Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds March to December 2000 Volume One: Main Report

This evaluation is published in two volumes, of which this is the first. Volume one contains the main findings of the evaluation including the executive summary. Volume two contains the appendices including the detailed beneficiary study and the summaries of the activities of the DEC agencies. Each agency summary looks at key issues relating to the performance of the agencies as well as presenting general data about their programme. The executive summary has also been published as a stand- alone document.

Independent evaluation conducted by Valid International and ANSA Valid, 3 Kames Close Oxford, OX4 3LD UK Tel: +44 1865 395810 Email: [email protected] http://www.validinternational.org

© 2001 Disasters Emergency Committee

52 Great Portland Street London, W1W 7HU Tel: +44 20 7580 6550 Fax: +44 20 7580 2854 Website: http://www.dec.org.uk Further details about this and other DEC evaluations can be found at the DEC website. Evaluation of DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Page 2

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the more than four hundred people who gave their time to answer the evaluation team’s questions. Special thanks are due for the full and generous assistance received from the DEC agencies in Mozambique during the evaluation. Not only did the evaluation team receive full and detailed answers to their many questions, but also received the full assistance of the DEC agencies in visiting many project sites throughout the county.

Evaluation Data Sheet

Title: Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds – March to December 2000 Client: Disasters Emergency Committee http://www.dec.org.uk Date: 23 July 2001

Total pages: 94. PDF version has 95 pages including cover.

Filename: Volume One.doc

Version: 1.03

Team leader and John Cosgrave [email protected] principal author http://www.interworkseurope.com Team members Kerry Selvester (ANSA) [email protected] Lourdes Fidalgo (ANSA) [email protected] Alistair Hallam [email protected] Sociologist Nelia Taimo [email protected] Manager Alistair Hallam [email protected] Peer reviewers Peter Wiles [email protected] Margaret McEwan [email protected] Steve Collins [email protected] ANSA Associação de Nutrição e Segurança Alimentar (Food Security and Nutrition Association) CP 373, Maputo, Mozambique Valid International: Valid International Ltd [email protected] http://www.validinternational.org

Cover photograph courtesy of Associated Press Photo.

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Executive Summary

Introduction The evaluation team found that the DEC agencies did a good job in responding to the floods in Mozambique in 2000. All of the DEC agencies had something unique to offer and all contributed to an effective response. They achieved this good result despite numerous operational challenges, particularly of access. The DEC agencies used the resources entrusted to them by the UK public in a sensible way. They provided timely assistance that was largely appropriate to needs and to the local context and that had a real impact on the lives of those affected by the floods. This impact will continue to be felt long beyond the life of individual programmes. Low mortality and morbidity was reported during the emergency period, and the DEC agencies also helped families return to their lands after the floods and rebuild their lives. While many people, agencies, and governments contributed to the success of the humanitarian operation that took place the DEC agencies and their partners played a particularly important role, carrying out a significant and very impressive amount of work.

Appropriateness Though DEC agencies had only limited involvement in the search and rescue activities that followed the floods, they were involved in a wide range of activities in the relief phase. These included food distribution and the provision of non-food-items, emergency shelter, water, sanitation, camp services and health services. The fast response by the DEC agencies meant that they were among the first to assist those affected. This relief assistance was particularly appropriate. DEC agencies also had extensive programmes to help communities recover their livelihoods. These largely focused on agriculture but also included the renovation of schools, clinics, and other social infrastructure. DEC agencies were also active in efforts to reduce vulnerability to future disasters through programmes such as resettlement, and the promotion of the use of treated mosquito nets. While interventions in all phases were generally appropriate, those that took place in the latter stages of the emergency response tended to be less appropriate than those at the beginning. The reasons for this are as follows: • all of the agencies underestimated the resilience of the Mozambican population and their coping mechanisms • beneficiary needs and capacities grew in their range and complexity with time, making the typical “one size fits all” solution of standard kits or packs less appropriate • the need for beneficiary consultation became more important with time while the lack of this became more evident. The evaluation team considers that, in the latter stages of the response, the greater use of cash, in direct distribution as grants or as part of kits, as well as in payment for work, would have allowed beneficiaries to respond better to their own needs.

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The evaluation team found that despite this the interventions of the DEC agencies were generally appropriate. They were based on assessments and on knowledge of Mozambique and were professionally delivered. They were broadly appropriate to the context and culture. The assistance was timely and the DEC agencies were often the first to deliver assistance in many sectors.

Impact The work of the DEC agencies had a real and noticeable impact on the lives of the beneficiaries. The evaluation team found evidence of the positive impact of the DEC agencies everywhere that they travelled. The efforts of the DEC agencies covered all phases of the operation, the whole of the affected area, and most sectors of activity, with a correspondingly broad impact.

Efficiency The DEC agencies used the resources entrusted to them by the UK public in a responsible way. The most glaring inefficiency was not anything done by the DEC agencies, but was donor governments’ use of military resources instead of commercial alternatives. Some of the most efficient interventions by DEC agencies were actions taken to mobilise resources of other agencies. Some DEC agencies implemented their programmes using their own staff while others either funded partners or used a combination of both. The evaluation team found that no one approach was inherently more efficient. While the extensive use of expatriate staff was very efficient in the initial stages, it became less so with time compared with the recruitment and training of local staff. The most efficient responses took place where agencies were able to build on pre-existing programmes or on their investment in disaster preparedness. Short time limits on expenditure meant that some interventions were less efficient than they could have been. This was not helped by the slow financial reporting systems of several DEC agencies that did not make for efficient resource control in an emergency situation. It was impossible to compare unit costs between agencies, but indirect measures suggested that some interventions were less efficient than they could have been. Where health and safety was concerned there were many examples of both good and poor practice by DEC agencies. Poor health and safety practices not only posed a risk to the lives and welfare of agency staff, put also posed the risk of costly accidents or responses to them. Many DEC agencies have special internal mechanisms for the rapid and effective management of their emergency response. While there are unique factors in each agency, the sharing of information about these mechanisms would allow each of the DEC agencies an opportunity to improve their own emergency management mechanism.

Coverage The DEC appeal was limited to Mozambique rather than the wider Southern African Region. This was appropriate as Mozambique was the worst affected country and a focused appeal probably generated more funds than a broader one would have done.

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As a group, DEC agencies and their partners worked throughout the whole country and assisted beneficiaries in the places that were hardest to reach. Overall, partly because of the involvement of agencies that were not as professional as those of the DEC, those beneficiaries who were more accessible received significantly more assistance. The evaluation team found no evidence that aid was allocated or directed within Mozambique based on political affiliation. Despite the inclusion of vulnerable individuals in target criteria, delivery to them was more by chance than by specific targeting. Some vulnerable groups were put at a disadvantage by aid programmes that did not take their particular needs into account. Such failings were not always noticed because of the lack of monitoring data categorised by gender, age, or vulnerability.

Connectedness The DEC agencies were generally familiar with the long-term context in Mozambique and took this into account in their programmes. The biggest problems were with the sustainability of the permanent infrastructure that they built.

Coherence Government co-ordination was strong in Maputo and poor outside the capital in the initial stages. This improved in the recovery phase as the activities fell under the aegis of particular ministries, rather than with the newly formed and inexperienced National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC - Instituto Nacional de Gestão de Calamidades). There were ongoing co-ordination problems in the resettlement of people affected by the floods as this did not fall neatly under any one ministry. Mozambique is a developing country with a complex set of rules that is administered by an under-resourced and sometimes poorly educated bureaucracy. This bureaucracy sometimes caused delays and increased costs for DEC agencies. Programmes also suffered from bureaucracy within the DEC agencies themselves.

Appeal management Co-ordination among DEC agencies was very good, and the establishment of a DEC agency group was extremely positive. However, setting up this effective mechanism for co-ordination between the DEC agencies demanded management resources at the same time that they were putting all their efforts into organising their own response. The delegation of authority by the DEC to the DEC agency group in Maputo for the allocation of ‘surplus’ appeal funds was very positive in that it enabled the agencies in Mozambique to react very quickly to the 2001 floods. The agencies saw the DEC appeal process as a valuable mechanism, not just in terms of providing funds, but both in raising awareness in the UK of the emergency in Mozambique and providing a channel for their donations. Members of the DEC found that they were brought together in-country in a positive way enhancing their mutual lesson learning and co-operation. Although agency monitoring and reporting was generally of a high standard there were some exceptions. There was a broad consensus among agencies that DEC reporting requirements and rules needed clarifying at the outset, particularly as many of the field staff involved came into contact with the DEC for the first time.

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Standards Although all of the DEC agencies subscribe to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster ReliefA one of the agencies had systems in place to monitor their compliance. With a very few exceptions, DEC agencies did not promote the code or monitor their own compliance. The evaluation team found that compliance with the principles of the code was not always satisfactory. The lack of support given by DEC agencies to beneficiaries settling away from the resettlement sites indicated by the government, although in line with government policy, may have breached the principle that all beneficiaries are entitled to assistance in proportion to their needs. DEC agencies promoted the Sphere standardsB and measured their work against them. There were some deviations from the numerical indicators in the Sphere standards and in some cases agencies decided to adhere to national standards instead. The evaluation team found that these deviations were generally appropriate.

Conclusion While there was room for improvement, the evaluation team found that the DEC agency response was generally appropriate, efficient, effective, and coherent. The agencies between them achieved a good and effective coverage of those affected by the disaster. Through the DEC agencies, the UK public’s generosity has had a significant impact on relieving suffering among flood-affected communities.

A Henceforth referred to as the Code of Conduct. B The Sphere project was set-up establish minimum standards for the provision of services to beneficiaries in emergencies. These standards cover disaster assistance in water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning, and health services.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... 2 Executive Summary ...... 3 Table of Contents...... 7 Introduction...... 10 1 Appropriateness ...... 14 1.1 Introduction...... 14 1.2 Needs Assessments...... 14 1.3 Beneficiary Consultation and Involvement...... 17 1.4 Clear Objectives ...... 19 1.5 Cultural Appropriateness...... 20 1.6 Timeliness ...... 21 1.7 Relief Programmes...... 22 1.8 Recovery Programmes ...... 26 1.9 Programmes for Vulnerability Reduction...... 30 1.10 Conclusions and Recommendations...... 35 2 Efficiency ...... 38 2.1 Use of Military Assets ...... 38 2.2 Efficiency Factors...... 39 2.3 Costs ...... 42 2.4 Health and Safety ...... 43 2.5 Internal Control Systems ...... 44 2.6 Preparedness and Speed of Response...... 45 2.7 Conclusions and Recommendations...... 45 3 Impact...... 48 3.1 Breadth of Impact ...... 48 3.2 Depth of Impact ...... 49 3.3 Constraints on Impact ...... 50 3.4 Monitoring Impact ...... 51 3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations...... 52 4 Coverage ...... 53 4.1 Geographical Coverage...... 53 4.2 Beneficiary Coverage...... 55 4.3 Sectoral Interventions ...... 59

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4.4 Conclusions and Recommendations...... 60 5 Connectedness ...... 62 5.1 The longer Term Context ...... 62 5.2 Sustainability...... 62 5.3 Learning From Previous Emergencies ...... 63 5.4 Strengthening Local Organisations...... 64 5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations...... 64 6 Coherence...... 65 6.1 Co-ordination by the UN ...... 65 6.2 Co-ordination by the Government ...... 66 6.3 Co-ordination by the DEC Agencies ...... 68 6.4 Conclusions and Recommendations...... 70 7 Appeal Management...... 72 7.1 Added Value of the DEC Funds ...... 72 7.2 Control and Reporting Processes ...... 73 7.3 DEC Rules ...... 73 7.4 Communication...... 76 7.5 The Evaluation System ...... 76 8 Standards...... 80 8.1 Code of Conduct ...... 80 8.2 Sphere...... 81 8.3 Conclusion and Recommendations ...... 82 9 Lessons for Learning ...... 84 9.1 Assessment...... 84 9.2 Preparedness and Speed of Response...... 84 9.3 Beneficiary Consultation...... 85 9.4 Targeting Assistance ...... 85 9.5 Programming Issues...... 86 9.6 Funding Agencies...... 87 9.7 Programme Monitoring ...... 87 9.8 Programme Management...... 87 9.9 Co-ordination ...... 87 9.10 DEC Procedures...... 88 9.11 Standards ...... 88 Index for main report...... 90

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References ...... 93

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Introduction

The floods that took place in Mozambique in the first quarter of 2000 were the worst in living memory, affecting the Limpopo, Buzi, Save, Incomati and Umbelezi rivers. These floods began in January 2000 on a scale similar to the previous year and by the beginning of February had affected more than 100,000 people and left 18 people dead. Outbreaks of flooding continued until mid-February, destroying houses in Maputo and displacing more than 300,000 people along the main rivers. To compound this Cyclone Eline hit Mozambique in late February bringing with it large amounts of rain and causing a second and very damaging wave of flooding as Mozambique’s rivers struggled to carry the rain to the seaA. Both rural and urban communities were devastated as the floods took 700 lives and destroyed houses, crops, livestock, and livelihoods. The floods caused damages of over £500 million and affected the lives of two million people, including displacing or making homeless more than half a million. The floods also severely damaged or destroyed countless roads and bridges, four hospitals, forty-eight other health facilities, and five hundred schools in one of the poorest countries in the world. The media played an important role in raising the world’s awareness of the floods. ITN’s website acknowledged the key role of Mark Austin’s 27 February report, referring to the footage as images that helped launch a national charity appeal. Mark Austin himself said: "it is perhaps Mozambique's good fortune that this is a telegenic catastrophe. With no dramatic rescues, no riveting footage, would the world have noticed?"1. In a part of the world that rarely makes the news, media money for TV coverage was suddenly no object. The BBC chartered three helicopters and a plane, ITN hired four helicopters, and other news organisations chartered anything left in southern Africa that would fly. There were concerns by some that the resources being used by journalists were having a negative impact on operations though few would disagree that their presence was fundamental to the success of the DEC Mozambique appeal. The response to the floods was incredible, both from the Mozambican public and the international community. The South African Air Force (SAAF) joined the rescue efforts of Mozambicans. Teams from around the world flew to assist. Military contingents from neighbouring countries, the United Kingdom, other European countries and the United States, worked alongside the Mozambican government, local and international Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) agencies. In the UK the public gave generously to the Mozambique Floods Appeal launched by the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), which raised £31.5 million. Of the 14 DEC member agencies, all but three participated in the appealB. The remaining

A There is a full and detailed chronology in the appendix. B CARE did not participate in the appeal even though they had a large programme in Mozambique. The other two members, Children’s Aid Direct and the Christian Children’s Fund of Great Britain had no existing programmes in Mozambique.

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elevenA shared £18.7 million of the money raised between them to fund the first nine months of their activities to December 2000 (Phase One).

Agencies share of Appeal Funds for Phase One

CAFOD BRCS 9.1% 8.4% ActionAid 7.3% Christian Aid 12.6% Concern 5.5% World Vision 4.8%

Other 9.3% Help the Aged Save the Children 2.2% 14.2% Merlin 1.5% TearFund 0.8%

OXFAM 33.6%

This expenditure was divided among a number of sectors.

Agencies expenditure of Appeal Funds for Phase One

Other 15.7% Household items 13.2%

Water and Sanitation Health 16.5% 8.4%

15.7% Education 3.9% Food 2.4%

Shelter Blankets and Clothes 0.9% 19.4% Agriculture 19.6%

DEC agencies moved families to places of safety, provided or distributed food, water, sanitation, shelter, and basic household utensils to some of the hundreds of thousands of people taking refuge in the Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) on higher ground. When people left the TACs the DEC agencies followed them with assistance to rebuild their houses or re-establish their livelihoods. The agencies

A Oxfam, Save the Children, Christian Aid, British Red Cross Society (BRCS), ActionAid, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), World Vision UK, Concern Worldwide, Help the Aged, Medical Relief in Emergencies (MERLIN), and Tearfund.

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repaired roads, distributed household utensils, food, seeds, tools, and housing kits to help the population recover. The humanitarian response, in which the DEC agencies played a significant part, was successful. After the initial loss of life in the floods themselves, there were relatively few deaths in the TACsA. Levels of malnutrition were also low. This evaluation report takes a close look at the humanitarian response undertaken by the DEC agencies in order to report back to the UK public on how and where their funds were used, and to identify good practice for future emergency operations. The terms of reference for the evaluation can be found in the Appendices in Volume Two. The evaluation team carried out extensive interviews, background research and field visits to develop this report. Full details of the methodology can be found in Volume Two. The report looks at the appropriateness of the actions of the DEC agencies, their efficiency, impact, coverage, connectedness, and coherence. The evaluation team also considered issues of appeal management and standards. Finally, there is a chapter presenting the lessons that can be learnt from the DEC agency response in Mozambique. Conclusions and recommendations for the future can be found at the end of each of the first eight chapters. The beneficiary survey carried out as part of the evaluation can be found as a stand- alone document in Volume Two, though its findings are reflected throughout this report. Other appendices relate to the context in which the floods and the emergency operations took place, the itinerary of the evaluation team, lists of acronyms etc. The evaluation team would like to thank all those who assisted them in their work, particularly the staff of the DEC agencies in Mozambique who provided logistical and moral support. The evaluation team pays tribute to the commitment and energy they demonstrated throughout the emergency, as well as to their willingness to be open and frank in discussions relating to the report. The evaluation team is also grateful to the people of Mozambique, who, despite the heavy load that the emergency had placed on them, still found time to tell the evaluation team about their experiences and about the assistance that they had received.

A The mortality rate in the camps was reportedly lower than the (admittedly high) background rate for Mozambique. (Source: Interview with Joe Hanlon)

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Summary of DEC agency activity in Phase One of the flood response. Health Health SanitationWater and Food Agriculture Shelter items Household Clothes and Blankets Education Other DEC Agency Interventions by Sector

Phase one Expenditure by Agency £1M £2M £3M £4M £5M £6M ActionAid

BRCS

CAFOD

Christian Aid

Concern

Help the Aged

Merlin

OXFAM

SC (UK)

TearFund

World Vision

Sectorspend as % of Total

Sector importance for Agency

5%

Major sector for agency

10% Significant sector

Minor sector for agency

15%

No Expenditure reported

20%

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1 Appropriateness

“Appropriateness is the need to tailor humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness.”2

1.1 Introduction This chapter examines how appropriate the DEC agency interventions were to the needs of those affected by the flooding. In particular it looks at: • how the agencies assessed needs and whether beneficiaries were consulted • whether agencies established clear objectives • whether interventions were culturally appropriate • how timely the interventions were • how appropriate the interventions in different sectors were in the relief, recovery, and vulnerability reduction phases. The DEC agencies engaged in three types of response to the disaster: immediate relief, recovery, and the reduction of vulnerability to future disasters. In terms of vulnerability reduction, DEC agencies worked to reduce the exposure to specific threats (e.g. by supporting the resettlement of people away from the flood plains), to limit vulnerability through economic development, and to increase local capacity to deal with future disasters. All but one of the DEC agencies that opted in were either already operating in Mozambique or had good knowledge of the country through their partners. This background knowledge helped agencies to respond appropriately to the crisis.

1.2 Needs Assessments

”Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs.” - from Principle 2 of the Code of Conduct.

A thorough assessment of needs helps ensure that subsequent programmes are appropriate to the types and levels of need. Detailed assessments can also help tailor programmes to take into account local cultural norms and begin the process of involving beneficiaries in the design and implementation of aid programmes. This section looks at the needs assessments carried out by the DEC agencies, the types of assessment used, the constraints encountered, and our overall analysis of agency performance in assessment.

1.2.1 TYPES OF ASSESSMENTS DEC agencies used a wide range of techniques for assessment, from helicopter surveys to the Save the Children’s detailed household economy survey in Nova Mambone. As well as the assessment of need, agencies also made technical assessments for their programmes. For example, Oxfam, the Red Cross, The General

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Union of Co-operatives (UGCA) and others sited their boreholes using geophysical assessment. Oxfam and Concern both carried our nutritional surveys. Save the Children trained their monitoring staff to use the Middle Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) tape to identify malnourished children for referral to the local hospital for supplementary feeding. Agencies used a range of tools for assessment. CAFOD’s partner UGC and Save the Children used beneficiary assessment forms, while volunteers from HelpAge’sB partner VUKOXA used HelpAge check lists to help them identify categories of vulnerability through direct observation, communication and listening. Oxfam and Concern both carried out Knowledge, Attitudes, Behaviour, and Practices (KABP) assessments for their public health programmes in Gaza. DEC agencies and their partners made extensive use of participatory appraisal tools. Funding agenciesC sent staff to assess the capacities of their partners as well as the scale of needs. It is also important to acknowledge that, due to prior involvement in an area (e.g. ActionAid in Manhiça), or close relationships with local partners (e.g. Cafod and UGC), some agencies had the great advantage of already having a good in-depth ‘base-line’ knowledge of the communities affected, before carrying out any assessments. Such in-depth knowledge is not always formally acknowledged or reported upon, yet can add considerably to the appropriateness of an agency’s intervention. It allowed CAFOD’s partner UGC and ActionAid to identify needs quickly and effectively. UGC’s co-operative network in particular was able to identify needs rapidly and efficiently, including less easily identified needs such as shelter for families living with relatives rather than in accommodation centres. ActionAid’s knowledge of their districts allowed them to indicate otherwise unrecognised needs to local officials.

1.2.2 CONSTRAINTS ON ASSESSMENT In the early stages access problems only allowed for short visits by helicopterD and therefore limited the depth of assessments carried out. Later on, as road access improved, the agencies were able to do more thorough and detailed assessments. These typically included field trips and extensive consultations with the provincial and district officials, communities, and both national and international NGOs. Inaccurate base data, as for example with data from the 1997 census, was also a constraining factor that the DEC agencies had to work around in their surveys.

A UGC was CAFOD’s main partner, getting £1,276,000 or 78% of CAFOD’s DEC funds. Oxfam also supported UGC with grants totalling £281,000 through Oxfam Canada (5% of Oxfam’s DEC funding). B Help the Aged is a member of the DEC, but international work is carried about by Help Age International. This will be referred to as HelpAge throughout the report. C CAFOD, Christian Aid, and Tearfund all sent assessment teams to Mozambique to work with partners. This was followed in all cases by other staff sent to support the work of partners. D Most agencies got lifts on the military helicopters but Oxfam used DEC funds to hire a helicopter that was used partly for assessments.

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1.2.3 ANALYSIS

1.2.3.1 GOOD PRACTICE • DEC agency responses were generally in accordance with the results of assessments they had carried out. Concern for example bought fewer blankets and kitchen kits than initially planned after assessments showed less were needed. Oxfam dropped plans for supplementary feeding after nutritional assessments showed low malnutrition rates that were well within the capacity of the agencies already working in the sector to deal with. Merlin decided to work from Beira when their first assessment mission in early March revealed that needs were greater there. • Agencies used assessments not only to define their own programming but also to bring problems to the attention of the broader aid community. Save the Children’s aerial assessment of the Save valley on 25 February found thousands of people stranded in trees and this alerted the UN and the INGC to the seriousness of the floods there. World Vision and Save the Children both used their assessments to persuade the World Food Programme to increase the number on the ration rolls. • ActionAid’s detailed assessment and registration in Manhiça and Marracuene was used by a number of other agenciesA to identify those in need of assistance. Save the Children conducted a household economy survey in Nova Mambone to build a database that served as a basis for its interventions over a prolonged period. • The DEC agencies provided assistance to others to carry out assessments. Concern assisted the roads and public works departments to appraise damage to infrastructure to help them obtain funding for rehabilitation projects. Oxfam and Concern supported a nutritional assessment in Gaza even though they were not involved with food distribution there. • DEC agencies responded to needs identified by their partners’ assessments. For example, Christian Aid gave The Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) an additional grant after CCM’s needs assessments identified groups of affected populations in Sofala that had not been assisted by other agencies due to their inaccessibility. • DEC agencies also carried out assessments of their partners and their capacity to implement emergency programmes. As a result CAFOD increased funds and targets for UGC and reduced them for Caritas de Maputo, reflecting their capacity to undertake shelter programmes. • ActionAid Mozambique subcontracted Rebuilding Hope (Reconstruindo a Esperança), a local NGO, to assess the psychological impact of the floods on children and women. • Red Cross and World Vision both did a detailed assessment of seeds in the areas in which they were working to develop a range of appropriate seed packs.

A Including World Vision and CAFOD.

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• HelpAge made their vulnerable individual checklists and village assessment forms available to other agencies and promoted their use. • Concern and Oxfam both used KABP to develop a suitable information programme to accompany their public health programmes. • Save the Children visited over 2,500 families in their homes to determine their income, family composition, and circumstances in order to come up with a definitive list of beneficiaries for food distributions and later for non-food items.

1.2.3.2 PROBLEM AREAS IN ASSESSMENT • Assessment was very constrained by access to communities. Typically helicopters allowed only short assessment visits. • Initial assessments focused only on those in TACs so that the problems of those staying with family or friends were sometimes overlooked • The weakness of Mozambique’s 1997 census complicated assessment. Many DEC agencies reported that the actual number of people in districts was more than the official numbers based on the extrapolation of the 1997 census figures. This and the previous point are discussed in more detail in the Coverage chapter. • Assessments took too long in some cases and while this contributed to the quality of the assessments it also meant that they were sometimes more detailed than necessaryA3. • Some DEC agency partners and local government officials had little capacity in assessment for which their local knowledge did not always compensate.B DEC agencies too readily accepted such assessments without asking obvious questions.C • There was too little beneficiary participation in assessments. This is discussed below.

1.3 Beneficiary Consultation and Involvement

“Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid. Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We

A The DEC agency programmes in Mozambique were development programmes which meant the agencies were used to doing thorough and lengthy assessments.

B The details provided to the IFRC by the Ministry of Health for clinic rehabilitation in Sofala were completely inaccurate. The IFRC was in a hurry to finish the assessment in time for the Rome Conference and made do with a quick helicopter survey and Ministry data. When they came to plan the work in detail, they discovered that they had to redo the assessment. C The acceptance by some agencies of the idea of a standard seeds pack for the affected area, recommended by the Ministry of Agriculture, is an example of this. BRCS note that while IFRC discussed many aspects of the seed pack with the Ministry of Agriculture, ultimately they had to respect the Ministry view and act accordingly.

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will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.” - Principle 7 of Code of Conduct.

The evaluation team found very little evidence of beneficiary participation in the assessment and programme design phases. The same was generally true of the implementation phase, where beneficiary participation was largely limited to the “we provide the materials, you do the work” approachA. While beneficiary participation is very difficult in the tight time frames of the acute relief phase, there is more time for beneficiary participation in the recovery and vulnerability reduction phases. However, the evaluation team found that participation in assessment and design was lacking even in the later stages of the rehabilitation process. Beneficiary consultation is an important component of needs assessment. Beneficiaries usually have a very good understanding of their own capacities and needs. While beneficiary needs may be obvious, their capacity to meet their needs is not. This capacity can be difficult to assess with the result that many external assessments overlook it. Time limits were not the only factor limiting beneficiary participation in execution. The affected communities faced many competing work priorities including building their shelter, re-establishing agricultural production, or earning cash. This limited the ability of beneficiaries to contribute labour to DEC agency projects. One positive example of beneficiary consultation was when Oxfam consulted communities about their shelter programme. The communities prioritised concrete floors and house size over the provision of doors. As a result the Oxfam houses were larger than the norm and had concrete floors, with the communities agreeing to provide doors themselvesB. In contrast, many DEC agencies seem to have made assumptions about what beneficiaries wanted rather than consulting them. In a follow up to their seeds and tools distribution the Red Cross asked farmers their opinions on the ideal tool kit. Farmers identified a sickle and axe as two basic tools that had been missing from the Red Cross kitC.

1.3.1 ALTERNATIVES TO BENEFICIARY CONSULTATION

1.3.1.1 PARTNERS AND OFFICIALS In lieu of consulting beneficiaries, agencies sometimes consulted local partners and government officials. The ‘key informants’ most accessible to agencies tend to be from the urban elite and therefore do not always have a good understanding of the needs of rural communitiesD. For example Oxfam consulted partners rather than beneficiaries about the design of their resettlement kits and as a result came up with large and complex kit that was both expensive and difficult to transport and

A Distributions of housing kits or latrine slabs are examples of this approach. B This was borne out by interviews with shelter beneficiaries in general. While people did not have the capacity to amass the amount of money needed to buy cement or roofing sheets, they had the capacity to improvise some sort of door for their house. C Unfortunately this consultation took place after the first distribution rather than before it. The consultation was intended to inform views for a second distribution that did not take place as the conclusion was that others would cover the future needs. D One could argue that techniques like Rapid Rural Appraisal have been developed precisely because of this gap between the views of such “key informants” and rural peasants.

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distribute. This kit even contained a kerosene stove, which Oxfam later acknowledged may have been inappropriate.

1.3.1.2 SELF TARGETING MECHANISMS A number of agencies used self-targeting mechanismsA to ensure that only those most in need received assistance. For example CEDES and ORAM, two Christian Aid funded agenciesB, both carried out Cash-for-Work projects. Other DEC agencies carried out food-for-work projects. While food for work allows those who target themselves to meet their food needs, cash-for-work allows beneficiaries both to target themselves and to identify which of their needs to meet first.

1.3.1.3 SELF IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS Supplying aid in a fungibleC form is an effective way of giving beneficiaries an influence over the assistance they get. Cash is the ultimate in fungibility. The usefulness of cash as opposed to goods in kind grows with time as markets re- establish themselves and family needs become more variedD. It is interesting to note the approach now in Kosovo, where those in need of shelter assistance are now given vouchers for building materials so that they can select what they need. This can be compared to the more paternalistic ‘one size fits all’ distributions in Mozambique. No DEC agencies made direct cash distributions to beneficiaries, though Oxfam did co-fund a Care and World Relief project that included small cash payments ($10 equivalent to £6) as part of their shelter relief. CAFOD funded (from non DEC sources) a UGC micro-enterprise project that provided cash loans to flood victims.

1.4 Clear Objectives Many of the DEC agenciesE used logical frameworks as a means of clearly stating objectives and the underlying assumptions. While some of these logical frameworks suffered from the usual confusion between inputs, outcomes, and impact, they were still extremely useful tools. Of all of the DEC agencies, World Vision arguably had the clearest setting of and measuring against targets. World Vision’s impact assessment very clearly measured

A Food for work is probably the archetypal self-targeting mechanism, in that only those who really need food will work for it, whereas everyone is interested in a free distribution of food. B CEDES also had funding from CAFOD. C Fungible is the extent to which something can be exchanged. For example, household goods like new blankets are usually more fungible than food, but may be difficult to exchange if the market is flooded with blankets. D While everyone needed blankets and household goods immediately after the floods, families have different outstanding needs several months afterwards as they will have met some of their needs by themselves or through their own networks already. E World Vision, Oxfam, and Concern made several references to the log frames (logical frameworks) in their reporting. While other agencies did not always formally present log frames, it was clear that many had used them for internal project management.

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the project impact against the original logical framework. Oxfam also measured impact against their logical framework in their excellentA final report. Although the evaluation team requested monitoring and evaluation plans from agencies (with a view to comparing them and preparing a synthesis for use by agencies), only six of the eleven agencies responded. This was despite the fact that they are required in the terms of reference for the evaluation to provide “List of indicators used ……to monitor and evaluate their DEC funded activities.” While the majority of the programmes evaluated did have fairly clear objectives, these should have been set out clearly at the beginning to facilitate monitoring.

1.5 Cultural Appropriateness

“We shall respect culture and custom: We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we are working in.” - Principle 5 of the Code of Conduct.

Most of the DEC agencies had worked in Mozambique for many years prior to the flooding. As a result, little of the aid delivered was culturally inappropriate. There were some exceptions. Oxfam, for example, distributed insecticide-treated mosquito nets to families for the use of women of childbearing age and children (as pregnant women and children are at greatest risk from Malaria). Some small families only received one mosquito net from Oxfam. Yet, Concern’s survey in the same area that highlighted the need for families to receive two nets, for if only one net were distributed, the husband, as head of household, would use it and leave his wife and children withoutB. IFRC also became aware of the risks of distributing one mosquito net and changed their standard kit (for future emergencies) to include two. Many agencies provided the same assistance to all families regardless of their sizeC. This is easier logistically and administratively, but does not take into account local culture. In the centre of the country families do not live in a single house but in a series of huts: one for the grandparents, one for the parents, and the other for the children. Agencies were therefore criticised for only providing one house kit per family. While the evaluators agree that three shelter kits per family would have been excessive, the agencies might have had fewer problems with the local authorities if they had been aware of this aspect of household organisation. A further issue of cultural appropriateness was that of settlement type. Prior to the floods rural communities had lived in a variety of settlement patterns ranging from individual households to household groups and villages, yet all of the rural

A The Oxfam report, despite covering a huge range of work, was thorough, consistent, well structured, and openly discussed the problems faced during implementation. B Mothers often sleep with their children while the man sleeps apart. Oxfam decided that rather than distribute additional nets, it would be better to conduct an extensive public education campaign to emphasise the vulnerability of pregnant women and children to malaria. The likely impact of a relatively short campaign, however, and the absence of men working outside the area (who were the ones who needed to know that mosquito net usage should reflect vulnerability rather than status within the household) both raise questions about the likely effectiveness of the campaign. C One exception was Oram, which used eight family-size categories for its Christian Aid funded assistance.

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resettlement sites seen were of a village type (resettlement is discussed in greater detail below). In general most programmes were culturally appropriate. Indeed, in some cases the agencies adjusted their programmes according to areas to take local variations into consideration. For example, BRCS felt that the supply of sanitary towels in the rural centre of the country was inappropriate, whereas ActionAid distributed them in response to beneficiary requests in the more urbanised south. Christian Aid felt that their partner CCM’s house design was more suitable for the south than for the centre of the country. Problems did occur with respect to the targeting of aid within communities. The Code of Conduct requires agencies to deliver assistance proportional to need, which often requires targeting within communities. However, such targeting may be contrary to local cultural norms and was certainly a source of beneficiary complaints for a number of reasons. Firstly, some assets are widely shared between householdsA and agency attempts to target may not have been worth the effort in terms of their impacts. Secondly, communities do not always feel that members of a vulnerable group should receive more than others, yet it is often these people that aid agencies attempt to target. In practice agencies took a pragmatic approach. ActionAid, for example, had planned to give three hoes to each family that had lost everything, but was forced by local pressure to give one hoe to all families, regardless of whether they had lost anything in the floods. Save the Children felt obliged to arrange free food distribution for those with salaries, after they had been removed from the free-food rolls at WFP insistence. The evaluation team recognises the difficulties involved for agencies in trying to meet local expectations at the same time as ensuring that aid reaches those most in need.

1.6 Timeliness Speed of response is very important for disaster victims. A small amount of assistance delivered quickly may be far more valuable than a large amount of assistance delivered late. One of the reasons that beneficiaries generally rated the provision of food as the most important assistance following the floods may not just have been their need for food, but the fact that food aid was commonly the first aid that communities received. The DEC agencies and their partners were reasonably fast to react. Several DEC agencies had additional international staff on the ground prior to the DEC appealB and others had already funded work through their partners in response to the January and early February floods. These agencies were well placed to react to the big floods of late February. When there were delays in DEC agency responses, these were often the result of external factors rather than any direct failing by the agencies. Customs clearance problems and the Mozambican bureaucracy slowed down some of the programmes of many of the DEC agencies (discussed further in the chapter on coherence). The failure of third party contractors to stick to agreed programmes was also a problem for many DEC agencies.

A Agricultural tools may be one example of this. (McEwan, M. 2001 Private communication) B Oxfam and Concern.

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Some partners took an overly leisurely approach. CAFOD’s partner OIKOS treated their emergency response more like a development project, which may have slowed down implementation. By contrast CAFOD’s principal partner UGC and Christian Aid’s partner CCM both responded very quickly and finished their shelter projects ahead of schedule. Several of the DEC agenciesA had been given Department for International Development (DFID – the UK’s overseas aid department) funding prior to the late February floods and the launching of the appeal. Their initial responses made use of this funding as well as their own emergency funds or public appeals rather than DEC funds. However, all the DEC agencies acknowledged the usefulness of DEC funding in mounting a comprehensive response to the needs.

1.7 Relief Programmes Relief interventions by the DEC agencies were largely in the following sectors: • food • non-food-items • water and sanitation • health • access • camp management.

