed up with the status quo and those at the top are no longer capable of remaining in power. That was the experience of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. But difficulties arise when there is one thing those at the top are still quite capable of doing, namely deploying tanks to deal with their opponents -- as is the case in Syria and Libya. Last week, the Syrian regime sent heavy artillery into the rebel city of Dara'a, while its forces attacked protesting students with clubs in the previously calm city of Aleppo, in Banias on the Mediterranean coast and in the northwestern Syrian town of Homs. According to Amnesty International, by last Tuesday 580 Syrians had died in the unrest. The United Nations human rights office puts the number of deaths at up to 850. In Libya, Colonel Moammar Gadhafi is attacking the rebels with snipers and mortars. Supported by NATO air strikes, the rebels did manage to capture the airport in the coastal city of Misurata. Nevertheless, it didn't feel like the revolutionary leader's days were numbered, despite rumors that surfaced on Friday evening that Gadhafi had been wounded in a bombing attack and had already left the capital city Tripoli. In a subsequent radio address, Gadhafi informed the "cowardly crusaders" that he was living in a place "where they cannot find and kill me." Revolutions Can Fail It becomes even more difficult when many ordinary citizens turn against the revolution, as has been the case in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Yemen and Oman. As it turns out, it isn't just the elites most closely associated with autocratic leaders who fear for their benefits, privileges and positions. These fears are also shared by the thousands upon thousands involved in the bloated apparatus of political parties and governments. And the lower their position and income, the more desperately they sometimes cling to the traditional system, particularly because ordinary public servants were not able to line their pockets and open Swiss bank accounts. The Arab revolution has come to a standstill, and all signs point to a restoration of the status quo. The new Arab world has reached a point at which many revolutionaries are worn out and those who are still in power refuse to give up control. Influenced by the images of celebration from Tunis, Benghazi and Cairo, many apparently forgot that revolutions could also fail. What succeeded in Central and Eastern Europe 20 years ago is not necessarily destined to repeat itself in the Middle East. The Tunisians and Egyptians have undoubtedly made

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history, but the regimes in the countries to which their revolutionary virus has spread now have no intention of allowing their governments to implode. The first act in the revolutionary drama in the Arab world ended when Libyan Colonel Gadhafi refused to go into exile, like Tunisia's former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, or to retire, like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, instead ordering his thugs to shoot at his own people. Gadhafi's stubbornness has emboldened many autocrats. If the Libyan dictator had followed in former Tunisian President Ben Ali's footsteps and stepped down, there would be no tanks in the streets or people being herded into football stadiums in Syria. Three Different Approaches The second act of the so-called "Arab Spring" smells more of gunpowder smoke and burned-out churches than of jasmine. In the light of early summer, some things look different than they did only eight weeks ago. In many cases, the status quo seems so entrenched that a Facebook revolution alone is no longer capable of suddenly transforming it into images of people dancing in the streets. Despots frequently rely on a broad cross-section of businesspeople, party officials, civil servants and military officers who have nothing more to lose than their chains. For decades, rulers like Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, Gadhafi in Libya, the Assad family in Syria and the Khalifa clan in Bahrain have managed to build a network of patronage and play off individual clans and old-boy networks against one another. In the harsh light of recent weeks, three approaches have emerged with which the anciens régimes are addressing the crisis. The first is the path chosen by China's leadership on Tiananmen Square in 1989 -- brutally overpowering all resistance. The regimes in Libya, Syria and Yemen are currently trying out this approach to see if it works. Bahrain already seems to have employed it successfully. The second is the method used by the Turkish military after its coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 -- an uneasy but expandable democracy controlled by the military. This is the scenario that is unfolding in Tunisia and Egypt. And then there is a third, narrow path of reforms directed from above. The monarchs in Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, as well as Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, know that the younger generation is demanding more participation and will not be satisfied in the long run with being placated in an autocratic manner. These rulers seem to be trying to hold onto power by making small concessions. The Regimes' Message: Choose Us or Chaos 'Choose Us, or Chaos' The Syrian government's crackdown on protesters most closely resembles the Chinese approach. Bouthaina Shaaban, the confidante and spokeswoman for President Bashar Assad, allowed a single Western journalist into the country last week, the Middle East correspondent for the New York Times. In a conversation with the reporter, Shaaban said the rebellion was the work of a "combination of fundamentalists, extremists, smugglers, people who are ex-convicts and are being used to make trouble." The end of the protests was near, she added, insisting that the regime had already survived the worst of the unrest, and that it was time to start a "national dialogue."

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Meanwhile, the government struck back against the protesters even more forcefully than before. Several cities in southern Syria are completely shut off from the outside world. According to the trickle of information coming from Dara'a, the electricity and water supply have been cut off, hardly any food is reaching the city and the shooting continues. Syrian human rights activists reported 13 dead last Wednesday alone and noted that one of those killed was an eight-year-old boy. Syria's security apparatus has also disabled mobile telephone service, reportedly using software and hardware provided to the regime by Iran. Tehran denies this, and yet it remains one of the few allies still supporting the secular Baath Party regime in Damascus. The regime justifies its actions with the same arguments it has always used to defend its police state. "If there is no stability here, there will never be stability in Israel," said Assad's cousin, businessman Rami Makhlouf. The message: Choose us or chaos. Syria has also been accused of inciting violence on May 16 along the Israeli border, where Israeli soldiers shot and killed some 15 Palestinians taking part in an annual march there to mark the nabka, or "catastrophe" of their displacement after Israel's founding in 1948. Washington alleged that the Syrian government encouraged unprecedented participation, with people coming from Lebanon, Gaza and Syria to overwhelm the Israelis and spark an incident to distract attention from the crackdown on protestors and prove that the delicate stability in the region could only be maintained if Assad stays in power. Assad would hardly be taking such a brutal approach if he weren't convinced that officials in Washington, Ankara, some European capitals and even Jerusalem were quietly relieved that his country hasn't been divided yet, like post-revolutionary Libya, and hasn't descended into a religious civil war, either, like Iraq did a few years ago. For those practicing realpolitik in his neighborhood and in the West, Assad remains a predictable dictator. By last Friday evening, the British press had not commented on the fact that his wife, who grew up in Great Britain, and their three small children had flown to London. Honoring the Counterrevolution Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh seems to be making similar calculations, as he coolly rides out a revolt that has been seething for four months and defies all attempts by his neighbors to convince him to make an honorable exit. He occasionally suggests the possibility of stepping down, and sometimes he makes threats, as he did last Friday, when he said: "We will counter every challenge with our own challenge." The protesters fear that the man who has run the country for more than 30 years could succeed in stalling them. "With each additional day he remains in office, he weakens the youth revolution," they say. On Wednesday, snipers fired at a group of marching protesters once again, injuring dozens and killing a young man. In Bahrain, the Sunni royal family has already completely stifled the protests by Shiites and reformers. The leaders of the movement have been arrested, the activists fired from their jobs and the press gagged. In the capital Manama, Pearl Square, the center of the protests, has been paved over and redesigned. It is now being referred to in the media as "Gulf Cooperation Council Square," in honor of the troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that helped quell the revolt there on March 14. Now even the Arab counterrevolution has its heroic square. 445

The United States, whose Fifth Fleet is stationed only a few kilometers away, has been silent on the incidents in Bahrain. The governments in Manama, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi know that Washington is more interested in maintaining stable conditions in the Gulf and Syria than in North Africa. As a result, they have ignored their large ally and pursued their own "Yes, we can" policies without Washington. Obstacles Ahead The generals running the show in Tunis and Cairo since their governments were overthrown do not dare looking to the future with such confidence. If their statements are to be believed, they imagine a transition from dictatorial to democratic conditions based on the Turkish model. To achieve this, however, they must depend on support from the West to overcome powerful adversaries. In Tunisia, the new government must contend with holdovers from the Ben Ali regime who have retained their positions in the Interior Ministry and in business. In Egypt, it is the many criminals who were released or escaped from prison in the last days of the Mubarak regime, as well as the radical forces of political Islam who are testing the new freedoms. The threat that continues to emanate from these militants was reflected in the arson attack on the St. Mina Coptic Orthodox Church in Cairo's Imbaba neighborhood two weekends ago, in which 12 people died. The sectarian violence flared up there again on May 15, when clashes between the two sides left at least 55 injured. While these incidents are still no proof of a religious war, like the Turkish model, they do show that the road to pluralism and democracy is full of obstacles. The situation in Cairo is currently changing "from bad to even worse," warns the Egyptian Nobel laureate and possible presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei. "I'm more concerned about the Salafists than the Muslim Brotherhood." It was Salafists, members of a fundamentalist movement that invokes what it calls the original Islam, who assassinated former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. They dream of the Middle Ages, demand the reintroduction of a special tax for non-Muslims not assessed since the 7th century, and prayed -- in a mosque next to the Coptic cathedral in Cairo -- for the soul of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden after he was killed. Islamists were also present during the large demonstrations on Tahrir Square at the beginning of the year. At the time, the protestors, who relied heavily on Facebook to spread their message, managed to maintain the secular character of their revolution. But it remains to be seen how secular the Arab Republic of Egypt will be after the parliamentary elections scheduled for September. The Turkish Islamists had decades to prepare for democratic processes. Their Egyptian counterparts have seven months. Preventative Measures Preventative Measures Meanwhile, the Arab nations that have been spared major unrest until now are trying out yet another approach: the path of preventive counterrevolution. More and more surveillance cameras are now being installed in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, citizens are being asked to report any sign of extremist thought to the police. In both countries, as well as in Oman and

