Botswana: Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT (OPEV)

PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT (PPER)

PROJECT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION DIVISION (OPEV.1)

May 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 TRANS-KGALAGADI ROAD PROJECT ...... 12 1.1 Country and Sector Context ...... 12 1.2 Project Formulation ...... 14 1.3 Objectives and Scope at Appraisal (Logical Framework) ...... 14 1.4 Financing Arrangements – Bank and Others ...... 15 1.5 Evaluation Methodology and Approach ...... 15 1.6 Key Performance Indicators and Availability of Baseline Data ...... 16 2 IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE ...... 16 2.1 Procurement and Contractors ...... 16 2.2 Loan Effectiveness, Start-Up and Implementation ...... 16 2.3 Adherence to Project Time and Costs, Disbursements and Financing Arrangements ...... 17 2.4 Project Management, Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation of Achievements ...... 17 3 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RATINGS ...... 18 3.1 Relevance of Goals and Objectives and Quality at Entry Assessment ...... 18 3.2 Achievement of Objectives and Outputs (“Efficacy”)...... 19 3.3 Efficiency ...... 22 3.4 Institutional Development Impact ...... 23 3.5 Other Development Impact ...... 23 3.6 Sustainability ...... 24 3.7 Aggregate Performance ...... 28 3.1 Borrower Performance ...... 28 3.2 Bank Group Performance ...... 28 3.3 Factors affecting Implementation Performance and Outcome ...... 28 4 CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 29

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APPENDICES No. of Pages A: EVALUATION CRITERIA - RETROSPECTIVE B: BORROWER PERFORMANCE C: BANK PERFORMANCE EVALUATION D: IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE RATING E: FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME F: INTERVENTION LOGIC G: RETROSPECTIVE PROJECT MATRIX H: CALCULATION OF ECONOMIC INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN I: ROADS DEPARTMENT PROFESSIONAL STAFF J: PERIODIC MAINTENANCE COSTS ON PROJECT ROAD K: SADC TRADE FIGURES L: SUMMARY SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

------This report was prepared by a team of consultants (Aurecon, Republic of South Africa) under the coordination of Ms. Maria PATEGUANA (Young Professional, OPEV.1) and under the supervision of Mr. M.H. MANAÏ, Division Manager, OPEV.1. Any questions related to this document should be forwarded to Mr. MANAI, Ext. 2416.

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Appraisal (May 1991) 1 UA = Pula 2.65770 PCR (February 2005) 1 UA = Pula 6.77580 PPER (June 2010 1 UA = Pula 10.3600

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1.00 metre (m) = 3.281 ft. 1.00 kilometre (km) = 0.621 mile 1.00 square kilometre (km 2) = 0.386 square mile (mi2) 1.00 hectare (ha) = 2.471 acres 1.00 kilogram (kg) = 2.205 lbs.

FISCAL YEAR

1 April – 31 March

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB = African Development Bank ADF = African Development Fund ADT = Average Daily Traffic BADEA = Arab Bank for Development of Africa BCSO = Botswana Central Statistics Office BOCONGO = Botswana Council of NGOs CTO = Central Transport Organisation DEA = Department of Environmental Affairs EA = Executing Agency EIA = Environment Impact Assessment EIRR = Economic Internal Rate of Return EMP = Environment Management Plan ESIA = Environment and Social Impact Assessment GDP = Gross Domestic Product GOB = Government of Botswana KFAED = Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development MFDP = Ministry of Finance and Development Planning MIST = Ministry of Infrastructure, Science and Technology MoWTC = Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication MoU = Memorandum of Understanding NACA = National AIDS Coordination NDF/ NIB = Norwegian Development Fund NDP9 = Ninth National Development Plan NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation OECF-Japan = Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund PAR = Project Appraisal Report PCR = Project Completion Report PPER = Project Performance Evaluation Report RD = Roads Department REC = Regional Economic Cooperation RUC = Road User Charges SADC = Southern Africa Development Community SIDA = Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency TKC = Trans-Kgalagadi Corridor TKCMC = Trans-Kgalagadi Corridor Management Committee TKR = Trans-Kgalagadi Road USD = United States Dollars UA = Unit of Account VDC = Village Development Committee VKT = Vehicle Kilometres Travelled VOC = Vehicle Operating Costs VPD = Vehicles per Day WMA = Wildlife Management Area

BASIC PROJECT DATA 1. Country : Botswana 2. Project : Trans-Kgalagadi Project Road 3. Loan Number : ADB - 2000191000007 ADF – 2100150000120 4. Borrower : Government of Botswana 5. Beneficiary : Government of Botswana 6. Executing Agency : Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications (Roads Department)

A. Key Dates Appraisal Actual

1. Loan Approval Date 25 November 1991 2. Loan Signature Date 13 May 1992 3. Loan Effectiveness Date 03 September 1993 4. Effective Date of First Disbursement: October 1991 September 1994 (ADF) September 1995 (ADF) 5. Effective Date of Last Disbursement: December 1998 November 2004 (ADF) (ADB) July 1998 (ADF)

B. Financing Plan (UA equivalents)

1. Financing Plan (UA million equivalents) UA Million Source of Appraisal Actual Finance FE LC Total % FE LC Total % ADB 18.50 --- 18.50 49.0 13.38 --- 13.38 48.0 ADF 10.59 --- 10.59 28.0 8.12 --- 8.12 29.0 GOB --- 8.63 8.63 23.0 --- 6.27 6.27 23.0 Total 29.09 8.63 37.72 100.0 21.50 6.27 27.77 100.0

C. Performance Indicators 1. Cost Under-run : 26.4% 2. Time Over-run  Slippage on Effectiveness : 9 Months  Slippage on Completion Date o Technical Assistance and Training: 7 Months o Environmental Protection : 17 Months o Road Upgrading : 19 Months  Slippage on Last Disbursement : 70 Months (ADF), Nil (AFDB)  No of Extensions of Grant Validity Period: 2 (ADF) 3. Project Implementation Status : Completed

D. Missions and Type of Missions Type of Mission Number of Number of Period Composition Man Missions Persons Days 1. Identification 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 2. Preparation 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 3. Appraisal 1 3 05/1991 Transport Engineer, 42 Transport Economist and Environmentalist 4. Supervision 1 1 08/1993 Transport Economist 7

1 2 11/1994 Transport Engineer and 14 Transport Economist

1 1 06/1995 Transport Engineer 13

1 2 08/1996 Transport Engineer and 14 Transport Economist

1 2 09/1997 Transport Engineer and 14 Transport Economist

1 2 03/1998 Transport Engineer and 14 Transport Economist

1 1 12/1999 Transport Engineer 4

1 2 11/2000 Transport Engineer and 7 Transport Economist

Type of Mission Number of Number of Period Composition Man Missions Persons Days 1 2 02/2001 Transport Engineer and 7 Transport Economist

5. PCR 1 2 02/2005 Transport Engineer and 16 Transport Economist

6. PPER 1 6 09/2010 Evaluation Officer, 10 Consultant Team (Transport Economist, Environmentalist, Socio- Economic Specialist, Project Administrator and Project Director)

E. Disbursements (UA Million) At Appraisal Actual Year ADB ADF ADB ADF Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % 1993 3.14 17.0 1.72 16.2 ------1994 7.77 59.0 3.93 53.4 ------0.38 4.7 1995 5.55 89.0 3.01 81.8 1.16 8.6 1.40 21.9 1996 2.04 100.0 1.47 95.7 5.62 50.7 2.32 50.4 1997 ------0.34 98.9 3.37 75.8 2.17 77.1 1998 ------0.05 99.3 3.32 100.0 1.42 94.6 1999 ------0.07 100.0 ------0.12 96.1 2000 ------0.02 96.3 2001 ------2002 ------2003 ------0.10 98.3 2004 ------0.14 100.0 Total 18.50 10.59 13.38 8.12 Loan Balance used for Construction of Bypass 5.07 1.89 Final Loan Balance to be Cancelled 0.05 0.58

F. Economic Internal Rates Return Section Appraisal PCR PPER Kang- Ghanzi (Section II) 30.60% 31.25% 19.35%

RATINGS SUMMARY

Evaluation Criteria PCR PPER Relevance and Quality at Entry - Unsatisfactory “Efficacy” - Satisfactory Efficiency Satisfactory Satisfactory Institutional Development Satisfactory Satisfactory Other Development Impact - Unsatisfactory Sustainability Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Aggregate Performance Indicator Satisfactory Satisfactory Borrower Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Project

1.1 The Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project (the Project) is part of a wider Road Corridor, the Trans Kgalagadi Road Corridor, linking Botswana, Namibia and the Republic of South Africa. Similarly to the Maputo Corridor, the Trans Kgalagadi Road Corridor has an end- point in the province of Gauteng in South Africa.

1.2 In 1991, the AfDB approved a loan totalling UA 21.5 million (comprised of an ADB loan of 13.38 million and an ADF loan of UA 8.12) to finance the section II of the Trans- Kgalagadi Road between Kang and Ghanzi districts. The project was initially designed to reduce transport costs, enhance social and economic integration of the south-western part of Botswana and facilitate economic integration with Namibia. The Bank’s financed project has three main components: (i) civil works for the construction of 221 kms road, (ii) consulting services for sections II and III of the road, (iii) environmental protection support, and (iv) and technical assistance for the management of the project and training of road engineers and planners. The PCR was submitted in 2005 and it rated the project performance as satisfactory.

2. Implementation Performance

2.1 In addition to the completion of expected outputs, the project achieved cost savings of approximately UA 6.89 million which enabled the construction of the Lobatse and Kanye bypasses. In overall the project completion suffered a delay of 21 months mainly due to delays caused by the non-availability of water in the dry land of the central Kgalagadi Desert for construction which called for an investigation on construction water sources prior to the invitation of tenders, and also delays in the disbursement of funds. Despite that, the road is technically sound and shows no major defects. 3. Evaluation Methodology

3.1 The Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV) has selected the project for evaluation in 2009 given its regional integration focus and the fact that sufficient time has passed since the PCR which provided time for results to be visible in 2009.

3.2 The evaluation draws on a review of project documents (including the Appraisal Report, Bank’s PCR, Supervision Mission Reports, Country Strategy Papers, etc.) and on discussions with Bank’s staff members. The second stage involved a field mission to Botswana in March 2010. The field mission was comprised of meetings held with relevant stakeholder representatives, including government officials involved in project preparation and implementation, and international development institutions resident in Botswana, to seek their views on the Trans-Kgalagadi Road project, field inspection in surrounding areas of Kang and Ghanzi, a rapid beneficiary assessment, and statistical data collection.

4. Main Findings

4.1 The project is rated relevant and is in line with both the Country’s National Strategies and the Bank’s Country Strategy Paper. At completion, it remains in line with the tenth National Development Plan (NDP10) for the period 2009-2016 to accelerate diversification with the key goals of developing and maintaining reliable infrastructure. Furthermore, the

8 project is in line with one of the proposed pillars as in the Country Strategy Paper 2009-2013, namely the removal of infrastructure bottlenecks to enhance competitiveness and growth. 4.2 Nonetheless, the project is rated unsatisfactory regarding Quality at Entry due to two main project design weaknesses. First, the project design was based on the assumption that traffic would flow to the road once it was upgraded from an unpaved road. Second, the design also lacked adequate framework or mechanism to ensure cross border or customs harmonization. It is only four years after project completion, after the project scope change from a highway to a corridor, that the project met its expected impacts. 4.3 The project is rated efficacious since it met its outputs (construction of 221 km of two-lane bitumen road between Sekoma and Mamuno) but did not meet, upon completion, its intended outcomes. Project design conceived the project as a highway project with the objective of promoting regional integration. A 4% traffic growth was anticipated at appraisal. Neither facilitation nor safety measures were conceived to meet this traffic target. 4.4 Long hours at the border posts, limitation on driving hours on the section of the highway, lack of facilities on some sections of the highway and the proximity of people and animals on the road dissuaded road users to use the highway. The unanticipated conversion of the Trans Kgalagadi Highway into a corridor was an essential measure to promote the use of the road and also to enhance regional benefits. The corridor has promoted cross-border trade and traffic as well as economic cooperation between Botswana and Namibia. The implementation of a structured corridor management committee has achieved substantial milestones in terms of customs harmonization. 4.5 The majority of intermediate outcomes were achieved but modest gains were made in terms of improvement of access to social services and the reduction of final cost of goods and services for roadside communities. As far as long term results are concerned, the establishment of the corridor has enhanced regional economic cooperation amongst the SADC Member States of the TKCMC which has been translated by the introduction of the Single Administration Document (SAD 500), the harmonization of axle load limits, the harmonization of border operating hours (7:00 - 24:00) and improved border clearance times (reduction from 2 days to 20-30 minutes with a maximum of 1 hour for commercial traffic). 4.6 As a result of the establishment of the road corridor, the project is rated efficient. The Economic Internal rate of Return (EIRR) was revisited as part of this PPER and amounted to 19.35% which is lower than an estimate of 31.25% in the PCR and 30.60% at appraisal. Both Vehicle operating costs (VOC) and travel time were reduced (VOC reduced by 35.76% and travel time reduced by at least 4 hours as the distance on the TKC between Gauteng and the port of Walvis Bay decreased from 2300km to 1900km), regional access has increased by 50% and the international traffic increased by 60%. 4.7 Regional integration is poorly mentioned in the appraisal and completion reports. Performance indicators to measure some of project outcomes such as the promotion of economic integration and cooperation between involved countries (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa) were lacking. Those mentioned above were identified and calculated by this review.

