UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Thomas Carrigan

YMCA 2019 Southeastern High School Model YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Dear Delegates,

On behalf of the conference staff, it is our honor to welcome you to SHSMUN 2019! There is no place other than Chattanooga, Tennessee that we would rather be this November 23-25, and we cannot wait for you to join us there. This year, we have again worked tirelessly to improve your SHSMUN experience by making our committee and conference procedures better than ever before thanks to the hard work of our staff. To date, we have prepared 36 topics for you to debate, changed General Assembly structure to be more involved and include more delegates, and increased the role of DPC to bring you a more authentic and updated conference experience.

Of course, the surest way to have an unforgettable SHSMUN experience is through work on the part of you, the delegate. Our longest SHSMUN tradition has been taking pride in our staff and our delegates’ commitment to research, hard work, and introspective and focused debate while at the conference. As such, we hope that the topic guides that we have prepared will introduce you to many intriguing and relevant international problems facing the world today, and inspire you to delve into your research into your country's position with the enthusiasm we have been so privileged to witness at past conferences.

Remember, the research and writing process of position papers and resolutions is not only rewarding but will have innumerable benefits at SHSMUN 2019. Coming into committee with knowledge about your country and ideas for how your country will address the issues at hand will allow your debate and diplomacy skills to shine each and every committee session. Coming in with an educated perspective will not only allow you to be a better and more informed delegate, but to realize that the positions of other countries can work in conjunction with your own. In any committee, delegates will have to agree to disagree and instead work to compromise for the betterment of the international community. To be able to do this and do it well is a vital skill for the increasingly interconnected world we live in today, and what better place to practice it than right here at SHSMUN 2019!

With all this in mind, please do not hesitate to contact your chair or any other conference staff members with your questions relating to topics, committee, or the conference in general. We wish you the best of luck in your work, and we cannot wait to see all of your efforts pay off at the Conference this November!

Best of luck, Caroline Cornett Caden Farley Ethan Fell 1 Secretary General Director General General Committee President [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

P.S. Make sure to keep up with the latest SHSMUN news and updates by following our social Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN media accounts!

Instagram Snapchat @tnshsmun @tnshsmun @tnshsmun

2

Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Table of Contents

Letter from the Chair ...... 6

Committee History ...... 7

Topic A: Addressing Post-Election Violence in Developing Countries ...... 8

Introduction ...... 8

Background ...... 9

Current Situation...... 11

Committee Directive and Jurisdiction ...... 13

Questions to Consider ...... 14

Suggested Sources ...... 14

Topic B: The Situation in Cameroon ...... 15

Introduction ...... 15

Background ...... 16

Current Situation...... 17

Committee Directive & Jurisdiction ...... 19

Questions to Consider ...... 20

Suggested Sources ...... 20

Topic C: Peacebuilding in the Sahel ...... 21

Introduction ...... 21

Background ...... 22

Current Situation...... 24

Committee Directive & Jurisdiction ...... 26

Questions to Consider ...... 26 3

Suggested Sources ...... 27

Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Parliamentary Cheat Sheets Sheet 1: Overview of Common Points and Motions

Motion or May Requires Pro-Con May Be Vote Point Interrupt Second? Debate? Amended? Required Speaker?

Point of Order Y N N/A N Chair’s Discretion

Right of Reply Y N N/A N Chair’s Discretion

Suspend the N Y N/A Y Simple Meeting Majority Limit / Extend N Y 1/1 Y Simple Debate Majority Limit Speaker’s N Y 1/1 Y Simple Time Majority Introduce N Y 1/1 N Simple Amendment Majority Introduce N Y 2/2 N Simple Resolution Majority Enter Voting N Y 2/2 N 2/3rds Procedures Majority Divide the N Y 1/1 N Simple Question Majority Table N Y 2/2 N 2/3rds Majority Take from the N Y 1/1 N Simple Table Majority Caucus (ALL) N Y 1/1 Y Simple Majority Roll Call Vote N Y 1/1 N Simple Majority 4 Suspend the N Y 2/2 Y 2/3rds Rules Majority

Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Sheet 2: The Parliamentary Procedure Basics Remember! 1. Any time you speak, you must begin by saying your name and country. 2. Before you ask questions to a delegate, you must say, “Does the delegate yield to a possible series of questions?” and if they yield, you may then ask up to three questions. Speakers’ List: add yourself if you wish to speak on the topic. If you are on the docket, you are automatically added. When on the Speakers’ List, you may yield your time one of three ways: • To the chair: Chair absorbs the rest of your time • To questions: Other delegates may ask you up to three questions • To another delegate: Another delegate may speak for the rest of your time Caucuses: • Moderated caucus: a way to hear from multiple delegates for short periods of time; set a total speakers time, an individual delegate speaking time, and a topic • Roll Call Caucus: The Co-Chair will take roll, and every delegate will be given thirty seconds to speak on their position. • Unmoderated caucus: unregulated time to work on super-resolutions; stay on task. Points: • Point of Order*: Used if a delegate incorrectly uses parliamentary procedure • Point of Inquiry: Used to ask questions about parliamentary procedure or clarify what is going on; also used to ask for other delegates to speak louder, for boys to ask to remove their coats, to ask to change temperature of the room • Right of Reply*: If another delegate directly slanders your country, you can use this to refute their claims and defend your nation *You may interrupt a speaker to make these points Introductions: • Amendments: In order to change or add anything to a resolution already introduced, you must send it to the dais and then move to introduce it. • Friendly amendments: The author(s) of the resolution(s) favor it and it is immediately added to the resolution • Unfriendly amendments: The author(s) of the resolution(s) do not favor it, and it is put to a vote in committee • Resolutions: 25% of the committee must be signatories, then send it to the dais and move to introduce it. Ways to Vote (Resolutions and Amendments)

• Simple Placard Vote: Delegates raise their placard to cast their vote (default) 5 • Roll Call Vote: The Co-Chair will take roll and each country will say their response; “rights” may be claimed during this vote

Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Letter from the Chair To the Security Council,

Greetings! My name is Thomas Carrigan, and I am honored to serve as the Security Council President for SHSMUN 2019. I am remarkably excited that you will be one of the 15 members apart of this incredible committee. This is my third year participating in Model UN and it is certainly not my last. Model UN, especially SHSMUN, provides a great amount of opportunity for students to expand their knowledge about international affairs, improve their debate and public speaking skills, and to connect with so many unique and talented people. This year at SHSMUN, like every year, chairs and delegates alike have poured their heart and soul into the conference, and I hope that I can help provide an unforgettable experience for you, my delegates. Apart from Model UN, I enjoy travelling, watching Youtube, and volunteering. I also have an unhealthy obsession with European history and politics. If you happen to be a fellow Europhile, please do not hesitate to inform me. On a more serious note, the Security Council is one of the most complex and challenging committees at SHSMUN. While all committees at SHSMUN prompt delegates to understand their country’s policy, the Security Council adds another level of realism and diplomacy that requires delegates to refine their negotiating skills. As many of you know, the Security Council is tasked with promoting and protecting international peace and security. Therefore, I chose three topics that best capture the current threats to global security: Addressing Post-Election Violence in Developing Countries, the Situation in Cameroon, and Peacebuilding in the Sahel. Not only do these three topics address peace and security, but they pose new aspects of debate that challenge the status quo of the Security Council. Whether you are a seasoned or first time SecCo delegate, I hope that you will be immersed into the advanced and dynamic experience that is the Security Council. To ensure that the committee runs as smoothly as possible, I hope that each and every one of you will bring unparalleled knowledge of your country’s position and parliamentary procedure, as well as an understanding of the functions of the Security Council. I look forward to seeing your preparation for the conference come to fruition. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to ask! I cannot wait to see all of you in debate! Sincerely, Thomas Carrigan 2019 Security Council President

