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The British Media Portrayal of Local Afghan Interpreters Employed by the British Armed Forces

BESSANT, Claire

Abstract

Local conflict zone interpreters occupy a precarious position between warring parties. They are often viewed as traitors by the adversaries of their employer military, and may be targeted as a result of their work. The Taliban’s persecution of local Afghan interpreters employed by the British military has received considerable media attention in the UK. Through the lens of narrative theory this paper analyses the British media’s portrayal of local Afghan interpreters and their situation, and looks at the role played by the media in its coverage of our topic. The findings indicate that press coverage is generally biased in favour of the interpreters. Publications may use their sway over public opinion and government policy to assist the interpreters, assuming the role of a player rather than that of a bystander reporter. This paper increases understanding of how local conflict zone interpreters are viewed, and the concrete impact which this can have on their situation.

Reference

BESSANT, Claire. The British Media Portrayal of Local Afghan Interpreters Employed by the British Armed Forces. Master : Univ. Genève, 2020

Available at: http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:147457

Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.

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The British Media Portrayal of Local Afghan Interpreters Employed by the British Armed Forces

Claire Bessant

Mémoire présenté à la Faculté de Traduction et d’Interprétation pour l’obtention du MA en Interprétation de Conférence Directeur de mémoire : Prof. Lucía RUIZ ROSENDO Juré : Prof. Kilian SEEBER

Janvier 2020

Key Words

Interpreters, media, conflict, military, Afghanistan

Abstract

Student Information

Claire Bessant 25 Boulevard du Pont d’Arve 1205 Genève [email protected]

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... 2 Student Information ...... 3 Table of Contents ...... 4 Acknowledgements ...... 6 Introduction ...... 7 Chapter 1 Local Interpreters in Conflict Zones ...... 15 Chapter 2 Afghanistan ...... 22 2.1 The Geography of Afghanistan ...... 22 2.2 The Population of Afghanistan ...... 24 2.3 The Afghan Economy ...... 25 2.4 The Durand Line ...... 25 2.5 The History of Afghanistan ...... 27 2.5.1 The Great Game: Russia and Britain ...... 28 2.5.2 Tradition and Modernity ...... 31 2.5.3 The Cold War in Afghanistan ...... 32 2.5.4 The Rise of the Taliban ...... 33 2.5.5 The Taliban and al Qaeda ...... 37 Chapter 3 The War ...... 39 3.1 The Invasion and ISAF ...... 39 3.2 The Taliban Insurgency ...... 41 3.3 The End in Sight? ...... 42 3.4 The British Campaign in Afghanistan...... 43 Chapter 4 Local Interpreters in Helmand Province ...... 47 4.1 The Role of Local Afghan Interpreters ...... 47 4.2 Risks faced by Local Afghan Interpreters ...... 48 4.3 Taliban Reprisals against Local Afghan Interpreters ...... 48 4.4 The British Government Response ...... 49 Chapter 5 The British Media Portrayal of Local Afghan Interpreters and their Situation ...... 55 5.1 Introduction ...... 55 5.2 Objectives ...... 55 5.3 Selection of Corpus ...... 56 5.3.1 Selection of Publications ...... 56

5.3.2 Selection of Articles ...... 58 5.4 Methodology...... 59 5.5 Analysis...... 60 5.5.1 How do the corpus articles depict the current situation of the interpreters?...... 60 5.5.2 How do the corpus articles depict the role of local Afghan interpreters in British employ? ...... 62 5.5.3 How do the corpus articles depict the character of the interpreters?...... 66 5.5.4 How do the corpus articles depict British government policy towards the interpreters? ...... 68 5.5.5 What kind of role does the British media assume in its coverage of our subject? ...... 70 Conclusion ...... 75 Bibliography ...... 78 Annexes ...... 87

Acknowledgements

I would first and foremost like to thank my supervisor, Lucía Ruiz Rosendo, for her valuable guidance.

Thanks are also due to my friends and family for proofreading this project.

Introduction

Mohammed Rafi Hotak was recruited as an interpreter by the British Armed Forces in 2006. Less than a year after beginning work, he was seriously injured in an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion. Even when equipped with full military body armour, an IED explosion can cause mutilation, loss of limb or loss of life. The explosion left Rafi scarred for life. In addition, his work with the British left him a marked man. He was attacked several times. The Taliban sent him regular death threats and threatened his family. Frightened for his life, Rafi applied for a UK visa.

His demand was rejected, a letter from the UK border agency telling him that his claims that he had received Taliban death threats were not accepted.

With his hopes of safe, legal passage to Britain dashed, Rafi embarked upon a journey across land and sea to the UK border, where he applied for asylum. His demand was rejected and then, after

The Times newspaper printed his story, accepted. Rafi had spent all of his savings, risked his life and left his family to escape the clutches of the Taliban. He was penniless and far from his family, but safe.

Others were not so lucky; Rafi came across a video showing several friends of his, also local interpreters, being beheaded by the Taliban.

Since the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan, other stories like Rafi’s have emerged. There have been reports of local Afghan interpreters being targeted for having worked with ISAF forces, since the Taliban view them as ‘infidels’ and

‘invaders’ (Anderson, 2014, p. 1). In an interview, the spokesperson of the Taliban affirmed that

these interpreters would be ‘targeted and executed like the foreign soldiers and other foreign occupiers. They will be put to death.’ (Anderson, 2014, p.5). Foreign governments which employed local civilians in Afghanistan have taken steps to assist their former employees, in some cases by granting them asylum. However, the measures taken by the British government have been a source of impassioned debate, which has been followed closely by the British media.

Since the situation of local Afghan interpreters is on the radar of the general public, rather than being an arcane academic topic, many different kinds of writer have taken an interest in the subject: from academic researchers such as Tălpaș (2016) and Pederson (2017) to reporters such as

Anderson (2014) and Engelhart (2015). Whilst their methodologies and focal points vary greatly, the point of convergence of a number of these studies (Anderson, 2014; Engelhart, 2015; Tălpaș,

2016) is the author’s intention to highlight the risks faced by local Afghan interpreters to draw attention to a need to remedy these risks. This implies a degree of concern in the writer for this topic, which comes through more clearly in the tone of reporters writing for the wider public

(Anderson, 2014; Engelhart 2015). The tone of academic studies on this topic (Tălpaș, 2016;

Pederson, 2017), whilst maintaining a scholarly detachment, is by no means dispassionate.

Anderson’s (2014) documentary and accompanying written report, pitched in a very practical and piercing key, are based upon interviews with local Afghan interpreters working with American forces. The focus is on the dangers faced by the interpreters and the difficulty of seeking refuge in the United States. On the other hand, in his 2017 article on Afghan interpreters in Danish employ,

Pederson draws upon his own experience as a Pashto-speaking military linguist and information collected from Danish Ministry of Defence reports to outline the risks faced by the interpreters,

and the reaction of the Danish and British governments to reports of intimidation. He argues that it is a moral obligation to save Afghan interpreters from violence and intimidation, thus explicitly stating what Anderson’s study insinuates. Engelhart supports Pederson’s conclusion in her 2015 study, which was a valuable source of information for this project since it outlines the steps taken by the British government to assist their Afghan former employees. Moreover, Englehart’s (2015) study was of particular interest because the researcher gathered information from the British press.

Tălpaș (2016) goes further still by explicitly stating that the goal of her study is to present the risks faced by Afghan interpreters working for ISAF forces in order to avoid these risks in the future.

The myriad of sources drawn upon include interviews like Anderson (2014), official reports like

Pederson (2017) and press reports like Engelhart (2015). She indicates that local Afghan interpreters were perceived as a potential threat by both the local community and their employers which, in turn, posed a threat to the interpreters themselves. The study concludes that the interpreters’ duties far exceeded that of interpreting speech, describing their role as that of an

‘interpreter-soldier’.

The same limitations are ubiquitous in both scholarly and journalistic contributions to this field: the absence of official figures on violence and intimidation suffered by Afghan interpreters.

Indeed, Pederson (2017) acknowledges this ambiguity, evoking the impossibility of investigating claims of intimidation, and the difficulty of providing robust evidence of death threats. Engelhart

(2015) substantiates this conclusion, stating that some governments may not have exact figures on how many local Afghan interpreters were actually employed. The absence of an ‘official death toll’ is perhaps what leads reporters such as Anderson (2014) and Engelhart (2015) to focus on narrating the stories of individual interpreters who have been victims of violence and intimidation.

In this sense, the absence of confirmed numbers has not hampered the reporters’ message concerning the precarity of local Afghan interpreters: narrative has the advantage of being easily understood by anyone (Baker, 2006).

Local Afghan interpreters are now seldom written about without the focus being on the violence and threats that they face. However, a number of studies do focus on other elements of the interpreters’ experience, providing a useful insight into the backdrop of the interpreters’ current situation. De Ridder, Soeters and Van Dijk (2010) studied the relations between Dutch personnel deployed in Uruzgan Province and their local interpreters. They took an interpretative approach using data drawn from surveys completed by Dutch military personnel. Similarly, Bos and Soeters

(2006) also studied interpreter-user relations, with a special emphasis on (dis)trust. However, unlike De Ridder, Soeters and Van Dijk’s (2010) work, their study encompassed both user and interpreter. Their findings suggested that local Afghan interpreters were caught in a precarious position between trust and distrust, not only with regard to their foreign employers, but also with regard to the local population. Moreover, this negative reaction from their compatriots meant that interpreters ‘feared for their lives outside of working hours’ (Bos & Soeters, 2006, p. 266); a grim harbinger of what was to come. Gómez Amich, in her 2013 article on interpreters in select zones of international conflict in the 20th and 21st centuries, surmises that the role of conflict interpreters goes beyond interpreting, suggesting that the term ‘interpreter’ may not fully capture their role.

She indicates that conflict zone interpreters’ position is further complicated by the difficulty of achieving neutrality and earning trust. Ruiz Rosendo (in press) studied the situation of two categories of interpreter working with the Afghanistan Spanish Force: national interpreters recruited in Spain, and local interpreters recruited in Afghanistan. Like Bos and Soeters (2006),

both interpreter and user were included in this qualitative study. Data collected from unstructured interviews indicated that the interpreters’ differing backgrounds influenced the way in which they processed information, their agency, and how well they were trusted by the military.

This project will explore the narratives constructed or conveyed by the British press about local

Afghan interpreters. This approach was inspired by Baker’s (2006) reflection on the relationship between conflict zone interpreters and narrative, meaning the stories that we tell ourselves about the world(s) around us. Distinct from literary narrative, narrative theory refers to ‘a meta-code that cuts across and underpins all modes of communication’ (Baker, 2006, p. 19). Not only do interpreters convey and co-author narratives, they are also portrayed by narratives ‘as victims or villains, as trust-worthy allies or security risks’ (Baker, 2010, p. 217). The importance of narrative should not be underestimated; our behaviour is guided by stories that we believe (Baker 2006). In this view, how local Afghan interpreters are narrated has a concrete impact on how they are treated by different parties. As observed by Tălpaș (2016), local interpreters being viewed as untrustworthy or treacherous is a real danger for the interpreters themselves; they may be shunned or targeted by the local population, without benefiting from the protection afforded by full acceptance into the ‘us’ camp.

The implications of narrative are especially acute in the context of war, where one’s perceived position in the conflict may have fatal consequences; the interpreters have been targeted because the Taliban view them as belonging to the enemy camp.

As far as I am aware, although press articles have been a rich source of information for studies in this domain (Engelhart, 2015; Tălpaș, 2016) no researcher has taken media coverage of this issue as their central focus. Hence, this study aims to fill this gap. Although Bos and Soeters (2006) note that an ethnographic approach based upon field work is increasingly seen as a valuable methodology in this domain, the scarcity of data on Afghan interpreters, coupled with the difficulty of investigating and documenting threats made against them (Pederson, 2017) necessitate a different approach to sourcing information for this project.

In addition to exploring the media portrayal of Afghan interpreters, this study will also assess what kind of role the British press assumes in its coverage of our topic. For many years, the role assigned to the media has been a subject of heated debate. Whilst traditional schools of thought generally argue that the role of the press should be that of an impartial, objective reporter, others contend that objectivity is not always possible, or indeed desirable (McLaughlin, 2016). As evidenced by the work of Anderson (2014) and Engelhart (2015), journalists have been known to depart from the traditional norms of objective reporting to support a given cause, stepping out of their traditional role as an objective bystander and using their reporting to raise the profile of a certain issue (McLaughlin, 2016). In light of this, it is possible that the role assumed by the British media when reporting on local Afghan interpreters will not be that of a traditional bystander reporter.

The importance of narratives carried in the media should not be underestimated given the dual role of the media both reflecting and informing public opinion (Anastasio, Rose, & Chapman, 1999).

Government policy can be swayed by public opinion (Younger, 1955), buckling to pressure or pandering to popular sympathy for a cause to win the hearts of the public. Therefore, analysing the

British media’s portrayal of the interpreters, and the role that the media assumes in its coverage of our subject, may also give an insight into the link between public opinion, the media view and government policy regarding Afghan interpreters.

Before exploring the media narratives about local Afghan interpreters, it is important to understand the wider context of this topic. Chapter one will thus be a theoretical reflection on interpreters in conflict zones. Chapter two will explain the modern history of Afghanistan and the rise of the

Taliban. Chapter three will explore the outbreak and unfolding of the war in Afghanistan before honing in on the role played by the British, especially in Helmand Province. Chapter four will focus on the local Afghan interpreters working with the British in Afghanistan, exploring their role(s) and risks that they faced. Special attention will be paid to the reprisals suffered by Afghan interpreters as a result of their work, and the assistance schemes established by the British government to help them: the Redundancy/ Ex-Gratia Scheme and the Intimidation Scheme.

Chapter five draws upon a corpus of British press articles to explore the media portrayal of local

Afghan interpreters working with the British army and their situation, and the role assumed by the media in its coverage of this topic.

The purpose of this project is not to cast a moral judgement on the situation of Afghan interpreters, nor is it to draw greater attention to their situation. Rather, through the lens of narrative, this paper aims to look at how the media depicts Afghan interpreters and their situation, framed within a reflection on the role of the media and the relationship between the British press, public opinion and government policy. This research is limited in that it focusses purely on the British media. A future study could hence contextualise these findings by taking a comparative approach

encompassing the media of other ISAF countries, or comparing and contrasting the media coverage of reprisals faced by local interpreters in other conflict zones, for example Iraq.

Chapter 1 Local Interpreters in Conflict Zones

Over recent decades, interpreting in conflict zones has garnered increasing scholarly attention, due in part to greater media interest in this group of interpreters (Ruiz Rosendo & Barea Muñoz, 2017).

This is sometimes a response to violence which they have suffered during, or as a result of, their work (Takeda, 2012). Although interpreting in areas of armed conflict is no longer uncharted territory for academia, the figure of the conflict zone interpreter remains elusive (Ruiz Rosendo &

Barea Muñoz, 2017); their role itself is vast, and sometimes poorly delimited (Baigorri Jalón,

2011). This is compounded by the difficulty of researching a domain set against a backdrop of complex relations between warring parties (Ruiz Rosendo & Barea Muñoz, 2017). Far removed from the more formalised part of the profession (Allen, 2012), interpreters working in zones of armed conflict remain little known for fellow interpreters and the layman alike (Baker, 2010).