4.7 The project sustainability is rated unsatisfactory. The project benefits are unlikely to be sustainable for the following reasons:

(i) Both the Road Fund and Roads Authority have not been implemented despite the clear recommendation of the Institutional Study of Botswana Road Agencies which was carried out in 1998;

(ii) Maintenance allocations are inadequate due to the absence of a sound road maintenance planning, weak institutional capacity, which has resulted into the failure of the concerned agencies to approve budget requests for maintenance. Funding from Central Government has not increased and funds allocated for bush clearing during this financial year have already been exhausted. The maintenance funding shortfall amounts to about Pula 58 million (approximately USD8.4 million). Only about a third is recovered from road users from the fuel tax revenue source. In addition, the lack of accuracy and reliability of traffic counts is likely to hamper robust planning by the RD, especially with respect to the Road Management System Analysis; and

(iii) There is staff shortage at the RD (33% of the positions are vacant). There is loss of continuity as the RD has been falling under distinct line ministries with low incentive bonuses and salaries than those offered by the private sector.

4.8 Although the project included TA for the PIU, it seems that the institutional capacity was not robust enough to identify risks and establish appropriate mitigation measures. Also, the use of Force Account Units for routine maintenance reduces the project’s cost effectiveness. 4.9 Road safety is a matter of high concern and with expectations of increased traffic safety issues such as lack of resting stops, risk of collision with cattle are likely to remain in the future. 4.10 The project has provided training for road engineering and planning as well as for environmental services but the capacity to plan, implement, and monitor social aspects of projects is currently insufficient. This is associated with high turnover of professional staff which has affected the implementation of the ESIA Report.

4.11 In terms of environmental impact, some of the recommendations made in the ESIA and the audit report conducted in November 2002 have not been implemented. These pertain specifically to operational aspects and the requirements to promote tourism and job.

4.12 Regarding social development impact, in areas like Ghanzi, the social evils associated with developments such as roads (increased crime, spread of HIV/AIDS, etc.) are increasing. In respect of crime, local government has responded by increasing police patrolling. At the time of construction of the road, HIV/AIDS had not yet been mainstreamed into impact assessments. In order to address the threat of HIV/AIDS, the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) has been charged to coordinate and facilitate the nation’s HIV/AIDS awareness and preventions programmes in collaboration with the National AIDS Council (NAC) and various stakeholders.

4.13 Overall, the project performance is rated satisfactory. As discussed above, the project is relevant, met its development objectives since it achieved its outputs and outcomes.

4.14 The Borrower performance is rated satisfactory since GoB committed itself to the success of the project by implementing all facilitation measures to meet project objectives as a corridor.

4.15 The Bank performance is rated unsatisfactory. There is no evidence that indicates that the Bank introduced mitigation measures to address project design issues. Although the project has undergone a major design change after completion of physical implementation, the Bank’s PCR failed to acknowledge that the road had been upgraded to a transport corridor due to under-utilization of the road.

5. Lessons

5.1 Non-physical barriers to cross-border movement of people and goods between the involved countries in regional road project such as the Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project are of importance and need to be considered in the design of this type of projects.

5.2 Setting up a corridor management team and cross-border arrangements and harmonization procedures prior to loan effectiveness are necessary conditions to ensure stakeholders’ ownership, project coordination and engagement with various stakeholders, and achievement of regional road project goals.

5.3 Continuous dialogue after project completion with country’s executing agencies is paramount to ensure ex post impact assessment of projects with regional integration focus especially when initial objectives are not met, and assist country authorities in taking essential measures to promote the use of the road and enhance regional benefits.

5.4 Appropriate M&E system with key performance indicators to measure regional project objectives such as the promotion of economic integration and cooperation between involved countries, is key to ensure that objectives are met and projects are yielding expected results.

5.5 Strengthening countries’ institutional capacity and providing effective support to the design and monitoring of projects with regional integration focus help assist the countries’ policy makers and executing agencies to enhance their knowledge on regional integration projects and programs and to learn from experience.

5.6 Regular and sufficient funds allocation for road maintenance is a necessary condition to ensure project sustainability. This allocation must be based on a sound road maintenance planning program.

5.7 The Roads Department needs adequate administrative and technical capacity to work in coordination with other government agencies on several issues identified by the project’s ESIA and Environmental Audit Review.

6. Recommendations

Recommendations to the Bank

6.1 It is recommended to the Bank to: a. Include in the design of any project with regional integration focus a component to mitigate non-physical barriers to the cross-border movement of people and goods between the involved countries, and key safety measures to avoid coalition with animals;

11 b. Set up a corridor management team prior to loan effectiveness to coordinate and engage with various stakeholders in order to ensure the achievement of project goals. The same applies to cross-border arrangements and harmonization procedures; c. Ensure a continuous dialogue after project completion with the country and Executing agencies, and undertake an impact assessment of projects with regional integration focus; d. Strengthen country’s institutional capacity and provide effective support to the design and monitoring of projects with regional integration focus by: (i) identifying impact indicators with targeted levels at project completion and beyond; (ii) defining a monitoring system to evaluate the progress of the project regional integration impacts during its implementation (iii) building a knowledge base on regional integration projects and programs’ experience; and (iv) reviewing periodically the implementation of regional integration projects.

Recommendations to the Borrower 6.2 It is recommended to the borrower to: a. Enhance the road safety through the reduction of the risk of collisions with stray cattle and donkeys can be done though the fencing of cattle posts. The partial fencing of the road must be monitored, especially during the operational phase to determine the effect on wildlife population; b. Monitor closely the recommendation of the Environmental Audit and Review of the Socio-economic Impacts of the TKR must be evaluated and monitored closely. The GOB must act on the outstanding issues; c. Include in the funding request costs needed to meet road maintenance based on road conditions and encourage the private sector to take over the periodic and routine maintenance works. d. Maintain road maintenance planning under the responsibility of RD but allocate road maintenance works to the private sector while GoB should replace force account works in the highway sector and encourage competitiveness.

Proposed Follow-Up Actions

6.3 The technical and economic viability of establishing the Road Fund and Road Authority should be revisited as a matter of urgency. It is recommended that the Bank in coordination with the Borrower re-initiate the discussion concerning road maintenance revenues. Clear and realistic sources of funding for the maintenance of the road and the entire road network in general should be identified. Also, the Transport Policy should be updated and integrated with other plans on an urgent basis.

6.4 Regarding the institutional capacity at the Roads Directorate, the GoB should systematically strengthen and/or restore capacity on road engineering, planning and socio- environmental safeguards. The Bank could include training components in the future transport operations.

6.5 Future transport operations should include the creation of the Road Fund, capacity building of the Roads Directorate to plan road works, the transfer of road maintenance execution from force account to contractors, and the creation of a Road Agency. This should establish a framework for sustained and efficient road maintenance program.

TRANS-KGALAGADI ROAD PROJECT

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Country and Sector Context

1.1.1 Botswana is a large landlocked semi-arid country located in the central Southern African region. It is bordered by Namibia on the west, Zimbabwe on the north-east, South Africa on the south and south-east and by Zambia at the junction of the Caprivi Strip. It has a total land area of 582 000 km2 and a population of approximately 1 990 876 (2009) that is sparsely distributed over the land area, most of which is concentrated in the eastern part of the country. Approximately 80% of Botswana is covered by the Kgalagadi sand-cover and therefore, has limited supplies of freshwater and rainfall.

1.1.2 Since attaining independence in 1966, Botswana has a high economic growth rate with diamonds, copper and nickel being the main minerals that are mined. Botswana’s GDP has grown at an average of 4.3% in the five years leading up to 2007/08. In 2007/08, the Mining and Quarrying economic sector contributed the most to GDP at 39%. However the country’s decade of robust growth deteriorated significantly due to the global economic and financial crisis but the medium term prospects are favourable.

1.1.3 As a landlocked country, Botswana’s physical infrastructure is important for the development of its regional and international competitiveness. The transport sector, in particular, is important for supporting other sectors such as that of Agriculture, Mining and Tourism. The transport sector contributions to GDP have been increasing steadily over the period 2002-2007, from 0.18% of GDP in 2002/03 to 3.8% of GDP in 2007/08.

1.1.4 The country’s transport sector consists of (i) a road network of about 8 916 km of which 73% is bitumen roads, 12.4 % is gravel roads and 14.6% is sand roads; (ii) Botswana Railways which owns a rail network of approximately 640 km (main line) which runs from Ramatlabama in the south and Bakaranga in the northern part of Botswana1 and has three branch lines that connect Botswana’s rail stations from which commodities are transported; and (iii) 5 main international airports and one national Carrier (Botswana Airways).

1.1.5 The Central Government operations in the transport sector fall under two Ministries, the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication (MWTC) which is the parent ministry for the Roads Department, and the Ministry of Local Government, which is the parent ministry for the Local Authorities. Responsibility for administering roads is shared between the Roads Department, which maintains gazetted roads, the District Councils which maintain non-gazetted rural roads and the City or Town Councils which are responsible for urban roads within their administrative boundaries.

1.1.6 An Institutional Study of Botswana Road Agencies was carried out in 1998 with the main objective of identifying a range of potential options available to the various road agencies in Botswana and recommending the most suitable format for the overall management of the Public Highway Network. The key recommendations were to establish:

 A Roads Board as an autonomous, representative stakeholder-based body with overview responsibility for the entire road sector;

...... 1 www.botswanarailways.co.bw

 An autonomous Roads Authority to be responsible for managing all roads sector activities related to primary and secondary roads;

 A Road Fund that would receive funds from road user charges and government budget, and distribute funds to the road sector agencies;

 Regional Offices of the Road Authority for carrying out their assigned activities. The recommendations of the Institutional Study have however not yet been implemented.

1.2 Project Formulation

1.2.1 The project was formulated using a feasibility study that gave technical, economic and financial justifications for the project. The mid to late 1980s brought about the need for the construction of a paved road that would cross the Kgalagadi desert. Contributing factors for the formulation of the project concept included the change in the political climate of South Africa coupled with positive results of research work (construction materials suitable for desert conditions) conducted in the area, which had started in the late 1970s. The project was deemed to have regional importance by the SADC and it was recommended as one of the projects that would facilitate cooperation and integration of Regional Economic Cooperation (REC) initiatives in the Southern African region.

1.2.2 The feasibility study was commissioned in 1988 with the funding from the GOB and the Swedish Government. The Swedish funds were managed by the AfDB. In the final report of the feasibility study, it was made clear that the project road Sekoma-Ghanzi-Kang- Mamuno was economically and technically feasible within the SADC region. The road would connect the eastern districts of Kgalagadi, Ghanzi in the west, Windhoek and the Port Walvis Bay to Botswana as a whole. Consequentially, the international significance of the project road led to formal technical studies, including the preparation of tender documents.

1.2.3 In November 1990, GOB in collaboration with the AfDB as the lead arranger organised a meeting in Gaborone to develop funding and guarantees for the development of the road. The entire Trans Kgalagadi Road Project was co-financed by the AfDB, Kuwait Fund, BADEA, NORAD, SIDA and OECF. Adequate consultation with local officials in the provinces traversed by the road were undertaken. Environmental considerations were incorporated in the project design through the inclusion of mitigation measures however social aspects, particularly the implementation of specific safeguards to address issues such as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) during construction were not taken into account. Alternative routes were considered for the alignment of the road and the key factors included route length, unit cost of construction, vehicle operating costs.

1.3 Objectives and Scope at Appraisal (Logical Framework)

1.3.1 Retrospectively, the overall impact targeted by the project was fourfold namely: (i) to promote regional cooperation among SADC Member States (mainly Botswana, Namibia and South Africa), (ii) to uphold socio-economic development in the project area (iii) to strengthen the Roads Department (RD) institutional capacity, and (iv) to improve environmental conditions along the road.

1.3.2 The project was designed to lead to the following expected intermediate results: (i) promotion of regional trade, (ii) reduction of final cost of goods and services to roadside communities, (iii) improved transport services, (iv) diversification of local economic activities in roadside communities, (v) increased product availability, (vi) improved access to social services, (vii) promotion of Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) practices, reduced erosion, pollution abatement, dust control and increased safe access, promotion of Environmental Protection Services to surrounding communities, and (viii) Improved Road Engineering and Planning Services.

1.3.3 In the short term, the project envisaged to accrue five main benefits including (i) increased regional road access, (ii) reduction of Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC), (iii)

15 reduction in travel time, (iv) improved accessibility due to the all-weather status of the road, and (v) the implementation of ESIA and the Environment Management Plan and the capability of the local communities to carry our environment protection services.

