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The Kernel Report
The kernel report (ELC 2012 edition) Jonathan Corbet LWN.net [email protected] The Plan Look at a year's worth of kernel work ...with an eye toward the future Starting off 2011 2.6.37 released - January 4, 2011 11,446 changes, 1,276 developers VFS scalability work (inode_lock removal) Block I/O bandwidth controller PPTP support Basic pNFS support Wakeup sources What have we done since then? Since 2.6.37: Five kernel releases have been made 59,000 changes have been merged 3069 developers have contributed to the kernel 416 companies have supported kernel development February As you can see in these posts, Ralink is sending patches for the upstream rt2x00 driver for their new chipsets, and not just dumping a huge, stand-alone tarball driver on the community, as they have done in the past. This shows a huge willingness to learn how to deal with the kernel community, and they should be strongly encouraged and praised for this major change in attitude. – Greg Kroah-Hartman, February 9 Employer contributions 2.6.38-3.2 Volunteers 13.9% Wolfson Micro 1.7% Red Hat 10.9% Samsung 1.6% Intel 7.3% Google 1.6% unknown 6.9% Oracle 1.5% Novell 4.0% Microsoft 1.4% IBM 3.6% AMD 1.3% TI 3.4% Freescale 1.3% Broadcom 3.1% Fujitsu 1.1% consultants 2.2% Atheros 1.1% Nokia 1.8% Wind River 1.0% Also in February Red Hat stops releasing individual kernel patches March 2.6.38 released – March 14, 2011 (9,577 changes from 1198 developers) Per-session group scheduling dcache scalability patch set Transmit packet steering Transparent huge pages Hierarchical block I/O bandwidth controller Somebody needs to get a grip in the ARM community. -
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 7.1 Release Notes
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 7.1 Release Notes Release Notes for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Customer Content Services Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 7.1 Release Notes Release Notes for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Customer Content Services Legal Notice Copyright © 2015 Red Hat, Inc. This document is licensed by Red Hat under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. If you distribute this document, or a modified version of it, you must provide attribution to Red Hat, Inc. and provide a link to the original. If the document is modified, all Red Hat trademarks must be removed. Red Hat, as the licensor of this document, waives the right to enforce, and agrees not to assert, Section 4d of CC-BY-SA to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law. Red Hat, Red Hat Enterprise Linux, the Shadowman logo, JBoss, MetaMatrix, Fedora, the Infinity Logo, and RHCE are trademarks of Red Hat, Inc., registered in the United States and other countries. Linux ® is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the United States and other countries. Java ® is a registered trademark of Oracle and/or its affiliates. XFS ® is a trademark of Silicon Graphics International Corp. or its subsidiaries in the United States and/or other countries. MySQL ® is a registered trademark of MySQL AB in the United States, the European Union and other countries. Node.js ® is an official trademark of Joyent. Red Hat Software Collections is not formally related to or endorsed by the official Joyent Node.js open source or commercial project. -
MLNX OFED Documentation Rev 5.0-2.1.8.0
MLNX_OFED Documentation Rev 5.0-2.1.8.0 Exported on May/21/2020 06:13 AM https://docs.mellanox.com/x/JLV-AQ Notice This document is provided for information purposes only and shall not be regarded as a warranty of a certain functionality, condition, or quality of a product. NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA”) makes no representations or warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this document and assumes no responsibility for any errors contained herein. NVIDIA shall have no liability for the consequences or use of such information or for any infringement of patents or other rights of third parties that may result from its use. This document is not a commitment to develop, release, or deliver any Material (defined below), code, or functionality. NVIDIA reserves the right to make corrections, modifications, enhancements, improvements, and any other changes to this document, at any time without notice. Customer should obtain the latest relevant information before placing orders and should verify that such information is current and complete. NVIDIA products are sold subject to the NVIDIA standard terms and conditions of sale supplied at the time of order acknowledgement, unless otherwise agreed in an individual sales agreement signed by authorized representatives of NVIDIA and customer (“Terms of Sale”). NVIDIA hereby expressly objects to applying any customer general terms and conditions with regards to the purchase of the NVIDIA product referenced in this document. No contractual obligations are formed either directly or indirectly by this document. NVIDIA products are not designed, authorized, or warranted to be suitable for use in medical, military, aircraft, space, or life support equipment, nor in applications where failure or malfunction of the NVIDIA product can reasonably be expected to result in personal injury, death, or property or environmental damage. -