1.7.1 FOOD Malnutrition was not a significant problem in this emergency. Despite public statements by UNICEF that one in three children were malnourished4, a rapid nutritional assessment by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF at the end of March found that only six per cent of children under five years were moderately malnourished while 0.4% of children were severely malnourished. This survey was carried out in eleven TACs. Mozambique has two main agricultural seasons with the main harvest in February and March and a smaller harvest one in August and September. The main harvest accounts for the bulk of the food grown. In most of the country, the rainfall in the shorter season is usually not enough for maize, but the crop can be grown in moist areas near rivers. Beans and vegetables can be grown in both long and short seasons. The floods therefore came at a critical time in the agricultural calendar, when the main crop of the year was almost ready for harvest. Although some granaries were on high enough ground to escape flood damage, most stored food grainsB and seed were swept away. In the flooded lowlands most people lost all their livestock. Food Aid was imperative for people to survive. The World Food Programme (WFP) had stocks of food in-country and quickly made them available to those affected. It had also placed food stocks in Chókwè, in

A The Red Cross got money for flood relief from DFID on 10 February, and ActionAid, Oxfam, and World Vision got DFID funding on 22 February. B Such stocks would have been low at this time of year in any case, but the previous season had been quite a good one overall. (FAO/WFP 2000)

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anticipation of the road being cut in the event of flooding, but the severity of the floods destroyed these stocks. The large number of military helicopters sent by donor countries to Mozambique, although generally arriving too late to rescue people, played a useful role in distributing food to areas inaccessible by other means. The ready availability of food from WFP meant that the DEC agencies did not need to buy much food and so were able to concentrate instead on distribution. Exceptions were the Lutheran World Federation (a Christian Aid partner), who purchased food for distribution to those who fell outside the WFP criteria in Chókwè and Guija, and ActionAid, who purchased salt. World Vision, Save the Children, Concern, ActionAid and others all distributed food in agreement with WFP. WFP paid a fixed amount towards distribution but as this did not always cover the full costs agencies supplemented this with DEC fundsA. WFP Ration Scale5 (Per person per day) Maize 500 Gm Equivalent to: Pulses 50 Gm 2,170 kCalories Sugar 20 Gm 60 gm Protein Oil 20 Gm 40 gm Fat

When ActionAid asked beneficiaries to rank the assistance they received, the majority of beneficiaries ranked food as most important. The same pattern was seen in beneficiary interviews carried out by the evaluation team. Problems with WFP assistance included the WFP food pipeline and the underestimation of the size of the population in need. This led in some cases to actual rations falling far short of the theoretical values given above. World Vision found that while 99.5% of targeted beneficiaries received food distributions, the amount they received was not adequate to meet all their needsB. Another problem was that WFP rations were calculated on a standard five-person family only. Save the Children and World Vision negotiated with WFP to distribute food on the basis of actual family size. This is in accordance with the Code of Conduct’s requirement that aid be proportional to need. Concern, arguing that a full survey would have been too difficultC, distributed food to each family on a five-person per family basis regardless of size. After those presumed to have another income were excluded from WFP free food distribution in Nova Mambone, Save the Children distributed rice to those excluded from their own stocksD. Agency decisions to distribute food were highly appropriate. Without this WFP would not have been able to manage distributions and malnutrition would undoubtedly have been higher. The financial strength of the DEC agencies and the availability of

A World Vision estimated that food delivery costs for them were over twice the contribution from the WFP. B World Vision in Machanga was probably the worst affected. They only received fifty per cent of the 4,997t of food that they should have received for the 22 weeks between April and August. C The district in which Concern was working was huge with a very disperse population. Concern argued that with only 10 staff and two motorcycles a full survey was not possible. D Those typically excluded were government officials, police, teachers, medical staff, and fishermen etc. This caused a great deal of problems because the WFP instruction to exclude those with an income came after beneficiaries had been told that they would receive further food aid.

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DEC funds also allowed them to supplement the amounts they received from WFP and to make adjustments where necessary. The DEC agencies are to be congratulated for their successful involvement in this area.

1.7.2 NON-FOOD ITEMS As bulk supplies of food were provided by WFP, the major relief area for DEC funding was the purchase and distribution of non-food items. These were normally distributed in kit form by the agencies. Almost all the DEC agencies distributed non-food-itemsA, and almost all beneficiaries received something. The Red Cross distributed non-food relief items to 26,472 families (plus reinstallation kits to 10,062 families). Christian Aid’s partner CCM distributed 24,200 kits, World Vision 14,494, and Oxfam 10,421. As the most critical areas became saturated with distributions, some items were carried over as emergency preparedness stocks. The range of non-food-item kits was very great. Oxfam had a very basic hygiene kit containing only a bucket and soap, but also produced a Rolls Royce resettlement kit containing a kerosene stove, a lantern, salt, sugar, and tea as well as kerosene, wrappers and clothingB. Kits typically contained blankets, cooking and eating utensils (usually two to three pots, four to five spoons, plates and cups), soap, capulanasC, a jerrycan or bucket and soap. Many of those interviewed in the south of the country received more than one kit though this was not the case in the centre of the country. World Vision’s survey in Machanga found that 92% of the families surveyed had received household kits of some sort and that of these 99.3% had used the items (as opposed to selling them or keeping them for later). Those surveyed ranked pots and pans, followed by plastic sheeting, and blankets as the most important items in the kit. The kits used by Christian Aid’s partner CCM cost around £25 whereas the Oxfam resettlement kits, which were more comprehensive, cost more than double this. Some of the kits contained inappropriate items, such as the razors and sanitary towels provided in the BRCS kit, which were of a type used by their beneficiaries. While the beneficiaries were very grateful for the assistance, a common complaint was that each family got just one kit regardless of how many members they had. While average family size in Mozambique is typically five to six, family size in Machanga ranged in a one-person family to a family of fifteen. For this reason kits with only one mosquito net were criticised resulting in the Red Cross adding a second one to their standard family kit for Mozambique. The most effective kit distributions were probably those where the items in them most closely corresponded to the needs of the beneficiaries. This was the case with the Save the Children kits, but they were only able to do this after an extensive survey of all the households to be assisted.

A As they are medical specialists, Merlin did not do any general distributions of non-food-items. B While these kits probably contained some unnecessary items, such as kerosene stoves, tea, etc, they also included clothing, knitted blankets and wrapping cloths. Inadequate distribution of clothing was one area of frequent beneficiary complaint and Oxfam’s supply of clothing was very welcome. C Traditional wrapping cloth used as a dress by women. It is usually a brightly coloured cotton fabric about 1.5m by 0.9m.

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The distribution of kits was not always timely. The evaluation team found one (non- DEC) NGO distributing low quality household kits in July, by which time families obviously already had basic household itemsA. The DEC agencies were generally much faster.

1.7.3 WATER AND SANITATION The floods contaminated many wells and destroyed many water systems and boreholes leading to the subsequent threat of an outbreak of cholera. One leading expert told the BBC that those affected: " will get cholera because of the natural habitat and because of being spread widely by faecal contamination of water.”6 In response to this threat all of the DEC agencies were, appropriately, involved with water and sanitation to some extent. Of all the DEC agencies, Oxfam played the leading role in this sector, especially in the relief phase. Oxfam made emergency repairs to water systems in towns, rehabilitated small water systems, dug new boreholes, built and rehabilitated wells and constructed thousands of latrines. Oxfam’s intervention was critical in the TACs and in the clean up of Chókwè and other sites.

1.7.4 HEALTH Merlin, the Red Cross and World Vision all had curative health programmes while most of the other agencies restricted themselves to health education and prevention. DEC agency involvement in health was broader in the recovery phase where Oxfam, Concern, the Red Cross, Merlin and Save the Children were all involved in clinic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

1.7.5 ACCESS The floods, and the waterlogged state of the soil for many months afterwards, had a very disruptive affect on land transport. Save the Children, World Vision, Oxfam, Concern and ActionAid all carried out road repairs and maintenance to enable them to service communities that were very difficult to reach. DEC agency partners also contributed, particularly with the operation of ferries,B and CEDES did major work, with Christian Aid funding, to open road access to Sabie after the destruction of the main bridge over the Incomati River by the floods in early February. Save the Children’s commitment to keep the road to Nova Mambone open consumed significant resourcesC. In many cases the end of support by DEC agencies has meant an end to the effective maintenance of the roads that they rehabilitated. Local officials interviewed all commented favourably on the broader economic impact of the opening of transport links after the floods. Despite the very many difficulties related

A When asked what she planned to do with this kit, one recipient replied that she would keep it as a souvenir of the floods. B Christian Aid’s partner, LWF, operated a ferry across the Limpopo at Chókwè that was used by HelpAge and other DEC agencies. Christian Aid and CAFOD’s partner CEDES operated a ferry service across the Incomati River until this was replaced by private operators (the boats used by CEDES were funded by a Danish agency). C Save the Children’s reporting does not identify the cost of this operation, but supplies and materials for the roads programme cost around 10 per cent of its total expenditure on supplies and materials (transport and labour were probably the biggest cost of road construction).

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to transport infrastructure, and the later non-maintenance of the work done, the evaluation team considered that it was an appropriate area for DEC agency involvement as access was the major constraint to aid reaching beneficiaries.

1.7.6 CAMP MANAGEMENT Many of the DEC agencies played a role in the TACs, but this was typically in the provision of services rather than in their management. Local authorities usually managed the TACs themselves. Oxfam, however, took responsibility for co-ordinating water and sanitation activities in the huge Chiaquelane TACA. UNICEF, with overall responsibility for the water and sanitation sector, was very complimentary of Oxfam’s involvement in this area. ActionAid also helped the district authorities in the areas where they worked. These were valuable contributions that helped ensure a more effective response to the emergency.

1.8 Recovery Programmes

1.8.1 FOOD Even though general free food distribution was suspended after four months this did not coincide with the end of food problems. Continued rain after the flooding kept the soil too wet for good growth of the maize variety distributed - a short season moisture-sensitive type. There were also problems with crops being washed away or attacked by pests. Farmers in the cyclone-affected areas, with land that was higher and dryer than the flood-affected areas, did not have the opportunity to make any significant sowings after the cyclone, except for small areas of irrigated vegetables near water sources. In Machanga, World Vision found that 36% of those surveyed reported having to travel in search of food. While this was a resumption of normal economic activities for some, for others, such as the woman who walked two days from Javane to Machaze to work on someone else’s farm in exchange for food, it demonstrated an element of desperation. Despite this, food insecurity does not seem to have been reflected in widespread malnutrition. In May both Concern and Oxfam participated in a nutrition survey of the area affected by flooding organised by the Ministry of Health with UNICEF support. The survey of children under five found that only 5.2% were malnourished, and 1.5 per cent severely malnourishedB7. The general picture of food insecurity in the centre of the country was confirmed by the beneficiaries, who, when asked what their most important outstanding need was, invariably answered food8. World Vision found little in the way of food reserves or agricultural production in some areas. Save the Children’s monitoring also revealed a poor food security situation in some areas and brought this to the attention of WFP and the Provincial Government.

A This site was estimated to hold up to 80,000 displaced. B These figures cannot be directly compared with the figure for the TACs given earlier as the population surveyed was different and methodologies were not identical. The ‘children under five’ category excluded infants of less than 6 months.

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1.8.2 NON FOOD ITEMS During the recovery phase, many DEC agencies distributed non-food-items to help families moving from TACs to resettlement sites or their own houses. Typically these contained the same items as the survival kits, though some also included tools, a plastic tarpaulin and some nails or wire. Oxfam was slow to assemble and distribute their large and complex resettlement kits. The longer the delay in distribution the less useful such kits are for their components, and the more important they are as a means of exchangeA.

1.8.3 TILLAGE RECOVERY As the floods had swept away seed stocks and agricultural tools there was a need to replace these. All the DEC Agencies, except for Merlin and Save the ChildrenB, participated in the distribution of seeds and tools. The first distributions were for the forthcoming short agricultural season and had a very variable impact (see the chapter on impact). Most of the DEC agencies also distributed seeds for the main growing season. ActionAid played a key role in co-ordinating NGO involvement in the seeds and tools programme, and was praised for this by many of those interviewed by the Evaluation Team. Although agencies knew that many of those affected had lost all their seed stocks, the quantities of seed they distributed were usually too small for farmers to plant their full areaC. This resulted in beneficiary complaints about the inadequate quantity supplied. Typically distributions only supplied one third to one half of the amount of maize seed needed.9 In Mozambique, rural families typically have three or more hoes for cultivationD10 and it would be very unusual for a family to have only one adult or child who could till the landE. The majority of DEC agenciesF did include two hoes per family in their kits, but some only included one. ActionAid had originally intended to provide three hoes to affected families, but eventually yielded to district pressure to supply one hoe to everyone, whether affected or not. Concern originally intended to supply two hoes per family but ended up just supplying the one. A further problem was that the Ministry of Agriculture-recommended kit contained neither a file nor a sickle, items which farmers in Sofala identified as components of the ideal tool kit.

A The programme ran until November. Oxfam note that the programme was intended to strengthen local partners as well as to distribute kits, and the links made between local organisations and the beneficiaries may have a longer-term impact. B Save the Children distributed some seeds, but no tools. C ActionAid note that in some areas in the south, where floodwaters were more persistent, farmers did not have their full areas available for cultivation. D The national average was 3.4 hoes per family in 1996. E While families may share hoes with each other, the fact that all need hoes at the same time in the planting season limits the usefulness of such sharing. F World Vision, Tearfund's partner Acridec, Red Cross, and Christian Aid's partners LWF and Oram. CAFOD’s partner OIKOS distributed 2 tilling hoes plus 1 weeding hoe, often regarded as the ideal set for a typical family.

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To a certain extent, the DEC agencies made simplistic assumptions about the beneficiary population’s involvement in agriculture. While the majority of those affected were peasant farmers for whom household maize is a very important food source, some families live largely from other activities and have relatively small plots. Groups for which seeds and tools were relatively inappropriate were those who lived from petty trading, fishing, or other activities (see the chapter on coverage for further comments on this issue).

1.8.4 LIVESTOCK RECOVERY Of those interviewed for the Beneficiary Study, 80 per cent had no livestock as a result of the floods. Those that did had reduced numbers. Livestock is an ‘insurance policy’ for farmers in Mozambique, since they can be sold or consumed if no other income is available. The floods swept away this insurance policy as well as the crop and food stocks. DEC agencies had limited involvement in restocking of livestock during the Phase One response, but World Vision, Oxfam, CAFOD, ActionAidA, and some of Christian Aid’s partners were all planning to begin this in 2001. CAFOD co-funded a small VetAid cattle-restocking project (100 head). Cattle are particularly important not only as a store of wealth for their owners, but because of their use for cultivation and transport. As cattle are an important form of wealth in rural communities, restocking projects could result in significant and complex changes in economic power within a community. It was therefore appropriate that agencies did not embark on large-scale restocking projects for cattle immediately after the floods. The largest restocking project was UGC’s poultry project, funded by both CAFOD and Oxfam. Co-operatives and families in Maputo, for whom chicken and egg sales are an important source of income, raise the chickens hatched by the project. This level of animal restocking was appropriate since chickens are easier for households to look after, are often kept by female-headed households, and do not represent as large an investment as cattle.

1.8.5 WATER AND SANITATION In the recovery phase, the re-establishment of community water supplies was one of the principle objectives of water supply projects. Oxfam, the Red Cross, and World Vision had large water supply projects. Oxfam, the Red Cross, and Concern had large household latrine projects. Oxfam and Concern accompanied their water and sanitation projects with very extensive hygiene education programmes, reflecting best practice in this sector. Other agencies engaged in building latrines also engaged in hygiene education. While involvement of the DEC agencies in water supply was appropriate, this did result in a huge increase in the fitting of hand pumps B without any proportionate

A ActionAid had planned to do restocking in Phase 1, but found that communities were too busy with shelter and food production activities initially. The outbreak of Food and Mouth in South Africa (the usual source for animals for restocking) then led to a postponement until Phase 2. World Vision also had planned to restock in Phase 1, but this has been deferred to Phase 2 for the same reasons.

B Thanks to Oxfam and the Red Cross, the seven districts that fall under Chókwè’s rural water workshop now have over 100 handpumps compared to less than 40 before. World Vision installed nearly 50 new handpumps on the island of Chiloane.

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increase in the institutional capacity needed to maintain themA. Although the agencies made effortsB to set up water committees and funds, the one fund that the evaluation team found in place had already had its funds stolen by the treasurer. The DEC agencies argue that even if the new or repaired water sources are not maintained, installing handpumps was still better option than others such as tankering, and that in any case, even-long term development projects in Mozambique have had problems with handpump maintenance. This is undeniably true and as a result the evaluation team does not consider their involvement in this sector to have been inappropriate. It is of the opinion, nevertheless, that DEC agencies should have done more to support the longer-term sustainability of such interventions. This could have been done by, for example, providing some ongoing resources to allow Água Rural to follow up with water committees formed until they became well establishedC. While Oxfam correctly argue that additional follow-up work would not have guaranteed sustainability, it would at least have given water committees a better chance to establish themselves.

1.8.6 SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE The floods and cyclone destroyed many schools and clinics. Several DEC agenciesD built or rehabilitated schools and other social infrastructure. Many of these projects were on the border between recovery and vulnerability reduction. In several places the agencies built schools where previously the children had had to learn outside sitting under a tree or in poorly built cramped huts of local materials. These locally built school huts (which have to be replaced every year) are a significant burden on the children’s families and result in some children being withheld from school. Replacing these with permanent structures has had a positive impact on attendance11. Agencies used community work, direct labour and third party contractors to build the schools. The Mozambique economy is still very undeveloped and contractors offer relatively low levels of quality and service. Oxfam and Save the Children made extensive use of building contractors and had various problems with these as well as some successes. Concern and World Vision favoured direct labour for their school construction. Save the Children provided water at all the school sites they built. All of the agencies provided rehabilitated latrines at the schools they renovated or built.

A Oxfam supplied Água Rural in Chókwè with a new motorcycle, a telephone, and spare parts for pumps as well as providing training for pump committees. B The Red Cross set up water point committees but noted that these proved hard to identify and motivate at the resettlement sites. Oxfam set up a few management committees before the programme ended without any provision for their continued support. World Vision also set up management committees. C Interestingly, this is exactly what the LWF (a Christian Aid Partner) did in a non-DEC funded project in Sabie. The consultant who did the follow up training with well committees had originally worked with Oxfam in Xai-Xai, but Oxfam did not follow up with the committees that they had instigated during the emergency. D Most significant were Oxfam in Gaza, Save the Children in Inhambane, World Vision in Xai-Xai, and Concern in Buzi. The Red Cross had a big health centre reconstruction programme that was deferred to Phase 2 and Merlin and Concern carried out some clinic rehabilitations.

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As Oxfam was only able to complete 50% of their over-ambitiousA school programme by the end of November it handed over unfinished work to the Christian Aid’s partner LWF. LWF planned to finish all of Oxfam schools by 2001 and also took over unfinished work on Concern’s school programme in Buzi when Concern closed its operation there.

1.9 Programmes for Vulnerability Reduction

“Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.” – Principle 8 of the Code of Conduct.

Many of the DEC agencies undertook programmes that could impact long-term vulnerability. There is a potential conflict between Principle 8 and the DEC rule that funds should only be spent on disaster response.

1.9.1 SHELTER Shelter and resettlement were major areas for DEC agency intervention since the floods left about half a million people without their homes. Almost all the DEC agencies distributed plastic sheeting or tents in the relief phase and severalB played a large role in the provision of permanent housing at resettlement sites. Shelter assistance ranged from tents and plastic tarpaulins in the period immediate after the floods to houses. The shelter work of the DEC agencies can be regarded as vulnerability reduction as most of the investment was in resettlementC. This raised two basic issues of appropriateness. The first of these was resettlement policy and the second the quality of housing assistance provided.

1.9.1.1 RESETTLEMENT The majority of those affected by the floods lived on the fertile flood plains of the river systems of Mozambique where they lived for generations and adapted to occasional floods. Government policy, however, was that people should resettle away from areas with a risk of flooding. Shelter assistance to those not settling at an approved site was forbidden. For example in Govuro District one displaced community chose to resettle at Mambula, close to their traditional farming land, instead of the government settlement areas of Pande, Save, and Malovane on the main road and a long way from natural amenities such as arable land and water. The Government allowed little formal support for the Mambula settlement while putting significant resources into the permanent settlements on the main road. The community in Mambula were reported to have received no shelter assistance as a result12. The selection of resettlement sites by the government seems to have been somewhat arbitrary. Some, such as Gwara-Gwara, were abandoned Strategic Hamlets or Communal Villages from the Independence War or the Civil War. Such abandoned

A Oxfam acknowledge that the programme was over-ambitious due to a lack of understanding of both logistics constraints and the problems of using contractors in Mozambique. B World Vision, Christian Aid, CAFOD, ActionAid, HelpAge, Tearfund and Oxfam all provided permanent shelter materials of some kind. The Red Cross provided tools for house construction. C CCM and World Vision built houses and provided materials outside of the resettlement sites.

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sites had been chosen initially for reasons other than the convenience of the resettled population. As noted earlier, the resettlement sites all followed a planned village arrangement in contrast to a variety of pre-flood settlement patterns. As a result, the evaluation team met people who had been resettled at some considerable distance from their traditional farmlands. This meant that many spent the week in small grass shelters at their farming land and only returned to their houses at the weekends. Others were typically absent for two or three days at a time. Such frequent and lengthy absences from the home raises questions about the care of small children, and the additional work that running homes at two different locations puts on women. With the exception of the Red Cross, which at least flagged up the ethical concerns, the DEC agencies appear to have accepted Government policy in this sector without any serious internal debate. There does not appear to have been any advocacy by the DEC agencies on behalf of those who opted not to be resettled far from their lands. Neither did any of the DEC agencies seem to have implemented any special programmes to help families cope with the stresses of living so far from their farm plots.

1.9.1.2 HOUSING QUALITY The quality of the housing varied a great deal, from substandardA houses provided by Caritas de Maputo, a CAFOD partner, to some excellentB houses built by Save the Children for people displaced by a new clinic. Prior to the floods, the types of houses in which the displaced had lived depended on the zone in which they lived and their wealth. Rural beneficiaries from the centre of the country and many of those from the south tended to live in traditionally built houses with thatched roofs. Some better off rural beneficiaries and many peri-urban beneficiaries had houses with corrugated galvanised steel roofing (usually with a cement plastered mud wall) although some had lived in conventionally built concrete block or brick dwellings.

1.9.1.2.1 ROOFS Agencies typically distributed ten or twelve corrugated galvanised steel roofing sheets to shelter beneficiaries, but some distributed moreC. This is enough to make a small house of about 15 to 25m2. Almost all the agencies supplied roof beams and support polesD and many also provided reeds to make walls. Christian Aid’s partners built houses for the beneficiaries but most of the agencies provided materials and some technical assistance and left the building to the beneficiary families or communities.

A These houses had very thin posts and beams made from untreated termite-susceptible timber. They were the poorest of any of the houses seen by the evaluation team. B These houses were a mix of cement and traditional materials and were the only ones not to use galvanised steel roofing sheets. C In Xai-Xai World Vision distributed kits with 18 roofing sheets. D Agencies (non-DEC) who provided roofing sheets without poles or beams were criticised by beneficiaries who said that they could not afford to buy these items (whose price was inflated after the floods in any case).

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The majority of shelter beneficiaries had previously had roofs of thatch and many felt that the roofing sheets were a huge improvement as this removed the need to replace the thatch on an annual basis.A Roofing sheets were seen as an improvement by all the beneficiaries questioned even though thatch is cooler and repairs are more within their capacity. All of the shelter beneficiaries interviewed were happy to have received houses and were reluctant to complain about them. Many beneficiaries noted that their new houses were smaller than their previous ones. Some local authorities criticised the houses as being too small, culturally inappropriate, and windowless.

1.9.1.2.2 FLOORS AND WALLS While some of the DEC agencies provided cement for people to cement their floors or walls, the majority did not. Those who had not received cementB ranked the lack of a cemented floor as the most needed improvement followed by cement-based plastering for the wallsC. As well as reeds to make the walls of the houses, some agencies provided a door and window. Typically the houses were rectangular in plan with the roofing sheets sloping from one side house to the other. Usually the houses were divided into a bedroom and a general room. Traditional houses have a large overhang to protect the mud walls from rainfall. A problem with almost all the houses built by the DEC agencies was that they had just a small overhang D with the result that mud plaster on the reed walls quickly washes off in the rain. A second problem was that, unlike the structural timbers supplied by most agencies, the reeds were neither treated nor termite resistant, giving them a life of only a few years. World Vision and UGC provided cement for people to plaster at least part of their reed walls removing the need to re-plaster them after every heavy rain. Even though the housing assistance provided by the DEC agencies was largely appropriate, some beneficiaries, particularly the vulnerable, will never have the resources to improve these initial houses and are condemned to live in an interim solution house in the long-term.

A The life of the thatch varies on the type of grass available, but most of the beneficiaries were in zones where thatching grasses only lasted one year. Replacing thatch may take two people a week each year to cut, collect, prepare, and lay the grass on the roof. B Cementing floors not only makes the house cleaner but also prevents insect or rodent attack on foodstuff stored on the floor of the house. Elderly interviewees in particular rated cemented walls highly as they said that they no longer had the strength to continually plaster the walls. However, they still ranked cemented floors higher than cemented walls (interviews with shelter beneficiaries in Xai-Xai and Chibuto). C When Oxfam consulted beneficiaries they opted for a larger house and a cement floor instead of doors and windows. Oxfam is the only DEC agency that has reported on designing a shelter assistance package based on beneficiary consultation. D This was to maximise the internal floor area. This illustrates the dangers of changing one aspect of a technology (roofing material and the overhang) without also changing the related aspects (wall material).

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1.9.1.2.3 SPEED OF IMPLEMENTATION The DEC agencies varied in their speed of implementation for shelter. Many interviewees noted that Christian Aid’s partner CCM had been the first agency to build houses in their area (their construction started in AugustA). Such speedy assistance was highly praised by the beneficiaries. The evaluation team was impressed by the consistently high quality of the CCM houses and of the materials used. World Vision’s large (4,000 housing kit) shelter programme was so late that many of the beneficiaries had already rebuilt their housesB. Even so, this assistance was still appreciated by the beneficiaries as in some cases it allowed them to dramatically improve the ones they had already built. The evaluation team feel that, at such a late stage, cash assistance would have been more useful than building materials. A further constraint on implementation for agencies that only supplied housing kits was that beneficiaries had lots of other demands on their time. ActionAid found that distributing shelter kits, instead of supplying kits and labour, placed an extra burden on women who often had to build the houses themselves while their men went away in search of paid work.

1.9.2 IMPROVED CROP VARIETIES One excellentC initiative by Oxfam, World Vision, Christian Aid’s partner LWF, and ActionAid, was their work with the Southern African Roots and Tubers Network (SARNET) to introduce improved sweet potato varieties. Although this programme had already been in place for some time the DEC agencies took advantage of the floods to introduce the improved orange-fleshed varieties. These varieties are rich in beta-carotene, the source of vitamin A, and provide this in addition to calories. Sweet potato is propagated from cuttings. Farmers provided with cuttings from improved varieties have leaves for consumption within two months and roots within three to five months of planting, depending upon the variety. Sweet potatoes produce all year around and are particularly useful for filling food gaps before the main grain harvestD.

1.9.3 MALARIA BED-NETS Malaria is the primary cause of death in Mozambique and is the reason for 40% of all outpatient visits. Widespread poverty, lack of access to health facilities, and delayed treatment of suspected malaria make the problem worse. Several DEC agencies distributed insecticide-treated bed-nets to limit malaria transmission as the concern was that the floods would cause an increase of mosquito breeding sites and lead to a surge in cases.E

A Houses were normally being built to accommodate those who had been in TACs until that date. B This was in southern Sofala where beneficiaries have better access to traditional materials than in many other areas. The kits were not DEC funded. C Excellent in that it took advantage of a programme meeting immediate needs to promote long-term work on food security. D The evaluation saw sweet potatoes growing that had been planted with cuttings supplied by DEC agencies. E Machanga hospital is illustrative. It had a nearly threefold increase in malaria cases from January- September 2000 compared with the same period in 1999. However, it cannot be certain that this

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This was a very important initiative as it had the potential to identify a new way of dealing with malaria in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Studies in the Gambia13 and Tanzania14 have shown that bed-nets can dramatically decrease child mortalityA in long-term development programmes. Distribution of insecticide treated bed-nets by DEC agencies Agency Programme No. of Nets Distribution: Oxfam National Malaria 50,000 Women of childbearing age and children Control under five in Rural Gaza. Programme 25,000 Distributed in Chókwè town (some (NMCP) additional nets provide by the Red Cross). Merlin NMCP 25,000 Donated to UNICEF for distribution in Gaza.B Concern NMCP 10,000 Two per family in part of Gaza Red Red Cross 20,124 Distributed in Non-Food Item kits. Cross World NMCP 10,005 Not DEC-funded. Two per family in Xai- Vision Xai in Gaza. Nets provided by UNICEF.

Concern and Merlin had planned to distribute bed-nets in Sofala. Oxfam had originally planned to distribute nets in the TACs but agreed to a Ministry of Health request not to do so bed-net since it was felt the project would be more sustainable if people were issued them after they had returned to their old houses or to resettlement sitesC. Following advice from the National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP) the three agencies decided to distribute the nets in Gaza as part of the national anti-malaria plan. Concern and Oxfam were directly involved in the distribution of their nets while Merlin donated theirs to UNICEF without any further involvement on their partD. Oxfam, Concern, and World Vision accompanied their net distributions with public health promotion campaigns on the dangers of malaria. Initial monitoring indicates that the Oxfam campaign appears to have been successful. While the promotion of treated mosquito nets is probably a very effective part of an overall malaria control strategy, the use of DEC funds for the NMCP in Mozambique is more questionable as:

increase correctly reflects increased disease incidence. It may simply reflect greater patient interest in going for treatment due to the presence of a World Vision doctor and drugs at the hospital. In the south, the increased malaria morbidity reported may reflect, in part, the easier access that beneficiaries had to health care from the TACs than they had had from their former homes. A 27% increase in child survival for children using nets in Tanzania and a 25% reduction in mortality for children 1-9 in the Gambia. B Merlin asked UNICEF to provide a report on the use of the nets provided by Merlin. Merlin has twice reminded UNICEF about this report, but it is still not available, despite six months having elapsed since the distribution. C The Government also relied on spraying in collective centres to control mosquitoes. D It is possible that World Vision may have distributed some of the Merlin nets for UNICEF in a non- DEC funded World Vision project.

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• The nets appeared to be development rather than humanitarian aid in that they were neither distributed at the earliest possible opportunity so as to alleviate sufferingA (i.e. in the TACs) nor were they distributed according to need across the whole of the five affected provincesB. • Their contribution to vulnerability reduction is debatable. The model chosen, that of free distribution and initial free re-treatment, failed in the Gambia as users were unwilling to pay for re-treatment once the free service ended13. By contrast the social marketing model adopted in Tanzania, where people paid from the start appears to have been much more successful14. Of the agencies involved in this intervention, Oxfam appears to have been the only one to have made a serious effort to follow upC. Follow-up of this experimental intervention is important in order to establish if similar approaches can be used in future emergenciesD.

1.10 Conclusions and Recommendations The aid delivered by the DEC agencies varied in its appropriateness. The initial relief aid was generally very appropriate. Initial needs for food and shelter were clear and were reasonably well metE. Initiatives such as the reopening of access routes were a very appropriate use of DEC funds as they facilitated a whole range of interventions and allowed communities to help themselves. In the recovery phase some interventions were more questionable. While accepting that encouraging sustainability in water supplies is difficult it would have been appropriate for the DEC agencies to have invested more effort in this. Clearly, much of the work done by the DEC agencies in education went far beyond restoring what was there previously. The evaluation team, however, considered that this was an appropriate use of DEC resources as: • the former structures had not adequately met the children’s rights to education • the construction of schools reduced vulnerability as properly built schools are more resistant to damage by future flooding • the construction was carried out throughout the country in response to actual needsF. The major doubts about appropriateness relate to projects designed to reduce vulnerability, in particular the resettlement projects and the bed-net programme.

A Implicit in Principle 1 of the Code of Conduct. B Principle 2 of the Code of Conduct. C Oxfam sent a staff member to Mozambique in 2001 partly to follow up on the malaria programme. Merlin was waiting for a report from UNICEF. Concern, World Vision, and the Red Cross did not report on any follow up. D Whatever flaws there were in the bed-net distribution, there can be no doubt that the education component of the programme has led to a very significant increase in awareness of malaria transmission and management. E Although beneficiaries complained that their need for clothing was overlooked in general. F This is in contrast to the NMCP bed-net programme that was only carried out in Gaza even though beneficiaries in Inhambane and Sofala were also dying from Malaria.

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While the quality of the housing provided was broadly appropriate, the same was not always true of the location of resettlement sites. The general pattern appears to be of increasingly questionable appropriateness as the agencies progressed from relief, through to recovery, and on to vulnerability reduction. There were a number of reasons for this. • All of the agencies underestimated the resilience of the Mozambican populationA and their coping mechanismsB. • Beneficiary needs and capacities grew in their range and complexity with time, making the typical “one size fits all” solution of standard kits or packs less appropriate. • The need for beneficiary consultation became more important with time and its lack more evident. While it is true that DEC time limits probably did not allow agencies enough time to mobilise communities, they were not so short as to prevent consultation with beneficiaries on project design. While the DEC agencies’ previous experience of emergencies and of Mozambique meant that their responses were still appropriate, they could have been more appropriate in some cases if beneficiaries had been more involved. Many of the DEC agencies acknowledge the lack of beneficiary participation in their programmes. Beneficiary participation was far easier for agencies such as ActionAid or UGCC which already had deep roots in the flood-affected communities and open communication channels with them. It was harder for agencies working outside of their normal areas. In the initial acute phase, there may be little opportunity for beneficiary involvement in specifying items to meet basic needs but beneficiary participation in programme design becomes both easier and more important as activities move into the recovery phase. Programmes that require a beneficiary labour input may discriminate against single parent households or extremely vulnerable individuals. Despite these problems, the interventions of the DEC agencies were generally appropriate. They were based on assessments and knowledge of Mozambique, were professionally delivered, and were generally appropriate to the context and culture. The assistance was timely and the DEC agencies were often the first to deliver assistance.

1.10.1 RECOMMENDATIONS DEC agencies need to place a higher priority on beneficiary participation in assessments and programme design.

A Who are used to living in a disaster-prone environment. B By October 2000 World Vision in Machanga found that only one respondent out of 180 interviewed was living with family or friends. The remaining 179 had either returned to their own homes or had resettled and reconstructed elsewhere. This was despite the fact that 81% of those interviewed had lost their homes in the cyclone and floods less than eight months earlier. Only a few of these had had agency support for reconstruction, but the need for support may have been lower here than elsewhere as it is an area of relatively high natural resource availability. C CAFOD and Oxfam both funded UGC.

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The DEC should consider requiring agencies to submit a logical framework reflecting their assessments with their four-week plans and then reporting and monitoring against this framework through beneficiary assessment. This may require some training for agency staff in the effective use of the logical framework. Unless there are overriding operational factors, DEC agencies should distribute food and non-food-items on the basis of actual family composition and of need. In areas with functioning markets, DEC agencies should consider cash distributions or basic kits plus cash rather than complex kits so that the kits are of more use to the recipients. This is particularly applicable in the recovery and later phases. The DEC agencies should closely review the impact that resettlement is having on those resettled far from their farms and modify their programmes accordingly. DEC agencies should ensure that programmes that require a beneficiary contribution in labour have some mechanism to allow the participation of single parent households or extremely vulnerable individuals. The DEC agencies should consider whether extremely vulnerable individuals that they have assisted with shelter packs or house kits should receive further assistance, such as cemented floors or walls, to leave them with a long-term housing solution. The DEC rules should clearly state that DEC funds may be spent on projects for vulnerability reduction provided they comply with the other requirements of the Code of Conduct. The DEC needs clearer rules for projects in the grey area of vulnerability reduction.

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2 Efficiency

“Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.” – from Principle 9 of the Code of Conduct.

This chapter looks at how efficient the DEC agencies were in responding to the Mozambique floods. In particular, it looks at: • the use of military assets by the DEC agencies • the impact on agency efficiency of pre-existing programmes, time limits and an underdeveloped local market • cost-efficiency • health and safety • internal controls • preparedness and speed of response.

2.1 Use of Military Assets Most of the DEC agencies made use of military assets to undertake assessments and to deliver food and resources to isolated areas. Helicopters were so popular that agencies were still trying to fly goods to the camps even after the road to Macia had been reopened15. The ready availability of military helicopters may have led to an inefficient assessment process, for they allowed different groups to assess the same areas with poor sharing of the results. The water and sanitation-working group visited some areas one day, only to have the seeds and tools working group visit shortly afterwards. An integrated approach would have been more efficient not only because of the resources used but also because such participating in or receiving such visits took a lot time for local government and agency officials. However, DEC agencies seem to have been better than others at sharing such assessment informationA. Mozambique again highlighted the high cost of using western military forces for humanitarian relief. Commercial helicopters, which have a larger capacity than military ones, cost between £1,250 and £1,600 an hour in Mozambique whereas military ones cost £2,200 an hour or moreB. The full cost of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Puma helicopters sent to Mozambique was about £5,000 an hourC16. The US Operation Atlas Response spent around £13 million, and transported 680 tonnes of supplies and 1,200 passengers,17 less than one tonne of supplies moved for every £20,000 spent. The far cheaper South African National Defence Forces (SANDF)

A This is certainly the case in the 2001 floods where DEC agencies pro-actively shared assessment and other data.