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Algeria, the government has announced costly housing construction and job creation programs. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an increasingly powerful self-help group of six concerned monarchs, has developed into the center of this enlightened counterrevolution in recent weeks. At its meeting in Riyadh last week, the council approved aid programs for Oman and Bahrain, battered after protests, and accepted the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's application for membership, as well as proposing membership to the Kingdom of Morocco. This could have far-reaching consequences and split the Arab world into new camps -- the influential, elite club of Arab monarchies, and the countries in which young democracy movements have already replaced or are still trying to replace corrupt dictatorships. Power Built on Sand? Morocco is more than 5,000 kilometers (3,125 miles) away from the shores of the Persian Gulf. By accepting this kingdom as a new member, the GCC is snubbing two much closer nations with central importance: the 24 million Yemenis, who are far more dependent on economic and political support than the Moroccans; and the 85 million Egyptians, of which at least 2 million guest workers are earning their money in the Gulf monarchies today, reducing the burden on the chronically strained Egyptian economy. The formation of new blocs downgrades the Arab League, which will exacerbate the political confrontation with poor, densely populated countries, which have either shaken off their anciens régimes (like Tunisia and Egypt) or are still trying to get rid of them (Syria, Yemen), but in either case face an uncertain future. The House of Saud and the ruling families in Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, at any rate, are determined to distribute power to the people only in homeopathic doses, if at all. In Dubai, known for its cosmopolitanism, five human rights activists are in prison for having dared to sign a petition demanding a greater say in political affairs. This alone is suspect to the sheikhs and emirs. They fear Egyptian conditions and, according to commentator Sultan al-Qasimi of the Emirate of Sharjah, sense a "temporary marriage of convenience" taking shape between Islamists and liberal forces. The images from the squares in Tunis, Cairo, Manama and Sana'a have the rulers along the Gulf scared stiff. They sense that their power could be built on sand and that not all protesters can be placated with strict surveillance and money. There is a great deal of nervousness in the Arab world. Another clever comment on revolutionary progressions doesn't come from Lenin but from the French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville. In 1856, he wrote: "The most dangerous moment for a bad government usually comes when it begins to reform itself." Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

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URL: Alexander Smoltczyk and Volkhard Windfuhr Autocrats Gain Ground in Middle East05/18/2011 11:01 AM http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762861,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Are Assad's Days Numbered?: Syria's Neighbors Fear Regime Change (05/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,760113,00.html • SPIEGEL Interview with Former Syrian Vice President: 'A Boundless Fury Has Been Building Up' (05/03/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,760116,00.html • Refugee Crisis in Niger: Sub-Saharan Africans Risk Everything to Flee Libya (05/04/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,760280,00.html • Syria on the Edge of the Abyss: Assad's Regime Escalates Crackdown on Protesters (04/25/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,758905,00.html • Frozen Funds: The Complicated Hunt for Gadhafi's Billions (05/16/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,762748,00.html Related internet links • New York Times: Syria Proclaims It Now Has Upper Hand Over Uprising http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/world/middleeast/10syria.html?_r=1&scp= 1&sq=shaaban&st=cse SPIEGEL ONLINE is not liable for the content of external web pages.

05/18/2011 09:08 AM A Peaceful City? Scratching Beneath the Surface in Abbottabad By Walter Mayr Is the city of Abbottabad, where Osama bin Laden was found and killed by US Special Operations forces on May 1, really as bucolic as it has been described? The al-Qaida boss, as it turns out, was far from the only Islamist who sought refuge in the town. There's an invisible trail running through Abbottabad. Those who follow it will eventually find themselves in the shadowy realm of al-Qaida. The path starts at the house where Osama bin Laden was killed. From there, it winds through potato fields and dusty lanes into the eastern part of the city before coming to a villa behind a white iron gate next to Hadshi Noor's general store. The villa's address is 497 Arambagh, and its inhabitant is Abdul Hamid Sohail. The retired director of an insurance company stands in the doorway wearing white baggy trousers and a shirt with a stand-up collar. He doesn't look like someone who would harbor terrorists. But the impression is mistaken. A few months ago, Sohail hosted Umar Patek, the presumed mastermind behind the bomb attacks in Bali nine years ago -- a man who has a $1 million (€700,000) bounty

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on his head. On Jan. 25, 2011, Pakistani police arrested the Indonesian in Sohail's villa. The insurance director's home is still pockmarked with bullet holes from the raid. Today, Sohail says that his son brought the freezing, hungry foreigner and his wife to the villa in mid-January. He describes his strange guest as someone who understood neither Urdu nor English, but who was undoubtedly in need of Muslim charity. How, he implores, was he supposed to know that he had handed his guest apartment over to the deputy commander of the southeast Asian arm of al-Qaida and that its chief, Osama bin Laden, had already found a hideout only three kilometers (1.9 miles) away? Like puzzle pieces, recent events in Abbottabad can be pieced together to form a picture. What emerges is not the image of a peaceful, idyllic military city far removed from terror. This city of 150,000 in the Himalayan foothills is home to a military academy and elite schools. For years, it enjoyed a reputation for being a peaceful oasis - - until May 2, when US Special Forces tracked down, shot and killed bin Laden here. The Bali Bomber It was 11 days before the Islamists reacted. Last Friday, two suicide bombers killed at least 80 people -- most of them young police recruits -- and wounded 140 in the northwestern Pakistani city of Shabqadar. According to a statement by the Pakistani Taliban, the attack was meant to avenge bin Laden's "martyrdom" in Abbottabad. The city of Abbottabad, the place where two of the kingpins of global terror had found refuge, isn't what it seems. At first glance, it looks like great powers have long wanted this wild stretch of land between the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush to look: well-kept and orderly. It is here that Pakistan's army, propped up as it is by US military assistance, has its most elite training academy -- a mere 900 meters from where bin Laden was living. Was Patek, the suspected Bali bomber, on his way to meet up with bin Laden when he was arrested in January, as Indonesia's defense minister claimed two weeks ago? Is it possible that the terrorist knew more than Pakistan's seemingly omnipotent Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, which still claims to have known nothing about bin Laden's hideout? Sohail, the retired villa owner, says he was equally unaware of both bin Laden's presence and Patek's plans. According to Sohail, the Indonesian had only been a guest in his house for nine days before the police dragged him down the steps and outside covered in blood "like a butchered hen." Sohail's son was also jailed as a suspected accomplice. The Mailman Jihadist The man who is said to have led police to Patek lived just 500 meters away. In a dirty yellow house near open sewers in the poor part of town: It was here that Tahir Shehzad lived. The bearded young man worked as a clerk in Abbottabad's main post office, accepting packages and disbursing cash. Whenever there was time, he spoke about "holy war." One relative says that Shehzad was "a jihadist through and through," and that he suddenly disappeared in 2009. When he finally re-emerged, he was wearing handcuffs. The ISI had supposedly been tailing Shehzad since August 2010, and it arrested him on Jan. 23, 2011 in the eastern city of Lahore. Within two days, the police already knew enough to be able to arrest Patek, the suspected Indonesian bomber, in Abbottabad. 449

