Where Did That Code Snippet Come From? Lisong Guo, Julia Lawall, Gilles Muller
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Dm-X: Protecting Volume-Level Integrity for Cloud Volumes and Local
dm-x: Protecting Volume-level Integrity for Cloud Volumes and Local Block Devices Anrin Chakraborti Bhushan Jain Jan Kasiak Stony Brook University Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University UNC, Chapel Hill Tao Zhang Donald Porter Radu Sion Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University UNC, Chapel Hill UNC, Chapel Hill ABSTRACT on Amazon’s Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) [2] (which provides The verified boot feature in recent Android devices, which strong security guarantees through network isolation) store deploys dm-verity, has been overwhelmingly successful in elim- data on untrusted storage devices residing in the public cloud. inating the extremely popular Android smart phone rooting For example, Amazon VPC file systems, object stores, and movement [25]. Unfortunately, dm-verity integrity guarantees databases reside on virtual block devices in the Amazon are read-only and do not extend to writable volumes. Elastic Block Storage (EBS). This paper introduces a new device mapper, dm-x, that This allows numerous attack vectors for a malicious cloud efficiently (fast) and reliably (metadata journaling) assures provider/untrusted software running on the server. For in- volume-level integrity for entire, writable volumes. In a direct stance, to ensure SEC-mandated assurances of end-to-end disk setup, dm-x overheads are around 6-35% over ext4 on the integrity, banks need to guarantee that the external cloud raw volume while offering additional integrity guarantees. For storage service is unable to remove log entries documenting cloud storage (Amazon EBS), dm-x overheads are negligible. financial transactions. Yet, without integrity of the storage device, a malicious cloud storage service could remove logs of a coordinated attack. -
Operating System Support for Redundant Multithreading
Operating System Support for Redundant Multithreading Dissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktoringenieur (Dr.-Ing.) Vorgelegt an der Technischen Universität Dresden Fakultät Informatik Eingereicht von Dipl.-Inf. Björn Döbel geboren am 17. Dezember 1980 in Lauchhammer Betreuender Hochschullehrer: Prof. Dr. Hermann Härtig Technische Universität Dresden Gutachter: Prof. Frank Mueller, Ph.D. North Carolina State University Fachreferent: Prof. Dr. Christof Fetzer Technische Universität Dresden Statusvortrag: 29.02.2012 Eingereicht am: 21.08.2014 Verteidigt am: 25.11.2014 FÜR JAKOB *† 15. Februar 2013 Contents 1 Introduction 7 1.1 Hardware meets Soft Errors 8 1.2 An Operating System for Tolerating Soft Errors 9 1.3 Whom can you Rely on? 12 2 Why Do Transistors Fail And What Can Be Done About It? 15 2.1 Hardware Faults at the Transistor Level 15 2.2 Faults, Errors, and Failures – A Taxonomy 18 2.3 Manifestation of Hardware Faults 20 2.4 Existing Approaches to Tolerating Faults 25 2.5 Thesis Goals and Design Decisions 36 3 Redundant Multithreading as an Operating System Service 39 3.1 Architectural Overview 39 3.2 Process Replication 41 3.3 Tracking Externalization Events 42 3.4 Handling Replica System Calls 45 3.5 Managing Replica Memory 49 3.6 Managing Memory Shared with External Applications 57 3.7 Hardware-Induced Non-Determinism 63 3.8 Error Detection and Recovery 65 4 Can We Put the Concurrency Back Into Redundant Multithreading? 71 4.1 What is the Problem with Multithreaded Replication? 71 4.2 Can we make Multithreading -
Linux Kernal II 9.1 Architecture
Page 1 of 7 Linux Kernal II 9.1 Architecture: The Linux kernel is a Unix-like operating system kernel used by a variety of operating systems based on it, which are usually in the form of Linux distributions. The Linux kernel is a prominent example of free and open source software. Programming language The Linux kernel is written in the version of the C programming language supported by GCC (which has introduced a number of extensions and changes to standard C), together with a number of short sections of code written in the assembly language (in GCC's "AT&T-style" syntax) of the target architecture. Because of the extensions to C it supports, GCC was for a long time the only compiler capable of correctly building the Linux kernel. Compiler compatibility GCC is the default compiler for the Linux kernel source. In 2004, Intel claimed to have modified the kernel so that its C compiler also was capable of compiling it. There was another such reported success in 2009 with a modified 2.6.22 version of the kernel. Since 2010, effort has been underway to build the Linux kernel with Clang, an alternative compiler for the C language; as of 12 April 2014, the official kernel could almost be compiled by Clang. The project dedicated to this effort is named LLVMLinxu after the LLVM compiler infrastructure upon which Clang is built. LLVMLinux does not aim to fork either the Linux kernel or the LLVM, therefore it is a meta-project composed of patches that are eventually submitted to the upstream projects. -