Administració De Sistemes GNU Linux Mòdul4 Administració
Administració local Josep Jorba Esteve PID_00238577 GNUFDL • PID_00238577 Administració local Es garanteix el permís per a copiar, distribuir i modificar aquest document segons els termes de la GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.3 o qualsevol altra de posterior publicada per la Free Software Foundation, sense seccions invariants ni textos de la oberta anterior o posterior. Podeu consultar els termes de la llicència a http://www.gnu.org/licenses/fdl-1.3.html. GNUFDL • PID_00238577 Administració local Índex Introducció.................................................................................................. 5 1. Eines bàsiques per a l'administrador........................................... 7 1.1. Eines gràfiques i línies de comandes .......................................... 8 1.2. Documents d'estàndards ............................................................. 10 1.3. Documentació del sistema en línia ............................................ 13 1.4. Eines de gestió de paquets .......................................................... 15 1.4.1. Paquets TGZ ................................................................... 16 1.4.2. Fedora/Red Hat: paquets RPM ....................................... 19 1.4.3. Debian: paquets DEB ..................................................... 24 1.4.4. Nous formats d'empaquetat: Snap i Flatpak .................. 28 1.5. Eines genèriques d'administració ................................................ 36 1.6. Altres eines ................................................................................. -
Storage Administration Guide Storage Administration Guide SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 Storage Administration Guide Storage Administration Guide SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP4 Provides information about how to manage storage devices on a SUSE Linux Enterprise Server. Publication Date: September 24, 2021 SUSE LLC 1800 South Novell Place Provo, UT 84606 USA https://documentation.suse.com Copyright © 2006– 2021 SUSE LLC and contributors. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or (at your option) version 1.3; with the Invariant Section being this copyright notice and license. A copy of the license version 1.2 is included in the section entitled “GNU Free Documentation License”. For SUSE trademarks, see https://www.suse.com/company/legal/ . All other third-party trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Trademark symbols (®, ™ etc.) denote trademarks of SUSE and its aliates. Asterisks (*) denote third-party trademarks. All information found in this book has been compiled with utmost attention to detail. However, this does not guarantee complete accuracy. Neither SUSE LLC, its aliates, the authors nor the translators shall be held liable for possible errors or the consequences thereof. Contents About This Guide xii 1 Available Documentation xii 2 Giving Feedback xiv 3 Documentation Conventions xiv 4 Product Life Cycle and Support xvi Support Statement for SUSE Linux Enterprise Server xvii • Technology Previews xviii I FILE SYSTEMS AND MOUNTING 1 1 Overview -
Security Assurance Requirements for Linux Application Container Deployments
NISTIR 8176 Security Assurance Requirements for Linux Application Container Deployments Ramaswamy Chandramouli This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8176 NISTIR 8176 Security Assurance Requirements for Linux Application Container Deployments Ramaswamy Chandramouli Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8176 October 2017 U.S. Department of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology NISTIR 8176 SECURITY ASSURANCE FOR LINUX CONTAINERS National Institute of Standards and Technology Internal Report 8176 37 pages (October 2017) This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8176 Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. This p There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each ublication is available free of charge from: http publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST. -
Rootless Containers with Podman and Fuse-Overlayfs