It could have been him who provided another crucial clue about bin Laden's hideout, which the Americans had already learned about by trailing bin Laden's personal courier. But Pakistani officials continue to insist they knew nothing. Was the arrest of the Islamists in Abbottabad at the beginning of the year the prelude to a closing act that would come in the early morning hours of May 2? There is little evidence that all of the trails leading to Abbottabad had been followed. Including the path leading to one of the world's most-sought-after men: Abu Faraj al- Libbi, the successor to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the planner behind the 9/11 attacks. According to Guantanamo files recently released by WikiLeaks, Al-Libbi told interrogators in Guantanamo that he had been appointed bin Laden's "official messenger" in July 2003, that he had sent his family "to Abbottabad" and that he had lived there himself until 2004. Was al-Libbi an advance guard for bin Laden? In 2006, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president at the time, acknowledged that al-Libbi had used three houses in Abbottabad as a base. No one, it would seem, followed up on the lead at the time -- not even the ISI. A Pakistani Failure Since May 2, Pakistan has been a divided country. The larger part is made up of people who are upset because they believe the whole story about bin Laden's hiding out in Abbottabad is an American lie. The other part is made up of people seething with anger because, even if they don't regret bin Laden's death, they still aren't happy about how this has damaged the reputation of Pakistan's army and its supposedly all-powerful ISI. How could Pakistan, both a sovereign nation and a nuclear power, they wonder, have been kept in the dark about a secret and deadly American military raid on their soil? The alternative isn't any better: namely that those in power knew about the raid before hand but don't want to admit it now. Abbottabad, where generals and jihadists lived more closely together than anywhere, reflects perfectly the full spectrum of Pakistani sensibilities. But bin Laden's opponents and supporters agree on one thing: The army, the pride of the country, has failed. In the 40 years since the lost war against India -- a war which resulted in Pakistan losing the eastern part of the country, today's Bangladesh -- Pakistan has doggedly pursued a single goal: destabilizing India, its powerful neighbor on the subcontinent, as well as Afghanistan, by providing support to Islamist terror groups. The more subtle details of this task have been left to the ISI. The fact that extremist bomb attacks have killed an average of 1,000 Pakistani civilians annually in recent years has provided enough reason for criticism. Now comes the realization that bin Laden and other al-Qaida members were able to operate undisturbed right under the noses of both the army and the intelligence service. The View of Osama's Allies "I'm ashamed that I worked for an organization that is guilty of this," says retired Brigadier General Asad Munir. Munir was a high-ranking ISI official who was ultimately responsible for waging the war against suspected terrorists in the tribal regions along the border with Afghanistan. He was also responsible for the search for bin Laden.

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Munir says that, when he was in charge, all operations were jointly conducted with the CIA. "We had the intelligence from the ground, and they had the technology," he says. "At the beginning," he continues, "I found it hard to believe that our people said they knew nothing about the mission to kill bin Laden. Now it seems to me that this really was the case." Munir, 61, numbers among a select group of well-established former senior officials whose retired status provides them with a safe distance from which to cast a critical eye on today's Pakistan. After 25 years in uniform -- some still in their mid-40s -- they can enjoy the pleasures of retirement. In Shimla Hill, Abbottabad's upscale neighborhood, the magnificent villas and the SUVs parked out front attest to the additional benefits that can result from serving in Pakistan's armed forces. The envy of normal citizens in this garrison city, who have to make ends meet with only a fraction of the officers' income, had long remained in check. Now that the elite have been disgraced, however, their silence has come to an end. "For 10 years, we fought against terror and against Osama bin Laden alongside the Americans. Then the target is there, and what do we get for it? Nothing but international criticism and ridicule," says Raja Kamra Khan, an eloquent politician whose house lies not far from bin Laden's hideout. "Why can't the government say if we were involved or not?" he asks. "Osama here? Nobody could have imagined that." Indeed, despite the constant stream of images broadcast from Abbottabad by CNN, the BBC and al-Jazeera, the locals still refuse to believe that the head of a terror network spanning the entire globe could manage to elude the curiosity of his neighbors for years. "If a cow bears a calf around here," people here say, "everyone in the village knows about it." Osama's Remaining Comrade-in-Arms The government in Islamabad, meanwhile, is doing its best to avoid transparency. It doesn't want to share any of the responsibility for killing a man widely viewed in this country as the standard bearer of the Islamic cause. But it also doesn't want to look like Washington's clueless lackey either. Last Monday, Interior Minister Rehman Malik tried to free himself from this corner by telling Al-Arabiya TV that he only learned about the American raid "15 minutes after it had begun," while insisting that he had been kept in the dark about the mission's target. This drama concerning Pakistan's identity and its duplicity vis-à-vis Islamist violence offers an opportunity for catharsis. But no one, it would seem, wants to take advantage of it. The country has fought alongside the Americans in the "war on terror" for almost a full decade -- even as some among Pakistan's elite tolerated the activities of radicals. Asad Durrani, a former head of the ISI and Pakistani ambassador to Germany, went on record recently as saying that the strategy is legitimate. Terrorism, he wrote, "is a technique of war, and therefore an instrument of policy." A similar view is espoused by the man who starts to talk about bin Laden in a modest backyard apartment somewhere in Pakistan on this evening. The man was a close companion of bin Laden while the two waged jihad against the Soviet infidels in Afghanistan -- and they remained in touch with one another. Among Osama's long- standing comrades-in-arms, he is one of the last who isn't either dead or in prison. Sitting cross-legged on his carpet, he says that even though Osama has been liquidated, his death will give rise to thousands of Osamas in every village and on every mountain. 451

"An individual can be killed, but the ideology lives on," he says. "Because the roots are still there, the oppression, the murder and the unequal political treatment of Muslims by America and the Western world." Visiting the Doctor? The US government has released videos that make it look like bin Laden spent years idling in his house in Abbottabad. But the man says the videos are misleading. "He came and went," the man says. "This last time, he came back to Abbottabad because he wanted to get treatment. He still had problems with his left leg, which was wounded during the fight at Tora Bora. In addition, he recently became seriously ill, probably a hepatitis." Less than 100 meters from bin Laden's house in Abbottabad is a villa belonging to a doctor named Amir Aziz. Fuel for speculation: A doctor named Amir or Amer Aziz was jailed in 2002 for providing medical assistance to bin Laden; he hasn't been seen at his job in Lahore for months. "Because he was temporarily in Abbottabad," reported a Pakistani parliamentarian. The army refuses to comment on suspicions that specialists in the military hospital in Abbottabad may have provided aid to Osama, their furtive neighbor. "I would only visit the military hospital if I wanted to be killed," quips Mohammed Karim Khan, the highest-ranking police officer in the district of Abbottabad. "There are many who haven't come out alive." His good mood is notable for the fact that he knew nothing about the biggest case in the history of his police department. Osama's helpers in the city? The arrest of the Indonesian Patek? The postal clerk Shehzad? The apartment rented by the CIA to observe Osama's compound? Never heard of it. "The army does all of that here," Khan says. "Our job is just to cordon off the area surrounding bin Laden's house." Biblical Warnings Outside, in the narrow lanes of Abbottabad's bazaar, the merchants sit in their stalls as stoically as ever, arms and legs crossed like fakirs sitting on beds of nails. At the traffic circle in the city's center, a loudspeaker van is booming with the staccato demands of the Jamaat-e-Islami party that the "world's biggest terrorist," the United States, cease deadly drone attacks on targets in Pakistani territory. Meanwhile, Father Akram Javed Gill sits in a quiet courtyard of a house off the city's main street talking of peace. The Catholic priest is in charge of the Parish of St. Peter Canisius, which has been here for over a century, as well as its grade school. It is the last of what were once several Christian educational establishments in Abbottabad; all the others have been taken over by the state or the army. It is thanks to these schools that the city's literacy rate is much higher than the national average. But even in enlightened Abbottabad, the majority of residents doubt whether bin Laden's end can signal the beginning of better times for Pakistan. "We don't know what was really going on in this house," Father Gill says cautiously when discussing Osama's final sanctuary. The Christians in Abbottabad don't want to suffer because bin Laden was killed here. "This was a peaceful city," Father Gill says. "But now we've had to ask the police for increased protection." Several years back, in the wake of furious Muslim protests, Father Gill had the walls raised around his church's property and the statue of Mary in its inner courtyard. But he 452

has so far refrained from hiring a sharpshooter like the one that began crouching behind sandbags in front of St. Luke's Church a couple of days ago. Father Gill refuses to let the situation get him down. At a quarter past ten, he appears for Sunday Mass wearing a bright-white alb and carrying a Bible under his arm. If you turn to Matthew 5:21, you will find: "Thou shall not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment." Here in Abbottabad, it can be interpreted as a delayed warning. For Osama and for Obama. Translated from the German by Josh Ward URL: Walter Mayr Scratching Beneath the Surface in Abbottabad05/18/2011 09:08 AMhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762763,00.html Related SPIEGEL ONLINE links: • Drone Killing Debate: Germany Limits Information Exchange with US Intelligence (05/17/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,762873,00.html • Terrorists Have Rights Too: What International Law Says about the Killing of Bin Laden (05/13/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,762417,00.html • Ottrando's Tears: A New York Fireman and Osama's Death (05/10/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,761526,00.html • The Search for Bin Laden's Cave: Fifteen Minutes of Fame for a Tiny Pakistani Village (05/09/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,761436,00.html • 'A Time of Great Testing for Al-Qaida': Bin Laden's Death and the Future of Violent Jihad (05/08/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,760938,00.html • Interview with Terrorism Expert Bruce Riedel: 'The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan Has Begun' (05/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,761049,00.html • US-Pakistani Relations: A Forced Marriage Plagued by Ever-Deepening Distrust (05/07/2011) http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,761190,00.html