A Linux Kernel Scheduler Extension for Multi-Core Systems
A Linux Kernel Scheduler Extension For Multi-Core Systems Aleix Roca Nonell Master in Innovation and Research in Informatics (MIRI) specialized in High Performance Computing (HPC) Facultat d’informàtica de Barcelona (FIB) Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya Supervisor: Vicenç Beltran Querol Cosupervisor: Eduard Ayguadé Parra Presentation date: 25 October 2017 Abstract The Linux Kernel OS is a black box from the user-space point of view. In most cases, this is not a problem. However, for parallel high performance computing applications it can be a limitation. Such applications usually execute on top of a runtime system, itself executing on top of a general purpose kernel. Current runtime systems take care of getting the most of each system core by distributing work among the multiple CPUs of a machine but they are not aware of when one of their threads perform blocking calls (e.g. I/O operations). When such a blocking call happens, the processing core is stalled, leading to performance loss. In this thesis, it is presented the proof-of-concept of a Linux kernel extension denoted User Monitored Threads (UMT). The extension allows a user-space application to be notified of the blocking and unblocking of its threads, making it possible for a core to execute another worker thread while the other is blocked. An existing runtime system (namely Nanos6) is adapted, so that it takes advantage of the kernel extension. The whole prototype is tested on a synthetic benchmarks and an industry mock-up application. The analysis of the results shows, on the tested hardware and the appropriate conditions, a significant speedup improvement. -
Embedded Linux Conference Europe 2019
Embedded Linux Conference Europe 2019 Linux kernel debugging: going beyond printk messages Embedded Labworks By Sergio Prado. São Paulo, October 2019 ® Copyright Embedded Labworks 2004-2019. All rights reserved. Embedded Labworks ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT ✗ This document is available under Creative Commons BY- SA 4.0. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ ✗ The source code of this document is available at: https://e-labworks.com/talks/elce2019 Embedded Labworks $ WHOAMI ✗ Embedded software developer for more than 20 years. ✗ Principal Engineer of Embedded Labworks, a company specialized in the development of software projects and BSPs for embedded systems. https://e-labworks.com/en/ ✗ Active in the embedded systems community in Brazil, creator of the website Embarcados and blogger (Portuguese language). https://sergioprado.org ✗ Contributor of several open source projects, including Buildroot, Yocto Project and the Linux kernel. Embedded Labworks THIS TALK IS NOT ABOUT... ✗ printk and all related functions and features (pr_ and dev_ family of functions, dynamic debug, etc). ✗ Static analysis tools and fuzzing (sparse, smatch, coccinelle, coverity, trinity, syzkaller, syzbot, etc). ✗ User space debugging. ✗ This is also not a tutorial! We will talk about a lot of tools and techniches and have fun with some demos! Embedded Labworks DEBUGGING STEP-BY-STEP 1. Understand the problem. 2. Reproduce the problem. 3. Identify the source of the problem. 4. Fix the problem. 5. Fixed? If so, celebrate! If not, go back to step 1. Embedded Labworks TYPES OF PROBLEMS ✗ We can consider as the top 5 types of problems in software: ✗ Crash. ✗ Lockup. ✗ Logic/implementation error. ✗ Resource leak. ✗ Performance. -
Project-Team REGAL
IN PARTNERSHIP WITH: CNRS Université Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris 6) Activity Report 2013 Project-Team REGAL Large-Scale Distributed Systems and Applications IN COLLABORATION WITH: Laboratoire d’informatique de Paris 6 (LIP6) RESEARCH CENTER Paris - Rocquencourt THEME Distributed Systems and middleware Table of contents 1. Members :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 1 2. Overall Objectives :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 2 2.1. Overall Objectives2 2.2. Highlights of the Year2 3. Research Program :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 3 3.1.1. Modern computer systems are increasingly parallel and distributed.3 3.1.2. Multicore architectures are everywhere.3 4. Software and Platforms ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 4 4.1. Coccinelle 4 4.2. SwiftCloud 4 4.3. JESSY 4 4.4. Java and .Net runtimes for LLVM5 5. New Results :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 5 5.1. Introduction 5 5.2. Distributed algorithms for dynamic networks5 5.2.1. Mutual Exclusion and Failure Detection.6 5.2.2. Self-Stabilization and Self-* Services.6 5.2.3. Dissemination and Data Finding in Large Scale Systems.6 5.2.4. Peer certification.7 5.3. Management of distributed data7 5.3.1. Long term durability7 5.3.2. Adaptative replication8 5.3.3. Strong consistency8 5.3.4. Distributed Transaction Scheduling9 5.3.5. Eventual consistency9 5.3.6. Mixing commutative and non-commutative updates: reservations9 5.4. Performance and Robustness of Systems Software in Multicore Architectures 10 5.4.1. Managed Runtime Environments 10 5.4.2. System software robustness 10 5.4.3. Domain-specific languages for systems software 11 6. Bilateral Contracts and Grants with Industry ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 11 6.1. Bilateral Contracts with Industry 11 6.2. Bilateral Grants with Industry 11 7. -