History shows us that language barriers have never confounded the outbreak of violent conflict. In a world marred by war there is no question as to the abiding importance of and need for interpreters in international conflict. They play an instrumental role at all stages of armed conflict (Baigorri

Jalón, 2011), from the belligerent’s declaration of war – which would be pointless should ‘the enemy’ not understand – to the eventual peace talks (Baker, 2006). Indeed, De Ridder, Soeters and van Dijk remind us that ‘words – if well chosen – can silence guns’ (2010, p. 923).

Some scholars have put forth taxonomies of interpreters in armed conflict, such as Allen (2012) and Ruiz Rosendo and Barea Muñoz (2017), identifying subgroups including military linguists, conference interpreters, and local civilians hired by the military. The evidently wide scope of the

term ‘interpreters in conflict zones’ means that any consideration of this group as whole would be beyond the scope of this study, which will instead focus on a major subcategory that has drawn the lion’s share of scholarly interest: local interpreters working with a foreign military.

Local interpreters, most of whom are civilians (Ruiz Rosendo & Barea Muñoz, 2017), form the largest subgroup of interpreters in conflict zones. They are often recruited by private companies on behalf of a foreign government (Allen, 2012). Crucially, many scholars stress that local interpreters do not tend to have professional interpreter training or experience (Moser-Mercer &

Bali, 2008; Allen, 2012; Gómez Amich, 2013; Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2016; Ruiz Rosendo &

Barea Muñoz, 2017), nor do they necessarily have any more than a rudimentary grasp of their employer’s language (Baker, 2010; Ruiz Rosendo & Barea Muñoz, 2017; Baigorri Jalón 2019).

Whilst in conference interpreting it would be out of the question to hire an interpreter with no proper training, in armed conflict ‘the law of supply and demand rules’ (Gómez Amich, 2013, p.

15) perhaps due to the enduring dearth of interpreters in this sphere (Moser-Mercer & Bali, 2008) and the language combinations required. Moreover, Moerman (2008) suggests that armies operating abroad seldom anticipate the hiring of interpreters, and often choose to recruit ‘cheaper locals’ to evade certain legal obligations such as providing health coverage and guaranteeing safe working conditions.

Despite the considerable danger to which these interpreters are exposed in their line of work (Allen,

2012), they may only receive meagre protection (Baker, 2010) and rarely benefit from war-zone training (Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2016) which could address challenges that form part of a days’ work for the interpreters, such as coping with secondary trauma and minimising risk in a violent

setting (Allen, 2012). Local civilians may accept this dangerous work for many reasons (Ruiz

Rosendo & Barea Muñoz, 2017), including for the good pay (Baigorri Jalón, 2011; Ruiz Rosendo, in press) or out of sheer desperation when unemployment is rife (Baker, 2010).

The tasks undertaken by local interpreters remain ambiguous, not just because of the difficulty of studying a figure caught between the clashing, vacillating narratives of conflict, but also because their job description is, in itself, often vaguely delimited (Baigorri Jalón, 2011). This group of interpreters cover most interpreting services in conflict, including going on patrol with troops, communicating between soldiers and local civilians, and liaising during important exchanges between leaders (Allen, 2012). They may be called upon to interpret during military operations, assist propaganda campaigns and communicate with captives (Baigorri Jalón, 2011). In addition to this, interpreters may be required to carry out multifarious tasks outside of their role as a linguistic mediator (Baker, 2010; Ruiz Rosendo & Persaud, 2016). Indeed, Gómez Amich (2013) suggests that the term ‘interpreter’ does not fully capture their role.

The role of the local interpreter when performing these tasks is not to act as a ‘neutral conduit […] doing nothing more than a machine-like rendition of what it said in the source speech into the target language’ (Takeda, 2012), but rather to act as a ‘cultural broker’ (Van Den Noortgate, 2016;

Takeda, 2012). It is widely accepted that ‘language is interwoven with the threads of culture, and that it is difficult, probably impossible, to separate the two’ (Al-Hassan, 2013, p. 97) meaning that cultural mediation is part and parcel of interpreting. Whilst this holds true in all spheres of the profession, perhaps for local interpreters brokering between distant cultures against the tense backdrop of war, cultural mediation becomes a more central and demanding part of the

interpreter’s role. This may be a reason for choosing locals; Anderson (2010) and Ruiz Rosendo

(in print) both affirm that local Afghan interpreters played an indispensable role helping foreign soldiers understand local culture. Local interpreters present the advantage of having a full understanding of local culture and language, including being able to read non-verbal signals (Ruiz

Rosendo, in press). Indeed, Ruiz Rosendo observes that a whole chapter of the manual on military strategy Advising the Command: Best Practices from the Special Operations is devoted to the importance of cultural and linguistic understanding. Moreover, one could argue that the fact that foreign militaries choose to employ local interpreters for their cultural expertise despite viewing them as a potential threat bears testament to the importance of cultural mediation in conflict zones.

Rendering both language and culture – themselves intrinsically linked – is the role of any interpreter. However, one could argue that for certain kinds of interpreter, including conflict zone interpreters, there is greater emphasis on cultural mediation. This shift has significant implications for the (in)visibility of the interpreter. Hidden from view and usually physically removed from the exchange, conference interpreters narrate themselves out of events to leave a seamless dialogue.

In theory, the interpreter’s own voice is not heard; they assume the character of the speaker. Local interpreters in conflict zones (and community interpreters), on the other hand, may be permitted, or even required, to make their own voice heard to comment on aspects of culture. Symbolically physically present in the midst of an exchange, these cultural brokers become protagonists with considerable latitude to influence the course of an exchange; ‘trusted to be selective in what they communicate’, they can give ‘the “gist” of what others say as they understand or wish to present it’ (Baker, 2010, p. 214). The interpreter’s agency when interpreting exchanges bestows them with significant power to shape the unfolding of wider events; interpreted exchanges feed into the

overarching narratives that guide the actions of warring parties, and may ultimately alter the course of the war (Baker, 2010).

The power of local interpreters in conflict zones to co-author unfolding narratives makes the paucity of targeted training all the more concerning; Baker affirms that poor interpreting could risk fuelling the ‘streamlined, homogenizing narratives’ that sustain conflict (Baker, 2010, p. 217).

Furthermore, the immediate fallout of communication breakdowns can be grievous for all involved

(Moser-Mercer & Bali, 2008).

Given that this group of interpreters is present and visible in an exchange, it is important to consider their position in relation to parties involved in the conflict. Professional standards require an interpreter to remain neutral when interpreting exchanges (Beebee, 2010, p. 295). However, the role of interpreters in conflict zones is not limited to neutral linguistic and cultural mediation; rather, the interpreter may temper utterances, make conscious omissions and volunteer their own opinion (Ruiz Rosendo, in press).

Interpreters are also traditionally required to remain impartial (Beebee, 2010, p. 295). Is it important to differentiate between an interpreter’s professional impartiality when interpreting exchanges, and the interpreter’s position in the conflict as a whole. Whilst the former may be achieved (Beebee 2010, p. 295), the latter is difficult to attain (Kahane, 2007; Gómez Amich,

2013) and – for this kind of interpreter – neither required, nor desired. Indeed, for a foreign military recruiting interpreters from a population who could be perceived as belonging to the enemy camp, loyalty is ‘sacred’ (Baigorri Jalón, 2011, p. 5) and is hence preferred to impartiality.

Moreover, the rigidly dichotomous narratives of war leave little room for a neutral space between enemy camps. War is defined by ‘two mutually exclusive categories […] us and them’ (Baker,

2010, p. 210) meaning that interpreters in conflict zones are often unable to find a neutral space in the void that separates the good, humane ‘us’ from the savage, malevolent ‘them’ (Kahane, 2007).

This seems to be the case in Afghanistan, where ‘there are no empty of neutral spaces between the

Taliban narrative and that of the coalition’ (Kahane, 2007). Even should an interpreter intend to be neutral, this may not be recognised by the warring parties (Kahane, 2007) operating in a context in which one’s identity is nearly entirely ‘constructed by other actors […] to suit the exigencies of war’ (Baker, 2010, p. 199). In armed conflict, it seems that the notions of interpreter neutrality and impartiality may be eclipsed by the more potent tradition of ‘with us or against us’.

Unable to find a neutral no-man’s-land in the midst of conflict, local interpreters may find themselves suspended between warring parties (Gómez Amich, 2013). Belonging to one culture and serving another, local interpreters are often mistrusted by both their employers and the local community (Baker, 2010). The foreign military may regard local interpreters with suspicion since they are viewed as a potential threat (Baigorri Jalón, 2011), whilst the local population may see their compatriot interpreters to be ‘sleeping with the enemy’ (Moerman, 2008) and identify them as ‘the other’ because of their work (Ruiz Rosendo, in print). This exposes local interpreters to great danger; they may be ostracised, threatened, violently assaulted or killed for their work.

To conclude, the position of local conflict interpreters is nuanced and complex in a situation which traditionally demands that one choose a side. Therein lies their precarity; belonging to the local

culture and serving a foreign military estranges them from their compatriots, without gaining them the full acceptance, and hence protection, of their employers. Suspended in limbo, they are cast as friend or foe, collaborator or traitor, and treated accordingly. Viewed with mistrust and suspicion, they are nonetheless entrusted with the power to shape narratives that may determine the path of a war, whilst remaining powerless to resist the net of contrasting narratives woven about them. The work of local conflict interpreters places them in the line of fire, and they remain so well after the end of hostilities.

Chapter 2 Afghanistan

2.1 The Geography of Afghanistan

Before addressing the situation of local interpreters in Afghanistan, it is useful to look at the setting in which their story begins. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is an Asian country bordered by

Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to the North, Pakistan to the South and South East and Iran to the

West. It shares a short border with China in the North-Western tip of the country, but this area is disputed between Pakistan and Tajikistan. The terrain of the country is very diverse (see figure 1) and has had an impact on the course of conflict in the region, as will be briefly seen in chapter 3.

Most of Afghanistan is covered by the Hindu Kush mountains, which sprawl from the North West to the centre of the country. To the North of the mountains lies a small area of fertile plains, whilst the South is dominated by an arid desert. Rain is rare, and usually falls over the Northern plains in

March and April.

Figure 1: Clockwise from top left: The Band-e-Amir National Park in Bamiyan Province, in the central highlands; The Saland Pass in the Hindu Kush; The Korengal Valley in the Northern Province of Kunar; The Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province, in the Southern plateau region. Image credits: Wikimedia Commons.

Melt water from the mountains feeds numerous rivers, streams and lakes, although much of this valuable resource flows over the border into Pakistan. Temperatures can vary widely, falling as low as -24°C in Winter, and climbing as high 50°C in Summer in the shade alone. Winter often brings snowstorms, Summer brings dust storms and drought, and the country’s location near the junction between the Eurasian and Indian tectonic plates make it prone to earthquakes. Transport links and communications infrastructure are rudimentary and unreliable, which hampers the

Afghan government’s ability to extend its authority over the entire area of the country – which is about sixteen times larger than Switzerland.

Figure 2: Topographical Map of Afghanistan. Image credits: Wikimedia Commons.

2.2 The Population of Afghanistan

The population of Afghanistan is just shy of 40 million people. Around three million people live in the capital city, Kabul. The population of the second city, Kandahar, is approximately 400,000

– just under that of Geneva. The country hosts a large number of diverse ethnicities, including

Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Aimak and Baloch (See figure 3). The official languages are

Pashto, spoken in Pashtun areas, and Dari, spoken in Hazara and Tajik areas. Turkmen and Uzbek are also spoken in the Northern provinces. 99% of the population are Muslim, the majority of whom are Sunni. The population of Afghanistan is relatively young; a 2012 study estimated that just 2.4% of the population were aged over 65 years (‘Afghanistan Population’, 2019). Afghanistan is a tribal society, and in some rural regions the traditional clan way life has continued unchanged for centuries. Many rulers throughout Afghan history have left the tribes in far-flung regions to self govern.

Figure 3: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan. Image credits: Wikimedia Commons. 24

2.3 The Afghan Economy

Decades of instability have taken a heavy toll on the Afghan economy. Afghanistan is a very poor country which relies on foreign aid, and living conditions in the country are ranked amongst the worst in the world (‘Afghanistan Overview’, 2019). The presence of foreign troops temporarily boosted economic growth, but since the foreign military drawdown in 2014 the economy has sagged once more. This has been exacerbated by the continued deterioration of the security situation (‘Afghanistan Economy’, 2019).

2.4 The Durand Line

The Durand Line, which separates Afghanistan from Pakistan, is the country’s longest and most controversial border. An overview of the line, including a brief history, belongs in this section since it is an extremely important geographical feature of Afghanistan. The Line dates back to an agreement signed in 1893 between Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary of India, and the Emir of Afghanistan. The agreement represented the first time in history that the border between

Afghanistan and British India (since Pakistan did not yet exist) had been officially demarcated.

The Emir accepted the border despite the fact that it cut across Pashtun and Baloch tribal land.

When Pakistan was founded in 1947, the Afghan Shah called for self-determination in Pashtun areas on the Pakistani side of the Line. When Pakistan refused, Afghanistan stopped recognising the Durand Line and claimed that the Pashtun regions of Pakistan rightfully belonged to

Afghanistan (Rahi, 2014).

Afghanistan therefore does not accept its longest internationally recognised border. This is one of the reasons for which the border is neither fenced, nor is it widely policed1– why would any country enforce a border which, in its view, does not officially exist? Moreover, the rugged terrain which characterises the border region would make sealing the border extremely difficult, even if it were recognised.

In recent times, the Afghan people and government have suffered a great deal from problems linked to the Durand Line. Differing opinions on the border led Pakistan to justifying its bombing of areas in Eastern Afghanistan by claiming that the region belonged to Pakistan. Moreover, a declassified CIA report notes that the porous nature of the border has historically allowed militants to travel with ease between the two countries, hampering efforts to quell insurgencies. Rahi (2014) affirms that this was indeed the case for the recent Taliban insurgency, since thousands of Islamist militants were able to cross the border to support the Taliban. As will be discussed in later chapters, the Taliban – who oppose the border on principle, since they believe that there should be no divisions in the Muslim world (Rahi, 2019) – have benefited enormously from being able to easily cross the border to seek refuge in Pakistan.

The economy has also been weakened by issues linked to the Durand Line. Every year tonnes of goods are smuggled over the border into Pakistan, meaning that the Afghan economy is being subverted by the black market (Rahi, 2019) – in a similar way to how the government is being subverted by the Taliban insurgency.

1 The 2,400km long border has 235 crossing points, 20 of which are used frequently. Border controls were in place at just two of these crossings in 2017 (Osman & Muzhary, 2017). 26

2.5 The History of Afghanistan

To fully grasp the current situation in Afghanistan it is necessary to understand its history. This is not always easy, since the narratives that we believe can be more potent than, and do not always accurately reflect, historical fact. Indeed, for Heehs (1994, p.1), ‘what we call history is, at best, mythistory’. Afghanistan could be said to be shrouded in ‘mythistory’, since its modern history is typified by misconceptions (Barfield, 2012).

New generations may have grown up hearing about Afghanistan only in the context of war. The mention of the country may therefore conjure up an image of a far-flung desert of never-ending and inevitable bloodshed. Such fatalistic views can also be found amongst political decision makers; in a television interview, Canadian Prime Minister Steven Harper asserted that ‘we’re never going to ever defeat the insurgency. Afghanistan has probably had – my reading of Afghan history, it’s probably had an insurgency forever, of some kind’ (Barfield, 2012, pp. 39-40). The prevailing narratives about Afghanistan tend to be based solely on the successive cataclysms which have shaken the country’s history, eclipsing millennia of rich cultural and religious exchange, thriving trade, and peace – albeit intermittent.