1.3.4 The expected outputs of the project were to (i) construct 221 km of environmentally friendly and sound two-lane bitumen road between Sekoma and Mumuno, (ii) develop a study on the investigation of construction water in the project area, (iii) train RD personnel in basic Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) techniques, (iv) conduct an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and (v) train the local communities to carry out environment protection services.

1.4 Financing Arrangements – Bank and Others

1.4.1 The overall costs for the project including taxes, was UA 88.07 million at Appraisal, of which about 43% of the project was jointly financed by AfDB/ADF. Other Co-financiers were Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) 9% (UA 7.77 million), Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF – Japan) 23% (UA 19.83 million), Arab Bank of Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) 8% (UA 6.77 million), Norwegian Development Fund/ Nordic Investment Bank (NDF/ NIB) 2% (UA 2.08 million) and the Government of Botswana (GOB) 25%.

1.4.2 As far as Bank’s financed project components are concerned, the estimated cost of the project at Appraisal was UA 37.72 million with UA 29.09 million consisting of the foreign exchange component and UA 8.63 million of local contributions. The actual cost of the project amounted to UA 27.88 million comprising a foreign exchange component and UA 6.27 million of local contributions.

1.5 Evaluation Methodology and Approach

1.5.1 The Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV) has selected the project for evaluation in 2009 given its regional integration focus which is one of Bank’s key operational priorities. Following the Bank’s revised guidelines,2 the PPER reassesses the status of the construction of the Trans Kgalagadi Road (TKR) and provides lessons. The evaluation draws on a review of project documents (including the Appraisal Report, Bank’s PCR, Supervision Mission Reports, Country Strategy Papers, etc.) and on discussions with Bank’s staff.

1.5.2 The second stage involved a field mission to Botswana which took place from 9 to 17 March 2010. The field mission included meetings with relevant stakeholder representatives, including government officials involved in project preparation and implementation, and international development institutions resident in Botswana, to seek their views on the Trans-Kgalagadi Road project, field inspection in surrounding areas of Kang and Ghanzi, a rapid beneficiary assessment, and statistical data collection.

1.5.3 The appraisal report did not include a results based logical framework (which was not mandatory at that time at appraisal). The RBLF from the Project Completion Report (PCR) has some deficiencies and in some cases it lacked the indicators to measure some of the project objectives such as the promotion of social and economic integration of Southern western part of Botswana as well as the promotion of economic cooperation between

...... 2 Revised Guidelines on Project Completion Report (PCR) Evaluation Note And Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER), Operations Evaluation Department 2002

Namibia and Botswana. In addition, the project framework focused mainly on road improvements and on the training of RD personnel.

1.5.4 Given the above weaknesses, a retrospective Results Based Logical Framework and the detailed evaluation framework as well as the intervention logic were prepared and are summarised in appendixes F and G. The lack of baseline data is however a limiting factor to this evaluation.

1.5.5 The PCR was drafted well after the November 2003 MOU between Namibia, Botswana and South Africa but did not mention the change in status of the project road from a highway to a corridor. The PCR also lacked indicators to measure project objectives such as the promotion of economic integration of Southern Western part of Botswana and the cooperation between Namibia and Botswana

1.5.6 Findings from the PCR (2005) point out to the fact that the TKR Project has achieved most of its objectives. The project was successfully implemented and is operating satisfactorily, albeit with 43 months delay in implementation.

1.6 Key Performance Indicators and Availability of Baseline Data

1.6.1 Due to inadequate record-keeping and in some cases the lack of sufficient baseline information, the evaluation has focused on available measurable indicators which included level of Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC), accessibility to transport, the level of transport costs, number of people now living and working in areas that were previously regarded as remote areas, socio-economic development, the number of women empowered and level of regional economic cooperation between Botswana and Namibia. It also examined the institutional strengthening of the project, the lessons that were drawn from the performance of the GOB, the Bank and the beneficiaries.

1.6.2 One specific key performance indicator which is imperative to measure the performance of the project is the average daily traffic (ADT) which had to be revisited and updated accordingly due to significant discrepancies in the data obtained from the Roads Department (RD).

2. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

2.1 Procurement and Contractors

2.1.1 The construction period was approximately 30 months. The twelve-month maintenance liability period was completed for the final section in July 1998 showing a 21 month delay when compared to the forecast for completion of October 1996. The underlying reason for the delay was the non-availability of water in the dry land of the central Kgalagadi Desert for construction.

2.1.2 The project area had no continual water supply and all settlements and development relied on underground water. This called for an investigation on construction water sources prior to the invitation of tenders in order to reduce the risk of high tender prices caused by uncertainty of the location of reliable water sources. The scarcity of water and high evaporation rates made traditional compaction techniques expensive.

2.2 Loan Effectiveness, Start-Up and Implementation

2.2.1 The AfDB and ADF loans for the project were approved in November 1991, signed in May 1992 and declared effective in September 1993. The loans were signed within the limit of 12 months between Board approval and loan effectiveness.

2.2.2 One out of seven loan covenants was partially fulfilled and the remaining six conditions were complied with. The partially fulfilled loan covenant relates to the provision of training to the members of the district councils, land boards and tribal administration, within the project districts, using project resources. Although four seminars were held at Mabutsane, Ghanzi and Kang with members of the district councils, land boards, development committees and chiefs, findings from the evaluation mission reveal that key community representatives were not aware of the training components of the project.

2.2.3 The 9-months slippage on the 1st disbursement of ADF funds was mainly due to a delay in fulfilling the conditions precedent to entry into Force of the Loan Agreement related to the “provision of works tender documents to contractors and consultants to mitigate the environmental impact of the Project Road and to implement and monitor the environmental protection measures”.

2.2.4 Nonetheless, start-up delays of the TKR project had no adverse effect on project performance. The project was successfully implemented by the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications through its Roads Department. The implementation of the project took place between 1993 and 1998 for the 3 sections of the road, respectively in June 1993 (completed in July 1995), March 1995 (completed in January 1998), and July 1995 (ended in February 1998).

2.3 Adherence to Project Time and Costs, Disbursements and Financing Arrangements

2.3.1 Adherence to project costs was satisfactory. There was a cost under-run of approximately 26.4% of the loan amount at completion estimated at UA 37.72 million. The project generated savings of about UA 9.95 million attributed to three factors: (i) the competitive prices obtained in procurement, (ii) the depreciation of the Pula during project implantation, and (iii) the identification of water resources and road construction material prior to tendering for civil works that helped in containing the cost of civil works. The balance of the loan was utilized to finance the construction of the Lobatse and Kanye bypasses. (See Basic Project Data).

2.3.2 Due to non-compliance and non-familiarization of the executing agency with ADF rules, a slippage of 70 months on last disbursement was shown. This delay was because the disbursement requests were incomplete and did not follow the Bank’s procedures as the request for reimbursements was not signed by an officer whose name was on a pre-approved list of authorized signatories. In some cases there was also the lack of supporting information such as invoices and receipts.

2.4 Project Management, Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation of Achievements

2.4.1 The Project’s reporting on the implementation was satisfactory as the GOB submitted copies of the monthly, quarterly progress reports and the Final Report to the Bank, as per the General Conditions of the Loan Agreement on the Submission of Reports clause.

2.4.2 The Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Borrower followed the Bank’s Operations Manual Format for the preparation of the PCR. In addition, audited financial statements of the project were prepared and submitted to the Bank.

3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND RATINGS

3.1 Relevance of Goals and Objectives and Quality at Entry Assessment

3.1.1 Consistency of the Project with the Development Strategies – at completion, the project remains consistent with the development strategy of the GOB as outlined in the tenth National Development Plan (NDP10) for the period 2009-2016 in which the strategic focus is to accelerate the diversification and to develop and maintain reliable infrastructure. Similarly the project remains relevant to the Transport Policy, which was developed for the period 1991 – 1997 but has not yet been updated. The Policy prioritised the consolidation of basic construction and development of safer, efficient and cost-effective transport services. A study to develop an Integrated Transport Strategy is underway, supported by the World Bank. Furthermore, the project is in line with one of the proposed pillars in the Country Strategy Paper 2009-2013, namely the removal of infrastructure bottlenecks to enhance competitiveness and growth.

3.1.2 Assessment of Project Formulation and Design - although the Bank’s intervention at appraisal was designed as a highway, the early underutilization motivated the South African, Botswana and Namibian Authorities to change the status of the highway to a transit corridor, linking the province of Gauteng in South Africa, south-western Botswana and the port of Walvis Bay in Namibia. This change in the scope took place four years after the Bank’s financed project was completed and has brought about various benefits, some of which are outlined in the sections to follow. This corridor was enabled through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in November 2003 between the Transport Ministries of Namibia, Botswana and South Africa. The MOU formally established the Trans-Kalahari Corridor Management Committee (TKCMC), based in Windhoek, Namibia. Contrary to the PCR statements, the Trans-Kgalagadi Road and the Maputo Corridor are separate corridors both with endpoints in the province of Gauteng in South Africa.

3.1.3 The design of the project suffered from two main weaknesses. First, the project design was based on over estimation of traffic levels, i.e., on the assumption that traffic would flow to the road once upgraded from an unpaved road. However, negative perceptions by potential road users around safety, transit times and other critical factors3 meant that transporters continued to choose against using the TKR for many years after its completion in 1998. The initial underutilization of the TKH4 led to an inspection team comprising public and private sector representatives of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa inspecting the highway to verify problems reported by motorists and to establish the reason for the underutilization. The situation has improved after the establishment of the corridor.

...... 3 The problems identified during an inspection team comprising of public and private sector representatives from Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (1999) were associated mainly with hours of the border posts, limitation on driving hours on a section of the highway, lack of facilities on some sections of the highway, people and domestic animals on the road. 4 The realisation that the highway could potentially develop into a “white elephant” in the sense that it will be grossly underutilized led to the formation of the Trans-Kalahari Corridor (TKC) marketed by the TKC Management Committee (TKCMC) and supported by the TKC Secretariat.

3.1.4 Second, the project objective related to the promotion of economic cooperation and trade between Botswana and Namibia does not seem to be realistic. The project formulation did not include any component to mitigate non-physical barriers to the cross- border movement of people and goods between the two countries or an adequate framework/mechanism to customs harmonization. Since the implementation of the corridor, SADC has been coordinating the simplification and harmonization of customs and transit procedures which culminated in the development of a “single administrative document” which replaces 18 previous non-aligned documents. SADC is also implementing other trade facilitation measures, such as the one stop border post (OSBP) between Namibia and Botswana at Mamuno border post. The feasibility study is complete, and the institutions are currently being put in place in Namibia and Botswana to implement the design. Both design weaknesses could have been mitigated if a multilateral committee such as the TKCMC, would have been established as part of the project design.

3.1.5 From a technical perspective, the design was highly satisfactory. The road was well designed, particularly taking into account the extremely dry conditions of the Botswana desert and the specific water conditions such a construction project would entail. Furthermore, the current TKR corridor is consistent with the respective strategies of the SADC region. For example Zimbabwe, a landlocked country, has applied for membership in order to enhance its trade via the growing port of Walvis Bay,.

3.2 Achievement of Objectives and Outputs (“Efficacy”)

3.2.1 The majority of project outputs have been achieved and these entailed the construction of an environmentally sound 221 km of two-lane bitumen road between Sekoma and Mamuno, a completed study on investigation of construction water, trained RD personnel in basic Environmental Impact Assessment techniques, completed Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and Environmental Mitigation Plan and trained road engineers and planners as initially planned. However, community members were not aware that training activities for local communities and Kgotla in carrying out Environmental Protection Services has been carried out.

3.2.3 Apart from local capacity on Environmental Protection Services, the remaining short term outcomes were achieved. These include vehicle operating costs (VOC) was reduced by 35.67% (from Pula 2.74 per vehicle km to approximately Pula 1.76 per vehicle km). Perceptions from road communities validate PCR’s assertion that travel time between Ghanzi and Gaborone has been reduced by about 50% (from 12-13 hours to 6-7 hours). Furthermore, increased regional access is evident and according to the TKCMC, the regional traffic increased by 50% and the international traffic increased by 60% since the establishment of the TKCMC. The access to the port of Walvis Bay in Namibia was also facilitated. The GoB is in the process of investigating the development (on a public-private partnership basis) of dry port facilities at the port of Walvis Bay.

3.2.4 Improved accessibility was obtained with a number of paved access roads constructed to link settlements that are about 10km far from the project road as well as feeder roads in the form of engineered gravel roads to link settlements also about 10km from the project road. All year round access to all vehicle types was provided compared to the situation before the project where only 4x4 vehicles could access the area, and places which were previously difficult to access such as Kang and Ghanzi are now more easily accessible. At project completion, the training of road engineers increased the road engineering and planning capacity at the Roads Department to at least 20 professional.