Le gouvernement de transition tunisien veut maintenir les élections du 24 juillet LEMONDE.FR avec AFP | 18.05.11 | 11h26 • Mis à jour le 18.05.11 | 12h26

Les Tunisiens sont appelés à élire le 24 juillet une Assemblée constituante, qui aura la tâche d'adopter une nouvelle Constitution et de préparer des élections. AFP/FETHI BELAID Le premier ministre de transition en Tunisie, Béji Caïd Essebsi, répète que la "volonté du gouvernement" est de maintenir l'élection d'une Assemblée constituante à la date du

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24 juillet. M. Essebsi est en visite à Paris, où il doit s'entretenir avec le président Nicolas Sarkozy. "Depuis le jour où le gouvernement a été constitué, nous avons spécifiquement dit et répété que ces élections auront lieu le 24 juillet", a-t-il déclaré, sur Europe 1. "Maintenant, actuellement, les élections ne dépendent plus du gouvernement puisqu'il y a une commission spéciale qui a été créée et va s'occuper des élections", a-t-il tenu à préciser. Les Tunisiens sont appelés à élire le 24 juillet une Assemblée constituante, qui aura la tâche d'adopter une nouvelle Constitution et de préparer des élections. L'hypothèse d'un report du scrutin a été récemment évoquée, notamment après une intervention télévisée de M. Essebsi, qui a évoqué la "lenteur" des travaux préparatoires. Interrogé mercredi sur le point de savoir si tout retard serait préjudiciable pour le pays, le premier ministre a répondu par l'affirmative. "Oui, en tout cas même au gouvernement, puisque nous-mêmes voudrions que la situation de légalité s'installe, parce que pour le moment nous sommes dans une situation particulière", a-t-il dit. Le président de la haute instance chargée de préparer les élections en Tunisie, Yadh Ben Achour, a estimé, la semaine dernière que la tâche restait "immense" avant la tenue du scrutin, n'excluant pas un report de la date. http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2011/05/18/le-gouvernement-de-transition- tunisien-veut-maintenir-les-elections-du-24-juillet_1523695_1466522.html

Proche-Orient Yémen : le président et l'opposition acceptent de signer l'initiative du Golfe LEMONDE.FR avec Reuters et AFP | 18.05.11 | 12h21

Le signe "v" de la victoire lors d'une manifestation à Taëz demandant le départ du président Ali Abdalalh Saleh, mardi 17 mai.REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah

Le président du Yémen, Ali Abdallah Saleh, et l'opposition ont accepté de signer le plan de transition élaboré par les pays du Golfe, a déclaré mercredi 18 mai un responsable de l'opposition. La signature serait imminente, a confirmé un conseiller du président. Cet accord, qui sera paraphé mercredi, est intervenu après une médiation de diplomates américains et européens, qui a entraîné de légères modifications du texte original. "A la suite des efforts américains, européens et du Golfe, le président a donné son accord à l'initiative du Golfe après de simples modifications et la signature aura lieu aujourd'hui", a dit Yahya Abou Ousboua. 454

Le plan prévoit la formation par l'opposition d'un gouvernement de réconciliation et la démission un mois plus tard de M. Saleh en échange de son immunité, puis une élection présidentielle dans les soixante jours. Jeudi, les Etats-Unis ont appelé "toutes les parties à signer" ce plan "immédiatement". Le président Saleh est confronté depuis plusieurs mois à de violentes manifestations exigeant son départ du pouvoir. La répression de ce mouvement de protestation a fait au moins 176 morts depuis fin janvier, selon un bilan établi par l'AFP à partir de sources médicales et de sécurité. Yémen : le président et l'opposition acceptent de signer l'initiative du Golfe 18.05.11 | 12h21 http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2011/05/18/yemen-le-president-et-l-opposition-acceptent-de- signer-l-initiative-du-golfe_1523740_3218.html

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La1 Sentinelle de Tunisie

Mai 17 Et si la Tunisie entrait dans l’UE ? L’une des plumes de l’hebdomadaire allemand estime que les Tunisiens ont autant leur place au sein de la communauté que les Chypriotes ou les Portugais. Auteur: Gero von Randon La Tunisie dans l’Union européenne ? Cela semble fou. Mais en période révolutionnaire, ce qui est fou devient raisonnable, comme il devient déraisonnable de se cantonner à ses habitudes. Sur la rive sud de la Méditerranée, la réalité se fissure. Comme autrefois dans l’est de l’Europe, quand le Mur est tombé. La Tunisie a donné le coup d’envoi et elle pourrait devenir la vitrine, voire la tête de pont des démocrates dans la région, du Maroc à l’Iran en passant par le monde arabe, si elle devenait membre de l’Union européenne. Essayons de l’imaginer. La Tunisie, État de droit sous la protection européenne, disposant des mêmes droits, et des mêmes devoirs à Bruxelles, y compris devant la Cour européenne de justice. De quoi aiguiser les appétits des voisins. Serait-ce une mauvaise chose ? C’est de France que cette idée audacieuse nous est venue tout récemment. On lui a objecté que la Tunisie ne faisait pas partie de l’Europe mais de l’Afrique. Certes. Pourtant, Chypre est membre de l’UE, et l’île se trouve en Asie. Il ne faut pas se contenter de regarder les cartes, encore faut-il savoir les lire. Montagnes et déserts isolent le Maghreb de l’Afrique noire. Des villes comme Marseille sont plus proches de Tunis que de Varsovie ou d’Helsinki. De fait, les voisins de la Tunisie, l’Algérie et la Libye, sont aussi des nôtres, dès à présent, même sans une intégration de la Tunisie à l’UE. Tout au moins, ceux qui défendent l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’Union ne devraient pas évoquer des arguments géographiques pour s’opposer à l’entrée de la Tunisie. La Turquie a d’ailleurs une frontière commune avec l’Irak, qui est tout sauf un voisin de l’Europe. L’intégration de la Turquie représenterait une étape nettement plus radicale que celle de la Tunisie. Il est effectivement gênant que la Tunisie, au sud, englobe un coin de Sahara, et par conséquent une région où Al-Qaida peut jouer les fauteurs de troubles. Mais si l’on part du principe que l’intégration ferait de la Tunisie un État plus prospère, cela profiterait-il au réseau terroriste ou lui porterait-il tort ? Il est vrai, pour l’heure, que le pays ne satisfait pas encore aux critères d’entrée dans l’UE. Mais cela était également le cas de la Roumanie, quand elle a entamé son processus d’intégration. Et gardons à l’esprit que, bientôt, la Tunisie sera plus démocratique que la Turquie ou la Hongrie, bien que la Constitution tunisienne stipule que l’État doit être musulman. Du reste, ce paragraphe, au nom de la paix sociale, finira par être repris dans la nouvelle Constitution : et alors ? Notre Loi fondamentale en appelle à Dieu ; du reste, l’Angleterre est dotée d’une Église d’État, et personne ne s’en soucie. La tolérance 456

prévaut en Tunisie. Pas dans chaque village, pas dans chaque famille, mais c’était comme ça aussi autrefois en Irlande. Ou en Bavière. Une seule question se pose, celle de savoir si l’Union peut supporter un nouvel élargissement. Aujourd’hui déjà, son processus de décision vire au mini drame. Peut- être parce que les objectifs unificateurs se sont évaporés ? Une Europe qui parlerait également arabe, qui compenserait dans la pratique le choc des civilisations, serait en tout cas un projet d’une réelle portée stratégique. Et l’UE pourrait le faire passer avant toutes ces vétilles dans lesquelles elle se débat aujourd’hui. Quant au risque économique, il serait modeste, à vrai dire. C’est en Tunisie que l’on rencontre la classe moyenne la plus qualifiée et la plus ouverte du monde arabophone. Ce n’est pas le tiers-monde. Certes, on trouve des zones sous- développées dans l’arrière-pays. Mais elles ne sont pas sans rappeler les régions pauvres du Portugal d’antan ; elles n’ont pas empêché ce pays d’entrer dans l’Union. Quant aux produits tunisiens, presque tous agricoles, ils renfloueraient la part toujours plus réduite de l’agriculture dans l’UE. Et nous préférerions accueillir les Tunisiens comme des immigrés prêts à travailler, plutôt que de voir le président de la Commission européenne, José Manuel Barroso, exiger des révolutionnaires qu’ils ferment leurs frontières d’urgence. Quelle honte ! Et si les Tunisiens n’y tenaient pas du tout ? Il se peut fort bien qu’eux, dont le pays a été un protectorat français jusqu’en 1956, refusent fièrement une offre d’intégration. Tout ne serait donc pas joué pour autant. Cette offre mettrait un point final à la politique méditerranéenne adoptée jusqu’à présent par l’Union, si tant est qu’une telle politique n’ait jamais existé. Les Tunisiens ont su faire preuve de courage. Pourrons-nous en faire autant ? Source: Courrier International n.1071 Gero von Randon Et si la Tunisie entrait dans l’UE ? 17 Mai 2011 http://www.sentinelle-tunisie.com/societe/item/et-si-la-tunisie-entrait-dans-l-ue