This bleak view of the country is also present looking further back into its history. The successive rise and fall of empires in the region has earned Afghanistan the disparaging title ‘the graveyard of empires’ (Barfield, 2012, p. 39). This casts a gloomy light on what, in fact, helped to make

Afghanistan a crucible of ethnicities, cultures and religions. From the bronze age, rich deposits of lapis lazuli fuelled trade with Mesopotamia, Pharaonic Egypt and the Indus civilisation, bringing wealth and foreign influence to the region. The Bactrian Greeks led by Alexander the Great left a

significant Hellenistic influence before being unseated by nomadic tribes who had united to reconquer the Afghan satrapies. The Hindu Shahis, the Persian Sassanids, the Central-Asian

Hepthalites, the Islamic armies, the Ghazanids, the Mongols led by Ghengis Khan, the Timurids, the Mughals of India and the Safavids of Persia ruled and left their own mark on the region before it slipped from their grasp (Barfield, 2012).

Moreover, Islam has not always been the main religion of Afghanistan. In fact, the Islamic armies experienced difficulty asserting their authority in the region; the local community would simply convert, and then reconvert once the army had moved on. Zoroastrianism thrived in early Afghan history. Hinduism was widespread under the Shahi dynasty, especially in Ghazni, where both

Hindu and Buddhist relics were discovered in the same temple (Ali et al., 2019). Pilgrims travelling the silk road from the East brought Buddhism, which became so influential that in the 6th century the largest Buddha statues in the world were carved into a cliff in Bamiyan. These statues were destroyed by the Taliban in 2001 (Ali et al., 2019).

2.5.1 The Great Game: Russia and Britain

Afghanistan’s more peaceful and prosperous days have been masked by its recent turmoil, giving rise to a view of the country as a land of endemic bloodshed. However, Afghanistan should not be viewed as a place that is naturally prone to conflict. Rather, for the past two centuries it has been caught in the middle of rival foreign empires, and torn apart from within by clashing ideologies

(Stewart, 2012) the roots of which lie firmly outside the Afghan borders.

Figure 4: Map of Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Image credits: Wikimedia Commons.

The recent troubles began in the early 19th century, when the country sat at the meeting point of the Russian and British empires. The Russians were afraid of the British expanding North. The

British were afraid that the Russians would win over the Afghan Shah and invade the ‘jewel in the crown of the empire’, British India (Stewart, 2012). Growing imperial paranoia pushed both empires into a match of espionage activities which would be termed, by the Russians and British respectively, the ‘tournament of shadows’ and ‘the Great Game’ (Stewart, 2012).

Figure 5: Cartoon caption reads: ‘"If at this moment it has been decided to invade the Ameer's territory, we are acting in pursuance of a policy which in its intention has been uniformly friendly to Afghanistan.” – Times, Nov. 21.’. The Amir of Afghanistan stands between the Russian bear and the British lion. Punch, or the London Charivari. November 30, 1878. Image credits: Wikimedia Commons.

So great were the suspicions of the British that they placed an army of occupation and laboured to win over the Shah, presenting him with:

‘such gifts as muskets, double and six-barrelled pistols, watches, telescopes, full length

mirrors, crystal dishes, and music boxes the like of which had never been seen by anyone

in this region up to this time. They also gave him two elephants with howdahs worked in

red gold and white silver and a gold-embroidered topcoat all of which they had brought on

behalf of the King of England’ (Fayż, 2013(a), p. 125).

Following this encounter, ‘the threads of friendship and harmony were tightly woven together’

(Fayż, 2013(a), p. 125). However, this amity was not to last. As the British occupation endured, the local population felt increasing mistrust towards their foreign occupiers. After hearing rumours of British soldiers philandering with local women, the Shah called for holy jihad against the British

(Stewart, 2012). The situation descended into a bloodbath, sparking off a series of attacks and revenge attacks that would span over half a century. Ultimately, the Afghan Shah and the British

Generals concluded a pact stating that should the Russians try to use Afghanistan as a stepping stone for invading British India, the British would give the Afghans sufficient funding and weaponry to curb the attack (Fayż, 2013). The Durand Line was established to clearly divide

Afghanistan and British India.

2.5.2 Tradition and Modernity

After World War One, with the threat of Tsarist Russia gone, Britain fully relinquished its hold on

Afghanistan (Stewart, 2012) and in 1919 King Amanullah ascended to the throne in a newly independent country. Inspired by his travels in Europe he quickly set about making reforms, from modernising the constitution and abolishing the obligatory wearing of the veil to decreeing that tribal leaders should wear pinstripe trousers (Stewart, 2012). However, these radical reforms, along with rumours of him consuming pork and alcohol, provoked a violent backlash from conservative parts of society (Stewart, 2012). A civil war broke out during which the King was exiled in Zurich.

The fate of King Amanullah points to a feature of Afghan society which must be understood to fully appreciate its current troubles. In the western idea of the state, ‘lines on a map denote precise boundaries’ within which ‘the state’s authority is presumed to be universal and absolute’ (Barfield,

2012, p. 40). Afghanistan, on the other hand, has traditionally been based on a different model of the state; over history, rulers contented themselves with controlling cities, towns and the most fertile farm land, leaving the isolated villages of the hinterlands to self-govern (Barfield, 2012).

The authority of modern leaders trying to impose centralised rule was therefore seen by self- contained rural communities as ‘illegitimate if it transgressed established barriers of autonomy’

(Barfield, 2012, p. 40). By bringing 20th century Europe to rural Afghanistan, reformist King

Amanullah crossed the established line.

In rural and mountainous areas of Afghanistan there are still over 20,000 isolated villages (Stewart,

2012). These places are difficult to reach and well beyond direct governmental rule (Barfield,

2012). The apparent impossibility of consolidating central authority over the whole of Afghanistan could partially explain the fragility of the current government in Kabul; urban and rural

Afghanistan exist side by side, but remain poles apart (Barfield, 2012).

2.5.3 The Cold War in Afghanistan

Despite Afghanistan being in a state of disunity, peace prevailed for several decades until the country was once again caught in the middle of two grappling superpowers. When the Cold War was at its height, Afghanistan sat between the USSR and two allies of the USA, Iran and Pakistan.

The USSR was afraid that the USA would cause trouble on their Southern border. The USA feared that the Russians would try to expand South in search of a warm water port (Stewart, 2012). Both superpowers therefore set about trying to gain influence in Afghanistan, the Soviets supporting communist bodies and projects and the Americans supporting a counter-narrative. The country was left deeply polarised and ultimately descended into a state of violent political upheaval. This prompted the 1979 Soviet invasion, which, for the USA, was a golden opportunity to strike out at

the USSR. In the largest covert operation in American history, accurately portrayed in the film

Charlie Wilson’s War, billions of dollars-worth of weaponry were channelled to the mujahideen,

Islamist warlord units fighting the Soviets. After a decade of bloodshed, the USSR withdrew having suffered a resounding defeat. Two years later, the Cold War came to an end. Afghanistan, however, was left to descend into a bitter civil war between warlords with stockpiles of leading- edge weaponry. It was in 1994, in the midst of this chaos, that a new power rose to prominence, promising to restore order: the Taliban.

2.5.4 The Rise of the Taliban

At the end of the Soviet War, the one-eyed Pashtun former mujahid Mullah Omar founded and taught at a religious school, or madrasah, in the Southern Afghan province of Kandahar. Claiming to have had a vision commanding him to bring peace to Afghanistan, he led his madrasah students

– his ṭālibān, the Arabic word for students – in a campaign promising to restore law and order to a war-weary country (Ghufran, 2001).

In the beginning, the Taliban were immensely popular (Rashid, 1999). There was no shortage of new recruits, most of whom were young refugee men fresh from Pakistani religious schools preaching a radical form of Islam (Rashid, 1999). Taliban rule swept over the country, sinking any opposition. The group seized Kabul in 1996 and Mullah Omar was named Emir of Afghanistan.

By 1998 the Taliban had conquered most of the country. Their last remaining rivals, the Northern

Alliance, a militia of non-Pashtun minorities, were cornered in a small scrap of strategic mountainous territory in the North (Rashid, 1999). Formally recognised by the governments of

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Taliban held all the cards in their hand: political legitimacy, military clout and religious authority.

It was hoped that the Taliban would bring peace to Afghanistan, but this was not to be (Carlisle,

2010). They ruled the country with an iron fist. Reports of ethnic cleansing, massacres and medieval styles of punishment soon emerged. Disobedience was punishable by flogging, stoning to death, amputation of hands, and public execution in the national sports stadium, including death by hanging from a slowly rising crane (Azzi, 1999). A strict dress code was enforced for both women and men. Women were not allowed to go out in public without a chaperone, attend school, or work (Carlisle, 2010). Activities such as kite flying and playing chess were banned, making the

Taliban regime as incomprehensible as it was cruel in the eyes of outsiders.

Reports of Taliban atrocities brought to the fore negative stereotypes about Islam that have soured relations between states and peoples around the world (Carlisle, 2010). The Taliban’s extremism has whitewashed Afghanistan’s image with that of Islamic fundamentalism, birthing the assumption that intolerant, dogmatic Islam has always been widespread in Afghanistan. However, this is not the case.

It is true that Afghanistan has long been a deeply conservative Muslim country, but historically the Islam practiced was philosophical and open in nature (Gunn, 2003). When Islam arrived in

Afghanistan, unlike in the other conquered lands the fledgling religion blended with Buddhism,

Zoroastrianism and local cult practices (Azad, 2017). In medieval Afghanistan Islam shaped itself around pre-existing religious rituals and customs (Lenz-Raymann, 2014), setting a precedent for a long tradition of religious tolerance. Indeed, until the outbreak of the civil war Islamic sectarianism was not a problem, and Afghan Hindus, Sikhs and Jews coexisted (Rashid, 1999). This is partially

explained by the dominance of the tolerant Hanafi school of thought (Lenz-Raymann, 2014) and the enormous popularity of non-dogmatic Islamic mysticism, Sufism (Chakravarty, 2002; Rashid,

1999).

Moreover, the Hanafi school of thought is non-hierarchical and decentralised (Chakravarty, 2002), akin to Afghanistan’s traditional political custom of allowing for tribal self-rule, which

Chakravarty aptly describes as ‘a watchman’s concept of state with little interference in the daily lives of the constituent tribes’ (2002, p. 68). Traditional Afghan Islam does not work in favour of centralised totalitarian rule like that enforced by the Taliban (Chakravarty, 2002). This raises several questions: how did such an extreme group emerge in a country with a long history of religious tolerance? And how did they gain support in a country torn asunder by religious, ethnic and tribal divisions?

Sullivan notes that the Taliban are frequently described as appearing ‘from thin air’ or ‘emerging from nowhere’ (2007, p. 93). Indeed, during the 1980s, tolerant Islamic schools of thought still prevailed; it was the influential Sufi orders Naqshbandiyah and Qaderiya that rallied the mujahideen, not the radical Islamists (Chakravarty, 2002). However, external influences soon tipped the scales in favour of more radical factions. The Pakistani secret services, charged with distributing covert American support for the mujahideen, channelled the lion’s share of aid to

Jamiat-e Islami, the radical Islamic party. Over time these fundamentalist fronts ‘ossified into a hardened camp of intolerance’ (Chakravarty, 2002, p. 68) laying the ideological foundations for the birth of the Taliban.

There is a common misconception that Pakistan created the Taliban. Whilst it is true that Pakistan fuelled radical Islam, they did not directly create the Taliban, nor did they manage to create a puppet regime by funding the radical Islamic party. In fact, the Pakistani-funded group later joined the Northern Alliance, who were the Taliban’s enemies. Crucially, the Jamiat-e Islami were able to seize control of Kabul, founding a government which Pakistan suspected of being anti-Pakistan and pro-India. When Mullah Omar and his students began conquering the country with a view to overthrowing the pro-India Kabul government, they attracted Pakistan’s interest (Rashi, 2019).

The Taliban were by no means the ideal solution for Pakistan; the Taliban do not recognise the

Durand Line, and by extension oppose Pakistan’s control of Pashtun regions between the Line and the Indus river. But they were the lesser of two evils. Pakistan put its money on the Taliban in the hope that they would restore law and order – opening overland trade routes to Central Asia – and provide them with a strategic depth against India2.

However, the extent to which the brief window of Taliban rule served Pakistani interests is questionable. Rashi (2019) argues that contrary to popular belief, Pakistan were not able to take advantage of the Taliban to further their strategic goals. Rather, the Taliban were able to take advantage of Pakistan, using the country as a strategic depth against the international coalition.

This view is supported by Osman and Muzhary’s (2017) study based on interviews with Taliban militants and commanders, which affirms that the Taliban ‘use Pakistan as a sanctuary’ and ‘rear base’. The majority of Taliban leaders are settled in Pakistan, and it is the group’s preferred location for convening and training (Osman & Muzhary, 2017).

2 Strategic depth is a military term coined in the 1980s. It refers to the distance between a country’s main industrial centres, which fuel its military, and the front lines. It can also mean the distance to which an army would be able to retreat in the event of an incident on the front lines (Hakimi, 2010). The greater the strategic depth, the better. 36

Madrasas were also central in the emergence of the Taliban (Rashid, 1999). With the Soviet invasion, a flood of refugees surged over the Pakistani border. In refugee camps, hard-line madrasas funded by Saudi Arabia were often the only source of formal education (Sullivan, 2007).

Scores of madrasas were founded, teaching Afghan boys the Taliban’s strict interpretation of

Islam, the Deobandi school of thought (Farrell, 2017). From the mid to late nineties, these young men and teenagers returned in droves to Afghanistan (Carlisle, 2010).

Rashid (1999) argues that the timing of the Taliban’s return was another a key factor of their rapid success. Exhausted by years of bloody internecine fighting between warlords, many people lent their support to the Taliban simply in the hope that they would check the power of despotic warlords and put an end to the bloodshed. In addition, the civil war had destroyed the country’s tradition of tolerance, pitting ethnic, religious and tribal groups against each other like never before

(Rashid, 1999). Islam was thus transformed from a pacifying influence to ‘a lethal weapon in the hands of extremists and a force for division and fragmentation’ (Rashid, 1999, p. 25).

At the outset, the rise of the Taliban stirred up hope that peace could be on the horizon in

Afghanistan. When the Taliban showed their true colours, these hopes were dashed and it became clear that Afghanistan would continue to be a pariah state where human rights abuses were rife.

2.5.5 The Taliban and al Qaeda

Towards the end of the 1990s, the Taliban threat took on a new dimension. Taliban human rights abuses, whilst reprehensible, had been confined within the Afghan borders. By providing a safe

haven for the al Qaeda network3, also born from the Soviet War, the Taliban were incubating a threat of global proportions.

Indeed, Azzi (1999) notes that in the late 1990s, Taliban atrocities were pushed from centre stage in the Western media by reports of the regime hosting al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. The

United States demanded his extradition because he had been linked to the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The Taliban did make a token effort to cooperate, offering to hold a trial for bin Laden in which American evidence would be heard. Writing in 1999, Azzi goes on to assert that:

‘By not taking advantage of this opportunity, the United States ensured that bin Laden

would remain free from extradition while in Afghanistan. Indeed, the United States’

opportunity to capture bin Laden may be completely lost now, as reports in February of

this year indicate bin Laden may have covertly fled from Afghanistan in order to organize

terrorist activity more easily’ (1999, p. 14).