3.2.5 The intra-regional trade (i.e. within SADC) for the years 2004-2008 shows an increase of about 10% per year from 2004 to 2008 and the trade of Botswana with the rest of SADC (i.e. imports plus exports) have increased with about 6% per year from 2004 to 2008. It is envisaged that the establishment of one stop border posts at Pioneer’s Gate (between South Africa and Botswana) and Mamuno (between Namibia and Botswana) which is also one of the initiatives of the Trans-Kalahari Corridor Secretariat will result in even higher traffic levels.

3.2.6 Passenger and freight transport services have also improved as shown in Table 1 in particular, the frequency of services and the presence of bus stops along the road. Also, a taxi and bus rank, scheduled for completion in April 2010, is being constructed in Ghanzi. The profitability of transporting cattle from Ghanzi to Lobatse has increased significantly due to a reduction in cattle weight loss and bruising. It is estimated that losses from the trekking of cattle from Ghanzi to Lobatse amounted to Pula 4.8 million - Pula 7.2 million per year. Additional estimations suggest that the reduction in travel time has led to a reduction in weight loss from 12% (based on before-project scenario and 3-5 days travel from Kang to Lobatse) to approximately 6% cattle weight loss (after-project scenario). This is turn is likely to be associated with an increase of profitability of 6.82% (Fox et al., 1985).

3.2.7 Local economic activity in roadside communities is increasingly diversified and more products are now available in Ghanzi and to farming areas along the road. Previously, farmers had to rely entirely on government-run Livestock Advisory Councils, which provide extension services and sell supplies such as feed, provide veterinary services, etc. The construction boom in Ghanzi partly derives from the fact that trucks carrying cattle to the BMC abattoir in Lobatse can be used to bring back construction materials leading to a general reduction in the cost of construction materials in Ghanzi. Qualitative data collected during the mission suggest that prices in Ghanzi prior to the project were at least twice as high as in Gaborone, and the price difference has now decreased to about 30%.

Table 1: Socio-Economic Impacts Expected Intermediate Results Description Before Project (Appraisal) After the Project (PPER) Passenger and freight transport Bus Service between between 3 daily scheduled bus services 4 buses buses per day (each way) services Gaborone and Ghanzi (each way) Taxi Operations Ghanzi 4 minibus taxis 22 minibus taxis Bus Service between Ghanzi and Mamuno0 1 bus service Access to Markets and labour 1 tuck shop and the Kang 2 filling stations with convenient shops for roadside communities Trading Store in the Kang along the road in the close vicinity of Botswana Meat Corporation (BMC) has also opened a depot in Kang Diversification Local Economy Guesthouses, lodges or hotels in Kang 0 5 lodges and 4 guesthouses

Product Diversification and Agricultural supplies, spare parts for No baseline Number of private vendors of Availability vehicles and food products agricultural supplies established in Ghanzi. Improvements in buildings which are evident in smaller settlements along the road. The practice of building traditional huts is diminishing, as these are being replaced with houses constructed from modern materials

3.2.8 The increased frequency of public transport services has resulted in improved access to services such as schools and clinic, particularly in Ghanzi. After road commissioning, there is evidence of 7 new Hospitals/ Clinics (3 Private and 4 Government) and 4 Primary Schools, 3 Secondary Schools, and 1 Distance Learning Centre in Ghanzi. Community perceptions in Kang reveal that Government service providers (water, electricity, etc.) have now much better access to the communities they service. 3.2.9 The project promoted the development of environmental capacity within the respective and relevant line ministry, as three officers from the then NCSA benefitted directly, two of the officers completed Master programmes, and one completed a certificate course. This capacity was built at the relevant line ministry with the mandate of issuing environmental project approvals. The promotion of environmental protection services at community level was not achieved as part of the project, as communities could not confirm that capacity building of local communities and Kgotla in carrying out Environmental Protection Services has been carried out. 3.2.10 The establishment of the corridor has enhanced regional economic cooperation amongst the SADC Member States of the TKCMC. The construction of the Trans-Kgalagadi Road and the subsequent transition to a transit corridor to prevent the underutilization of the project road has led to the establishment of a structured Corridor Management Institution, the introduction of the Single Administration Document (SAD 500), the harmonization of axle load limits, the harmonization of border operating hours (7:00 - 24:00) and improved border clearance times (commercial traffic clearance from two days to between 20 to 30 minutes with a maximum of one hour). According to SADC, the lessons learned on achieving this harmonization have already been applied on the most recent transport corridors in the region such as the Nacala Transport Corridor (which involves Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia).

3.2.11 The socio-economic assessment, described in detail in appendix M, shows that there has been a general improvement in socio-economic benefits in roadside communities. There

22 is currently a job creation program for vulnerable local communities. Information obtained from the Ghanzi Roads Department indicates that an average of 70 local people are employed on a casual basis each month (for a duration of 20 days) to undertake bush clearing and grass cutting along the road, as well as maintenance of the roads camp and cleaning of the weighbridge facilities. Each intake of casual employees includes a quota of at least 25% women. The road has also stimulated the development of the informal trading sector in areas around Ghanzi, as there are a growing number of stalls selling fresh produce, airtime units, etc. along the road to Ghanzi. In addition, Ghanzi serves as the gateway from remote areas with potential for agriculture to the Eastern part of the country. It is reported that the project has improved access from agricultural production areas such as Qabo village to markets.

3.2.12 Improved environmental conditions along the road was partially achieved via the promotion of EIA Practices, reduced erosion, pollution abatement, dust control which was evident from the site inspection. Many of the recommendations made in the ESIA and the audit report conducted in November 2002 were not implemented. These pertain specifically to operational aspects and the requirements to promote tourism and job creation, which is not necessarily a RD function, but which needs to be a co-ordinated GOB initiative across various departments. The physical construction environmental protection objectives were achieved except the fencing of the road. This situation in turn has contributed to an increased number of accidents with domestic animals. Data from the RD reveals that there has been an increase in road accidents of approximately 64%. Increased road accidents are due to negligence, animals and mechanical deficiencies.

3.3 Efficiency

3.3.1 The project is rated efficient in view of the economic analysis and the assessment of project implementation. The EIRR was revisited as part of this PPER (Table 2) and the assumptions for the recalculation of the EIRR. Details on the calculation of the EIRR are described in appendix H.

Table 2: Comparison of Economic Internal Rate Return (EIRR)

Section Appraisal Appraisal PPER (recalculated at PCR) Kang- Ghanzi (Section II) 30.60% 31.25% 19.35%

3.4 Institutional Development Impact

3.4.1 As previously stated, the TA component and the respective training in EIA techniques had a positive impact on the institutional capacity of the Department of Environmental Affairs. However, due to high turnover of staff, only one of the original recipients of the capacity building remains with the Department of Environmental Affairs (approximately ten years after project completion). As mentioned previously, some activities of the Environmental Audit Plan were not implemented which suggests that there are still some weaknesses in capacity to implement the Social and Environmental Safeguards.

3.5 Other Development Impact

3.5.1 The project does not appear to have accelerated tourism and especially ecotourism opportunities, and expectations to this effect may have been unrealistic. Larger tourism opportunities and initiatives and the integration of tourism between western Botswana parks and the Kgalagadi Trans-Frontier Park have been identified, but have not been implemented. Lack of leadership and poor entrepreneurial stimulus were identified as contributing factors.

3.5.2 Environmental Impact - the increase of domestic animals in the area and within the boundaries of WMA, a direct function of the increase in human populations herding cattle, has a negative impact on wildlife; wildlife populations are being pushed back into formal reserves. Erosion problems in the project area are not really evident. However, the paving of the road and the provision of drainage has a positive impact on erosion. The absence of ablution facilities gives rise to sanitation impacts, which pose an environmental health risk.

3.5.3 Gender Development: the project contribution to gender development has been marginal. Findings from the evaluation mission reveal that currently 17 women are employed out of a total of 70 persons to engage in road routine maintenance activities such as grass cutting. It was reported that an underlying reason for this modest result is the fact women often require additional support to be able to start a businesses and take full advantage of economic opportunities presented by the road.

3.5.4 HIV/AIDS: The road has contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS in Ghanzi District according to the Ganzi Female Community members. At the time of the construction of the road, HIV/AIDS mitigation measures were not yet mainstreamed into impact assessments. Consequently, there is no baseline from which to compare HIV/AIDS prevalence statistics before and after commissioning of the project. However, the impact of the road on HIV/AIDS was raised as an issue of concern in the socio-economic-assessment. It was pointed out that this risk is related to the practice of “Multiple Concurrent Partnerships” (MCPS) by many local women, whereby these relationships tend to involve truck drivers and are practiced in exchange for cash. The risk is exacerbated by the fact that there are a limited number of overnight stops along the way, which means that prostitutes congregate at the stops that are available. The threat of HIV/AIDS and the contribution of the road to this problem do, however, appear to be less in Ghanzi district than elsewhere in Botswana. Statistics from the Botswana HIV/AIDS impact surveys of 2004 and 2008 show that country- wide HIV prevalence increased from 17.1% to 17.6% a while in Ghanzi district there was a decline in HIV prevalence from 15.6% in 2004 to 13.5% over the same period. In order to address the threat of HIV/AIDS, the National Aids Coordinating Agency (NACA) has been charged with coordinating and facilitating the Nation’s HIV/AIDS awareness and preventions programmes in collaboration with the National Aids Council (NAC) and a diverse set of government, development and civil society partners.

3.5.5 Increase in Crime: figures from the Ghanzi district police indicates that crime rates in the district have increased by about 35% between 1999 and the present. This is partially due to the increased number of people that come from the neighbouring Ngami district who are believed to be responsible for most of the criminal activities in Ghanzi Township. Some of the criminal acts reported include housebreaking and theft. Instances of rape by truck drivers have also been reported (39 cases of rape were reported in 2007, and 19 cases in 2008). In addition, the corridor has also brought about an increase in the number of cases of illegal immigration into the country (mostly from Zimbabwe), with 345 cases of illegal immigration having been reported in 2008. In order to address the increase in crime, local government has responded by increasing police patrolling.

3.5.6 Loss of Ethnic Identity: the community member’s perception suggests that increased mobility has increased the rate of intermarriage between tribes, with the consequence that traditional practices are slowly being lost. This impact is particularly significant in areas such as Ghanzi which, prior to the project, were relatively isolated from the more developed eastern part of the country, and thus more isolated from external cultural influences.

3.5.7 Feeder Roads: additional development impact includes the construction of feeder roads. The Department of Local Government Technical Services is responsible for the construction of feeder (tertiary) roads connecting villages within 10km of a given road. In the case of the TKR, all access roads were constructed as required, and paved access roads were provided to Charles Hill, Xanagas, Karabukis, Kalkfontein and Chobokwane. The villages of Okwa, Kacgae and Bere are situated just over 10km off the road. Thus, they were not provided with paved link roads but were provided instead with engineered gravel roads. There were plans to build a 120km paved road to New Xade (the site to which San people relocated from their original settlement – Xade – in the Kgalagadi National Park), but these plans have been put on hold because of the recession. New Xade has been identified as a presidential priority area.

3.5.8 Poverty Reduction: the impact of the project on poverty reduction should, however, be seen within the context of the broader socio-economic situation in Ghanzi and Botswana as a whole. Ghanzi is still one of the poorest districts in Botswana, and poverty and deprivation are especially prevalent among “remote area dwellers” (RADs – the term used in Botswana official literature for San people who do not live in formal settlements and are far removed from services and infrastructure). For reasons that may have as much to do with San cultural practices and preferences as with prejudice from other population groups, RADs have a long history of social exclusion and marginalisation, and these represent obstacles to their reaping the socio-economic benefits offered by the project. Although comparative statistics on unemployment and poverty rates before and after commissioning of the road are not available (a census is undertaken every 10 years, the most recent one being in 2001 and the preceding one in 1991), the project has brought about significant improvement in standard of living for most roadside communities (with particular emphasis on larger settlements such as Ghanzi and Kang). In essence, the road has greatly increased the mobility of local communities (See Appendix L).

3.6 Sustainability

3.6.1 Technical Sustainability: the technical soundness is affected by four main risks. First, the burrowing rodents (moles) in the road reserve as well as morama plant are likely to pose risks to the technical sustainability of the road if they are not acted upon. The burrowing

25 rodents (moles) in the road reserve and directly adjacent to the carriageway are responsible for localized failure of the carriageway in sections between Ghanzi and Mamuno, and Kang and Secoma. The RD has drafted an approach to deal with this problem as part of the Routine Maintenance activities in the Draft Roads Maintenance Manual. The morama plant which has a very large root which, when it rots, leaves a depression that can cause a pothole to develop. The removal of the Morama root is also described as a maintenance action in the Botswana Road Maintenance Manual.