[email protected] 6 Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Committee History

The Security Council first convened in January of 1946 as one of the six principal organs of the United Nations (UN). Created as part of an effort to replace the ineffective League of Nations, the Security Council’s mandate is to maintain international peace and security. While its primary goal is to seek peaceful resolution to conflict, the Security Council is the only body of the UN which can create binding legislation for its member states. In addition, the Security Council is in charge of the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the imposition of military sanctions, and the authorization of military force. The Security Council is comprised of 15 member states. These consist of the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, , and the ) as well as ten rotating members. Five members are voted on annually, and they serve two- year terms. In order to achieve equal global representation, the rotating countries on the Council are broken down as follows: five total from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, and two from any other regions of the world. Each member on the council receives a single vote, but a vote of “nay” from any of the five permanent members (colloquially referred to as the P5) serves as a “veto”; therefore, without the approval of all P5 nations, legislation cannot Pass. Since its inception, the Security Council has played an active role in maintaining international security and peace. Beginning in 1948, the Security Council has conducted successful peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Tajikistan, Guatemala, El Salvador, , and Mozambique. However, the Security Council has also experienced failures with peacekeeping, especially in Rwanda and Somalia where peacekeeping operations resulted in many unaddressed desires. These varying levels of success have led to modifications in the peacekeeping doctrine, most notably with the introduction of the robust peacekeeping mandate in MONUSCO, a peacekeeping mission based out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition to peacekeeping, the Security Council is bestowed the power to use economic sanctions in concordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Council has used the power to sanction for not only countries, but also individuals and smaller entities from all parts of the world. As with peacekeeping, sanctions from the Security Council have a mixed record. Success stories can be seen in the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, and Libya, yet sanctions failures can be seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Angola. The Security Council’s attitude towards sanctions has shifted over the years, as sector-targeted sanctions are now considered to be more effective than broad measures, which crippled not only national

economies but also adversely affected global growth. Additionally, the Security Council

now accompanies these sanctions with supplemental support and investigative missions. 7 Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Topic A: Addressing Post-Election Violence in Developing Countries

“Winning or losing an election is less important than strengthening the country.” - Indira Gandhi, Former Prime Minister of India Introduction With almost all 193 member states of the United Nations having some sort of elections, there arises the international issue of subsequent post-election violence.1 Post-election violence is defined by Cambridge University as, “acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to influence an electoral process, after the fact, or that arises in the context of electoral competition.”2 While election turmoil has been present in developed, democratic countries, it has seemingly been plaguing developing countries with fragile democracies at an increasing rate in recent years. After elections occur, politically motivated violence can completely destabilize a developing country and even send some nations into civil war. As such, this phenomenon not only jeopardizes regional stability, but international stability, as well. Election violence typically occurs as a result of weak government institutions that fail to ensure the validity of elections.3 These institutions vary from local polling stations to religious parishes, like those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria. With these institutions jeopardizing the credibility of results, along with many developing countries harboring ethnically and religiously charged groups, it creates a hotbed for violence. Additionally, many people in developing countries see the success of other groups in election tampering through violence and mimic those actions. Often, youth are the most susceptible to these sentiments and therefore are 4 the most likely to participate in election violence. The international community recognizes the clear dangers of post-election violence, as the United Nations and its family of organizations have passed many resolutions addressing the issue. For example, resolutions A/RES/70/168 and A/RES/72/164 set out to address election violence and ensure the validity of elections in developing countries.5 The General Assembly has also adopted A/RES/72/262 C, which created the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) under the jurisdiction of the Security Council.6 One of this department’s primary goals is to prioritize the prevention of election violence and to sustain peace in regards to political/electoral affairs. With this multilateral legislation in place, it emphasizes the

1 "Democracy Continues Its Disturbing Retreat." The Economist. January 31, 2018. https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues-its-disturbing-retreat. 2Bekoe, Dorina A., and Stephanie M. Burchard. "The Contradictions of Pre-election Violence: The Effects of Violence on Voter Turnout in Sub-Saharan Africa | African Studies Review." Cambridge Core. June 20, 2017. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/african-studies-review/article/contradictions-of-preelection-violence-the-ef fects-of-violence-on-voter-turnout-in-subsaharan-africa/AAAC0536FBFDA4D11E1617B0058D7737. 3Khazan, Olga. "What Causes Some Elections to Go Violent?" The Atlantic. March 06, 2013. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/what-causes-some-elections-to-go-violent/273728/. 8 4 Political Parties | Ghana Election 2016. http://www.africanelections.org/liberia/news/page.php?news=5597. 5“Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democratization,” United Nations, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1302192/files/A_72_260-EN.pdf 6"UN Reform: Two New Departments for the Peace and Security Pillar." Syria Permanent Mission to the United

Nations. August 23, 2018. https://www.un.int/news/un-reform-two-new-departments-peace-and-security-pillar. Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN international community’s priority of preventing election violence; however, established legislation does not properly outline appropriate responses and solutions after an election has occurred, especially in developing countries.

Background As a result of globalization, democratic principles, including fair and transparent electoral processes, are continuously spreading around the world, and with this spread, the issue of post-election violence becomes increasingly relevant. Unfortunately, developing countries with emerging democracies are at the greatest risk of election violence because of low-government authority, including the power to effectively respond to violence and enforce results and generally fragile political systems. This is particularly evident in Africa and South America, where nations such as Kenya, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Honduras have all experienced violent election turmoil in recent years.7 Since 1995, over 101 nations have encountered some sort of election violence with this number continuously growing.8 African countries play a central role in these cases, as more than 50 African elections between 9 2011 to 2017 had cases of electoral violence at some stage. Initially, election races for government positions begin and political campaigns materialize. This stage is identified as the foundation of electoral violence because, leading up to the election, radical and inflammatory candidates are common, and ethnocentric movements often gain traction.10 This ultimately increases the likelihood of violence, as many voters come to the belief that the election has to do with communal identity rather than a simple matter of politics. Simply put, candidates weaponize ethnic and religious sentiments pushing many to commit acts of violence. As an example, elections in Guinea continuously spark election violence as leaders from government and opposition parties represent specific ethnic groups, and as a result, when these candidates lose an election, many people view it as an attack on a specific 11 ethnic group, therefore justifying unrest and subsequent violence. When an election does take place, many voters become victims of intimidation tactics from political groups, and these same groups often attack polling stations, seriously jeopardizing the authenticity of election outcomes.12 When votes are counted, there are often concerns of vote-tampering and fraud, with governments and political groups willing to alter votes to obtain

7 "Preventing Electoral Violence in Africa." Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/book/preventing-electoral-violence-africa. 8Tololyan, Khachig. "Terrorism in Modern Armenian Political Culture." Terrorism and Political Violence4, no. 2 (1992): 8-22. doi:10.1080/09546559208427146. 9"Violence in African Elections - World." ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/violence-african-elections. 10The Mediums of Communication and Impacts on Elections-. http://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/archive/questions/replies/438369727.

