Linux Kernal II 9.1 Architecture
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Kernel Panic
Kernel Panic Connect, Inc. 1701 Quincy Avenue, Suites 5 & 6, Naperville, IL 60540 Ph: (630) 717-7200 Fax: (630) 717-7243 www.connectrf.com Table of Contents SCO Kernel Patches for Panics on Pentium Systems…………………………………..1 Kernel Panic Debug Methodologies..............................................................................3 SCO Kernel Patches for Panics on Pentium Systems SCO Kernel Patches for Panics on Pentium Systems Web Links http://www.sco.com/cgi-bin/ssl_reference?104530 http://www.sco.com/cgi-bin/ssl_reference?105532 Pentium System Panics with Trap Type 6; no dump is saved to /dev/swap. Keywords panic trap kernel invalid opcode pentium querytlb querytbl 386 mpx unix v4 dump swap double type6 no patch /etc/conf/pack.d/kernel/locore.o image locore Release SCO UNIX System V/386 Release 3.2 Operating System Version 4.0, 4.1 and 4.2 SCO Open Desktop Release 2.0 and 3.0 SCO Open Server System Release 2.0 and 3.0 Problem My system panics with a Trap Type 6, but no memory dump gets written. Cause There is a flaw in the kernel querytlb() routine that allows the Pentium to execute a 386-specific instruction which causes it to panic with an invalid opcode. querytlb() is only called when your system is panicking. The fault causes the system to double- panic and it thus fails to write a panic dump to disk. This means that the panic trap type 6 is concealing another type of panic which will show itself after the following patch has been applied. Solution You can apply the following patch, as root, to: /etc/conf/pack.d/kernel/locore.o Use the procedure that follows. -
Customizable Multimedia Devices in Virtual Environments
Customizable Multimedia Devices in Virtual Environments Ankur Pai, Balasubramanian Seshasayee, Himanshu Raj and Karsten Schwan Center for Experimental Research in Computer Systems Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, Georgia 30332–0250 fpaiankur, bala, rhim, [email protected] Abstract—The separation of logical from physical devices maintain a consistent view of physical devices by presenting provided by modern virtualization techniques can be used to only a common minimal set of device features is too limiting enhance device functionality, including by emulating non-native and worse, it cannot account for changes in the environmental device functions in software. Such logically extended devices are particularly promising in the mobile domain, for embedded conditions or contexts in which devices are used. machines, handhelds, or phones. Challenges arise, however, from We argue that device sharing and interoperation in mobile the highly heterogeneous nature of portables and the devices with systems requires models and interfaces with which virtual- which they can interact. This suggests that device extensions ization infrastructures can dynamically change device func- should be dynamic, varied at runtime to adjust to new user needs and/or changes in environmental conditions. This paper tionality to account for runtime changes in device use, con- presents a model for runtime device extension and for then using ditions, and contexts. This paper presents such a model. It such extended devices. The model provides uniform interfaces to implements the safe, runtime extension of device functionality, native and extended devices, permits the safe runtime extension by enabling the virtualization layer, guest operating systems, of device functionality, and can be shown to operate across both or applications to safely specify and deploy custom code that stationary and mobile platforms, and arbitrary operating systems and applications. -
Interrupt Handling in Linux
Department Informatik Technical Reports / ISSN 2191-5008 Valentin Rothberg Interrupt Handling in Linux Technical Report CS-2015-07 November 2015 Please cite as: Valentin Rothberg, “Interrupt Handling in Linux,” Friedrich-Alexander-Universitat¨ Erlangen-Nurnberg,¨ Dept. of Computer Science, Technical Reports, CS-2015-07, November 2015. Friedrich-Alexander-Universitat¨ Erlangen-Nurnberg¨ Department Informatik Martensstr. 3 · 91058 Erlangen · Germany www.cs.fau.de Interrupt Handling in Linux Valentin Rothberg Distributed Systems and Operating Systems Dept. of Computer Science, University of Erlangen, Germany [email protected] November 8, 2015 An interrupt is an event that alters the sequence of instructions executed by a processor and requires immediate attention. When the processor receives an interrupt signal, it may temporarily switch control to an inter- rupt service routine (ISR) and the suspended process (i.e., the previously running program) will be resumed as soon as the interrupt is being served. The generic term interrupt is oftentimes used synonymously for two terms, interrupts and exceptions [2]. An exception is a synchronous event that occurs when the processor detects an error condition while executing an instruction. Such an error condition may be a devision by zero, a page fault, a protection violation, etc. An interrupt, on the other hand, is an asynchronous event that occurs at random times during execution of a pro- gram in response to a signal from hardware. A proper and timely handling of interrupts is critical to the performance, but also to the security of a computer system. In general, interrupts can be emitted by hardware as well as by software. Software interrupts (e.g., via the INT n instruction of the x86 instruction set architecture (ISA) [5]) are means to change the execution context of a program to a more privileged interrupt context in order to enter the kernel and, in contrast to hardware interrupts, occur synchronously to the currently running program. -
