DOCSLIB.ORG

Nato – Yes Or No? (2)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

No. 25 ● May 2009 NATO – YES OR NO? (2) Early April discreet raising of the «Defense» of Russia issue of the military-security position of Serbia (after Croatia and Decision about that Albania became full members of engagement was taken by the Serb NATO), 1 seems to have triggered off government within the framework of a major alarm among the influential Partnership for Peace in December members of the conservative block. 2008. Then the proposal of Urging of few politicians, analysts Individual Program of partnership and commentators that Serbia between Serbia and Partnership for should re-assess all aspects and Peace for 2009 and 2010, envisaging angles of its controversial military also deployment of the officers in neutrality (Declaration of Serb Georgia, was adopted. 3 However in Parliament adopted in December mid-April in Belgrade have arrived 2007 during the tenure of Prime the Moscow news that Russia was Minister Vojislav Koštunice) from energetically opposing NATO the standpoint of regional milieu manouevres in the Caucasian and its own European future, was region. Russian President Medvedev interpreted as the start of the then stated that such a conduct did campaign for Serbia's accession to not contribute to the renewal of co- NATO. 2 And the motive for the operation between the alliance and backlash against that unproven Moscow. 4 Dimitri Rogozin, intiative, was the announced permanent representative of Russia participation of the two Serb officers with NATO, then stated: «... From in the NATO-manouvres in Georgia, the standpoint of Russia, from the in May-June period. standpoint of Georgia, and from the standpoint of a large part of the 1 www. helsinki org.rs 2 Miroslav Lazanski, «Discreet Charm 3Danas , 22 April 2009. of Photography», Politika , 20 April 2009. 4Politika , 22. April 2009. 1 world, such kind of a military game Serbia has branded with a dirty must be considered as the one of an NATO seal the face of the Serb openly provocative character.» He peope.» 7 went on to note that the August Author Bosko Obradovic, 2008 war in South Ossetia was Secretary of the Management Board preceded by military drills of the of the Serb Assembly Dveri stated North Atlantic Alliance. 5 that «on the symbolical and real plane Serbia's entry into NATO shall adversely affect relations with Russia.» He then went on to assert that the existence of political parties with a hostile attitude towards Russia was not comrehensible: «Are these domestic forces part of a broader strategic process of enclosing and suppressing Russia? The foregoing shall surely affect us. Have we assessed the price of this easy joining the Euro-Atlantic wave...we can drown in it, especially Response of Moscow caused since we had in advance renounced quite a stir in Belgrade. Thus the possibility of looking for Milorad Vucelic, in an editorial of his salvation on the other coast.» weekly Pecat, wrote: »Who gave a Obradovic openly opposes Serbia's mandate to the Serb power-mongers membership of the EU on the to make a bid for Serbia's NATO following ground:» How shall we be membership...and thus violate their able to maintain special relations own constitution, history of the Serb with Russia, when we shall have to people and Resolution on the take part in every manifestation of 8 military neutrality of the Serb joint policy of the EU.» Parliament. No-one in Serbia is President of Democratic Party entitled to send soliders and officers of Serbia, former Prime Minister, to take part in NATO campaigns Vojislav Koštunica, after a joint anywhere, and notably campaigns meeting with President of the Serb against Russia. That weekly Democratic Party from Republika dedicated to the supposed Srpska, Mladen Bosić, sharply deployment of the two officers the condemned announcement that whole issue, under a dramatic Serbia would take part in NATO headline «Serbia in the Eastern manouvres in Georgia: «Serb officers Front.» 6 According to Vučelić, that have never in the country's history act of co-operation within the taken part in conflicts in the East or 9 framework of Partnership for Peace went near the Russian borders.» is a shame, humiliation and «Defense of Russia» public national and state treason: «While mood which was intentionally moving along 'the European road' created nearly silenced proponents Serbia through NATO reaches the and advocates of different Eastern front... Everybody in Serbia viewpoints. The spin off of that can see that the incumbent media campaign was a host of authorities are doing their utmost to public opinion polls and surveys, facilitate Serbia's entry into NATO, dominated by demands that the in a stealthy, creeping way, against government of Serbia change its the will of the Serb people... By decision and renounce deployment acting so the incumbent regime in of the two officers in the Caucasian 7 Idem 5Idem. 8 Idem 6Pečat , 24 April 2009. 9 Danas , 22 April 2009. 