11AfricaNews. "Guinean Government Warns against Ethnic Violence after Polls." Africanews. February 13, 2018. 9 http://www.africanews.com/2018/02/13/guinean-government-warns-against-ethnic-violence-after-polls//. 12 The Associated Press. "Broken Machines to Threats of Violence among Voting Problems." AP News. November 07, 2018. https://www.apnews.com/3b8fac656c7f446ca95542d599e2f2c0. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN or maintain power.13 This clearly violates the validity and credibility of these elections and can clearly be a root of election violence as the results would be faux. Finally, after the results are announced, political violence occurs due to the withholding of final outcomes or election results. 14 Losing candidates often discredit the election and call for protests or even outright violence. A prime example of losing candidates capitalizing off of questionably valid elections is the 2007-2008 Kenyan Election Crisis. After the 2007 Kenyan election of President Mwai Kibaki, violence soon erupted as opposition leader, Raila Odinga, claimed the election was fraudulent.15 Strong division between ethnic lines exacerbated the situation, and the country was engulfed in post-election turmoil.16 The situation continued to deteriorate as clashes between Kibaki and Odinga supporters became everyday occurrences and several Kenyan Parliament members became the victims of frequent murders.17 Grass-roots support for both candidates also contributed to violence, with youth playing an active role. Local communities became vital to the continuation of unrest with specific tribal groups taking sides.18 The government’s poor handling of the violence, as well as a lack of international response elongated the situation and indirectly lead to over a thousand casualties, as well as the displacement of over 100,000 people.19 The situation was resolved by an agreement in which a coalition in the government was formed. Under this governmental program, candidates from each party were put into different official positions, and as a result, civil dialogue within the government was sustained. The violence soon ceased, however the situation still remains fragile and fears of rekindled election violence 20 remain. Although the international community has created legislation and processes to prevent election violence, these actions are typically temporary and generally lacking. United Nations organizations like the DPPA, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the United Nations Development Programme all work in conjunction with one another to help and carry out guidelines to prevent pre-and post-election violence in developing countries. However, these organizations’ efforts often fall short of creating effective responses to violence and ensuring peaceful transition of power.

13 Zetter, Kim. "The Crisis of Election Security." The New York Times. September 26, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/election-security-crisis-midterms.html. 14 Samuel. "Youth Involvement in Political Violence/Thuggery: A Counter Weight to Democratic Development in Africa." Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs 05, no. 03 (2017). doi:10.4172/2332-0761.1000280. 15 Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya Into Bloodshed." The New York Times. December 31, 2007. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/31/world/africa/31kenya.html. 16"Africa | Key Points: Kenya Power-sharing Deal." BBC News. February 28, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7269476.stm. 17Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Second Lawmaker Is Killed as Kenya's Riots Intensify." The New York Times. February 01,

2008. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/world/africa/01kenya.html. 18 Deutsche Welle. "In Kenya, Politics Split on Ethnic Divide | DW | 26.10.2017." DW.COM.

https://www.dw.com/en/in-kenya-politics-split-on-ethnic-divide/a-37442394. 10 19 “Kenya Ethnic Clashes Intensify,” al-Jazeera, January 29, 2008, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2008/01/2008525141155386432.html. 20Moore, Jina. "Violence Flares and Tensions Rise After Kenya Presidential Vote." The New York Times. October 28, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/africa/kenya-election-uhuru-kenyatta-raila-odinga.html. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Current Situation Post-election turmoil and violence in developing countries is an ongoing issue that plagues emerging democracies to this day. The violence seen in post-election scenarios differs from most other violence the world sees, as this violence is based upon political and often ethnic, religious, and cultural beliefs, making it difficult to objectively address the situation. There is also the issue of government responses to this violence and the oppression of dissenters. Not only does post-election violence divide and destabilize nations, but it discredits the concept of democracy and often results in a shift to authoritarian leadership.21 As an example, the former leader of Togo, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, repeatedly exploited chaos after elections and increased government authority and control, all while simultaneously discrediting democracy.22 Similarly, the current president of Cameroon has been involved with post-election violence, with most violence resulting from ethnic tension, which has lead president Paul Biya to crack down on the rights of all citizens, but most significantly the opposition to his government.23 The developing nations of Bangladesh, , and Venezuela also serve as prime examples of this issue, as they’ve been at the forefront of election violence in recent years. Bangladesh, a once stable, growing democracy is now dealing with violent political turmoil, as well.24 After the 2018 Parliamentary elections, Bangladeshis protested the results and said that the government tampered with votes. This led to protests from opposition leaders and supporters. Deadly violence soon arose between government and opposition forces, and atrocities such as gang rape have reportedly been committed by government officials.25, 26 The government has also been criticized for its harsh practices in combating the election violence.27 Some of these practices include torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.28 The situation remains stable, but many nations have called for an official United Nations-led

21“Modern Authoritarianism: Elections." Freedom House. July 10, 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report/modern-authoritarianism-elections. 22 Stephen Brown, “Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya’s Daniel Arap Moi in Power,” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 5 (2001): 725-39, http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~brown/pages/Stephen_Brown_TWQ.pdf. 23 Corey-Boulet, Robbie. "Biya Resorts to Familiar Tactics in Silencing Cameroon's Opposition." World Politics Review. February 01, 2019. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/27342/biya-resorts-to-familiar-tactics-in-silencing-cameroon-s-op position. 24"UN Urges 'restraint' in Bangladesh's Post-parliamentary Election Violence | UN News." United Nations. https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1029612.

25"Bangladesh Election: 'Gang Rape' Suspects Detained." BBC News. January 06, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46775833.

26 Schlein, Lisa, and Lisa Schlein. "UN: Bangladesh Mired in Election Violence and Repression." VOA. January 05, 11 2019. https://www.voanews.com/a/un-bangladesh-mired-in-election-violence-and-repression/4730032.html. 27"Bangladesh: Violent Repression of Opposition." . January 17, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/17/bangladesh-violent-repression-opposition. 28 Ibid. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN investigation to ensure that the election violence is mitigated, while ensuring the rights of the 29 opposition are protected. With Robert Mugabe forced to resign as President in late 2017, Zimbabwe has once again plunged into political and electoral turmoil.30 After the 2018 election results were announced, opposition leaders questioned the legitimacy of the election and called for a boycott of the results. Mass protests across Zimbabwe took place the day following the election, and government forces responded by opening fire on the crowds of dissenters.31 Many countries have criticized the government’s actions in handling the election violence; nevertheless, the government continues to crack down on protests.32 The situation has also destabilized the nation’s economy, with protestors refusing to accept the government’s financial policies.33 Zimbabwe’s post-election violence has become a major setback in the country’s many advances towards democratization, with authoritarian tactics becoming rampant once again. Venezuela is also suffering due to mass post-election violence. With the country already facing political turmoil before the election, mostly due to President Nicolas Maduro’s policies, the 2018 Presidential Election served as a catalyst for violence in the developing nation. When the highly unpopular incumbent President Nicolas Maduro was announced the winner of the 2018 election, large protests erupted with cases of riots and subsequent violence.34 With all of this unrest, the Maduro government chose to employ many harsh tactics on protestors, which have lead many to flee the country to neighboring Colombia.35 The situation is considered a humanitarian and political crisis.36 With the continued destabilization of the country and