UG1046 Ultrafast Embedded Design Methodology Guide
UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology Guide UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 Revision History The following table shows the revision history for this document. Date Version Revision 04/20/2018 2.3 • Added a note in the Overview section of Chapter 5. • Replaced BFM terminology with VIP across the user guide. 07/27/2017 2.2 • Vivado IDE updates and minor editorial changes. 04/22/2015 2.1 • Added Embedded Design Methodology Checklist. • Added Accessing Documentation and Training. 03/26/2015 2.0 • Added SDSoC Environment. • Added Related Design Hubs. 10/20/2014 1.1 • Removed outdated information. •In System Level Considerations, added information to the following sections: ° Performance ° Clocking and Reset 10/08/2014 1.0 Initial Release of document. UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology Guide Send Feedback 2 UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 www.xilinx.com Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Embedded Design Methodology Checklist. 9 Accessing Documentation and Training . 10 Chapter 2: System Level Considerations Performance. 13 Power Consumption . 18 Clocking and Reset. 36 Interrupts . 41 Embedded Device Security . 45 Profiling and Partitioning . 51 Chapter 3: Hardware Design Considerations Configuration and Boot Devices . 63 Memory Interfaces . 69 Peripherals . 76 Designing IP Blocks . 94 Hardware Performance Considerations . 102 Dataflow . 108 PL Clocking Methodology . 112 ACP and Cache Coherency. 116 PL High-Performance Port Access. 120 System Management Hardware Assistance. 124 Managing Hardware Reconfiguration . 127 GPs and Direct PL Access from APU . 133 Chapter 4: Software Design Considerations Processor Configuration . 137 OS and RTOS Choices . 142 Libraries and Middleware . 152 Boot Loaders . 156 Software Development Tools . 162 UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology GuideSend Feedback 3 UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 www.xilinx.com Chapter 5: Hardware Design Flow Overview . -
Microkernel Mechanisms for Improving the Trustworthiness of Commodity Hardware
Microkernel Mechanisms for Improving the Trustworthiness of Commodity Hardware Yanyan Shen Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Computer Science and Engineering Faculty of Engineering March 2019 Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname/Family Name : Shen Given Name/s : Yanyan Abbreviation for degree as give in the University calendar : PhD Faculty : Faculty of Engineering School : School of Computer Science and Engineering Microkernel Mechanisms for Improving the Trustworthiness of Commodity Thesis Title : Hardware Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE) The thesis presents microkernel-based software-implemented mechanisms for improving the trustworthiness of computer systems based on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware that can malfunction when the hardware is impacted by transient hardware faults. The hardware anomalies, if undetected, can cause data corruptions, system crashes, and security vulnerabilities, significantly undermining system dependability. Specifically, we adopt the single event upset (SEU) fault model and address transient CPU or memory faults. We take advantage of the functional correctness and isolation guarantee provided by the formally verified seL4 microkernel and hardware redundancy provided by multicore processors, design the redundant co-execution (RCoE) architecture that replicates a whole software system (including the microkernel) onto different CPU cores, and implement two variants, loosely-coupled redundant co-execution (LC-RCoE) and closely-coupled redundant co-execution (CC-RCoE), for the ARM and x86 architectures. RCoE treats each replica of the software system as a state machine and ensures that the replicas start from the same initial state, observe consistent inputs, perform equivalent state transitions, and thus produce consistent outputs during error-free executions. -
Dm-X: Protecting Volume-Level Integrity for Cloud Volumes and Local
dm-x: Protecting Volume-level Integrity for Cloud Volumes and Local Block Devices Anrin Chakraborti Bhushan Jain Jan Kasiak Stony Brook University Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University UNC, Chapel Hill Tao Zhang Donald Porter Radu Sion Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University & Stony Brook University UNC, Chapel Hill UNC, Chapel Hill ABSTRACT on Amazon’s Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) [2] (which provides The verified boot feature in recent Android devices, which strong security guarantees through network isolation) store deploys dm-verity, has been overwhelmingly successful in elim- data on untrusted storage devices residing in the public cloud. inating the extremely popular Android smart phone rooting For example, Amazon VPC