2 region. Thus daily Danas ,10 ran the notewrothy that the Russian following statement of a recearcher Ambassador in Belgrade, of the Centre for Civilian-Military Aleksandar Konuzin, had been Relations, Djordje Popović: «Since informed of the nature of the said the strategic goal of Serbia is decision several days ahead of its preservation of Kosovo and Metohija adoption, while the NATO officials within the framework of Serbia and were informed of the government's in view of the fact that in that effort decision only after the pertinent Serbia relies heavily on the support session. Subsequently the Serb of Russia, I don't know how good Foreign Secretary Vuk Jeremic made would it be for us to take part in a public statement: »We decided not those manouvres, which are to take part in something assessed tantamount to direct confrontation as a security threat to Russia.» 13 with Russia.» President of the Thus the NATO manouvres in Atlantic Alliance of Serbia, Vladan Georgia began on the 6th of May Živulović stated that «Serbia's without rerpesentatives of the Serb participation in NATO manouvres army. The Serb Defense Secretary was not realistic.» Dragan Šutanovac then stated the According to Professor of the following: «We think that the Army of Security Faculty, Dr. Milan Serbia would not draw sufficient Mijalkovski, Serbia should not take benefits from participating in such a part in the international manouvres drill. Decision on participation of in Georgia for it would be officers was taken in early 2008, tantamount «to putting a finger in that is before the war in Georgia. Russia's eye». 11 Ministry of Defense and the Serb However, in his extensive Army did not have a foreknowledge intervew to daily Borba, Djordje of that drill.» 14 Popovic from the Centre from Civilian-Military Relations, espoused Alleged disagreement between a totally different view point from Šutanovac and Jeremic the one who had floated, several days earlier in an interview to daily Despite a host of pertinent, Danas . After expressing his opinion official statements, it still remains that a final decision on the unclear who was behind the aforementioned participation should initiative that the two officers of the be taken by the government in Serb Army be sent to Georgia: Serbia, after taking into Ministry of Foreign Affairs or consideration dissatisfaction of Ministry of Defense. But regardless Russia, he shed light on the other of the foregoing one gets the aspect of that, essentially «benign» impression that the said debate decision: «This is a good drill for our brought to the fore simmering army, since after so many years of animosities and misunderstandings absence from the international within the largest member of the security scene, this would be a good ruling coalition, Democratic Party, opportunity for our officers to that is an alleged rift between the familiarize with new technological Defense Secretary, Dragan standards and be in company of Šutanovac and Head of Diplomacy, 1,300 soldiers from the countries, Vuk Jeremić, or between the members of NATO». 12 «cabinet» and «party» of President of And finally the government of the Republic, Boris Tadić. Serbia on its 30 April 2009 decided Before the news about the not to take part in the NATO aforementioned disagreement was manouvres in Georgia. It is leaked, demands for replacement of 10 Danas , 10 April 2009. 13 According to Standard , 1 May 2009. 11 Borba , 28 April 2009. 14 Borba , 7 May 2009. 12 Borba, 12 April 2009. 3 Defense Secretary, Dragan According to the same quotation, the Šutanovac, were made public. Thus Serb Foreign Affairs Ministry at the in the aforementioned issue of same time informed the Defense weekly Pečat, Aleksandar Vulin, Ministry of its proposal not to deploy President of the Socialists' any officers in Georgia. 17 If there Movement pathetically stated the was any misunderstanding, it was following: «Dragan Šutanovac must hushed up by the official be dismissed, and his policy too. It explanation given by the state seems he cannot forgive Russia the secretary in the Defense Ministry, fact that it has not bombarded us, Dušan Spasojević, that «such a seized part of our territory, and misunderstanding was due to a strengthened every terrorists and bureaucratic mistake.» 18 enemy of Serbia. In order to convince Russia, our last great ally, that our Defense Minister is not speaking on behalf of Serbia, Defense Minister must resign.» 15 In the same issue of Pecat, a demand for replacement of Šutanovac, considered an advocate of Serbia's accession to the Euro-Atlantic integrations, was also made by the Srpski sabor Dveri. As regards the above story, which in all likelihood shall have its sequel, it is noteworthy that Politika's commentator Miroslav Lazanski, one of the most persistent detractors of the Defense Secretary, Dragan Šutanovic-criticized even from having too often his photos But it turned out that the very taken with NATO officials and Minister Šutanovac in his letter to officers, and never with the Russian Prime Minister Cvetković, stated officers-this time around sided with that «the Serb Defense Ministry the Serb Defense Ministry.
Recommended publications
  • The Yugoslav Peoples's Army: Between Civil War and Disintegration