The Taliban continued to host Osama bin Laden, who went on to organise the September 11th terrorist attacks, the deadliest act of terrorism to date.

3 Al Qaeda, meaning ‘the base’ in Arabic, is a militant Sunni Islamist organisation led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. It was founded in the 1980s to act as a support network for the mujahideen. In the midi 1990s the Taliban regime allowed the al Qaeda network to establish its headquarters in Afghanistan, from which place the group planned and executed the September 11th terrorist attacks. 38

Chapter 3 The War

3.1 The Invasion and ISAF

It was the Taliban’s refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden following the September 11th terrorist attacks that led to the invasion of Afghanistan. The horror of the attacks prompted the then US

Secretary of State to send the Taliban an ultimatum: give up bin Laden or ‘suffer the full wrath of the US and its allies’ (Carlisle, 2010). When the Taliban refused, the United States launched

Operation Enduring Freedom, aiming to crush al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts without becoming embroiled in a long-term conflict (Ware, 2011). The American strategy was to wage ‘war lite’, preferring intelligence operations and strategic alliances to ‘boots on the ground’. CIA officers were deployed to persuade the ‘ragtag militia’ Northern Alliance, which had been able to maintain control of strategic mountainous terrain in the North (see figure 6, p. 41), to join forces with the sophisticated US Army (Ware, 2011). Despite the incongruous nature of the coalition, the Taliban were shattered within months and the campaign was hailed as a ‘stunning success’ (Veit, 2002, p.

4). The outcome of the early campaign created a feeling of ‘mission accomplished’ (Ware, 2011).

Over the following months the US and an international coalition continued to conduct military operations to wipe out the remaining Taliban presence. With the Taliban threat apparently neutralised (Carlisle, 2010), the focus shifted to rebuilding Afghanistan (Rabasa et al., 2011). The

Bonn Conference in 2001 saw the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an international coalition aiming to support and provide security for the new Kabul government led by Hamid Karzai (Rabasa et al., 2011). Military operations were scaled down since the Taliban

seemed to have been defeated, and there was no indication that an insurgency was nigh (Rabasa et al., 2011).

Figure 6: Map showing the changing territory of warring parties in Afghanistan from 1992 to late 2001, after the initial offensive against the Taliban. Notice how the mountainous terrain in the North-West creates a perfect defensive stronghold (see topographical map to the left); Jamiat-e Islami (later part of the Northern Alliance) was able to resist the Taliban in the mountains, but lost control of the less mountainous terrain around Herat. This illustrates the fact that Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain makes the country difficult to fully conquer. Perhaps this goes some way to explaining why so many empires throughout history have failed to consolidate their power over the region. Image credits: Wikimedia Commons.

However, the Taliban had not been fully defeated. During the initial offensive Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar had taken refuge in the Tora Bora caves in the Eastern White Mountains before slipping over the border into Pakistan (Ware, 2011). Other Taliban fighters had also fled to

Pakistan, where they were slowly but surely regrouping (Rabasa et al., 2011).

3.2 The Taliban Insurgency

Barely a year later, with the support of al Qaeda fighters, the Taliban were preparing to counterattack the coalition (Rabasa et al., 2011). Violence spread over the country. NATO-led

ISAF operations were initially restricted to Kabul, but faced with a growing insurgency they had been expanded across the whole country by mid 2006. Over the following years the violence continued to escalate, scuppering development projects and drawing ISAF troops into a fierce battle against an insurgency that could not be fully quelled (Rabasa et al., 2011).

The Taliban insurgency has been described by a former CIA officer as ‘one of the most brilliant military comebacks of modern times’ (Ware, 2011). Their return turned the tide of the conflict, and US and ISAF forces proved unable to contain the insurgency. Some attribute this to the fact that after the initial defeat of the Taliban, the coalition no longer had clearly defined goals; states with troops deployed in violent areas believed that the main goal was to conquer the Taliban, whereas countries operating in more peaceful provinces saw ISAF’s main goals to be peacekeeping and nation building (Grenier & Mattox, 2015).

Further explanation for the unbridled growth of the insurgency can be found in the weakness of the Kabul government. Speaking at the Naval War College in the sixties, counterinsurgency expert

Bernard Fall stated ‘when a country is being subverted, it is not being outfought; it is being out administered… [W]e can win the war and lose the country.’ (Ricks, 2010). This is why American and ISAF forces endeavoured to support and provide security for Karzai’s fledgling government.

Paradoxically, Karzai’s close relationship with the coalition forces may have weakened his authority; some came to seen him as a foreign puppet, and Afghanistan has a long tradition of defying foreign rule (Carlisle, 2010).

Moreover, as discussed in previous chapters, Afghanistan has historically resisted centralised rule based on Manichaean Western concepts of state and governance, instead operating on an implicit understanding that rural tribes would be left to self-govern. Many resented interference from the distant government in Kabul (Carlisle, 2010). Indeed, Karzai experienced great difficulty extending his authority into other provinces, earning him the disparaging nickname the ‘mayor of

Kabul’ (Carlisle, 2010).

Furthermore, it became clear that Karzai’s government was steeped in corruption, legitimising the

Taliban’s subversion of the central powers and gaining support for the insurgency amongst those who felt exasperated by the continued presence of venal civil servants (Farrell, 2017).

3.3 The End in Sight?

The beginning of 2015 marked the transition from ISAF to NATO’s Resolute Support mission, designed to provide support and training to the Afghan Security Forces and government. Since then, the security situation has continued to deteriorate, with civilians bearing the brunt of the conflict. War exhaustion has made a political settlement seem an increasingly viable option (‘The

Current Situation in Afghanistan’, 2019). A three-day cease fire between the Taliban and the

Afghan Security Forces, and the holding of US led peace talks, also lean in this direction. However, in light of President Trump’s decision to suspend peace talks with the Taliban in September 2019, it remains unclear when the Afghan people can hope for some respite after nearly half a century of war (Wilder, 2019).

3.4 The British Campaign in Afghanistan

In early January 2002, a plane carrying British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his wife, Cherie, flew into Bagram air base in North East Afghanistan. A red carpet was rolled out in Blair’s honour

- which he was warned not to step off, since large swathes of the airfield were mined. Meeting with the newly inaugurated President Karzai, Blair promised that ‘Britain would stay with them for the long term’ (Farrell, 2017, p. 116).

Blair believed that Britain was morally obligated to help restore peace and security to Afghanistan

(Farrell, 2017). Britain therefore supported its American allies from the very beginning by launching Operation Veritas in October 2001. Small numbers of British Special Forces troops were dispatched, followed by ground troops to root out the remaining Taliban fighters. Operation

Veritas was succeeded by Operation Fingal, the code name for Britain’s contribution to early ISAF efforts. All subsequent military operations, including the operations in Helmand province, were led under Operation Herrick, which replaced Operation Fingal in 2002. The British military presence in Afghanistan spanned from October 2001 to October 2014 after Prime Minister David

Cameron announced the withdrawal of British troops. In January 2015 Operation Herrick was replaced by Operation Toral, the UK’s contribution to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission. During

the war, 456 British soldiers were killed, and hundreds more were wounded or sustained life changing injuries. Nearly £40 billion were spent on the campaign, which has since been deemed

‘unwinnable’ (Farrell, 2017).

In Spring 2006, when ISAF countries divided up operations in the different Afghan provinces, the

UK assumed responsibility for Helmand province. The remote Southern province was economically dependent on opiates, with poor infrastructure and public services (Ware, 2011).

Corruption was rife and drug gangs operated unchecked in the absence of any working security or justice system (Ware, 2011). Undaunted, Blair had an ambitious vision for rebuilding – or indeed building – the medieval province, establishing a link between the people of Helmand and the Kabul government, and promoting economic development (Egnell, 2011). It was a bold endeavour, and has been likened to attempting to fully form Belgium in a few years (Ware, 2011). A planning team sent to Helmand in 2005 judged the goals to be unrealistic, but the mission went ahead. 3,300 troops were deployed to the main British base in Helmand Province, Camp Bastion. Just 800 of these troops were to be engaged in combat. Because of the small number of troops, the mission was to be limited to central Helmand around the provincial capital Lashkargah (Ware, 2011).

When the British army arrived in Lashkargah, the governor of the province informed them that lawless gunmen were roaming unchecked in Northern Helmand, and implored them to intervene.

Despite their strong reservations, the army was strong-armed into spreading its limited forces over four more districts than planned: Musaqala, Nowzad, Kajakidam and Sangin. The arrival of the army in these areas ‘stirred up a hornets’ nest’ (Ware, 2011). The British were drawn into a fierce conflict against Taliban fighters, drug groups and locals who resented the foreign military

presence. They were sucked ever deeper into a quagmire, fighting to prop up a government crippled by corruption in complex society which it was difficult fully understand (Ware, 2011).

Figure 7: Map of Helmand Province. Image Credits: Wikimedia Commons.

Some argue that in the early days in Helmand, the British made tactical errors by relying too heavily on military operations (Farrell, 2017; Egnell, 2011), which may have fuelled the insurgency by pushing locals to siding with the Taliban (Ware, 2011; Farrell, 2017). It is not 45

uncommon for a military to make tactical errors early on in a campaign (Farrell, 2017), and the

British did later adopt a more successful counterinsurgency strategy based on psyops, or psychological operations to win over the local population. This strategy is based on the idea that the keystone of a successful counterinsurgency campaign is winning over the hearts and minds of locals to gain support for the government (Farrell, 2017). The role of interpreters could be said to be particularly crucial in psyops, since they involve building a relationship with the local population.

Overall, the reconstruction mission in Helmand was hampered by the security situation, itself aggravated by the arrival of foreign troops of whom there were too few to effectively restore order

(Egnell, 2011). A large deployment of US troops in Helmand in spring 2009 swung the balance in favour of ISAF forces (Egnell, 2011), and significant gains had been made by the time the British army withdrew. However, this did not translate into sustainable progress because of pervasive corruption in the central government (Farrell, 2017). After all, winning support for the government may be the keystone of counterinsurgency operations, but the cornerstone is having a non-corrupt government to defend.

In October 2014 the last British troops withdrew from Helmand province, and after eight years of fighting Camp Bastion fell silent. And yet the security situation in Helmand, and Afghanistan as a whole, has continued to deteriorate. The Taliban have consistently targeted LECs (Locally

Employed Civilians) who worked for ISAF forces (Engelhart, 2015), including former interpreters.

Chapter 4 Local Interpreters in Helmand Province

Local Afghan interpreters played an instrumental role in the Helmand Mission. They were present in every exchange, helping British soldiers to understand local culture (Wilson 2011). Without them, a partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan army would have been impossible (Wilson, 2011). Local Afghan interpreters have been known to go far beyond the call of the duty, risking their lives to save British soldiers (Gómez Amich, 2013; Tălpaș, 2016).

Military officials and soldiers who served in Afghanistan have underscored the importance of their interpreters, without whom the army would have been ‘helpless’ and ‘blind’ (Wilson, 2011).

4.1 The Role of Local Afghan Interpreters

2,904 Afghan civilians worked as interpreters for the British in Afghanistan between 2001 and

2014 (Sawer, Farmer & Barbakarkhail, 2015b) accounting for around half of the 7,000 LECs in

British employ. It is difficult to define their exact responsibilities since, as Baigorri Jalón (2011) observes is often the case, their role is vast. A job description published by a private agency under contract to the British government states that ‘their role will be to accompany British patrols as well as working on military bases. They will act as a liaison between troops and the indigenous population, the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police’ (‘thebigword Appointed by Ministry of Defence to Provide Interpreters for Afghanistan’, n.d.). According to the Ministry of Defence, Afghan interpreters sometimes accompanied troops on patrol or during other operations up to four times per day. They also interpreted for high profile visitors, including Prince

Charles, Foreign Secretary William Hague and Defence Secretary Liam Fox (Brown, 2018).

4.2 Risks faced by Local Afghan Interpreters

A report released by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee notes that LECs were often exposed to danger, and ‘the greatest risks were taken by those acting as interpreters who accompanied British troops on operational patrols’ (‘Lost in Translation?’, 2018). Interpreters played a dangerous front-line role, running the same risks as the troops who they accompanied without benefiting from the same military training. They were exposed to enemy fire, booby trap attacks (Farmer, 2009) and IED explosions (Williams, 2018). Some interpreters wounded on duty have complained of not receiving sick pay, and having to cover their own medical fees (Farmer,

2009). When the British Forces withdrew, interpreters allegedly had their contracts terminated rather than being made redundant (Williams, 2018). If these reports are true, this would add a financial dimension to their precarity, exacerbated by the impossibility of earning a living in hiding.

Some accepted this dangerous work for the relatively good salary (Wilson, 2011) of around $1,500 per month, in a place where GDP per capita is approximately $650 (Engelhart, 2015). Others did so in the hope of being granted a visa to the UK (Wilson, 2011), whilst some interpreters say that they were motivated by a desire to rebuild, stabilise and help bring peace to their country (Brown,

2018).

4.3 Taliban Reprisals against Local Afghan Interpreters

The important role played by local Afghan interpreters has not escaped the notice of Taliban insurgents. ‘They say we are the eyes and ears of ISAF’, says one interpreter (Wilson, 2011). Since the UK withdrawal was announced there has been a marked increase in Taliban attacks against 48

LECs (Engelhart, 2015). Reports have emerged of interpreters being kidnapped, beaten threatened, tortured and beheaded – the punishment assigned to the ‘infidel’s translators’ in the 2010 Taliban

Code of Conduct (Engelhart, 2015). Many interpreters are living in hiding for fear of themselves or their families being targeted (Sawer, Farmer & Barbakarkhail, 2015b).

As a result of their work for the British army, local Afghan interpreters have become a magnet for

Taliban revenge attacks (Engelhart, 2015). ‘Betrayal of the Brave’, a media campaign launched by the Daily Mail newspaper in the year following the British drawdown, reported one former interpreter being shot, and his pregnant wife losing her baby after being beaten by Taliban militants

(Williams, 2015). Another young interpreter was reported to have been shot dead on his doorstep by the Taliban (Williams & Brown, 2015), and others have allegedly been tortured, murdered, or have had to pay people smugglers to help them flee the Taliban (Williams, 2015). Once protected by the military presence, the interpreters of Helmand province were even more exposed to Taliban violence after the British withdrawal.

4.4 The British Government Response

In Spring 2013 General Sir Mike Jackson, the former Chief of the General Staff, penned an open letter to the Times newspaper in which he appealed to the government to help local Afghan interpreters ‘in danger of being abandoned by the British’ (Coghlan, 2013). Sir Mike and the other signatories, including Lord Ashdown, roundly condemned Britain being the only NATO country not to have granted asylum to its former LECs, who ‘risked their lives and made extraordinary sacrifices just like British soldiers’ (Coghlan, 2013). He wrote that ‘Britain has a moral obligation to support this small number of brave men who put themselves in grave danger so that British

soldiers could do their jobs’ (Coghlan, 2013). In the same year Alexander Perkins, Winston

Churchill’s great grandson who served in Afghanistan, launched a petition calling upon the government to stop denying former interpreters sanctuary, which he saw as being ‘morally reprehensible’ and tantamount to ‘condemning [the interpreters] to persecution and almost certain death at the hands of the Taliban’ (Kisiel & Infante, 2013). The AIIC Interpreters in Conflict Zones

Project (ICZ), part of the coalition to help translators and interpreters at risk4, has worked to increase the visibility of these ‘abandoned interpreters’, including by urging governments to protect their former linguists, and by supporting a petition calling for a UN resolution on the protection of translators and interpreters in conflict zones (Fitchett, 2018).