B The Joint Evaluation of the Rwanda crisis found that military air operations cost four to eight times more than civilian operations. C The Ministry of Defence (MoD) charged less than this as they paid £600,000 from their own budget that had been earmarked for an exercise in Norway.

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operationA moved 961 tonnes during the crisis as well as rescuing over 14,000 people.18 With the ready availability of military transport, DEC agencies did not have to hire air transport for their own use. While this meant they had more resources left for other aspects of their programmes, the expensive military operations consumed huge amounts of potential co-funding, limiting later donor funding of NGO projectsB.

2.2 Efficiency Factors

2.2.1 CHOICE OF RESPONSE ROUTE Agencies responding to the floods had a number of choices: • intervening directly with operational programmes • working through local partners • working through international network membersC. Oxfam had considered implementing a non-operational programme, but decided against this given the pressing needs and weak local NGO capacity. Oxfam used its excellentD humanitarian department to quickly build a large team on the ground to manage a very large responseE. Oxfam’s response again illustrated the advantages of preparedness at a global level. Oxfam supported their operational programme with projects executed through international networks and local partners. Christian Aid found that it was possible, despite the weak management capacity of some of its partners, to deliver good quality programmes by reinforcing local partners in key skills areas. Christian Aid’s support to its local partners was exemplary. Christian Aid strengthened their capacity by recruiting specialist staff to assist their partners in areas where the partners did not have the relevant skills. Some of the most efficient interventions were the mobilisation of resources by others. One example of this was HelpAge’s advocacy for the elderly. HelpAge promoted their excellentF guidelines for Best Practice for Older People in Disasters and Humanitarian Crises through the agency meetings in Maputo. All of the agencies were sensitised to the needs of the elderly in this way. Another example was World Vision flying Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) to a camp to get them to appreciate the need for and then install a water bladder in the 2001 floods.

A The WFP budget for the air operation (Special Operation SO 0623000) suggests that the operating cost of the SANDF operation was less than £600,000 a month. The SANDF operation ran for nearly three months. B Interview with DEC agency staff. C The Agency Summaries detail the partnerships of the DEC agencies. D Excellent because Oxfam’s huge investment in emergency staff, training, and resources allows it to respond quickly to humanitarian crises wherever they occur. E Oxfam estimate that there were over one million beneficiaries of their programme. F Excellent in that they were well written, well presented, based on experiences, and included practical assessment tools for use by the readers.

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Funding agencies argued that working through local partners was more efficient, but the evaluation team found that this was not always the caseA. By comparison Oxfam’s direct implementation resulted in a very fast response. The evaluation team did not find that any one route was inherently better but that staff composition, rather than approach, had a bigger impact on efficiency (discussed below).

2.2.2 PRE-EXISTING PROGRAMMES All but one of the DEC Agencies had existing programmes in Mozambique. These programmes ranged from funding arrangements with partners in MozambiqueB to direct operational programmes. For agencies such as ActionAid or CAFOD and Oxfam’s partner UGC, where the existing development programme was in the middle of the affected area, it was relatively easy to focus their existing staff on the emergency. Concern, Oxfam, and World Vision, with programmes outside of the most affected area, had to decide whether to mobilise largely national or international resources. Concern and World Vision built their emergency response on their existing capacity in-country using some external support. In Concern’s case this led to their development programme almost grinding to a halt. Oxfam built its emergency response on international staff. Concern, Oxfam, and World Vision do not plan to continue working in the areas where they had emergency programmes. Save the Children, on the other hand, which did not have a programme in the flood-affected area, has changed its strategic plans to continue working in this area. In general, building on pre-existing programmes allowed a faster response and left participating long-term staff better prepared to deal with new emergencies such as the 2001 floods. It also allowed the use of existing capital assets and benefited from investment in the development of national staff. It was clear to the evaluation team that agencies with existing programmes in the flooded area had the benefit of existing resources and relationships that served them well. Oxfam’s response to the problems in Chókwè was very quick, despite being unable to draw on existing structures in their area of operation, and demonstrated the impact of large-scale investment in global humanitarian preparedness. Oxfam also closed down their programme quickly. Merlin had no existing programme in Mozambique and therefore had to cover the entire cost of starting a new programme. However, Merlin closed their operational programme after six monthsC, leaving the start-up costs in money and learning spread over a relatively short period. While Oxfam could justify its programme through its very rapid intervention and the large numbers of beneficiaries that received substantial assistance, Merlin could not.

A While CAFOD’s partner UGC was very efficient, the same is not true of Caritas de Maputo, another CAFOD partner. B Christian Aid, CAFOD, and TearFund had no operational programmes but were funding local partners. C Merlin responded in part because of a request from the Roll Back Malaria programme and closed their programme in recognition of the very limited role for Merlin in the recovery phase.

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Agencies that changed their strategic plans in order to continue working in the places they first worked in during the emergency, such as Save the Children, should see benefits in terms of the cost-efficiency of their programmes.

2.2.3 STAFF COMPOSITION International staff are expensive, not only in direct costs, but also in support costs and management time. The agencies argue, correctly, that Mozambican labour law (which makes staff permanent once they have been issued with a second contract) makes it more difficult to employ new national staff for emergency work of an uncertain term. The best national candidates have the option of working for the commercial sector at salaries several times those paid by NGOs and were in any case not interested in the short contracts on offer. Agencies also noted that emergency competencies were not that widely available and that there was stiff competition for experienced staff. Notwithstanding all of these points and the very high quality of many of the international staff that the evaluation team met, the team found that some agencies made excessive use of international staff. Oxfam had 30 international staff at the peak of its operations and made almost no attempt to recruit national staff in the initial stagesA. Although Save the Children employed a number of very experienced national staff, they felt that they were sidelined and that their experience was ignored19. Save the Children also recruited internationally for jobs, such as that of logistician, for which position there were, reportedly, good quality candidates available locally20.

2.2.4 TIME LIMITS The time limit for Phase 1 expenditure prevented agencies from using more participatory approaches and meant that more of the direct costs had to be assumed by the agencies themselves, rather than relying on communities to provide part of the inputB. Time limits also reduce efficiency gains from learning, in that resources are all consumed at an earlier part of the learning curveC. Similarly, agencies had a much better understanding of beneficiary needs after monitoring the first distributions. Oxfam effectively terminated their emergency programme after nine months, not because of the DEC time limit, but because of an internal policy decision. This meant that Oxfam did not have an opportunity to correct whatever problems had been discovered in their original approach. “How often do you get things right the first time?” asked one senior Oxfam staff member. Both Oxfam and Concern had to rely on

A Most of these international staff were concentrated in Chókwè. By contrast, Oxfam’s programme in Xai-Xai got 80% of its staff on secondment from the government and had only one expatriate. While large numbers of international staff were necessary at the start to mount Oxfam’s rapid intervention, the evaluation team consider that they were not so necessary for the programme in the recovery phase. B While communities had a limited capacity because of other demands, there were examples of DEC agencies working with communities for more efficient implementation, such as Oxfam’s renovation of traditionally built schools. C There was evidence of a learning curve - Christian Aid noted that their partner’s performance significantly improved during the response to the floods.

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LWF (a Christian Aid partner) to complete their school programmes after the end of the first Phase of DEC funding. Time limits on expenditure meant that some interventions were less efficient than they could otherwise have been. This was particularly the case for those agencies involved in infrastructural rehabilitation.

2.2.5 THE UNDERDEVELOPED LOCAL MARKET The underdeveloped market for contracted services in Mozambique limited the efficiency of agency responses. Oxfam, Save the Children, and CAFOD partner Caritas de Maputo all had significant problems with contractors. The use of national contractors enabled agencies to implement equipment-heavy works, such as road repairs and deep borehole drilling, without having to make huge capital investments themselves. Similarly, using general construction contractors meant that agencies could have a large construction programme without establishing a large infrastructure. Unfortunately, the contractors used by the DEC agencies often failed to meet their obligations in a timely manner and the agencies had to invest considerable resources to follow up. Some programmes were so slow that agencies felt that direct implementation would have been better. Mozambique is a developing country with a weak physical and legal infrastructure. The weak physical infrastructure makes unforeseen delays more likely and the weak legal infrastructure makes contracts effectively unenforceable. Of the DEC agencies Save the Children probably had the most developed approach towards their contractors, carefully monitoring their progress and following best practice in some of their standard contract conditions. However, other agencies did not always use basic contracting techniques such as spreading the work over a number of contractors in order to reduce risk, retaining a portion of the contract fee to guarantee repairs in the first year, or paying bonuses to speed work up. The evaluation team concluded that the DEC agencies did not make sufficient allowances for the low quality of many of the local contractors on offer and did not properly manage the resulting risks.

2.3 Costs The evaluation team did attempt to compare unit costs between agencies but found that this was not possible. The same items, be they kits, houses, or seed packs were very different when supplied by different. Even when the items were same, delivery through different channels had different costs. Save the Children paid commercial contractors £31,000 to £35,000 for a four-classroom school, but only £18,000 for the same school when built by Jesus AliveA. Given the difficulty of comparing unit costs, the evaluation team relied on the cost implications of the more general practice observed. For example, with the exception

A Jesus Alive, a South African based Christian missionary organisation, paid some of its own costs. Save the Children had to use commercial contractors because Jesus Alive did not have the capacity to build all the planned schools, and the Provincial authorities objected to the illegal use of Jesus Alive as it was not a registered contractor.

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of World VisionA, warehousing practice was poor in all the warehouses visitedB. This increases losses and thereby costs. In Sabie, food stored by Christian Aid’s partner CEDES was infested with weevils. The high level of the infestation indicated that CEDES had failed to take effective action at an early stage. The very low quality houses built by CAFOD’s partner CDM appear to have cost more than the better quality ones built by other agencies, although this may be partly due to the inclusion of latrines and boreholes in the project. Most of the cost increases in the planned work stemmed from external factors. Transport cost escalation proved a problem for many agencies. The cost of transport rose considerably due to poor roads and increased demand. Poor roads also resulted in high maintenance costs for vehicles. Mozambique’s bureaucracy also had an impact on costs. Save the Children, for instance, drilled a borehole, at a cost of more than £5,000, at a school site in a resettlement area in Inhambane only to have this site summarily changed by a government minister, rendering the borehole and the £4,000 latrines useless for the schoolC. Another example encountered was that the seed distributed by CEDES in Sabie had not been sown April 2001 because the farmers were still waiting for the agricultural authorities to allocate plots in the state irrigation scheme. Meanwhile the land, which had already been ploughed, was choked by weeds and needed to be ploughed again. Several agencies experienced problems with delayed (and presumably less efficient) implementation due to customs delays. World Vision had to distribute weekly rations, rather than a more efficient monthly distribution, because of problems with the WFP food pipelineD. This added to cost and logistical complexity.

2.4 Health and Safety The cost of accidents, which are inefficient and waste resources, usually weighs more heavily on flexible funding sources such as the DEC rather than the more tightly earmarked donor funding. Disaster relief is a dangerous business. The flood relief operation in Mozambique claimed the lives of at least three people working as part of the aid operation and at least twenty of the initial survivors, as well as causing serious injuries to others. The worst accident involving a DEC agency or partner was the capsizing of a Mozambican Red Cross rescue boat at Guija with the loss of the lives of two Red Cross volunteers and six others21.

A No Red Cross warehouses were visited and must be excluded from this general observation. The evaluation team accept that the Red Cross put a significant effort into ensuring good warehouse practice. B Typical problems included the failure to use pallets or dunnage, the stacking of goods against walls, a lack of separation of stacks, and low levels of warehouse hygiene. C Fortunately the new school site was served by a borehole provided by CARE so that Save the Children did not need to build a new one. The borehole and latrines were completed by Save the Children to allow them to be used by the families resettled nearby. D To be fair to WFP, WFP can only pass on the food that it receives from donors.

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No other major accidents involving DEC agencies were reported. This is no grounds for complacency as the evaluation team noted several examples of poor health and safety practice by DEC agencies. For example: • Some of the DEC-agency vehicles did not have seatbelts on their rear seats and agency staff did not use the seatbelts provided. • Vehicles being driven at speeds over the national (or agency) speed limits, even in the presence of senior agency staff. • Boats used at high speed without life jackets, flares, or other safety equipment, or where all aboard were not obliged to use life jackets was of particular concern as it illustrated a failure to learn from the earlier Red Cross accident. • Night driving and staff working long hours on a regular basis. • Dangerous electrical installationsA. • Staff accommodation without mosquito nets for all the beds, even though the same agencies were promoting the use of bed-nets by the general population. This was particularly unfortunate given the high prevalence of malaria among aid workers. Some good health and safety practice was observed. Concern provided insurance for all their staff, CAFOD were unusual in that they adhered to the national speed limit, and Save the Children observed good radio practice. The DEC Kosovo Evaluation recommended that “the DEC should require member agencies to be signatories to the People in Aid Code”. Five of the DEC agencies in Mozambique are pioneering the code. Principle 7 of the code states that: “we take all reasonable steps to ensure the security and well being of staff and their families”.

2.5 Internal Control Systems One glaring example of inefficiency was the need for several DEC agencies to maintain parallel accounting systems in order to avoid problems in financial control. Essentially their main finance systems are not fast enough to provide adequate control in emergencies. Oxfam emergency staff set up a system to record the invoice values of all the goods delivered by charter flights from the UK. The project had still not been billed for some of the items delivered by the time the project closed. ActionAid set up a parallel system to keep track of financial commitments, as their old accounting system did not adequately cater for theseB. It was clear from comments by other agencies that they also used a variety of parallel systems to ensure that managers had a good view of their financial positions. Problems in internal control systems raise three issues: • the need for parallel systems, with the implied reduction in efficiency

A Where such installations where pointed out during the initial fieldwork, the evaluation team were happy to note that they had been corrected by the second fieldwork. B ActionAid has since replaced this system. The replacement had been planned for early 2000 but was postponed so as not to disrupt work during the floods response.

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• the accuracy of the accounts submitted to the DEC Secretariat must be questionable, given that the accounts of some agencies take months for expenditures against projects to be reflected • parallel systems rarely have the full rigour of traditional accounting systems and long delays between expenditure and formal reporting in the accounts provides a window for fraud by unscrupulous staff.

2.6 Preparedness and Speed of Response Speed of response is important - “he who gives quickly gives the poor man twice as much good.”A. Responding quickly can be expensive, but investments in preparedness can reduce this cost. Many of the DEC agencies were already responding to the first floods when the floods of late February hit MozambiqueB. This meant that agency responses were faster than they would otherwise have been. The response to the 2001 floods was faster again, because of the experience gained following the 2000 floods and the resources left over from that response. DEC agencies that had invested in disaster preparedness saw a return on this. The staff of Tearfund’s partner, Ministério Centro De Louvor (MCL - Centre for Praise Ministry) had participated in Tearfund’s emergency management training in the 1990’s which probably resulted in a faster and more effective response by MCL Oxfam saw a large return from its investment in global preparedness through its Humanitarian Department which was able to mobilise significant material and human resources quickly in response to the floods. The BRCS responded far more quickly than many of the other Red Cross societies and their assistance was more effective as a result. Almost all the DEC agencies have internal emergency management structuresC that allow them to manage emergency response quickly. DEC agency preparedness was generally no worse (and in some cases far better) than UN or Government preparedness. DEC agencies were often the first to deliver effective aid in many cases, particularly in the recovery phase (e.g. CCM’s Christian Aid funded houses were generally the first to be built at several of the sites visited).

2.7 Conclusions and Recommendations

2.7.1 CONCLUSIONS Overall, the DEC agencies used the resources entrusted to them by the UK public in a responsible way. The biggest inefficiency was donor governments’ use of military resources, rather than anything that the DEC agencies did. DEC agencies made sensible use of the available military assets to deliver their programmes. Military assets cost significantly more than the equivalent civilian assets, and donor

A “Inopi beneficium dib dat qui dat celeriter” – Publilius Syrus, Sententiae B The Oxfam team had to evacuate from Chókwè to avoid being trapped by the floods. C CAFOD had the Bubbling Up emergency Group (BUG), Tearfund the Crisis Operations Group (COG), BRCS the Emergency Task Force (ETF) etc.

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government use of military assets may have resulted in less funds being available for NGOs later. Some of the most efficient interventions were actions taken to mobilise resources by other agencies. This has implications for agencies with a narrow mandate or with a primary focus on one particular group or type of beneficiary. Efficiency was neither better nor worst depending on whether agencies operated directly or through partners. Staff composition did have an effect on efficiency - while the extensive use of expatriate staff was very efficient in the initial stagesA, it became less so with time compared with the recruitment and training of local staff. Both the presence of existing programmes in the areas affected by the disaster, or an intention to continue working there after the end of DEC funding, led to more efficient responses. DEC agencies that had invested in preparedness saw a return on this. Short time limits on expenditure meant that some interventions were less efficient that they could otherwise have been. DEC agencies’ management of contractors was rudimentary and did not allow for the inherent risks of the underdeveloped contracting market in Mozambique. Although it was not possible to compare unit costs between agencies, indirect measures showed that some interventions were less efficient than they should have been, such as the evidence of poor warehousing practice. While some good health and safety practice was seen, there were many examples by DEC agencies where this was not the case. Many DEC agencies have special internal mechanisms to fast track their emergency response. I Inter-agency learning could be enhanced by the exchange of the details of such systems. Several DEC agencies had weak financial reporting systems that were too slow for efficient resource control in an emergency.

2.7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS DEC agencies should not advocate the use of military assets in humanitarian operations except where there are overriding issues of security or humanitarian space. The DEC should note that agencies with existing operational programmes, a strong organisational commitment to emergency response, or with strong partner programmes in disaster-affected areas (rather than just the country concerned) are better placed to respond to emergencies. The DEC could, therefore, consider increasing the capacity indicator for such agencies in specific emergencies by some factor to take account of this. DEC Agencies with a specialist brief, or particularly good geographical knowledge of an affected area, should consider using some of their resources to monitor interventions by other agencies where they touch on their target group or specialist area, and advise and support these agencies as necessary. The DEC should give

A For example, the use of experienced expatriate staff to set up emergency water supplies in the TACs.

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favourable consideration to monitoring projects included in agency proposals. The DEC should consider supporting agency disaster preparedness efforts with unexpended appeal funds. DEC agencies should recognise contract management as an emergency competence and include it in their emergency training programmes. DEC agencies that are already members of the PIA should encourage its adoption by the other DEC agencies. DEC agencies should apply the same health and safety procedures to their overseas operations that apply to their work in the UK. The DEC Secretariat should consider how to promote the sharing of experience and emergency response management models between the DEC agencies in the UK. The DEC Secretariat should consider whether DEC agencies should be required to have financial control systems appropriate for use in emergencies. Requirements might include the ability to properly reflect commitments and to present an accurate financial position to managers within 15 days of the end of the month.

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3 Impact

“Impact looks at the wider effects of the project – social, economic, technical, environmental – on individuals, communities, and institutions. Impacts can be immediate and long-range, intended and unintended, positive and negative, macro (sector) and micro (household). Impact studies address the question: what real difference has the project made to the beneficiaries.”22

The positive impact of DEC agency interventions was considerable. DEC agencies worked throughout the affected areas and in all sectors of activity. The evaluation team saw many hundreds of houses built with materials provided by DEC agencies, crops grown from seed provided by DEC agencies and people wearing the clothing and using the pots and other utensils provided by the DEC agencies. This chapter considers: • the breadth of the impact of the DEC funded interventions • the depth of this impact • constraints on impact • the efforts of the DEC agencies to monitor the impact of their projects.

3.1 Breadth of Impact We also saw the work carried out in water and sanitation, and in infrastructure rehabilitation. Indeed, as the evaluation team travelled across Mozambique, we were left with the impression that there was no one who had not benefited from DEC agency assistance in some way! Oxfam, the agency that received the most DEC funding, reported a total of 1,472,414 beneficiaries for its programmes alone. Amongst their achievements were the following: • provision of water to Sphere standards for 60-80,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) • 10,401 resettlement kits distributed through partners. In Chókwè: • 8,712 family latrines built and 114 school latrines • 12 health posts built with functioning latrines • 1,279 septic tanks cleaned and 31 repaired • 3,000 rubbish bins provided and in use • 122 diarrhoea-prevention plays presented in eight communities, 392 puppet- theatre performances in schools, 200 malaria-prevention plays in 25 communities • workshops held on diarrhoea-prevention for 106 activists • 9,744 household visits and 392 health talks in public places • workshops for teachers, Ministry of Health (MoH) staff and health post personnel

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• distribution of 1,207 boxes of soap, 7,695 Oxfam buckets, 10 boxes of soap per month to schools and health facilities, 12,500 cholera prevention pamphlets and 9,500 sachets of Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) supplied to the MoH • tip site dug and maintained, including 3,000 trees planted around the tip • 11 incinerators given to MoH for health posts • Chókwè and six other towns cleaned, 41 new wells dug and six new boreholes drilled, five town water systems rehabilitated, one town water system constructed, 27 new public tap-stands and 541 household connections replaced, nine water committees and 41 maintenance groups formed • 85,000 bed-nets distributed to 35,000 families • over one million chicks distributed to co-operatives in Maputo. In Xai-Xai: • 1,600 latrines constructed, used and maintained • 36 wells rehabilitated and repaired, one hand-dug well constructed, nine boreholes constructed • 200 basic houses constructed. Other DEC agencies, while not having as large a scale or as broad a range of activities as Oxfam, also had impressive outputs and reported beneficiary numbers in the range of 50,000 to 150,000 each. Similar lists, albeit on a smaller scale, could also be prepared for them.

3.2 Depth of Impact Equally important as the physical signs of DEC agency interventions was the reported impact of DEC agency activities on mortality and morbidityA during the worst moments of the emergency. The low level of mortality reported after the floods was due, in part, to the large amount of assistance that DEC and other agencies brought to those in need. Despite cholera being endemic, and hundreds of thousands of people being crowded into TACs, there were no major outbreaks in areas where DEC agencies were providing sanitation. Where there were cholera outbreaks, DEC agencies responded quickly with environmental sanitation and medical responsesB. Almost all the communities visited by the evaluation team had re-established their lives in some way. While this is in large part due to the resilience of communities that live in areas subject to natural disasters, it is also due to the assistance provided by the DEC agencies and others. The value of the work undertaken by the DEC agencies was confirmed in interviews with beneficiaries, who were clearly grateful for

A Despite repeated searches and requests to the Ministry of Health, the evaluation team has been unable to obtain definitive statistics on mortality rates after the floods. Many interviewees spoke of reduced mortality, there was no anecdotal evidence of high mortality, nor any evidence of serious epidemics or malnutrition. These factors led the evaluation team to conclude that post-flood mortality was low - it was definitely lower than it would have been without the intervention of the DEC agencies. B Merlin’s rapid response to a small outbreak in Gwara-Gwara was particularly fast.

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the assistance they had receivedA (see the Beneficiary Assessment in the Volume Two). The impact of some agency interventions – particularly with respect to the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure – went far beyond the immediate saving of lives and livelihoods. For example, the wharf built by World Vision at Devinhe to facilitate the shelter and well construction programmes will serve this community for at least the next decade. Headmasters indicated that school enrolment had increased dramatically in areas where Save the Children was building schools.

3.3 Constraints on Impact The impressive achievements detailed above were accomplished in the face of numerous constraints and difficulties. Primary among these was the problem of access. The floods affected a huge area and, unlike previous floods, the waters were very slow to recede - some small areas were still flooded a year later. Mozambique had a relatively weak physical infrastructure before the floods. Afterwards it was even weaker because of flood damage to roads and bridgesB. There were considerable delays in reopening some roads. For example, it was October before the main north-south road in the country, linking Maputo to Xai Xai, was opened. Agencies were fortunate to have the use of military and other helicopters to reach areas and transport materials in the early stages of the operation. As time passed, they were able to use alternative routes and means of transportC. As already outlined, DEC agencies invested in repairing transport infrastructure in order to guarantee access to project areas. This brought important benefits that went beyond immediate relief objectives. Oxfam undertook extensive road repairs in Chókwè, Action Aid repaired roads in Maputo, World Vision repaired roads in Sofala, CEDES opened an alternative road to Sabie with Christian Aid funding, and Save the Children repaired the main road to Nova Mambone and kept it open. Impact was less than anticipated in a number of instances. Agricultural programmes, in particular, faced a number of problems. First was the extensive delays faced by some agencies in the delivery of seeds by suppliers. Seed suppliers, particularly Semoc, the national seed company, were clearly over-committed and not able to meet their promised delivery dates. Secondly, waterlogged soils and unseasonable rainfall significantly reduced the impact of the initial post-flood planting. Many agencies responded to this by a second round of seed distribution for the main harvest. Disease and infestation also reduced agricultural impact. Those programmes that depended on community participation were sometimes less successful that expected. The main reason for this was that communities were unable to contribute much labour for DEC projects as they were fully occupied with agricultural or income-generating activities. There was limited community participation, for example, in the reconstruction of Oxfam-funded schools. World Vision noted that the pressures of everyday work prevented people in some areas

A Where beneficiaries did raise concerns, these were typically about such issues as the household kits being too small for their families, or the general lack of clothing in distributions. B Some of this damage was being repaired during the evaluation team’s second visit, more than 12 months after the flooding. Some, such as the bridge to Sabie, is likely to take years to repair. C World Vision used a hovercraft for part of the initial phase.

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from finishing the construction of their houses. Agencies reacted to these problems by changing the timescales of their projects. The aid operations had a significant effect on local economies. For example, the cost of hiring transport rose considerably at times of peak demand by aid agencies. The cash injected into the economy by agency purchases and wages had a noticeable effect in some areas, and wages paid by agencies generated a lot of economic activity. However, the overall impact of the DEC agency activities on local production was limited by the inability of local manufacturers, themselves flood-affected, to provide relief items at a reasonable cost in the quantities needed to a short time-frame.

3.4 Monitoring Impact Monitoring of progress and of impact was generally good. DEC agencies typically undertook post-action assessments or evaluations. This indicated their professionalism since such assessments can highlight inadequacies in programme design and implementation. Some of these assessments were of a very high quality and should help in the design of future emergency programmes. Concern did a post-distribution survey of the mosquito net programme to see whether nets were being used and to test local knowledge of their use and re-treatment. A survey in the Chókwè area revealed that 79% of the nets distributed were in use. Oxfam, in their very detailed survey, found that 72% of the nets that they had distributed were also in use and that people had a better understanding of re- treatment than those who had received nets from Concern. Oxfam also undertook detailed impact assessments of their health promotion work. The Red Cross did an excellent assessment of their seeds and tools programmes. Their hard-hitting and thorough assessmentA highlighted the fact that the Red Cross, and other agencies, had distributed insufficient seed and that, overall, the impact of these agricultural programmes was not enough to guarantee household food security until the next harvest in February 2001. World Vision did a major impact assessment of its work in Sofala, and interestingly, linked this back to their original logical framework. Despite some minor flaws this was an excellent piece of work and could serve as a model for impact monitoring by the DEC Agencies generally. Both CAFOD and Christian Aid provided project accompaniers who monitored partners as well as helped them to develop their own monitoring systems. CCM staff noted that the Christian Aid staff regularly visited the sites to give advice and to help avoid errors. CAFOD’s partners spoke very highly of the CAFOD accompanier and internal reports indicate a high level of effective monitoring. There were very few issues raised by the evaluation team of which CAFOD and Christian Aid were not already aware of through their own monitoring. Tearfund’s International Projects Officer carried out a monitoring visit of all their partners in early April. DEC agencies who closed their programmes with some projects still to be finished, arranged in advance for other agencies to carry out monitoring: Trócaire agreed to provide Merlin with monitoring data for their co- funding of ADC; and LWF agreed to provide Oxfam and Concern with data on the

A The consultant even identified duplicate signatures on distribution records.

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schools and teacher’s houses that LWF was completing after Oxfam and Concern had left. Agencies not only monitored the impact of their own activities but those of other agencies too. Save the Children’s monitoring team was impressive and provided good information on food security in the area in which they were working. This information was used to alert WFP and the authorities to the size of food security problems. The benefits of monitoring were made clear in the programme changes that were subsequently made, for example, as a result of monitoring: • CAFOD’s partner UGC went on to provide more cement for shelter beneficiaries • CAFOD helped UGC implement a new stock control system • BRCS changed their standard relief kits • Oxfam adapted their approach to community-built schools • Christian Aid’s partner CCM changed the composition of their seed packs. Oxfam’s strong commitment to monitoring produced extensive data with which to design and evaluate. Oxfam collected so much data that the time needed for analysis delayed the integration of emerging lessons into the programme. That managing a large monitoring exercise is a significant task in itself, and the need to allocate adequate resources and keep monitoring focused on the objectives, were lessons learned by Oxfam. While impact monitoring was generally carried out by DEC agencies, this was done, in some cases, on a rather ad-hoc basis. Only six of the eleven opting-in agencies were able to provide monitoring and evaluation plans to the evaluation team and some of these were weak. Tighter integration of objectives and impact monitoring would help the DEC agencies to deliver even more professionally.

3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

3.5.1 CONCLUSIONS Despite numerous difficulties, particularly of access, the DEC agencies did a very significant and impressive amount of work. The impact of their activities will live long beyond the life of their programmes. Mortality and morbidity during the emergency period was low, and families were also helped to return to their lands after the floods had settled. While many agencies contributed to the success of the humanitarian operation that took place in Mozambique in 2000, the DEC agencies and their partners played a particularly important role. Through the DEC agencies, the UK public’s generosity has had a significant impact on relieving suffering among the displaced and in helping communities and individuals to rebuild their lives.

3.5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS DEC agencies should prepare logical frameworks as part of their emergency project planning and refer back to these for monitoring.

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4 Coverage

“Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in disaster prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes.” - from Principle Two of the Code of Conduct.

This chapter examines whether DEC agencies covered the needs that arose as a result of the disaster in terms of: the geographical area, the type of beneficiary affected and the sectors in which projects were implemented.

4.1 Geographical Coverage

4.1.1 A REGIONAL DISASTER Mozambique was only one of the southern African countries affected by floods and storms in January and February 2000. Storms and Floods in early 200023 Country Deaths Affected Mozambique 800 1,500,000 Madagascar 130 736,937 South Africa 103 200 Zimbabwe 70 266,000 Botswana 3 138,776 Swaziland 272,000

Despite the broader pattern of disaster, the DEC appeal was limited to MozambiqueA although several DEC agencies implemented emergency programmes in other countries with their own funds. Tearfund made flood relief grants in Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe Both Christian Aid and the Red Cross had appeals for southern Africa as a whole. Some operational DEC agencies did look at the possibility of responding in countries in which they did not have existing programmes or where they only had small development programmes. Concern considered working in Zimbabwe, and Oxfam carried out assessments in the region. The security situation in Zimbabwe, however, (approaching the elections at the height of the land campaign) precluded a response in Zimbabwe and Oxfam found that other agencies had needs reasonably well covered in Madagascar. While there were needs in other countries in the region, none were of the scale of those in Mozambique. Adding other countries to the appeal, particularly Zimbabwe, could well have lessened the funds raised. The evaluation team consider that the decision to appeal only for Mozambique was the correct one.

A Tearfund argued strongly for including neighbouring countries in the appeal.

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4.1.2 THE SOUTH AND CENTRE ISSUE The majority of aid went to the south of the country which, broadly speaking, was appropriate, as the impact of the floods in the south was far greater - they affected many more peopleA and lasted longer than the floods in the centre. However, there was an imbalance on a per capita basis in the aid provided and disproportionate amount went to the southB. The south also featured more heavily in media reports of the emergency. Some DEC agenciesC questioned whether this was because of national politicsD but the evaluation team found that the south was favoured because: • it is much closer to the capital and therefore easier for senior government officials, journalists, aid workers, and donor government representatives to visit • for the media, the news footage of people being plucked from the waters in the south was much more dramatic than from the centre. • access to the centre of the country remained difficult for much longer than to most of the south • the problems in the centre had more to do with chronic poverty and were therefore less responsive to emergency assistance. Closer examination revealed that access, rather than politics, was the predominant factor. Areas in the south that were inaccessible also received less assistance than the more accessible ones. Chókwè, south of the river Limpopo and nearer to the capital, for example, was far more accessible than Guija on the north bank of the river. Consequently, many more agencies delivered assistance to Chókwè, while Christian Aid’s partners, LWF and ORAM, were almost the only NGOs working in GuijaE. While the majority of DEC assistance went to the south of the country, DEC agencies were also very prominent in the centre. Concern worked in otherwise forgotten areas of Sofala and Manica. Christian Aid’s partner CCM worked throughout the centre of the country. BRCSF and Merlin were both based in Beira. World Vision had a very strong programme in Machanga and was the only international NGO working in Divinhe.

A Gaza had nearly 70% of the flooding deaths and about one third of the displaced. B This is possibly illustrated by the fact that many of the beneficiaries interviewed in the south had received more than one household kit, while those in the centre got only one, if any. C This issue was raised by one of Christian Aid’s partners in their report and by some of the DEC agencies in interviews. D Gaza, in the south, is the heartland of the ruling Frelimo party, whereas the centre of the country is the area where the opposition Renamo party draws much of its support. E There was so little assistance in Guija that this was one of the few areas in the south selected by USAID for its cash distribution to the flood affected. F Technically a BRCS supported sub-delegation of the IFRC.

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Save the Children Christian Aid Provincial World Vision ActionAid TearFund Help Age

distribution of DEC Concern OXFAM CAFOD agency Merlin BRCS programmes

South Maputo 132342 3 2 Key Gaza 3332232 23Sole province 1 Centre Inhambane 33441 Major activity 2 Sofala 2322 2Significant activity 3 Manica 3 Minor activity 4

Taken as a whole, the DEC agencies and their partners worked in every affected part of the country, and were often the most prominent agencies in the areas that were hardest to reach.

4.2 Beneficiary Coverage

4.2.1 GENDER The evaluation team looked at how the DEC agencies took account of the social differences between men and women, their differing needs, and the different impact that DEC-funded programmes had on them. Women were often the targets for DEC assistance. This was partly a result of targeting, but also because the majority of adults in the worst affected area were femaleA. This female ascendancy is due to both the pattern of male outwork in southern Africa and the loss of males during the civil war. UGC supported a network of co-operatives whose members were mainly female. One of the UGC programmes supported by both Oxfam and CAFOD was the UGC poultry project. Poultry is an important source of food security and income for more vulnerable households, i.e. female-headed households. Between 80 and 90% of all participants in LWF’s food-for-work schemes, over 80% of ORAM’s cash-for-work programmes and over 60% of CEDES’ cash for work programmes were female. Christian Aid funded all three of these projects. Despite the predominance of women as beneficiaries in some programmes, and the existence of some excellent initiatives based on gender analysis - such as Save the Children’s focus on girls’ education and ActionAid’s registering of both husband and wife as house owners - few agencies showed any real gender analysis in their work. Oxfam’s targeted distribution of mosquito nets to women of childbearing age, for example, ignored the strong risk that the male head of household would use the net rather than the intended beneficiaries.

A The preliminary census data for the ’97 census suggests that there are 67% more adult females than males in Gaza and 61% more in Inhambane. (Overall differences are less because of the large number of children).

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This lack of gender analysis meant that the aid that women did receive did not always take into account the fact that they often had many competing demands on their time. Women receiving shelter packs, for example, were not always able to complete their homes due to heavy commitments in their agricultural areas and because of the demands of their families. Such negative effects on women were rarely appreciated, partly because very few agencies collected gender and disability disaggregated data on their distributions and assistance projects.

4.2.2 VULNERABLE INDIVIDUALS Several DEC agencies made an effort to target vulnerable people. HelpAge’s work is an example of such targeted assistance directed towards the elderly. CCM’s Christian Aid funded shelter programme also had a high number of elderly widows among its beneficiaries, particularly in the centre of the country. Despite these efforts many vulnerable people were not as well served by the humanitarian programme as they could have been. HelpAge noted, for example, that older people who had been abandoned, and those with mobility problems, were not getting relief items even in the TACs. . This was partly because they did not know that distributions were taking place or because the distribution was not organised to allow them access to the queues. The latrines seen in the camps were small and awkward to use. Unlike in the Balkans emergency, where Oxfam made a proportion of latrines accessible to the disabledA, there was no reference to such latrines in their reports from Mozambique. One of the biggest challenges for those with mobility problems and for one-parent families generally, was the impact of resettlement. People were resettled far away from their former farms and this limited the participation of the extremely vulnerable in agriculture. No programmes were seen that tried to address this issue. When asked, agencies were generally unable to provide disaggregated data for the vulnerable people assisted by general programmes. While some agencies, such as Christian Aid’s partner CCM, provided labour as well as housing materials others supplied no labour, making it harder for the elderly and female-headed households to rebuild their homes. Similarly, the beneficiary assessment found that disadvantaged households found it much harder to participate in latrine programmes that required householders to dig the pitB.