file systems, object stores, and movement [25]. Unfortunately, dm-verity integrity guarantees databases reside on virtual block devices in the Amazon are read-only and do not extend to writable volumes. Elastic Block Storage (EBS). This paper introduces a new device mapper, dm-x, that This allows numerous attack vectors for a malicious cloud efficiently (fast) and reliably (metadata journaling) assures provider/untrusted software running on the server. For in- volume-level integrity for entire, writable volumes. In a direct stance, to ensure SEC-mandated assurances of end-to-end disk setup, dm-x overheads are around 6-35% over ext4 on the integrity, banks need to guarantee that the external cloud raw volume while offering additional integrity guarantees. For storage service is unable to remove log entries documenting cloud storage (Amazon EBS), dm-x overheads are negligible. financial transactions. Yet, without integrity of the storage device, a malicious cloud storage service could remove logs of a coordinated attack. -
User Manual Issue 2.0.2 September 2017
The Embedded I/O Company TDRV015-SW-82 Linux Device Driver Reconfigurable FPGA Version 2.0.x User Manual Issue 2.0.2 September 2017 TEWS TECHNOLOGIES GmbH Am Bahnhof 7 25469 Halstenbek, Germany Phone: +49 (0) 4101 4058 0 Fax: +49 (0) 4101 4058 19 e-mail: [email protected] www.tews.com TDRV015-SW-82 This document contains information, which is Linux Device Driver proprietary to TEWS TECHNOLOGIES GmbH. Any Reconfigurable FPGA reproduction without written permission is forbidden. Supported Modules: TEWS TECHNOLOGIES GmbH has made any TAMC631 (TPLD001) effort to ensure that this manual is accurate and TAMC640 (TPLD002) complete. However TEWS TECHNOLOGIES GmbH TAMC641 (TPLD003) reserves the right to change the product described TAMC651 (TPLD004) in this document at any time without notice. TPMC632 (TPLD005) TEWS TECHNOLOGIES GmbH is not liable for any damage arising out of the application or use of the device described herein. 2011-2017 by TEWS TECHNOLOGIES GmbH Issue Description Date 1.0.0 First Issue March 14, 2011 1.0.1 SupportedModulesadded September30,2011 2.0.0 New API implemented March 7, 2012 2.0.1 IncludestatementinExampleCodescorrected August 18, 2015 Reference to Engineering Documentation removed 2.0.2 Filelistmodified(licenseadded) September28,2017 TDRV015-SW-82 - Linux Device Driver Page 2 of 75 Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 4 2 INSTALLATION......................................................................................................... -
Version 7.8-Systemd
Linux From Scratch Version 7.8-systemd Created by Gerard Beekmans Edited by Douglas R. Reno Linux From Scratch: Version 7.8-systemd by Created by Gerard Beekmans and Edited by Douglas R. Reno Copyright © 1999-2015 Gerard Beekmans Copyright © 1999-2015, Gerard Beekmans All rights reserved. This book is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Computer instructions may be extracted from the book under the MIT License. Linux® is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. Linux From Scratch - Version 7.8-systemd Table of Contents Preface .......................................................................................................................................................................... vii i. Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................. vii ii. Audience ............................................................................................................................................................ vii iii. LFS Target Architectures ................................................................................................................................ viii iv. LFS and Standards ............................................................................................................................................ ix v. Rationale for Packages in the Book .................................................................................................................... x vi. Prerequisites -
Advanced Operating Systems #1
<Slides download> https://www.pf.is.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp/classes Advanced Operating Systems #2 Hiroyuki Chishiro Project Lecturer Department of Computer Science Graduate School of Information Science and Technology The University of Tokyo Room 007 Introduction of Myself • Name: Hiroyuki Chishiro • Project Lecturer at Kato Laboratory in December 2017 - Present. • Short Bibliography • Ph.D. at Keio University on March 2012 (Yamasaki Laboratory: Same as Prof. Kato). • JSPS Research Fellow (PD) in April 2012 – March 2014. • Research Associate at Keio University in April 2014 – March 2016. • Assistant Professor at Advanced Institute of Industrial Technology in April 2016 – November 2017. • Research Interests • Real-Time Systems • Operating Systems • Middleware • Trading Systems Course Plan • Multi-core Resource Management • Many-core Resource Management • GPU Resource Management • Virtual Machines • Distributed File Systems • High-performance Networking • Memory Management • Network on a Chip • Embedded Real-time OS • Device Drivers • Linux Kernel Schedule 1. 2018.9.28 Introduction + Linux Kernel (Kato) 2. 2018.10.5 Linux Kernel (Chishiro) 3. 2018.10.12 Linux Kernel (Kato) 4. 2018.10.19 Linux Kernel (Kato) 5. 2018.10.26 Linux Kernel (Kato) 6. 2018.11.2 Advanced Research (Chishiro) 7. 2018.11.9 Advanced Research (Chishiro) 8. 2018.11.16 (No Class) 9. 2018.11.23 (Holiday) 10. 2018.11.30 Advanced Research (Kato) 11. 2018.12.7 Advanced Research (Kato) 12. 2018.12.14 Advanced Research (Chishiro) 13. 2018.12.21 Linux Kernel 14. 2019.1.11 Linux Kernel 15. 2019.1.18 (No Class) 16. 2019.1.25 (No Class) Linux Kernel Introducing Synchronization /* The cases for Linux */ Acknowledgement: Prof. -