There is a general consensus amongst senior military officers that the British government has a duty to protect its former interpreters. The government claims to have held true to its debt of gratitude by establishing two schemes: the Redundancy Scheme and the Intimidation Scheme.

Both schemes have been sources of controversy. Widespread criticism of the schemes prompted the House of Commons Defence Committee to conduct a review of both schemes in 2018. The following section, unless otherwise indicated, draws on the findings of the report (‘Lost in

Translation?’, 2018).

The Intimidation Scheme, established in 2010, is theoretically open to all LECs. The Scheme aims to protect LECs who have been threatened by insurgents by relocating them in Afghanistan or, as

4 The coalition includes FIT (Fédération Internationale de Traducteurs), IAPTI (International Association of Professional Translators and Interpreters), WASLI (World Association of Sign Language Interpreters), CLI (Critical Link International), which supports community interpreters, and Red T, a non-profit organisation which promotes the protection of translators and interpreters working in high-risk settings. 50

a last resort, resettling them in the UK. To qualify, claimants must prove to the UK Intimidation

Investigations Unit (IIU) in Kabul that their lives are in danger as a direct result of having worked for the British. Claims are considered on a case-by-case basis using a traffic-light system to assess the threat level. A ‘Green’ threat level would close the case with the provision of security advice, an ‘Amber’ threat would mean relocation in Afghanistan, and only a ‘Red’ threat level would see relocation to the UK considered.

Figure 8: British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Afghanistan travel advice map, 2014.

At the time of writing, no LECs have been resettled in the UK under the Intimidation Scheme, despite the continued deterioration of the security situation (compare figures 4 and 5). By early

2017 the IIU had received 401 claims. Just one case was classed as a ‘red’ threat level, in spite of reports that the situation was so dangerous that the IIU was operating remotely within the confines

of the NATO base at Hamid Karzai International Airport (see figure 5). The one LEC considered for resettlement failed to pass the security screening and was denied a visa. The Defence Select

Committee judged the scheme to have ‘dismally failed to give any meaningful assurance of protection’ (‘Lost in Translation?’, 2018, p. 19) and called upon the government to ‘abandon its policy of leaving former interpreters and other loyal personnel dangerously exposed in a country deemed too dangerous for those charged with assessing their claims to venture out from their bases in order to do so’ (‘Lost in Translation?’, 2018, p. 4).

Figure 9: British Foreign & Commonwealth Office Afghanistan travel advice map, 2019.

The Redundancy or Ex-Gratia Scheme was more successful. Established in 2013, the Scheme offered a choice between a one-off financial payment or funding for further education to LECs who, on the 19th December 2012 (when the drawdown was announced) were working for the

British, and had been for at least a year. A third option of relocation to the UK was available to interpreters who had served in a frontline role in Helmand province for at least one year. Five-year visas were to be granted, with the possibility of applying for Indefinite Leave to Remain.

A year after the establishment of the scheme just two visas had been issued (Engelhart, 2015), but by spring 2018 the scheme had brought 450 LECs and 700 dependents to the UK, and had provided training and financial support to another 372 individuals.

However, BBC News has reported that interpreters resettled in the UK faced ‘stress and anguish’

(Gruffydd-Jones, 2019) because they were not able to bring their families with them immediately.

In addition, in early 2018 150 Afghan interpreters brought to the UK under the scheme were informed that they would have to pay thousands of pounds to be granted Indefinite Leave to

Remain, or risk being repatriated (‘Lost in Translation?’, 2018). Following a media outcry, Home

Secretary Sajid Javid announced that the fees would be waived (Brown, 2018).

Furthermore, the eligibility cut-off date of December 2012 has been deemed arbitrary and unjustified (Brown & Williams, 2019b). In June 2018 Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson moved the cut-off date to 2006, claiming that this would allow 50 more interpreters and their families to qualify for UK visas under the scheme (Brown & Williams, 2018). However, by April 2019 none of these interpreters had arrived in the UK despite reports of increasing Taliban violence against former LECs (Brown & Williams, 2019a). In August 2019 it was revealed that the Ministry of

Defence had overestimated the number of interpreters eligible under the new criteria. Just two

more former interpreters qualified, both of whom arrived in the UK in August 2019 (Brown &

Williams, 2019b).

In 2015, two former interpreters took the UK government to court claiming that the government’s failure to provide Afghan interpreters with a scheme equal to the 2007 resettlement scheme for

Iraqi interpreters5 was discriminatory (Engelhart, 2015). The lawyer acting on behalf of the two

Afghan interpreters claimed that government policy towards Afghan LECs breached the 2010

Equality Act. However, the judge ruled in favour of the government. One of the claimants, known simply as ‘AL’ to protect his identity, is still in hiding in Afghanistan (Feeney, 2015). The other claimant in the case was former interpreter Mohammed Rafi Hotak. After settling in the UK, he retrained as an accountant; his training fees were paid for by two anonymous readers of The Times after the newspaper reported his story. He works as an accounting clerk and sometimes spends

Christmas with British soldiers for whom he interpreted. However, Rafi felt that the court case was the only way of bringing his wife and children to the UK, and many other former LECs are still in

Afghanistan (Engelhart, 2015).

5 The British government established a scheme called the Gateway Protection Programme, designed to resettle vulnerable civilians employed by the British in Iraq. 69 Iraqis were resettled under the scheme in 2007, 355 in 2008 and 432 in 2009 (Hancock, 2010). The same scheme was not extended to local civilians in British employ in Afghanistan because the British Ministry of Defence did not view the threat level in Afghanistan to be equal to that of Iraq (‘HMG Policy on Afghan Interpreters’, 2015). 54

Chapter 5 The British Media Portrayal of Local Afghan Interpreters and their Situation

5.1 Introduction

This section will explore the narratives constructed or conveyed by the British media about local

Afghan interpreters in British employ by analysing a corpus of press articles. Here, the term

‘narrative’ does not mean literary narrative, but rather the stories that we tell ourselves about the world(s) around us (Baker, 2006) and how we perceive it. What interests us is not the stream of textual narrative within each article, but rather how these articles flow into overarching narratives about local Afghan interpreters. After discussing the narratives carried in the British press about the interpreters, we will look at the role of the British media as a narrator of the interpreters’ story.

5.2 Objectives

The main objective of this qualitative study will be to analyse, from a narrative approach, the

British media’s portrayal of local Afghan interpreters employed by the British, the risks that they face and the British government’s reaction thereto. This is based on the notion that how interpreters are viewed has a concrete impact on how they are treated (Baker, 2010; Beebee, 2010), and since government policy can be influenced by public opinion (Younger, 1955), which is itself swayed by the media (Anastasio, Rose & Chapman, 1999), positive media attention about Afghan interpreters could have the power to influence British government policy towards them.

The analysis is broken down into several research questions:

• How do the corpus articles depict:

o the current situation of the interpreters? (5.5.1)

o the role of local Afghan interpreters in British employ? (5.5.2)

o the character of the interpreters? (5.5.3)

o British government policy towards the interpreters? (5.5.4)

In order to fully understand the answers to these questions, it is important to address what kind of narrator is telling the interpreters’ story. Traditional, objective journalism requires reporters to cover stories in a detached, objective fashion. However, when reporting on morally contentious stories journalists have been known to use their writing as a way of influencing opinion on the subject (McLaughlin, 2016). Our opinions, informed by the narratives that we believe, govern our actions (Baker, 2010). In this view, by swaying public opinion the media becomes a player rather than a mere reporter. This may be the case with British media coverage of our topic. Therefore, the final research question will be:

• What kind of role does the British media assume in its coverage of our subject? (5.5.5)

This study is not intended to make a moral judgement about Afghan interpreters and their situation, but rather to observe and understand how the British media has covered this topic.

5.3 Selection of Corpus

5.3.1 Selection of Publications

The corpus includes articles gathered from 10 national British newspapers. These include tabloid, broadsheet, daily and Sunday newspapers and reflect publications at different points on the

political spectrum. Three criteria were taken into consideration for selecting the newspapers: fame, popularity and accessibility. A YouGov Rating6 was used to assess the fame and popularity of the newspapers. The publications selected are the following:

• The Daily Mail, most famous and the 5th most popular newspaper

• The Sun, the 2nd most famous and the 7th most popular newspaper

• The Guardian, the 3rd most famous and the 2nd most popular newspaper

• The Daily Mirror, the 4th most famous and the 4th most popular newspaper

• The Daily Express, the 5th most famous and the 19th most popular newspaper

• The Sunday Times, the 6th most famous and the 4th most popular newspaper

• The Sunday Mirror, the 7th most famous and the 14th most popular newspaper

• The Daily Telegraph, the 8th most famous and the 11th most popular newspaper

• The Times, the 9th most famous and the 3rd most popular newspaper

• The Independent, the 10th most famous and the 6th most popular newspaper

Articles were also gathered from BBC News, which does not feature in the ranking because it is a website rather than a newspaper, but is nonetheless a famous and popular source of news. Two additional articles were included from the Evening Standard since they provide further examples of themes present in the main corpus, and are representative of the publication’s relatively limited coverage of our subject.

6 YouGov Ratings provides free, open access data on the fame and popularity of subjects based on millions of responses from the British public. 57

The third criterion taken into consideration was the accessibility of the publications. Concretely, this meant selecting news outlets that are available online. This was first and foremost a practical concern, since it would have been challenging to try to gather the printed versions of articles published in the UK over the space of a decade. Conveniently, online press articles which are easily accessible for the researcher are also likely to be accessible for the British reader, so have the potential to attract a greater number of readers. Moreover, the internet is forever; online articles remain accessible long after paper editions are out of print, so can continue to attract readers in perpetuum.

For this analysis it was important to select famous, popular and accessible sources because, whilst this does not automatically guarantee influence over public opinion, it does give a publication wider reach and thus greater potential to sway the general public. The appeal of analysing narratives in the press is, after all, the media’s influence over the wider public, since a narrative exists because it is believed. Otherwise, the elements of narrative contained in press articles would remain mere ink on paper – or, indeed, pixels on a screen.

5.3.2 Selection of Articles

The corpus consists of approximately 100 articles gathered from the selected publications. Two contending concerns governed the selection of this number: on one hand having a sufficiently wide and representative sample to ensure the validity of the findings, and on the other hand having a manageable corpus which could realistically be the subject of an in-depth manual content analysis.

It should be noted that whilst 100 articles have been selected, they do not represent the entirety of the articles read as part of this project. Rather, wider reading was conducted and then the corpus

articles were selected because they were judged to be representative of the narrative carried in each publication.

The number of articles selected from each publication varies widely. This is deliberate, and is intended to reflect the number of articles which were found on the website of each publication. For publications for which fewer articles were found, namely The Sun, the Daily Mirror, the Sunday

Mirror, the Independent and the Daily Express, the articles selected for the corpus seem to represent all of the articles published by that publication on our topic. This cannot be guaranteed, since the search was conducted manually, and human error cannot be ruled out. In addition, other relevant articles may have been removed from the website.

For more prolific publications, such as The Times, the Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph and BBC

News, it would have been beyond the scope of this project to manually analyse all relevant articles in sufficient depth. Every effort has been made to ensure that all of the articles published on our topic have been read, and that representative articles covering a range of years have been selected.

The articles selected were published between 2009 and late 2019, or from when media coverage of the topic at hand began to gain momentum to the time of writing of this project.

5.4 Methodology

After reading the corpus articles once during the selection process, each article was analysed manually to identify pieces of text that contributed to the portrayal of interpreters and their situation. A process of reflexive iteration was used to identify recurrent themes relevant to the

research questions. Segments of text relating to these themes were extracted and arranged into question-related groups in order to construct an overall picture of the narrative carried in the British

Press about local Afghan interpreters.

In the following section, each research question will be answered in turn based on the findings of the analysis. The questions were addressed from a descriptive approach, using representative (and not exhaustive) examples from the corpus to illustrate the findings. A wider theoretical approach will at times be adopted to address more abstract issues that arise during the analysis, such as the interplay between the media, public and opinion and government policy, and the existence, possibility and desirability of objective and impartial reporting in the media.

5.5 Analysis

5.5.1 How do the corpus articles depict the current situation of the interpreters?

5.5.1.1 Victims of violence

The interpreters are portrayed as victims of violence as a result of their work for the British. This is the most prominent part of their narrative, and the reason for which their story is being told at all.

The Daily Mail reports interpreters being ‘threatened, ambushed, beaten, shot, tortured and, in some cases, killed’ (Rose, 2015). Another Daily Mail article quotes the findings of a survey which showed that ‘93 per cent of translators with UK forces said that their lives had been threatened as a result of their work’ (Williams, 2013). Similarly, The Guardian describes Afghan interpreters as being ‘in mortal peril from Taliban reprisals […] because they have collaborated with “the enemy”’ (Taylor,

2016). This is echoed in the Daily Mail, which affirms that the Taliban ‘target [interpreters] universally as traitors’ (Rose, 2015). A Daily Express headline reads ‘We need help! Desperate plea

of Afghan translators left behind by Britain’ (Osborne, 2019). The BBC interviewed an interpreter forced into hiding near Kabul, who reportedly brought with him a folder of death threats sent to him by the Taliban. The journalist reports the interpreter saying that he ‘fears for his life and that of his family’ (author unknown, 2015). A similar interview published in The Daily Telegraph reflects the same sentiment (Sawer, Farmer & Barbakarkhail, 2015b). ‘In one of the most disturbing claims’, writes a Daily Mail journalist, some interpreters claim to have ‘been threatened by members of the

Afghan police and the Afghan National Army’ (Williams, 2013). This report is supported by The

Times, which writes that some Afghan policemen and soldiers view the interpreters as ‘traitor[s] who deserve to die’ (author unknown, 2012).

5.5.1.2 Use of emotive language

Vivid language is often used to describe the violence suffered by local Afghan interpreters. A Daily

Express headline reports interpreters being ‘slaughtered’ by the Taliban (Gutteridge, 2015). The

Daily Telegraph opts for ‘hunted’ (Bodkin, 2018), whilst in their coverage of the same story both the Daily Express and The Daily Telegraph describe an interpreter being ‘tortured and murdered’

(Gutteridge 2015; Rothwell 2015) rather than the more neutral and less evocative ‘killed’. The Daily

Mail carries the day with a headline reading ‘We will kill you and your families and feed your bodies to the dogs: chilling threats of the Taliban to Afghan interpreters who fear they are being abandoned by Britain’ (Williams, 2013). It could be said that this use of evocative language is merely an example of media sensationalism. However, it is possible that this use of language is intended to elicit an emotional response in the reader, perhaps evoking greater sympathy for the interpreters than a more expressionless form of reporting.

5.5.2 How do the corpus articles depict the role of local Afghan interpreters in

British employ?