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Rape in Pakistan: the real verdict Ayesha Khan, 17th May 2011

The gang-rape of Mukhtaran Mai launched a nine-year court battle that concluded with a verdict by the Supreme Court of Pakistan acquitting all but one of the accused. Her case illustrates how both the formal and informal systems of justice share the same hostility to women who defy social norms and demand justice in cases of rape, says Ayesha khan About the author Ayesha Khan is a researcher on gender and development issues with the Collective for Social Science Research in Karachi, Pakistan On April 21st, the Supreme Court of Pakistan issued its verdict [9] in the case of Mukhtaran Mai, acquitting all but one of the accused in the famous gang-rape case that made headlines [10] around the world nine years ago. The victim was a young illiterate woman from rural Punjab, who alleged that she was raped by a group of men from a dominant caste and class group in her village as retribution for a transgression committed against one of their women by her younger brother, age 12 at the time. Breaking with social norms, Mukhtaran had filed charges against the accused and publicly denounced them. Supported by human rights activists and women’s groups, she appeared on television, gave newspaper interviews, joined in women’s activist meetings, and travelled to Europe and the United States to highlight her cause. She became a household name in Pakistan. Whether or not this verdict is overturned after the next and final appeal is filed, there are important lessons to be learned from the details of this case and the manner in which it was handled. Women’s rights activists and their supporters in Pakistan will recognize what the verdict was actually about–the audacity of a woman speaking out publicly and attempting to get the criminal justice system to assert that her rape was a violation that should not go unpunished. Her very survival is an insult to the guardians of this system. Let us consider what happens when a rape case is pursued in Pakistan.If a woman, or someone acting on her behalf, wishes to file a complaint of rape, her statement needs to be recorded at a police station. This first step is exceedingly difficult to take, because police officers regularly humiliate women who allege sexual violation. They doubt the veracity of their stories, delay or refuse to file the complaint if it concerns influential people, and/or conduct half-baked investigations. These are all grounds later on, if the case makes it to court, for dismissal of the case. As legal activists working in Karachi to support rape survivors report [11], if a woman is too composed at the police station, and even brings along evidence such as soiled clothing, that is reason for the police to assume that she is lying. If she admits to knowing the rapist, or being related to him, again she is treated as a liar, and if she was

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out of the house alone at the time of the rape she doesn’t stand a chance of recording an accurate First Information Report (FIR) with the police. If she is married, and therefore not a virgin, then the case further diminishes in importance. The trial [9] of the accused in Mukhtaran Mai’s case fully reflected these norms. Two out of the three Supreme Court judges argued that she waited an inordinately long time (over a week) before filing the FIR with the police in 2002. They further maintained that there was insufficient evidence based on the police investigation and that Mukhtaran herself gave an inconsistent testimony in court. They doubted the veracity of her account with regard to gang-rape, arguing that she fabricated the story due to a personal vengeance motive against the accused. The fact that she had been briefly married once before, and thus was not a virgin, added to the difficulty in gathering evidence of rape. However, they did believe that one of the accused did indeed rape her, mainly because he himself acknowledged having had intercourse with her. “It is utterly disappointing [12] that insufficient police investigation and delay in registering a case with police have been made basis for acquittal of the accused,” was the official response released by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, a non- governmental organization. Women’s groups expressed their shock [13] as well. The verdict was disappointing but not surprising. In Pakistan rape is a social calamity – the accused and his family, but more so the victim, are understood to have suffered disgrace due to as a result of the allegation. For example, in a different court ruling granting bail to another alleged rapist, the judge observed that the accused had been languishing in jail for the duration of the trial, although he came from a “respected Syed (belonging to the lineage of the Prophet) family” and his suffering was detrimental to his family’s reputation. Despite the fact that rape is a non-bailable offence, judges can exercise discretion when cases drag on too long - which is most often the case in Pakistan. Defence and prosecuting lawyers, as well as judges, often see their role as facilitators of an amicable settlement. Lawyers may persuade, harass, or intimidate the prosecuting witnesses to change their testimony or back off from pressing charges and settle. In their view the very best settlement is one in which the victim and her rapist are joined in marriage, restoring the reputations of both parties. These attitudes and beliefs reflect accurately social norms that use the sexual control of women as powerful methods of ensuring their obedience. The informal justice system holds more sway in matters relating to sexual conduct (or misconduct) than the formal criminal justice system in Pakistan. It also brokers settlements between aggrieved parties. The informal system relies on tribal or clan- based jirgas, councils of male elders representing their kinship group, to settle disputes at the community level, although they do not form a part of the formal system. These jirgas are quickest to issue judgements on couples accused of illicit relations and to oversee their punishments as well, based on customary practices that often violate the actual law. (Honour killings are integral to this tradition.) Settlements among families or clans often include the payment of money by the offending party to the victims , but in the absence of adequate money the payment takes the form of offering women or girls, as well as cattle, as compensation. In a more recent example, a jirga in the province of Sindh ordered 12 minor girls to be handed over in marriage as part of a settlement in the murder of four men - in other words three virgin girls to compensate for one man [14].

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The police has arrested some of those involved in the jirga, but in such cases their prosecution and conviction is unlikely. Mukhtaran Mai was sent to a jirga held by the clan representing the accused to make amends for their allegation that there had been an illicit relationship between her younger brother and one of their women relatives. Since Mukhtaran belongs to a less influential clan, low in the social hierarchy of the area, her family did not press ahead with their own charges that Mukhtaran’s younger brother had actually been raped by relatives of the accused. Instead, Mukhtaran was forced to appear before the jirga to apologize for his alleged illicit relations with a woman. But the jirga representing the accused suddenly decided not to accept her apology and instead punish to her and her family by raping her. The police in her area may have been aware of what was happening, but they would not take action on their own initiative in defiance of a jirga ruling . Afterwards, the rapists were confident they had silenced her and her family forever. But Mukhtaran Mai herself defied the informal systems of justice by filing a FIR with the police and pursuing her case [15] through numerous appeals in the formal courts of law for nine years. She travelled around the world to share her story and received accolades for her bravery [16]. She grew from an illiterate young woman to become the founder of a school [17] for girls in her village. New York Times journalist Nicholas Kristoff [18] advocated for her cause internationally, referring to her as a “national treasure” for Pakistan. But at home, she was perceived by too many lawyers, judges, media and ordinary people, to be deepening the shame of her rape by taking it “outside”, and bringing disgrace to the country in the eyes of the world. In 2005 then President Parvez Musharraf said in an interview with the Washington Post that many people in Pakistan believed that alleging rape was a good way to get oneself asylum to live abroad [19], referring to other prominent cases in which women had fled the country out of fear for their lives after alleging rape at the hands of influential people. There was also political pressure to drop the charges; it has been alleged that a government minister has been threatening [20] her, on behalf of the accused, to drop the case since 2006. Her growing renown only made the stakes higher for the guardians of both the formal and the informal systems of justice, who appeared to share the same dim view of women as commodities to be bartered in the name of maintaining social stability. It appears that they needed to teach her an exemplary lesson. Hence it became more important than ever to establish her unreliability as a witness to her own rape. Soon after the Supreme Court verdict Mukhtaran appeared on a popular evening news programme [21]. The host opened the show commenting on the day’s event and introducing her unpleasantly as a woman who had “travelled all over the world”. He then proceeded to probe her about details of the case, particularly why she had waited so many days to file the FIR, and invited the views of two other men on the panel. They launched into a detailed discussion, wondering aloud about the quality of the evidence. As the discussion began to veer towards explicit details of the rape, Mukhtaran took out her earplugs and calmly walked out of the studio. Apparently Mukhtaran has worn earplugs on television interviews before as well, to block out the insulting remarks made by other guests and maintain her focus on what to say. The host and panellists hardly missed a beat and continued their conversation about her rape.