4.2.3 HIV One area of vulnerability where the DEC agencies were active was that of HIV. HIV/AIDS is a growing problem in Mozambique and there was concern that the social dislocation caused by the floods could increase rates of transmission. One of ActionAid’s excellent initiatives was to use the opportunity presented by the TACs – i.e. the large concentration of people with little to do - to promote learning about HIV/AIDS through plays and discussions. ActionAid also supported this education campaign in the centres by distributed condoms and pamphlets.

A This is a Sphere Standards requirement. B However, this was not found to be a problem in Oxfam’s latrine project in Chókwè despite the high number of female-headed households.

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HIV seems to be an increasingly important sector for the DEC agencies in Mozambique. BRCS is supporting the Mozambican Red Cross’s national Aids programme and CAFOD is the lead agency in the Caritas network for Aids. CAFOD have developed some information materials on aids in emergencies and these are now being tested by UGC. Save the Children conducted some in-depth research with a participatory assessment of Knowledge and Perspectives of Youths in Northern Inhambane regarding sexual health and behaviour. World Vision health staff gave several presentations a week on sexually transmitted diseases.

4.2.4 TARGETING DEC agencies went to some lengths to ensure that beneficiaries were correctly and fairly identified. ActionAid, in an example of best practice, carefully registered the population they were assisting. Save the Children carried out home visits and a survey in order to target assistance. Targeting is not always accepted in the local culture. Everyone suffered from the floods and if some suffered more than others, it appears that the community see this as being fair enough. VetAid, a CAFOD partner, initially had trouble persuading community leaders to discuss the selection of beneficiaries for a cattle-restocking programme, although they were eventually convinced that it made sense only to target those with sufficient responsibility to receive and manage cattle. The situation of the elderly was particularly difficult in that there was sometimes community opposition to targeting them for assistanceA. The local culture also allows significant benefits to those in powerB. When ActionAid took over WFP food distributions from the traditional leaders, who had initially been doing it, recipients were very surprised at how big the rations were. People brought one-litre cans to their distributions to collect their oil, only to find that they were entitled to five or ten litres. People also had to go and get extra sacks to carry their maize as they got so much more than when the chiefs had been doing the distribution. ActionAid informed beneficiaries what they were entitled to. This acknowledged their right to know their entitlements and accorded them the dignity of treating them as participants rather than recipients. This ensured they got their entitlements and minimised the diversion of food aid. This good practice, in line with the requirement of principle nine of the Code of ConductC, was not repeated by other agencies for this type of distribution. Despite DEC agency efforts to target those in need there were gaps in coverage: • those in TACs got more assistance than those staying with relatives • those who were affected by the cyclone received far less aid than those affected by flooding

A HelpAge reported that in some cases, older people had been left behind during the floods and told that flood waters would kill them as their time had come. Some were locked in the houses by their children, but were later escaped when rescued by good Samaritans. B The typical saying when encountering any abuse of power is “Chefe é Chefe” (a boss is a boss), implying that such abuses are the norm, or even a privilege of power. C We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.

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• those who remained in TACs longer than others did not get seeds and tools and sometimes missed out on shelter assistance • those who did not go to government-selected resettlement sites often got no assistance to rebuild their homes. These were gaps in overall assistance rather than just for the DEC agencies. Several of the DEC agencies tried to target these groups. World Vision targeted 6,227 families who did not receive seed or tool kits from any organization in April as they were still residing in TACs. Volunteers from HelpAge’s partner VUKOXA realised during monitoring that some relief items distributed for the elderly had been diverted by their carers. In these cases VUKOXA assumed direct responsibility for the delivery of food to them. While WFP provided the great bulk of food assistance, there were a number of gaps. WFP and the Government’s selection criteria stated that beneficiaries must have had their house destroyed in the floods to qualify for food assistance. Others were in need because of the general economic effect of the floods. Christian Aid’s partner, LWF, filled these gaps in Chókwè and Guija region with purchased food. One approach to targeting that the evaluation team were not particularly impressed with was CCM’s raffle in Xai-Xai. The numbers of Christian Aid funded houses to be built around the country was determined in advance by a mechanistic formulaA. As Xai-Xai had more beneficiaries fitting into the CCM assistance categories than there were houses, CCM held a raffle in the presence of community representatives to select beneficiaries for housingB.

4.2.5 UNDERCOUNTING Typically in emergencies over-counting of the beneficiary population is a problem. In Mozambique, however, the problem was not one of over-counting but of under- counting, since local authorities often underestimated the numbers of people affected. For example ActionAid, in a detailed, triangulated, and verified survey of the population in Manhiça, found 25,000 beneficiaries compared with the Government’s figure of 17,000. When UGC began (Oxfam-funded) distributions of seeds and tools, it soon found that the actual affected population in Matola was much higher than the number supplied by the local authority. UGC decided to respond to overall need and increased the amount distributed. In Machanga, World Vision found that the actual population was 58,000 rather than the 48,000 estimated by the government. Across the river in Nova Mambone, Save the Children also found that the government’s population figures had been underestimated. Concern found the same in Manica.

A Five per cent of the beneficiaries of the kit distribution programme were to get houses. While this distributed houses around the country, it seemed to be based more on administrative convenience than need. B With the agreement of community leaders all the names were put into a container and then picked at random. While this process avoided accusations of bias etc, the evaluation team consider that it would have been more appropriate to use some sort of points system to identify the most vulnerable among those initially identified.

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The Government’s figures for Nova Mambone and Machanga were based on the 1997 census. Although Concern found some continuing immigration from Zimbabwe, this does not explain the whole difference. While some undercounting at a local level was politically inspiredA it seems to stem from major problems with the 1997 census.

4.3 Sectoral Interventions Major sources % of income24 4.3.1 TILLAGE/OTHERS Agriculture 92 One recurring criticism from beneficiaries that were not primarily dependant on crop production was that they Fishing 25 were not assisted to recover their livelihoods. Almost all Salary 21 the DEC agency assistance was focused on tillage Small Business 19 agriculture. Hunting 0.5 While rural Mozambique is a peasant society it is not exclusively agriculturally based. While almost every family in the rural areas is involved in some sort of agriculture, many have primary sources of income other than crop production. Even in the heart of rural Sofala, World Vision found that 8% of the families they surveyed had no farm plot. Even though this was a fishing area, and therefore more diverse than an inland rural community, the spread of income sources was still impressive. Small businesses in the rural areas included the production of traditional beer and charcoal, petty trading, traditional medicine, and the manufacture of dugout canoes. Closer to Maputo and the peri-urban areas of Xai-Xai and Chókwè, petty trading became a much larger part of the income base and some of those who received seeds and tools had no agricultural production at all. While the floods swept away crops and seed stocks, they also swept away canoes and nets as well as livestock. None of the DEC agencies addressed the needs of fishermen even though World Vision and Save the Children had a strong presence in the fishing areas at the mouth of the Save river. Fishing nets, canoes and livestock represent large investmentsB for families in Mozambique and are often the result of years of saving. Apart from UGC’s CAFOD and Oxfam funded chicken project and VetAid’s CAFOD- funded cattle project there seems to have been little restocking of animals and poultry lost to the floods. While this was probably appropriate for cattle (given the complexity of this area), it was less appropriate for chickens and small ruminants. The impact of DEC agency assistance on other livelihoods was mixed. Traditional healers probably benefited from the larger amounts of cash flowing into the economy while traditional brewers and distillers were seen to be making use of distributed jerrycans and other non-food-items in their business.

A Concern had problems in Donde where the District Administrator insisted that food go to some areas and not to others. He has since been demoted. B A canoe and nets cost over £130 while cattle start at about £40 each. This is in a country with a GDP per head of about £150. While cattle may tend to concentrate resources in the hands of the better off, fishing often provides employment for casual labourers or in fishing or processing, or for petty trading.

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4.4 Conclusions and Recommendations

4.4.1 CONCLUSIONS The DEC agencies were correct to limit the appeal to Mozambique. It was by far the worst affected country and a focused appeal probably generated more funds than an appeal that included neighbouring countries in political turmoil, such as Zimbabwe. The level of provision of service varied greatly. Some of the beneficiaries interviewed in easily accessible areas received three household kits, whereas those in the centre of the country typically received only one. In Nova Mambone so many (non-DEC) agencies distributed roofing sheets that they were being sold on the local market for 10% of their cost to the agencies. The evaluation team found no evidence that aid was allocated between geographic areas based on political affiliation. Typically, beneficiaries who were more accessible received more assistance, particularly from the short-stay and less professional NGOs. This was not the case with the DEC agencies. The DEC agencies and their partners worked throughout the country and assisted beneficiaries in places that were hardest to reach. Despite the inclusion of vulnerable individuals in target criteria, delivery to them was by chance more than by specific targeting. Some vulnerable groups were put at a disadvantage by aid programmes that did not take their special needs into account. The lack of monitoring data disaggregated by vulnerability meant that such issues were often not discovered in time to correct them. One way in which coverage might be improved is by recruiting beneficiaries to monitor it themselves. PublishingA information about which groups were entitled to what assistance together with agency contract details, would have allowed beneficiaries to monitor some aspects of coverage. The evaluation team considered that the HIV programmes undertaken by DEC agencies were excellent and focused on the needs of a group that is very vulnerable to the disease. The assistance provided could have been more appropriate if at least part of it was provided in cash rather than making assumptions about beneficiary livelihoods.

4.4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS DEC agencies should collect monitoring data disaggregated on both gender and vulnerability, even for general programmes. DEC agencies should generally allocate some resources to verifying beneficiary numbers to ensure that all beneficiaries are included. DEC agencies should provide mechanisms to ensure that those who are unable to attend the main distribution events still have access to assistance. DEC agencies should publish notices at project and distribution sites clearly stating beneficiary entitlements to assistance.

A By public notices at project and distribution sites, for example.

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DEC agencies should learn from the example of ActionAid and use the opportunity of concentrations of people in camps to promote Aids awareness and other social messages. DEC agencies should consider minority livelihoods in their assistance programmes and should either design appropriate assistance packages or provide beneficiaries with the opportunity to design their own package through the provision of some cash assistance.

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5 Connectedness

“Connectedness is the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.”2

5.1 The longer Term Context DEC agencies were very aware of the longer-term context from their previous experience in Mozambique. World Vision, ActionAid, HelpAge, and Save the Children had ongoing development programmes in Mozambique. CAFOD, Christian Aid, and Tearfund were financing long-term programmes through their partners. BRCS had had a long-term support relationship with CVM. Merlin, with no previous Mozambique experience, was the only exception. The relationship between the emergency work and the agencies’ long-term work depended not only on the geographical location, but also on the sectors in which their programmes were operating. Oxfam, for example, found almost no link between their ongoing development programme and their emergency programme. There were several examples of agencies tying in their emergency response to their longer-term programmes. IFRC changed the health centres that they were targeting for rehabilitation under their emergency programme to areas where CVM intended to implement their Community-based Health and First Aid Post programme. Save the Children changed their strategic plan in order to continue working in the same area they had worked in during the emergency. The promotion of improved sweet potato cultivars were supported by several DEC agencies. As with ActionAid’s work on HIV and the mosquito net programme supported by Oxfam, Merlin, and Concern, this is an example of integrating emergency response with existing programmes that have longer-term objectives.

5.2 Sustainability Sustainability is not a requirement for humanitarian assistance programmes. Most of the interventions made by the DEC agencies, such as distributions or road maintenance, were not intended to be sustainable. However, for work with a longer- term impact, it is useful to consider whether interventions made offered temporary or sustained benefits to the communities assisted. One of the biggest sustainability questions is for how long the water systems and boreholes repaired or installed by the DEC agencies work. Two boreholes provided by CCM in Xai-XaiA were not working, although they had been handed over only a few weeks prior to the visit by the evaluation team. Such quick breakdown usually indicates low quality installationB.

A Although these boreholes serviced a resettlement site with Christian Aid funded houses, Christian Aid did not fund the boreholes because of concerns about sustainability. B It did not bode well that Água Rural in Xai-Xai, the body responsible for repairing boreholes, had done the installation. Though the actual breakdown was not the responsibility of CCM, the fact that the community did not know how to go about having the pump fixed revealed a weakness in the project.

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In an effort to increase the sustainability of the water sources provided, Oxfam invested considerable time and effort in training water committees, promoting cost recovery schemes and training and secondments with Água Rural and the Ministry of Health. Oxfam’s programme closed in Chókwè, however, before providing Água Rural with all the planned spares for the pumps installed. In addition Água Rural did not have the capacity to follow up on the water committees created. Oxfam made the point that development programmes of several years’ duration in Mozambique have failed to implement sustainable water supplies since poverty undermines cost recovery. They also pointed out that even if the systems installed last just six months, they are still a cheaper means of delivering water than alternatives such as trucking. While this is true, the evaluation team still feel that Oxfam should have followed through on the work they had done in order to increase the chance of a longer-term benefit for the communities concerned. World Vision also had problems with sustainability but was planning to continue with the communities for longer in order to set up sustainable systems. World Vision staff placed complete reliance on the water committee concept even though the only committee interviewed that had collected money had already had half of it stolen. Agencies attempted to deal with sustainability issues by handing over their programmes to others. Oxfam managed to pass support for their activist network in Xai-Xai to another NGO, but there was no one to take over the work in Chókwè. World Vision apparently intend to hand over the remnants of their programme in Machanga to Kulima, a local NGO, even though that NGO has demonstrated very limited capacity in Machanga.

5.3 Learning From Previous Emergencies Several agencies made a determined effort to apply lessons learnt from previous floods. ActionAid brought staff from Bangladesh and Central America to apply lessons learnt from the Bangladesh Floods and Hurricane Mitch. World Vision and Save the Children used national staff with experience of other flood emergencies. The opportunity for learning from other flood emergencies in Mozambique was limited simply because the 2000 floods were on a far larger scale than the floods of the previous two decades. However, many of the DEC Agencies’ national staff, and the staff of their partners, had extensive experience of emergencies during the civil war and were able to use this in their response. The international staff sent by agencies often had extensive emergency experience and used this to good effect. Concern’s Field Director had managed the Tanzania programme during the latter part of the Rwanda Emergency, Oxfam’s Country Director had a great deal of emergency experience from Angola and elsewhere, as did the Oxfam Humanitarian Department team and the Red Cross Delegates. The evaluation team had the opportunity to pay a brief visit to the site of the 2001 floods to see if DEC agencies had learned lessons from the 2000 floods and found that they had. Co-ordination between the DEC agencies was for the 2001 floods was extremely good. The joint management of surplus funds from the 2000 floods helped this (discussed under appeal management).

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5.4 Strengthening Local Organisations The DEC agencies repeatedly involved local agencies in their work. All of them, including Merlin, which was new to Mozambique, made a major effort to involve local structures in their work. Funding organisations made a strong effort to boost their partner’s capacity. CAFOD and Christian Aid both sent accompaniers to Mozambique partly to support their partners. Christian Aid, BRCS, and Tearfund sent technical staff to bolster their local partners. Christian Aid also supported the Mozambican NGO forum ‘Link’. Other agencies working with local partners also tried to boost their capacity. One of Oxfam’s aims in the household kit distribution was to increase the capacity of their partners. Save the Children’s patient work with their contractors is increasing their capacity. ActionAid's role in Manhiça probably reflects best practice in supporting a local administration. In addition to this there were numerous examples of DEC agencies supporting local organisations through secondments, funding, and training.

5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

5.5.1 CONCLUSIONS The DEC agencies were generally familiar with the longer-term context in Mozambique and took this into account in their programmes. The biggest problems were with the sustainability of the permanent infrastructure built by the DEC agencies. The evaluation team feel that agencies paid insufficient attention to sustainability issues, and that this could have been improved by: • handing over responsibility to a competent organisation with the resources to resolve any problems that arise (this may involve providing resources to the organisation in questionA) • maintaining a watching brief for 12 months after completion. The evaluation team further feel that agencies should carefully consider issues of sustainability before engaging in permanent infrastructure projects.

5.5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS Where agencies use DEC funds for infrastructure work they should carefully consider if investment in sustainability could increase the overall cost-effectiveness of their intervention, and whether such infrastructure work is justified if it is unlikely to be sustained.

A Oxfam, for example, provided a motorcycle for Água Rural in Chókwè but did not provide a budget for the continuing fuel cost. While communities pay for the fuel to have pumps repaired, there was no one to pay for the fuel for support work with the water committees after the closure of the Oxfam project.

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6 Coherence

“Where possible, we will work through local non-governmental humanitarian agencies as partners in planning and implementation, and co-operate with local government structures where appropriate. We will place a high priority on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.” - from Principle 6 of the Code of Conduct.

This chapter examines whether the interventions by DEC agencies fitted in with those of the UN, the government, and other agencies to form a harmonious whole. In particular, this chapter looks at co-ordination by the UN, the government, and the DEC agencies and the constraints to greater coherence identified by the agencies and the evaluation team.

6.1 Co-ordination by the UN After the floods of early February, a UN Disaster Assistance and Co-ordination (UNDAC) team went to Mozambique to prepare an appeal document. Within one week of arriving the team had helped to set up an On-Site Operations Co-ordination Centre (OSOCC) at INGC – the national body responsible for co-ordinating emergency response in Mozambique (see below). The OSOCC consisted of six sectoral desks, each manned by national officials and a representative from an international agencyA. Each desk held meetings involving all the organisations active in the sector. However, the lack of a clear definition of INGC’s status vis-à-vis the ministries meant that some ministries effectively ignored INGC and rarely sent representatives to the meetings. The first UNDAC team also set up a Logistics Co-ordination Cell, which on 5 March became the Joint Logistic Operations Centre (JLOC). WFP took effective control of the JLOC. Like the OSOCC, this operated out of the INGC on behalf of the government. This was an unusualB but successful approach by the UN, for it preserved an element of national sovereignty and control, even when the INGC was overrun by foreign aid and military contingents. Several DEC agencies complimented UNICEF’s co-ordination role on the water and sanitation desk. Interviewees also praised the role played by JLOC in ensuring an effective and efficient logistics system to deliver aid throughout the country.

A The desks were: Food - WFP; health - WHO; shelter/non-food items - IFRC; water and sanitation - UNICEF; transport, customs and communications – DFID; information – UNDP. There was criticism that these desks represented agency mandates and interests rather than a logical division of work. B Typically the UNDAC team operates out of UN offices.

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6.2 Co-ordination by the Government

6.2.1 THE INGC

The INGC is the body responsible for co-ordinating emergency response in Mozambique. It is a relatively new organisation, established less than a year before the floods in June 1999. It was based on the former Departmento para Prevenção e Combate as Calamidades Naturais (DPCCN - the Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Disasters). The DPCCN had managed relief assistance during the civil war and up to the late 1990’s. As the major problem it had faced had been theft by its own workforce the government decided that the new INGC would not deal with commodities directly, but would act as a ‘light’ co-ordinating body. The remaining trucks and warehouses were sold off and staff levels considerably reducedA25. When the flood struck, the new INGC was still in formation and had very few resources outside of Maputo. Its delegates were former DPCCN delegates and were new to a co-ordination, as opposed to an operations, role26. INGC co-ordination meetings in Maputo were the chief source of information on the floods. The number of organisations attending ballooned and journalists began using them as press conferences. This allowed no room for effective discussion so that some agencies just turned up to collect the reports. In general the INGC presence outside Maputo made only a modest contribution to the flood response management operation. Few INGC delegates made regular visits to the more than 100 TACs set up to provide shelter and refuge to an estimated displaced population of 650,00027. Several DEC agencies commented on the low quality of INGC meetings in the field and the fact that many of the key ministries did not send delegates28.

6.2.2 RESETTLEMENT CO-ORDINATION No single ministry had overall responsibility for resettlement and this lead to a lack of co-ordination in this sector. The government decided to close down the TACs and placed pressure on the local authorities to do so. While this may have been a good decision in some respects, it was taken before any provision had been made at the selected resettlement sites to receive those evicted from the TACs. Neither was there any consultation with or notice to the agencies supplying services in the centres. The lack of preparatory work at the resettlement sites caused unnecessary suffering to new arrivals. There was a lack of clarity on shelter guidelines. Although the INGC sector group drew up guidelines (with input from DEC agencies) in compliance with the Sphere standards at an early stage of the emergency, the government later changed these guidelines. However, this change came too late for the many agencies, including Christian Aid’s partners, which had already begun purchasing material to the

A The UN’s lessons learning report bemoaned the loss of DPCCN’s warehouse management capacity and experience.

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original approved design. Some local authorities demanded a higher specificationA than had been set at a national level.

6.2.3 OTHER GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES In the absence of effective co-ordination by the INGC outside Maputo, local and district authorities from among the displaced communities took an active leadership role in the organization of the TACs. With the help of NGOs and international agencies, these local leaders organized food distributions, water rations, vaccinations, latrine digging and enforced public health standards. The move from the relief to the recovery phase meant that agencies fell increasingly under the co-ordination of the line ministries. These were more effective at co- ordination in their sectors than the INGC had beenB. This was partly because the ministries were well established and partly because many of the ministries, by their absence from INGC meetings, had undermined co-ordination by the INGC. One excellent example of local government co-ordination was in Manhiça, where ActionAid played a significant role in supporting the District Emergency Co- ordination Committee. The marriage of resources from the district and from ActionAid led to an effective intervention.

6.2.4 BUREAUCRACY While the government provided a strong overall framework of co-ordination, especially in the recovery stage, this had disadvantages as well as benefits. Mozambique has a complex web of regulations inherited from five centuries of Portuguese rule. These have been overlain with the rules of the socialist state established after independence and new rules introduced at the insistence of donors. The bureaucracy that administers this complex web is poorly resourced and not always well educated. Bureaucratic delay and inefficiency also caused operational problems for the DEC agencies. World Vision had repaired the existing airstrips at Machanga and Divinhe towns shortly after the floods, but had to wait until the end of July before they were approved for use by the civil aviation authorities. BRCS assessed all the health centres in Sofala in June together with the Ministry of health. However, it took the Ministry of Health six weeks to produce a definitive list of health centres for repair. The government relatively quickly set up an emergency customs procedure to speed up importation of relief items. DEC agencies benefited greatly from this. As operations moved from relief to recovery agencies experienced increasing problems with customs and long delays in clearance. CCM had problems with shelter materials, UGC with watering cans and water pumps, BRCS with materials, and Oxfam with components of its household kits. In some cases these delays added to costs and reduced implementation. Some tightening of the customs procedures was understandable, given that some (non-DEC) agencies appeared to be abusing the customs dispensation by imported

A The Governor of Sofala criticised the CCM houses in the media saying that they were not houses, but chicken coops. In fact the Christian Aid funded CCM houses were generally of higher quality than most of the houses built in the first nine months after the floods. B For example, the role of the Ministry of Health in the rehabilitation of health infrastructure.

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materials for their long-term projects as relief itemsA. However, the long delays in processing customs clearance requests reflected an inefficient bureaucracy rather than protection of the national economic interest. The Ministry of Agriculture created problems for some agenciesB. The Ministry promoted the Matuba maize variety, but this drought resistance variety performed very poorly after the floods due to its low tolerance for waterlogged soils. The Ministry also insisted on the removal of the Kalahari Early Pearl maize seeds from Red Cross seed packs, saying that Matuba was more suitable as it was a shorter season variety. The Ministry undertook to swap the seeds in the pack but did not do so, leaving the Red Cross to do so itself after a delay of two weeks. This delayed seed distributions by two weeks (more than the difference between the maturation time of Kalahari Early Pearl and Matuba). The Ministry also advised removal of millet seed from Red Cross seed packs for fear that it would be eaten, since it was being distributed outside the traditional planting time for the crop. The Ministry of Agriculture noted that these “errors” could have been avoided had there been more consultation with them, even though they had originally approved all of the items they later asked to have changed. Christian Aid noted that while there was strong co-ordination by the Ministry, the advice was not always the best29. While Mozambican bureaucracy sometimes created problems for the DEC agencies, other delays in projects clearly arose from bureaucratic problems within agencies. Difficulties in recruiting led to delays in the IFRC health centre rehabilitation programme. Save the Children delayed the employment of a locally recruited engineer for bureaucratic reasons even though contractors were executing technically unsound work in the absence of the engineer.

6.3 Co-ordination by the DEC Agencies The absence of a truly effective countrywide co-ordination mechanism made co- ordination difficult for the DEC agencies. However, the evaluation team formed the impression that in the NGO sector the DEC agencies led the way in trying to make local co-ordination mechanisms work. For example, Oxfam played a leading role in the co-ordination of the water and sanitation sector, Save the Children started holding co-ordination meetings for work on the south bank of the Save River, and Concern chaired the NGO Emergency Co-ordination Meeting in Chókwè. The DEC agencies were prominent in the co-ordination mechanisms found by the evaluation team. Many of the DEC agencies made a conscious effort to participate in co-ordination mechanisms, even when these mechanisms were not as useful as they should have been. There were many good examples of effective co-ordination between DEC agencies, local authorities, and other NGOs. Operational co-ordination between the DEC agencies was excellent and there were many examples of them sharing information and resources. At the very start of the floods World Vision and Oxfam co-operated on the hire of a helicopter in February, World Vision and ActionAid loaned staff to Save the Children, Concern assisted Merlin with logistics, and Tearfund assisted ActionAid with water. Good operational

A Interview with Government Official in Beira who quotes concrete examples of such abuse. B One agency commented that the Ministry was stronger on co-ordination than on quality advice.

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co-operation between DEC agencies continued throughout the emergency but several agencies commented the co-ordination in the UK, other than for the appeal, was almost non-existent.

6.3.1 THE DEC AGENCY GROUP Co-operation between DEC agencies was not limited to operational issues but took place at all levels in Mozambique and they quickly formed their own co-ordination structureA. This structure established a new way of working for the DEC when it was given delegated authority for the allocation of surplus funds from the appealB. The evaluation team believe that the high level of co-ordination between the DEC agencies came about for a number of reasons: • their representatives in Mozambique were experienced staff with mature personalities who understood the advantages of co-operation and were committed to it and prepared to invest time and resources to it • many of them were already members, together with the Dutch overseas development service (SNV) and Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO), of an informal co-ordination network prior to the floods • their development programmes were well established and many of the representatives had already served for some time in MozambiqueC • the early emergence of a common issue, the length of the expenditure period, united the group and the success of their advocacy on this reinforced the value of co-ordinated action • the scale of the problem meant that there was more than enough work for everyone • they were relatively well funded and donors were open to further funding requests, leading to little need for competition for donor funds disbursed at field level. The DEC group has had many successes since its first success with the extension of the period of expenditure. The group successfully lobbied to be included in the UN Disaster Management Team meetings so as to gain access to planning and information flows. Another example of common advocacy was the joint letter to WFP reflecting agency concern about WFP distribution contracts. These contracts obliged any agencies distributing food in the 2001 floods to carry out food-for-work projects afterwards. Even World Vision, which was a strong WFP partner and had no problems with the WFP agreement as such, agreed to sign the letter in solidarity with the other DEC agencies. Merlin, which had no presence in Maputo, was not involved in the DEC agency co- ordination. There was a concern that non-operational agencies with little or no in-

A This structure has no formal name but will be referred to as the DEC agency group in this report. B Most of these ‘surplus’ funds seem to have arisen because of delayed returns of unspent monies by DEC agencies, and the continuing income from the appeal long after it had ended. The DEC Secretariat is considering a new “terminal mechanism” for disposing of such ‘surplus’ funding in future. C One agency pointed out that the agencies had shared a common experience in the transition from relief during the civil war and the start of the peace process to the development programme in place before the floods.

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country presence would lose out in the DEC co-ordination, but the distribution of minutes by email lessened this concern. In Zambézia, where there was a DEC agency sub-groupA, Christian Aid had no presence but two of its partners were represented as observers on the group. There was some concern that DEC agency co-ordination could subvert broader NGO co-ordination. However, international NGO co-ordination was weak in Mozambique and the DEC agencies represented a natural grouping of professional NGOs with a commitment to improving their performance. Broader co-ordination groups have greater difficulty in agreeing common advocacy positions because of the wider diversity of views they contain.

6.3.2 A NEW WAY OF WORKING A unique aspect of the Mozambique floods appeal was the delegation of authority to the DEC agency group in Mozambique allowing them to allocate a significant partB of the appeal funds. The DEC agency group requested proposals from DEC agencies and then evaluated them. The members of the review team for each proposal were well placed to review them, given their knowledge of Mozambique. One interviewee commented that the transparency of the allocation process, and the knowledge that developed of each other’s programmes, led to even better and more open co-ordination between the DEC agencies. Delegated authority offers a number of advantages to the DEC Secretariat. Firstly, the members reviewing the proposals are very knowledgeable about the context and about the real, rather than assumed, capacity of the agency requesting the funding. Secondly, the process allows the effective use of surplus funding without the horrors of a Kosovo style never-ending story of different phases. Non-operational DEC agencies raised the concern, however, that their partners could lose out with this system if the DEC agency had no representative in country.

6.4 Conclusions and Recommendations

6.4.1 CONCLUSIONS While co-ordination in Maputo was strong, it was poor outside the capital. Government co-ordination improved in the recovery phase since the activities fell under the aegis of particular ministries, rather than the newly formed and inexperienced INGC. There were continuing problems with resettlement, which did not fall neatly under any one ministry. The UN’s decision to locate the UNDAC team in the INGC’s offices was a positive move. Mozambique is a developing country with a complex set of rules that are administered by an under-resourced and sometimes poorly educated bureaucracy. This bureaucracy sometimes caused delays and increased costs for DEC agencies.

A This group was set up to co-ordinate the responses to the 2001 floods in that province. Part of this response was financed by DEC funds allocated through the DEC agency group’s delegated authority. B Over £1.5M was allocated for projects in Mozambique under the DEC agency group’s delegated authority.

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Programmes also suffered from bureaucracy within the DEC agencies. While such delays may be tolerable in development programmes, they can cause serious problems in an emergency response, and there may be room for the DEC to promote improvement. Co-ordination between the DEC agencies was extremely good, and the establishment of a DEC agency group extremely positive. However setting up this co-ordination consumed management time at a time when DEC agency managers were fully committed to organizing their agency’s responses. The delegation of authority for the allocation of ‘surplus’ appeal funds was very positive and enabled the DEC agencies to react very quickly to the 2001 floods. However, its application in future emergencies may risk marginalizing non- operational agencies that have no presence in-country.

6.4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS The DEC Secretariat should consider working with the DEC agencies to establish common benchmarks for internal processesA (such as recruitment or project proposal processing), so that the DEC agencies can measure their own performance against other agencies. The DEC should encourage co-ordination between DEC agencies in country, possibly through the provision of a facilitator at the start of an emergency, to brief agencies on DEC rulesB and to support the formation of a DEC agency group, and through an early visit by the DEC chief executive at the start of emergency operations. The DEC will need to ensure that this does not disadvantage agencies without a field presence. The DEC should consider delegated authority for the allocation of funds by an inclusive local DEC agency group as part of the terminal mechanism for appeals. The DEC should also consider incorporating any local DEC agency group into the review process for any funds that are allocated on a project proposal rather than an automatic basis.

A Such benchmarks could include: the time taken for emergency proposals or funding requests to be acted upon at different levels, the time taken for different stages of recruitment, and the lead time for agency procurement. B For many agency representatives this was the first time that they had dealt with a DEC appeal. This is a particular problem for agencies with a more devolved authority structure where country office develop the four-week plans etc. directly and ‘post’ them through the agency’s UK office.

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7 Appeal Management

The DEC is currently undertaking a review of internal processes and organisation. In the light of this, the comments on appeal management are restricted to those issues that might usefully be considered in such a review. This chapter looks at: the added value of DEC funds, agency control and reporting processes, DEC rules, communication between the Secretariat and the agencies, and the evaluation process.

7.1 Added Value of the DEC Funds The DEC appeal was launched in response to the second wave of floodingA but many of the DEC agencies had begun operations in response to the first floods. Four of themB had received DFID funding for their response to the first floods prior to the launch of the DEC appeal. BRCS noted that the early availability of DFID funding helped the Red Cross to act more quickly than if they had been solely reliant on DEC appeal funding. While a small minority of DEC agencies considered the DEC to be nothing more than a funding mechanism, most felt that it also played a role as a valuable co-operative mechanism for UK agencies to respond to emergencies. The following features of the DEC appeal in Mozambique supported the majority view: • the appeal raised the profile of the Mozambique floods and helped to increase the donations for Mozambique outside of the appeal • the appeal presented an image to the public of the UK agencies working together to raise funds, which was better from a marketing viewpoint • the DEC evaluation was expected to give the agencies a chance to learn from each other’s mistakes and identify best practice • the creation of the DEC agency group was felt by all the DEC agencies in- country, and almost all the agency headquarters, to have added value • the success of the appeal allowed a very broad response by the DEC agencies which had a considerable impact as a result • DEC funding was more flexible than donor funding and allowed agencies to tailor their response to people’s needs as these emerged during the operationC • the DEC funds were not subject to overnight changes in policy as donor funds wereD, nor were they soaked up by expensive military logistics operations.

A Prior to the second wave of flooding, broadcasters, partly on the advice of DFID, had indicated that they would not support a DEC appeal. Consulting DFID about DEC appeals is not a formal protest part of the process, but the broadcasters have done so since Claire Short’s strong criticism of the DEC Sudan appeal (OSC minutes, and Agency HQ interviews). B The Red Cross, Oxfam, ActionAid, and World Vision. C It was also noted that DEC funds are less flexible than agencies’ own funding from the general public. D USAID had planned to rehabilitate traditionally built schools. Oxfam agreed to submit a register of schools reconstructed by them, on the understanding that the schools not repaired by Oxfam would be the priority target for the USAID project. USAID subsequently decided to concentrate on transport infrastructure and dropped plans to rehabilitate the schools.

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The evaluation team believes that the DEC appeal added value to the Mozambique floods response. It allowed the very professional group of agencies that make up the DEC to respond on an appropriate scale to the huge impact of the flooding.

7.2 Control and Reporting Processes Agency reporting to the DEC was significantly better than for the Kosovo appealA. Many of the reports to the DEC were exemplary, clearly explaining what the agencies had done and why. Oxfam’s large and detailed report was particularly good given the huge range of actions Oxfam had carried out. ActionAid produced what was probably the best report in terms of the analysis of what had been done. General reporting was also of a high standard. Particularly good were World Vision’s Report on Impact Assessment in Machanga and BRCS’s external assessment of their seeds and tools programme, CAFOD’s many updates, and Oxfam’s Health Report. However, there were also some problems with reporting. Save the Children did not submit their 10 month expenditure report, originally due on 7 January, until early MayB. BRCS’s financial report was almost as late, being apparently delayed by problems getting IFRC to clearly identify what DEC funds had been used for. This delay suggested that there were weaknesses in financial management in the Red Cross movement. A number of agencies said that DEC reporting requirements were not sufficiently clear. There was certainly some confusion concerning DEC rules on expenditure. Given the high staff turnover in NGOs and the relatively low number of DEC appeals, agency staff were often dealing with DEC rules and procedures for the first time. As noted under efficiency, several DEC agencies had to set up parallel accounting systems to track spending. This raises questions about the accuracy of the accounts submitted to the DEC. Best practice would suggest that financial accounts attached to reports should be certified by the agencies’ chief finance officer. One irritant for DEC agencies was that the end of the period of expenditure fell on 7 December, rather than on the end of a calendar month. As agencies usually operate accounts on a calendar month basis, this would have made it easier to produce accurate financial reports.

7.3 DEC Rules The initial six-month expenditure period was, at the request of the DEC agency group in Mozambique, increased to nine months. In the view of the evaluation team this was entirely appropriate in the circumstances of this appealC. There was some confusion about the amounts of money available - an initial disbursement of £15,000,000 was planned but because the incorrect capacity indicators were used, only 98% of this amount was initially disbursed. The allocation

A Both the Evaluation Manager and Team Leader had worked on the DEC Kosovo evaluation. B However, Save the Children did supply the evaluation team with a draft narrative report during the fieldwork, but this had no financial data. C It would have been even more appropriate if the expenditure period had been extended to 31 December as suggested in the recommendations.

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of DEC funds is made based on DEC capacity indicators. At the time the DEC capacity indicator was basedA on an Agency’s spending on emergencies in the previous three years. As the appeal was made in the UK Financial Year 99/00, the capacity indicator should have been based on the three years to 1999 but was mistakenly based on the three years to 2000. When this error was corrected CAFOD and Christian Aid received a quarter of a million pounds less between them from the pool than had originally been planned. Confusion did not end there. The then DEC Executive Secretary advised agencies that the appeal had been very successful and that they should indicate if they needed additional funds. ActionAid included an increased budget in its twelve-week report but did not realise until much later that no one had picked up on this. When told of the appeal extension, CAFOD assumed that the total allocation for the first phase would be increased to cover the additional costs of running projects over nine months rather than sixB. Comparing the DEC schedule of disbursements with agency reports of funds received revealed a number of inconsistencies. Firstly, four agenciesC made direct or indirect reference to retrospective fundingD by the DECE. This funding, issued towards the end of the period of expenditure, appears to have been intended to fill shortfalls in agency funding. Such shortfalls arose, in the case of at least one agency, from an understanding that additional funds were available as a result of the increased 12- week budget.