5.5.2.1 An important role

Local Afghan interpreters are portrayed as playing a pivotal role in the British Mission in

Afghanistan. For example, the interpreters are described as ‘vital’ (Knox, 2017 in the Daily Express;

Bulman, 2018 in The Independent) ‘more valuable to us than ammunition’ (author unknown in the

Evening Standard) and ‘the best weapon you have’ (Gallimore, 2016 in the Daily Mail).

5.5.2.2 A heroic role

In addition, the selected publications depict the interpreters as heroes who went beyond the call of duty to serve the British Army. The following extract, written by a major in the Welsh Guards for the Daily Mail, is a prime example of the recurrent portrayal of local Afghan interpreters as heroes who provided vital support to the British Armed Forces:

‘No ambushes are walks in the park, but within a few seconds it became swiftly and violently

apparent that we were being hit extremely hard. As well as the tell-tale crackle of AK-47

assault rifles, I could hear the rapid chatter of Russian-made PKM machine guns, and even

the thudding of ‘Dushka’ heavy weapons […] The rate of fire being brought down on us was

extraordinary, and we did our best to return it. All of us were using whatever weapons we

had to hand, but I knew we could not match those machine guns.

Among those returning fire was my interpreter, a 19-year-old Afghan called Shams, who was

bravely firing back with his Makarov pistol.

Sadly, it was not long before we suffered our first casualty — an Afghan soldier shot in the

stomach. Shortly afterwards we suffered another, as an Afghan soldier was shot through the

wrist.

Stretchers were called for, and the two wounded men were placed on them. I could not help

but notice that among those carrying a stretcher was none other than Shams.

Despite the confusion of battle, I noticed that he was doing as much as any man — perhaps

more than any other.

But Shams wasn’t just being brave, he was also being clever. It was his job to monitor the

radio traffic of our attackers, and it became clear to him that the Taliban knew we were

outnumbered, and that they would surely press on with their attack.

Shams came up to me, his normally impish face deadly serious and wide-eyed. He advised

me that we needed to get out immediately, as the Taliban would not scuttle, and would

certainly press home their deadly advantage.

This was a tough judgment call for Shams to make, but I trusted him completely. I ordered

an immediate withdrawal before we were surrounded, and, just like in the movies, we

managed to get over the bridge near our vehicles with the Taliban right on our heels.

[…] Thankfully, our wounded men survived, and there had been no other casualties. There

was no doubt that was partly thanks to the quick thinking Shams, who was clearly so much

more to us than an interpreter’ (Gallimore, 2016).

The story of Shams helping save the lives of British and Afghan troops is one of many articles that portray Afghan interpreters as courageous, heroic figures going beyond the call of duty to support

the British Armed Forces. A Sunday Times headline hails them as ‘hero interpreters’, a descriptor also used in The Times (Callaghan & Hookham, 2015; Williamson, 2018), the Daily Express

(Gutteridge, 2015), the Daily Mirror (Shammas, 2016) and The Sun (Wight, 2018). The Daily Mirror lauds the ‘brave Afghan interpreters’ (Cullen, 2018), a sentiment echoed in the Times View, an opinion column which reflects the stance of The Times (author unknown, 2019).

Many writers quote senior military officers praising their former interpreters: for example, the Daily

Mail quotes former Chief of Defence Staff Field Marshall Lord Guthrie saying that local Afghan interpreters ‘risked their lives to support us’ (Brown, Williams & Boyle, 2016). Similarly, a headline in The Sun reports another former head of the Armed Forces, Lord Richards of Herstmonceux, describing the interpreters as ‘brave and loyal’ (Lockett, 2018). This is a common feature in the corpus articles, whether it be by reprinting quotations from a different publication, or publishing original interviews and content to which senior military officers contributed.

On June 11th 2018, Daily Mail readers woke up to an article written by the then Secretary of State for Defence Gavin Williamson. His piece is another good example of Afghan interpreters being narrated as heroes:

‘Frontline patrol interpreters were the unsung heroes of the military campaign in

Afghanistan. Standing shoulder to shoulder with our troops on the battlefield they

demonstrated unflinching courage in carrying out duties that were fraught with great

difficulty and danger.

[…] I cannot be clearer in expressing our nation’s eternal appreciation to these brave

individuals who regularly risked life and limb to help defeat our enemies and protect us from

terrorists’ (Williamson, 2018).

By early afternoon on the same day, Mr Williamson’s words had been reprinted in The Daily

Telegraph (Bodkin, 2018), The Times (Badshah, 2018), the Daily Mirror (Cullen, 2018) and The

Sun (Dathan, 2018).

5.5.2.3 Interpreter loyalty

Interestingly, the interpreters’ loyalty is not questioned in the corpus articles. On the contrary, a writer for The Guardian observes that many senior military officers have praised the ‘unfailing loyalty’ of their interpreters (Long, 2013). The Times, The Independent and The Sun quote certificates awarded by the British army to its interpreters describing them as ‘loyal, intelligent and hardworking’ (Fisher, 2019), ‘outstanding, personable and loyal’ (Bulman, 2017) and ‘enthusiastic, personable and loyal’ (Shammas, 2017) respectively. Paradoxically, this element of the narrative presumably stems from the suspicion imbued in local interpreters; their loyalty is applauded because it could not be taken for granted. Moreover, Kristensen argues that it is the mistrust which beleaguers wartime interpreters that gives them the makings of heroes, because by proving their loyalty they surpass the military’s expectations (Kristensen, 2019). One of the reasons for which the interpreters’ heroism becomes such a prominent element of their narrative is, therefore, that they went above and beyond what was expected of them by proving themselves to be trustworthy allies when their loyalty was doubted.

5.5.3 How do the corpus articles depict the character of the interpreters?

5.5.3.1 A humanising narrative

In the media narrative about interpreters, their human side is often brought to the fore. Gallimore, for example, writing in the Daily Mail describes his interpreter as a ‘comic character’ and a ‘young man of immense charm’ who ‘behaved like a mischievous and likeable son’ (Gallimore, 2016).

Similarly, a 2017 article in The Sunday Times headlined ‘Army interpreter lost three limbs – but not his big heart’ (Kerbaj, 2017) tells the story of a local interpreter injured in an IED blast who spent his compensation on housing and schooling for Afghan orphans. Like the aforementioned Times article, many writers focus on telling the stories of individuals, bringing their character to life with observations about their personality, their feelings, their families. Their stories are often taken to represent, as if by synecdoche, the situation of all Afghan interpreters.

It is generally accepted that in order to wage war, it is first necessary to construct an enemy so evil, so distant and so alien that it can be imprisoned, maimed and killed. Dehumanisation is often used to this end, since it allows ‘moral disengagement’ from the sub-human enemy’s suffering (Bruneau

& Kteily, 2017). It is therefore unsurprising, but interesting, to see the reverse mechanism being used to characterise the interpreters. As illustrated above, the British press emphasises the interpreters’ humanity, underscoring the fact that they are living, breathing, caring human beings. Logically, since dehumanisation leads to ‘moral disengagement’, humanising discourse promotes the readers’ moral investment in the subject’s cause. Drawing attention to the humanity of the interpreters may therefore lead the reader to sympathise with them more deeply based on their shared humanity.

5.5.3.2 A ‘westernising’ narrative

The reader is drawn still closer to the interpreters by articles narrating the latter as being

‘westernised’ or fond of ‘Western’ culture. The Daily Express, for example, reports an interpreter settled in the UK with his family saying ‘we love the freedoms of the UK […] In Afghanistan people are not that open-minded’ (Knox, 2017). The interpreter’s four-year-old daughter is ‘already speaking in a broad Scots accent’ and his wife is hoping to find work (Knox, 2017). Similarly, a writer for the Daily Mail describes one interpreter who ‘desperately tried to westernise himself as much as possible’ (Gallimore, 2016). According to psychology professor Stephen Bochner, there is a human tendency to place individuals of other cultures ‘into the category “they”, distinguishing

“them” from “us”’ (1983, p. 10). Hence, the idea of the ‘westernised Afghan’ could reinforce the position of the interpreters in the ‘us’ camp of the conflict, not only because they worked for the

British Army, but also in their capacity as ‘westernised Afghans’.

5.5.3.3 Allaying opposition to resettlement

It is difficult not to conclude that the wealth of articles narrating interpreters in an ostensibly humanising and familiarising tone betrays an effort to temper opposition to resettling Afghan interpreters in the UK. This hypothesis is supported by articles which explicitly set Afghan interpreters apart from other migrants. Writing in the Daily Mail, Gallimore (2016) laments that

‘despite the huge number of immigrants we allow into this country, we are not even willing to offer asylum to the likes of Shams’. Similarly, The Times (2019) observes that the interpreter’s cases are

‘evidently different from run-of-the-mill instances’. Other writers directly address and rebut arguments frequently put forth by opponents to immigration. The common fear of being overwhelmed by large number of migrants, for example, is addressed in The Daily Telegraph which quotes a senior military figure saying ‘I know that immigration is a real problem but the number [of

Afghan interpreters] we are talking about is so small that actually making a fuss about it is a real embarrassment’ (Sawer, Farmer & Barbakarkhail, 2015a). Addressing the fear that immigrants will be a burden on the economy, a Sunday Times journalist writes of one interpreter that he ‘has always been self-reliant’ (Kerbaj, 2017). Another Times article tells the story of an interpreter settled in the

UK who is ‘forced to live on just £5 a day – a handout he is ashamed to accept because he is used to working and does not want to be a charity case’ (author unknown, 2012). In addition, an article published in The Sun describes Afghan interpreters as ‘highly educated men and women who would make a worthwhile contribution to the social fabric and economy of this country’ (Shammas, 2017).

5.5.4 How do the corpus articles depict British government policy towards the interpreters?

5.5.4.1 A critical view of government policy

Most articles convey the view that the British government has not done enough to help the interpreters. Whilst the publications do not necessarily (but sometimes do) take a stance on government policy themselves, articles frequently relay criticism of the British government’s policy towards its former interpreters. Writing before the introduction of the Redundancy Scheme, journalists for the BBC (author unknown, 2013) and The Times (Haynes et al., 2011; Coghlan, 2013) observed that whilst other countries had granted their interpreters the right to asylum, Britain had not. Writers report the government being accused of ‘abandoning’ (Haynes, 2014 in The Times;

Farmer, 2017 in The Daily Telegraph), ‘failing’ (Bulman, 2018 in The Independent; Giannangeli,

2018 in the Daily Express; MacAskill, 2018 in The Guardian; Willets, 2018 in The Sun; Times View,

2019), and ‘betraying’ (Gallimore, 2016 in the Daily Mail; Brown & Williams, 2019 in the Daily

Mail) its interpreters by ‘refusing’ to grant them asylum (Amoore, 2013 in The Sunday Times;

Barnett, 2015 in the Daily Express; Gutteridge, 2015 in the Daily Express; Sawer, Farmer, &

Barbakarkhail, 2015a in The Daily Telegraph; Farmer, 2017 in The Daily Telegraph; Willets, 2018 in The Sun). The government’s approach has been called ‘shameful’ (Gutteridge, 2015 in the Daily

Express; Gallimore, 2016 in the Daily Mail; Brown, Williams & Boyle, 2016 in the Daily Mail;

Diggins, 2018 in The Guardian; Lockett 2018, in The Sun; author unknown, 2019 in The Times).

Writers have described the government to be ‘dragging its feet’ to save its former interpreters (Elliott

& Haynes, 2014 in The Times) and ‘turning its back on them’ (Gallimore, 2016 in the Daily Mail).

Moreover, The Guardian observes that the schemes put in place by the government have been deemed ‘unfair and miserly’ (MacAskill, 2018). In the same vein, some writers emphatically state that ‘Just ONE’ interpreter (Gayle, 2014 in the Daily Mail), ‘only one applicant’ (Elliott & Haynes,

2014 in The Times), ‘only a handful’ of interpreters (author unknown, 2015 in The Daily Telegraph) or ‘Just TWO’ interpreters (Brown & Williams, 2019 in the Daily Mail) had qualified for resettlement under the schemes because of the ‘arbitrary’ cut-off date (Knox, 2017 in the Daily

Express; Brown & Williams, 2019 in the Daily Mail) and the eligibility criteria which were judged to be ‘stringent’ (Brown & Williams, 2016 in the Daily Mail) and ‘tough’ (Badshah, 2018 in The

Times).

Writers for The Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Sun relay the view of the government’s approach to granting asylum as being unwise, on the basis that in light of the treatment that interpreters have received, the Armed Forces may struggle to recruit local interpreters in the future

(Haynes, 2012; Farmer, 2017; Willets, 2018).

Furthermore, writers frequently report senior military figures calling upon the government to respect its ‘moral obligation’ to help former Afghan interpreters (Coghlan, 2013 in The Times; Sawer,

Farmer & Barbakarkhail, 2015a in The Daily Telegraph; Farmer, 2017 in The Daily Telegraph; author unknown, 2018 for the BBC). The Daily Mail describes Field Marshall Lord Guthrie leading a ‘furious protest’ to see Afghan interpreters granted sanctuary in Britain, quoting him calling their treatment ‘mean and churlish’ (Brown, Williams & Boyle, 2016). Similarly, Lord Ashdown is quoted in The Times declaring that the government’s response ‘falls significantly short of what is required to fulfil a debt of honour’ (Coghlan, 2013).

5.5.4.2 Unequal treatment of Iraqi and Afghan interpreters

The Times and The Sunday Times insinuate that Afghan and Iraqi interpreters have been treated unequally (Haynes, 2012; Amoore, 2013) since whilst Iraqi interpreters had been resettled in Britain,

‘there is no such special treatment for Afghan interpreters […] despite evidence revealed in The

Times last month the Afghan police and Army as well as the Taleban are threatening to kill any

Afghan interpreter seen to be working too closely with the British’ (Haynes, 2012). In his reply to a reader’s letter, the Defence Editor of the Evening Standard concurs that ‘the treatment of interpreters working with British forces and government agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan has been uneven, to put it mildly’ (Fox, 2018).

5.5.5 What kind of role does the British media assume in its coverage of our subject?

5.5.5.1 Media bias in favour of the interpreters

Overall, the media portrays interpreters in a positive light, whilst British media coverage of the government’s response is overwhelmingly negative. Interpreters are narrated as: war heroes and loyal allies; honourable, deserving people in need of help; innocent victims of extremists, the insensitivity of the British government and the vagaries of the asylum system. The ensuing narrative seems to indicate sympathy for the interpreters’ cause. For McLaughlin (2016) sympathy implies

partiality, so it can be inferred that reporting in many of the corpus articles is biased in favour of the interpreters.

5.5.5.2 Objectivity in the media

The above conclusion raises questions as to the presence and possibility of objective and impartial reporting in the media – topics which have long been the subject of acrimonious debate (McLaughlin,

2016). The debate is complicated by the fact that objectivity in itself is difficult to define. Parenti

(1993) suggests that what ‘passes for’ objectivity is ‘the acceptance of a social reality shaped by the dominant forces of society’ (p. 52 in McLaughlin, 2016, p. 39), making ‘objectivity’ a mere euphemism for the prevailing narratives moulded by the chief influencers of a society. In light of the media’s influence over public opinion, one could argue that the press plays a role in selecting, conveying and constructing the consensus narratives that ‘pass for’ objectivity.