29Paul, Ruma. "U.N. Calls for Probe into Bangladesh Elections." Reuters. January 04, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-election-un/un-calls-for-probe-into-bangladesh-elections-idUSKCN1 OY1K7. 30The Editorial Board. "Robert Mugabe's Long Shadow." The New York Times. January 29, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/opinion/zimbabwe-mnangagwa-mugabe.html. 31"Zimbabwe Army Used 'unjustifiable' Force in Post-election Clashes." BBC News. December 18, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46614129?intlink_from_url=https://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cyg13vlev9 xt/zimbabwe-election-2018&link_location=live-reporting-story. 32"OVERVIEW: Zim Military Helicopter Fires Teargas at Demonstrators in Capital ." News24. January 15, 2019. https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/live-mdc-hq-set-alight-as-fuel-price-hike-protests-set-to-continue-in-zi m-20190115. 33Mavhunga, Columbus S., and Bukola Adebayo. "Zimbabwe Protests Turn Violent after Fuel Prices More than Double." CNN. January 15, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/14/africa/zimbabwe-fuel-protests-intl/index.html. 34The Associated Press. "The Latest: Death Toll up to 7 in Venezuelan Unrest." The Washington Post. January 23, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/the-latest-eerie-calm-falls-over-caracas-ahead-of-protests/201 9/01/23/cf4a53f8-1f17-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html?utm_term=.f2bad4cae875. 35

Janetsky, Megan. "Fleeing Venezuela, Migrants Flood Colombia amid Region's Worst Humanitarian Crisis in Decades." USA Today. November 21, 2018.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/11/19/venezuela-colombia-migrants-nicolas-maduro-humanitaria 12 n-crisis-migrants-food-and-medicine-shortages/1808395002/. 36Fiorucci, Erika. "Venezuelans Call for Humanitarian Aid as Political Crisis Deepens." GCC News | Al Jazeera. January 31, 2019. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Maduro’s cruel response, opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself ‘interim president’ of Venezuela through loopholes within the Venezuelan constitution, further highlighting the uncertainty surrounding the situation.37 This prolonged the political crisis escalated to an international scale as Western nations, like the United States and members, backed Guaidó, while nations like China and Russia support Maduro.3839 The situation remains unsteady, with new, often brash, developments from the Maduro administration and increasing calls for international action further changing the crisis daily. The election violence shown in these developing countries is not unique to these nations. Nations with developing democracies are commonly at risk of post-election violence. These developing crises, specifically in Venezuela, showcase the significant impact post-election violence has on global peace, security and stability. Therefore, it is imperative for the Security Council to address this issue and create an international guideline on how to appropriately respond to post-election violence in developing countries and ensure a peaceful transition of power.

Committee Directive and Jurisdiction The United Nations Security Council will convene to address post-election violence in developing countries, while specifically focusing on the response of the international community in mitigating election violence, preventing governmental and non-governmental abuses while combating violence, and securing a peaceful transition of power. While the Security Council may pass binding legislation with national sovereignty not being at the center of debate, it is important for delegates to craft resolutions that incorporate national sovereignty in order to maximize effectiveness. Delegates should also consider the balance between humanitarian outreach and peacekeeping initiatives to ensure a truly multi-faceted solution that could address the different aspects of post-election violence. The Security Council has jurisdiction over peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions, and the implementation of UN Peacekeepers should be reviewed; however, delegates should exercise restraint with such missions. The role of third-party observers and non-governmental organizations should also be recognized, including the many instances and impacts of state-actors and non-state actors. To foster and promote productive debate, delegates should avoid the idea of enforcing election results and questioning the validity of elections. Delegates should also not focus on creating election systems or trying to

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/venezuelans-call-humanitarian-aid-political-crisis-deepens-190130225106 119.html. 37 The Associated Press. "Juan Guaido Declares Himself Interim President of Venezuela." San Diego Tribune January 23, 2019. https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/nation- world/112671261-132.html. 38 Cancian, Dan. "European Union to Recognize Juan Guaido as Venezuela's Interim President." Newsweek. February 02, 2019. 13 39Guy, Jack. "What China, Russia and Turkey Have to Lose If Maduro Falls." CNN. January 29, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/29/americas/venezuela-geopolitical-battle-intl/index.html. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN prevent election violence before an election has occurred as that is the prerogative of the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Instead, delegates should concentrate more on creating frameworks for the international community to implement for current and future cases of post-election violence. The solutions that the Security Council finds during this session shall serve as a lifeline for emerging democracies and help further secure international peace and stability.

Questions to Consider 1. Has your country experienced post-election violence and/or turmoil? a. How did your country handle these situations? 2. How has your country voted on Security Council and/or General Assembly resolutions in the past with regards to election violence? 3. How could the Security Council draft a guideline responding to election violence that could be implemented internationally? 4. Have peacekeeping missions in the past been effective in handling post-election violence? a. Should peacekeeping missions be implemented in response to election violence? 5. How can the use of non-governmental organizations help the overall effectiveness of resolutions?

Suggested Sources 1. Information regarding the Development of Sustainable Democracy in Africa | EISA https://www.eisa.org.za/

2. Overview of the Jurisdiction and Objectives of the Department on Political and Peacebuilding Affairs | DPA https://dpa.un.org/en/elections

3. Comparative Data on Elections and Legal Framework regarding Elections | ACE Project http://aceproject.org/

4. Electoral Processes and Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections | Bridge Project https://www.bridge-project.org/

14 Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Topic B: The Situation in Cameroon

“The enemy is inside the population. They go in one door, they are normal citizens. They leave through the back door, they have a weapon and they are secessionists.” - Didier Badjeck, Cameroon Ministry of Defense Spokesman Introduction Having taken the lives of over 1,200 people and displaced over 500,000 civilians, the anglo-francophone crisis in Cameroon continues to spiral out of control.1 While Cameroon was once known as a stable and conflict-free nation, increased ethnic and linguistic tension in late 2016 has since threatened this stability. With 80% of Cameroonians speaking French and only 20% speaking English, the de facto French majority in government is believed by the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) to have disenfranchised and marginalized the Anglophone minority.2 As these sentiments grew, English-speaking regions began to hold mass protests. However, the government responded violently, leading English-speaking regions to declare independence from Cameroon. The Cameroonian government has since declared war on the separatists, which has sparked violent clashes between military and rebel groups. The burning of villages by government forces and subsequent terrorist attacks by rebels are now 3 common within Cameroon. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 400 of the 1,200 people killed in the past two years have been identified as Cameroonian civilians.4 Over 26,000 Anglophone Cameroonians have fled into Nigeria, and an additional 239,000 Cameroonians are considered internally displaced due to the conflict.5’6 The crisis has drawn little international attention, and the United Nations has yet to effectively address the issue and its humanitarian and security implications. The UN has, however, classified over 4.3 million Cameroons as “in need of lifesaving assistance.”7 This so-called “forgotten crisis” in Cameroon shows no signs of stopping, as government and rebel forces continue to be motivated by their ethno-linguistic differences. Without an effective response by the United Nations Security

1"Cameroon's Language Division Is Tearing It Apart." The Independent. February 27, 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/cameroon-language-french-english-military-africa-ambazonia-a8770396 .html. 2Africa Center for Strategic Studies. "Understanding Cameroon's Crisis of Governance – Africa Center for Strategic Studies." Africa Center for Strategic Studies. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/understanding-cameroons-crisis-of-governance/. 3Ibid. 4United Nations. "Cameroonian Refugees Flee Clashes and Find Safety in Nigeria." UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2018/10/5bbb5f714/cameroonian-refugees-flee-clashes-find-safety-nigeria.html. 5"Cameroon."Internal Displacement| IDMC. http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/cameroon. 6Ibid. 15 7"'Forgotten Crisis' in Cameroon, with Attacks on the Rise, Millions in Need of 'lifesaving Assistance' | UN News." United Nations. https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031232. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Council, the situation in Cameroon could throw the nation into civil war, leaving thousands of human rights violations and civilian casualties unaddressed.

