DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS EU strategic communications With a view to counteracting propaganda ABSTRACT Emanating from Russia in the east and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the south, the EU has been increasingly hit by destabilising messages amounting – in different forms and to different degrees – to coherent hostile ‘strategic communications’ campaigns, or the processes of infusing communications activities with an agenda or plan to impact the behaviour of a target audience. Both Russia and ISIL have engaged in aggressive messaging and deceptive media campaigns, albeit with distinct narratives, targets and audiences. This paper analyses the ‘what’ and the ‘how’: the respective narratives of each actor, their specificities, their similarities and their differences. The analysis also draws attention to strategic communications efforts undertaken by the EU, which are vectored into defensive (react and respond) and offensive (probe and push) dimensions. This understanding of the present context finally allows for an evaluation of what actions can be taken to enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s own strategic communications. EP/EXPO/B/FWC/AFET/2015-01/02 EN May 2016 - PE 578.008 © European Union, 2016 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies This paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. English-language manuscript was completed on 19 May 2016. Printed in Belgium. Author: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), France. Official Responsible: Jérôme LEGRAND. Editorial Assistant: Ifigeneia ZAMPA. Feedback of all kind is welcome. Please write to: [email protected]. To obtain copies, please send a request to: [email protected]. 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ISBN: 978-92-823-9283-6 (pdf) ISBN: 978-92-823-9284-3 (paper) doi:10.2861/506928 (pdf) doi:10.2861/476498 (paper) Catalogue number: QA-01-16-562-EN-N (pdf) Catalogue number: QA-01-16-562-EN-C (paper) EU strategic communications with a view to counteracting propaganda Table of contents 1 Introduction 4 1.1 What’s in a name? 4 1.2 East, south and inside 4 2 Strategic communications from the east: Russia 6 2.1 Russia’s grand narrative(s)… 6 2.2 …and target audiences 10 2.3 Russia’s impact 13 3 NATO’s strategic communications 18 3.1 Back to the future? 19 4 Strategic communications from the south: ISIL 20 4.1 ISIL’s grand narrative(s)… 20 4.2 …and target audiences 21 4.3 ISIL’s modus operandi 23 4.4 Counter-narratives in Arabic 24 4.5 Counter-narratives in English and other languages 26 5 EU strategic communications: where from and what next 29 5.1 General approaches 29 5.2 Specific approaches 31 6 Bibliography 33 3 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 1 Introduction Just like the term ‘hybrid’ (often associated with warfare, tactics or threats), ‘strategic communication(s)’ – which this paper will use in the plural form – has recently become rather fashionable. Moreover, not unlike ‘hybrid’, it often lacks a stringent definition. This has advantages, of course, as the term can be used to cover a wide range of disparate issues and activities. Still, a better understanding of its possible scope can be of help in assessing the extent to which it is applicable to the actions and actors analysed in this paper. 1.1 What’s in a name? Broadly speaking, strategic communications infuses ‘communications’ activities with an agenda or a plan. The field of ‘communications’ is broad, encompassing individuals and organisations who create news or push information (public relations firms, broadcasters), who deliver news and media (journalists), and who study the interplay between media and society (researchers). As an umbrella term, ‘strategic’ communications combines them all – especially the pushing and the delivering – thanks also to new forms of engagement, the proliferation of different types of media, and the low entry barriers. Depending on the nature of an organisation, ‘strategic communications’ can range from marketing to policy. It can also refer to a process as well as a profession – let alone an academic discipline in its own right. Most importantly, it implies and requires tight coordination and consistency across the board in order to purposefully implement a large set of different, targeted and tailored actions. A useful definition, especially for the scope of this paper, is offered in a 2011 Chatham House Report, in which strategic communications is described as ‘a systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences and identifies effective conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour’1. In practice, for policy-related organisations, it includes elements of public diplomacy and ‘spin’, media relations, advertising, recruitment and training and, most notably, high levels of situational awareness (detect and deter). In operational terms, it entails both a defensive (react and respond) and an offensive dimension (probe and push). 1.2 East, south and inside To what extent is all this applicable – and how equally – to Russia and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), i.e. the two external players which have contributed the most to destabilising the EU and its neighbours in recent years? Given that both have engaged in aggressive messaging and deceptive media campaigns, a qualified use of the term ‘strategic communications’ for both seems in order. That said, a degree of differentiation may be necessary, namely between a large state with powerful resources and extensive outreach (also to fellow ‘nationals’ in third countries) – one with which the EU and its Member States still cooperate on a number of issues – and a dispersed organisation – combining state-like behaviour where it is in control of territory with a sect-like modus operandi – acting across borders and outside the law. Accordingly, this paper will analyse the ‘what’ and the ‘how’: the respective narratives of each actor, their specificities, their similarities and their differences – but without entering into a contest over which represents a more ‘clear and present danger’. Both are serious, and each is unique in its own way. 1 P.Cornish, J.Lindley-French, C.Yorke, Strategic Communications and National Strategy, Chatham House Report, September 2011, p.4. 4 EU strategic communications with a view to counteracting propaganda And how can Europeans respond to their strategic communications campaigns? This paper will also highlight what has been and is being undertaken – notably, but not exclusively, by the EU (and in this respect, under what constraints and within what limits). Finally, it will explore what more could be done, what could be done better, as well as how and by whom in the current context. Particular attention will be devoted to the sources, the vectors, the conduits, the targets – including unconventional ones – and of course the responses. Dedicated boxes will be used to highlight specific aspects of the problem and complement the core analysis. For the EUISS, as an autonomous EU agency funded exclusively by the Member States, the main focus will have to be, however, on the role that EU institutions, bodies and agencies have played and can play in this domain – without any detailed or systematic reference to initiatives at the national level. Looking into these would also require time and resources and, above all, is likely to lead to modest results, as at least some of the relevant activities in and by the Member States often fall into the domain of intelligence and counter-intelligence. 5 Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 2 Strategic communications from the east: Russia Russia’s strategic communications are complex, both with regard to ideas and institutions. Carried out both directly and through proxies, they shape people’s perceptions of the EU – be it inside Russia, in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) states or in the EU itself, as well as its candidate countries. In light of the goals it intends to achieve, Russia’s messaging has proved quite effective, if not necessarily consistent: while often crude and deceitful in terms of content, its delivery is sophisticated, targeted and tailored to different audiences, and capable of exploiting the EU’s weaknesses. 2.1 Russia’s grand narrative(s)… The so-called ‘Colour Revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine were a wake-up call for Russia. The resulting internal debate on what went wrong led Moscow to conclude that it needed to build up its own ‘soft power’, partly by making more attractive offers, but partly also by developing the machinery to promote itself through media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other key players – from business lobbies to political parties. Most importantly, this was accompanied by the realisation that ‘selling’ Russia was not enough. The ‘attractiveness gap’ between Russia and the EU had to be bridged by improving Russia’s standing – mainly through the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir) – but also by reducing that of the EU. The launch of Russia Today (RT), a dedicated TV channel, just one year after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, was the first tangible outcome of Russia’s lessons learned2. While the economic crisis that has dominated much of the last decade did not give much for Russia to boast about, it did generate a stream of negative news about the outside world, especially the EU.