AFS - a Secure Distributed File System
SLAC-PUB-11152 Part III: AFS - A Secure Distributed File System Alf Wachsmann Submitted to Linux Journal issue #132/April 2005 Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94309 Work supported by Department of Energy contract DE–AC02–76SF00515. SLAC-PUB-11152.txt Part III: AFS - A Secure Distributed File System III.1 Introduction AFS is a secure distributed global file system providing location independence, scalability and transparent migration capabilities for data. AFS works across a multitude of Unix and non-Unix operating systems and is used at many large sites in production for many years. AFS still provides unique features that are not available with other distributed file systems even though AFS is almost 20 years old. This age might make it less appealing to some but with IBM making AFS available as open-source in 2000, new interest in use and development was sparked. When talking about AFS, people often mention other file systems as potential alternatives. Coda (http://www.coda.cs.cmu.edu/) with its disconnected mode will always be a research project and never have production quality. Intermezzo (http://www.inter-mezzo.org/) is now in the Linux kernel but not available for any other operating systems. NFSv4 (http://www.nfsv4.org/) which picked up many ideas from AFS and Coda is not mature enough yet to be used in serious production mode. This article presents the rich features of AFS and invites readers to play with it. III.2 Features and Benefits of AFS AFS client software is available for many Unix flavors: HP, Compaq, IBM, SUN, SGI, Linux. -
Process Scheduling Ii
PROCESS SCHEDULING II CS124 – Operating Systems Spring 2021, Lecture 12 2 Real-Time Systems • Increasingly common to have systems with real-time scheduling requirements • Real-time systems are driven by specific events • Often a periodic hardware timer interrupt • Can also be other events, e.g. detecting a wheel slipping, or an optical sensor triggering, or a proximity sensor reaching a threshold • Event latency is the amount of time between an event occurring, and when it is actually serviced • Usually, real-time systems must keep event latency below a minimum required threshold • e.g. antilock braking system has 3-5 ms to respond to wheel-slide • The real-time system must try to meet its deadlines, regardless of system load • Of course, may not always be possible… 3 Real-Time Systems (2) • Hard real-time systems require tasks to be serviced before their deadlines, otherwise the system has failed • e.g. robotic assembly lines, antilock braking systems • Soft real-time systems do not guarantee tasks will be serviced before their deadlines • Typically only guarantee that real-time tasks will be higher priority than other non-real-time tasks • e.g. media players • Within the operating system, two latencies affect the event latency of the system’s response: • Interrupt latency is the time between an interrupt occurring, and the interrupt service routine beginning to execute • Dispatch latency is the time the scheduler dispatcher takes to switch from one process to another 4 Interrupt Latency • Interrupt latency in context: Interrupt! Task -
SUMURI Macintosh Forensics Best Practices
! MAC FORENSICS - STEP BY STEP Disclaimer: Before using any new procedure, hardware or software for forensics you must do your own validation and testing before working on true evidence. These best practices are summarized from SUMURI’s Macintosh Forensic Survival Courses which is a vendor- neutral training course taught to law enforcement, government and corporate examiners worldwide. More information about SUMURI can be found at SUMURI.com STEP ACTIONS DESCRIPTION STEP-1: PRE-SEARCH INTELLIGENCE Find out as much as you can about your target: • Number and types of Macs (MacBook, iMac or Mac Pro). • Operating System Versions (for collecting/processing volatile data and Copy Over Procedure). • Type/s and number of ports. • Does it contain a T2 chipset with Secure Boot? • Is FileVault Active? STEP-2: ISOLATE Assign one trained Digital Evidence Collection Specialist to handle the computers to minimize contamination and Chain of Custody. Prohibit anyone else from handling the devices. STEP-3: ALWAYS ASK FOR THE PASSWORD Most newer Macs have enhanced security features such as T2 Security Chipsets, APFS File Systems, Secure Boot, FileVault and more. Any one or combination of these security features can stop you from getting the data. ALWAYS ASK FOR THE PASSWORD. SUMURI.com © SUMURI 2010-2019 ! STEP ACTIONS DESCRIPTION STEP-4: IF COMPUTER IS ON - SCREEN SAVER PASSWORD ACTIVE Options are: • Ask for the Password - Confirm password and proceed to Step-6. • Restart to Image RAM - Connect a RAM Imaging Utility to the Mac such as RECON IMAGER. Conduct a soft-restart (do not power off if possible and image the RAM).