    The Yugoslav Peoples's Army: Between Civil War and Disintegration

    WARNING! The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The Yugoslav Peoples's Army: Between Civil War and Disintegration by Dr. Timothy L. Sanz Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article appeared originally in Military Review December 1991 Pages 36-45 August, a crisis in the Balkans, and a revolutionary upheaval in part of Europe--these words raise the hair on the back of the neck. Just a bit less than eighty years ago, Europe inaugurated this century of total war, thanks to the inability of its monarchs, statesmen, and generals to deal with a Balkan Crisis, the latest manifestation of what diplomats then called the "accursed Eastern Question." In the wake of that failure of statecraft, million-man armies marched into battle from one end of the continent to the other. Looking back on the long interval of peace which Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War, the present crisis confirms the reality of a profound shift in the European security system and raises the question of whether the emerging security system in Europe will be able to deal with new Balkan crises. For several decades, while the military might of two ideologically-hostile blocs stood poised for action in Central Europe, a hypothetical internal crisis in Yugoslavia was often seen as an element in a scenario for bringing about a NATO-WTO military confrontation.
  • CEAS New Report What a Difference a Year Makes

    CEAS New Report What a Difference a Year Makes

    WHAT A DIFFERENCE A YEAR MAKES Comparative reading and analysis of the April 2018 and August 2019 draft versions of the National Security and Defense Strategies Belgrade | September 2019 This study has been published with the partial support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Views and opinions expressed in this publication do not represent views and opinions of NED. CONTENTS Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 5 Short political background and the context analysis in which new strategic documents of the Republic of Serbia are adopted by the government – breakdown of key political events ...................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Serbia and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) .............................................. 15 Comparative reading and analysis of the April 2018 and August 2019 versions of the draft National Security Strategy ................................................................................................................ 17 Comparative reading and analysis of the April 2018 and August 2019 versions of the draft National Defense Strategy ................................................................................................................. 21 Conclusions and recommendations ........................................................................................................
  • The “International Community” and Territories with Altered Sovereignty*

    The “International Community” and Territories with Altered Sovereignty*

    THE “INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY” AND TERRITORIES WITH ALTERED SOVEREIGNTY* Višeslav Simić El Tecnológico de Monterrey, México DOI: 10.5937/vojdelo1506118S From Kosovo to Syria s the so-called Kosovo "war"1 is being used by the United States of America as a A blueprint2 for how the euphemistically3 called "international community"4 should militarily resolve the crisis in Syria without a mandate from the U.N. (in spite of the U.S. persistently insisting that it was a sui generis case), it is becoming increasingly more important not only to finally independently study the "mob or sole assailant"5 aspect of the contemporary U.S. international approach but, even more, to dedicate particular at- tention to the post- and extra-combat involvement (or the lack of it) of the "international community" in the management6 of the territories and the people "liberated"7 by it. * 2do Seminario Internacional "Análisis e incidencia de las políticas públicas" – EGAP – Tecnológico de Mon- terrey – 25 y 26 de Septiembre 2013 – México 1 Strictly legally speaking, no war was declared by the aggressors (the U.S. called it "hostilities" and "military opera- tions in Kosovo"). The government of the attacked sovereign founding member of the U.N. didn't denounce the ag- gression as war (only after the November 2012 Strasbourg Court ruling that "war veterans" must be paid for the time served in the "war of 1999" did Serbia implicitly recognize NATO aggression as a war). The U.N. itself kept silent about the grossest violation of its Charter since its founding (the silence forced upon the U.N.
  • The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: a Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power by Christopher J

    The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: a Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power by Christopher J

    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 15 The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power by Christopher J. Lamb, with Sarah Arkin and Sally Scudder Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified com- batant commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: President Bill Clinton addressing Croat-Muslim Federation Peace Agreement signing ceremony in the Old Executive Office Building, March 18, 1994 (William J. Clinton Presidential Library) The Bosnian Train and Equip Program The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power By Christopher J. Lamb with Sarah Arkin and Sally Scudder Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 15 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. March 2014 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
  • Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies Central European Studies Charles W

    Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies Central European Studies Charles W

    Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies Central European Studies Charles W. Ingrao, senior editor Gary B. Cohen, editor Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies A Scholars’ Initiative Edited by Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert United States Institute of Peace Press Washington, D.C. D Purdue University Press West Lafayette, Indiana Copyright 2009 by Purdue University. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Second revision, May 2010. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative / edited by Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-55753-533-7 1. Yugoslavia--History--1992-2003. 2. Former Yugoslav republics--History. 3. Yugoslavia--Ethnic relations--History--20th century. 4. Former Yugoslav republics--Ethnic relations--History--20th century. 5. Ethnic conflict-- Yugoslavia--History--20th century. 6. Ethnic conflict--Former Yugoslav republics--History--20th century. 7. Yugoslav War, 1991-1995. 8. Kosovo War, 1998-1999. 9. Kosovo (Republic)--History--1980-2008. I. Ingrao, Charles W. II. Emmert, Thomas Allan, 1945- DR1316.C66 2009 949.703--dc22 2008050130 Contents Introduction Charles Ingrao 1 1. The Dissolution of Yugoslavia Andrew Wachtel and Christopher Bennett 12 2. Kosovo under Autonomy, 1974–1990 Momčilo Pavlović 48 3. Independence and the Fate of Minorities, 1991–1992 Gale Stokes 82 4. Ethnic Cleansing and War Crimes, 1991–1995 Marie-Janine Calic 114 5. The International Community and the FRY/Belligerents, 1989–1997 Matjaž Klemenčič 152 6. Safe Areas Charles Ingrao 200 7. The War in Croatia, 1991–1995 Mile Bjelajac and Ozren Žunec 230 8. Kosovo under the Milošević Regime Dusan Janjić, with Anna Lalaj and Besnik Pula 272 9.
  • EU Strategic Communications with a View to Counteracting Propaganda

    EU Strategic Communications with a View to Counteracting Propaganda

    DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS EU strategic communications With a view to counteracting propaganda ABSTRACT Emanating from Russia in the east and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the south, the EU has been increasingly hit by destabilising messages amounting – in different forms and to different degrees – to coherent hostile ‘strategic communications’ campaigns, or the processes of infusing communications activities with an agenda or plan to impact the behaviour of a target audience. Both Russia and ISIL have engaged in aggressive messaging and deceptive media campaigns, albeit with distinct narratives, targets and audiences. This paper analyses the ‘what’ and the ‘how’: the respective narratives of each actor, their specificities, their similarities and their differences. The analysis also draws attention to strategic communications efforts undertaken by the EU, which are vectored into defensive (react and respond) and offensive (probe and push) dimensions. This understanding of the present context finally allows for an evaluation of what actions can be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s own strategic communications. EP/EXPO/B/FWC/AFET/2015-01/02 EN May 2016 - PE 578.008 © European Union, 2016 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies This paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. English-language manuscript was completed on 19 May 2016. Printed in Belgium. Author: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), France. Official Responsible: Jérôme LEGRAND. Editorial Assistant: Ifigeneia ZAMPA. Feedback of all kind is welcome. Please write to: [email protected].
  • HB-No53-Serbia and Croatia

    HB-No53-Serbia and Croatia

    HELSINKIBulletin Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Rige od Fere str. # 20 , 11000 Belgrade, Serbia tel./fax +381 11 30 32 408; e-mail: [email protected] ; www.helsinki.org.rs No 53 ● January 2010 Serbia and Croatia: Past Still in the Way Almost two decades after the end of Above all, the two countries share the war and fourteen years after the responsibility for Bosnia-Herzegovina. establishment of diplomatic relations, Unlike official Zagreb that clearly Serbia and Croatia still move from one distances itself from any paternalism crisis to another – each reviving over Bosnian Croats, official Belgrade traditional and carefully cherished openly supports Republika Srpska as an mutual animosities. Belgrade is autonomous and statelike entity. Serb responsible for such oscillations in the strategists maintain status quo as they first place: not only when it comes to expect territorial aspirations – on the Croatia but also for the entire region. account of which the war in 1990s was Official Belgrade recognizes regional wagged in the first place – to come true realities with leaden step unwilling to sometime in future. acknowledge “new” borders. Serbia specifically reproaches Croatia for recognizing Kosovo and establishing diplomatic relations with Prishtina at ambassadorial level. According to some analysts, recognition of Kosovo’s independence placed Belgrade-Zagreb relations at the lowest point ever since 1996 when the two established diplomatic relations. Belgrade’s officials and the media were The predominant political and most angered at the fact that Croatia was intellectual elites in Serbia are not the only ex-Yugoslav republic (and the ready yet to distance themselves from only neighboring country besides the legacy of Milosevic’s era and Bulgaria) to advocate Kosovo’s right to Milosevic’s warring policies.
  • Southeastern Europe at a Glance