Background Cameroon was established as a result of the colonization of Africa during the late 1800s. It was colonized by the German Empire in 1884 and remained a colony until 1916, when Germany lost control of Cameroon after World War 1.8 In 1919, the Cameroonian territory was officially divided into two zones between the British and the French, and it became a League of Nations administrative mandate.9 These administrative mandates offered limited autonomy and were virtually a continuation of European colonial rule. The French later obtained control of a majority of Cameroon, while the British kept a much smaller portion to the West, due to the 10 proximity of the territory to their Nigerian colony. Under separate colonial rule between the British and the French, the people of Cameroon lived under largely different political, social, and economic circumstances. A majority of Cameroonians learned French and lived under direct rule by the French government whilst a minority spoke English and lived under indirect British rule with strong local governments.11 Political parties in both French-controlled and British-controlled Cameroon emerged and gained traction in the 1940’s and 1950’s, eventually garnering enough support to demand independence from France and the United Kingdom (UK). France and the UK responded by banning the parties, which effectively ignited a rebellion. It wasn’t until 1960 that France granted their Cameroonian territories independence.12 On the other hand, in 1961, the British offered their English-speaking territories the opportunity to either join Anglophone Nigeria or francophone Cameroon. The British Northern territories chose to unite with Nigeria, while the Southern territories chose to join Cameroon.13 As a result, the bilingual Federal Republic of Cameroon was 14 born. Cameroon saw no major violence after their independence movement, and the nation was soon classified as one of the most peaceful nations in Africa.15 However, in 1997 ethno-linguistic tensions began to fester and become violent. In May of 1997, during the Cameroonian general election, violence broke out in the Northwest Anglophone regions to protest the elections. The

8Deutsche Welle. "Cameroon: Colonial past and Present Frictions | DW | 31.01.2017." DW.COM. https://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-colonial-past-and-present-frictions/a-37344849. 9Ibid. 10"Cameroon : History." Cameroon: History | The Commonwealth. http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/cameroon/history. 11Ibid. 12

Ibid. 13"Cameroon Profile - Timeline." BBC News. October 22, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13148483. 14

Ibid. 16 15"2018: Cameroon, One of the Most Peaceful Countries in Africa Facing Destabilization." AFRIC. January 04, 2019. https://afric.online/5679-retro-2018-cameroon-one-of-the-most-peaceful-countries-in-africa-facing-destabilization/. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Cameroonian government responded by enforcing a curfew and banning public meetings and assemblies of Anglophone political parties.16 The tensions seemingly dissipated after the elections, but the situation has been credited for laying the foundation for increased turmoil and conflict more than two decades later. . The majority-Francophone government has been accused of disenfranchising Anglophones for quite a long time, and Anglophones continue to express their discontent.17 Specifically, many English-speakers feel that they are under-represented in the national government, resulting in a disregard for Anglophone rights and complacency when it comes to improving infrastructure, schools, and hospitals within the English-speaking North-West and South-West provinces.18 For example, Cameroon’s public investment budget in 2017 prioritized French-speaking regions, leaving English-speaking provinces with minimal investments.19 Some Anglophones have called the government’s actions a form of forced assimilation by prioritizing French over English. This alleged marginalization has ignited Anglophone independence movements, and many currently recognize the English-speaking separatist state, Ambazonia, as an independent nation in Western Cameroon.20 The Ambazonian insurgency has destabilized Cameroon and made efforts to quell the turmoil nearly impossible, as Anglophones no longer 21 believe they are just fighting for their rights, but for their liberation as well.

Current Situation As aforementioned, the situation in Cameroon has been developing ever since the English-speaking territories united with the French-speaking territories in 1961. Although tension was mostly quelled since the 1997 general election, there remained lingering turmoil. That tension was reignited in late 2016 during a protest by Anglophones. In Bamenda, a city located in the North-West region of English-speaking Cameroon, students, teachers, judges and lawyers amassed in the streets to protest the government and their decision to appoint Francophone judges in English-speaking courts.22 Although the protests were strictly peaceful, when the police forces arrived, they fired tear gas and even live rounds of ammunition into

16"Cameroon." U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/231.htm. 17"English-speakers Mobilize to End Their Marginalization in Cameroon." Waging Nonviolence. https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/anglophone-movement-cameroon/. 18Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. "Thousands Flee Villages in English-speaking Parts of Cameroon." VOA. December 05, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/thousands-flee-villages-english-speaking-parts-cameroon/4150137.html. 19Atabong, Amindeh Blaise. "Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis Isn't about Language, but Economic Deprivation." Quartz. October 09, 2017. https://qz.com/africa/1097892/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-is-danger-of-becoming-a-full-blown-conflict/. 20AfricaNews. "'We Are Ambazonians:' Cameroon Separatists Tell Military Court." Africanews. December 07,

2018. http://www.africanews.com/2018/12/07/we-are-ambazonians-cameroon-separatists-tell-military-court//. 21Ibid. 22

"Cameroon: Excessive Force That Led to Deaths of Protesters Must Be Urgently Investigated." Amnesty 17 International https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/12/cameroon-excessive-force-that-led-to-deaths-of-protesters-must-be -urgently-investigated/. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN crowds of protestors.23 The government also began jailing English opposition.24 This alleged excessive use of force by the government escalated the situation into a crisis in which the Anglophone regions declared independence. The Anglophone’s separatist state, Ambazonia, is heavily militaristic, with formerly moderate rebels resorting to violence to promote and advance their cause. However, the Cameroonian government views Ambazonia’s establishment as an act of treason and has since responded with even more violence.25 Clashes between separatist and government forces often take place in villages, where English-speaking civilians are most at risk. However, there have been many reports of rebel groups kidnapping Francophones and participating in terrorist activities, such as their attacks on over 42 schools between February 2017 and May 2018.26, 27 Most notably, a group of separatists kidnapped over 80 students from a Presbyterian school and proceeded to use them as bargaining tools for Ambazonian independence.28 The conflict has also led to many ongoing reports of human rights abuses by the Cameroonian government and military. Countless Anglophones have accused Cameroonian forces of burning down Anglophone villages and deliberately attacking, torturing and displacing English-speakers.29 The government has neither confirmed nor denied these accusations; however, the government has also banned military officers from obtaining cellular devices capable of recording video and/or audio.30 All of these instances have increasingly inspired English-speakers to take up arms and 31 join the Anglophone insurgency against the government. The Cameroonian government has since tried to reconcile with separatists by establishing the National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism, which seeks to promote both French and English within federal and regional institutions.32 Despite government action to halt the conflict, separatists have refused to come to the table,