3.6.2 Second, the issue of road safety is of high concern and is comprised by two main aspects, the wildlife and domestic animal conflict and the lack of rest stops and facilities on the section of road between Ghanzi and Kang (266 km). Domestic animals, particularly donkeys, in the road reserve and on the carriageway, pose a significant safety issue. The RD commissioned a study on this issue, Environmental and Archaeological Impact Statement for the Proposed Fencing of the Trans-Kalahari Highway, completed in April 2008. Statistics from the study, as well as accident statistics for the past five years received from the Kang Traffic Police, illustrate a steady decline in the number of large wildlife species killed, while the number of accidents where domestic animals are involved fluctuates greatly. According to the Ghanzi District Police representatives, approximately 150 road accidents involving both wild and domestic animals occurred in 2009, with 19 people losing their lives. This represents a significant increase since 1999, when only 50 accidents were reported during the year. The recommendation is the partial fencing of the road, which is in conflict with the original decision upon which the road was authorized. In 1991, a fencing policy was introduced that allows for the fencing of areas around boreholes, but the implementation of this policy has been slow. Part of the delay in the implementation of this policy is caused by the fact that boreholes belonging to different owners are often situated close together, thus making it difficult to demarcate an area around each.

3.6.3 Regarding the lack of rest stops and facilities, it has various negative impacts mainly associated with driver fatigue thereby increasing the risk of accidents. The statistics indicate that about 50% of accidents are caused by animals and the rest by mechanical failure, driver fatigue and/or negligence. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that, for most roads in Botswana, there is no legislation limiting the hours that truck operations are allowed to take place on the TKR (currently, such limitations are in force only on part of the A1 Highway in Botswana). The absence of rest facilities between Ghanzi and Kang is partially due to the restrictions on new developments in Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs). This restriction is not absolute, however, as Kacgae and one other settlement have been allocated plots within the WMA to develop tourism-related facilities. Vandalism of rest stops is a reasonably significant problem and some of the facilities at the rest stops are not maintained in regular intervals although this is prescribed in the Botswana Road Maintenance Manual.

3.6.4 Third, the rehabilitation of borrow pits and construction material quarries has been partially achieved. Certain quarries have naturally rehabilitated, while the majority require urgent attention, especially the Kang Brigade quarry in Kang Pan, which has recently experienced two fatalities, and should be fenced as a matter of priority together with warning signs. In Ghanzi district two borrow pits in particular present a problem: one near Charles Hill (where cattle have fallen into the pit that has not been rehabilitated and drowned, and court cases are pending), and one near Ghanzi town that is contaminating underground water.

3.6.5 Lastly, road signs on the project road are not always according to the SADC standard and a number of signs are in a poor condition or have been vandalized. This is a serious issue for a major transit corridor which is part of the SADC Regional Trunk Route Network.

Based on the ongoing initiatives of the Trans-Kalahari Corridor Secretariat (TKCS), the process is underway to adopt the SADC traffic sign standard.

3.6.6 The road upgrading strategy has proven to be robust. Significant research went into how material can be brought to the project road and how material can be compacted due to shortage of water. Chip Seal, initially thought to be a very marginal material, was used and the project road shows no major defects.

3.6.7 Government’s commitment to the project is shown at regional, national and local level. The regional commitment is evidenced in the support the project enjoys from SADC, as well as the commitment through the MOU of the three signatory governments. The national government furthermore shows its commitment to the future of the project through its active participation in the TKCMC. However, a potential constraint to the project’s future is the fact that despite the Institutional Study of Botswana Road Agencies was carried out in 1998 the recommendation to create an autonomous Road Fund and Roads Authority was not implemented yet. In addition, there is loss of continuity as the RD previously fell under the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications, then Ministry of Works and Transport and since the new Financial Year starting April 2010 the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) with “Works” now part of the Ministry of Infrastructure, Science and Technology (MIST). The loss of continuity also resulted in the fact that it is unclear under which ministry (i.e. MTC or MIST) the Statistics Unit now resides. The statistics unit is important for the execution of the planning function of the RD. Furthermore, the Transport Policy formulated in the 1990s was never updated. The study to formulate an Integrated Transport Strategy for Botswana is about to commence in 2010.

3.6.8 Social Sustainability: in overall there is socio-economic support from the local communities. Perceptions from roadside communities indicate that project has led to greater social integration between the west and east of Botswana. It was reported that more people now work in the east and return home for the weekends and more officers are willing to work in areas in the west of Botswana. However, there is inadequate interdepartmental administrative co-ordination and cooperation and failure of government departments to provide support for the development of entrepreneurs. Another factor that influences the social sustainability of the road is the safety of road users. An important issue that has a deleterious impact on road safety is the lack of cell phone coverage along the route, drivers who are involved in accidents are frequently unable to call for assistance. Transport companies in particular raised this issue as a matter of concern. However some progress has been made towards addressing this situation. Indications are that TKCMC had successfully mobilised the transport ministers of the TKC MOU signatory nations to engage with service providers to address the lack of cell phone coverage on the road. Refer to Appendix K for a copy of the signed MoU.

3.6.9 Financial Sustainability: the financial sustainability of the road is not assured. There is no dedicated source of funding for road maintenance, as funds are received from the recurrent budget of the central fiscus. Based on the actual budget submissions and the fact that the funds have been used up in the first six months, for the current year the shortfall amounts to about Pula 58 million (approximately USD8.4 million). Every three years the RD submits a motivation for additional funding to the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MoFDP), which correlates the level of budget provided with the future condition of the road. However the desired level of funding has not been granted and the funding from the central fiscus has not increased.

3.6.10 The determination of cost recovery is aggravated by the fact that Botswana does not have a dedicated road user charges system. For the purpose of the PPER, cost recovery indications were estimated from revenues from the fuel tax (Botswana does not have a dedicated fuel levy but fuel tax can be used as proxy) as well as transit fees collected from foreign road users entering the border posts. Based on 2005 figures, the Vehicle Kilometres Travelled (VKT) on the entire project road represents about 11% of the total VKT. Using the VKT as a proxy to determine the proportion of charges that were collected from road users on the project road and thereby to the cost recovery, approximately Pula 10.5 million (USD1.5 million) out of a total of Pula 97 million (USD13.9 million) was collected from revenue from fuel taxes in 2009/2010 which is by far the highest source of revenue collected from road users. Comparing this figure to the 2009/2010 figures related to routine and periodic road maintenance costs of Pula 31 million (USD4.4 million) it is evident that only about a third is recovered from road users from the fuel tax revenue source. Furthermore, if the above mentioned estimated revenue from road users is compared to the actual periodic maintenance costs carried out on the road network of Pula 57 million (approximately USD8.2 million) it is clear that the recovery rate drops to about 17%.

3.6.11 Institutional Sustainability: the long term institutional capacity of the RD is affected by two main aspects. In one hand, there is a staff shortage and 26 out of a total of 78 professional positions at the RD (or 33%) are vacant (refer to Appendix I). As staff members are trained, they take up positions with the private sector due to more attractive job outlooks (career perspectives, salary, etc.). Mitigation measures include incentive bonuses and higher salaries but the private sector often matches these benefits. Nonetheless, routine maintenance such as grass cutting and bush clearing is being carried out on a regular basis. Due to the use of Force Account Units, there are no records of the extent (i.e. number of km) of routine maintenance carried out and how much money was spent on routine maintenance. However, it is evident that some routine maintenance activities on the project road are being postponed, as edge breaks, rest stop facilities not properly maintained and broken traffic signs were observed. Periodic maintenance and rehabilitation is outsourced to private sector contractors and the entire history of periodic maintenance carried out is known (in 2004/2005 reseal for Pula 44 million about US$6.28 million on the sections from Sekoma to Mamuno (Sections I, II and III) and fog spray for Pula 6 million (or about US$ 0.85 million) on a sub-section of Section III between Mamuno and Charles Hill). At 12 years old, with a fairly adequate maintenance history and no extraordinary events, the road does not yet require rehabilitation.

3.6.12 On the other hand, the lack of accuracy and reliability of traffic counts is likely to hamper robust planning by the RD, especially with respect to the Road Management System Analysis. Knowledge of the traffic volumes is required for defining maintenance standards and threshold levels for triggering maintenance works. The traffic counts for 2009 are not available, as they had been discontinued. There are indications that in some instances past traffic counts are not accurate and whenever independent traffic counts studies are being conducted as part of studies, there are significant variances in the counts.

3.6.13 Environmental Sustainability – with the region becoming more accessible to outside influences, the pressures on previously protected natural resources such as wildlife and wildlife migration and movement corridors has increased. Conflict between domestic animal husbandry and wildlife has subsequently also increased human population numbers who are benefiting from the GOB policy of encouraging cattle ranching as a poverty alleviation mechanism. The long-term viability of wild life populations and free movement and

accessibility/ migration to breeding grounds needs serious consideration, and should not be compromised.

3.6.14 Transfer of ownership of construction boreholes back to the Department of Water Affairs has taken place but not yet to the communities. Reasons cited include the poor water quality for human and livestock consumption within proximity to the road (a minimum radius of 20km is required to discourage the concentration of domestic animals and wildlife), proximity to WMA and the pressure on wildlife. Boreholes with a yield of 5m³/hour or greater close to the road have been retained by RD for periodic road maintenance use.

3.7 Aggregate Performance

Overall, the project performance is rated satisfactory. The unanticipated upgrade to a transport corridor - which took place in 20035- enabled the achievement of benefits at the project and corridor levels. The project has led to the reduction of VOC (35.76%), a reduction of travel time between Ghanzi to Gaborone (time savings of approximately 6 hours) and to an increased economic activity along the corridor. Also, transport services have improved along project road since project completion.

3.8 Borrower Performance

The performance of the Borrower was satisfactory although a number of weaknesses in the financial administration of the Executing Agency were identified in the Audit Report, related to wrong or incomplete submissions of reimbursement applications. The Bank instituted an internal mechanism to improve the monitoring system of its disbursement processing procedures to avoid further delays.

3.9 Bank Group Performance

3.9.1 The performance of the Bank Group was rated unsatisfactory. Even though the Bank conducted nine supervision missions between 1993 and 2001, and a PCR mission in 2005, the Bank did not discuss mitigation measures with the GOB to address the under-utilization of the project road or to improve the consultation with the local community. The change of the status of the road project from that of a highway to a corridor was not acknowledged by the Bank at the time of the PCR (2005).

3.9.2 In addition, the Bank could have been more rigorous in its environmental protection requirements through the enforcement and monitoring of the EMP operational requirements which some remains outstanding.

3.10 Factors affecting Implementation Performance and Outcome

3.10.1 Budgetary allocations for road maintenance are inadequate. In previous years, unused funds in a specific financial year were not rolled over and the budget was reduced accordingly in the following financial year. As per the Ghanzi Roads Department, resources for road maintenance are insufficient to cover bush clearing where still 151 km of road clearing are to be undertaken.

...... 5 Date of signature of the MOU by the three signatory countries: Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.

3.10.2 The use of Force Unit Account for routine maintenance over the project life has reduced the project’s cost effectiveness and increased the challenges to an effective maintenance planning.

3.10.3 In terms of monitoring and implementation of environmental audit report - there is still lack of ablution facilities at bus stops which may have negative sanitation impacts on the environment. In terms of tourism and socio-economic impact, the environmental audit report made several recommendations with respect to the development of support industries and larger tourism initiatives along the route and the major centres such as Kang and Ganzi. This requires co-ordination between the relevant GOB departments and the various NGOs operating in the region to develop and facilitate a plan for implementation.

IV. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Conclusions

4.1 Overall, the project performance is rated satisfactory. The project remains relevant to the country development needs. At completion (1998) the road was under-utilized due to project design weaknesses. This in turn hampered efficiency and efficacy of the project. Nevertheless, the unanticipated upgrade to a transport corridor - which took place in 20036- enabled the achievement of benefits at the project and corridor levels. The project has led to the reduction of VOC (35.76%), a reduction of travel time between Ghanzi to Gaborone (time savings of approximately 6 hours) and to an increased economic activity along the corridor. Since road commissioning of the road, there are currently 5 lodges and 4 guesthouses in Kang. Also, transport services have improved along project road since project completion (from 3 buses to 4 per day (each way) and from 4 minibus taxis to 22). At the corridor level, the establishment of the TKC has led to the establishment of a structured Corridor Management Institution, the introduction of the Single Administration Document (SAD 500), the harmonization of axle load limits, the harmonization of border operating hours (7:00 - 24:00) and improved border clearance times (commercial traffic clearance of between 20 to 30 minutes).

4.2 Going forward, the likelihood of retaining project benefits reside with both institutional and financial sustainability. The Road Fund and Roads Authority were not implemented yet despite the recommendation of the Institutional Study of Botswana Road Agencies carried out in 1998. Therefore, there is no dedicated source of funding for road maintenance and cost recovery estimations shows that only about a third is recovered from road users from the fuel tax revenue source. As far as institutional sustainability is concerned, 33% or 26 positions at the Roads Department are vacant coupled with weaknesses in road maintenance planning and record keeping on traffic counts.

...... 6 Date of signature of the MOU by the three signatory countries: Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.

5. Lessons

5.3 Continuous dialogue after project completion with country’s executing agencies is paramount to ensure appropriate impact assessment of projects with regional integration focus especially when initial objectives are not met, and assist country authorities in taking essential measures to promote the use of the road and also to enhance regional benefits.

