1.0 Introduction

1.1 Operation PLATO is the multi-agency response to the incident, whilst the term `MTFA' describes the type of incident.

1.2 Forces should consider the fact that terrorist attacks in their force area may take the form of less sophisticated attacks than those described within this Operation PLATO guidance document and that the response to these attacks may be managed through a local force only response.

1.3 This protocol refers to the provision for the spontaneous deployment of Armed Officers anc within the North West Region.

1.4 The North West Forces included in this protocol are: Alliance (Cheshire Constabulary and North Wales Police), Cumbria Constabulary, Greater Manchester Police, Lancashire Constabulary, and Merseyside Police.

1.5 A mdi duding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA) does not have a single recognised definition; there are many factors that could be seen in isolation or as a combination of events that indicate an MTFA is taking place.

1.6 It is important that forces recognise that an MTFA will be an extraordinary event with unprecedented demands placed upon all aspects of the policing (and emergency service partners) response.

2.0 Force Control Rooms

2.1 It is anticipated that the initial response to a MTFA incident will be coordinated by the host Force's Control Room with the immediate deployment of resources to the scene being authorised by the Force Incident Manager / Force Duty Officer (FIM / FDO)

2.2 Forces should consider the strategic aims and objectives of the response and in particular the principle of identifying, locating and confronting a subject(s) in order to neutralise the threat. This principle should then direct how forces triage their incoming calls, deal with public on the incoming calls system and then manage the information gleaned from this process.

2.3 The intention should be to ascertain as quickly as possible where subjects are, their description and what they are doing. This enables the first two elements of the strategy (identifying and locating) to be achieved. Other calls that do not provide this information should not be allowed to draw upon resources and undermine the overall response.

2.4 The traditional response and rationale for a response to a firearms incident may have to be altered in view of the extraordinary circumstances and challenges that a MTFA incident provides. Early recognition of a MTFA incident and speedy reaction will be crucial to saving life.

2.5 The FIM / FDO in other NW Region Forces will also have to be cognisant of the fact that urgent mutual aid requests may be made for immediate deployments of their resources (ARV) to support the host force for a MTFA incident.

04/05/2017 RESTRICTED

INQ029178/3