Christian Retrospectively Funded Total ActionAid CAFOD Aid Concern DEC Funds (Agency) 6,898,708 1,987,083 1,642,490 2,278,347 990,789 DEC Net Figures 5,105,504 1,314,696 1,268,646 2,068,427 453,735 Retrospective Funds 1,770,688 612,755 410,959 209,920F 537,054 End of period returns (22,516) (59,632)G 37,115H Nil Nil

A The allocation system is currently being reviewed. B This seemed to show a lack of understanding of the DEC rules. Even though the expenditure period was extended, there was no obligation on agencies to extend the timeframe of their projects. C ActionAid, Christian Aid, CAFOD, and Concern. D Funding allocated to the agencies to cover expenditures already made. Retrospective funding allocations were apparently made in November, towards the end of the period of expenditure. E No figures for retrospective funding were included in the summary of Phase 1 disbursements received by the evaluation team. F Christian Aid’s original request for retrospective funding was for £225,800. G This difference arises because of a difference between the financial report statement of the amount to be funded by retrospective funding and the amount given in the narrative report for ActionAid. H CAFOD report that the £37,115 was not an end of period return but was money that was probably spent by 7 December but not reported by CAFOD partners. Some partners had difficulty reporting their expenditures up to 7 December within the one-month deadline, so they reported up to mid or late November instead, giving rise to the difference.

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Retrospective funding effectively allowed the DEC to match funding more closely to in-country capacity. However, it would have been better if the retrospective funding process had been more transparent. Allocating additional money in response to budget changes in the twelve-week and six-month reports might have been a more efficient approach. Of those agencies without retrospective funding only one – Save the ChildrenA - made significant returns (11.5% of funds initially allocated). Needing to make large returns at a late stage of the programme suggests some problems with financial management.

Without Retrospective Save the Funding Total BRCS Oxfam Children Others DEC Funds (Agency) 11,816,317 1,511,640 6,071,054 2,556,772 1,676,851 DEC Net Figures 12,162,433 1,545,698 6,090,125 2,849,782 1,676,828 End of period returns 346,116 34,058 19,071 293,010 (23) As % of funding. 2.9% 2.3% 0.3% 11.5% 0.0%

One recurring issue was the ‘point of recognition’ for expenditures. In normal NGO practice expenditures are ‘recognised’ in the accounts when the payment is actually madeB. This means that agency accounts usually make no direct recognition of commitments. Such commitments can be: • legally enforceable, as in purchase orders or formal contracts • undertakings to communities or local authorities that are only morally rather than legally binding. The policy of the DEC appears to be that only funds that are physically expended can be included in the period of expenditure. In the case of ActionAid, where there were outstanding contractual payments, it was agreed that they could include the cost of items that had already been executed but had not yet been paid for. However, it was also agreed that ActionAid was not to include provisions for the outstanding contractual payments for the parts of the work that had not been completed by 7 December. Most of the problems that arose with carry-forward payments did so either because of slow implementation by contractors or by the agencies themselves. Oxfam made a one-off payment of about £3,000 to allow LWF to complete the Oxfam community- built schools programme. Oxfam also asked that the DEC allow carry forward of £5,624.92 on the first round of pooled funds to give their partner Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento Urbano (AMDU – Mozambican Association for Urban Development) time to complete the works that were underway. Concern gave materials to LWF for work to be executed after the end of the funding period. While

A These returns seem to have arisen because of much slower progress than expected by contractors. B In commercial practice receipts and expenditures are recognised at the point where the liability or credit is generated, so that sales are entered in the accounts when an invoice is issued, rather than when payment is received.

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these examples involved relatively small amounts of money, they are, nevertheless, technical breaches of the DEC funding period rules. Some agencies, such as ActionAid and Oxfam, have clearly identified items of carry forward in their budgets. The evaluation team suspects, from experience in the Balkans, that others have not and have simply maintained a discreet silence. The present situation discriminates against the more ethical agencies and DEC rules on carry-forwards need to be rethought. It would be good to have a mechanism to allow small amounts of the budget to be carried forward to allow for terminal works. This rule could either be along the lines of permission for a small amount of carry forwardA, or of a liquidation period for existing commitmentsB.

7.4 Communication The quality of communication between agencies and the Secretariat was an issue raised by a number of agencies. This arose partly because of agency ignorance of DEC rules (or the lack of them) and partly because of communication problems. Several agencies said that communication between the Secretariat and members was poorC. One agency alleged that random information was sent by the Secretariat, and that the correct people within the agencies were not kept informedD. There was also criticism of the lack of standardisation for the four-week plans and other documents, and that systems and requirements were not clear.

7.5 The Evaluation System The DEC evaluation is an awkward combination of two functions: • to determine if agencies have spent appeal money in an appropriate way and to inform the UK public as to the result • lesson learning for future emergencies. Some interviewees recognised the natural tension between these two functions, since discretion may be the best course when being audited and disclosure the best approach to lesson learning. Interviewees were divided about the usefulness of the evaluation, although the majority were in favour, believing that the evaluation serves to bring critical issues to the attention of senior management. There was some debate about the usefulness of the lesson-learning role of the evaluation. Given the large numbers of agencies

A This could be allowing up to 5% of the Agency’s phase funding to be carried forward automatically and up to 15 per cent with the permission of the Operations Sub Committee, when an agency can demonstrate that the need for carry forward has arisen due to circumstances beyond its control. B This would not permit any new commitments after the end of the expenditure period but would allow a period of, say, 45 days for agencies to pay off any outstanding commitments. C One of the worst examples of communication problems was when Merlin, in the field, was not aware that the funding period had been extended to nine months until informed of this by the evaluation team during the first period of fieldwork in July 2000. It subsequently emerged that this was an internal communication issue since Merlin had been involved in the decision to extend the expenditure period. D Part of the problem is that for some agencies it is the desk rather than an emergency unit that is responsible for dealing with the DEC. When different desks are involved in subsequent emergencies, those dealing with the DEC may be doing so for the first time, in headquarters as well as in the field.

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involved, lessons that emerge tend to be rather generic. Internal agency lesson learning may be more useful. The identification of best practice was felt by interviewees to be an important part of the evaluation. Indeed, earlier feedback of best practice was suggested, as a way of maximising the benefit of the evaluation. The consensus seemed to be that the DEC needed a mechanism for quality control. One interviewee said that evaluation by the DEC is a good reminder that the money involved is other people’s money. There was also evidence that awareness by some of the agencies of the possibility of their actions being held up to public scrutiny had influenced their way of workingA. The most telling criticism of the evaluation was possibly that the present system focuses on accountability to the resource providers, i.e. the donor public in the UK, rather than to those to whom assistance is provided. Principle Nine of the Code of Conduct, to which all the DEC agencies have subscribed states: “We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.” In many cases beneficiaries were not aware which agency was assisting them. It would be good practice for DEC agencies to provide signs at sites that both describe the work to be done, and provide contact details of the agency. Contacts details should include the UK office address to give those unhappy with the project some route for redress. The evaluation team were impressed by the commitment of the DEC agencies to learn lessons from their work to improve their own performanceB. Many of the lesson- learning studies were of very high quality. Some agencies undertook these as a once- off exercise while others, such as Tearfund, now carry out lesson learning exercises after every operation as a matter of course. One problem the evaluation team encountered was in trying to identify which assets were DEC funded. In at least one case the team was shown assets by the staff of a local partner which were identified as having been funded by a DEC agency with DEC funds, but which the funding agency later explained had not been funded by them or with DEC funds. Clearly identifying the source of funding for permanent infrastructure projects would reduce this sort of confusion. Internal lesson learning offers agencies the opportunity to improve their own processes in a way that the broader DEC evaluation cannot, but there is still need for an overall external review to identify best practice and to highlight common themes between agencies.

7.5.1 CONCLUSIONS The DEC appeal process is a valuable mechanism, greatly appreciated by the agencies, who regard it as more than just a funding mechanism. The DEC appeal increased the awareness of the British public of the emergency in Mozambique and

A One agency staff member said that this was part of the reason that the agency now monitors partners more closely. Another said that they would not fund partners with DEC money unless they were sure that the partners could meet accountability and reporting requirements. B Concern, ActionAid, TearFund, Cafod, and World Vision carried out major lesson learning reviews. Oxfam and Christian Aid also reviewed their programmes.

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provided a channel for their donations. Members of the DEC found that they were brought together in country in a positive way that enhanced mutual lesson learning and co-operation. Agency monitoring and reporting was of a high standard with a few exceptions. A number of agencies felt that reporting requirements could have been made a little clearer. Indeed, there was a broad consensus that DEC rules in general needed clarifying at the outset, particularly as many of those involved in emergency programmes were coming into contact with the DEC for the first time. Financial allocation, expenditure and reporting rules all need clarifying, and communication between the Secretariat and the agencies needs to be more systematic and uniform. While the evaluation is felt to be useful, it cannot replace agencies’ own lesson learning exercises. The evaluation suffers from being, of necessity, a ‘broad-brush’ review and cannot examine specific issues in the depth that some agencies would like.

7.5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS The Secretariat should circulate clear guidelines on reporting to the agencies at the launch of every appeal, and request that these are forwarded to the field offices. DEC Agency Finance Officers should certify their Agency’s financial reports to the DEC as being an accurate reflection of the true situation. Future DEC expenditure periods should terminate at the end of a calendar month. The period should normally be extended to meet this requirementA. Any additional funding phases should consist of whole calendar months. The DEC should consider establishing a rule to allow the carry forward of a small proportion of funding from one expenditure period to the next. The DEC should consider ways in which agency lesson learning could be incorporated into the broader evaluation. The DEC should consider including in its Terms of Reference for future evaluations a provision to allow issues for in-depth study identified in the initial work, to be added to the Terms of Reference before the main field-work starts. DEC agencies should provide notices at project sites clearly stating the extent of the project and providing contact details for the agency, including the address of the UK office. The DEC should consider introducing the rule that infrastructure projects built with DEC funds display the fact that they are DEC-

A One exception to extension in this way would be where an expenditure period was due to end in early January. Here it would be appropriate to end on 31 December instead as many agencies operate accounts on a calendar year basis.

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funded, together with the relative contribution of the DEC and other funders.

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8 Standards

Adhesion to the Code of Conduct is a prerequisite for all the DEC agencies. In addition several of the DEC agencies have adopted the Sphere standards. This chapter considers how agencies promoted and measured up to the Code of Conduct and the Sphere standards.

8.1 Code of Conduct

8.1.1 PROMOTION Although all the DEC agencies have signed up to the Code of Conduct, only CAFOD refers to promoting it in their final report.A The Red Cross included compliance with the Code as one of the components of their internal review, but almost no other monitoring of programmes against the Code seems to have taken place. In general DEC agencies did not appear to have any system for ensuring their own compliance with the code.

8.1.2 COMPLIANCE The Code of Conduct codifies the basic standards for humanitarian assistance and adherence to the it is a pre-requisite for membership of the DEC, reflecting broad agreement that it is vital to strengthening and delivering high quality assistance programmes. It appeared to the evaluation team that agency compliance with principles six, seven, and nineB was not always very good. There was an excessive use of expatriates by some, there was inadequate beneficiary consultation, and beneficiaries were generally not informed of their entitlements. More serious was the concern that DEC agencies may not have complied with principles one and twoC in their treatment of those settling at unofficial resettlement sites. Agencies accepted, without a murmur of protest, the government prohibition on shelter assistance to those resettling outside the government-approved resettlement sites. World Vision, for example, did not assist 37 families who returned to their original homes from the Nhancutze transit centre instead of going to a resettlement site, and seemed to find nothing wrong in not doing so. Other DEC agencies seem to have similarly accepted that assistance should only be provided to those resettling on the government’s terms. The DEC agencies also made very little use of advocacy for the beneficiaries in the face of poor decision making by the government. Save the Children appears not to have made any representations on behalf of their beneficiaries at the Malovane resettlement site, where construction of the school was postponed following an

A Concern mention it briefly and Oxfam refer to it in their six-month report. B Principle 6: We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities; Principle 7: Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid; Principle 9: We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources. C Principle 1: The Humanitarian imperative comes first: The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries… Principle 2: Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone….

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arbitrary decision by a government minister to move the entire site across the road. While Save the Children had the resources to move the school site, the beneficiaries did not have the resources to move. Many had been unable to complete their houses on the site, despite having been there for almost a year, presumably because of the pressures of having to work on their now-distant farms.

8.2 Sphere

8.2.1 PROMOTION DEC agencies were at the forefront of promoting standards for service delivery to beneficiaries in the floods. The DEC Secretariat supported the cost of translation of the Sphere standards into PortugueseA. Oxfam gave a presentation to the water and sanitation sectoral meeting. Concern distributed the Sphere standards in Portuguese to its national staff as well as conducting a special training and monitoring mission. Christian Aid pushed hard to ensure that its own staff, and those of its partners, were aware of and using the Sphere standards. Tearfund now use Sphere standards in reviewing all project proposals from partners. It was necessary to promote Sphere because many heads of agency who come from a development background were unaware of their existenceB. This was also true of local partners. The evaluation team were surprised to note that only five of the DEC agenciesC referred to the Sphere standards in their final reports.

8.2.2 SPHERE OR NATIONAL STANDARDS? Several agencies found that there were conflicts between Sphere and National standards. IFRC, BRCS’s partner, noticed during a monitoring visit that the queues for water at handpumps in some areas were excessive and promoted the provision of one water point per 500 person. This is the national standard but IFRC did not appear to notice that this was only half of the level of provision advocated in the Sphere standards.D Christian Aid thought that Sphere specifies that latrines should be ventilated improved pit latrinesE but decided to follow the national standard instead. The national standard is based around a domed thin concrete slab with tight fitting lid.

A CAFOD held discussions with the Sphere project team and proposed that the translation be paid from its share of DEC funds. After discussions with the Operational Sub Committee it was widely agreed that funding for the translation should come out of DEC central funds and not one agency’s funds. B The head of UNICEF’s Water and Sanitation department was unaware of Sphere. The Action Aid representative, widely praised for his co-ordination work, was aware of Sphere in a general way, but not of specific service standards contained in it. C CAFOD, Oxfam, Concern, Christian Aid, and the Red Cross. D Because of their higher rate of flow, one handpump per 500 people is generally adequate while one tap is needed for every 250 people to prevent excessive queuing. Sphere standards reflect the use of emergency piped water systems rather than handpumps. E Sphere does not specify this, only that latrines should minimise fly and mosquito breeding. A latrine that can be kept clean and is supplied with a close fitting lid probably meets this requirement.

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8.2.3 DEPARTURES FROM SPHERE Oxfam only provided one latrine per 70 persons at Chiaquelane TAC. This is far below the Sphere standards’ key indicator of one per 20 personsA. There was no evidence, however, of uncontrolled defecation and the toilets were clean and without queues, suggesting in fact that the level of provision was adequate. The population in this camp objected to the provision of the latrines adjacent to the accommodationB and insisted that they be placed further from the huts.

8.2.4 ANALYSIS OF SPHERE COMPLIANCE The Sphere standards are minimum standards rather than desirable levels of service. Increasing service levels above the Sphere levels may bring benefits in reduced stress and morbidity. Many of the agency personnel interviewed, however, seemed to think that they were not responsible for improving standards beyond the minimum numerical indicators enshrined in Sphere. While agencies put some effort into meeting the numerical indicators in the standards, others aspects seemed to have been forgotten. The Sphere standards require beneficiary participation in programme design and implementation. They also require that both men and women get information on the assistance programme and have the opportunity to comment on it. This seldom happened. It was clear from interviews with beneficiaries that they often had very little idea of what was going on because agencies were not telling them. There were exceptions, such as ActionAid’s efforts to inform beneficiaries of their entitlements, but these were rare. Beneficiaries were often completely confused about what agencies were doing. While some of the sites visited had agency signs, none of these displayed agency contact details. Providing such signs would comply with the Sphere requirement to allow beneficiaries a chance to give feedback.

8.3 Conclusion and Recommendations

8.3.1 CONCLUSIONS The Code of Conduct imposes very high standards. Generally DEC agencies did little to promote the Code of Conduct and, apart from one example, there was no agency monitoring of their compliance with the code. DEC agency compliance with principles six, seven, and nine was not always satisfactory. The lack of support to beneficiaries not settling at government- indicated settlement sites may have breached principles one and two of the Code of Conduct. Assisting such populations with their shelter needs could have created problems with local authorities, but that is implicit in the first principle, the primacy of the humanitarian imperative. DEC agencies did excellent work to promote the Sphere Standards and to measure their work against them. There were some deviations from the numerical indicators in the Sphere Standards, and in some cases agencies decided to adhere to national

A The Sphere standard level of one toilet per 20 is arguably excessive. It is higher than the UK standard of one per 25 persons for offices and factories. B Sphere specifies that latrines should be within 50m of all the shelters.

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standards instead. However, the evaluation team found that these deviations were generally appropriate.

8.3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS DEC agencies should consider informing their development staff of the Code of Conduct and Sphere so that they are at least aware of their existence. The DEC should consider how the member agencies should monitor their compliance with the Code of Conduct and report to the DEC on this.

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9 Lessons for Learning

This chapter pulls together in bullet form the issues that the evaluation team consider to be the lessons for learning from the DEC agencies response to the 2000 floods. Some of the lessons identified may seem trivial, contentious, or specific to Mozambique.

9.1 Assessment • Agencies can increase their impact by providing assistance to others to carry out assessments or by using their own assessments to bring problems to the attention of the broader aid community. • In resettlement it is important to assess what impact it will have on access to land, markets, and other resources, as well as the balance of work within the household. • The needs of those not in centres or in inaccessible areas risk being overlooked, as initial assessments tend to focus on accessible areas where large numbers of beneficiaries are concentrated. • It is good practice to share assessment tools, such as checklists and assessment forms, with other agencies. • It is good practice to share detailed assessment and registration to reduce the risk of duplication. • Malnutrition estimates should be based on assessments and not on guesswork. • Prior involvement in an area or close relationships with local partners active in an area gave some agencies a good in-depth ‘base-line’ knowledge of the communities affected, even before carrying out any assessment. • Specialist assessments can be subcontracted to specialist (local) NGOs. • The speed of assessment needs to be balanced with the level and complexity of humanitarian need.

9.2 Preparedness and Speed of Response • Agencies with existing operational programmes, or a strong organisational commitment to emergency response, or with strong partner programmes in disaster-affected areas (rather than just the affected country) are better placed to respond to emergencies. • Building on pre-existing programmes allowed a faster response. • Agencies that had invested in disaster preparedness saw a return on this. • The relationship between the emergency work and the agencies’ long-term work depended not only on the geographical location, but also on the sectors in which their programmes were operating.

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9.3 Beneficiary Consultation • Beneficiaries’ capacity to meet their needs is not always obvious and may be overlooked by external assessment if there is inadequate beneficiary consultation. • Cash-for-work not only allows beneficiaries to target themselves, but also allows them to identify which of their needs should be met first. • If there is time, farmers should be consulted about the contents of what would make up an ideal tools package for them as this may vary with location or the type of soil or crops. • It is good practice for agencies to identify themselves at project sites by providing details of their address and how they can be contacted. • It is good practice to inform beneficiaries of their entitlements to relief assistance (through prominently displayed notice-boards, sample containers etc.). • Local agencies and government officials are often from the educated elite and consulting them is not a substitute for beneficiary consultation. • The DEC time limits do not allow DEC agencies enough time to mobilise communities, but they do permit consultation in project design.

9.4 Targeting Assistance • Targeting to meet the requirements of the Code of Conduct may be contrary to local cultural norms. • Communities do not always feel that members of a vulnerable group should receive more than others, yet it is often these that aid agencies attempt to target. • Food and non-food-items should be distributed proportionate to family size. • Gender analysis still needs to be mainstreamed in the work of DEC agencies. • In rural communities, assets may be widely shared between households rather than individually held, and attempts to target such assets at a household level may not be worth the effort involved. • It is appropriate to allocate some resources to verifying beneficiary numbers to ensure that all beneficiaries are included. • It is appropriate to provide mechanisms to ensure that those who are unable to attend the main distribution events can still have access to assistance. • Livestock restocking is very complex in a mixed farming environment and should only be done as part of a longer-term programme. • Seeds programmes that seek to restart agricultural production should include enough seeds to plant the areas typically cultivated. • Distributions of agricultural tools to restart production should be based on the typical number of tools used by families. • While the majority of those affected were peasant farmers for whom household maize is a very important food source, some families lived largely from other

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activities and had relatively small plots. Providing some assistance in cash would have better assisted these households. • Assistance to vulnerable individuals should take account of the fact that they may never be able to improve on the initial assistance provided. • Even when vulnerable individuals are included in general programmes, they may not be able to benefit due to problems of access etc.

9.5 Programming Issues • Access was the principle factor in deciding how much assistance communities got. Work on transport links by DEC agencies to ensure access for relief had a broader economic impact. • Addressing sustainability can increase the efficiency of spending on infrastructure projects. Where new water sources are supplied, agencies need to invest in maintenance systems to increase their capacity proportionately. • Beneficiaries have lots of other demands on their time after a disaster and may be hard pressed to provide a labour contribution. • Disasters provide opportunities as well as threats (e.g. improved sweet-potato promotion and Aids education in TACs). The collection of large numbers of people in temporary accommodation provides a ready audience for social promotion and education campaigns. • Transport cost escalation is to be expected when transport infrastructure is damaged in disasters. • If men have to travel to find work, paying them to work on their own house may be more appropriate than simply passing the job to women. • Irregular food deliveries can significantly increase the cost of distributing food. • It is appropriate to promote health education to combat the risk of accelerated AIDS transmission that the social disruption caused by disasters may bring. • It is good practice to provide a water point at school sites as well as latrines. • The construction of schools with thatch (which has to be replaced every year) is a significant burden on the children’s families and results in some children being withheld from school. Replacing these with permanent structures can increase attendance. • The longer the delay in distribution the less useful fixed kits are, and the more useful cash is. • The low quality of many local contractors is a source of risk that needs to be well managed. • When providing a part improvement to traditional technologies, the impact of the improvement on other aspects of the technology also needs to be considered (you need cement plastered walls if the new roofing you introduce does not protect the walls with an overhang). • Military humanitarian operations consume large amounts of funds, some of which might otherwise be available as donor funding for NGOs.

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9.6 Funding Agencies • Funders need to assess the capacity of their partners as well as the overall needs in a situation. • Funders need to respond to assessments made by their partners to develop their relationships. • Even where partners have weak management capacity, it is still possible to deliver good quality programmes by reinforcing them in key skills areas. • It is appropriate for funding agencies to spend DEC funds to place Project Accompaniers in the field to support and monitor their partners.

9.7 Programme Monitoring • Monitoring data should be disaggregated on gender, age, and vulnerability status, even for general programmes. • Monitoring needs to be carefully managed and only as much data as can be processed should be collected. • Monitoring of other agencies by agencies with a specialist sector or deep geographical knowledge may be a very efficient use of resources. • Tying monitoring into the original logic framework allows significant opportunities for learning. • Providing more information about programmes to beneficiaries and providing them with agency contact details, will allow them to monitor what the agency is actually doing.

9.8 Programme Management • Many DEC agencies have financial systems that are inadequate for the effective management of emergency funds. • Several DEC agencies had to set up parallel accounting systems to track spending. This raises questions about the accuracy of the accounts submitted to the DEC. It would be good practice for agency financial reports to the DEC to be certified by the finance professional responsible for preparing them. • The DEC agencies need to improve internal processes to make them faster and more efficient. • It might be useful for DEC agencies in the UK to share their emergency response management models and experience.

9.9 Co-ordination • Effective on-the-ground co-ordination between DEC agencies can give them a stronger voice when negotiating with the UN, donors, and government. • New emergency co-ordination structures should fit into the existing co- ordination structures as much as possible.

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9.10 DEC Procedures • DEC agencies are not always fully aware of the reporting requirement. • DEC funding periods should end on the last day of the calendar month. • Delegating disbursement authority offered a number of advantages to the DEC Secretariat but can only be used when all the opting-in agencies have the opportunity to participate. • Even when disasters affect a whole region it may still be more appropriate for an appeal to concentrate on one country as this makes the message clearer and may result in a better response to the appeal. • Providing a DEC facilitator at the start of an emergency to brief agencies could help to promote field co-operation between the DEC agencies. • The appeal presented an image to the public of the UK agencies working together to raise funds, and this was helpful from a marketing viewpoint. • The creation of the DEC agency group added value to the DEC agency response. • The DEC appeal raised the profile of the Mozambique Floods and this raised the response by supporters outside of the appeal. • The DEC evaluation gives the agencies a chance to learn from each other’s mistakes and best practice but it focuses on accountability to the resource providers rather than to those to whom assistance is provided. • The DEC needs a mechanism to incorporate individual agency learning into the broader evaluation. • The DEC funding was more flexible than donor funding and allowed agencies to tailor their response to changing beneficiary needs during the operation. The DEC funds were not subject to overnight changes in policy as were donor funds. • The DEC needs a rule to allow the carry-forward of small amounts of funding from one expenditure period to another. • Retrospective funding allowed the DEC to more closely match funding to in- country capacity.

9.11 Standards • DEC agencies do not have any systems for monitoring their compliance with the Code of Conduct. • Health and Safety practices in the field are an area in need of attention by DEC agencies. Ideally these should not differ from the agency practice in the UK. • Humanitarian assistance is distinguishable from development by considering where assistance: • is available to all in accordance with their need • is available at the earliest possible opportunity

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• People who do things that the government disapprove of are just as eligible for humanitarian assistance as those who follow government policy.

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Index for main report

Access, 3, 15, 17, 22, 25, 26, 33, 34, 35, Code of Conduct, 6, 14, 18, 20, 21, 23, 50, 52, 54, 56, 60, 69, 84, 85, 86 30, 35, 37, 38, 53, 57, 65, 77, 80, 82, 83, 85, 88 ActionAid, 11, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 36, 40, 44, 55, 56, Concern, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 72, 73, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 40, 41, 44, 74, 75, 76, 77, 82 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 62, 63, 68, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 93 Advocacy, 31, 39, 46, 69, 70, 80, 81 Co-ordination, 5, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, AFP, 93 70, 71, 81, 87 BBC, 10, 25, 93 Customs, 20, 21, 43, 65, 67 Bed-nets, 34, 35, 36, 44, 49, 93 CVM, 62 Beira, 16, 54, 68 Cyclone, 10, 26, 29, 36, 57 Blankets, 16, 19, 24 Cyclone Eline, 10 Botswana, 53 Deaths, 10, 12, 34, 53, 54 Bridge, 10, 26, 50 DFID, 22, 65, 72 British Red Cross, 11, 17, 21, 24, 45, Disaster, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 17, 21, 52, 54, 57, 62, 64, 67, 72, 73, 75, 81, 30, 34, 36, 39, 43, 45, 46, 47, 49, 53, 93 65, 66, 69, 80, 84, 86, 88 Buzi, 10, 29, 30 Divinhe, 54, 67 CAFOD, 11, 15, 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 30, DoD, 93 31, 36, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 52, 55, 57, 59, 62, 64, 73, 74, 80, 81 DPCCN, 66 CCM, 16, 21, 22, 24, 30, 33, 45, 51, 52, Education, 3, 10, 20, 25, 29, 30, 35, 36, 54, 56, 58, 62, 67 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 72, 75, 81, 86, 93 Chiaquelane, 26, 82 Expatriates, 4, 41, 46, 80 Chibuto, 32 FAO, 22 Chickens, 28, 59, 67 Food, 2, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, Chiloane, 29 34, 65, 85, 93 Chókwè, 23, 25, 29, 34, 40, 41, 45, 48, Frelimo, 54 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 58, 59, 63, 64, 68 Gaza, 15, 16, 29, 34, 35, 36, 54, 55 Cholera, 25, 49 GDP, 59 Christian Aid, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, Govuro, 31 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, Guija, 23, 43, 54, 58 54, 55, 56, 58, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 74, 77, 81 Gwara, 31, 49 Clothing, 24, 35, 48, 50 Handpumps, 29, 81 Health, 3, 4, 6, 10, 15, 17, 22, 25, 26, 29, 31, 34, 35, 38, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48,

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49, 51, 57, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 73, 86, Mosquito, 3, 20, 25, 34, 35, 44, 51, 55, 88 62, 81 Health and safety, 4, 38, 43, 44, 46, 47, MSF, 39, 93 88 National Malaria Control Programme, Helicopters, 10, 14, 15, 17, 23, 38, 50, 34, 35, 36 68 NGO, 16, 25, 27, 39, 54, 63, 64, 68, 70, Help Age International, 15, 17, 25, 30, 75 39, 56, 57, 58, 62 Nova, 14, 16, 24, 26, 50, 58, 59, 60 Hygiene Education, 29 Nutrition, 2, 6, 12, 15, 16, 22, 24, 26, IFRC, 17, 20, 54, 62, 65, 68, 73, 81 49, 84, 93 Incomati, 10, 25, 26 OECD, 93 INGC, 5, 16, 65, 66, 67, 70 OSC, 72 Inhambane, 29, 36, 43, 55, 57 OSOCC, 65 ITN, 10 Oxfam, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, JLOC, 65 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, KABP survey, 15, 17 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, Limpopo, 10, 25, 54 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82 LWF, 25, 28, 29, 30, 33, 42, 52, 54, 55, 58, 75 People in Aid, 44, 47 Machanga, 23, 24, 25, 26, 34, 36, 54, RAF, 38 58, 59, 63, 67, 73 Records, 44, 51 Macia, 38 Red Cross, 6, 14, 16, 18, 22, 24, 25, 28, Malaria, 20, 34, 35, 36, 44, 48, 93 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 43, 44, 45, 51, 53, 57, 63, 68, 72, 73, 80, 81 Malawi, 53 Renamo, 54 Mambone, 14, 16, 24, 26, 50, 58, 59, 60 Resettlement, 3, 5, 6, 14, 18, 21, 24, 27, Manhiça, 15, 16, 58, 64, 67 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 43, 48, 56, 58, Manica, 54, 58 62, 66, 70, 80, 81, 84 Maputo, 2, 5, 10, 16, 28, 31, 39, 40, 42, Road Transport, 66 49, 50, 59, 66, 67, 69, 70, 93 Roads, 10, 12, 15, 16, 23, 25, 26, 31, 38, Meetings, 30, 33, 39, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 42, 43, 50, 62, 81 81, 82 Roll Back Malaria, 40 Merlin, 16, 24, 25, 27, 29, 34, 35, 40, SAAF, 10 49, 51, 54, 62, 64, 68, 69, 76 SANDF, 38, 39, 93 MERLIN, 11 Save River, 68 Missing, 18 Save the Children, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, MoD, 38 21, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 40, 41, Morbidity, 3, 34, 49, 52, 82, 93 42, 43, 44, 50, 52, 55, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 68, 73, 75, 80 Mortality, 3, 12, 34, 49, 52, 93 Search and Rescue, 3, 10, 23, 43, 57

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Shelter, 3, 6, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, USAID, 54, 72 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 50, 52, 56, Wat/San, 3, 6, 11, 22, 25, 26, 29, 38, 48, 58, 65, 66, 67, 80, 82 49, 65, 68, 81 SNV, 69 WFP, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 39, 43, 52, 57, Sofala, 16, 17, 28, 33, 34, 36, 50, 51, 54, 58, 65, 69, 93 59, 67, 93 WHO, 65 South Africa, 10, 28, 38, 42, 53 Wind, 32 Sphere, 6, 48, 56, 66, 80, 81, 82, 83 World Vision, 11, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, Swaziland, 53 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 43, 50, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59, 62, TAC, 26, 82 63, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 77, 80 Tanzania, 34, 35, 63, 93 Xai-Xai, 29, 32, 34, 41, 49, 58, 59, 62, UN, 10, 16, 45, 65, 66, 69, 70, 87 63 UNDAC, 65, 70 Zambézia, 70 UNDP, 65 Zambia, 53 UNICEF, 22, 26, 34, 35, 65, 81 Zimbabwe, 53, 59, 60 US, 38

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References

1 Austin, M. (2000) Would we care without a tide of TV images? The Sunday Times. 5- 3-2000. London. 2 OECD/DAC (1999) Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, OECD, Paris, and referenced to: Minnear, L. (1994) The International Relief System: A Critical Review" paper presented to the Parallel National Intelligence Estimate on Global Humanitarian Emergencies, Meridian International Centre, Washington DC, September 22. 3 Interview with Agency Headquarters. 4 AFP (2000)- Thousands of Mozambican children malnourished following floods – AFP, Maputo, March 31, 2000. 5 WFP - (2000) EMOP MOZ- 6225.00: Assistance to Flood Victims in Southern and Central Mozambique 24/02/00 – WFP Maputo. 6 Bohumil Drasar professor of bacteriology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine quoted in BBC online: Monday, 28 February, 2000, 19:26 GMT Mozambique flood: the threat of disease 7 Concern (2000). Phase 1 Report to the DEC – 2001 – Concern, Maputo 8 Pinney, A (2000). Agricultural Rehabilitation Assessment Sofala Province, Mozambique. BRCS, London. 9 Pinney, A (2000). Agricultural Rehabilitation Assessment Sofala Province, Mozambique. BRCS, London. 10 MSF/Cellula Intra Seccões (1996). Food Security Survey April/August 1966. MSF/CIS, Maputo. 11 Interviews with school principals and DEC agency staff in Mozambique. 12 Interview with agency staff. 13 D’Alessandro U, Olaleye BO, McGuire W, et al. (1995). Mortality and morbidity from malaria in Gambian children after introduction of an impregnated bed- net programme. Lancet 1995; 345: 479-83. 14 Armstong-Schellenberg JRM, Abdulla S, Nathan R, et al. (2001) Effect of large- scale social marketing of insecticide-treated nets on child survival in rural Tanzania. Lancet 2001; 357: 1241-47. 15 McGrory, D. & Dynes, M. (2000) Charities delayed by airport chaos. The Times 8-3- 2000, London 16 The Select Committee on International Development (2000), Fifth Report, The Stationary Office Ltd, London. 17 Bacon, K. (2000), DefenseLINK News: DoD News Briefing Tuesday, March 28, 2000 2:02 p.m. EST, United States Department of Defence, Washington. 18 SANDF (2000), Operation Lichi: Flood Aid in Mozambique Bulletin 26/2000, SANDF. 19Interviews with DEC agency staff

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20 Interviews with DEC agency staff. 21 IFRC (2000) Mozambique: Volunteers to the rescue. IFRC, Geneva. USAID (2000). Southern Africa Cyclone Hudah Fact Sheet #3 (FY 2000), USAID, Washington. 22 Hallam, A. (1998) Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance programmes in Complex Emergencies. Relief and Rehabilitation Network, ODI, London 23 Emergency Disaster Events Database (EM-DAT) from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED), Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. http://www.cred .be/emdat. 24 Gaudrault, M. (2000) Impact assessment, Machanga district, Sofala province. World Vision, Maputo. 25 AIM (1999) Aim Reports No 160, 22nd June 1999, AIM, Maputo. 26 Interviews with Government officials. 27 FEWS (2000), FEWS Mozambique Food Security Update: September 2000, USAID Famine Early Warning System. 28 Interviews with DEC agencies 29 Various BRCS reports and Agency HQ interviews

Volume One: Main Findings Valid International and ANSA Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of

DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds March to December 2000 Volume Two: Appendices

This evaluation is published in two volumes, of which this is the second. Volume one contains the main findings of the evaluation including the executive summary. Volume two contains the appendices including the detailed beneficiary study and the summaries of the activities of the DEC agencies. Each agency summary looks at key issues relating to the performance of the agencies as well as presenting general data about their programme. The executive summary has also been published as a stand- alone document.

Independent evaluation conducted by Valid International and ANSA Valid, 3 Kames Close Oxford, OX4 3LD UK Tel: +44 1865 395810 Email: [email protected] http://www.validinternational.org

© 2001 Disasters Emergency Committee

52 Great Portland Street London, W1W 7HU Tel: +44 20 758 06550 Fax: +44 20 7580 2854 Website: http://www.dec.org.uk Further details about this and other DEC evaluations can be found at the DEC website. Evaluation of DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Page 2

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the more than four hundred people who gave their time to answer the evaluation team’s questions. Special thanks are due for the full and generous assistance received from the DEC agencies in Mozambique during the evaluation. Not only did the evaluation team receive full and detailed answers to their many questions, but also received the full assistance of the DEC agencies in visiting many project sites throughout the county.

Evaluation Data Sheet

Title: Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds – March to December 2000 Client: Disasters Emergency Committee http://www.dec.org.uk Date: 23 July 2001

Total pages: 129. PDF version has 130 pages including cover.