CernVM Workshop 2019 (4th June 2019) Rootless containers with Podman and fuse-overlayfs Giuseppe Scrivano @gscrivano Introduction 2 Rootless Containers • “Rootless containers refers to the ability for an unprivileged user (i.e. non-root user) to create, run and otherwise manage containers.” (https://rootlesscontaine.rs/ ) • Not just about running the container payload as an unprivileged user • Container runtime runs also as an unprivileged user 3 Don’t confuse with... • sudo podman run --user foo – Executes the process in the container as non-root – Podman and the OCI runtime still running as root • USER instruction in Dockerfile – same as above – Notably you can’t RUN dnf install ... 4 Don’t confuse with... • podman run --uidmap – Execute containers as a non-root user, using user namespaces – Most similar to rootless containers, but still requires podman and runc to run as root 5 Motivation of Rootless Containers • To mitigate potential vulnerability of container runtimes • To allow users of shared machines (e.g. HPC) to run containers without the risk of breaking other users environments • To isolate nested containers 6 Caveat: Not a panacea • Although rootless containers could mitigate these vulnerabilities, it is not a panacea , especially it is powerless against kernel (and hardware) vulnerabilities – CVE 2013-1858, CVE-2015-1328, CVE-2018-18955 • Castle approach : it should be used in conjunction with other security layers such as seccomp and SELinux 7 Podman 8 Rootless Podman Podman is a daemon-less alternative to Docker • $ alias -
Study of File System Evolution
Study of File System Evolution Swaminathan Sundararaman, Sriram Subramanian Department of Computer Science University of Wisconsin {swami, srirams} @cs.wisc.edu Abstract File systems have traditionally been a major area of file systems are typically developed and maintained by research and development. This is evident from the several programmer across the globe. At any point in existence of over 50 file systems of varying popularity time, for a file system, there are three to six active in the current version of the Linux kernel. They developers, ten to fifteen patch contributors but a single represent a complex subsystem of the kernel, with each maintainer. These people communicate through file system employing different strategies for tackling individual file system mailing lists [14, 16, 18] various issues. Although there are many file systems in submitting proposals for new features, enhancements, Linux, there has been no prior work (to the best of our reporting bugs, submitting and reviewing patches for knowledge) on understanding how file systems evolve. known bugs. The problems with the open source We believe that such information would be useful to the development approach is that all communication is file system community allowing developers to learn buried in the mailing list archives and aren’t easily from previous experiences. accessible to others. As a result when new file systems are developed they do not leverage past experience and This paper looks at six file systems (Ext2, Ext3, Ext4, could end up re-inventing the wheel. To make things JFS, ReiserFS, and XFS) from a historical perspective worse, people could typically end up doing the same (between kernel versions 1.0 to 2.6) to get an insight on mistakes as done in other file systems. -
Dm-X: Protecting Volume-Level Integrity for Cloud Volumes and Local
dm-x: Protecting Volume-level Integrity for Cloud Volumes and Local Block Devices Anrin Chakraborti Bhushan Jain Jan Kasiak Stony Brook University Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University UNC, Chapel Hill Tao Zhang Donald Porter Radu Sion Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University UNC, Chapel Hill UNC, Chapel Hill ABSTRACT on Amazon’s Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) [2] (which provides The verified boot feature in recent Android devices, which strong security guarantees through network isolation) store deploys dm-verity, has been overwhelmingly successful in elim- data on untrusted storage devices residing in the public cloud. inating the extremely popular Android smart phone rooting For example, Amazon VPC file systems, object stores, and movement [25]. Unfortunately, dm-verity integrity guarantees databases reside on virtual block devices in the Amazon are read-only and do not extend to writable volumes. Elastic Block Storage (EBS). This paper introduces a new device mapper, dm-x, that This allows numerous attack vectors for a malicious cloud efficiently (fast) and reliably (metadata journaling) assures provider/untrusted software running on the server. For in- volume-level integrity for entire, writable volumes. In a direct stance, to ensure SEC-mandated assurances of end-to-end disk setup, dm-x overheads are around 6-35% over ext4 on the integrity, banks need to guarantee that the external cloud raw volume while offering additional integrity guarantees. For storage service is unable to remove log entries documenting cloud storage (Amazon EBS), dm-x overheads are negligible. financial transactions. Yet, without integrity of the storage device, a malicious cloud storage service could remove logs of a coordinated attack. -