5.6 Regular and sufficient funds allocation for road maintenance is a necessary condition to ensure the project sustainability. This allocation must be based on a sound road maintenance planning program.

5.7 The Roads Department needs adequate institutional capacity to be able to work with other government agencies and local officials on several issues identified by the project’s ESIA and Environmental Audit Review.

6. Recommendations

Recommendations to the Bank

6.1 It is recommended that the design of any project with regional integration focus: (i) includes a component to mitigate non-physical barriers to the cross-border movement of people and goods between the involved countries, (ii) ensures the implementation of facilitation measures, and (iii) implements safety measures to avoid coalition with animals.

6.2 In case the purpose at the outset is to build a transport corridor, it is recommended to set up a corridor management team prior to loan effectiveness to coordinate and engage with various stakeholders in order to ensure the achievement of project goals. The same applies to cross-border arrangements and harmonization procedures.

6.3 It is recommended to ensure: (i) a continuous dialogue after project completion with the country and Executing agencies, and (ii) an appropriate impact assessment of projects with regional integration focus especially when initial objectives are not met.

6.4 The Bank should strengthen country’s institutional capacity and provide effective support to the design and monitoring of projects with regional integration focus by: (i) identifying impact indicators with targeted levels at project completion and beyond; (ii) defining a monitoring system to evaluate the evolution of the project regional integration impacts during its implementation (iii) building a knowledge on regional integration projects and programs experiencing and incorporating lessons in project design, implementation and evaluation; and (iv) reviewing periodically how the countries are implementing regional integration projects and ensuring that they are achieving expected results.

Recommendations to the Borrower

6.5 Measure to increase road safety through the reduction of the risk of collisions with stray cattle and donkeys can be done though the fencing of cattle posts. The partial fencing of the road must be monitored, especially during the operational phase to determine the effect on wildlife population.

6.6 The recommendation of the Environmental Audit and Review of the Socio-economic Impacts of the TKR must be evaluated and monitored closely. The GOB must act on the outstanding issues.

6.7 As far as Operations and Maintenance (O&M) activities are concerned, it is recommended that the programming of O&M and the approval of funding request should be done not only on the funds that are realistically available but also on the road conditions. Also, the Government while continuing to plan the maintenance works, should encourage the private sector to take over the periodic and routine maintenance works.

6.8 Road maintenance planning should remain within the prerogative of RD but road maintenance works should be done by the private sector. GoB should encourage competitiveness and give a bigger role to the private sector in the transport and public works industries, replace force account works in the highway sector, including road maintenance works, with works by contract;

Recommendations to the Bank and the Borrower: Follow up actions 6.9 The technical and economic viability of establishing the Road Fund and Road Authority should be revisited as a matter of urgency. It is recommended that the Bank in coordination with the Borrower re-initiate the discussion concerning road maintenance revenues. Clear and realistic sources of funding for the maintenance of the road and the entire road network in general should be identified. Also, the Transport Policy should be updated and integrated with other plans on an urgent basis.

6.10 Regarding the institutional capacity at the Roads Directorate, the Borrower should systematically strengthen and/or restore capacity on road engineering, planning and socio-

32 environmental safeguards. The Bank could include training components in the future transport operations.

6.11 Future transport operations should include the creation of the Road Fund, capacity building of the Roads Directorate to plan road works, the transfer of road maintenance execution from force account to contractors, and the creation of a Road Agency. This should establish a framework for sustained and efficient road maintenance.

Annex A PROJECT AREA

APPENDIX B

EVALUATION CRITERIA - PPER

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4)

1. Relevance and Quality at Entry 2 Unsatisfactory. At completion the project remains consistent with Botswana’s overall development strategy and the Bank’s Country Strategy Paper 2009-2013. However, Quality at Entry is quite poor and weaknesses in project design related to inadequacy of project risk analysis and assumptions led to unintended departures in the initial design. Due to underutilization of the road, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa have decided to upgrade the road to a transport corridor.

i) Consistency with country’s overall 3 At completion, the project remains development strategy consistent with the development strategy of the GOB as outlined in the ninth National Development Plan (NDP9) particularly the development and maintenance of reliable infrastructure as well as with the respective strategies of the SADC region.

ii) Consistent with Bank’s Country Assistance 3 The project is in line with one of the Strategy proposed pillars as in the Country Strategy Paper 2009-2013, namely the removal of infrastructure bottlenecks to enhance competitiveness and growth

v) Human Resources Development 3 Roads Department (RD) personnel were trained in basic Environmental Impact Assessment techniques. vii) Quality at Entry 2 The design of the project suffers from weaknesses related to inadequacy of project risk analysis and assumptions, namely the impact of lack of cross border agreements in project performance and the over estimation of traffic levels although from a technical perspective, the design was highly satisfactory.

2. Achievements of Objectives and Outputs 3 Satisfactory. The project has achieved

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4) (“Efficacy”) most of its relevant objectives, and has achieved satisfactory development results, with only a few shortcomings. Objectives that were achieved include the enhancement of regional access, the reduction of VOC and travel time, and socio-economic development and poverty reduction in roadside communities occurred.

i) Physical Objectives (Outputs) 3 Most outputs were achieved. The only outstanding output is the training to the community on Environmental services.

ii) Short-Term Results 3 Reduction in VOC (35.76%); Average Roughness (IRI): good to fair; Average travel time (6-7 hours (section I, II and III).

iii) Intermediate Results 3 Promotion of regional trade was achieved, passenger and freight transport services have improved, access to markets and roadside communities have been improved and diversified, social and economic integration between western and eastern Botswana are fostered by facilitating access and smooth movement of traffic.

iv) Long Term Results 3 According to the SADC, Promotion of regional economic cooperation amongst the SADC member states of the TKCMC has been achieved. The trade within SADC increased with about 10% per year from 2004 to 2008. Socio-economic development and poverty reduction in roadside communities was achieved although the anticipated economic development of Kang and the corridor was reported to be unexpectedly slow. The promotion of protection services at the community level was not achieved as part of the project. An audit report conducted in November 2002 revealed that many of the recommendations made in the EISA have not been implemented; these include promoting tourism and job creation.

v) Environmental Objectives 3 Physical construction environmental protection objectives were achieved except the fencing of the road.

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4)

Maintenance of soil, air and water 3 Erosion problems in the area were not evident. Transfer of ownership of construction boreholes back to the Department of Water Affairs has taken place.

Maintenance of biodiversity 2 No fencing in the WMA allowed although the killing of moles as a part of standard routine maintenance activity’s impact on the upper and lower part of the food chain has not been properly assessed. vii) Social Objectives and Targets 3 The socio-economic assessment shows that here has been a general improvement in socio-economic benefits in roadside communities. There is currently a job creation program for vulnerable local communities. The road has also stimulated the development of the informal trading sector in areas around Ghanzi, as there are a growing number of stalls selling fresh produce, airtime units, etc. along the road to Ghanzi. In addition, the project has also contributed to the growth of cultivated agriculture

Poverty Alleviation 2 Comparative statistics on unemployment and poverty rates before and after commissioning of the road are not available but the findings from the socio- economic assessment reveals that the project has brought about significant improvement in standard of living for most roadside communities (with particular emphasis on larger settlements such as Ghanzi and Kang). In essence, the road has greatly increased the mobility of local communities.

viii) Private Sector Development Objectives N/A

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4)

3. Efficiency 3 Satisfactory. The EIRR which was revisited as part of this PPER amounted to 19.35% which is in line with appraisal estimate of 20.45%. However there are two implementation factors have affected the efficiency of the project namely project delays and the use of Force Account Units.

4. Institutional Development Objectives 3 Satisfactory. The project Institutional Development components are to be of only intermediate relevance and modest efficacy or impact. Local communities were not trained to conduct environment protection services although basic EIA training was offered to the environmentalist who worked on the project itself. Also, the TA component and the respective training in EIA techniques had a positive impact on the institutional capacity of the Department of Environmental Affairs. Approximately ten years after project completion, one of the original recipients of the capacity building is still with the Department of Environmental Affairs

i) Other Development Objectives 2 Tourism wasn’t promoted particularly for eco-tourism opportunities. The project contributed toward the improvement of gender equity. Social evils such as increase in crime, MCPs and the spread of HIV/AIDS have been evident in Ghanzi and are increasing. In respect of crime, local government has responded by increasing police patrolling.

5. Sustainability 2 Unsatisfactory. The sustainability of most achievements and benefits is uncertain. The institutional, financial, and environmental sustainability as well as Government commitment are the key bottlenecks

i) Technical Soundness 2 Unsatisfactory. There is a lack of rest stops on the last section of the road. The presence of wildlife and domestic animals poses a safety risk on the road even though a fencing policy has been developed, its implementation is slow. The issue of rodents on the road should have been addressed during the construction phase.

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4)

ii) Government Commitment to the Future of the 3 Satisfactory. Commitment is shown at Project regional (SADC), national (government’s participation in the TKCMC) and local levels. However, a potential constraint to the project’s future is the fact that despite the Institutional Study of Botswana Road Agencies was carried out in 1998 the recommendation to create an autonomous Road Fund and Roads Authority has not been implemented yet. In addition there is loss of continuity as the RD is continuously falling under different ministries. iii) Social Sustainability 2 Unsatisfactory. Issue of future socio- economic sustainability of the road has not been adequately addressed. According to interviewees, this is attributable to the failure of interdepartmental administrative coordination and cooperation for the creation of economic opportunities and supporting the development of entrepreneurs. iv) Financial Sustainability 2 Unsatisfactory. There is no dedicated source of funding for road maintenance and not enough funds are received for maintenance. For the purpose of the PPER, cost recovery estimations shows that only about a third is recovered from road users from the fuel tax revenue source.

v) Institutional Sustainability 1 Highly unsatisfactory. There are staff shortages in the RD as most qualified individuals are absorbed by the private sector. Some of the available traffic data is inaccurate and thereby hampers planning initiatives by the RD. vi) Environmental Viability 2 Unsatisfactory. Majority of the operational recommendations of the 2002 Environmental Review and Audit Report still have not been implemented. Lack of ablution facilities at bus stops may have negative sanitation impacts on the environment. In addition, moles are being killed as part of routine maintenance activities. It is clear that his may have potentially negative environmental consequences over the long term. vii) Resilience to Exogenous Factors 3 Satisfactory. Project enjoys support and this is evident from the signing of the

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4) MoU by RSA, Namibia and Botswana and the fact that Zimbabwe expressed an interest in joining the TKCMC.

APPENDIX C BORROWER PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4)

1. Quality at Preparation 3 Satisfactory.

i) Ownership, Beneficiaries Participation 3 At the beginning of the project, three consultative seminars for representatives of communities were held in each of the affected districts to discuss the impact of the project. Previously, information about the proposed project had been disseminated to the public through their political representatives. During the construction of the road, periodic consultations were held with local and central government authorities to address issues as they arose. alternative routes were considered for the alignment of the road ... the factors considered were route length, unit cost of construction, vehicle operating costs, and socio-economic and environmental factors. ii) Government Commitment 3 GOB committed itself to the success of the project although failed to develop and implement policies that are aimed at securing dedicated funding for the road sub-sector. iii) Institutional Arrangements (Counterpart 3 Satisfactory. Funding)

2. Quality of implementation 3 Satisfactory.

i) Assignment of Key Staff 4 Appropriate skilled staff was appointed. ii) Management Performance of Executing 3 Satisfactory. Agency iv) Adherence to Time Schedule and Costs 3 Satisfactory. There were delays in the initial implementation stages of the project although these did not have a damaging effect on the implementation process.

3. Compliance with Covenants 3 even though it did so with varying degrees of difficulties.

4. Adequacy of Monitoring, Evaluation and 3 Satisfactory. The GOB submitted copies of Reporting the monthly, quarterly progress reports and the Final Report to the Bank, as per the General Conditions of the Loan Agreement on the Submission of Reports clause.

The Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Borrower followed the Bank’s Operations Manual Format for the preparation of the PCR to be submitted by the Borrower.

5. Satisfactory Operations 3 Road is open to traffic. The road upgrading strategy has proven to be robust and the project road shows no major defects.

Overall Borrower Performance 3 Satisfactory. GOB showed commitment to the project and complied with most of the regulations set out by the Bank. Major shortcoming was the fact that the PIU did not identify or act promptly on traffic projections below expectations/ targets and on signs that the road was being underutilized.

APPENDIX D BANK PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4)

1. At Identification 3 Satisfactory ii) Involvement of GOB/ beneficiaries 3 Please refer to the appendix B point 1 i)

2. At Preparation of Project N/A There was no preparatory mission on this project.

i) Relevance of Bank Support 3 GOB with the ADB as the lead agency organized a donors meeting in Gaborone to finalize arrangements and pledges for the implementation of the project. ii) Timely Bank Support N/A Background information on project was not made available.