Filename: Volume Two

Version: 1.03

Team leader and John Cosgrave [email protected] principal author http://www.interworkseurope.com Team members Kerry Selvester (ANSA) [email protected] Lourdes Fidalgo (ANSA) [email protected] Alistair Hallam [email protected] Sociologist Nelia Taimo [email protected] Manager Alistair Hallam [email protected] Peer reviewers Peter Wiles [email protected] Margaret McEwan [email protected] Steve Collins [email protected] ANSA Associação de Nutrição e Segurança Alimentar (Food Security and Nutrition Association) CP 373, Maputo, Mozambique Valid International: Valid International Ltd [email protected] http://www.validinternational.org

Cover photograph courtesy of Associated Press Photo.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... 2 Table of Contents...... 3 Appendix 1: Acronyms used ...... 8 Appendix 2: Terms of Reference: Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of Dec Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds...... 13 A2.01 Background...... 13 A2.02 Main purpose of the evaluation...... 13 A2.03 Specific Issues for Consideration...... 15 A2.04 Method ...... 16 A2.05 The Report ...... 17 A2.06 Evaluation team and timeframe ...... 18 A2.07 Tenders and Evaluation Management...... 18 A2.08 Further information...... 19 Appendix 3: Beneficiary Study...... 20 A3.01 Introduction...... 20 A3.02 Description of the aid offered by organisations ...... 21 A3.03 Methodology ...... 22 A3.04 Results of the fieldwork ...... 23 A3.05 Opinions on the aid received ...... 26 A3.06 The worst moments of the floods...... 28 A3.07 The best moment during the floods...... 29 A3.08 The Future...... 29 A3.09 Conclusions...... 29 Appendix 4: Emergency context ...... 32 A4.01 Mozambique: the country ...... 32 A4.02 Context: the floods...... 33 Appendix 5: Chronology ...... 36 Appendix 6: ActionAid: Summary of activities ...... 45 A6.01 Context...... 45 A6.02 ActionAid’s Approach...... 45 A6.03 The ActionAid Network ...... 45 A6.04 ActionAid’s response to the Floods...... 45 A6.05 ActionAid’s DEC-funded activities ...... 46

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A6.06 Financial Summary...... 47 A6.07 Where ActionAid stood out ...... 48 A6.08 Areas needing attention...... 48 A6.09 ActionAid’s plans for the future ...... 48 A6.10 Recommendation to ActionAid Management ...... 49 Appendix 7: BRCS: Summary of activities ...... 50 A7.01 Context...... 50 A7.02 BRCS’s Approach ...... 50 A7.03 The BRCS Network...... 50 A7.04 BRCS’s response to the Floods ...... 51 A7.05 BRCS’s DEC-funded activities ...... 51 A7.06 Financial Summary...... 52 A7.07 Where BRCS stood out...... 53 A7.08 Areas needing attention...... 53 A7.09 BRCS’s plans for the future...... 54 A7.10 Recommendation to BRCS Management...... 54 Appendix 8: CAFOD: Summary of activities...... 55 A8.01 Context...... 55 A8.02 CAFOD’s Approach ...... 55 A8.03 The CAFOD Network...... 55 A8.04 CAFOD’s response to the Floods ...... 55 A8.05 CAFOD’s DEC-funded activities ...... 56 A8.06 Financial Summary...... 57 A8.07 Where CAFOD stood out...... 58 A8.08 Areas needing attention...... 58 A8.09 CAFOD’s plans for the future...... 58 A8.10 Recommendation to CAFOD Headquarters...... 58 Appendix 9: Christian Aid: Summary of activities...... 60 A9.01 Context...... 60 A9.02 Christian Aid’s Approach...... 60 A9.03 The Christian Aid Network ...... 61 A9.04 Christian Aid’s response to the floods...... 61 A9.05 Christian Aid’s DEC-funded activities...... 61 A9.06 Financial Summary...... 62 A9.07 Where Christian Aid stood out ...... 63

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A9.08 Areas needing attention...... 63 A9.09 Christian Aid’s plans for the future ...... 64 A9.10 Recommendation to Christian Aid management ...... 64 Appendix 10: Concern: Summary of activities ...... 65 A10.01 Context ...... 65 A10.02 Concern’s Approach ...... 65 A10.03 The Concern Network...... 65 A10.04 Concern’s response to the Floods...... 65 A10.05 Concern’s DEC-funded activities ...... 66 A10.06 Financial Summary ...... 67 A10.07 Where Concern stood out ...... 68 A10.08 Areas needing attention ...... 69 A10.09 Concern’s plans for the future...... 69 A10.10 Recommendation to Concern Management...... 69 Appendix 11: HelpAge International: Summary of activities ...... 70 A11.01 Context ...... 70 A11.02 HelpAge International’s Approach ...... 70 A11.03 The HelpAge International Network...... 71 A11.04 HelpAge International’s DEC-funded activities ...... 71 A11.05 Financial Summary ...... 72 A11.06 Where HelpAge stood out...... 73 A11.07 Areas needing attention ...... 73 A11.08 HelpAge’s plans for the future ...... 73 A11.09 Recommendation to HelpAge Management...... 73 Appendix 12: Merlin: Summary of activities...... 74 A12.01 Context ...... 74 A12.02 Merlin’s Approach...... 74 A12.03 The Merlin Network ...... 75 A12.04 Merlin’s response to the Floods ...... 75 A12.05 Merlin’s DEC funded activities...... 75 A12.06 Financial Summary ...... 76 A12.07 Where Merlin stood out...... Error! Bookmark not defined. A12.08 Areas needing attention ...... 77 A12.09 Merlin’s plans for the future ...... 77 A12.10 Recommendation to Merlin Management ...... 78

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Appendix 13: Oxfam GB: Summary of activities...... 79 A13.01 Context ...... 79 A13.02 Oxfam’s Approach...... 79 A13.03 The Oxfam Network ...... 79 A13.04 Oxfam’s response to the Floods...... 80 A13.05 Oxfam’s DEC-funded activities...... 80 A13.06 Financial Summary ...... 84 A13.07 Where Oxfam stood out ...... 85 A13.08 Areas needing attention ...... 86 A13.09 Oxfam’s plans for the future ...... 87 A13.10 Recommendation to Oxfam Management ...... 87 Appendix 14: Save the Children: Summary of activities ...... 88 A14.01 Context ...... 88 A14.02 Save the Children ’s Approach...... 88 A14.03 The Save the Children Network ...... 88 A14.04 Save the Children ’s response to the Floods...... 89 A14.05 Save the Children ’s DEC-funded activities...... 89 A14.06 Financial Summary ...... 91 A14.07 Where Save the Children stood out ...... 92 A14.08 Areas needing attention ...... 92 A14.09 Save the Children ’s plans for the future ...... 94 A14.10 Recommendations to Save the Children Management...... 94 Appendix 15: Tearfund: Summary of activities ...... 95 A15.01 Context ...... 95 A15.02 Tearfund’s Approach ...... 95 A15.03 The Tearfund Network...... 95 A15.04 Tearfund’s response to the Floods ...... 96 A15.05 Tearfund’s DEC-funded activities ...... 96 A15.06 Financial Summary ...... 97 A15.07 Where Tearfund stood out...... 98 A15.08 Areas needing attention ...... 98 A15.09 Tearfund’s plans for the future...... 99 A15.10 Recommendation to Tearfund Management...... 99 Appendix 16: World Vision: Summary of activities...... 100 A16.01 Context ...... 100

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A16.02 World Vision’s Approach ...... 100 A16.03 The World Vision Network...... 100 A16.04 World Vision’s response to the Floods ...... 100 A16.05 World Vision’s DEC-funded activities ...... 101 A16.06 Financial Summary ...... 102 A16.07 Where World Vision stood out ...... 103 A16.08 Areas needing attention ...... 103 A16.09 World Vision’s plans for the future...... 104 A16.10 Recommendations to World Vision Management...... 104 Appendix 17: Methodology ...... 105 A17.01 Overall Methods ...... 105 A17.02 Fieldwork ...... 105 A17.03 Headquarter Interviews...... 107 A17.04 Peer review...... 107 A17.05 The reference database ...... 107 Appendix 18: Persons met ...... 110 A18.01 Initial Fieldwork...... 110 A18.02 Headquarter Interviews...... 116 A18.03 Second Fieldwork...... 117 A18.04 Beneficiary Assessment...... 121 Appendix 19: Index of Appendices ...... 124 Appendix 20: References for Volume 2 ...... 129

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Appendix 1: Acronyms used

The meaning of acronyms used in the report and in the background documents:

Acronym Meaning AA ActionAid ACF Action Contre la Faim: Action Against Hunger ACRIDEC Associação Cristão para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário: Christian Association for Community Development ACT Action by Churches Together ADC Associação para Desenvolvimento Comunitário: Community Development Association AdeM Águas de Maputo: The Maputo Water Company ADPP Acção de Desenvolvimento de Povo ao Povo, (formerly Ajuda Dinamarquesa de Povo ao Povo): Development Action (formerly Danish Aid) from People to People ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency ADS Associação para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável: Association for Sustainable Development AEM Associação Evangélica de Moçambique: Mozambique Evangelical Association AFP Agence France-Presse AMDU Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento Urbano: Mozambican Association for Urban Development AP Associated Press APOSEMO Associação dos Aposentados de Moçambique: Mozambique Retired Association ARA Administração Regional das Águas: Regional Water Authority ARA-SUL Administração Regional das Águas- Sul: Southern Region Water Authority BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BHR Bureau for Humanitarian Response BRCS British Red Cross Society CA Christian Aid CAFOD Catholic Fund for Overseas Development CBC Canadian Broadcasting Corporation CCGC Conselho Coordenador De Gestão De Calamidades: Disaster Management Co-ordination Council CCM Conselho Cristão de Moçambique: The Christian Council of

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Acronym Meaning Mozambique CDC Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta CDM Caritas, Dioceses de Maputo: Maputo Dioceses Caritas CEDES Comité Ecuménico para o Desenvolvimento Social: Ecumenical Committee for Social Development CHAD Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, UK Department for International Development (DFID) Concern Concern Worldwide CRED Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters CSB Corn/Soya Blend CVM Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique: Mozambique Red Cross DEC Disasters Emergency Committee DFA Department for Foreign Affairs DFID UK Department for International Development (replaced the Overseas Development Administration - ODA) DNA Direcção Nacional de Águas: National Directorate of Water DoD United States Department of Defense DPCCN Departamento de Prevenção e Control de Calamidades Naturais: The Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Disasters DPOPH Direcção Provincial de Obras Públicas e Habitação: Provincial Directorate of Public Works and Housing DPS Direcção Provincial de Saúde. Provincial Directorate for Health DRT Disaster Response Team (Tearfund’ s direct implementation arm) ENSO El Niño Southern Oscillation EPC Emergency Programme Co-ordinator (Oxfam) EPRO European Partnership of Relief Organisations EU European Union EVI Extremely Vulnerable Individual ExCom Executive Committee (of DEC) FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN) FDC Fundo de Desenvolvimento Comunitário: Community Development Fund FFW Food-for-work FHI Food for the Hungry International Frelimo Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: Mozambique Liberation Front – the ruling party since 1975

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Acronym Meaning GACOPI Gabinete de Coordenação de Projectos de Investmentos: Office for the co-ordination of investment projects GDP Gross Domestic Product GIEWS Global Information and Early Warning System (FAO) GIS Geographical Information System GNP Gross National Product GoM Government of Mozambique GTZ German Technical Co-operation (German Development Quango) HA Humanitarian Assistance HAST Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (US DoD term) HelpAge HelpAge International Hyg. Ed. Hygiene Education ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent IMF International Monetary Fund. Part of the World Bank group INGC Instituto Nacional de Governance des Calamidades: The National Disaster Management Institute

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation IOCC International Orthodox Christian Charities IPM Igrega Presbiteriano de Moçambique: Presbyterian Church of Mozambique ITN Independent Television News JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Centre JTF Joint Task Force KAPB Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices, and Behaviour LINK NGO forum in Maputo with 180 members LLDC Least-Developed Countries group - United Nations classification for the poorest countries LWF Lutheran World Federation MCC Mennonite Central Committee MCL Ministério Centro De Louvor: Centre for Praise Ministry MDM Médecins du Monde: Doctors of the World MdS Ministério de Saúde: Ministry of Health MERLIN Medical Emergency Relief International

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Acronym Meaning MoD UK Ministry of Defence MOPH Ministério de Obras Públicas e Habitação: Ministry of Public Works and Housing MOU Memorandum of Understanding MSF Médecins Sans Frontières or Médicos sem Fronteiras: Doctors without Borders Muleide Associação Mulher, Lei e Desenvolvimento: Women's Association for Law and Development NFI Non-food Items NGHA Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agency NGO Non Governmental Organisation, (also referred to as Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) in the US) NLG Dutch Guilder NMCP National Malaria Control Programme NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOVIB Netherlands Organisation for International Development Co- operation (Oxfam International member) OCHA Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OFDA US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance OIKOS A Portuguese NGO (the name is the classical Greek work for a "house," "family," "people," or "nation") OJM Organização da Juventude Moçambicana: –Mozambican Youth Organisation OMM Organisação da Mulher Moçambicana: ORAM Organisação Rural de Ajuda Mútua: Rural Mutual Help Organisation OSC Operational Sub-Committee of DEC OSOCC On-Site Operations Co-ordination Centre PHE Public Health Engineering PHP Public Health Promotion PJA Period of Joint Action PNS Participating National Societies (Red Cross) PSI Population Services International RAF Royal Air Force Rapid Rescue and Preparedness in Disasters (UK NGO) RBM Roll Back Malaria

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Acronym Meaning RC Red Cross RedR Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief Renamo Resistência Nacional Moçambicana: Mozambican National Resistance RFA Royal Fleet Auxiliary (composed of ships, such as fuel tankers and re-supply ships that support Royal Navy operations) RNLI Royal National Lifeboat Institution SA South Africa SANDF South African National Defence Force SARNET South African Roots and Tubers Network SC Save the Children SCHR Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response SNV Quasi-governmental Dutch development agency. STD Sexually Transmitted Disease TAC Temporary Accommodation Centre: Sites where flood victims were temporarily accommodated. Ranged from public buildings to camps for the displaced UGC União Geral das Cooperativas: General Union of Co-operatives. UN United Nations UNAC União Nacional de Camponeses: National Peasants Union (font) UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination UNDP United Nations Development Program UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund US United States of America USAID United States Agency for International Development VUKOXA Not a direct acronym. VUKOXA is a volunteer organisation serving the elderly Watsan Water and Sanitation WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organisation WV World Vision ZW Zimbabwe

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Appendix 2: Terms of Reference: Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of Dec Mozambique Floods Appeal Funds

(18/04/2000 – Approved)

A2.01 Background Around 8th February 2000, Mozambique, one of the world’s poorest countries, suffered its worst floods for half a century. Following the unusually heavy rains over the region and the tropical storms that accompanied cyclones Connie and Eline, hundreds of square miles around the Limpopo and Save river basins were left under water, with hundreds of thousands of people homeless and at risk. The Mozambique Government estimated that up to 1 million people had been affected with hundreds feared dead. Overwhelmed by the devastation it appealed to the international community for assistance. The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) is a UK charity which launches and co- ordinates a National Appeal in response to a major disaster overseas. It brings together a unique alliance of aid, corporate, public and broadcasting sector services to rally compassion and ensure that funds raised go to those amongst its fourteen UK member aid agencies best placed to bring effective and timely relief. DEC agencies have been present in Mozambique for many years working directly or supporting local partners. The DEC ‘Mozambique Floods Appeal’ was launched on 2nd March 2000. To date, the appeal has generated some £20m pooled funds to be disbursed to the 11 DEC agencies participating in the appeal. These funds are supporting activities in: search and rescue; water and sanitation; food aid; medicine and health care; clothing and household items; shelter and housing; seeds and tools etc (see Appendix 2 for summary of agencies’ activities and locations). There will be an initial nine-month expenditure period following the launch of this appeal, during which participating agencies will have access to a pre-determined share of pooled appeal funds (see Appendix 1 for summary of disbursement shares). Participating agencies will submit a ‘Final Declaration of Expenditure’ reports in the tenth month following the launch. DEC rules require an independent evaluation of the expenditure of appeal funds. This provides an important mechanism for DEC transparency and accountability to fundraising partners and the British public. Evaluation also enables DEC agencies to extend individual and collective learning on good-practice in response to humanitarian emergencies. The final report will be made public on completion of the evaluation.

A2.02 Main purpose of the evaluation To provide independent assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the DEC- funded responses following the Mozambique floods.

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A2.02.1 APPROPRIATENESS • Were assessments undertaken appropriate to identification of need? Were the actions undertaken appropriate in the context of the needs of the affected population and the context in which the agencies were operating? Was sufficient attention given to the identification of clear objectives and activities that would ensure objectives were met? • Was the assistance appropriate in relation to the customs and practices of the affected population? • To what extent were potential and actual beneficiaries consulted as to their perceived needs and priorities? What was the level of beneficiary involvement in project design, implementation and monitoring? How effective and appropriate were these processes in ensuring relevant and timely project delivery in support of the most needy and vulnerable? • Was the assistance provided in a timely manner?

A2.02.2 EFFICIENCY • Were resources used efficiently? For instance, were more expensive forms of response (such as air transport) used longer than was necessary? Would greater investment in preparedness measures have resulted in more effective and less costly responses?

A2.02.3 IMPACT • What direct and indirect evidence is available that the action taken contributed to the reduction of mortality, morbidity and suffering and that the affected population was assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and livelihoods? In the absence of much baseline data, it is suggested this might best be measured against the level of satisfaction of beneficiaries and their perception of appropriateness and effectiveness of the response. • What systems or indicators did agencies use to evaluate the effectiveness of their work?

A2.02.4 COVERAGE • Was DEC assistance provided to all major population groups facing life- threatening situations? • What efforts were made to ensure that particular populations, vulnerable groups and areas were not overlooked? • Were beneficiaries correctly and fairly identified and targeted?

A2.02.5 CONNECTEDNESS • Was the assistance provided in a way that took account of the longer-term context? • Did the assistance seek to strengthen the capacity of local agencies and personnel?

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A2.02.6 COHERENCE • What steps were taken by participating agencies to ensure their responses were co-ordinated with each other and with other humanitarian agencies? • Were other actions, such as advocacy work, undertaken by the member agencies to complement their immediate relief actions? These criteria take into account 'standard' evaluation questions, and also reflect the DEC's Objective, the NGO/Red Cross Code of Conduct and those disaster response objectives of DEC member agencies that are broadly shared. Thus, objectives such as achieving a co-ordinated response, ensuring that relief activities take account of longer-term considerations and that the capacity of local organisations and personnel is strengthened during the response, are explicitly included in the criteria. Following the field visits the evaluation team should be in a position to comment on the adequacy of management, accounting, monitoring and reporting processes of the DEC agencies and their field-level partners. They should also be able to comment on the key constraints that affected the DEC supported programs, and how the different DEC agencies dealt with them.

A2.03 Specific Issues for Consideration • What was the added value of DEC appeal funds in the context of the overall humanitarian response? Did DEC funds facilitate a quick response? • Was gender considered in the agencies’ emergency assessments? Did relief provision include special components for women and, if so, were these systematically monitored? • Were the special needs of acute vulnerable groups (e.g. children/elderly/disabled etc) considered in the agencies’ emergency assessments and were they consulted in the same way as other groups? Did relief provision include special components for them and if so were these appropriate and systematically monitored? • Did the response of the DEC agencies strengthen and complement the response of local organisations and coping mechanisms, or hinder them? • What was the level of co-operation in the field? Could more have been done to help improve the effectiveness of DEC agencies’ responses in terms of co- ordination, joint-logistics, communications packages, and information flows between the key relief players? • Was there appropriate geographical coverage within the affected region? • To what extent did responses reflect lessons-learned from previous flood disasters? • To what extent did the DEC agencies’ limited involvement in ‘search & rescue’ and the difficulties around transport affect the impact of the DEC funded response? The evaluation team is requested to dedicate one section of the final evaluation report to this issue.

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A2.04 Method Participating DEC agencies are required to submit the following material (in both hard copy and electronic format) to the Secretariat to assist the evaluation team’s work: • a summary chronology • key documents on the agency's response to the emergency and their use of DEC funds - e.g. ‘48 Hour Plan of Action’; ‘4 Week Plan of Action’. • names, contact details and roles during the response of key agency and partner personnel in the head office and in the relevant field offices. • List of indicators used by the agencies to monitor and evaluate their DEC funded activities. The Secretariat will prepare a package of materials on each participating agency to be given to the evaluation team, as well as minutes of appeal related decision-making meetings – e.g. decision to appeal; decision to extend/reduce the period of joint action; decisions affecting DEC rules governing appeals. The evaluation team will begin with a review of available documentation. The evaluation team will be responsible for ensuring appropriate data-collection is undertaken in the field following their appointment, so that key information, that may no longer be available in the later stage of the DEC funded response, is not lost to the evaluation process. Following submission of DEC agencies’ ‘10th Month Declaration of Expenditure’ reports, member(s) of the evaluation team will visit the head office of each participating agency to undertake interviews and collect and review supplementary documentation. Evaluators should be allowed full access to relevant files. The schedule of the subsequent fieldwork will be discussed during these visits. Since certain operations will already have closed down by the time the evaluation proper is underway, it will be appropriate to undertake preliminary fieldwork during the expenditure period. The evaluation team’s schedule, accommodation and transport arrangements will be finalised and communicated to the Secretariat and all agencies at least one week prior to any visit. In the field the evaluation team will seek to spend a period with each agency that is roughly proportional to the share of DEC pooled funds received by each agency. During their work the evaluators will fill out the chronology of decisions and actions so as to understand the context and the level of information that was available to the agency in deciding on a particular action. During their time with each agency the team will interview key personnel remaining in-country (contacting others prior to the field visits or on their return) and undertake visits to selected project sites/areas. The field visit must include at least one DEC funded project for each participating agency. The evaluators will have to make extensive use of agency reports and their own preliminary data collection, where later site visits would prove pointless. It should be noted that in the case of agencies that are part of larger organisations UK assistance might not be distinguishable from that of global counterparts, nevertheless, every effort should be made to distinguish DEC funding. As well as interviewing the agencies' project officers, key officials in co-ordinating agencies (e.g. UNICEF, OCHA, central and state governments), and partner agencies, a sample of beneficiaries will be selected and interviewed by the evaluators.

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These interviews will be conducted without agency personnel being present, using interpreters (where necessary) hired directly by the evaluation team. The beneficiaries will be questioned on their views of the assistance provided, the way they were selected and their overall views of the agency. Interviews with individuals may be complemented by discussions with groups of beneficiaries. So as to assess the agency's targeting and beneficiary selection methods the evaluation team will also interview a selection of potential beneficiaries who did not receive assistance. It is expected that the evaluation team will use gender-aware and participatory approaches to seek the views of beneficiaries and, where appropriate, non- beneficiaries. Inclusive techniques will be expected of the evaluators, to seek active participation in the evaluation by members of local emergency committees, staff of implementing partner agencies and member agencies, and representatives of local and central governments. Agencies’ ‘10th Month Declaration of Expenditure’ reports will be examined to assess direct and indirect project costs, and, in conjunction with beneficiary/team assessment of direct and indirect benefits, and to compare the cost-effectiveness of different approaches. The evaluation will be undertaken with due reference to the Red Cross/Red Crescent NGO Code of Conduct, which all agencies have signed. Reference should also be made to the Sphere Standards. Before leaving the country, members of the team will indicate their broad findings to Country Representative and senior staff of each agency and note their comments. A meeting should then be held in London to disseminate a draft report of the evaluation. The report should be circulated one week prior to the workshop to allow for preliminary review by agencies and their partners, and followed by a two-week formal agency comment period. The evaluation team should allow for a follow-up workshop in-country within a month of the release of the final evaluation report. The aim of this workshop will be to discuss the evaluation recommendations and major lessons of the Mozambique floods, and how agencies might seek to implement. It is suggested that participants include UK, regional, and in-country representatives from the agencies and their implementing partners, and other key stakeholders as appropriate.

A2.05 The Report

The evaluation report should consist of: • executive summary and recommendations (not more than six pages) • main text, to include index, emergency context, evaluation methodology, appeal management, commentary and analysis addressing evaluation purpose and outputs to include a section dedicated to the issue of particular lesson- learning focus, conclusions (not more than thirty pages) • appendices, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework, summary of agency activities, sub-team report(s), end notes (where appropriate) and bibliography. (All material collected in the undertaking of the evaluation process should be lodged with the Secretariat prior to termination of the contract)

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A2.06 Evaluation team and timeframe

It is anticipated there will be a core team of at least three people, with others drawn in as necessary. The Team Leader should have a relevant skill and a proven background in emergency evaluations. The appropriate balance of professional and analytical skills amongst the remaining team members should be determined following a preliminary examination of agency activities. It is likely, however, that sector expertise in areas such as water and sanitation, public health and shelter will be required. At least one person from the region should be included in the team that makes the field visits. All team members should be gender aware, and a reasonable gender balance within field teams is desirable. Consultants or independent evaluation teams short-listed in the tendering process should seek DEC approval for any proposed changes to the composition of the team originally submitted. The evaluation timeframe should allow for the circulation of a first draft by early March 2001, followed by presentation of the draft by the evaluation consultant(s) to member agencies a week later. A formal comment period, of at least two weeks, for participating agencies and their partners will then follow. The completion date for the Final Evaluation Report will be 15th April 2001, the consultants having addressed agencies’ comments as appropriate.

A2.07 Tenders and Evaluation Management Tenders should be submitted to the DEC Secretariat by the closing date of 15th May 2000. A maximum 5 page summary should be submitted with appendices of team member CVs (each CV a maximum of 3 pages) and an indication of availability. The DEC may wish to see substantive pieces work or to take up references of short-listed consultants. The final decision on tenders will be taken by the DEC Executive Committee, following short-listing and interviews. Key factors will include: • Provisional framework, methodology, team balance, local experiences, distinctive competencies, timeframe and budget, an appreciation of key constraints and comments on the above terms of reference. • Professionalism of the bid, team experience (professional and analytical), degree of parity with the terms of reference, likelihood of achieving the DEC timetable, and realism not just competitiveness in the cost submission. Tenders will be accepted from “freelance” teams as well as from company, PVO or academic teams. Tenders are particularly welcome from regional teams. Administration and overall co-ordination, including monitoring progress, lies with the DEC Secretariat. The evaluation Team Leader must, from the commencement of the evaluation, submit a weekly report on actual against anticipated progress. The Steering Committee (DEC Operations Sub-Committee) will via the Secretariat undertake to respond to weekly submissions as necessary. In addition, the Team

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Leader should alert the Secretariat immediately if serious problems or delays are encountered. Approval for any significant changes to the evaluation timetable will be referred to the Steering Committee. It is anticipated the selection process will be complete by beginning June 2000.

A2.08 Further information For further information please contact: Jamie McCaul, Executive Secretary Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) 52, Great Portland Street London, W1N 5AH Tel. 44 + (0)171 580 6550 Fax. 44 +(0)171 580 2854 email [email protected] Or visit the DEC’s website: www.dec.org.uk

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Appendix 3: Beneficiary Study

Nelia Taimo, a sociologist based in Mozambique, carried out this independent study in November 2000. As this is an independent study it may contains some recommendations that are at variance with the main report. It has not been edited except or some copy editing and some minor corrections.

A3.01 Introduction In February 2000, the Provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, and Sofala were severely affected by the worst floods in Mozambique in 50 years. To try and resolve the problems caused by these floods, the Government of Mozambique launched an international appeal for aid. Governments around the world responded positively to this appeal, sending funds and personnel to support the emergency effort. The non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that comprise the DEC launched an appeal to the UK public and money was raised for the relief and rehabilitation of the flood victims. This money was divided between the agencies and subsequently used in Mozambique to fund a wide range of programmes. As is customary with DEC appeals, an independent evaluation of the programmes carried out by the agencies was subsequently commissioned. An important requirement of the evaluation was that beneficiaries should be consulted about their impressions of the emergency response. This study represents one of the ways in which the evaluation team consulted beneficiaries. The objective of this study was to analyse the aid from the point of view of the recipients - those people resident in the areas affected by the floods that lost homes, animals, farms, and even family members during the floods. The aim was to hear the opinions of beneficiaries on the aid they received in terms of: • usefulness of the articles received • quality of the same • quantity • timeliness of the aid • suggestions for improvements in other emergencies. The study also offered the opportunity for people to tell their own stories of survival, how they felt, and how they feel in relation to the future. Stories were collected that revealed just how much courage, determination and creativity people needed to survive those difficult days. These stories are told in this report. The report is divided in the following way: • description of the aid given by the organisations • methodology and sampling of the study • results of the study • opinions about the aid received • the worst moments of the floods • the best moments of the floods

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• the future • conclusions.

A3.02 Description of the aid offered by organisationsA The Oxfam programme in Chokwe included activities in the sectors of health and sanitation, water and malaria control. As part of this programme, roads were rehabilitated, wells and latrines were constructed, and education campaigns were conducted on health issues. Many families in the area received a kit, for the construction of latrines, that contained reeds for the walls, wooden posts, and a hammer. At the beginning of the emergency, the target was to provide one latrine for every ten families. At the time of the study each family was in the process of receiving their kits. One of the objectives of the Health Promotion programme was to educate the population in the correct and safe use of latrines. Another was to train people about the safe use and storage of water. As part of this programme each family was distributed with: • a 15-litre bucket for water conservation • two bars of soap. At the time of the floods chlorine was added to the wells in the town and plastic sheeting was distributed for the latrines. Oxfam, in partnership with Caritas, worked together at the start of the emergency distributing tents, buckets, and soap in the camps. The Community Development Fund - Fundo para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade (FDC), a national NGO, received survival kits from Oxfam for distribution. These kits contained capulanas, bowls, sugar, tea, and soap. In Chokwe, World Relief and HelpAge distributed seeds, agricultural instruments, zinc roofing, wooden construction poles, pots and 150,000 Meticais (about £7) to the elderly. In addition, the Nazarene Church donated seven million Meticais (approximately £320) per household, to allow families to purchase construction materials to reconstruct their houses. In Nova Mambone, Save the Children UK (SC -UK)B distributed food from the World Food Programme (WFP) to each family, as well as vegetable seeds, agricultural instruments and tarpaulins for protection. Save the Children donated medicines to the health centres and are in the process of rehabilitating the road through a food- for-work programme. For those schools furthest from the district centre and most severely affected, Save the Children offered kits of school material that contained maps of Mozambique, maps of Africa, footballs, volley balls, staplers, blackboards, rulers, compasses, and

A In Chokwe in the south of Mozambique and in Nova Mambone in the centre of the country, many organisations distributed goods to the affected populations. The populations themselves were not necessarily aware which organisation had provided which goods. The Oxfam monitor in the case of Chokwe and the Save the Children monitor in Nova Mambone helped to distinguish between the different distributions carried out. The same situation did not exist in Machanga where World Vision was practically the only organisation working in the area. B Save the Children (UK) is referred to as Save the Children throughout the report.

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boxes of chalk. They distributed kits for the children that were made up of a school bag, exercise books, pens, pencils, rubbers, and coloured pencils. For the teachers they provided files, paper, and pens. Save the Children also distributed clothes and a nutritious high-energy Corn Soya Blend (CSB) porridge that had been donated by UNICEF to malnourished children and pregnant women. The Save the Children monitors carried out a house-to-house study in June to ascertain the true number of beneficiaries of the food distribution programme. During this study it was possible to verify that the monitors had a very good, clear idea of the families and communities with whom they were working. The following organisations also worked in Nova Mambone: Handicap International, Médicos sem Fronteiras (MSF – Doctors without borders), Conselho Cristão de Moçambique (CCM - the Christian Council of Mozambique), and Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique (CVM- the Mozambique Red Cross). The first three organisations distributed zinc roofing sheets for construction. CCM also constructed houses for affected populations (using local material and zinc roofing), while the Red Cross distributed roof beams and construction poles. In Machanga, World Vision (WV) distributed vegetable seeds (onion, tomato, cabbage, and pumpkin), maize and bean seeds, and agricultural instruments. They also distributed survival kits containing pots, drinking cups, plates, spoons, and capulanas. As far as could be verified by this study, two types of kits were distributed (one comprising six cups and six plates and the other one cup, one plate and one spoon). World Vision also gave medicine to the health centre in Chiloane, as well as opening wells, boreholes and constructing latrines. Action Aid in Manhiça distributed food, seeds, tools, and survival kits and facilitated the building of houses in a new resettlement area. They also built wells, planted fruit and shade trees, and have plans to build a new school in the resettlement area.

A3.03 Methodology One-on-one interviews were carried out with beneficiaries. The interviewer recorded all information in written form. The information was collected in this way for the following reasons: • to allow the people – the majority of whom are illiterate – to express themselves in their own language and their own way • to allow the interviewer to add questions whenever necessary. The four provinces most affected by the floods were selected for the fieldwork. This was carried out with monitors who were familiar with the situation and the community. Decisions about which villages to visit were decided between the interviewer and the field monitors. The following organisations participated in the study: • Action Aid in the district of Manhiça – Province of Maputo • Save the Children – district of Govuro - Province of Inhambane • World Vision - district of Machanga – Province of Sofala • Oxfam UK - district of Chókwè - Province of Gaza The fieldwork was preceded by an analysis of the area, carried out with the support of the relevant NGO project co-ordinator for the area. Information was collected

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about the areas that had received support, the sort of work carried out, and the goods that had been distributed. Following this initial orientation, the interview form was presented to the monitor or activist for translation into the local language. The study tried to be as inclusive as possible and therefore opted to work in areas where access was difficult, in the localities and villages furthest from the centres of the districts. In each locality the interviewer sought to interview at least one person from each of the groups considered to be most vulnerable, namely, the elderly, disabled, female heads of households and families with small children. Generally, the interviews were carried out in a random selection of houses. Exceptions were made, however, to ensure that members of vulnerable groups were also included. Sixty-one interviews were carried out in the locations shown below in Table 1. Table 1 – Numbers of people interviewed by province and sexA Men Women Total Province n % n % N % Gaza 4 25 12 26.7 16 26 Inhambane 2 13 13 28.9 15 25 Manhiça 5 31 12 26.7 17 28 Sofala 5 31 8 17.8 13 21 Total 16 100 45 100 61 100

74% of those interviewed were female and 26% male. 30% of those interviewed were elderly, 13% were widows, and 11% had some form of disability. Eight per cent of the women interviewed did not have husbands. The fieldwork for this study was carried out in November 2001, before the agencies had completed their DEC-funded projects. The findings were used to orient the subsequent fieldwork of the full evaluation team.

A3.04 Results of the fieldwork

A3.04.1 SHELTER The majority of the people interviewed had lost their homes through the floods or because of falling trees. Most had had houses made from traditional material – very few had zinc roofing. The majority of people interviewed had reconstructed some form of shelter, though this could not always be described as a proper house. Often they were small shacks covered with the plastic sheeting or tarpaulin received from the organisations with poles used from their old homes. The majority of interviewees had not managed to build houses with the zinc roofs received, as they did not have the roof beams or the poles for the rest of the construction. Many people said that they did not have money to buy these items. Those elderly beneficiaries who had received a complete kit for reconstruction were often unable to build a house because they did not have any money to pay for the labour and were unable to build one themselves. In some cases the elderly also

A A further dozen or so people were interviewed by Nelia, but have not been included in these figures because these were relatively short interviews that did not cover the full range of questions.

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became the easy victims of robberies, as they were unable to protect themselves due to their physical frailtyA. The houses that were reconstructed with a thatched roof and traditional material for the walls were generally smaller than the ones the families had previously inhabited. Only one of the interviewees, in Nova Mambone, had built a house that was stronger - with thick poles and a high roof – with a view to possible future floods. This interviewee had received a lot of family support, from brothers and his father, to carry out the construction. One of the elderly interviewees, who had built an improved house in Chokwe, confirmed that she had done this with money given by the Nazarene Church, so she was able to chose the best material and also pay for the labour for the house and latrine construction. The house she built had traditional wall material and a zinc roof. The great majority of those interviewed had previously inhabited larger dwellings, and in the majority of cases the families had had more than one house, as the number in each extended family is large. At the time of the study, the majority of those interviewed had constructed some sort of shack (improvised) or had built a small house, resulting in considerable over-crowding.

A3.04.2 FOOD All the people interviewed had received food aid – corn-soya flour, maize, beans, peas, oil, sugar, and sardines - either in the accommodation camps or at home. In the opinion of the majority of the interviewees, the quantity distributed was low and the disorganisation in the camps increased anxiety and hunger, as they were never sure when the next meal was arriving. In Nova Mambone, there were many more complaints of disorganisation than in the other areas. In Chokwe, the opposite was true, with people saying they had never eaten so much before! When asked for an explanation, they reported that during the crisis a lorry arrived from the Church for the Assembly of God and distributed chickens to the affected population for consumption. In terms of the food received at home, people were satisfied and recognised that without the food aid they could not have survived. However, there were complaints that the food distribution had now terminated, before the harvest was in, leaving people very insecure about the future and frightened of the possibility of going hungry again. In Nova Mambone, many of those interviewed found that their farms had become silted over with the river sand and the soil salty due to sea invasion. As a result, planting cannot yet take place. In other areas of the same district, the soil had become sodden and clay-like, making turning with hand tools very difficult. Many people had tried to plant the vegetable seeds and the maize they had been given, but in general the results were poor. In Machanga, people complained that animals, mainly lizards, which had survived the floods, were destroying the planted seeds. In Chokwe, there were no complaints about the seeds or the state of the farm plots.