I.MX Encrypted Storage Using CAAM Secure Keys Rev
AN12714 i.MX Encrypted Storage Using CAAM Secure Keys Rev. 1 — 11/2020 Application Note Contents 1 Preface 1 Preface............................................1 Devices often contain highly sensitive information which is consistently at risk 1.1 Intended audience and scope......1 1.2 References...................................1 to get physically lost or stolen. Setting user passwords does not guarantee data 2 Overview......................................... 1 protection against unauthorized access. The attackers can simply bypass the 2.1 DM-Crypt......................................1 software system of a device and access the data storage directly. Only the 2.2 DM-Crypt accelerated by CAAM use of encryption can guarantee data confidentiality in the case where storage .....................................................2 media is directly accessed. 2.3 DM-Crypt using CAAM's Secure Key...............................................3 This document provides steps to run a transparent storage encryption at block 3 Hands-On........................................4 level using DM-Crypt taking advantage of the secure key feature provided 3.1 Installation....................................4 by i.MXs Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM). The 3.2 Usage...........................................6 document applies to all i.MX SoCs having CAAM module. The feature is not 3.3 Performance................................ 9 available on i.MX SoCs with DCP. 4 Revision History............................ 10 5 Appendix A. Configuration........... -
Linux Kernel User Documentation V4.20.0
usepackagefontspec setsansfontDejaVu Sans setromanfontDejaVu Serif setmonofontDejaVu Sans Mono Linux Kernel User Documentation v4.20.0 The kernel development community 1 16, 2019 Contents 1 Linux kernel release 4.x <http://kernel.org/> 3 2 The kernel’s command-line parameters 9 3 Linux allocated devices (4.x+ version) 109 4 L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault 171 5 Reporting bugs 181 6 Security bugs 185 7 Bug hunting 187 8 Bisecting a bug 193 9 Tainted kernels 195 10 Ramoops oops/panic logger 197 11 Dynamic debug 201 12 Explaining the dreaded “No init found.” boot hang message 207 13 Rules on how to access information in sysfs 209 14 Using the initial RAM disk (initrd) 213 15 Control Group v2 219 16 Linux Serial Console 245 17 Linux Braille Console 247 18 Parport 249 19 RAID arrays 253 20 Kernel module signing facility 263 21 Linux Magic System Request Key Hacks 267 i 22 Unicode support 273 23 Software cursor for VGA 277 24 Kernel Support for miscellaneous (your favourite) Binary Formats v1.1 279 25 Mono(tm) Binary Kernel Support for Linux 283 26 Java(tm) Binary Kernel Support for Linux v1.03 285 27 Reliability, Availability and Serviceability 293 28 A block layer cache (bcache) 309 29 ext4 General Information 319 30 Power Management 327 31 Thunderbolt 349 32 Linux Security Module Usage 353 33 Memory Management 369 ii Linux Kernel User Documentation, v4.20.0 The following is a collection of user-oriented documents that have been added to the kernel over time. There is, as yet, little overall order or organization here — this material was not written to be a single, coherent document! With luck things will improve quickly over time. -
A Study on Faults and Error Propagation in the Linux Operating System
A Thesis for the Degree of Ph.D. in Engineering A Study on Faults and Error Propagation in the Linux Operating System March 2016 Graduate School of Science and Technology Keio University Takeshi Yoshimura Acknowledgement I would like to thank my adviser, Prof. Kenji Kono. His guidance helped me in all the time of research. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Hiroshi Yamada. This dissertation would not have been possible without their advice and encouragement. I am also grateful to the members of my thesis committee: Prof. Shingo Takada, Prof. Hiroaki Saito, and Prof. Kenichi Kourai. This dissertation was greatly improved by their invaluable feedback. During my Ph.D., I did an internship at NEC. I enjoyed working with Dr. Masato Asahara and the opportunity had a significant impact on my research skills. He also taught me LDA, which is the core of the fault study in this dis- sertation. I am also thankful to my colleagues in the sslab. Their surprising enthusiasm and skills have always inspired me. I appreciate the financial supports from the Research Fellowships of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for Young Scientists and the Core Re- search for Evolutional Science and Technology of Japan Science and Technology Agency. Finally, I would like to thank my family, my parents, sister for their support all these years. Without their support and encouragement, many accomplishments in my life including this dissertation would not have been possible. 2 Abstract A Study on Faults and Error Propagation in the Linux Operating System Takeshi Yoshimura Operating systems are crucial for application reliability. -