23Gigova, Radina. "Rights Groups Call for Probe into Protesters' Deaths in Cameroon." CNN. December 15, 2016. https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/15/world/cameroon-protesters-deaths/index.html. 24Roussinos, Aris. "Inside Cameroon's Bloody War over the English Language." VICE News. October 01, 2018. https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/qvajj3/inside-cameroons-bloody-war-over-the-english-language. 25Atabong, Amindeh Blaise. "Cameroon Armed Forces and Separatists Have the Anglophone Region on Lockdown Ahead of Elections." Quartz. October 03, 2018. https://qz.com/africa/1410357/cameroon-army-anglophone-separatists-have-ambazonia-region-on-lockdown/. 26Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. "Cameroon Separatists Attack Buses in English-Speaking Region." VOA. September 09, 2018. https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-anglophone-separatists-block-regional-capital/4563814.html. 27"Cameroon: Anglophone Regions Gripped by Deadly Violence." Early Marriage and Harassment of Syrian Refugee Women and Girls in Jordan. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/06/cameroon-anglophone-regions-gripped-by-deadly-violence/. 28Wamsley, Laurel. "Nearly 80 Children Abducted From A School In Cameroon." NPR. November 05, 2018. https://www.npr.org/2018/11/05/664438252/nearly-80-children-abducted-from-a-school-in-cameroon. 29

"World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Cameroon." Human Rights Watch. January 23, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/cameroon. 30

"Burning Cameroon: Images You're Not Meant to See." BBC News. June 25, 2018. 18 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44561929. 31Ibid. 32Ibid. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN declaring that they will not stop until Ambazonia is an independent state.33 This staunch position, however, only compels the Cameroonian government to take harsher actions against the 34 separatists who continue to experience mass-radicalization. On another note, Cameroon continues to defend against Boko Haram and its subsidiaries in Northern Cameroon and Nigeria.35 The fight against Boko Haram, an Islamic militant group in Western Nigeria, has exhausted Cameroon’s military, leading many Northern regions to become destabilized. As a result, the United States has sent military aid to the nation to assist with counterterrorism, including some 300 troops to help train Cameroonian military personnel in fighting Boko Haram.36 However, relations changed between the United States and Cameroon when reports of widespread human rights abuses arose. This prompted the US to cut military aid 37 to Cameroon and brought the crisis in Cameroon to a forefront in the international community. According to many, Cameroon is spiralling into an all-out civil war. The international community has done little to nothing to address the conflict, and this lack of a coherent international response can be attributed to widespread Cameroonian hostility toward media. More specifically, the Cameroonian government has denied media access to many of the conflict zones and continues to jail journalists.38 There have been reports of over 450,000 internally displaced people in Cameroon over the last two years.39 With these reports, some nations have collaborated with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to donate care packages to Cameroon, but cohesive international action that effectively addresses the conflict has yet to 40 materialize.

Committee Directive & Jurisdiction The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold a meeting on the situation in Cameroon to discuss and find solutions to the Anglo-Francophone conflict within the nation. The UNSC shall address the many facets of the crisis and developing civil war, including military

33 Roj Eli Zalla, “Ambazonians Appeal for World to Recognize Their Right to Independence,” Rudaw, August 24, 2018, https://www.rudaw.net/english/world/240820181 34 Ibid. 35"Cameroon's Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram." Crisis Group. August 20, 2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/263-extreme-nord-du-cameroun-nouveau-chapitre-dans-l a-lutte-contre-boko-haram. 36 The Associated Press. "US Cuts Military Aid to Cameroon over Human Rights Concerns." Military Times. February 07, 2019. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/02/07/us-cuts-military-aid-to-cameroon-over-human- rights-concerns/. 37Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. "US Halting Some Military Assistance to Cameroon Over Rights Concerns." VOA. February 07, 2019.

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-ambassador-cameroon-relations-good-despite-aid-cut/4777100.html. 38"Burning Cameroon: Images You're Not Meant to See." BBC News. June 25, 2018.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44561929. 19 39Pat. "Cameroon." The Ethnolinguistic Conflict in Cameroon. January 31, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/cameroon_en. 40"Cameroon Humanitarian Relief Initiative | Anglophone Refugees | CHRI." CHRI | Cameroon Humanitarian Relief Initiative. http://chrelief.org/. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN conflict, the humanitarian crisis, the estimated 500,000+ displaced Cameroonians, allegations of governmental abuse, and the sovereignty of Ambazonia. Therefore, the UNSC should look toward binding initiatives such as peacekeeping missions, sanctions, embargos, ceasefires, and increased humanitarian aid efforts. When drafting solutions, delegates should review both sides of the conflict, including both the government separatists’ viewpoints. Aside from addressing the issue itself in terms of armed conflict, delegates must also assume the role of creating a comprehensive plan in stabilizing Cameroon and providing a framework for effective humanitarian aid efforts. With limited international action, delegates should compile many of the solutions implemented by the UNSC in similar conflicts, like those in Yemen, Sudan, and Syria. The continued lack of Security Council action could lead to a further destabilization of Cameroon, devolving the crisis into an all-out civil war.

Questions to Consider 1. How has your country responded to the situation in Cameroon? a. Has it participated in any military operations in regard to Boko Haram? b. Has it sponsored humanitarian aid efforts within Cameroon? 2. Has your country ever dealt with violent secessionist movements? a. If so, how did your country go about handling the situation? 3. Have international ceasefires and sanctions worked in the past in mitigating internal armed conflict? 4. If Cameroon successfully reconciles and reunites with Ambazonia, how can sustainable peace be achieved?

Suggested Sources 1. Annual Report 201/2018 | Amnesty International https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/

2. Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis | BBC https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/

3. Report on Human Rights in Cameroon | United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/africaregion/pages/cmindex.aspx

4. Crisis Report in Cameroon | International Crisis Group https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon

20 Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN

Topic C: Peacebuilding in the Sahel

“The world is witnessing a dramatic evolution in the nature of the terrorist threat… These attacks have been carried out by violent extremists who thrive in conditions of insecurity and injustice, fragility and failed leadership.” - Ban Ki-Moon, Former UN Secretary General Introduction From November 2018 to March 2019, over 4,776 fatalities were reported in the Sahel region of Africa, with over 2,500 of those fatalities being attributed to 724 direct attacks on civilians.1, 2 The Sahel is the semiarid region of Western and North-Central Africa and is seen as a transitional zone between North and Sub-Saharan Africa.3 The region spans across an array of nations, including Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea.4 Unfortunately, these nations are all plagued by radical and expansive terrorist organizations that continuously cause conflict and destabilize the region.5, 6 As a result, civilian attacks in 2018 grew by 7,028% in Burkina Faso, 500% in Niger and over 300% in Mali.7 This recent spike in terrorist activity represents an increasing presence of extremism and conflict across the region and has subsequently given rise to human, drug, and illicit arms trafficking, all 8 of which continue to devastate communities across the Sahel. The devastating situation in the Sahel has not, however, gone unnoticed. In fact, this instability has prompted many international initiatives that seek to re-establish regional security, such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the G5 Sahel Joint Force.9,10 However, since terror groups often operate transnationally, these efforts

