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ISSN: 2654-0304 1 ΜΑΥ 06 - 12, 2019 – VOL. 2 - ISSUE 29 SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AT A GLANCE SOUTHEAST EUROPE DIRECTORATE PROVIDING KNOWLEDGE TO THOSE WHO SHAPE THE FUTURE “SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AT A GLANCE” (ISSN: 2654-0304) is a weekly review of the most significant current political, economic, energy, defense, and security news of Southeastern Europe. It covers 14 countries; Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey. However Greece enjoys its own weekly review for a more detailed presentation of its current affairs (GREECE AT A GLANCE). This ambitious newsletter aspires to become an informative “tool” for anyone who is interested in the region and wishes to have knowledge of the non-stop current developments and challenges. “HERMES” Institute is not a news agency and it is not one of its ambitions to become one but it is strongly believed that today’s events provide the necessary material to understand the future and to analyze situations that may affect in peace, stability, and growth of the region. “HERMES” I.I.A.S.GE “HERMES” Institute of International Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy (“HERMES” I.I.A.S.GE) is an independent, non – governmental, non – profit organization, consisting of scholars dedicated in the research and analysis of international affairs in regional and global level. The Institute aims at providing objective, scientific, and reliable research analysis through a variety of studies contributing effectively and constructively in the public dialogue and the evolution of scientific knowledge. Copyright © 2019 “HERMES” Institute for Foreign Affairs, Security & Geoeconomy All rights reserved ISSN: 2654-0304 1 compromises. We are prepared to help overcome th ALBANIA: May 8 , the Albanian the crisis if both sides have the will to do so,” he Prime Minister, Edi Rama, declared from a joint said. Among the obstacles, he mentioned the ever- press release with the EU High Representative, present need to advance the fight against Federica Mogherini, that Albania expects the corruption and organized crime, in order for the European Commission to recommend the EU country to meet the conditions to open accession accession negotiations. “Albania speaks with negotiations. In this regard, he said the results. We are aware that the final decision will implementation of laws is particularly important. depend on the specific circumstances of member (www.tiranatimes.com) countries, but we believe that it is time to close th the phase for preparing the negotiations, and - May 12 , Albanian opposition protesters hurled open them,” Rama stated. (www.top-channel.tv) petrol bombs at the entrance of Prime Minister Edi Rama’s office on Saturday, after three months th - May 9 , in an interview with Shekulli of demonstrations calling for him to quit over newspaper, Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU alleged election fraud and corruption. Chanting parliamentary group in the German Bundestag “We want a European Albania,” the slogan of responsible for foreign, defense and security pro-democracy protests when the Balkan country policy and the Council of Europe Dr. Johann dumped communism in 1990 they renewed the David Wadephul said that Albania finds itself in a call they made since February for snap polls after dangerous political crisis. “Albania finds himself their lawmakers also cut ties with Parliament. in a dangerous political crisis. This is bad for the Some protesters, including a group with masked EU perspective of the country. It is therefore the faces, hurled petrol bombs, firecrackers and paint duty of all pro-European parties in Government at the entrance of the Government building and and opposition to approach each other and be later at Parliament. A dozen Policemen and prepared to make real compromises. If both sides several protesters were hurt, Police and reporters are not prepared to do so, they question their said. During a lull in the attacks at the premier’s country‟s EU perspective,” Wadephul said. building, opposition Democratic Party of Further on, Wadephul said if the Government and Albania (Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë – PD) opposition continue like this, they will strengthen leader Lulzim Basha said they were “determined those forces that want to promote nationalism and to keep waging a bigger and more resolute battle pursue the path of a grander Albania, as well as as long as the Government was keeping Albania encourage third powers to intervene in Albania’s apart from Europe.” “We are here with a mission, affairs. “To say it bluntly; Grand Albanian plans to liberate Albania from crime and corruption, to will be the end of Albania‟s EU perspective! That make Albania like the rest of Europe,” Basha told is why the Government and opposition have a a crowd of several thousand along the main responsibility to overcome the crisis immediately. boulevard. Recognizing progress, the European Even if the Rama Government has a majority in Commission recommended Albania start Parliament, it must be prepared to make real accession talks last year, but the European ISSN: 2654-0304 2 Council delayed the decision for this year in June MPs decided to abandon Parliament and resign as Albania overhauls its judiciary to flush out aiming at blocking Parliament‟s works. Such corrupt judges. Then the crowd moved near the decision was strongly criticized by the Parliament building where a group of protesters international community namely the EU and U.S kept hurling petrol bombs and firecrackers, to putting at risk the opening of accession which Police responded with tear gas and water negotiations in June 2019. Opposition hardened jets. After four hours, the crowd moved to the its protests last weekend using violence. Albanian Tirana Police precinct to protest the arrest of a PD political crisis is getting deeper and deeper official. Calling the opposition’s policies “blind,” undermining Albania‟s EU future. Local elections Rama said he was saddened to hear an opposition scheduled for June 30th, 2019 is the milestone of leader begging the Government to resign, and rapid political developments in the country. The their fire harmed not his Government but the ruling socialists push by any mean to conduct the country. The EU and the US have called the elections, while opposition declares that there will Government legitimate, and have urged the be no elections. Escalation of tension including opposition to return to Parliament and take part in violent incidents is highly expected as we local elections on June 30th, 2019. “The approach to the election date. PD and LSI opposition‟s stated objective to make Albania‟s leaders, Basha and Kryemadhi respectively democracy stronger runs counter to the violence pushing for the Government‟s topple and snap currently being perpetrated by protesters,” the elections. International community strongly United States Embassy said in a statement, supports Rama urging opposition to follow condemning the violence and calling for restraint. parliamentary procedures avoiding its (www.reuters.com) unconventional practices. It is not normal for a stable country seeking to enter the European club to face such situation of political abnormality. Opposition MPs‟ resignation aiming at forcing the Government in collapse is not a reasonable political strategy for a functional and stable democracy. It is assessed that Rama is stabilizing situation eliminating possibilities for snap elections. The Government is accused of having Protest on May 11th, 2019 links with organized crime and current situation (Photo source: www.pd.al) raises questions over the power of “Albanian mafia” in the country and its influence in state‟s COUNTRY ASSESSMENT : politics. Undoubtedly, corruption and organized crime remains the most significant state‟s Albania has entered in a period of political problem undermining its strategic goal of opening turmoil and fragile political stability not only accession negotiations with the EU. The EU because opposition organizes huge protests closely monitors progress of reforms especially in against the Government, but because opposition ISSN: 2654-0304 3 justice sector. The final decision for opening They pointed out that the submission of the Albania‟s accession negotiations in June 2019 is Annual State Program (ANP) to compliance with up to the EU Heads of Governments. One should the laws passed in the field of defense and that underline that unofficial concerns have already this is the question of the rule of law. Admiral been raised regarding this date due to current Foggo thinks that it is time for BiH to hand over political instability. Failure of opening accession the ANP and it is his opinion that his talks with the EU it will further destabilize the postponement would risk creating “bad images” country toppling the Government. Albania for the European Bank for Regional Development monitors Kosovo – Serbia negotiations and (EBRD) bankers who will arrive in Sarajevo this definitely has a role as a “mother nation.” The week as part of the Third EBRD Summit. He state maintains its leading role in the Albanian stressed that the authorities of BiH are themselves world providing guarantees and support to preparing their annual state program and have full Albanian population in the region namely control over its content. Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and North (www.sarajevotimes.com) Macedonia. In this context, the Albanian Prime - May 10th, the Chairman of Bosnia’s tripartite Minister and his Government
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