How to Find Bugs in USB Device Drivers
Don’t trust your USB! How to find bugs in USB device drivers Sergej Schumilo Ralf Spenneberg OpenSource Security Ralf Spenneberg OpenSource Training Ralf Spenneberg University of Applied Sciences Muenster [email protected] [email protected] Hendrik Schwartke OpenSource Security Ralf Spenneberg [email protected] Abstract The USB fuzzing technique either tries to specifically modify the USB traffic implementing a Man-in-the-Middle Attacks via USB have been demonstrated regularly for approach[4] or to emulate a malicious USB device, which some years. A comprehensive systematic analysis of the po- injects malicious payloads into the USB host. In the past, tential risk of this weakness was very expensive, yet. The no approach supported a systematic, comprehensive analy- framework presented in this paper supports the systematic sis of all available USB device drivers of a given operating high performance fuzzing of USB drivers using massive par- system. The vast amount of possible USB device drivers allel virtual machines. The framework identifies and docu- and the possible variations of the USB traffic require the ments the security weaknesses. The format used permits the generation of several million possible fuzzing tests. The reproduction of the attack, supporting the analysis by devel- slow speed of the known hardware solutions (Facedancer, opers and analysts. etc.) makes such fuzzing attacks virtually impossible. This papers presents the development of USB fuzzing Keywords: USB, Fuzzing, QEMU, KVM, USB- framework named vUSBf (virtual USB fuzzer). This frame- Redirection, Emulation work increases the speed of the fuzzing test by several mag- nitudes. Additional features support the reproducibility and 1. -
Windows 1.0 – Boot Error [Wikipedia]
Windows 1.0 – boot error [Wikipedia] Windows 3.1 - Black Screen of Death [Wikipedia] Windows 98– Blue Screen of Death [Wikipedia] Windows 9x – Blue Screen of Death [Wikipedia] <- the actual error <- what is currently in memory <- about to be loaded <- current status of Kernel debugger Windows Vista [http://camarojones.wordpress.com/2009/09/17/backup-screen-of-death/] Windows XP – Blue Screen of Death [Wikipedia] Windows Vista (beta) - Red Screen of Death [Wikipedia] Windows 8 – Blue Screen of Death [Wikipedia] Bug Check or Stop Code A5 = Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) BIOS of the computer is not fully compliant with the ACPI specification. Windows Vista – Blue Screen of Death [Wikipedia] What is the Blue Screen of Death? “When a blue screen happens, it is the because somewhere in your computer, something has performed an illegal operation. In technical terms, it is called a Stop Error, and the blue screen is the DOS ( disk operating system ) that runs behind the scenes on your computer. Think of it as the Windows program being the clothes, which are stripped away to see what is underneath just before the lights go out. “ [http://asknerd.net] Demystifying the 'Blue Screen of Death' : http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc750081.aspx Blue Screen Data: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff547224.aspx Bug Check Codes: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh994433.aspx FreeBSD – segmentation fault kernel panic [Wikipedia] Linux - kernel oops on PA-RISC with a dead ASCII cow [Wikipedia] Linux - kernel oops on -
Android™ Hacker's Handbook
ffi rs.indd 01:50:14:PM 02/28/2014 Page ii Android™ Hacker’s Handbook ffi rs.indd 01:50:14:PM 02/28/2014 Page i ffi rs.indd 01:50:14:PM 02/28/2014 Page ii Android™ Hacker’s Handbook Joshua J. Drake Pau Oliva Fora Zach Lanier Collin Mulliner Stephen A. Ridley Georg Wicherski ffi rs.indd 01:50:14:PM 02/28/2014 Page iii Android™ Hacker’s Handbook Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 10475 Crosspoint Boulevard Indianapolis, IN 46256 www.wiley.com Copyright © 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana ISBN: 978-1-118-60864-7 ISBN: 978-1-118-60861-6 (ebk) ISBN: 978-1-118-92225-5 (ebk) Manufactured in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except as permitted under Sections 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or autho- rization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 646-8600. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, (201) 748-6011, fax (201) 748-6008, or online at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions. Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: The publisher and the author make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this work and specifi cally disclaim all warranties, including without limitation warranties of fi tness for a particular purpose.