A HelpAge note that family and community membership played a key role in ensuring the well being of elderly beneficiaries. The HelpAge house construction project depended on the capacity of the family and community to construct houses for vulnerable older people. However, this required close monitoring by HelpAge’s partners.

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In Manhiça, interviewees reported that the soil was still waterlogged, making it difficult to sow all the available land, and that even the areas they had planted ran the risk of destruction if the floods returned. Residents of the new resettlement area in Manhiça also observed that their farms were now distant from their homes (about one and a half hours by foot). For the elderly this was especially difficult; before they had been active in the farms, but now they arrived tired and unable to carry out the work, and did not produce as much as they had previously. Before the floods 67% of the people interviewed had had animals; after the flooding only 13% said that they had animals, and in reduced quantities (one or two ducks, or one goat for example). The majority of the peasant farmers have small livestock, chickens, ducks, goats, and pigs. In Manhiça, families lost goats and pigs that had been part of Action Aid’s development programme. Families with animals Animals Animals before and after floods pre-flood post-flood Province N n % n % LossA Gaza 16 5 31% 1 6% 80% Inhambane 15 9 60% 1 7% 89% Manhiça 17 15 88% 4 24% 73% Sofala 13 12 92% 2 15% 83% Total 61 41 67% 8 13% 80%

A3.04.3 HEALTH The majority of those interviewed said that they had fallen sick, or that one of the members of their family had fallen sick during the emergency period. Children were particularly susceptible. Illnesses most frequently mentioned were malaria, fever, diarrhoea, and pains in the body. One positive aspect was that all mentioned that they had been able to receive treatment and medicines, both in the camps and at the health posts closest to their homes. They considered that the treatment they received was very good, and had particular praise for the volunteers of the Red Cross. However, communities were concerned about malnutrition; the harvest was of uncertain size and not yet brought in from the fields, while food aid distribution had terminated. There remained the possibility of severe food shortages in the future. Communities were concerned about the lack of latrines. In Nova Mambone not one of those interviewed had built a latrine. The reasons given were the high cost in financial, time and energy terms. These were major constraints for women without husbands, widows, and the elderly, who complained about the lack of men to help with these activities. Usually the digging of the pit of the latrine is a man’s job, as it requires significant strength. The situation in Chokwe was much better than in the other provinces, due to Oxfam’s large latrine construction programme. Similar programmes were not found in other provinces. In Sofala, even before the floods, the population did not have latrines.

A The loss figure understates the actual loss as this is the decrease in the number of families with animals and not the number of animals. Families that had animals after the flood complained that they had far less animals than before.

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Families with latrines Latrines Latrines before and after floods pre-flood post-flood Province N n % n % Loss Gaza 16 12 75% 11 69% 8% Inhambane 15 9 60% 0 0% 100% Manhiça 17 8 47% 5 29% 38% Sofala 13 2 15% 1 8% 50% Total 61 31 51% 17 28% 45%

Interviewees talked about their uncertainties for the future, their fear of further floods (many times people spoke of the new floods that were expected within the year). They were therefore concerned that the investments they were making would be wasted.

A3.05 Opinions on the aid received All those interviewed, without exception, said that they were extremely satisfied with the support they received and that they would like to use the opportunity of the interview to express their gratitude to the organisations and the people who offered help in this difficult situation. They said that the aid was very important and saved lives, from the rescues by helicopter to the food and medical care in the camps. The interviewees noted that the best moment during this terrible time was when they started to receive aid and visits from people who were looking at how they were living and suffering. In some districts, for example, Manhiça and Chokwe, beneficiaries said that the aid had not taken long to arrive. However, in other districts, such as Nova Mambone and Machanga (especially Machanga), those interviewed said that they had had to wait a long time for help. But even these people were of the opinion that it was “better late than never”. Also, many of the people interviewed in these areas said that the reason for the later arrival of help was due to the fact that they were surrounded by water and access was extremely difficult; they could only be reached by plane, boat and much later cars. The main work tools distributed were agricultural instruments and some construction material. For this reason some of the material distributed was not very useful to people whose livelihood did not depend on farming. This was particularly true of the fishermen, who had lost boats and nets, and tailors and shoemakers. One of the men interviewed managed to save his sewing machine by putting it in the boat with his family. A traditional doctor in Nova Mambone was devastated, as the floods had destroyed all the vegetation, leaves and roots that he needed for his work; he was therefore unable to work as a healer. The majority of the most vulnerable people interviewed (elderly, disabled people and women with small children) said that they felt they were not given any priority during the floods in relation to others. They were neither the first to receive aid during distribution, nor given increased amounts of aid. One of the elderly in Nova Mambone, who was dressed in rags, said she had not received any clothing at all. On asking the secretary of the locality the reason for this,

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he said that the amount received had been very little, and that there was not enough for everyone. He confirmed that no priority had been given to vulnerable groups. In Chokwe, only one of those interviewed, a disabled person, said she had received special treatment, from the Catholic sisters in the camp. They had cooked for her and helped with other essential tasks (this woman did not have any legs and had lost her wheelchair in the floods). In Nova Mambone, the women and children confirmed that they had received special food for their children. Pregnant and lactating women, and young children received CSB from Save the Children. The most frequent complaints from the interviewees were: • insufficient food - families received the same quantity of food irrespective of the size of the family • insufficient quantities of plates, spoons and cups - the average size of the Mozambican family is six to seven, and is often much larger in rural areas. The areas affected by the floods were predominately rural, with families ranging from eight to 20 people. Yet they still all received kits with six cups, two blankets and two capulanas, obviously not sufficient for the whole family’s needs • lack of clothes, especially children’s clothing. In nearly all of the districts where the interviews took place, those interviewed said they would have liked to have received clothes. Few organisations distributed clothes, and when there were distributions, there were no children’s clothes. During the study, it was easy to observe that people were dressed in rags and that their clothes had been taken in the floods or rotted soon afterwards. Technical staff from Oxfam had recognised at the time of the flooding that there was an urgent need for clothing, but neither they nor the other organisations had managed to distribute any • lack of information. Interviewees complained that they had no information in the camps, and had no idea what the future held. They could not move from one place to another and they never knew when food or other goods were to be distributed • lack of transparency and organisation. Interviewees complained, especially in Chokwe and Nova Mambone, that only the heads of areas (“chefes”), and their families and friends, had access to the goods being delivered. In Chokwe, in particular, interviewees spoke about the leaders of the suburbs who illegally took zinc roofing and survival kits that were subsequently sold in the market place. In Nova Mambone, they spoke of a lack of transparency and illegal transactions in the distribution of roof beams and poles. In Manhiça and Machanga, however, nobody made reference to such issues • aid only helped the farmer. In Machanga, in the locality of Divinhe, 100 km from the centre of the district, men earn their living by fishing. Many had lost their boats and nets. They would therefore have liked to have received a fishing kit that would have allowed them to resume their activities. They saw that help arrived for the farmers, in the form of seeds and tools, but felt that they had been forgotten.

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A3.06 The worst moments of the floods Each interviewee was asked what was the worst moment during the crisis. Their responses revealed a little of the difficult situations experienced by them during the floods and their incredible capacity to overcome those difficulties. In Gaza, the majority of the interviewees said that the worst moment was the night when the water rose. All were frightened of dying or losing their way during flight. As one elderly lady said: "The worst moment for me was at dawn when the waters were coming and I didn’t know where to go, I just followed all the other people.” For other people, the worst moment was when they had to spend three to four days in the trees or on the top of a roof with their children. An interviewee in Chokwe told how: "We decided to not leave the place we were in, because if we abandoned the place we would be robbed and everything that we had managed to buy through 12 years of working in South Africa would be lost. I climbed on to the roof with 122 other people of a house with a zinc roof, and the roof did not cave in. We stayed there during four days. Nobody slept and I had to watch over all of the family to make sure they didn’t sleep, especially the children, otherwise they could slip into the water and be taken by the floods. I made a bucket with some tin and made a fire and caught dead goats and ducks that floated by. We cooked them with their blood and everything and shared with the other people. I gave the first parts to the women who were breast feeding babies and then the children and the elderly. The helicopter arrived and took the people who were on the roof of the school and left a message to say they would be back for us. We took heart, but the helicopter never arrived.” The birth rate is very high in Mozambique, especially in the rural areas, so it is not surprising that many women gave birth during the floods. One such woman explained how, with the help of older women who had taken refuge in the same place, she gave birth to twins at the top of a tree, surrounded by water and in the rain: “The worst moment was after I had given birth, and I was so thirsty and so hungry and we didn’t have anything to eat or drink. The birth of my twins was a mixture of happiness and worry." Another of the moments chosen as the worst by interviewees, was when they discovered that they had lost their homes and everything in them. Two people in Machanga said: "The worst was the night of the cyclone. There were rains and high winds that took the trees, knocked down the houses, and it seemed to be the end of the world." "The worst that happened was that now we do not have anything - no home, no food, no clothes, no animals, not even something with which to fetch water." The people interviewed who had lost people close to them said the worst moment was when they saw their loved ones disappearing into the water, never to be seen again: "The worst thing that happened to me was to lose my husband. He went back with the bicycle to try and save some things from the house. I went ahead with our two grandchildren, and we never saw my husband again, only the bicycle." People interviewed in Manhiça said that the worst moment was when they were isolated for months without communication, without knowing what the future held,

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without news of family, just waiting for the waters to lower so the roads would open again.

A3.07 The best moment during the floods For the great majority of people, the best moment was when they could return home and start rebuilding their lives. This moment was important as they had survived and could now start to work in the farms again. Many interviewees said that the best moment was when the aid arrived, mainly the food aid, because they were already suffering from hunger. With the arrival of the aid they felt they had not been forgotten, and that somebody was thinking of them. For some people the rescue in the helicopter was the best moment, when the helicopter came to save them.

A3.08 The Future The vast majority of those interviewed were fearful of new flooding this year and as a result felt very insecure. They had not yet recovered from the first floods, and were already worried about the next ones. However, nobody wanted to move as the places they live in are where they have their farms, which give them their livelihoods. What they would most like for the future is to work on the farm, have a good harvest, with enough to eat and enough to sell, make some money to buy clothes and send their children to school. They would also like to start with livestock again. Others would like to return to their petty trading activities that were interrupted by the floods, such as pole cutting and firewood collection, charcoal making, cane cutting, and making traditional beer. The main worry for the future was hunger, as the farms, for different reasons, were not producing and the food aid had terminated. People were very worried about how they were going to obtain food in the near future.

A3.09 Conclusions Aid donated by the international humanitarian organisations was without doubt very useful and important, as the interviewees testified, in particular the food aid and the medical aid. The aid was also important because it helped raise the morale of the affected populations, as they stated that one of the best moments was when the aid arrived and they knew they had not been forgotten. However, there are some points that could help future interventions based on the information collected from the beneficiaries.

A3.09.1 SHELTER • The distribution of zinc roofingA, hammers, nails and wire, was not sufficient for people to rebuild their homes. There should have been a distribution of roof beams and poles. These are expensive and were very difficult to obtain after the floods had destroyed all vegetation.

A Thatch was not an alternative as it was the wrong time of year for harvesting and the floods had destroyed some traditional thatch areas. Thatch also requires very large amounts of timber for supports, and the numbers of people needing roofing far exceeded the available quantities of thatching material.

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• The elderly and female-headed households required money, as well as construction material, in order to pay labour costs. During the study we saw that many of the zinc roofing sheets given to these groups had not been used, and were beginning to rust as people had nowhere to store them. The result was that many people were still living in precarious dwellings, and waiting for the first opportunity to sell the zinc sheets in order to buy material to build their own homes. The Nazarene Church in Chokwe gave about £320 to each family to rebuild their homes. One elderly recipient used it to build a two- bedroomed zinc-roofed house, a latrine, and a smaller house with a thatched roof for her daughter. She was able to manage the money and take decisions about the sort of house she wanted. It may have been more effective, therefore, if people had been given money instead of construction materials. • Organisations that were building houses, or who planned to build houses for the affected populations, such as World Vision, CCM, and Action Aid, used standard designs, which did not necessarily suit each family. It would have been better to let people decide the type of house that they would have liked to construct for their family, particularly as the majority of households normally have more than one house in order to accommodate all family members. • In relation to the houses under construction, it will be interesting to see the effects of the introduction of a new style of housing - rectangular and standing alone - rather than the traditional style of round houses with various dwellings around to house family members.

A3.09.2 KIT AND TOOL DISTRIBUTION • The distribution of working instruments concentrated exclusively on agricultural instruments and seeds. While it is true that the majority of the people in the rural areas are peasant farmers, there were also many other people affected by the floods who had other livelihoods, for example tailors and fishermen. These groups did not receive any consideration or aid. People who did not have farms were given the same agricultural kit as those with farms. These people are waiting for the opportunity to sell or exchange these items for others of more use. In this case, we can also see that if people had received some sort of cash compensation they could have bought the appropriate material for themselves. In future, kits for other types of livelihoods such as craftsmen, fishermen, and tailors, could be considered. • The survival kits were small in relation to the size of the extended family, especially taking into consideration that rural families are usually larger than urban families. If people had received money, they could have bought domestic utensils on the local markets, replacing the things they had lost, and stimulating the local economy. The markets in the districts visited were full of food, domestic wares, and clothes. • Insufficient or no clothing was distributed. Beneficiaries particularly felt the lack of children’s clothing, and complained frequently about this in the interviews. Again, some sort of cash option would have helped the families to resolve this problem through the local market.

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A3.09.3 RE-BUILDING LIVES • Those affected by the floods were waiting to be able to work on their farms or re-start their small businesses. Nobody was waiting for external aid to come and solve all his or her problems. Many people had already started the reconstruction process, by preparing the land for sowing the seeds donated during the crisis, building shacks for shelter, and trying to set up in business again. • However, in some areas harvests will be poor because the soil was either removed or covered in sand by the floods (Nova Mambone) or because the rains continued and the ground is still waterlogged (Manhiça). In these areas it will be difficult for people to feed themselves without some form of food aid. The situation is worse in areas where people lost all their animals. It would be wise to start restocking programmes, for chickens, ducks, goats and pigs, as this could increase the food security of affected families and provide some future source of income.

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Appendix 4: Emergency context

A4.01 Mozambique: the country Mozambique lies on the south east coast of Africa. It has a population of 17.3 million and a land area of just over 800,000 km2 (more than three times as big as the UK). For much of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s Mozambique was at war, crippling its economy, and driving many Mozambicans outside the country as refugees. A war against Portuguese colonialism ended with independence in 1975. However, armed groups, backed by former Rhodesia, and later South Africa, kept the country in a state of conflict until 1992, when UN-sanctioned peace accords were implemented. Although the Mozambican economy has subsequently started to recover at a rapid rate, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Gross National Product (GNP) per head is only £140, less than half the average for sub-Saharan Africa, with an infant mortality rate of 134 per thousand live births, a life expectancy of 45, and low primary school enrolment.1.

A4.01.1 RECENT HISTORY Following independence in 1975, Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: Mozambique Liberation Front) took over the running of the country. Independence led to the flight of many of the Portuguese who had managed the economy, creating considerable difficulties for the new state, as there had never been a large cadre of educated and trained Mozambicans. A one-party socialist system was adopted. The new Mozambican state supported the liberation movements fighting in neighbouring Rhodesia and South Africa. As a result, the Rhodesians created Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana: Mozambican National Resistance) in 1976 to destabilise Mozambique. Following the Lancaster House agreement that led to the creation of Zimbabwe, the South Africans took over support of Renamo and intensified the levels of violence in Mozambique. Renamo plunged the country into a highly destructive civil war, drawing not only on their foreign backers but also, in some areas, on popular dissatisfaction with Frelimo policies. Renamo support among the Mozambican population was strongest in the centre and north of the country. Renamo targeted symbols of government rule such as schools and clinics and destroyed a great deal of infrastructure in the rural areas. Road travel was unsafe in much of the country. Mozambique was classified as the poorest country in the world by the late 1980’s. In 1992, a General Peace Agreement was signed between Renamo and the Government. By then, one third of the entire population was displaced, with one and a half million taking refuge in neighbouring countries. In 1994 and again in December 1999 Mozambique held multi-party presidential and legislative elections. The elections were won on both occasions by President Chissano and his Frelimo party. Renamo has been disappointed with its electoral losses and threatened to form its own government in January 2000, a threat that was overtaken by the floods2.

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A4.01.2 A FAVOURED AID RECIPIENT Donor assistance to Mozambique has shown a broad upward trend since independence, rising sharply in the mid to late 1980’s when the Government, under President Chissano, began an economic reform programme. Mozambique now receives about three times as much per head in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as the other Least Developed Countries (LLDC). This popularity can be seen by the speed with which the donors pledged to meet the government appeal after the floods and the fact that the Rome Donor Conference pledged US$3M more than the US$450M requested3. Even the initial appeal on 10 February for US$2.7M of relief had already raised pledges of US$3.27M within one week4.

A4.02 Context: the floodsA After a faltering start to the rainy season, heavy rains and floods in early January left 18 dead and 113,000 persons affected in Gaza and Maputo Provinces. This was followed by severe rainfall in Maputo in the first week of February and flooding on the Save and other rivers. By mid-February the death toll had risen to 48 with another 15 missing and 300,000 affected. About half of the affected were displaced. Cyclone Eline passed through Mozambique on 22 February and brought large amounts of rain to the river basins of the Save and Limpopo in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The swollen Limpopo caused severe flooding in Gaza. This was the first time in recorded history that the Incomati, Limpopo, and Umbelezi Rivers had all flooded together. The official death toll eventually rose to 699 with 95 missing and 2,000,000 affected, of which 544,000 were homeless or otherwise displaced by the floods. In agriculture, 20,000 cattle were lost and 140,000 hectares of crops were inundated. Many roads and bridges, 48 health facilities, four hospitals, and 500 primary schools were significantly damaged. The World Bank assessed the damage at US$273.1m in direct costs, US$214.8M in indirect costs, US$64.8M in relief costs, and a further US$427.7M needed for re-construction, making a total of US$780.4M.5 This represents 20% of Mozambique’s 1999 GNP of US$3.9bn.

A4.02.1 A HISTORY OF FLOODING Floods and storms are an almost annual event in Mozambique. The 2000 floods were the worst in at least 50 years. Date Event6 1975 Floods on the Limpopo and Incomati kill one and affect 75,000 Feb 1977 Limpopo floods kill 300 and affect 400,000 Oct 1977 Hailstones kill three and injure 51 in Maputo Mar 1978 Zambezi Floods kill 40 and leave 200,000 affected Dec 1978 Cyclone Angele kills four with another 80,000 affected 1981 500,000 affected by heavy rain and flooding across Mozambique 1984 Cyclone Domoina kills 109 and leaves 350,000 affected 1985 Floods in Maputo and Sofala leave eight dead and 500,000 affected 1988 Cyclone Filao kills 100 and leaves 4,000 affected 1989 Sofala floods kill two

A A detailed account of the events is included in the chronology.

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Date Event6 1994 Cyclone Nadia kills 240 and leaves 2,000,000 affected (including 170,000 homeless) 1996 200,000 affected in flooding. South African helicopters assist Jan 1997 Floods in Tete and Sofala kill 35 and leave 26,300 affected Feb 1997 Floods kill 78 and affect 559,000. 150,000Ha under water. South African and Zimbabwean rescue teams assist Jan 1998 A landslide after heavy rains in Zambézia leaves 63 dead and 78 missing, with another 7,500 people homeless Feb 1998 45,500 hectares lost to floods, Lugela District cut off after the bridge was washed away in Zambézia 1999 Inhambane floods leave 23 dead and 70,000 affected

A4.02.2 RAIN FROM THE NEIGHBOURS Mozambique is also crossed by most of the principal river systems of southern Africa including the Zambezi, the Save, Limpopo Rivers, and the much smaller Incomati River. These drain water from Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland, and parts of South Africa, Zaire, Angola, Botswana, and Namibia. The worst damage from Cyclone Eline was not from the rain that fell on Mozambique but from the flooding that followed Eline’s rain on Zimbabwe and South Africa. The Limpopo repeatedly broke the record flood levels it had earlier set.

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Appendix 5: Chronology

The chronology has been developed from a wide variety of sources, including base chronologies from the UN, UK Department for International Development (DFID), Save the Children, and the Parliamentary Select Committee on international development. This has been supported by INGC (Instituto Nacional de Governance des Calamidades: The National Disaster Management Institute) reports, news reports, press releases, and DEC agency reports.

Date Event Nov 1999 INGC Contingency Plan for 1999/2000 rainy season launched. Late start to rains Dec 1999 Dry spells at the start of the rains Mon 3 Jan Tropical Cyclone Astride peters out off the coast at Pemba. Tue 11 Jan The level of the main rivers in southern Mozambique has fallen. Administração Regional das Águas-Sul (ARA-Sul) Southern Region Water Authority says that the threat of major flooding has receded. 17-23 Jan Flood crests on Umbelúzi, Incomati, and Limpopo Rivers in Southern Mozambique. Wed 26 Jan First OCHA sitrep on Mozambique floods, prepared by WFP. Mon 31 Jan Maputo Province had 300mm of rain in January, twice the norm. Tue 1 Feb 113,000 people affected by January flooding in southern Mozambique, 93,000 in Gaza and 20,000 in Maputo, leaving 18 dead. Wed 2 Feb Mozambican Government launches initial appeal for flood victims. Cyclone Connie peters out to the east of Madagascar, more than 2,000km from Maputo. Thu Feb 3 Cyclone Eline begins life as a Tropical Depression off the south coast of Java. Fri 4 Feb Beginning of heavy rain in the centre and south of Mozambique. Same weather system also brings heavy rains to neighbouring countries. Sat 5 Feb Heavy rain in Maputo leads to the collapse of many houses. Localised flooding begins. ActionAid starts relief works in the districts. Sun 6 Feb 328mm of rain recorded at Maputo airport, 453 mm in the last three days against an average seasonal cumulative rainfall of 264mm. Severe flooding in Maputo, Matola, and Boane, with damage to water supply and other social infrastructure in the capital. First daily meeting chaired by the Mozambican Foreign Minister with other government ministers to co-ordinate the response to the floods. Mon 7 Feb Incomati River reaches all-time high. Roads between Maputo and Matola and onwards to South Africa (SA) and Swaziland are cut. A national disaster is declared (also by the US Ambassador). Tue 8 Feb OCHA offers a UN Disaster Assessment and Co-ordination (UNDAC) team. North-south Highway is cut in two places in Sofala and at one place in Inhambane (at the same location as in 1999). South African National Defence Force (SANDF) helicopters rescued more than 100 from floods in SA since 7 February. CCM starts relief work with

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Date Event Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) funds. First Concern assessment of damage from weekend rain. Wed 9 Feb First informal meeting at Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) of water and sanitation group (OXFAM, UNICEF, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent [IFRC], MSF and Águas de Maputo [AdeM]: The Maputo Water Company). Over 100,000 people homeless. Concern allocates 100,000IEP to their work for the floods crisis. Floods on the Incomati cut main national highway (EN1) between Maputo and Xai-Xai. Umbelúzi river floods. Maputo Water works restart at 50% of capacity. Red Cross produces Mozambique Floods Information Bulletin No.1 Thu 10 Feb Mozambique government formally accepts OCHA offer of UNDAC team. The INGC is given responsibility for co-ordinating the government’s response GoM appeals for US$2.7 million (half of which is for 100 inflatables) plus US$15 million for soil-erosion control. Water distribution restarts in Maputo. 160,000 people are now displaced. The Buzi River is flooded. Flooding in Govuro District by Save River. IFRC funds CVM with 100,000 Swiss Francs. DFID gives US$215,000 to the Red Cross. Fri 11 Feb Arrival of first SA aircraft (five helicopters and three fixed-wing craft). WFP, IFRC, and UNICEF issue appeals. The Dutch Government gives 100,000 Guilders to CVM. Concern requests a visit by an environmental health specialist from headquarters. Sat 12 Feb Limpopo River floods the cities of Chókwè and the lower part of Xai- Xai. First joint assessment of the Limpopo valley (UNICEF, MSF, IFRC and DFID). Concern visits the bairros with IPM. First NGO/UN co-ordinated meeting held in Hotel Cardoso and chaired by UNICEF). It is agreed to hold daily meetings. The Save and the Buzi Rivers in central Mozambique flood. Incomati River is at the highest level ever recorded. The Umbelúzi and Sabie (a tributary of the Incomati) Rivers are at their highest levels since 1937. The UNDAC team of five arrives in Maputo (including two DFID experts). A BHR assessment team arrives in Mozambique. It reported that while damage was "serious”, local resources could handle it. Sun 13 Feb UNDAC team meets with GoM and the UN. The road to SA is open again through the premature opening to traffic of the new toll road that is still under construction. Mon 14 Feb 2,700 people are rescued from the flood today (2,000 in Chibuto plus 700 in Guija.) The OXFAM PHE team leader arrives. Tue 15 Feb UNDAC team moves to offices within INGC. First all-donor briefing by INGC takes place. Formation of floods cell in INGC. DPOPH moves from low part of Xai-Xai in advance of expected flooding. Save

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Date Event the Children starts distributing family kits. Death toll stands at 48 people with another 15 missing, presumed dead. Consensus between government, donors, and NGOs that situation in and around Maputo is under control, but some NGOs are concerned that response has been too Maputo-focused. Wed 16 Feb GoM asks UNICEF to play a co-ordinating role for external support agencies in water and sanitation. Daily meetings are held at UNICEF. GoM updates 10 February appeal to include food for 300,000. UNDAC team fully operational, computers and cell phones supplied by United Nations Development Program (UNDP). First On-Site Operations Co-ordination Centre (OSOCC) meeting takes place. Botswana declares a flooding disaster. Thu 17 Feb INGC reorganised into five sectors: food, water and sanitation and health; transport and customs; resettlement and infrastructure. First daily INGC/UNDAC briefing and co-ordination meeting which is open to all. South Africa declares a flooding disaster. Cyclone Eline hits the east coast of Madagascar. Concern’s Environmental Health Mission starts. Fri 18 Feb First basic needs tables are produced Save the Children Joint Assessment in Inhambane with GoM and Irish Aid. Concern’s environmental health advisor arrives to begin assessment. A 12-person US Department of Defence (DoD) Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) arrives in Mozambique to assess conditions. Though it calls Mozambique's situation "difficult”, the military team reports that it feels local resources can handle the problem. Sat 19 Feb French military C160 arrives in Maputo to join airlift operations. Oxfam begin an assessment in Gaza. Sun 20 Feb Inland villages are cut off by floodwaters in Gaza. Planned date of return for SA helicopters. Predicted arrival of Cyclone Eline. Heavy rain on coast. Mon 21 Feb WFP food drops begin in Gaza, southern Sofala, southern Manica, and northern Inhambane. Gaza provincial government evacuates offices in lower part of Xai- Xai. 360,000 now displaced and one million affected. Centre of Eline reaches within 30km of the mouth of the Save River. There is flooding along the coast. Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands agree to fund an extension of the SANDF helicopter operations that would otherwise have stopped today. Tue 22 Feb SANDF helicopter operations suspended because of high winds. Cyclone Eline passes over mouth of Save, Chiloane and Divinhe Rivers before moving inland over Chibabava and on to Zimbabwe (ZW). Winds speeds are over 200km/h. DFID specialists on the UNDAC team return to UK.

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Date Event ActionAid receive £159,936 from DFID, OXFAM £155,047, and WV £67,000. Tearfund give first floods grant of US$15,000 to a partner for food relief. Wed 23 Feb Launch of GoM International Appeal for Emergency Relief and Initial Rehabilitation, requesting US$65M. Appeal is made in collaboration with the UN. SA helicopters have rescued 2,814 people to date (14 today) with the Mozambican Air Force lifting 970 people. The death toll stands at 67 people, with 211,000 displaced. Cyclone Eline has now crossed into Zimbabwe bringing rain to the basins of the Limpopo and Save Rivers. Thu 24 Feb The UNDAC team leaves Mozambique now that the appeal document has been launched. People start to return to their homes in Gaza. SANDF make a quick aerial assessment of Inhambane and Beira. Christian Aid launches their own Southern African Flood Appeal as does British Red Cross Society (BRCS) their appeal for Mozambique. Fri 25 Feb Fresh flooding in South Africa kills another 12 people. Beitbridge, approx 450km upstream from Chókwè, is flooded by the Limpopo, stopping all traffic from SA to ZW. Tourist camps are abandoned in SA’s Kruger National Park due to flooding on a tributary of the Limpopo. The Limpopo sweeps away nine pylons on the Cabora Bassa electricity line just across the border about 300km upstream of Chókwè, costing Mozambique US$900,000 a month for imported electricity. Fresh floods on the Save and Buzi Rivers. Save the Children Save the Children assessment mission finds thousands stranded in trees or on their roofs along the Save and alerts the UN and INGC. An aid convoy is isolated by floodwaters on the Save. Zimbabwe declares a disaster in three provinces hit by Cyclone Eline. ARA-Sul advise that the floodwaters coming down the Limpopo within the next week will be much more severe than the previous registered peaks. WFP expecting fresh floods in Gaza over the weekend. IFRC launch a revised appeal. First case of cholera reported in Maputo. DFID advise the BBC that the DEC appeal requested by the agencies is not needed as there is plenty of government money available and DFID have already funded four DEC agencies. DEC Operational Sub- Committee (OSC) consults on DEC response. The death toll rises to 84 people. Sat 26 Feb The Save flooding worsens as the floods are fed by water from Zimbabwe. The French C160 leaves Maputo. DFID phones the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) to ascertain what UK assets are in the region. DFID told that nearest assets are 3,000 miles away. DFID provides grant of US$1 million to ensure continued operation of SANDF helicopters already in Maputo. DFID tell OCHA to get a team back into Mozambique.

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Date Event DEC Executive Committee Teleconference on Mozambique is held. Sun 27 Feb Oxfam and IFRC flee Chókwè just after midnight as the Limpopo rises 2m and floods the town. Mozambique Foreign Minister chairs an urgent meeting with the UN and donors in the INGC offices. UNICEF calls NGOs to a special meeting to explain about the new floods crisis. The UN announces that a new UNDAC team is to arrive shortly. ITN screens Mark Austin’s pivotal report on the floods in the UK. The official death toll is now 118 people. SANDF rescue 2,120 today. Two Malawian helicopters arrive in Beira. Predictions that the opening of the spillway at Kariba will cause flooding on the Zambezi. Mon 28 Feb Daily ministers' meeting moves to INGC. SANDF rescue 2,703 people. DFID grants £500,000 between Oxfam and Save the Children. Oxfam appeals on Mozambique television for the owners of boats to assist the rescue effort. UK MoD prepares contingency plans. Agreement reached to launch DEC Mozambique Floods Appeal. Tue Feb 29 Second UNDAC team of five arrives in Maputo. The team includes three members of the first UNDAC mission. Two more SANDF Oryx helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft begin work. MoD offers its services to DFID for £2.34 million. Offer rejected as too expensive. DFID contracts five commercial helicopters: two that are already working in Mozambique and three more from SA. (Additional helicopters only deployed on 3rd of March). One of the helicopters hired by DFID had been working for WV and Oxfam. DFID commits funds to airlift an Emergency Response Team. Donor meeting in Geneva pledges US$13million for the Mozambique Floods. OCHA director named as Special Humanitarian Envoy of the UN Secretary General. 675mm of rain in Maputo Province for Feb- six times the norm. Limpopo is 5m about alert levels at Xai-Xai. SANDF rescue 922 and increase their deployment to 7 helicopters and 4 fixed wing aircraft. Wed Mar 1 The water level has decreased slightly in Chókwè. In Xai-Xai, the water level is currently 9.88m, 5 metres above the critical level. 25,000 people are now in the Chiaquelane camp. Water levels on the river Save increasing and 15,000 people need evacuation from Nova Mambone. MoD submits lower cost estimate, dropping the costs of the Pumas from £3,000 an hour to £2,721 per hour, and dropping the Royal Marines with their hovercraft and boats. DFID decides to deploy UK Pumas, but not RFA Fort George. DFID’s chartered Iluyshin 76 left the UK with supplies, boats, helicopters, and personnel. Bill Clinton announces the approval of the deployment of a JTF. SANDF rescue Baby Rosita and her mother from a tree while being

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Date Event filmed by a crew in another helicopter. The SANDF rescue 915 people that day to make 6,660 rescued by them in the last 4 days and over 8000 since Feb 11. The death toll now stands at 150 people with dozens missing. Thu Mar 2 The DEC appeal is launched. Concern undertakes aerial survey along the Save. Tropical Cyclone Gloria makes landfall on Madagascar early morning local time. The Special Humanitarian Envoy of the UN Secretary General arrives in Maputo. EU HA Commissioner Poul Nielson arrives for a three-day visit. Portugal writes off US$145million in Mozambican debt. Italy announces a decision to write off US$500million in Mozambican debt. Zimbabwe now has 250,000 people affected and 80 dead after a week of non-stop rain that started with Cyclone Eline. First DFID flight departs with boats, rafts, RNLI, International Rescue Corps (IRCorps) volunteers, Landrovers, and shelter material. Total DFID aid is now £6million. The UN’s FAO launches an appeal for US$2.5million for seeds and tools. 1,451 people rescued by SANDF helicopters today giving a total of 9,974 rescued by the SANDF since February 11. Death toll now stands at 200 people and it is expected to rise as more bodies are found. Fri Mar 3 The DEC appeal has raised £5million in less than 24 hours. Second DFID flight departs the UK. First flight arrives in SA. SA initially refused permission for Royal Air Force (RAF) plane carrying helicopter to land but the pilot insists saying he is low on fuel. The French military C160 arrives in Maputo. A Belgian military C130 arrives in Maputo. Agreement is reached on the deployment of the RFA Fort George from the Gulf. The Joint Logistics Co-ordination Centre (JLOC) is opened within INGC to co-ordinate the air assets of foreign air forces, one NGO and of the commercial charters. US DoD JTF is deployed. The Regional Meeting takes place in Pretoria. Sat Mar 4 SANDF say that they cannot find any more phase one cases to rescue. Operation now moves from SAR to relief delivery. Four of their helicopters will now move to relief distribution with only three on SAR. The remaining 3 helicopters chartered by DFID begin work. 4 out of the five are used for search and rescue. 1,338 people rescued by SA helicopters today. Assembly and testing of RAF Pumas continues in SA. Sun Mar 5 The DEC appeal has raised £10 million by noon today. The first two UK Pumas begin operations, primarily for movement of relief supplies. One Puma returns to base after a communications failure. 3 German Helicopters arrive – 4 more are on their way. 2

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Date Event French Pumas start work. Chiaquelane Camp holds 35,000 people. 10,000-15,000 are at the two camps in Macia. SANDF helicopters have rescued more than 14,000 people to date, (at least 97% of the total rescued by SANDF). Search and rescue are now practically over The RNLI team move to Beira, but too late to rescue anyone. Rapid- UK boat teams in Chókwè are also too late to rescue anyone. Mon Mar 6 The DEC Appeal has now raised £13 million. Mozambique's Foreign Minister takes over chair of the daily briefings in the INGC. Second 2 UK Pumas begin operations. Statement on Mozambique by the President of the Security Council. WFP issues a second appeal. WV receives one million guilders from the Dutch Government. Tue Mar 7 German military contingent arrives (2x C160 in Maputo, 4 helicopters in Beira). The death toll rises to 212 people plus 15 missing believed dead. Save the Children begins taking photos of unaccompanied minors for family tracing. The INGOs meet with DFID in London The two Malawian Helicopters, plus the third chartered from SA by the Malawi government have rescued 1,200 people since they started. US Helicopters are due to arrive. Wed Mar 8 The DEC Appeal now stands at £13.5million. French military helicopters leave Maputo. Kenya donates US$75,000, Tanzania donates 1,000t of Maize. DFID grants £1 million to IFRC for the regional response. The US pledges US$2.5million for the clearance of flood-affected landmines. Wrangling between the commanders from the seven main international military contingents is blamed for complicating the humanitarian airlift. Mukesh Kapila, Head of DIFD’s CHAD, visits Mozambique accompanied by Roger Yates as a representative from the DEC. Thu Mar 9 The DEC Appeal had so far raised £14 million. The US military contingent arrives (3xC130 and 3 helicopters in Maputo and 4 helicopters in Beira). RFA Fort George is due to arrive. The road to Chókwè is reopened. Fri Mar 10 The UN General Assembly calls on the UN Secretary General to continue mobilising and co-ordinating the humanitarian assistance and the support for reconstruction. 3rd UNDAC team arrives in Maputo. Sat Mar 11 RFA Fort George arrives off the Mozambique coast and begins operations. DFID assistance is now £20 million. Mukesh Kapila, the head of CHAD, meets with NGOs in Maputo. Sun Mar 12 The Spanish military contingent arrives (3 helicopters in Maputo). The Belgian military C130 leaves Maputo. The French military C160 leaves Maputo. Mon Mar 13 DEC due to consider to an extension to the PJA. There is no extension. Tue Mar 14 WFP now distributing to 365,000 people.