3. At Appraisal 3 Satisfactory Satisfactory. i) Quality of technical, economic, financial, 3 In May 1991, donors institutional, social and environmental consisting of the ADB, Kuwait analyses Fund, BADEA, NORAD, SIDA and OECF, undertook a joint appraisal of the project. The Bank appraisal team comprised three experts, a Civil Engineer, a Transport Economist and an Environmental Expert/Consultant. The loan conditions were negotiated and there were no issues of disagreement raised by the Bank or the Borrower concerning the project ii) Financial Package adequacy 3 Satisfactory. The cost overrun was due to (i) the competitive prices obtained in procurement, (ii) the depreciation of the Pula during project implantation, and (iii) the identification of water resources and road construction material prior to tendering for civil works that helped in containing the cost of civil works. The remainder of the loan was utilized to finance the construction of

Score No. Component Indicators Remarks (1 – 4) the Lobatse and Kanye bypasses.

4. At Supervision 2 Unsatisfactory. There is no evidence that indicates that the Bank introduced mitigation measures to address the underutilization of the project road. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Bank intervened to improve consultation measures with the local community. In addition, the Bank could have been more rigorous in its environmental protection requirements through the enforcement and monitoring of the EMP operational requirements which some remains outstanding.

5. Overall Assessment of Bank 2 Unsatisfactory. The quality of the Performance supervision mission is quite poor. There is no evidence that indicates that the Bank introduced mitigation measures to address project design issues. Although the project has undergone a major design change after completion of physical implementation, the Bank’s PCR failed to acknowledge that the road had been upgraded to a transport corridor due to under-utilization of the road.

APPENDIX E FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME Factors affecting positively (+) or negatively (-) the implementations and achievements of major objectives

Factors Sub- Partial Negli- N/A Remarks stantial gible

1. Not subject to Government Control

1.1 World Market prices -

1.2 Natural events -

1.3 Bank Performance - There is no evidence that Bank’s supervision missions promptly identified issues mainly the underutilization of the project road. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Bank intervened to improve consultation measures with the local community. In addition, the Bank could have been more rigorous in its environmental protection requirements through the enforcement and monitoring of the EMP operational requirements which some remains outstanding.

1.4 Performance of + contractors/consultants

1.5 Civil war -

1.6 Others (Specify) -

2. Subject to Government Control

2.1 Macro policies -

2.2 Government - The lack of the establishment of the commitment and Sector Road Fund has hampered the policies availability of funds for maintenance and therefore the sustainability of the project. The introduction of dedicated funding through the implementation of a RUC system and the establishment of

Factors Sub- Partial Negli- N/A Remarks stantial gible

a Road Fund and Road Authority will benefit the road sector.

2.3 Appointment of key - staff

2.4 Counterpart funding + No major delays occurred during disbursement of counterpart funds which facilitated the implementation of expected project activities and components.

2.5 Administrative capacity -

2.7 Others (Specify) -

3. Subject to Executing Agency Control

3.1 Management -

3.2 Staffing + The appointment of key staff with adequate skills mix was key in ensuring smooth and satisfactory project implementation.

3.3 Use of technical + The training of road engineers and assistance planners resulted in capable road engineers and planners in the Roads Department of the line ministry

3.4 Monitoring & - The availability of baseline data at Evaluation district level. Would have facilitated the assessment of outcomes particularly the socio economic result.

3.5 Beneficiary + Beneficiary participation could have Participation been instrumental in achieving further socio-economic upliftment through the implementation of eco-tourism initiatives and for the practice of environment protection services.

3.6 Others (Specify) -

4- Factors Affecting Implementation

Factors Sub- Partial Negli- N/A Remarks stantial gible

4.1Changes in project + The change of the status of the project scope/scale/design road from highway to corridor had significant results.

4.2 Deficiency in estimating - physical inputs, the base unit costs

4.3 Inadequacy of - price/physical contingencies

4.4 Changes in exchange + - The depreciation of the Pula during rates, in financial and project implantation was one of the institutional arrangements reasons that led to cost under-run

4.5 Unrealistic implementation schedule

4.6 Quality of management - Weaknesses in the financial including financial administration of the Executor, which management led to project delays, were identified in the Audit Report. These relate to the disbursement application received by an officer whose name is not on the initial list of authorized signatories, incomplete submissions of reimbursement applications in the sense that invoices and receipts were not attached and payment of duties and taxes from the loan.

4.7 Delays in selecting staff/ - consultants/ contractors and in receiving counterpart funds

4.8 Inefficient procurement - Same comment as point 4.6 and disbursement procedures

4.9 Others (Specify)

APPENDIX F INTERVENTION LOGIC

APPENDIX G RETROSPECTIVE PROJECT MATRIX

Measure Hierarchy of Objectives Expected Results Performance Indicators Indicative Assumptions & Risks Baseline PCR Value PPER Value Target Goal (Overall Objective) Impacts Impact Indicators TKCMC Facilitate regional economic Regional Integration amongst Stakeholder perception - - - formed, MoU cooperation SADC Member States signed Assumption: All three countries share in

economic benefits of the road Risk: Road serves only as transit route between Promote Economic growth Economic growth and GDP of project area Not available SA and Namibia, excluding Botswana from and development development most benefits Assumption: Adequate government Contribute to socio- Socio-economic development/ % households in roadside commitment. Risk: Non-transport factors economic development & poverty alleviation in roadside communities living below Not available neutralize economic benefits accrued because poverty alleviation communities poverty line of the road Number of road engineering Strengthening of Roads Increased capacity of RD services developed and N/a. Department personnel implemented by in-house team trained Purpose (Specific Intermediate Results Intermediate Results

Objective) (indirect) Indicators Upgrade and/or construct The ADT on The ADT in Assumption: Adequate support (e.g. 589 km of road to promote Increase in the project 2004 was 213 government assistance) available for roadside regional integration, Number of categories of vehicle traffic road is and the traffic Diversification of local communities to take advantage of economic stimulate economic growth economic activities, Traffic by 4-6% per increasing growth is economic activity in road side opportunities and development, facilitate volumes through roadside year. Target about 6% per 1.28% per communities Risk: Roadside communities do not have the poverty reduction and communities ADT = 250 year. In 2004, year. capacity to take advantage of opportunities improve quality of life vpd the ADT was 5 lodges and 4 created by the road 405 vpd guesthouses

Measure Hierarchy of Objectives Expected Results Performance Indicators Indicative Assumptions & Risks Baseline PCR Value PPER Value Target Presence of two service stations along Presence of Kang – two service Ghanzi

stations along junction No service Kang – section. stations Ghanzi Botswana Road-side amenities/ facilities junction Meat section. Corporation (BMC) has also opened a depot in Kang Improved access to markets Travel time to markets for road side communities

Improved access to social Travel time to school, clinic

services etc 4 buses per day (each Frequency of public transport Improved transport services way); 22 services minibus taxis; 1 bus service Trade within SADC increased with about 10% per year from 2004 to 2008. Assumption: Measures are instituted by The trade of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa to Volume of in-country and Promotion in regional trade Botswana with minimize non transport barriers and harmonize cross-border trade the rest of axle loads and working hours of border custom SADC have posts increased with about 6% per year from 2004 to 2008.

Measure Hierarchy of Objectives Expected Results Performance Indicators Indicative Assumptions & Risks Baseline PCR Value PPER Value Target Presence of Reduced erosion, pollution Evidence of erosion control, drainage and abatement, dust control, Number of accidents run-off increased and safe access structures. Promotion of Environmental n/a Protection Services 10 years after project completion Capable Road Engineering only 1 out of

and Planners 20 professionals trained has been retained, Short-term Results Short-term Results (direct) Indicators Traffic growth

Amount of transit traffic 1.28% per Increased regional road access year (2004- Assumption: Reduced transport costs are

VOC reduced VOC reduced 2008). VOC translated into reduced costs of goods/ services Reduction in vehicle Vehicle operating cost per km by about 50% by 20%. reduced to operating costs 35.76%

The training have exceeded Capable Road Engineers and the targets. At 13 Planners least 20 professionals were trained.

6-7 hours 6-7 hours (section I, II (section I, II Reduction in travel time Travel time and III) and III) 2-3 hours 2-3 hours section II section II Improved accessibility (all Days per year that road is 365 days weather road) usable

Measure Hierarchy of Objectives Expected Results Performance Indicators Indicative Assumptions & Risks Baseline PCR Value PPER Value Target Local community capable in Number of community Environmental Protection members that are able to Services perform Environmental Protection Services

0 (not aware Number of RD staff that are that this has Capable RD personnel in able to perform basic EIA happened) basic EIA assessment ESIA and EMP implemented Implementation of ESIA and EMP

No changes to design, or changes managed

Inputs/Activities within project Inputs No major delay in the project implementation; Competent consultants and

Financing (UA million): contractors/suppliers selected. AFDB Loan UA 13.38, ADF Loan UA 8.12, No changes No major cost overruns Counterpart financing:GOB 6.27 HR Resources: Availability of counterpart funds. Adequate resourcing (contractor, consultant, No changes PIU PIU) Clear accountability for project delivery Relevance of loan conditions/covenants, and

Activities compliance with those Civil works for construction of 589 km road to two-lane bitumen standard divided into three sections as follows: 19 months Section I - Sekoma to Kang slippage (161 km) Section II - Kang to Ghanzi Junction (221 km) Section III - Ghanzi Junction Environmentally sound 589 to Mamuno (207 km) km of two-lane bitumen road

Measure Hierarchy of Objectives Expected Results Performance Indicators Indicative Assumptions & Risks Baseline PCR Value PPER Value Target Consultancy services for Construction in budget and on Cost under supervision of above time run 26.9% mentioned civil works

Completed study on Completion in budget and on

Construction water investigation of construction time investigation study water Environmental protection Completed Environmental Completion in budget and on support in form of short-term Protection Services time consultancy services, ESIA Report and EMP - Completion in budget and on 17 months land use planning data, and Environmental mitigation plan time slippage training in basic environmental impact Completion in budget and on assessment Trained RD personnel in basic time techniques EIA techniques Trained project managers, Completion in budget and on Technical assistance for the road engineers and planners time management of the project 7 months and training of road Trained RD personnel in basic Completion in budget and on slippage engineers and planners EIA techniques time

APPENDIX H CALCULATIONS OF ECONOMIC RATES OF RETURN

Comments on EIRR calculation in PCR

In PCR wrongly stated as every two years. It should have been every four years Fogspray based on calculations shown in PCR. In PCR wrongly stated as every four years. It should have been six years from Reseal start and then every four years based on calculations shown in PCR. Based on assumption that transit traffic (which is in fact traffic from Gauteng, RSA to Walvis Bay, Namibia) saves factor of 988km/588km=1.679 where 588km equals the distance of Section I, II and III. However, the 400km saving should be based on the total distance from Gauteng to Walvis Bay (i.e. 2300km/1900km = 1.21). This resulted in an overestimation of benefits Diverted Traffic accruing to diverted traffic. Although it was assumed that the elasticity of traffic growth with respect to GDP is unity (1) in the PCR, for some reason the PCR assumed an elasticity of travel demand used for calculation of generated traffic of about 1.5 which should also be 1. This resulted in an overestimation of benefits accruing to Generated Traffic generated traffic. In the PCR an annual growth rate of 4% was adopted. However, as part of the continuous update of the Botswana Road Management system, VKE consultants Traffic growth established the traffic growth on Section II of the project road as 1.28%.