    Southeastern Europe at a Glance

    ISSN: 2654-0304 1 ΜΑΥ 06 - 12, 2019 – VOL. 2 - ISSUE 29 SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AT A GLANCE SOUTHEAST EUROPE DIRECTORATE PROVIDING KNOWLEDGE TO THOSE WHO SHAPE THE FUTURE “SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AT A GLANCE” (ISSN: 2654-0304) is a weekly review of the most significant current political, economic, energy, defense, and security news of Southeastern Europe. It covers 14 countries; Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey. However Greece enjoys its own weekly review for a more detailed presentation of its current affairs (GREECE AT A GLANCE). This ambitious newsletter aspires to become an informative “tool” for anyone who is interested in the region and wishes to have knowledge of the non-stop current developments and challenges. “HERMES” Institute is not a news agency and it is not one of its ambitions to become one but it is strongly believed that today’s events provide the necessary material to understand the future and to analyze situations that may affect in peace, stability, and growth of the region. “HERMES” I.I.A.S.GE “HERMES” Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy (“HERMES” I.I.A.S.GE) is an independent, non – governmental, non – profit organization, consisting of scholars dedicated in the research and analysis of international affairs in regional and global level. The Institute aims at providing objective, scientific, and reliable research analysis through a variety of studies contributing effectively and constructively in the public dialogue and the evolution of scientific knowledge. Copyright © 2019 “HERMES” Institute for Foreign Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy All rights reserved ISSN: 2654-0304 1 compromises.
  • CEU Political Science Journal

    CEU Political Science Journal

    Vol. 8, No. 3 September 2013 CEU Political Science Journal Department of Political Science Central European University CEU Political Science Journal Department of Political Science Central European University, Budapest September 2013 Advisory Board S.M. Amadae, Ohio State University Gabriela Borz, University of Aberdeen Andras Bozoki, CEU Budapest Anil Duman, CEU Budapest Carol Harrington, Victoria University of Wellington Karen Henderson, University of Leicester Herbert Kitschelt, Duke University Levente Littvay, CEU Budapest Cristian Pirvulescu, SNSPA Bucharest Phillippe C. Schmitter, EUI Florence Carsten Q. Schneider, CEU Budapest Jan Zielonka, University of Oxford Editors Sergiu Gherghina, Goethe University Frankfurt Arpad Todor, European University Institute, Florence Editorial Board Dorothee Bohle, CEU Budapest Mihail Chiru, CEU Budapest Zsolt Enyedi, CEU Budapest Rebecca J. Hannagan, Northern Illinois University Dylan Kissane, CEFAM Lyon Robert Sata, CEU Budapest Daniela Sirinic, University of Zagreb Jan Smolenski, New School for Social Research Maria Spirova, Leiden University Andreas Umland, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Editorial Assistants Ela Genc, CEU Budapest Theresa Gessler, CEU Budapest ISSN: 1818-7668 CONTENTS ARTICLES Daniel Agbiboa One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Political Culture of Corruption and Cleanups in Nigeria 273 Niels Smeets, Johan Adriaensen, and Yf Reykers Learning to Talk the Talk: Re-Appraising the External Perspective in the EU’s Foreign Policy 296 Olga Sholderer The Drivers of Police Reform: The Cases of Georgia and Armenia 323 Esref Kenan Rasidagic Involved by Default: External Actors and Foreign Policy of the Western Balkan States 348 BOOK REVIEWS Pippa Norris, Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) Reviewed by: Victoria Makulilo 369 Sandipani Dash, Sudan’s Oil Diplomacy, 1991-2003 (New Delhi: Manak Publications Pvt.
  • Eyes Wide Shut; Strengthening of Russian Soft Power in Serbia