1 Ibid. 2"PRESS RELEASE: Political Violence Skyrockets in the Sahel According to Latest ACLED Data." Acled Data. April 09, 2019. https://www.acleddata.com/2019/03/28/press-release-political-violence-skyrockets-in-the-sahel-according-to-latest-a cled-data/. 3Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Sahel." Encyclopædia Britannica. October 09, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahel. 4Suleiman, Muhammad Dan. "Sahel Region, Africa." The Conversation. March 15, 2019. http://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569. 5Africa Center for Strategic Studies. "Militant Islamist Group Activity in the Sahel Rises – Africa Center for Strategic Studies." Africa Center for Strategic Studies. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/militant-islamist-group-activity-sahel-rises/. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8Lounnas, Djallil. "The Links between Jihadi Organizations and Illegal Trafficking in the Sahel." IAI Istituto Affari

Internazionali. November 30, 2018. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/links-between-jihadi-organizations-and-illegal-trafficking-sahel. 9 "MINUSMA Peacekeeping." United Nations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma. 21 10Ministère De L'Europe Et Des Affaires étrangères. "G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance." France Diplomatie :: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/crisis-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-a nd-the-sahel-alliance/. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN have largely proven ineffective.11 As a result, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission has also stepped in, calling for a Security Council session to bring concrete solutions that accomplish sustainable peace throughout the Sahel.12 As governments within the Sahel continue to struggle with developing economies, feeble militaries, and political and religious divisiveness, it is imperative that the situation be addressed thoroughly by the international community.

Background While recent terror activity has occurred within the past two years, the countries making up the Sahel are no strangers to conflict, particularly when it involves Jihadi insurgencies. Specifically, a conglomerate of Islamic terrorist groups has been active in Nigeria over the past few years, all of which are under the central command of Boko Haram. Although the group was established to protect Sharia Law, the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group, and the situation, nevertheless, turned towards rebellion.13 Following the uprising of 2009, Boko Haram’s altercations with police forces were relatively contained to Nigeria. However, the group quickly turned to acts of violence and sought foreign assistance from other Islamic terrorist organizations.14 This led to the strengthening and rapid growth of the group, as 15 well as its expansion into neighboring countries like Chad and Niger. As Boko Haram expanded across the region, the Sahel saw an exponential increase in the number of organized crime and terrorist groups. This can largely be attributed to the coalition of Islamist groups under Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).16 JNIM, which stands for “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims,” is an al-Qaeda affiliate primarily operating in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.17 JNIM’s widespread influence is a result of the group’s

11"PRESS RELEASE: Political Violence Skyrockets in the Sahel According to Latest ACLED Data." Acled Data. April 09, 2019. https://www.acleddata.com/2019/03/28/press-release-political-violence-skyrockets-in-the-sahel-according-to-latest-a cled-data/. 12“Peacebuilding Commission Urges Member States to Keep Sahel High On Agenda, Foster Stability, Ensure Sustainable Peace,” United Nations, November 12, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/pbc128.doc.htm.” 13Press, Associated. "Nigeria Accused of Ignoring Sect Warnings before Wave of Killings." The Guardian. August 02, 2009. Accessed January 12, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/02/nigeria-boko-haram-islamist-sect 14"Spiraling Violence | Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria." Human Rights Watch. October 19, 2015. Accessed January 12, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/10/11/spiraling-violence/boko-haram-attacks-and-security-force-abuses-nigeria. 15 "Boko Haram Jihadists Kill 7 in Cameroon, Chad." News24. February 23, 2018. Accessed January 12, 2019. https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/boko-haram-jihadists-kill-7-in-cameroon-chad-20180222 16

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. "Militant Islamist Group Activity in the Sahel Rises – Africa Center for Strategic Studies." Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/militant-islamist-group-activity-sahel-rises/. 22 17"Jama'at Nasr Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM)." Jama'at Nasr Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) | Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-musl imin. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN promotion of religious “unity and togetherness” regardless of ethnicity and/or nationality.18 Currently, the group has an estimated 2,000 fighters; however, that number is expected to grow as an increasing amount of civilians are being radicalized by terrorist propaganda.19 This propaganda not only calls for a religious war against non-Muslims, but also showcases JNIM’s main goal of eradicating all remnants of French colonialism.20 JNIM’s leader, Emir Iyad Ag Ghaly, has been very outspoken about the group’s efforts to take revenge against the French and return Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to Sharia law, saying recently, “The war between us will not end until the last soldier from the soldiers of Crusader France evacuate the Muslim land of 21 Mali, and until the Shariah of Allah governs this dear land.” In response to JNIM’s terrorist attacks, the United Nations (UN) and France have since organized military operations within Mali, including Operation Barkhane, which is headquartered in Chad’s capital of N’Djamena and consists of 4,000 military personnel.22, 23 However, this aggressive response has provoked the militant group and caused many more civilians to become radicalized, destabilizing the Sahel and sparking further controversy within the international community.24 France, in particular, has been criticized over its ever-increasing role in West-African affairs and Operation Barkhane.25 In addition to France, the European Union has also begun operations in the Sahel, boasting three training missions throughout the region.26 Many member states of the UN, including China and Russia, have called out France for having an unnecessarily significant role in African affairs, especially in regards to intervening 27 with insurgencies and Islamic terrorist networks.

18SITE Intelligence Group, “Ansar Dine and AQIM’s Sahara and Murabitoon Branches Announce Merger,” March 2, 2017, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/ansar-dine-and-aqim-s-sahara-and-murabitoon-branches-announce-merger .html. 19Data from the CSIS Transnational Threats Project’s 2018 report, The Evolving Terror Threat (forthcoming). 20"Jama'at Nasr Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM)." Jama'at Nasr Al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) | Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-musl imin. 21SITE Intelligence Group, “Al-Qaeda's Mali Branch Claims Attack on French Forces Before Malian Elections,” July 29, 2018, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/jihadist-threat/643-siteintelgroup-07-29-2018-nim-mali-presidentelection/file.html. 22 "Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?" Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security? | Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 06, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security. 23Ibid. 24 Bloomberg.com https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-11/muslim-leaders-in-mali-criticize-government-at-public-rally. 25

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. "A Review of Major Regional Security Efforts in the Sahel – Africa Center for Strategic Studies." Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/review-regional-security-efforts-sahel/. 23 26Ibid. 27Souleymane Ndiayeis for Warscapes, Part Of TheGuardian Africa Network. "French Intervention 'will Cost Mali Its Independence'." The Guardian. February 08, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/08/mali. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Another growing terror group in the Sahel is the Abu Walid al Sahrawi’s Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which has contributed to roughly a quarter of all violent, militant events that occurred in the past 12 months.28 Similar to JNIM, ISGS is mainly active within Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. Although ISGS is relatively small, it draws upon sympathetic civilians who are vulnerable to extremist Islamic rhetoric as a result of unresolved ethnic conflict.29 This tactic proves even more difficult for governments of the Sahel to combat because it goes beyond religious ideology, but to ethnic identity. Many developing countries in and around Africa, like Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia, have suggested a more regional approach to this issue, where former colonial powers, like France and the United Kingdom, would not become involved, and inter-governmental organizations would lead interventions.30 An example of this is the G5 Sahel Taskforce. This taskforce consists of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger and serves to promote coordination in security efforts throughout the Sahel.31 This increasing sentiment towards regional intervention stems from a fear that European nations will further radicalize civilians in the wake of neo-colonialism.32 As a result, any foreign intervention within Africa is largely viewed as an initiative by the developed world to subjugate vulnerable nations, increase influence, and gain economic affluence. Nevertheless, international efforts to combat terrorist groups in the Sahel have significantly increased over recent years, with the UN organizing and endorsing many initiatives to combat the rise of terrorism, including the efforts of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, as well as the UN Multinational Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.33 While these military operations may be successful in mitigating land holdings, they are increasingly jeopardized by insurrections and have failed to stop the sentiments of these extremist terrorist 34 organizations.