Conversely, for Schudson (1978), objectivity in journalism means ‘a faith in “fact”, a distrust in

“values” and a commitment to their segregation’ (p. 6 in McLaughlin, 1972, p. 39). This traditional method of ‘objective’ reporting protects journalists from being accused of partisanship and libel

(McLaughlin, 1972).

However, when covering stories about Afghan interpreters, writers cannot be said to conform to the traditional norms of objective journalism since they do not religiously shy away from value judgements. In 2018 it was revealed that former LECs resettled in the UK would have to pay a fee to extend their visas. A journalist writing for the Daily Express describes the fees as a ‘huge’, ‘eye- watering payment’ (Millar, 2018). Likewise, a writer for The Guardian reports interpreters facing a

‘hefty fee’ (MacAskill, 2018). Values are here blended with facts, the reporters’ choice of words implying that the fees are unreasonable – a judgement, rather than ‘objective’ journalism.

It is true that some writers work toward objective reporting by distancing themselves from opinions expressed by their hand, and by separating opinion from fact. Punctuation is often used to this effect.

For example, a headline in The Daily Telegraph reads ‘Afghanistan: interpreters working with

British Army “abandoned”’ (Farmer, 2009). Similarly, a Times headline reads ‘Army “abandons”

Afghan interpreters as death threats soar’ (Haynes, 2014), and one published on the BBC states

‘Afghan interpreter Javed Hotek “let down” by UK government’ (author unknown, 2017). Other techniques are used to the same effect, as shown in the Times headline ‘Denying refuge to veteran

Afghan interpreters is shameful, MoD told’ (Burgess, 2018).

Whilst the norms of objective journalism are here respected, one could argue that true objectivity is still not achieved. McLaughlin (2016) observes that ‘Bias […] is structured within the entire news process; the news filters and constructs reality’ (2016, p. 39). An article may be presented in accordance with the norms of objective reporting, but the facts and views selected to tell the story, and the choice of subject matter itself, are potential sources of media bias. One could therefore argue that objectivity in the media is an impossible ideal. Indeed, for leading Slovenian journalist Ervin

Hladnik Milharčič, ‘every story is, to a degree, a reflection of the storyteller’ (Flis, 2012, p. 37).

5.5.5.3 Journalism of attachment

It is clear to see that in general, British media coverage of this topic is neither objective nor impartial.

Faced with this, one may well ask whether media coverage of such a topic can or should be impartial.

BBC journalist Martin Bell would answer in the negative. When reporting atrocities during the

Bosnian civil war, Bell found himself unable to remain impartial; he felt that adopting a traditional objective stance faced with such iniquities ‘removes any sort of moral content from the story and leaves only an empty spectacle’ (McLaughlin, 2016, p. 43). Bell’s journalism of attachment saw objectivity to be of lesser importance than the writer’s moral duty to tell the whole truth. For Bell, it was the journalist’s responsibility to depart from the traditional norms of objective journalism to highlight the moral question at hand; presenting the facts in a skeletal manner, stripped of their moral implications, would not enable the reader to understand the wider ethical dilemma. The message would be lost. The prevailing mode of reporting in the corpus articles certainly shares more with

Bell’s journalism of attachment than with traditional objective journalism.

5.5.5.4 Reporter or player?

Some articles indicate that the publication in which they feature has openly campaigned to put pressure on the British government. Certain media outlets go so far as to openly boast of their support for the interpreters’ cause. A headline in The Sun, for example, reads ‘The Sun on Sunday backs petition to help Afghan hero’. The article provides a link to the petition and urges the reader to sign it (Wight, 2018). Likewise, the Daily Mail launched a dedicated campaign to highlight the plight of

Afghan former interpreters. The ‘Betrayal of the Brave’ campaign is also supported by a petition which readers are encouraged to sign (Brown, Williams & Boyle, 2016). Similarly, The Sunday

Times has been congratulated on its ‘fight’ to secure better compensation for injured interpreters

(Diggins, 2017 in The Times). The Independent boasts that an interpreter issued a deportation notice

‘had his removal halted by the High Court after The Independent highlighted his plight’ (Bulman,

2018).

The above examples are indicative of the fact that in its coverage of our topic, the role of the media has not been limited to that of an objective reporter. Rather, a number of publications have attempted to influence government policy regarding Afghan interpreters. Here, the British press is not just a bystander reporter, but rather a player endeavouring to influence the fate of local Afghan interpreters and, to a degree, succeeding. This bears testament to the power of the media, and that of narrative which, when combined, are an indomitable duo.

Furthermore, given the media’s sway over public opinion it could be said that the press has an inherent influence over government policy. In this view the press is therefore never a mere reporter, and always, to some extent, a player in politics and society.

Conclusion

To conclude, the most prominent part of the media narrative about local Afghan interpreters is arguably their portrayal as victims of violence as a result of their work for the British. This is unsurprising, since it is the reason for which their story is being reported. What is interesting is the use of vivid language to describe this violence, which perhaps has the effect of eliciting a greater emotional response in the reader than a more neutral form of reporting. Whilst this could be put down to media sensationalism, in light of the apparent partisanship of the British press in favour of the interpreters, it is difficult not to read this as a first clue of the media’s sympathy for the interpreters.

Another prominent theme is the media’s depiction of the interpreters as heroes who went beyond the call of duty to loyally serve the British Army. It is interesting that the interpreters’ loyalty is not here called into question given the typical mistrust which follows local interpreters in conflict zones – but it seems that, paradoxically, their ‘unfailing loyalty’ is highlighted because it was doubted. By extension, the interpreters’ portrayal as heroes may also stem in part from the mistrust with which they are imbued, since by proving their loyalty they can go above and beyond what the military expects of them (Kristensen, 2020).

It is clear that the interpreters are narrated in very different ways by different parties in the conflict.

As Baker puts it, they are alternately narrated ‘as victims or villains, as trust-worthy allies or security risks’ (Baker, 2010, p. 217). Enemies or allies, heroes or villains, trustworthy or treacherous – perhaps due to the Manichean nature of war, these narratives seem to emerge in diametrically opposed pairs. Neither one of a pair of narratives could exist without its antithetical

partner. Like two sides of the same coin, these opposing narratives are mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing. In this view, the media narrative about Afghan interpreters could be seen as a reflection of contrasting narratives; they are narrated as heroic allies because the Taliban enemy views them as treacherous villains. After all, an enemy of an enemy is a friend.

The British press also emphasises the interpreters’ humanity. If dehumanisation leads to ‘moral disengagement’ from the subject (Bruneau & Kteily, 2017), the reverse phenomenon seems to be present in the corpus articles; a manifestly humanising narrative deepens the reader’s moral investment in the interpreters’ cause. This, in addition to descriptions of interpreters as being

‘westernised’ or enamoured of ‘Western’ culture, bring the reader closer to the interpreter, perhaps with a view to quelling opposition to granting Afghan interpreters asylum in the UK.

The prevailing media narrative about British government policy towards Afghan interpreters alleges that the government has failed to fulfil its debt of honour, and in so doing has shot itself in the foot since the Armed Forces may struggle to recruit local interpreters in future conflicts. Whilst many writers frequently dissociate themselves from critical views presented in their articles, others throw objectivity to the wind and openly cast judgement on the British government and its LEC assistance schemes.

It is clear to see that the media portrayal of the interpreters is overwhelmingly positive, whilst its depiction of the government’s approach to assisting them is decidedly negative. The overall picture seems to indicate sympathy for the interpreters and, since sympathy implies partiality (McLaughlin,

2016), the media seems to be biased in favour of local Afghan interpreters. Indeed, analysis of the

corpus reveals that some publications have openly campaigned to raise the profile of the interpreters, showing that in their coverage of the situation of Afghan interpreters, these publications have been neither objective, nor bystander reporters. Rather, the press has assumed the role of a player, throwing its weight behind the interpreters’ cause. It is beyond the scope of this study to do justice to the divisive question of whether the media should be an objective bystander. Following Bell’s line of reasoning and considering the positive impact of the British media on the interpreters’ situation, were the media to report objectively on such an ethical question then not only the message, but also the interpreters’ cause, might well be lost.

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Williams, D. (2015, August 17). Betrayal of the brave: As illegal immigrants flood in unchecked, Afghan interpreters are forced to pay people smugglers to escape revenge of the Taliban. Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3200303/Betrayal-brave-illegal-

immigrants-flood-unchecked-Afghan-interpreters-abandoned-Britain-forced-pay-people- smugglers-escape-revenge-Taliban.html

Williams, D. (2018, August 30). Afghan interpreters are betrayed again as promises of sanctuary in UK is delayed while ISIS thugs warn they will ‘die like dogs’ as they face doorstep executions back home. Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- 6116301/Afgan-interpreters-betrayed-promises-sanctuary-UK-delayed.html

Wilson H. (2011, May 19). Helmand 26: Our eyes and ears. Retrieved from https://www.wasafirihub.com/helmand-26-our-eyes-and-ears/

Younger, K. (1955). Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. The British Journal of Sociology, 6(2), 169–175. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/587482

Annexes

The following section contains the headlines of the corpus articles. The full articles have not been included since it was felt that the articles were best consulted ‘in situ’, in their original published format. Links to the articles have been provided, should the reader wish to consult them. The signature font of each publication has been respected as closely as possible. Please note that any spelling mistakes in the original headlines have not been corrected.

Afghanistan: interpreters working with British Army 'abandoned' Farmer, B. (2009, November 16). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6584224/Afghanistan- interpreters-working-with-British-Army-abandoned.html

Afghan interpreters 'abandoned' by MoD after being wounded Farmer, B. (2010, April 18). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7603884/Afghan- interpreters-abandoned-by-MoD-after-being-wounded.html

Taleban target Britain’s army of interpreters Haynes, D. (2011, August 1). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/taleban-target-britains-army-of-interpreters- z72n9vpf7k0

No 10 behaving ‘shamefully’ over interpreters, says ex-Navy chief Haynes, D., Coates, S. & Savage, M. (2011, August 2). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/no-10-behaving-shamefully-over-interpreters-says-ex- navy-chief-d6bf58pbx8q

Interpreter fled Afghan police’s death threats to live in limbo on £5 a day

Author unknown (2012, August 31). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/interpreter-fled-afghan-polices-death-threats-to-live- on-£5-a-day

Interpreters regarded at traitors Haynes, D. (2012a, October 2). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/interpreters-regarded-at-traitors-2bxv65h5txq

The Afghan interpreters seeking asylum in the UK Wyatt, C. (2012, December 19). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk- 20778751

Is the UK abandoning its Afghan interpreters? Author unknown (2013, February 11). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21406826

Campaign backs Afghan interpreters Author unknown (2013, March 21). Daily Express. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/385886/Campaign-backs-Afghan-interpreters

Former army chief in Afghan interpreters asylum appeal Author unknown (2013, April 6). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22051400

We must not abandon our Afghan interpreters, says former head of the Army General Sir Mike Jackson Coghlan, T. (2013, April 6). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-must-not-abandon-our-afghan-interpreters-says- former-head-of-the-army-general-sir-mike-jackson-gqt6jvcr0c5

UK is leaving us to die, say Afghan aides Amoore, M. (2013, April 7). The Sunday Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-is-leaving-us-to-die-say-afghan-aides- wb7nrpq89dn

Our moral duty towards Afghan interpreters The Times letters (2013, May 2). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/our-moral-duty-towards-afghan-interpreters- wmpw89cf27f

Afghan interpreters who helped British forces in home country launch legal challenge against government decision not to allow them to settle in the UK Lea, L. (2013, May 3). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/afghan-interpreters-who-helped- british-forces-in-home-country-launch-legal-challenge-against-8602115.html

Afghan translators can come to Britain Kirkup, J. (2013, May 21). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10072059/Afghan- translators-can-come-to-Britain.html

Clarification demanded over Afghan interpreters UK visas Author unknown (2013a, May 22). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22629218

Afghan interpreters: 'No life for us here' Author unknown (2013b, May 22). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22625887

‘Flaws’ in interpreters deal will leave many stuck in Afghanistan Coghlan, T., Kelly, J. & Watson, R. (2013, May 23). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/flaws-in-interpreters-deal-will-leave-many-stuck-in- afghanistan-vgrfqkbx3ps

‘We will kill you and your families and feed your bodies to the dogs’: Chilling threats of the Taliban to Afghan interpreters who fear they are being abandoned by Britain Williams, D. (2013, May 26). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2331184/Afghan-interpreters-fear-abandoned- Britain-left-mercy-vengeful-Taliban.html

Afghan interpreters for British Army given UK rights Hughes, D. (3012, June 4). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/afghan-interpreters-for-british-army- given-uk-rights-8644235.html

Afghan interpreters can come to UK, says Philip Hammond Author unknown (2013, June 4). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk- politics-22771238

Interpreters’ deal ‘does not fulfil our debt of honour’ Coghlan, T. (2013, June 5). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/interpreters-deal-does-not-fulfil-our-debt-of-honour- xtxjc6bskjd

Afghan aides petition goes to No 10 Author unknown (2013, August 14). Evening Standard. Retrieved from https://www.standard.co.uk/panewsfeeds/afghan-aides-petition-goes-to-no-10- 8761335.html

Winston Churchill's great grandson hands petition to David Cameron calling for protection of front line Afghan interpreters Kisiel, R. & Infante, F. (2013, August 14). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2392923/Winston-Churchills-great-grandson- petitions-protection-line-Afghan-interpreters.html

Afghan interpreters petition delivered to Cameron Author unknown (2013, June 4). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk- 23684980

Britain and the US have betrayed their troops' Iraqi and Afghan interpreters Long, H. (2013, September 27). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/27/afghan-interpreter-visas-janis- shinwari

Afghan interpreters call for better deal when troops leave Haynes, D. (2013, December 28). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/afghan-interpreters-call-for-better-deal-when-troops- leave-fv373scwvbs

Army ‘abandons’ Afghan interpreters as death threats soar Haynes, D. (2014, November 12). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/army-abandons-afghan-interpreters-as-death-threats- soar-5kd9nnr6tmq

Just ONE Afghan interpreter who helped British forces has been allowed to move to the UK despite hundreds of requests from staff who have been threatened by Taliban Gayle, D. (2014, November 12). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2831077/Just-ONE-Afghan-interpreter-helped- British-forces-allowed-UK-despite-hundreds-requests-staff-threatened-Taliban.html

MoD drags its feet on saving interpreters from Taliban Elliott, F. & Haynes, D. (2014, December 24). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mod-drags-its-feet-on-saving-interpreters-from- taliban-22n0zfpjxmq

Afghan interpreter identifies colleagues in beheading footage Syal, R. (2014, December 31). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/31/afghan-interpreter-colleagues- beheading-footage

Fewer than 100 brave interpreters from Afghan War resettled in UK despite Taliban threats Batchelor, T. (2015, March 25). Daily Express. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/566315/Afghanistan-interpreters-Britain-War- Taliban-attacks

Afghan interpreter who worked with British army refused UK asylum Gayle, D. (2015, April 7). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk- news/2015/apr/07/afghan-interpreter-british-army-refused-uk-asylum

Afghan interpreters take asylum case to High Court Haynes, D. (2015, May 4). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/afghan-interpreters-take-asylum-case-to-high-court- 0m7k3s5x6b7

UK government taken to court by Afghan interpreter over assistance scheme Feeney, D. (2015, May 6). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/government-court-afghan-interpreter- assistance

Afghan translators who served on front line fear attacks by UK ‘lunatics’ if they return home Warburton, D. (2015, May 10). Sunday Mirror. Retrieved from https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/afghan-translators-who-served-front- 5671289