Resultant revised EIRR calculation Assumptions Distances Section I: Sekoma to Kang 161 Km Section II: Kang to Ghanzi Junction 221 Km Section III: Ghanzi Junction to Mamuno 207 Km

Routine maintenance costs Old Road 4 162.90 Pula per km New Road 3 525.00 Pula per km

Periodic maintenance costs Old Road 0 Pula per km New Road Fogspray every four years @ 14 816.00 Pula per km Reseal every six years @ 86 048.00 Pula per km

Capital Costs Section II 1993 1994 1.37 Pula million 1995 7.4 Pula million 1996 41.39 Pula million 1997 28.53 Pula million 1998 23.61 Pula million

Days per year 365 days

With TKH Without TKH Distance for Transit Traffic from Gauteng to Walvis Bay 1900 2300 Factor: Distance Difference for purposes of calculation of Diverted Traffic 1.21052632

Value of Time 0 Pula per hour

Salvage Value after 20 yrs 25%

Discount Rate 12%

Elasticity of Demand 1 Resultant factor for multiplying generated traffic 0.5

Traffic Growth (from 2008 onwards) 1.28% per year

Total Traffic on Section II Year Cars Pickup LDV MGV HGV VHGV Bus Minibus Total 1998 50 36 70 12 9 16 12 4 209 1999 76 52 106 23 7 35 6 8 313 2000 68 42 100 27 7 46 6 10 306 2001 54 42 102 23 10 62 6 8 307 2002 80 56 124 17 12 67 8 12 376 2003 74 48 116 21 10 59 10 10 348 2004 44 29 69 14 7 39 7 4 213 2005 39 31 73 12 6 29 5 4 199 2006 30 23 67 9 3 26 4 2 164 2007 67 45 121 18 7 66 5 7 336 2008 43 37 106 19 5 42 6 5 263 2009 44 37 107 19 5 43 6 5 266 2010 45 37 108 19 5 44 6 5 269 2011 46 37 109 19 5 45 6 5 272 2012 47 37 110 19 5 46 6 5 275 2013 48 37 111 19 5 47 6 5 278 2014 49 37 112 19 5 48 6 5 281 2015 50 37 113 19 5 49 6 5 284

2016 51 37 114 19 5 50 6 5 287 2017 52 37 115 19 5 51 6 5 290

% Normal to Total Traffic - Section II Year Cars Pickup LDV MGV HGV VHGV Bus Minibus Total 1998 50% 50% 80% 83% 78% 0% 50% 50% 59% 1999 50% 50% 80% 78% 86% 0% 50% 50% 58% 2000 50% 50% 80% 81% 86% 0% 50% 50% 56% 2001 50% 50% 80% 78% 80% 0% 50% 50% 53% 2002 50% 50% 80% 82% 83% 24% 50% 50% 58% 2003 50% 50% 80% 81% 80% 27% 50% 50% 59% 2004 50% 50% 80% 80% 83% 21% 50% 50% 57% 2005 50% 50% 80% 81% 77% 21% 50% 50% 57% 2006 50% 50% 80% 79% 79% 21% 50% 50% 58% 2007 50% 50% 80% 79% 79% 21% 50% 50% 58% 2008 50% 50% 80% 80% 80% 21% 50% 50% 58% 2009 50% 50% 80% 81% 80% 21% 50% 50% 59% 2010 50% 50% 80% 79% 81% 21% 50% 50% 59% 2011 50% 50% 80% 80% 81% 21% 50% 50% 59% 2012 50% 50% 80% 81% 82% 21% 50% 50% 59% 2013 50% 50% 80% 81% 78% 21% 50% 50% 59% 2014 50% 50% 80% 79% 79% 21% 50% 50% 59% 2015 50% 50% 80% 80% 80% 21% 50% 50% 60% 2016 50% 50% 80% 81% 80% 21% 50% 50% 60% 2017 50% 50% 80% 80% 81% 21% 50% 50% 60%

% Generated to Total Traffic - Section II

Year Cars Pickup LDV MGV HGV VHGV Bus Minibus Total 1998 50% 50% 20% 17% 22% 0% 50% 50% 33% 1999 50% 50% 20% 22% 14% 0% 50% 50% 31% 2000 50% 50% 20% 19% 14% 0% 50% 50% 29% 2001 50% 50% 20% 22% 20% 0% 50% 50% 27% 2002 50% 50% 20% 18% 17% 0% 50% 50% 29% 2003 50% 50% 20% 19% 20% 0% 50% 50% 29% 2004 50% 50% 20% 20% 17% 0% 50% 50% 28% 2005 50% 50% 20% 19% 23% 0% 50% 50% 29% 2006 50% 50% 20% 21% 21% 0% 50% 50% 29% 2007 50% 50% 20% 21% 21% 0% 50% 50% 29% 2008 50% 50% 20% 20% 20% 0% 50% 50% 29% 2009 50% 50% 20% 19% 20% 0% 50% 50% 29% 2010 50% 50% 20% 21% 19% 0% 50% 50% 30% 2011 50% 50% 20% 20% 19% 0% 50% 50% 30% 2012 50% 50% 20% 19% 18% 0% 50% 50% 30% 2013 50% 50% 20% 19% 22% 0% 50% 50% 30% 2014 50% 50% 20% 21% 21% 0% 50% 50% 30% 2015 50% 50% 20% 20% 20% 0% 50% 50% 30% 2016 50% 50% 20% 19% 20% 0% 50% 50% 31% 2017 50% 50% 20% 20% 19% 0% 50% 50% 31%

% Diverted to Total Traffic - Section II Year Cars Pickup LDV MGV HGV VHGV Bus Minibus Total 1998 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 8% 1999 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 11% 2000 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 15% 2001 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 20% 2002 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 76% 0% 0% 14%

Year Cars Pickup LDV MGV HGV VHGV Bus Minibus Total 2003 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 73% 0% 0% 12% 2004 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 15% 2005 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 14% 2006 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 14% 2007 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 13% 2008 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 13% 2009 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 12% 2010 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 12% 2011 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 11% 2012 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 11% 2013 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 11% 2014 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 10% 2015 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 10% 2016 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 10% 2017 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 79% 0% 0% 9%

VOC/km (Pula 1998 Prices) Type of Vehicle Upgraded Existing Car 1.134 1.699 Pick-up 1.083 1.883 LDV 1.986 3.295 MGV 2.288 4.271 HGV 3.941 7.071 VHGV 5.597 10.604 Bus 2.347 3.506 Minibus 1.278 2.44

Results Comparison of Without Project Case with Project Case (Alternative 0 minus Alternative 1) (1998 Pula)

Year Capital Cost Periodic Routine VOC-Normal VOC- VOC-Diverted Time Total Total- Generated Discounted at 12%

1994 -1 370 000 ------1 370 000 -1 370 000

1995 -7 400 000 ------7 400 000 -6 607 143

1996 -41 390 000 ------41 390 000 -32 995 855

1997 -28 530 000 ------28 530 000 -20 307 090

1998 -23 610 000 - 140 975 12 329 403 2 676 263 1 520 781 - -6 942 577 -4 412 133

1999 - - 140 975 17 434 449 3 667 394 3 326 710 - 24 569 528 13 941 410

2000 - - 140 975 17 135 101 3 408 984 4 372 247 - 25 057 307 12 694 811

2001 - - 140 975 16 798 648 3 328 843 5 893 028 - 26 161 494 11 834 131

2002 - -3 274 336 140 975 26 246 213 4 095 443 4 847 491 - 32 055 786 12 946 794

2003 - - 140 975 25 192 486 3 872 283 4 087 100 - 33 292 844 12 005 733

2004 - -19 016 608 140 975 14 862 150 2 326 329 2 926 504 - 1 239 350 399 038

2005 - - 140 975 13 669 505 2 279 588 2 176 118 - 18 266 186 5 251 092

2006 - -3 274 336 140 975 11 293 328 1 801 004 1 951 003 - 11 911 973 3 057 507

2007 - - 140 975 23 045 844 3 535 134 4 952 545 - 31 674 498 7 258 977

2008 - -19 016 608 140 975 18 626 794 2 907 851 3 151 620 - 5 810 632 1 188 970

Year Capital Cost Periodic Routine VOC-Normal VOC- VOC-Diverted Time Total Total- Generated Discounted at 12%

2009 - - 140 975 18 899 022 2 889 835 3 226 658 - 25 156 490 4 595 997

2010 - -3 274 336 140 975 19 011 245 2 951 822 3 301 697 - 22 131 402 3 610 111

2011 - - 140 975 19 247 779 2 951 652 3 376 735 - 25 717 142 3 745 556

2012 - -19 016 608 140 975 19 483 366 2 951 957 3 451 774 - 7 011 464 911 768

2013 - - 140 975 19 609 298 3 007 088 3 526 812 - 26 284 174 3 051 771

2014 - -3 274 336 140 975 19 791 761 3 033 955 3 601 851 - 23 294 206 2 414 835

2015 - - 140 975 20 001 158 3 047 354 3 676 889 - 26 866 376 2 486 741

2016 - -19 016 608 140 975 20 211 399 3 060 331 3 751 928 - 8 148 026 673 373

2017 25 575 000 - 140 975 20 405 342 3 081 458 3 826 967 - 53 029 742 3 912 956 NPV at 12% 40 289 351 EIRR 19.35%

APPENDIX I ROADS DEPARTMENT PROFESSIONAL STAFF Professional Staff Turnover since 2007

Year Exit: 2007 Year Exit: 2008 Designation Number Reason Designation Number Reason Assistant Roads Engineer Assistant Roads Engineer 2 Resignation Roads Engineer 1 Resignation Roads Engineer 1 Resignation Senior Roads Engineer 1 Resignation Senior Roads Engineer 3 End contract Principal Roads Engineer 1 Resignation Principal Roads Engineer 3 Retirement (1) resignation (2) Director Roads Director Roads 1 Retirement Total 3 Total 10

Year Exit: 2009 Year Exit: 2010 Designation Number Reason Designation Number Reason Assistant Roads Engineer 2 Resignation Assistant Roads Engineer Roads Engineer 5 Transfer another ministry (2) resignation (3) Roads Engineer 1 Transfer another ministry Senior Roads Engineer 3 Transfer another ministry (20 retiremenet (1) Senior Roads Engineer Principal Roads Engineer 2 End Contract Principal Roads Engineer 1 Transfer another ministry Director Roads Director Roads Total 12 Total 2

Current Establishment Name Post In Post Vacancies Director Roads 0 1 Chief Roads Engineer 2 0 Principal Roads Engineer 25 3 Senior Roads Engineers 3 16 Road Engineers 22 6 Total 52 26

APPENDIX L PERIODIC MAINTENANCE COSTS ON PROJECT ROAD

Outsourced Maintenance for the entire Botswana Road Network

Budget Allocation to Roads Department YEAR APPROVED BUDGET (Pula)

YEAR AMOUNT (PULA) 2000 - 2001 67 000 000

2005 - 2006 209 997 728 2001 - 2002 71 000 000

2002 - 2003 76 800 000 2006 - 2007 218 640 220 2007 - 2008 277 022 350 2003 - 2004 83 300 000

2008 - 2009 275 131 808 2004 - 2005 80 571 420

2009 - 2010 274 893 345 2005 - 2006 80 571 420

Source: Roads Department 2006 - 2007 93 730 090

2007 - 2008 130 526 910

2008 - 2009 117 029 970

2009 - 2010 165 650 200

Source: Roads Department

APPENDIX K SADC TRADE FIGURES

SADC Intra-Regional Trade (2004-2008) Botswana Trade with rest of SADC (2004-2008)

US$ Million US$ Million

Year Imports Exports Total Trade Year Imports

2004 2 764.81 471.50 3 236.31 2004 12 493.55

2005 2 738.67 606.33 3 345.00 2005 13 461.72

2006 2 710.07 585.66 3 295.73 2006 15 047.40

2007 3 422.08 0.48 3 422.57 2007 16 120.36

2008 4 097.86 0.56 4 098.42 2008 18 321.10

Source: ITC Com Stats

APPENDIX N SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

After Road Improvement Negative Positive Domestic animals such as Boreholes sunk during construction of the TKR were almost all allocated to communal farmers when donkeys and cattle pose a construction was completed. serious road safety risk.

Traffic signs have been Profitability of transporting cattle from Ghanzi to Lobatse has also increased significantly due to a reduction vandalised/stolen in some in cattle weight loss and bruising. instances

The facilities at the rest areas In 1999 there were 4 taxis; this represents an increase of more than 500% since the road was alongside the road have been commissioned. Taxis travel between Ghanzi Township and surrounding settlements, and also as far as vandalised Namibia and Maun. There is also now a bus services between Ghanzi and Mamuno, which did not exist prior to the project.

Some of the traffic signs are not A taxi and bus rank is being constructed in Ghanzi; it is scheduled for completion in April 2010 according to the SADC standardised traffic signs

A further negative cultural impact Vehicle operating costs are estimated to have halved since the TKR was commissioned. This is partly due is that of a loss of ethnic identity: to the fact that spare parts are now available in Ghanzi, where previously it was necessary to obtain them increased mobility has increased from larger centres such as Gaborone. the rate of intermarriage between tribes, with the consequence that traditional practices are slowly being lost

The road has contributed to an Stakeholders consulted during the field mission maintain that prices in Ghanzi prior to the project were at increase in crime in Ghanzi. least twice as high as in Goborne, and the the price difference has now decreased to about 30%. However, Types of crime that have some commodities are now cheaper in Ghanzi than in Gaborone – e.g. a bread in Ghanzi costs P 6, while in increased include housebreaking, Gaborone it costs P 9. theft and robbery. Instances of rape by truck drivers have also The road alignment was strategically chosen so that it passes close to a large number of villages; this was done to ensure that benefits of the road accrue to as many people as possible. Villages between Ghanzi and Kang include Okwa, Kacgae and Bere. The road as improved access from these villages to larger centres (such as Kang and Ghanzi); their inhabitants make frequent use of available bus services. Some growth is also evident in these villages – e.g. one meeting attendee has applied for a plot at Okwa with the intention of starting a tourism-related business. Accessibility of the road has improved significantly: previously, only vehicles with 4x4 drive could use the road. Now, the road can be used by all types of vehicles. This has increased vehicle ownership, as people Previously it was difficult for employees to be transferred to Ghanzi. Now, with the improved road, they can work in Ghanzi and still return home over the weekends to be with their families. In the population served by the clinic, there are currently 388 people confirmed as living with HIV. Of these, 60 are on ARV treatment. The clinic also treats 72 people from the surrounding villages who were previously treated at other clinics, but were transferred to St. Theresa Clinic when the treatment programme

Government services providers (water, electricity, etc.) now have much better access to the communities they service. This has brought about cost savings for government, as previously employees making a call to a roadside community would have had to spend the night there before returning; how, they can return the same day.