Course Outline & Schedule
Course Outline & Schedule Call US 408-759-5074 or UK +44 20 7620 0033 Suse Linux Advanced System Administration Curriculum Linux Course Code SLASA Duration 5 Day Course Price $2,425 Course Description This instructor led SUSE Linux Advanced System Administration training course is designed to teach the advanced administration, security, networking and performance tasks required on a SUSE Linux Enterprise system. Targeted to closely follow the official LPI curriculum (generic Linux), this course together with the SUSE Linux System Administration course will enable the delegate to work towards achieving the LPIC-2 qualification. Exercises and examples are used throughout the course to give practical hands-on experience with the techniques covered. Objectives The delegate will learn and acquire skills as follows: Perform administrative tasks with supplied tools such as YaST Advanced network configuration Network troubleshooting and analysing packets Creating Apache virtual hosts and hosting user web content Sharing Windows and Linux resources with SAMBA Configuring a DNS server and configuring DNS logging Configuring a DHCP server and client Sharing Linux network resources with NFS Creating Unit Files Configuring AutoFS direct and indirect maps Configuring a secure FTP server Configuring a SQUID proxy server Creating Btrfs subvolumes and snapshots Backing-up and restoring XFS filesystems Configuring LVM and managing Logical Volumes Managing software RAID Centralised storage with iSCSI Monitoring disk status and reliability with SMART Perpetual -
ECE 598 – Advanced Operating Systems Lecture 19
ECE 598 { Advanced Operating Systems Lecture 19 Vince Weaver http://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver [email protected] 7 April 2016 Announcements • Homework #7 was due • Homework #8 will be posted 1 Why use FAT over ext2? • FAT simpler, easy to code • FAT supported on all major OSes • ext2 faster, more robust filename and permissions 2 btrfs • B-tree fs (similar to a binary tree, but with pages full of leaves) • overwrite filesystem (overwite on modify) vs CoW • Copy on write. When write to a file, old data not overwritten. Since old data not over-written, crash recovery better Eventually old data garbage collected • Data in extents 3 • Copy-on-write • Forest of trees: { sub-volumes { extent-allocation { checksum tree { chunk device { reloc • On-line defragmentation • On-line volume growth 4 • Built-in RAID • Transparent compression • Snapshots • Checksums on data and meta-data • De-duplication • Cloning { can make an exact snapshot of file, copy-on- write different than link, different inodles but same blocks 5 Embedded • Designed to be small, simple, read-only? • romfs { 32 byte header (magic, size, checksum,name) { Repeating files (pointer to next [0 if none]), info, size, checksum, file name, file data • cramfs 6 ZFS Advanced OS from Sun/Oracle. Similar in idea to btrfs indirect still, not extent based? 7 ReFS Resilient FS, Microsoft's answer to brtfs and zfs 8 Networked File Systems • Allow a centralized file server to export a filesystem to multiple clients. • Provide file level access, not just raw blocks (NBD) • Clustered filesystems also exist, where multiple servers work in conjunction. -
CS 5600 Computer Systems
CS 5600 Computer Systems Lecture 10: File Systems What are We Doing Today? • Last week we talked extensively about hard drives and SSDs – How they work – Performance characterisEcs • This week is all about managing storage – Disks/SSDs offer a blank slate of empty blocks – How do we store files on these devices, and keep track of them? – How do we maintain high performance? – How do we maintain consistency in the face of random crashes? 2 • ParEEons and MounEng • Basics (FAT) • inodes and Blocks (ext) • Block Groups (ext2) • Journaling (ext3) • Extents and B-Trees (ext4) • Log-based File Systems 3 Building the Root File System • One of the first tasks of an OS during bootup is to build the root file system 1. Locate all bootable media – Internal and external hard disks – SSDs – Floppy disks, CDs, DVDs, USB scks 2. Locate all the parEEons on each media – Read MBR(s), extended parEEon tables, etc. 3. Mount one or more parEEons – Makes the file system(s) available for access 4 The Master Boot Record Address Size Descripon Hex Dec. (Bytes) Includes the starEng 0x000 0 Bootstrap code area 446 LBA and length of 0x1BE 446 ParEEon Entry #1 16 the parEEon 0x1CE 462 ParEEon Entry #2 16 0x1DE 478 ParEEon Entry #3 16 0x1EE 494 ParEEon Entry #4 16 0x1FE 510 Magic Number 2 Total: 512 ParEEon 1 ParEEon 2 ParEEon 3 ParEEon 4 MBR (ext3) (swap) (NTFS) (FAT32) Disk 1 ParEEon 1 MBR (NTFS) 5 Disk 2 Extended ParEEons • In some cases, you may want >4 parEEons • Modern OSes support extended parEEons Logical Logical ParEEon 1 ParEEon 2 Ext.