Britain refuses to ensure safety of Afghan interpreters who faced death to help our troops Barnett, H. (2015, July 8). Daily Express. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/589807/Britain-refuses-to-ensure-safety-of-Afghan- interpreters-who-faced-death-to-help-our-troops

Betrayal of the brave: As illegal immigrants flood in unchecked, Afghan interpreters abandoned by Britain are forced to pay people smugglers to escape revenge of the Taliban Williams, D. (2015, August 16). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3200303/Betrayal-brave-illegal-immigrants-

flood-unchecked-Afghan-interpreters-abandoned-Britain-forced-pay-people-smugglers- escape-revenge-Taliban.html

Translator who was 'denied refuge in Britain' executed in Afghanistan Rothwell, J. (2015, August 18). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11809079/Translator- who-was-denied-refuge-in-Britain-executed-in-Afghanistan.html

Britain’s shame: Afghan hero interpreter refused asylum is slaughtered by Taliban Gutteridge, N. (2015, August 18). Daily Express. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/599085/Afghan-interpreter-Britain-army- executed-Taliban-Iran

Afghan 'terrorist' is free to roam the streets of Britain as hero interpreters are abandoned to Taliban: Man who has been stripped of British citizenship is embroiled in battle to fight deportation Brown, L. & Williams, D. (2015, August 20). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3205406/Afghan-terrorist-free-roam-streets- Britain-hero-interpreters-abandoned-Taliban-Man-stripped-British-citizenship- embroiled-battle-fight-deportation.html

Leave no man behind: Throughout history that's been the Army's rule when it retreats. By refusing refuge to our brave Afghan interpreters, we dishonour our country, writes GENERAL SIR MICHAEL ROSE Rose, M. (2015, August 20). Daily mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3204176/Leave-no-man-history-s-Army-s-rule- retreats-refusing-refuge-brave-Afghan-interpreters-dishonour-country-writes-GENERAL- SIR-MICHAEL-ROSE.html

Britain 'owes Afghan interpreters a debt of honour’ Sawer, P., Farmer, B, & Barbakarkhail, Z. (2015a, August 29). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11832796/Britain-owes- Afghan-interpreters-a-debt-of-honour.html

Britain owes a lot to its Afghan interpreters Telegraph View: Those who have risked their lives for Britain and now find themselves in peril should be given sanctuary Author unknown (2015, August 30). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11832879/Britain-owes- a-lot-to-its-Afghan-interpreters.html

Lord Dannatt tells Government to allow Afghan interpreters into Britain Sawer, P., Farmer, B, & Barbakarkhail, Z. (2015b, September 5). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11846505/Lord-Dannatt- tells-Government-to-allow-Afghan-interpreters-into-Britain.html

Afghan hero’s nine month escape to UK Callaghan, L. & Hookham, M. (2015, September 20). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/afghan-heros-nine-month-escape-to-uk-g85px7nw3x9

Afghan translator who risked his life for Britain wins right to live here along with his family after they were targeted by Taliban assassins Brown, L. & Williams, D. (2015, October 17). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3276762/Afghan-translator-risked-life-Britain- wins-right-live-family-targeted-Taliban-assassins.html

Home Office 'to review' policy on returning Afghan military interpreters Taylor, D. (2016, March 25). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/25/home-office-to-review-policy-on- returning-afghan-military-interpreters

Heroic translator who served British Army in Afghan war 'kills himself after being told he would be deported' Shammas, J. (2016, May 2). Daily Mirror. Retrieved from https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/nangyalai-dawoodzai-translator-afghanistan- war-7877839

Betrayal of the Brave: Deporting our Afghan translators shames Britain says former Forces chief Lord Guthrie Brown, L., Williams, D. & Boyle, S. (2016, May 3). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3570278/Betrayal-Brave-Deporting-Afghan- translators-shames-Britain-says-former-Forces-chief-Lord-Guthrie.html

Britain 'inhumane and shameful' over asylum for Afghan interpreters Farmer, B. (2016, May 5). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/05/britain-inhumane-and-shameful-over- ayslum-for-afghan-interpreter/

Afghan interpreter asks 'how many more must die' as he loses High Court fight Farmer, B (2016, May 9). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/09/afghan-interpreter-asks-how-many-more- must-die-as-he-loses-high/

Why this Army major was willing to break the law to smuggle his brave Afghan interpreter to Britain Gallimore, R. (2016, May 12). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3585923/Why-Army-major-willing-break-law- smuggle-brave-Afghan-interpreter-Britain.html

I helped Britain fight the Taliban as an Army translator, but now I'm a refugee: the UK has abandoned me Sakhi, A. (2016, June 20). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/i-helped-britain-fight-the-taliban-as-a-translator- but-now-im-a-refugee-the-uk-has-abandoned-me-a7091611.html

Afghan interpreter Javed Hotak 'let down' by UK government Author unknown (2017, February 14). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-birmingham-38957928

Army interpreter lost three limbs — but not his big heart Kerbaj, R. (2017, October 15). The Sunday Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/army-interpreter-lost-three-limbs-but-not-his- big-heart-qs6wdv80h

Bigger payout for Afghan interpreters Kerbaj, R. (2017, October 22). The Sunday Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bigger-payout-for-afghan-interpreters-9rqgcs7f7

Doing right by army’s Afghan interpreters Letters and points (2017, October 29). The Sunday Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/doing-right-by-armys-afghan-interpreters-v75qnn5b2

Britain has 'moral obligation' to help Afghan interpreters, MPs hear Farmer, B (2017, November 28). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/28/britain-has-moral-obligation-help-afghan- interpreters-mps-hear/

Afghan man who worked for British Army set to be deported from UK in days, prompting urgent appeal Bulman, M. (2017, December 3). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/afghan-british-army-deported- hafizzulah-husseinkhel-appeal-taliban-asylum-seeker-wednesday-a8089356.html

'He saved British lives. It's ridiculous': Senior soldier condemns plan to deport Afghan man who worked with UK Army Bulman, M. (2017, December 5). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-army-translator-hafizzulah- husseinkhel-uk-deportation-afghanistan-war-save-lives-officer-a8092801.html

Barrister takes Home Office to High Court over 'unlawful' decision to deport Afghan man who served in British Army Bulman, M. (2017, December 6). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/hafizzulah-husseinkhel-deportation- afghan-interpreter-army-home-office-legal-challenge-latest-a8093686.html

DEPORTATION ROW Afghan man who served in British Army to be deported from UK ‘within days’ Shammas, J. (2017, December 4). The Sun. Retrieved from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5062751/afghan-man-served-british-army-to-be- deported-hafizzulah-husseinkhel/

High Court halts deportation of Afghan interpreter who worked with British Army Bulman, M. (2017, December 7). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/hafizzulah-husseinkhel-afghan- british-army-deport-removal-halted-high-court-home-office-latest-a8096871.html

Afghan national who saved British Army from terror: ‘We love the freedoms of the UK’ Knox, C. (2017, December 31). Daily Express. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/898384/british-national-afghanistan-interpreter- Rahmatullah-Mohammad-Juma

Afghan interpreter for British army denied right to move to UK Grierson, J. (2018, January 19). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jan/19/afghan-interpreter-british-denied- right-move-uk

'I'M LIVING IN FEAR' UK’s longest-serving Afghan army interpreter is REFUSED sanctuary in Britain despite 16 years of ‘unfailing loyalty’ Lockett, J. (2018, January 19). The Sun. Retrieved from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5367131/uks-longest-serving-afghan-army-interpreter-is- refused-sanctuary-in-britain-despite-16-years-of-unfailing-loyalty/

'BRAVE AND LOYAL' Top military chief ‘ashamed’ by government’s decision not to give Afghani translator sanctuary in Britain Lockett, J. (2018, January 19). The Sun. Retrieved from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5375593/top-military-chief-ashamed-by-governments- decision-not-to-give-afghani-translator-sanctuary-in-britain/

Denying refuge to veteran Afghan interpreter is shameful, MoD told Burgess, K. (2018, January 29). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/denying-refuge-to-veteran-afghan-interpreter-is- shameful-mod-told-pnfdxcdt9

UK record just as poor as that of US on Afghan interpreters Diggins, S. (2018, February 13). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/feb/13/uk-record-just-as-poor-as-that-of-us- on-afghan-interpreters

The Reader: Our duty to help the brave interpreters of Afghanistan Fox, R. (2018, April 20). Evening Standard. Retrieved from https://www.standard.co.uk/comment/letters/the-reader-our-duty-to-help-the-brave- interpreters-of-afghanistan-a3819511.html

Afghanistan: Army interpreter 'will die if deported' Author unknown (2018, April 26). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-manchester-43904806

Victory for Afghan interpreters as Home Office backs down row over fees for right to remain. Glaze, B. (2018, May 4). Daily Mirror. Retrieved from https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/victory-afghan-interpreters-home-office- 12477645

LEFT IN LIMBO More than 150 interpreters face eviction back to Afghanistan unless they pay Home Office £2,400 Cox, J. (2018, May 3). The Sun. Retrieved from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6198982/afghan-interpreters-uk-eviction-home-office- 2400/

Now brave Army translators face deportation in fresh Government immigration scandal Millar, J. (2018, May 3). Daily Express. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/954662/windrush-home-office-immigration-british- army-afghanistan-translators-interpreters

Afghan interpreters should be able to stay in UK - defence secretary Author unknown (2018, May 3). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk- 43990220

UK backs down over Afghan interpreters' immigration fees MacAskill, E. (2018, May 3) The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/03/uk-home-office-afghan-interpreters- helmand-immigration-fees

Afghan interpreters put their lives on the line for us Williamson, G. (2018, May 4). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/afghan-interpreters-put-their-lives-on-the-line-for-us- so-they-shouldn-t-have-to-pay-to-stay-here-qtf5p2hlr

Afghan interpreters who served with British army able to stay in UK for free, says Sajid Javid Farand, C. (2018. May 4). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/afghan-interpreters-british-army-uk- stay-free-sajid-javid-home-secretary-a8335916.html

Afghan interpreters' UK immigration fee waived Author unknown (2018, May 4). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk- 43998925

Afghan interpreters still threatened with deportation despite government suggesting they could stay Bulman, M. (2018. May 5). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/afghan-interpreters-threatened- deportation-government-uk-a8337116.html

UK government 'dismally failed' Afghan interpreters who worked for British Army, warn MPs Bulman, M. (2018. May 25). Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/afghan-interpreters-british-army- failed-defence-committee-mod-a8369136.html

Afghan allies left at risk of reprisals by government scheme Burgess, K. (2018, May 26). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/afghan-allies-left-at-risk-of-reprisals-by-government- scheme-0rxrc76sx

Afghan interpreters working for UK army ‘failed’ by government MacAskill, E. (2018, May 26). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/26/afghan-interpreters-uk-army-failed- british-government-commons-report

HELP THEIR HEROES Commons Defence Committee calls for Afghan interpreters facing death threats to be brought to UK for protection Willets, D. (2018, May 25). The Sun. Retrieved from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6382141/afghan-interpreters-face-death-threats/

UK has FAILED interpreters working for British Army warns Afghan premier Giannangeli, M. (2018, June 10). Daily Express. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/972135/britain-afghanistan-war-immigration- deported-interpreters-war

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Victory for brave Afghan interpreters as Tories finally let more settle in Britain Cullen, E. (2018, June 11). Daily Mirror. Retrieved from https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/victory-brave-afghan-interpreters-tories- 12681781

Afghan interpreters to be granted UK visas as relocation scheme extended Bodkin, H. (2018, June 11). The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/10/afghan-interpreters-granted-visas- following-government-review/

ASYLUM U-TURN Afghan interpreters who worked alongside Britsh troops from 2006 to be given asylum in UK Dathan, M. (2018, June 11). The Sun. Retrieved from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6497196/afghan-interpreters-given-asylum-in-uk/

Afghan interpreters to get visas as tough rules eased Badshah, N. (2018, June 11). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/afghan-interpreters-to-get-visas-as-tough-rules-eased- vrs20bfkt

Sanctuary at last for Afghan heroes: Local translators who served alongside British troops win the right to come to Britain after years of uncertainty Brown, L. & Williams, D. (2018, June 11). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5827979/Translators-served-alongside-British- troops-win-right-come-UK-years-uncertainty.html

Afghan interpreters are betrayed again as promises of sanctuary in UK is delayed while ISIS thugs warn they will ‘die like dogs’ as they face doorstep executions back home Williams, D. (2018, August 30). Daily Mail. Retrieve from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6116301/Afgan-interpreters-betrayed-promises- sanctuary-UK-delayed.html

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How two men and a WhatsApp group rescued scores of Afghan heroes MacAskill, E. (2018, September 7). The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/07/how-two-men-and-a-whatsapp-group- rescued-scores-of-afghan-heroes

HELP HERO The Sun on Sunday backs petition to help Afghan hero Mohammed Nabi Wardak after the UK ‘left him to be homeless prey for Taliban revenge killers’ Wight, D. (2018, September 22). The Sun. Retrieved from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/7323648/help-afghan-hero-nabi-wardak/

Afghan translator who risked his life to work with Prince Charles could be kicked out of the UK after the government fails to renew his visa Brown, L. (2018, December 16). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6502313/Afghan-translator-risked-life-work- Prince-Charles-kicked-UK.html

Afghan interpreters' UK immigration rules 'anguish' Gruffydd-Jones (2019, January 13). BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-politics-46825201

‘Abandoned’ Afghan interpreters fear for their lives Fisher, L. (2019, April 6). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/abandoned-interpreters-fear-for-their-lives- 5qz2n2qpw

Afghan interpreters: ‘We cannot sleep safely in our homes’ Fisher, L. (2019, April 6). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/afghan-interpreters-we-cannot-sleep-safely-in-our- homes-6nmf3rdlh

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The Times view on support for translators: Afghan Interpreters We must support those who assisted British troops in Afghanistan Author unknown, (2019, April 6). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-times-view-on-support-for-translators-afghan- interpreters-d77ts78d8

REVEALED: None of the 50 Afghan translators promised sanctuary in the UK after serving alongside British soldiers have arrived yet - despite defence secretary's promise Brown, L. & Williams, D. (2019, April 7). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6896711/None-50-Afghan-translators- promised-sanctuary-UK-arrived-yet.html

'EMPTY WORDS' Gavin Williamson accused of failing 50 Afghan translators promised sanctuary in the UK – as none have arrived yet James, E. (2019, April 8). The Sun. Retrieved from https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/8812971/gavin-williamson-afghan-translators-promised- sanctuary/

'We need help!' Desperate plea of Afghan translators 'left behind' by Britain Osborne, S. (2019, April 8). Daily Express. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1111256/afghan-translators-abandoned-british- military-taliban-threat-afghanistan

The Times view on Afghans who worked with the British military: Interpreting Loyalty These men deserve quicker security clearance Author unknown (2019, June 15). The Times. Retrieved from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-times-view-on-afghans-who-worked-with-the- british-military-interpreting-loyalty-37pj5kvvh

Just TWO Afghan translators have been offered sanctuary in the UK as the number promised a safe haven is slashed from 50 due to MoD blunder Brown, L. & Williams, D. (2019, August 17). Daily Mail. Retrieved from https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7365843/only-TWO-Afghan-translators- offered-sanctuary-UK.html#comments

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