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One of the first comments she made to the press after the verdict was to express deep concern for those women and girls who had filed charges of rape based on her example, and who now stood to be humiliated all over again [22] by hostile courts. A leading women’s rights organization, Aurat Foundation, compiles data on violence against women, and reports that out of a total of 8,000 cases of violence in 2010, 928 were rape cases [23]. The actual figure is estimated to be much higher, since most cases go unreported. Out of those cases that make it to court, there is a three percent conviction rate. Unbelievably, Pakistan is a country where rape is a crime that the state is bound to prosecute even if the victim does not file charges, although this is not widely known and hardly practiced. But Mukhtaran’s example had encouraged activists, and women lawyers pressed ahead with rape cases in the hope of securing more convictions. Mukhtaran Mai has said on numerous occasions that her life is in danger. She requested police protection in her village while the case was inching its way to the courts, and the government grudgingly gave her a policeman or two to sit at her door. The relatives of the accused live a stone’s throw from her own home, and now the accused themselves will be returning. The lesson to be learned from her case so far is that speaking out and fighting for justice has only earned her powerful enemies in the formal and informal justice systems alike. Sideboxes Related stories: Rape in Turkey: between incitement, complicity and silence [24] Rape in war: the time for 'never again' is now [25] Gender justice and the ICC: turning a miracle into reality [26] US Election 2010: Obama lost the terms of debate and a large segment of white women [27] Two million dollars: a patriarchal bargain [28] Pakistan: the liberals’ dilemma [29]

Source URL: http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/ayesha-khan/rape-in-pakistan-real- verdict Created 05/17/2011 - 17:07

Links: [1] http://www.opendemocracy.net/themes/5050-theme [2] http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050 [3] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/equality [4] http://www.opendemocracy.net/topics/culture [5] http://www.opendemocracy.net/countries/pakistan [6] http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/pathways-of-womens-empowerment [7] http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/religion-gender-politics [8] http://www.opendemocracy.net/author/ayesha-khan [9] http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Crl.P.163_to_171&S.M.C5_2005.pdf [10] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mukhtaran_Bibi [11] http://www.war.org.pk/ [12] http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/23/mukhtar-mai-case-verdict-disappoints-hrcp.html [13] http://www.wluml.org/node/7098 [14] http://www.opendemocracy.net/tribune.com.pk/story/163148/12-girls-given-as-compensation-in-murder-case [15] http://sanasaleem.com/2011/04/24/going-back-to-mukhtar-mai/ [16] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mukhtaran_Bibi#Awards_and_acclaim [17] http://www.mukhtarmaimmwo.com/mukhtar-mai-girls-model-school.html [18] http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/feudals-vs-mukhtar [19] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/audio/2005/09/23/AU2005092301278.html [20] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-first/mukhtar-mai-pakistani-wom_b_219553.html [21] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDIaa3GYjXM [22] http://www.newsweek.com/2011/05/01/true-survivor.html [23] http://www.af.org.pk/VAW%20Reports.htm [24] http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/serta%C3%A7-sehliko%C4%9Flu/rape-in-turkey-between-incitement-complicity-and- silence [25] http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/theresa-de-langis/rape-in-war-time-for-never-again-is-now [26] http://www.opendemocracy.net/cleo-wilder/gender-justice-and-icc-turning-miracle-into-reality 461

[27] http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/ruth-rosen/us-election-2010-obama-lost-terms-of-debate-and-large-segment-of-white- women [28] http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/afiya-shehrbano-zia/two-million-dollars-patriarchal-bargain [29] http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/afiya-shehrbano-zia/pakistan-liberals%E2%80%99-dilemma [30] http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ [31] http://www.opendemocracy.net/about/syndication

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May 17, 2011 Bibi and Barack By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Reading the headlines from the Middle East these days — Christians and Muslims clashing in Egypt, Syria attempting to crush its democracy rebellion and Palestinians climbing over fences into Israel — you get the sense of a region where the wheels could really start to come off. In such a moment, President Obama has to show the same decisiveness he showed in tracking down Osama bin Laden. A useful analogy for this moment comes from climate science, where a popular motto says: Given how much climate change is already baked into our future, the best we can do now is manage the unavoidable and avoid the unmanageable. In Middle East terms, the “unmanageable” we have to avoid is another war between Israel and any of its neighbors. The “unavoidable” we have to manage is dealing with what is certain to be a much more unstable Arab world, sitting atop the world’s largest oil reserves. The strategy we need is a serious peace policy combined with a serious energy policy. Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu of Israel is always wondering why his nation is losing support and what the world expects of a tiny country surrounded by implacable foes. I can’t speak for the world, but I can speak for myself. I have no idea whether Israel has a Palestinian or Syrian partner for a secure peace that Israel can live with. But I know this: With a more democratic and populist Arab world in Israel’s future, and with Israel facing the prospect of having a minority of Jews permanently ruling over a majority of Arabs — between Israel and the West Bank, which could lead to Israel being equated with apartheid South Africa all over the world — Israel needs to use every ounce of its creativity to explore ways to securely cede the West Bank to a Palestinian state. I repeat: It may not be possible. But Netanyahu has not spent his time in office using Israel’s creativity to find ways to do such a deal. He has spent his time trying to avoid such a deal — and everyone knows it. No one is fooled. Israel is in a dangerous situation. For the first time in its history, it has bad relations with all three regional superpowers — Turkey, Iran and Egypt — plus rapidly eroding support in Europe. America is Israel’s only friend today. These strains are not all Israel’s fault by any means, especially with Iran, but Israel will never improve ties with Egypt, Turkey and Europe without a more serious effort to safely get out of the West Bank. The only way for Netanyahu to be taken seriously again is if he risks some political capital and actually surprises people. Bibi keeps hinting that he is ready for painful territorial compromises involving settlements. Fine, put a map on the table. Let’s see what you’re talking about. Or how about removing the illegal West Bank settlements built by renegade settler groups against the will of Israel’s government. Either move

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would force Israel’s adversaries to take Bibi seriously and would pressure Palestinians to be equally serious. Absent that, it’s just silly for us to have Netanyahu addressing the U.S. Congress when he needs to be addressing Palestinians down the street. And it is equally silly for the Palestinians to be going to the United Nations for a state when they need to be persuading Israelis why a Hamas-Fatah rapprochement is in their security interest. As for managing the unavoidable, well, Obama just announced that he was opening up more federal areas for oil exploration, as Republicans have demanded. Great: Let’s make America even more dependent on an energy resource, the price of which is certain to go up as the world’s population increases and the greatest reserves of which lie beneath what is now the world’s most politically unstable region. Frankly, I have no problem with more oil drilling, as long as it is done under the highest environmental standards. I have no problem with more nuclear power, if you can find a utility ready to put up the money. My problem is with an energy policy that focuses exclusively on oil drilling and nuclear power. That is not an energy policy. That is a policy for campaign donations. It will have no impact at the pump. A real energy policy is a system. It has to start with a national renewable energy standard that requires every utility to build up their use of renewable energy — wind, solar, hydro, nuclear, bio — to 20 percent of their total output by 2020. This would be accompanied with higher auto mileage standards and higher national appliance and building efficiency standards. All these standards would then be reinforced with a price on carbon. That is how you get higher energy prices but lower energy bills, because efficiency improvements mean everyone uses less. We are going to have to raise taxes. Why not a carbon tax that also reduces energy consumption, drives innovation, cleans the air and reduces our dependence on the Middle East? We don’t want the Arab democracy rebellions to stop, but no one can predict how they will end. The smart thing for us and Israel to do is avoid what we can’t manage, and manage what we can’t avoid. Right now we’re doing neither. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/18/opinion/18friedman.html?nl=todaysheadlines&em c=tha212

May 17, 2011 President Obama and the Arab Spring It should be no surprise that the ferment in the Arab world has touched the Palestinians, whose promised two-state solution is no closer than ever. On Sunday, the anniversary of Israel’s creation, thousands marching from Syria, Gaza, Lebanon and the West Bank breached Israel’s borders and confronted Israeli troops. More than a dozen people were killed; scores were injured. According to The Times’s Ethan Bronner, the protests were coordinated via social media, but they also appeared to have support from Lebanon and President