    Eyes Wide Shut; Strengthening of Russian Soft Power in Serbia

    EYES WIDE SHUT STRENGTHENING OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN SERBIA: GOALS, INSTRUMENTS, AND EFFECTS STUDY OF THE CENTER FOR EURO–ATLANTIC STUDIES MAY 2016 The study was created within the project “Reform of the security sector in Serbia and Integration”, which was supported by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund CONTENT 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................... 16 2. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS ............................................................... 20 2.1. VERY BRIEFLY THE CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER AND ITS LIBERAL UNDERSTANDING......... 23 2.2. RUSSIAN UNDERSTANDING OF SOFT POWER .................................................................... 24 3. CURRENT OBJECTIVES OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN SERBIA AND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY ARE REALIZED....................................................................................................................... 28 3.1. THE MAIN METHODS OF OPERATION OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN SERBIA .................... 35 3.1.1. RUSSIAN POLICY OF COMPATRIOTS ............................................................................ 36 3.1.2. RUSSIAN COMPATRIOT ORGANIZATIONS IN SERBIA .................................................. 38 3.1.3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN SERBIA ................................................................................................
  • Here to Help Them Navigate These Murky Waters, to Provide Them with Context, Localization and Interpretation of Facts?

    Here to Help Them Navigate These Murky Waters, to Provide Them with Context, Localization and Interpretation of Facts?

    The Civil Society Facility, Media Freedom and Accountability Programme, EuropeAid/134613/C/ACT/MULTI A World The Size Of A Saucer - International news reporting in SEE countries This project is funded by A project implemented by The European Union The Center for Independent Journalism South-East European Partnership for Media Development SEE Partnership for Media Development is implemented by a consortium of media organizations from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania. Media professionals from Kosovo and Turkey will also be involved. The Project is co-financed by the European Commission, the Civil Society Facility, Media Freedom and Accountability Programme, Europe Aid/134613/C/ACT/MULTI The SEENPM members that are part of the project: Albanian Media Institute (Albania), Mediacenter for Media and Civil Society Development (BiH), Media Initiatives – Association for Media Development and Promotion of Professional Journalism (BiH), Macedonian Institute for Media (Macedonia), Montenegro Media Institute (Montenegro), Media Center (Serbia), Media and Reform Centre Nis (Serbia), Media Development Center (Bulgaria). Disclaimer: This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents are the sole responsibility of the Center for Independent Journalism and its partners and it can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the EU. A project implemented This project is funded The European Commission is the EU’s executive body. By the Center for Independent by the European Union Journalism “The European Union is made up of 28 Member States who have decided to gradually link Delegation of together their know-how, resources and destinies.
  • Annual Report on Human Rights : Serbia in 2009 – Europeanization

    Annual Report on Human Rights : Serbia in 2009 – Europeanization

    HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA annual report on human rights : serbia in 2009 europeanization – accomplishments and limitations and – accomplishments europeanization a nnual europeanization – r accomplishments eport on and limitations h uman r ights : ights s erbia in in erbia 2009 iizvestaj2009-eng-monta.inddzvestaj2009-eng-monta.indd 1 228/06/20108/06/2010 220:46:010:46:01 PProcessrocess CyaannPProcessrocess MMaageentantaPProcessrocess YYellowellowPProcessrocess BBlacklack jjjp j7g HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA Annual Report on Human Rights : Serbia in 2009 Europeanization – Accomplishments and Limitations BELGRADE, 2010 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2009– ENGLESKI” strana 1 Annual Report on Human Rights : Serbia in 2009 EUROPEANIZATION – ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND LIMITATIONS publisher Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia for the publisher Sonja Biserko translation Dragan Novaković Veronika Bauer Vera i Mira Gligorijević Spomenka Grujičić layout and design Ivan Hrašovec title page illustration Maurits Cornelis Escher, Ascending and Descending, 1960 printed by Zagorac, Belgrade This edition was published with the support of Civil rights defenders ISBN 978-86-7208-167-1 COBISS.SR-ID 176051212 CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd 061.2”2009”; 316.4(497.11)”2009”; 323(497.11)”2009” EUROPEANIZATION - Accomplishments and Limitations : Annual Report on Human Rights : Serbia in 2009 / [prepared by] Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia ; [translation Dragan Novaković ... et al.]. - Belgrade : Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2010 (Belgrade : Zagorac). - 601 str. ; 23 cmIzv. stv. nasl.: Između realnosti i evropskih integracija. - Tiraž 500. - Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. 1. Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji (Beograd) a) Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji (Beograd) - 2009 b) Srbija - Društvene prilike - 2009 c) Srbija - Političke prilike - 2009 HOLJP, “godišnji izveštaj za 2009 – ENGLESKI” strana 2 jjjp j7g 3 Contents Conclusions and Recommendations .