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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 7.1 Release Notes

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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 7.1 Release Notes Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 7.1 Release Notes Release Notes for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Customer Content Services Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 7.1 Release Notes Release Notes for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Customer Content Services Legal Notice Copyright © 2015 Red Hat, Inc. This document is licensed by Red Hat under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. If you distribute this document, or a modified version of it, you must provide attribution to Red Hat, Inc. and provide a link to the original. If the document is modified, all Red Hat trademarks must be removed. Red Hat, as the licensor of this document, waives the right to enforce, and agrees not to assert, Section 4d of CC-BY-SA to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law. Red Hat, Red Hat Enterprise Linux, the Shadowman logo, JBoss, MetaMatrix, Fedora, the Infinity Logo, and RHCE are trademarks of Red Hat, Inc., registered in the United States and other countries. Linux ® is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the United States and other countries. Java ® is a registered trademark of Oracle and/or its affiliates. XFS ® is a trademark of Silicon Graphics International Corp. or its subsidiaries in the United States and/or other countries. MySQL ® is a registered trademark of MySQL AB in the United States, the European Union and other countries. Node.js ® is an official trademark of Joyent. Red Hat Software Collections is not formally related to or endorsed by the official Joyent Node.js open source or commercial project. The OpenStack ® Word Mark and OpenStack Logo are either registered trademarks/service marks or trademarks/service marks of the OpenStack Foundation, in the United States and other countries and are used with the OpenStack Foundation's permission. We are not affiliated with, endorsed or sponsored by the OpenStack Foundation, or the OpenStack community. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Abstract The Release Notes document the major new features and enhancements implemented in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 and the known issues in this release. For detailed information regarding the changes between Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, see the Migration Planning Guide. Acknowledgements Red Hat Global Support Services would like to recognize Sterling Alexander and Michael Everette for their outstanding contributions in testing Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7. T able of Cont ent s Table of Contents .P .r e. f. a. c. e. 5. .P .a .r t. .I .. N. .e .w . F. e. a. t. u. r. e. s. 6. .C .h .a .p . t.e .r . 1. .. A. r. c. h. i.t .e .c .t u. .r e. s. 7. ⁠1.1. Red Hat Enterp rise Linux fo r POWER, little end ian 7 .C .h .a .p . t.e .r . 2. .. H. .a .r d. w. .a .r e. .E . n. a. b. l.e .m . e. n. .t . 8. ⁠2.1. Intel Bro ad well Pro cesso r and Grap hics Sup p o rt 8 ⁠2.2. Sup p o rt fo r TCO Watchd o g and I2C (SMBUS) o n Intel Co mmunicatio ns Chip set 8 9 xx Series ⁠2.3. Intel Pro cesso r Micro co d e Up d ate 8 8 ⁠2.4. AMD Hawaii GPU Sup p o rt 8 ⁠2.5. OSA-Exp ress5s Card s Sup p o rt in q ethq o at 8 .C .h .a .p . t.e .r . 3. .. I.n .s .t .a .l l.a .t i.o . n. .a .n .d . .B .o . o. t. i.n .g . 9. ⁠3.1. Installer 9 ⁠3.2. Bo o t Lo ad er 13 .C .h .a .p . t.e .r . 4. .. S. t. o. r. a. g. e. 1. 4. ⁠LVM Cache 14 ⁠Sto rag e Array Manag ement with lib Sto rag eMg mt API 14 ⁠Sup p o rt fo r LSI Syncro 14 ⁠DIF/DIX Sup p o rt 15 ⁠Enhanced d evice-map p er-multip ath Syntax Erro r Checking and Outp ut 15 .C .h .a .p . t.e .r . 5. .. F. i.l e. .S .y .s .t .e .m . s. 1. 6. ⁠Sup p o rt o f Btrfs File System 16 ⁠OverlayFS 16 ⁠Sup p o rt o f Parallel NFS 16 .C .h .a .p . t.e .r . 6. .. K. e. r. n. e. l. 1. 7. ⁠Sup p o rt fo r Cep h Blo ck Devices 17 ⁠Co ncurrent Flash MCL Up d ates 17 ⁠Dynamic kernel Patching 17 ⁠Crashkernel with Mo re than 1 CPU 17 ⁠d m-era Targ et 17 ⁠Cisco VIC kernel Driver 17 ⁠Enhanced Entro p y Manag ement in hwrng 17 ⁠Sched uler Lo ad -Balancing Perfo rmance Imp ro vement 18 ⁠Imp ro ved newid le Balance in Sched uler 18 ⁠Hug eTLB Sup p o rts Per-No d e 1GB Hug e Pag e Allo catio n 18 ⁠New MCS-b ased Lo cking Mechanism 18 ⁠Pro cess Stack Size Increased fro m 8 KB to 16 KB 18 ⁠up ro b e and uretp ro b e Features Enab led in p erf and systemtap 18 ⁠End -To -End Data Co nsistency Checking 18 ⁠DRBG o n 32-Bit Systems 18 ⁠NFSo RDMA Availab le 18 ⁠Sup p o rt fo r Larg e Crashkernel Sizes 18 ⁠Kd ump Sup p o rted o n Secure Bo o t Machines 19 ⁠Firmware-assisted Crash Dump ing 19 ⁠Runtime Instrumentatio n fo r IBM System z 19 ⁠Cisco usNIC Driver 19 ⁠Intel Ethernet Server Ad ap ter X710 /XL710 Driver Up d ate 19 1 7 .1 Release Not es ⁠.C .h .a .p . t.e .r . 7. .. V. i.r .t u. .a .l i.z .a .t i.o . n. 2. 0. ⁠Increased Maximum Numb er o f vCPUs in KVM 20 ⁠5th Generatio n Intel Co re New Instructio ns Sup p o rt in QEMU, KVM, and lib virt API 20 ⁠USB 3.0 Sup p o rt fo r KVM Guests 20 ⁠Co mp ressio n fo r the d ump -g uest-memo ry Co mmand 20 ⁠Op en Virtual Machine Firmware 20 ⁠Imp ro ve Netwo rk Perfo rmance o n Hyp er-V 20 ⁠hyp ervfco p yd in hyp erv-d aemo ns 20 ⁠New Features in lib g uestfs 20 ⁠Flig ht Reco rd er Tracing 21 ⁠LPAR Watchd o g fo r IBM System z 21 ⁠RDMA-b ased Mig ratio n o f Live Guests 21 ⁠.C .h .a .p . t.e .r . 8. .. C. l.u . s. t.e .r .i n. g. 2. 2. ..
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