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Bashar al-Assad of Syria, who is eager to divert attention from his crackdown on pro- democracy demonstrators. Israel must defend its territory. But the protests and the casualties might have been avoided if credible peace negotiations were under way. Since President Obama took office, Israeli and Palestinian leaders have had just three weeks of direct talks. Last week, George Mitchell, Mr. Obama’s Middle East envoy, quit. There is blame all around: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, who is scheduled to meet with Mr. Obama at the White House on Friday, has shown little interest in negotiations and has used the regional turmoil as one more excuse to hunker down. Arab leaders haven’t given him much incentive to compromise. President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority wants a deal but seemed to give up after Mr. Obama couldn’t deliver a promised settlement freeze. President Obama has done far too little to break the stalemate. As he prepares to give a speech on Thursday on the Arab Spring, the White House signaled that he is unlikely to offer any new initiative to revive peace talks. Frankly, we do not see how Mr. Obama can talk persuasively about transformation in the Arab world without showing Palestinians a peaceful way forward. It is time for Mr. Obama, alone or with crucial allies, to put a map and a deal on the table. The two sides will not break the impasse by themselves. This is a singular moment of great opportunity and challenge in the Arab world. The United States and other democracies cannot dictate the outcome but must invest maximum effort and creativity to help shape it. There is no one-size-fits-all doctrine for dealing with disparate countries. The United States and its allies are right to balance values and strategic interests. Still Mr. Obama can use the speech to articulate principles that Arab countries should follow as a condition of Western economic and political support: democratic elections, free markets, peaceful relations with neighboring states — including Israel — rights for women and minorities, the rule of law. He should press American allies to lay out similar principles when the Group of 8 industrialized nations meets this month in France and back them up with clear offers of support. The United States and its allies must help Tunisia and Egypt — their struggles have inspired the region — weather severe economic problems, providing debt relief, trade and access to international financial institutions. Civil society groups need support. President Obama raised great hopes in 2009 when he spoke in Cairo about “a new beginning” with the Muslim world. The glow has faded. He has another chance this week to bolster this country’s image and to help support democratic change in the region. Reviving the peace process must be part of that effort. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict wasn’t central to protests in Egypt, Libya or Syria. But as Mr. Assad proved, it is still a far too potent weapon for autocrats and extremists. President Obama and the Arab Spring May 17, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/18/opinion/18wed1.html?ref=opinion&gwh=D1D422 B2BD023AA8EB2E0C3E168993D8

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La Haya pide la detención de Gadafi por crímenes contra la humanidad La fiscalía solicita también el arresto de uno de sus hijos y del jefe del espionaje "Tenemos tantas pruebas que estamos listos para ir a juicio", dice Moreno Ocampo ISABEL FERRER - La Haya - 17/05/2011 La Fiscalía de la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI), con sede en La Haya, ha pedido a los jueces la detención del líder libio Muamar el Gadafi por crímenes contra la humanidad perpetrados durante las revueltas populares desatadas desde el pasado 15 de febrero. Asimismo, y por iguales cargos, solicita el arresto de Saif el Islam, segundo hijo del dictador, y de Abdulá Senusi, jefe del espionaje interior. El coronel Gadafi se convierte así en el segundo jefe de Estado en ejercicio más buscado por la justicia internacional. El otro es el sudanés Omar el Bashir, acusado por la misma corte de genocidio por la muerte de civiles en Darfur. Según Luis Moreno Ocampo, fiscal jefe de la CPI, "Gadafi es el responsable directo de los crímenes registrados en Libia". "Disponemos de tantas pruebas de los asesinatos de disidentes, de la muerte de civiles durante su asistencia a funerales, o bien camino de la mezquita, que estamos casi listos para ir a juicio". En la distribución de tareas efectuada por el dictador libio, Saif el Islam presentaba el rostro moderno del régimen. "Su actuación es la de un primer ministro de hecho", asegura Moreno Ocampo. Abdulá Senusi completa el trío de máximos responsables de una represión que, solo en febrero, costó hasta 700 vidas. Nada más enterarse, el régimen libio rechazó las acusaciones. El viceministro de Exteriores libio, Khalid Kaim, calificó además a la Corte Penal Internacional de "juguete de la Unión Europea pensado para perseguir a dirigentes africanos". Si bien Omar el Bashir no ha sido detenido aún, el presidente de Sudán "ha visto limitados sus movimientos y la orden de arresto sigue en pie; no hay inmunidad posible para estos delitos", señala Ocampo. Ahora, con Gadafi, el jurista ha sido igualmente firme. Asegura que se apoya en su círculo íntimo para reprimir cualquier amenaza a su poder. Comete, en suma, dos de los delitos contemplados en el cargo de crímenes contra la humanidad: asesinato y persecución. "El líder libio es el responsable indirecto de los crímenes que denunciamos porque utiliza el sistema, que controla por completo, para mantenerse al mando. Él mismo confecciona las listas de disidentes que acaban en la cárcel, en Trípoli, y luego desaparecen. Su hijo Saif y Sanusi son los peones que ejecutan sus órdenes". Conocido por sus frases redondas, Moreno Ocampo dijo que la mejor garantía de lograr la paz en Libia sería que las propias autoridades detuvieran a Gadafi. El fiscal lanzó la idea como una esperanzada llamada de atención. "Gadafi gobierna con el miedo, y los árabes están perdiendo el miedo. Están cambiando el mundo", dijo. "La mejor forma de proteger a la población consistiría en que Gadafi fuera detenido por los libios. Supondría un ejemplo para otros líderes en su situación". 466

La Corte Penal Internacional investiga la revuelta libia a instancias del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas. Durante sus pesquisas, la fiscalía ha revisado al menos 1.200 documentos y efectuado 50 entrevistas con afectados directos de la represión. "Disponemos de pruebas clarísimas", asegura el fiscal. En el equipo de Moreno Ocampo de este caso trabaja Dolores Delgado, fiscal española de la Audiencia Nacional. En comisión de servicios, ella será la encargada de comprobar los aspectos jurídicos de la acusación. El próximo 7 de junio, el Comité de Derechos Humanos de la ONU espera presentar un informe sobre los crímenes, esta vez de guerra, perpetrados también en Libia. Los tres acusados del régimen - Muamar el Gadafi. Líder de Libia desde el golpe de Estado de 1969, oficialmente no ocupa ningún cargo público y se le atribuye el título de Guía de la Revolución. Además de la represión de los opositores, se le acusa de haber apoyado el terrorismo internacional durante los años ochenta. - Saif el Islam. Es uno de los hijos de Gadafi más activo en política. Fiel escudero del padre, es, según Ocampo, el "primer ministro de facto" en Libia. Mostró su cara más dura al iniciarse la guerra, amenazando con que iba a ser "peor que Yugoslavia e Irak". - Abdulá Senusi. Cuñado de Gadafi y jefe del espionaje militar. Se le considera la mano derecha del dictador y uno de los responsables de la represión. Fue condenado en rebeldía en Francia por su implicación en el derribo de un avión en 1989 en Níger, en el que murieron 170 personas. ISABEL FERRER La Haya pide la detención de Gadafi por crímenes contra la humanidad17/05/2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Haya/pide/detencion/Gadafi/crimene s/humanidad/elpepuint/20110517elpepiint_12/Tes

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May 16, 2011 A Conflict Without End Osama bin Laden had been dead only a few days when House Republicans began their efforts to expand, rather than contract, the war on terror. Not content with the president’s wide-ranging powers to pursue the archcriminals of Sept. 11, 2001, Republicans want to authorize the military to pursue virtually anyone suspected of terrorism, anywhere on earth, from now to the end of time. This wildly expansive authorization would, in essence, make the war on terror a permanent and limitless aspect of life on earth, along with its huge potential for abuse. The Authorization for Use of Military Force, approved by Congress a week after Sept. 11, 2001, gives the president the power to go after anyone who committed or aided in the 9/11 attacks, or who harbored such people, to prevent acts of terrorism. It was this document that authorized the war in Afghanistan and the raid on Bin Laden’s compound. A new bill, approved last week by the House Armed Services Committee and heading for the floor this month, would go much further. It would allow military attacks against not just Al Qaeda and the Taliban but also any “associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States.” That deliberately vague phrase could include anyone who doesn’t like America, even if they are not connected in any way with the 2001 attacks. It could even apply to domestic threats. It allows the president to detain “belligerents” until the “termination of hostilities,” presumably at a camp like the one in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Since it does not give a plausible scenario of how those hostilities could be considered over, it raises the possibility of endless detention for anyone who gets on the wrong side of a future administration. The bill, part of the National Defense Authorization Act, was introduced by the committee chairman, Howard McKeon of California, who said it simply aligns old legal authorities with current threats. We’ve heard that before, about wiretapping and torture, and it was always untrue. These powers are not needed, for current threats, or any other threat. President Obama has not asked for them (though, unfortunately, the administration has used a similar definition of the enemy in legal papers). Under the existing powers, or perhaps ignoring them, President George W. Bush abused his authority for many years with excessive detentions and illegal wiretapping. Those kinds of abuses could range even more widely with this open-ended authorization. As more than 30 House Democrats protested to Mr. McKeon, a declaration of “global war against nameless individuals, organizations, and nations” could “grant the president near unfettered authority to initiate military action around the world without further Congressional approval.” If a future administration wanted to attack Iran unilaterally, it could do so without having to consult with Congress. This measure is unnecessary. The Bush administration demonstrated how dangerous it could be. The Democrats were right to demand the House conduct hearings on the measure, which was approved with little scrutiny. If it passes, the Senate should amend it out of existence, and President Obama should make clear he will veto it. A Conflict Without End May 16, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17tue1.html?gwh=A38C1376EDCAA896 73EB1BA74A0CD1B0&hpw=&pagewanted=print