Current Situation

28 Ibid. 29"The Islamic State "Presence" in the Sahel Is More Complicated Than Affiliates Suggest." Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/islamic-state-presence-sahel-more-complicated-affiliates-suggest. 30Paul, James. "General Analysis on US Military Expansion and Intervention." General Analysis on US Military Expansion and Intervention. https://www.globalpolicy.org/us-military-expansion-and-intervention/general-analysis-on-us-military-expansion-and -intervention.html. 31 "Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?" Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security? | Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 06, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security. 32

"Crisis in Mali." IRCtoP. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-mali. 33Africa Center for Strategic Studies. "A Review of Major Regional Security Efforts in the Sahel – Africa Center for

Strategic Studies." Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 24 https://africacenter.org/spotlight/review-regional-security-efforts-sahel/. 34"Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?" Crisis Group. September 13, 2016. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/islamist-terrorism-sahel-fact-or-fiction. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN Although the region of Sahel has faced security hardships in the past, no circumstances have been this severe and uncontrollable. As aforementioned, terrorist attacks are increasing at alarming rates, and as international operations continue to be ineffective, many African-led coalitions continuously lag behind projected goals.35 Transnational terrorist groups have deteriorated regional security and caused a humanitarian crisis by destroying infrastructure and damaging food and water security, which has since resulted in 5.2 million people requiring humanitarian assistance.36 As a result, the ill-equipped and unstable governments of the Sahel are forced to sign deals with untrustworthy militia groups, which often radicalize and turn against 37 the government. While the international community has taken note of these recent developments, new action has yet been taken. One of the biggest issues that arises when dealing with these terror groups is that many have evolved into organized crime syndicates that use illicit drug and human trafficking to fund their agendas.38, 39 Additionally, these groups often appeal to human insecurity by providing citizens with food, water, and an identity, which often bolsters radicalization efforts 40 as developed nations continue to militarize the Sahel. As this international presence increases, fears over the Sahel falling into disarray are becoming more and more justified. Despite this, Russia and China have now created their own counter-terrorism strategies to stabilize the region and expand their influence.41 The European Council on Foreign Relations has since criticized Russia on its use of mercenaries and private military companies in the Sahel for political and economic gain. 42 Although this growing influence has sparked concern among Western nations, Russia’s presence continues to create tensions within African political regimes, especially as many Sahelian nations grow weary of foreign intervention. However, these hostile exchanges between Europe and Russia on counter-terrorism in Africa are nothing new. They represent a larger, growing conflict that surrounds the Sahel and

35"Security Council Told African-led Force on Terrorism in the Sahel Operational but Challenged | Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force." United Nations. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/security-council-told-african-led-force-terrorism-sahel-operational-chal lenged-0. 36McVeigh, Karen. "Mali Peace Deal Jeopardised by Armed Groups Linked to Terrorism, UN Warns." The Guardian. September 05, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/sep/05/mali-peace-deal-jeopardised-armed-groups-terroris m-un-security-council-warns. 37Ibid. 38Kevin Town. "Transnational Organized Crime:Let's Put Them out of Business." UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/reports/TOCTAWestAfrica.html. 39Lounnas, Djallil. "The Links between Jihadi Organizations and Illegal Trafficking in the Sahel." IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali. November 30, 2018.

https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/links-between-jihadi-organizations-and-illegal-trafficking-sahel. 40 https://academic.oup.com/isp/article-abstract/19/4/344/5052711?redirectedFrom=fulltext 25 41"Russia Begins to Assist Sahel Region States in Fighting Terrorism." TASS. http://tass.com/politics/973296. 42Sukhankin, Sergey. "Russia's Hired Guns in Africa." ECFR. November 12, 1970. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russias_hired_guns_in_africa. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN continues to stall any concrete, international solution on the issue. Nevertheless, the Security Council has yet to hold a session on peacebuilding in the Sahel, despite the council’s subsidiary organs urging member states to call a session.43 Alongside the lack of international inaction, militant groups flourish in many of the Sahel’s ungovernable territory.44 This territory contains minute pockets of peoples where regional governments have no presence and therefore can not combat terrorism and the radicalization of the population. As previously mentioned, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has taken no action to solidify a comprehensive solution to the expansive terrorist groups throughout the Sahel. Many intelligence agencies across the world fear that continued lack of action may lead to a further destabilized region in which radical Islamic terrorism governs unchecked by the international community.

Committee Directive & Jurisdiction The ever-growing number of Islamic extremist groups throughout the Sahel will likely continue to terrorize the West African people and destabilize the region if a multi-faceted, coordinated solution is not adopted by the Security Council. It is the responsibility of the Security Council to promote and protect international peace and security, and as such, it is the best interest of the council to convene and find a solution that establishes sustainable peace in the Sahel. The UNSC should prioritize three main facets: combating the Islamic terrorist militant groups, establishing stability throughout the Sahel, and providing humanitarian aid to over 5.2 million people. The Security Council, being the only organ of the UN with binding powers, may exercise its ability to establish peacekeeping missions throughout the Sahel, as there are none currently active. Whilst drafting solutions, delegates should be wary of infringing on national sovereignty, as governments in the Sahel often struggle with preventing further radicalization of civilians. Ideally, delegates should look to crafting a framework for establishing sustainable peace in the Sahel, outlining the transitions of regions from terrorist controlled to government controlled, and preventing the isolation and subsequent radicalization of ungoverned areas. Whatever solution the Security Council comes to, it must consider the implications of interventionism, the use of third-party military operations, and the volatile dynamics of the extremist groups in the Sahel.

Questions to Consider 1. What is your country's relationship with the nations of the Sahel? 2. Has your country ever participated in any military or diplomatic initiatives in the Sahel?

3. What is your country’s view on Islamic terrorist groups and organized crime in conflict areas? 26

43 https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/pbc128.doc.htm 44Raleigh, Clionadh, and Caitriona Dowd. "International Journal of Security and Development." Stability. July 05, 2013. https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.bs/. Security Council Council Security YMCA Southeastern High School Model UN 4. Does your country contain active terrorist cells? a. How has your country addressed these issues? 5. Has your country been in support of interventionist policies before? a. Does your country support and/or implement these policies now?

Suggested Sources 1. West Africa and the Sahel Report | Security Council Report https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/unowas-west-africa-and-the-sahel.php

2. United Nations Office on Counter-Terrorism | UNOCT https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en

3. West Africa | Council on Foreign Relations https://www.cfr.org/

4. Center for Strategic and International Studies | CSIS https://www.csis.org/

27 Security Council Council Security