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Gaddafis named as international criminal court suspects Chief prosecutor requests crimes against humanity arrest warrants for Libyan leader, son Saif al-Islam and intelligence chief Abdullah Senussi Julian Borger, diplomatic editor guardian.co.uk, Monday 16 May 2011 15.07 BST ICC chief prosecutor requests arrest warrants for the Libyan leader, his son Saif al-Islam and his intelligence chief Abdullah Senussi Link to this video Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam and his intelligence chief, Abdullah Senussi, were accused of crimes against humanity by the chief prosecutor for the international criminal court, who called for their arrest for orchestrating a campaign of mass murder against Libyan pro-democracy protesters. Saif Gaddafi's indictment for committing atrocities against civilians will profoundly embarrass the wealthy and influential circle of friends he cultivated over eight years studying at the London School of Economics and living a playboy's life in Hampstead. According to prosecution documents, his image in the west as a moderniser and reformer, often at odds with his autocratic father, was a carefully crafted sham. A panel of three ICC judges will now decide whether to grant the arrest warrants, after which it will be left to the Libyan government to enforce them, in effect by handing over its leaders. Nato will not be asked to intervene. Even though arrests currently seem a remote possibility, Philippe Sands, a University College London professor who is writing a book on the making of international law, said the indictment of Saif broke new ground. "This is a new direction for the ICC in the sense that an individual closely associated with the establishment in many western countries now finds himself the subject of an indictment," Sands said. The ICC chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, said that Saif played a central role in the machinery of state repression. He was the "de facto prime minister", with control of regime finances. He is also alleged to have taken "an active role in the recruitment of foreign mercenaries". According to the charges, Muammar Gaddafi held a series of meetings in mid-February with Saif and Senussi, the head of military intelligence and brother-in-law of the Libyan leader, described by Moreno-Ocampo as his "right-hand man, the executioner". This "inner circle" convened, as the Arab Spring democracy movement threatened to take off in Libya, to plan the crushing of the protests through the use of snipers, machine guns and heavy weapons. Moreno-Ocampo said his investigators had uncovered "direct evidence" of the three men committing the crimes. 469

The three each face charges of crimes against humanity, not only for murder but also political persecution through mass arrests and torture. "Methods used to torture alleged dissidents have included tying electric wires around victims' genitals and shocking them with electricity and whipping victims with an electric wire after tying them upside down with a rope connected to a stick," the prosecutors say in their application for the arrest warrants. The document notes Gaddafi has challenged his critics to produce the bodies of those killed by the regime, but the prosecutors say: "Cemeteries and burial sites have been destroyed and bodies dug up, loaded on trucks and taken away." The Libyan government shrugged off the charges. "We believe that the ICC has no jurisdiction on these issues," the deputy foreign minister, Khaled al-Khiam, said. "We see the international criminal court as targeting African states." In his remarks, Moreno-Ocampo singled out Interpol for praise. According to officials at the prosecutor's office, the agency kept the prosecutors informed when potential witnesses of crimes against humanity in Libya fled the country, helping investigators to track them down and interview them. The investigators also pored over mobile phone records and internet communications, potentially a source of huge discomfort for Saif's friends in the UK. "His address book is going to be bulging with significant contacts. The question is going to be how long those contacts stayed in touch and at what point they cut him off," a source familiar with the investigation said. Saif's indictment will deepen the already considerable embarrassment of the London School of Economics, where Saif studied for six years. The LSE accepted a £1.5m donation from a foundation he controlled to fund a north African research programme. Of that total, £300,000 was spent before the programme was suspended. The LSE was far from alone in viewing Gaddafi's urbane second son as a sign that Libya was set for change. Western diplomats saw him as a reformer with whom it was possible to do business, and western governments kept up contacts with him after the fighting began in Libya, hoping he could be a conduit for a peace deal. Moreno-Ocampo alleges that much of Saif's moderate gloss was a sham. "Evidence shows that the purported 'fallouts' with Gaddafi are staged to bolster Saif al-Islam's image as the modern successor of his father," the indictment alleges. Richard Dicker, director of the international justice programme at Human Rights Watch, said: "The prosecutor's announcement is a warning bell to others in Libya that serious crimes there will be punished. While it's up to the judges to weigh the evidence and decide, the request for an arrest warrant for Muammar Gaddafi is a remarkable development for victims in Libya, the ICC and justice more broadly." Critics have argued that such indictments are an obstacle to peace because they make it harder to propose exile as a way out for the Gaddafi clan. Sands argued that the indictments did not necessarily make a peace deal in Libya less likely: "Although it takes Saif Gaddafi out of any possible resolution, it will increase pressure on others to sort this out sooner rather than later, before they too are indicted." http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/16/gaddafis-war-crimes- suspects?CMP=EMCGT_170511&

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May 16, 2011 The Long Overdue Palestinian State By MAHMOUD ABBAS Ramallah, West Bank SIXTY-THREE years ago, a 13-year-old Palestinian boy was forced to leave his home in the Galilean city of Safed and flee with his family to Syria. He took up shelter in a canvas tent provided to all the arriving refugees. Though he and his family wished for decades to return to their home and homeland, they were denied that most basic of human rights. That child’s story, like that of so many other Palestinians, is mine. This month, however, as we commemorate another year of our expulsion — which we call the nakba, or catastrophe — the Palestinian people have cause for hope: this September, at the United Nations General Assembly, we will request international recognition of the State of Palestine on the 1967 border and that our state be admitted as a full member of the United Nations. Many are questioning what value there is to such recognition while the Israeli occupation continues. Others have accused us of imperiling the peace process. We believe, however, that there is tremendous value for all Palestinians — those living in the homeland, in exile and under occupation. It is important to note that the last time the question of Palestinian statehood took center stage at the General Assembly, the question posed to the international community was whether our homeland should be partitioned into two states. In November 1947, the General Assembly made its recommendation and answered in the affirmative. Shortly thereafter, Zionist forces expelled Palestinian Arabs to ensure a decisive Jewish majority in the future state of Israel, and Arab armies intervened. War and further expulsions ensued. Indeed, it was the descendants of these expelled Palestinians who were shot and wounded by Israeli forces on Sunday as they tried to symbolically exercise their right to return to their families’ homes. Minutes after the State of Israel was established on May 14, 1948, the United States granted it recognition. Our Palestinian state, however, remains a promise unfulfilled. Palestine’s admission to the United Nations would pave the way for the internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a political one. It would also pave the way for us to pursue claims against Israel at the United Nations, human rights treaty bodies and the International Court of Justice. Our quest for recognition as a state should not be seen as a stunt; too many of our men and women have been lost for us to engage in such political theater. We go to the United Nations now to secure the right to live free in the remaining 22 percent of our historic homeland because we have been negotiating with the State of Israel for 20 years without coming any closer to realizing a state of our own. We cannot wait indefinitely while Israel continues to send more settlers to the occupied West Bank and denies Palestinians access to most of our land and holy places, particularly in Jerusalem. Neither political pressure nor promises of rewards by the United States have stopped Israel’s settlement program.

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Negotiations remain our first option, but due to their failure we are now compelled to turn to the international community to assist us in preserving the opportunity for a peaceful and just end to the conflict. Palestinian national unity is a key step in this regard. Contrary to what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel asserts, and can be expected to repeat this week during his visit to Washington, the choice is not between Palestinian unity or peace with Israel; it is between a two-state solution or settlement-colonies. Despite Israel’s attempt to deny us our long-awaited membership in the community of nations, we have met all prerequisites to statehood listed in the Montevideo Convention, the 1933 treaty that sets out the rights and duties of states. The permanent population of our land is the Palestinian people, whose right to self-determination has been repeatedly recognized by the United Nations, and by the International Court of Justice in 2004. Our territory is recognized as the lands framed by the 1967 border, though it is occupied by Israel. We have the capacity to enter into relations with other states and have embassies and missions in more than 100 countries. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union have indicated that our institutions are developed to the level where we are now prepared for statehood. Only the occupation of our land hinders us from reaching our full national potential; it does not impede United Nations recognition. The State of Palestine intends to be a peace-loving nation, committed to human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. Once admitted to the United Nations, our state stands ready to negotiate all core issues of the conflict with Israel. A key focus of negotiations will be reaching a just solution for Palestinian refugees based on Resolution 194, which the General Assembly passed in 1948. Palestine would be negotiating from the position of one United Nations member whose territory is militarily occupied by another, however, and not as a vanquished people ready to accept whatever terms are put in front of us. We call on all friendly, peace-loving nations to join us in realizing our national aspirations by recognizing the State of Palestine on the 1967 border and by supporting its admission to the United Nations. Only if the international community keeps the promise it made to us six decades ago, and ensures that a just resolution for Palestinian refugees is put into effect, can there be a future of hope and dignity for our people. Mahmoud Abbas is the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the president of the Palestinian National Authority. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html?gwh=78DE32A775E31055 587F044A78397006&hpw=&pagewanted=print

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