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Date Event Wed Mar 15 The end of the DEC Appeal’s Period of Joint Action (PJA)A. £18million has been raised so far. WFP launches an appeal for US$34million to finance emergency food and food-for-work (FFW). The total WFP request is now US$45.2million to cover the food needs of 650,000 people until a 2nd harvest in mid-August. The level of the Incomati river begins to fall. The Paris Club of creditors grants Mozambique a "debt holiday" from payments this year. Thu Mar 16 The level of the Save river begins to fall. Fri Mar 17 ARA-Sul warns of flooding along Umbelúzi as the Maputo-Swaziland road is flooded. The Incomati is still about flood levels. The water is ankle deep in the town of Buzi. 14,399 people are rescued to date by SA helicopters. The death toll is now 492 people. Sat Mar 18 The level of the Buzi river is falling. The level of the Umbelúzi river is high but stable. The Incomati river rose one-meter in the past 24 hours. Sun Mar 19 UK Pumas fly their last mission. They have airlifted 563 people to safety. Mon Mar 20 The Portuguese military contingent arrives (1 C130 in Maputo). British military contingent leaves. Tue Mar 21 INGC say that the level of the Buzi river had risen sharply because of discharges from the Chicamba dam. Wed Mar 22 An updated UN/GoM Appeal is issued for US$102million. GoM has already received US$58.5million against the Feb 23 appeal. The total need now stands at US$160.5million. 402 cases of suspected cholera in Maputo (337 in the last 2 weeks). Between January and late February, 22,207 cases of Malaria are reported against 9,546 for the same period in 1999. Thu Mar 23 The death toll has risen to 640 people. Concern begins helicopter drops to isolated communities in Gaza. A riot at Chiaquelane camp is said to have killed one and injured ten people. Later reports indicate that only one was killed and five injured. A panicking truck driver at a disorderly distribution was to blame rather than a riot. Fri Mar 24 RFA Fort George departs. Cyclone Hudah begins life as it is upgraded from a tropical disturbance/depression to a Tropical Storm. Sat Mar 25 GoM announces that it will support baby Rosita. Sun Mar 26 The road from Beira to Inhambane is now open again after being closed for almost 7 weeks. Final American helicopter mission takes place. The German team also started leaving Beira. Mon Mar 27 Xai-Xai is again flooded by the Limpopo. The US military contingent leaves. They moved 680 tonne of goods and 1,200 passengers. Tue Mar 28 A new flood wave on the Limpopo reaches Xai-Xai. Wed Mar 29 The German military contingent leaves.

A The PJA is the period during which agencies may not make appeals or advertise outside of the DEC mechanism. This is usually a little over two weeks, including the preparatory days to launch the appeal.

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Date Event Thu Mar 30 Preliminary assessment by the World Bank estimates the losses resulting from the flood as ranging from US$270 to US$430million, with two million people severely affected by the crisis. Malawi helicopters are to depart. Fri Mar 31 3rd UNDAC team leaves Maputo. WFP now assisting 561,000 flood victims. Sat Apr 1 Cyclone Hudah threatens Madagascar. Sun Apr 2 The Spanish military contingent leaves. Cyclone Hudah makes landfall on Madagascar. Mon Apr 3 The death toll now stands at 699 and 95 missing. Tue Apr 4 Food deliveries are due to start to Machanga. The Portuguese military contingent leaves. Wed Apr 5 The Umbelúzi river is stable and its level is dropping slowly. The level of the Incomati river fell overnight, but may rise again at Ressano Garcia and Magude because of rain upstream. The Limpopo River is declining slowly. The Save River rose overnight to alert levels, although no fresh flooding has occurred. The Buzi River and its tributaries have fallen significantly, mainly because the Chicamba dam has stopped discharging. Thu Apr 6 The formal start of the resettlement programme in Gaza province. Fri Apr 7 Cyclone Hudah centred approximately 200km southeast of Quelimane. 80mm of rain fell at Quelimane. Apr 8 - 9 Zambézia and Nampula hit by Cyclone Hudah. Hudah kills three people and severely injures four. 424 houses are destroyed. Mon Apr 10 IFRC issue its third revised Appeal for the floods. Ministry of Health says that there have been 1,935 cases of Cholera in Maputo city, and 235 in the nearby areas during the last week in March and the first week in April. The Population at Chiaquelane camp is now estimated at 60,000 people (the official figure is 80,000). Tue Apr 11 WFP complains that the response to their US$35million appeal in March has been poor. Wed Apr 12 World Bank and the IMF give Mozambique a 12-month “Debt holiday”. Tue Apr 18 The NGO Co-ordination workshop takes place in Maputo. Concern, Merlin, Oxfam and WV attend a Malaria Co-ordination workshop. May 3-4 The Rome conference on post-flood reconstruction receives pledges in excess of the amount requested (US$453 million instead of US$450illion).

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Appendix 6: ActionAid: Summary of activities

“ActionAid works with over five million of the world's poorest people in more than 30 countries across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

ActionAid's vision is a world without poverty - a high ideal, but one we are convinced can be achieved. Fighting poverty together, ActionAid's strategy for 1999 to 2003, turns this conviction into four specific goals for us to concentrate our efforts on. They are: helping poor people exercise their basic rights; strengthening the movement against poverty; promoting change internationally; and improving gender equityA.”

A6.01 Context Action Aid began working in Mozambique in 1988 in the province of Zambézia. Initial work was based on emergency relief and rehabilitation activities but after the Peace Accords it was transformed into the now established development programme. In 1995 ActionAid expanded operations to Maputo province where two development programmes were established in the districts of Marracuene and Manhiça. At the time of the floods in 2000, the majority of ActionAid staff were development workers with very little emergency experience. The most experienced emergency worker was the Country Director.

A6.02 ActionAid’s Approach ActionAid responded quickly to the emergency, as it directly affected the two districts in Maputo province that had development programmes. ActionAid took the lead in co- ordination activities at various levels; district, provincial and national. This approach enhanced the efficiency of their response to the emergency. ActionAid worked in partnership with the district authorities to set-up emergency committees, were active on the seeds and tools co-ordination body, and the Water and Sanitation group at national level. ActionAid actively encouraged the DEC agencies to meet and share information. This proved to be an effective co-ordination and lobbying forum.

A6.03 The ActionAid Network ActionAid programmes are relatively independent of each other and each country programme manages its own affairs. Some have national boards of management and trustees, but ActionAid Mozambique has not yet developed to this stage.

A6.04 ActionAid’s response to the Floods ActionAid responded immediately to requests from the field for support. They provided logistical support to the Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) and

A http://www.actionaid.org/

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provided immediate relief items. ActionAid also worked with the Dutch Government on rescue activities using rubber boats. The ActionAid emergency unit in London provided technical support by sending Technical Assistance staff with experience in Honduras and Bangladesh. This was considered timely and useful assistance and helped in the preparation of coherent plans and provided training for local staff. ActionAid staff were deployed to emergency work and additional staff were employed to support the district teams. ActionAid opted into the DEC appeal, and ActionAid Mozambique developed detailed plans for the emergency programme in Marracuene and Manhiça.

A6.05 ActionAid’s DEC-funded activities

Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Manhiça Local Food aid (May, June, July) Not Stated government • distribution of food aid to 46,607 beneficiaries Manhiça and Local Seeds, tools, and planting material 612,513 Marracuene government • seeds for short season for 20,639 families • seeds for long season for 20,389 families • cassava cuttings for 15,134 families • sweet potato cuttings for 14,080 families • banana suckers for 21,181 families • agricultural tools for 16,835 families

Manhiça and Muleide, OJM, HIV/AIDS programme Not Stated Marracuene Kindlimuka • 17,712 condoms distributed • 9150 leaflets distributed • 29 plays with an audience of 10,000 • 101 activists trained • 1,478 women and youths in discussion groups Manhiça and DPOPH, water and sanitation 170,358 Marracuene ADRA • 23 boreholes drilled • 71 shallow wells cleaned Manhiça and Local Shelter 219,674 Marracuene government • 696 houses built Manhiça and District Social infrastructure 94,738 Marracuene authorities • rehabilitation of heath post and maternity blocks • construction of 11 classrooms • repair of 12.5 km of road Manhiça and Reconstruindo Psycho-social rehabilitation 20,001 Marracuene a Esperança • arts and drama activities • two festivals

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Total 1,314,696

A6.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC ActionAid Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health 34,094 1.6% 4.4% 36% Water/sanitation 170,358 8.0% 8.3% 96% Food 7,905 0.4% 1.3% 28% Agriculture 612,513 28.7% 8.2% 349% Shelter 219,674 10.3% 9.7% 106% Household items 64,284 3.0% 6.9% 43% Blankets and clothes 1,140 0.1% 0.5% 10% Education 44,138 2.1% 2.0% 106% Other 41,624 1.9% 8.4% 23% Sub-total 1,195,730 55.9% 56.9% 98% Non-personnel costs Procurement 694 0.0% 1.9% 2% Transport 41,690 2.0% 9.0% 22% Storage/security 24,920 1.2% 0.4% 327% Office 43,123 2.0% 2.8% 73% Other 212 0.0% 0.5% 2% Sub-total 110,639 5.2% 16.4% 31% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 198,497 9.3% 5.0% 185% In-country expatriate 108,817 5.1% 4.8% 107% Off-shore staff - 0.3% Other – personnel 74,768 3.5% 0.3% 1018% Sub-total 382,082 17.9% 12.5% 142% Personnel support 395,073 18.5% 6.9% 269% Other costs 5,514 0.3% 2.9% 9% Agency management 48,105 2.3% 4.3% 53% Contingencies - 0.1% Total project cost 2,137,142 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 1,314,696 61.5% 65.4% 94%

The high expenditure on other personnel costs is for the cost of permanent ActionAid Mozambique staff (the other personnel costs appear to apply to staff hired specifically for the emergency response). Storage charges arise from warehouse rental and the purchase of shipping containers to act as secure temporary stores.

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A6.07 Where ActionAid stood out Many examples of ActionAid’s programme were exemplary. In some ways this was because ActionAid was already deeply rooted in an area that was very affected by the floods.

A6.07.1 BENEFICIARY REGISTRATION Effective registration of affected population greatly enhanced the efficiency of the distribution of relief items. ActionAid’s registration was used by other agencies in organising their own distributions.

A6.07.2 SUPPORT TO DISTRICT STRUCTURES Support to the district level structures was very effective as ActionAid supplied resources like fuel and cash to match those held by the district. The work with the District Emergency Committees helped to ensure order in a very difficult situation and contributed to capacity building of the local authorities. The lessons learnt from ActionAid’s experience should be used to encourage capacity building of local authorities in emergency preparedness and response.

A6.07.3 EXCELLENT HIV/AIDS WORK The ActionAid teams carried out excellent HIV/AIDS and psycho-social rehabilitation work. ActionAid led the field in their attention to these critical aspects of emergency work.

A6.08 Areas needing attention

A6.08.1 INTER-PROGRAMME EXCHANGE ActionAid carried out an excellent initiative in bringing staff from Bangladesh and Honduras to provide input into the flood response planning in Mozambique. However, this was not as successful as it might have been, as the Mozambique staff’s short- term focus on immediate problems limited their engagement with the visitors. An experienced facilitator might increase the usefulness of such exchanges in future.

A6.08.2 OVEREMPHASIS ON BENEFICIARY CONTRIBUTION ActionAid found that the beneficiary contribution demanded (e.g. in labour for shelter construction) placed a large load on some beneficiaries, particularly women. In future it might be more appropriate to reduce the beneficiary contribution in emergency response programmes when beneficiaries already have other very heavy demands on their time.

A6.09 ActionAid’s plans for the future ActionAid will continue to work with the affected communities in the districts of Marracuene and Manhiça. Development activities will be dovetailed into the emergency work in order to ensure consistency and coherence in programme implementation.

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A6.10 Recommendation to ActionAid Management

ActionAid should try to capture the lessons learned by their Mozambique team for the next DEC-funded emergency that they undertake.

While ActionAid has already engaged in an extensive lesson-learning exercise, it would be useful to have the Country Director share his experience with other ActionAid programmes.

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Appendix 7: BRCS: Summary of activities

“The British Red Cross cares for people in crisis in local communities throughout the British Isles and overseas as part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Overseas, as part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the British Red Cross assists in the aftermath of natural and manmade disasters, such as earthquakes, famine, and war. It also works directly with local communities to improve their ability to cope with natural disasters and the 'silent emergencies' of disease and hunger”A

A7.01 Context The British Red Cross Society (BRCS) had no operational programmes in Mozambique, but has prioritised working with the CVM (Cruz Vermelha de Moçambique: Mozambique Red Cross) for the past five years because of the country’s huge needs and an established relationship with the Society. BRCS’s most recent support has been in funding a national water and sanitation programme.

A7.02 BRCS’s Approach BRCS is a member of the Red Cross family and works exclusively through Red Cross organisations. In Mozambique, the National Society is CVM, which has been working in the country for almost 20 years. For many years the Society has focused on relief activities in response to the influx of hundreds of thousands of returned refugees at the end of the civil war. CVM has been restructuring over the past five years in order to increase its capacity for long-term development work whilst retaining its ability to carry out relief work in response to cholera epidemics and smaller scale annual flooding. There are currently 70,000 volunteers and members, and 181 paid staff based in the headquarters in Maputo and branches throughout the country. BRCS also works through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). This has a well-established delegation in Maputo working in partnership with CVM, but at the time of the floods this delegation only had two development delegates and substantial scaling up was needed to respond proportionately. The regional delegation office in Harare has also been supporting relief efforts in Mozambique for a number of years in conjunction with the Maputo office. Relief assistance is available in water and sanitation, health, and disaster preparedness.

A7.03 The BRCS Network As well as CVM and IFRC, a number of other national Red Cross societies have programmes in Mozambique though these are normally funded directly by the society concerned.

A From http://www. redcross.org.uk

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A7.04 BRCS’s response to the Floods IFRC launched an initial Emergency Appeal on February 11th for £1.1 million to assist the worst affected flood victims in Mozambique and Botswana. The British Red Cross launched its own Appeal for Mozambique on the 24th February, for £500,000. BRCS was one of the four DEC agencies to receive DFID funding after the first wave of flooding.

A7.05 BRCS’s DEC-funded activities BRCS carried out a wide range of activities with DEC funds. Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ CVM and Distribution of relief items (partly DEC- Not Stated IFRC funded) • distribution of 3,403 tents, 14,832 tarpaulins, 838 plastic sheeting, 86,095 blankets, 19,441 kitchen sets, 18,150 jerry-cans, and 25,312 buckets in 125 separate distributions CVM and Agricultural rehabilitation central Not Stated IFRC Mozambique (partly DEC-funded) • distribution of seeds and tools to 5,000 families in central Mozambique • conducting agricultural assessments Note: The second assessment, to assess the impact of the seeds and tools distribution was particularly good CVM and Gaza water and sanitation project Not Stated IFRC (partly DEC-funded) • rehabilitation and reconstruction of 71 well aprons • rehabilitation of 41 handpumps • 50 borehole sites surveyed and drilled, 47 fitted with handpumps • 30 community water groups formed • four shallow wells constructed • 25 communal latrines • 552 family latrines CVM and Reinstallation kit distributions (partly Not Stated IFRC DEC-funded) • distribution of reinstallation kits comprising one tarpaulin, one kitchen set, one jerry-can, two blankets, two buckets with lids, 12 bars of soap, two mosquito nets, two capulanas, construction wire, nails, one machete, one axe and one hoe to 10,062 families IFRC and Federation Head of Delegation in Not Stated CVM Maputo – and other staff (partly DEC-

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ funded) • assessment by an experienced BRCS delegate • supplying all staff (five expatriates at peak) for the IFRC sub-delegation in Beira • supplying a construction delegate for the IFRC’s rehabilitation programme • funding the IFRC Head of Delegation in Maputo Total 1,511,640

A7.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC BRCS Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health 3,815 0.2% 4.5% 5% Water/sanitation 39,429 2.2% 8.7% 26% Food 20,034 1.1% 1.2% 92% Agriculture 90,395 5.1% 10.2% 50% Shelter 254,830 14.5% 9.4% 154% Household items 184,524 10.5% 6.3% 165% Blankets and clothes 45,984 2.6% 0.3% 809% Education - 2.1% Other 277,028 15.7% 7.3% 215% Sub-total 916,039 52.0% 57.1% 91% Non-personnel costs Procurement - 1.8% Transport 383,725 21.8% 7.5% 291% Storage/security 10,936 0.6% 0.4% 152% Office 30,970 1.8% 2.8% 64% Other 1,665 0.1% 0.4% 21% Sub-total 427,296 24.3% 14.9% 163% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 55,903 3.2% 5.5% 57% In-country expatriate 103,620 5.9% 4.7% 125% Off-shore staff - 0.3% Other – personnel - 0.6% Sub-total 159,523 9.1% 13.3% 68% Personnel support 114,977 6.5% 7.9% 83% Other costs 28,557 1.6% 2.8% 59% Agency management 115,248 6.5% 3.9% 167% Contingencies - 0.1%

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Compared to other DEC BRCS Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Total project cost 1,761,640 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 1,511,640 85.8% 63.6% 135%

The high proportion of expenditure on blankets and clothes reflect the distribution of non-food-items by the Red Cross .

A7.07 Where BRCS stood out

A7.07.1 CVM CVM played a very important role in the whole flood response. Many agency interviewees spoke highly of CVM and worked closely with its volunteers. BRCS is fortunate to have such a capable partner. Part of this capacity may stem from the long-term BRCS support for CVM. BRCS has been working closely with CVM for five years, and BRCS support was very highly spoken of by those CVM delegates interviewed. BRCS’s long-term commitment is shown in its plans for continued funding for operations in Mozambique.

A7.07.2 DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW MODEL OF WORKING In the case of the Mozambique flood emergency, BRCS developed a new model for co- operation between National Red Cross societies and the IFRC. Although specific to the Red Cross movement, it is a model that could be used by other DEC agencies with strong networks. In the new model, BRCS established a sub-delegation on behalf of the IFRC in Beira. This allowed the Maputo delegation to concentrate on the south while avoiding the risks posed by a bilateral BRCS involvement in Beira.

A7.08 Areas needing attention

A7.08.1 REPORTING BRCS reporting has been poor compared to other agencies. The cause is not BRCS itself, but delays by their partner IFRC in reporting on the use of BRCS DEC funds received. The BRCS financial report was received only in late April, and the BRCS narrative report neither shows the costs of the individual projects nor the percentages funded by DEC.

A7.08.2 SPEED Although BRCS had intended to support the rehabilitation of clinics under an IFRC project, IFRC progressed so slowly that no work could be done within the DEC funding period. This led to BRCS returning 54% of the funds received from the DECA.

A It should be noted that the problem is not BRCS’s speed of response (which was noticeably faster than that of other larger northern Red Cross societies) but of their partner IFRC.

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A7.09 BRCS’s plans for the future BRCS will continue to fund CVM and IFRC operations in Mozambique and to develop its partnership with the CVM in the areas of Institutional Development and HIV/AIDS.

A7.10 Recommendation to BRCS Management BRCS should work further with the IFRC to improve IFRC’s speed of action to make them a more viable partner for the use of time-limited DEC funds, and to improve the timeliness of their reporting.

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Appendix 8: CAFOD: Summary of activities

“CAFOD is a major British charity that has been fighting third world poverty since 1962. We believe that all human beings have a right to dignity and respect and that the world's resources are a gift to be shared by all men and women, whatever their race, nationality or religion.

CAFOD is the English and Welsh arm of Caritas Internationalis, a worldwide network of Catholic relief and development organisations. With the help of our network of Regional Organisers throughout England and Wales, CAFOD works in partnership on over 1,000 programmes worldwideA.”

A8.01 Context CAFOD have worked in Mozambique since the mid 1980’s. They began work in relief operations in the northern provinces of Mozambique and in Maputo Province. They have both secular and church partners in Mozambique.

A8.02 CAFOD’s Approach CAFOD strongly believe that, even during emergency work, it is necessary to take into consideration the long-term sustainability of activities undertaken and to consciously work with partners to build capacity for the future. During the 2000 floods, CAFOD worked with existing partners and two small international partners who were able to fulfil a special need for the affected populations. CAFOD worked with long-term partner the União Geral das Cooperativas (UGC) General Union of Cooperatives, the Caritas, Dioceses de Maputo (CDM) Maputo Dioceses Caritas, the National Caritas Office, and international partners OIKOS and VetAid (Veterinary Aid). The overall goal of the CAFOD programme was to prepare emergency responses according to partner capacity, support partners in implementation according to Sphere Standards and within the Code of Conduct, monitor and evaluate the activities and, finally, learn lessons in order to inform future emergency response.

A8.03 The CAFOD Network CAFOD is part of Caritas Internationalis. After some initial delay, Caritas International agencies established a coordination network in Mozambique with different focal agencies for relief and development assistance.

A8.04 CAFOD’s response to the Floods By 11 February CAFOD was beginning to receive reports from partners in Mozambique about the floods and responded to this with funding. At the beginning of March, CAFOD staff came to look at the situation in Mozambique and work with partners to prepare an emergency response programme. They began to work with

A http://www.cafod.org.uk/

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partners and maintained a support presence in the country throughout the critical period of the emergency.

A8.05 CAFOD’s DEC-funded activities

Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Maputo UGC Housing project 775,846 Province • distribution of 1,090 shelter kits • distribution of 1,090 household kits Maputo UGC Agriculture and water 322,878 Province • seeds and Tools for 6,954 families • distribution of 57 heifers • distribution of 366 goats • 38 boreholes drilled • six 5,000-litre water tanks installed • 29 2,500-litre water tanks installed • 25 pumps installed Maputo UGC Poultry project 176,904 Province • rehabilitated 4,000 m2 of UGC chicken houses • rehabilitated 12 co-op-managed chicken houses • rehabilitated five family chicken houses • distributed over 450,000 day old chicks Xinavane OIKOS Agricultural rehabilitation 83,505 – Maputo • seeds and tools for 2,000 households Province • 500 people employed on road rehabilitation • 130 ducks/130 rabbits to 100 households • distribution of sweet potato cuttings Maputo Caritas House and latrine construction 175,388 Province (CDM) • 183 houses in Boane • 52 construction kits in Sabie • 124 latrines in Boane • 452 slabs for latrines in Boane • 200 household kits, agriculture tools and blankets • 2 boreholes : Boane Gaza VetAid Livestock restocking 47,949 Province • 100 heifers to 50 families Maputo CAFOD Project monitoring and support 60,020 • one project accompanier Total 1,642,490

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A8.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC CAFOD Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health - 4.6% Water/sanitation 353,926 14.3% 7.6% 187% Food 50,093 2.0% 1.1% 177% Agriculture 412,880 16.7% 9.2% 182% Shelter 596,928 24.1% 8.2% 293% Household items 52,516 2.1% 7.1% 30% Blankets and clothes - 0.5% Education - 2.2% Other 530,056 21.4% 6.5% 332% Sub-total 1,996,399 80.7% 54.3% 149% Non-personnel costs Procurement 9,251 0.4% 1.9% 20% Transport 166,336 6.7% 8.6% 78% Storage/security - 0.5% Office 2,977 0.1% 3.0% 4% Other - 0.5% Sub-total 178,563 7.2% 16.4% 44% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 135,251 5.5% 5.4% 102% In-country expatriate 17,180 0.7% 5.2% 13% Off-shore staff - 0.3% Other - personnel 5 0.0% 0.7% 0% Sub-total 152,437 6.2% 13.7% 45% Personnel support 41,419 1.7% 8.4% 20% Other costs 2,040 0.1% 2.9% 3% Agency management 75,130 3.0% 4.2% 72% Contingencies 27,698 1.1% 0.0% 7904% Total project cost 2,473,685 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 1,642,490 66.4% 64.9% 102%

Contingency items arose because of increases in costs for UGC’s poultry, agricultural, and water projects. “Other” expenditures arose because CAFOD used a different coding system from other agenciesA and the evaluation team allocated restocking to this line for CAFOD.

A Most agencies used the example codings given in the DEC manual, even though these were only examples and not the codings to be used. However, the use of common codings between the agencies make inter-agency benchmarking much easier.

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A8.07 Where CAFOD stood out

A8.07.1 WORKING CLOSELY WITH PARTNERS CAFOD managed a complex programme with a variety of partners. Each partner had strengths and weaknesses. These were recognised by CAFOD who sought to overcome the problems together and create long-term advantages for the local organisations.

A8.07.2 FLEXIBILITY IN PARTNERSHIP While CAFOD had funded projects with UGC before, it was unusual for the bulk of CAFOD’s funding to go to the secular UGC rather than to the national Caritas Society. Working closely with UGC meant that the emergency programme was able to adapt itself to the rapidly changing circumstances presented in the Province of Maputo. This made for a programme that addressed the needs of the affected households.

A8.07.3 JOINT WORKSHOP WITH CHRISTIAN AID One excellent initiative undertaken by CAFOD and Christian Aid was a joint workshop with their partners to develop lessons from the emergency programme.

A8.08 Areas needing attention

A8.08.1 PROJECT PLANNING More careful consideration needs to be taken about the necessary duration of projects when they include major rehabilitation, construction, or water and sanitation activities. Underestimating time and supervision needs can severely undermine the efficacy of these projects.

A8.09 CAFOD’s plans for the future CAFOD will continue to work with their original partners and feel that the work carried out during the emergency period has deepened understanding on both sides of the partnership.

A8.10 Recommendation to CAFOD Headquarters CAFOD should remain flexible about which partners it funds and remain open to funding local partners outside of the Caritas Network. CAFOD was able to achieve so much because the majority of funding was channelled through a secular, community-based partner with far greater capacity than the Caritas partner CDM. CAFOD should consider using the project accompanier model in future emergencies. Using a project accompanier to support partners and to alert London to problems and opportunities at an early stage was a success in Mozambique and allowed CAFOD to respond to the capacity demonstrated by partners on the ground.

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CAFOD, Christian Aid, and Tearfund, despite their confessional differencesA, share many features of their programmes and may have much to learn from sharing their experiences. The joint workshop held by CAFOD and Christian Aid was very positive. CAFOD should again seek to share experience with Christian Aid and also with Tearfund and their partners in future operations.

A The roots of the agencies are in the Established, Protestant Evangelical, and Catholic Churches respectively.

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Appendix 9: Christian Aid: Summary of activities

“An agency of the churches in the UK and Ireland, Christian Aid works wherever the need is greatest, regardless of religion. It works through local organisations that understand local needs, as well as giving help on the ground through 16 overseas offices.

Christian Aid believes in strengthening people to find their own solutions to the problems they face. It strives for a new world transformed by an end to poverty and campaigns to change the rules that keep people poor.A”

A9.01 Context Christian Aid (CA) has been working with local partners in Mozambique for over 20 years. The main partners are the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM), the Rural Association for Mutual Support (ORAM), the Ecumenical Committee for Social Development (CEDES), and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). During the emergency period, Christian Aid also supported LINK, an NGO forum based in Maputo and the Presbyterian Church of Mozambique (IPM). Christian Aid has supported CCM for 20 years. Initially CCM was involved in emergency relief work during the war. After the Peace Accords, CCM became involved in rehabilitation of infrastructures and has moved towards agricultural sector support and community development activities. ORAM was established in the early 1990s and has been supported by Christian Aid since its inception. ORAM was initially involved in land conflict issues and has in recent years broadened its mandate to include food security and credit activities. CEDES was initially an organisation called Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration (RRR), which was set-up by CCM, Caritas, and LWF to deal with the need for reconstruction after peace. Christian Aid supported the RRR programme in 1993, and have continued to support the more recently formed CEDES. LWF have been working in Mozambique since 1977. Christian Aid and LWF collaborated during the 2000 emergency.

A9.02 Christian Aid’s Approach Christian Aid work through partners in their development work, and carried this through to their emergency interventions, working with the partners listed above. Christian Aid provided technical back-up skills in the area of monitoring and evaluations, preparation of proposals and training. Christian Aid emphasise that even in emergency situations it is important to look and plan for the longer term. This is reflected in their own emergency appeals and in their response to emergencies.

A From http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/

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A9.03 The Christian Aid Network Christian Aid is a member of the Action by Churches Together (ACT) network. ACT is a loose network of protestant church agencies set up jointly by LWF and the World Council of Churches. In Mozambique, CCM and LWF are also ACT members. After criticism of poor co-ordination between ACT members in an ACT evaluation of the flood response, CCM and LWF now have fortnightly co-ordination meetings.

A9.04 Christian Aid’s response to the floods Christian Aid began receiving reports from local partners as early as January, and their headquarters was alerted to the situation. Partners were involved in immediate relief work during February. On 21 February, in response to a request from partners, a decision was taken to send a technical team to Mozambique. A Christian Aid Southern African Appeal was launched on 24 February, and Christian Aid opted into the DEC appeal. During the first week of March, proposals were written with the support of the Christian Aid team, and by 10 March all emergency and relief grants had been approved and transferred to partners, totalling £1.2 million. Further grants were made during the rehabilitation phase.

A9.05 Christian Aid’s DEC-funded activities

Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Sofala, CCM Emergency relief 713,299 Inhambane, • distribution of 20,400 family survival Gaza, and kits Maputo • distribution of 22,300 kits of vegetable Provinces seeds • distribution of 22,300 seed and tool kits Sofala, CCM Emergency shelter programme 436,428 Inhambane, • construction of 1,245 homes targeted at Gaza vulnerable individuals note: CCM constructed houses and did not just supply house kits as most other agencies did Sofala, CCM Agricultural rehabilitation 208,490 Inhambane, • distributed seeds for long agricultural Gaza season to 17,500 families Gaza ORAM Emergency relief 143,512 • distribution of 6,000 survival kits • distribution of 7,514 seed and tool kits Gaza ORAM Emergency rehabilitation 203,290 • cash-for-work for 62,318 person days for drainage clearance, house construction and road access Maputo CEDES Emergency relief 64,430 • food aid for 9,000 • seed and tool kits for 2,940 families

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Maputo CEDES Emergency rehabilitation 70,017 • cash-for-work for 614 households with 30 days employment on road opening Maputo CEDES Second season seeds 41,780 • seeds for 3,940 families Maputo IPM Capacity building 8,013 • financial support services (accountant) LINK Co-ordination support 11,802 • funding for information and database CA Programme support 90,000 • monitoring by CA staff • on-the-job training for partners LWF Emergency response programme 287,285 • food aid distribution • food for work programmes • seeds and tools distribution • agricultural assistance Total 2,278,346

A9.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC Christian Aid Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health - 4.8% Water/sanitation - 9.4% Food 94,705 3.1% 1.0% 316% Agriculture 709,952 23.2% 8.1% 286% Shelter 308,107 10.1% 9.7% 104% Household items 677,728 22.2% 4.6% 484% Blankets and clothes - 0.5% Education - 2.2% Other 132,345 4.3% 8.3% 52% Sub-total 1,922,837 62.9% 56.0% 112% Non-personnel costs Procurement 9,080 0.3% 1.9% 16% Transport 321,255 10.5% 8.2% 129% Storage/security 19,655 0.6% 0.4% 164% Office 40,378 1.3% 2.9% 46% Other 45,002 1.5% 0.3% 528% Sub-total 435,369 14.2% 15.7% 91% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 225,856 7.4% 5.1% 145%

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Compared to other DEC Christian Aid Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others In-country expatriate 47,987 1.6% 5.2% 30% Off-shore staff 32,060 1.0% 0.1% 700% Other - personnel 27,903 0.9% 0.6% 164% Sub-total 333,806 10.9% 13.3% 82% Personnel support 296,206 9.7% 7.6% 128% Other costs 20,975 0.7% 2.9% 23% Agency management 47,439 1.6% 4.4% 35% Contingencies - 0.1% Total project cost 3,056,633 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 2,278,347 74.5% 63.8% 117%

A9.07 Where Christian Aid stood out

A9.07.1 WORKING CLOSELY WITH PARTNERS Partnership work was very effective. Christian Aid worked well and consistently with a variety of partners. This approach represented a challenge, particularly in an emergency situation. Christian Aid provided strategic support for partners’ weaker aspects.

A9.07.2 JOINT LESSON LEARNING WITH CAFOD A joint “lessons learnt” seminar was held with partners together with CAFOD. This very positive step helped to strengthen not only partner organisations, but also Christian Aid’s own ability to intervene in an emergency.

A9.07.3 REACH Only CVM exceeded the reach of Christian Aid’s partners. Christian Aid’s partners were particularly evident in the areas of the country that were hardest to reach such as Guija, Machanga, and Muxungu.

A9.07.4 USE OF CASH-FOR-WORK More than any other DEC agency, Christian Aid partners made large use of cash-for- work. Beneficiaries were very positive about this and it was particularly appropriate in the south were there is already a strong cash economy.

A9.08 Areas needing attention

A9.08.1 COMPLEX NETWORK ARRANGEMENTS Many of the DEC agencies worked with LWF. Both Oxfam and Concern left parts of their planned programmes to LWF to finish, and LWF also assisted other DEC agencies. However, Christian Aid gave proportionately little support to this strong

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partner. At the same time, the partners that Christian Aid did fund also had multiple funding sources and there was some evidence of agencies being pulled in different directions by different donors. One approach might have been to have had more network discipline with lead network agencies in different locations or sectors (as Caritas Internationalis, and to some extent the Red Cross and Oxfam International did). Another might have been to encourage partners like CCM and LWF to undertake joint programmes with Christian Aid finance.

A9.09 Christian Aid’s plans for the future Christian Aid plans to continue to support their traditional partners in Mozambique with development work.

A9.10 Recommendation to Christian Aid management Christian’s Aid’s approach to working with partners worked well. In future emergencies, Christian Aid would do well to follow the model used in Mozambique, with a project accompanier and support for partners. Christian Aid, CAFOD, and Tearfund, despite their confessional differences,A share many features of their programmes and may have much to learn from sharing their experiences. The joint workshop held by CAFOD and Christian Aid was very positive. Christian Aid should again seek to share experience with CAFOD and Tearfund and their partners in future operations.

A The roots of the agencies are in the Established, Catholic, and Protestant Evangelical Churches respectively.

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Appendix 10: Concern: Summary of activities

“Founded in Ireland in response to famine in Biafra in 1968, Concern has continued to direct resources towards the alleviation and elimination of poverty among people living in extreme or absolute poverty in the poorest countries of the world.

Our integrated programme strategy towards poverty elimination is carried out in three key areas: 1) Emergency Response 2) Development Work 3) Advocacy and Development Education.”A

A10.01 Context Concern started work in Nampula Province, Mozambique, in 1987. Response to a drought which had affected Manica Province led, in 1992-93, to a rehabilitation programme covering Chimoio City and Gondola District. Majune District in Niassa was added to the Concern project portfolio in 1994. By the time of the floods in 2000, Concern was operational in four provinces (Nampula, Niassa, Manica, and Maputo). Of these, both Manica and Maputo were directly affected by the flooding. However, the Concern programmes there were either small programmes through partners (Maputo) or not directly located in the affected districts (Manica).

A10.02 Concern’s Approach The stability following the Peace Accords in Mozambique allowed Concern to engage in longer term planning. Concern Mozambique developed a participatory methodology based on the identification and/or creation of groups. These groups are empowered to define their problems and objectives to resolve them, resourced initially by Concern. Attention has recently also been given to capacity-building of local civil society organisations in each of the programme areas, which now include Maputo, and to improving institutional links between communities and local government. This capacity building has led to some funding of local organisations.

A10.03 The Concern Network Concern is a member of many agency groupings and networks, but is essentially an individual NGO rather than a member of a “Concern” network.

A10.04 Concern’s response to the Floods Concern’s response began before the late February floods that eventually triggered the DEC appeal. Their first response began on 7 February, immediately after the heavy rain in Maputo that left many homeless. Concern distributed food to 1,000 of the worst affected families. Concern also sent an environmental health officer from Dublin, who was in place to assist with the response to the flooding at the end of February.

A From http://www.Concern.org

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A10.05 Concern’s DEC-funded activities Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Manica Concern and Emergency phase interventions Not stated local • distributed food aid to over 7,000 authorities families in Machaze and Sussundenga and districts for WFP after providing initial communities food items from own resources • seeds and tools distributed to the same 7,000 families as received food • emergency shelter and non-food items were distributed to 1,022 families • concern repaired 2km of road, repaired a drift and assisted communities and the roads department to rehabilitate a further 5km of road to allow relief items in Sofala Concern, local Emergency phase interventions: Not stated authorities, • evacuation of 600 families to safer ACF, FHI ground using DFID boats and locally hired tractors • distributed food to 528 families • provided logistics and personnel support to both ACF and FHI for their WFP distributions • built 110 temporary latrines in Gwara- Gwara camp • installing small water system in Gwara- Gwara camp • distribution of 500 tents, 1,366 plastic tarpaulins, 1,260 Concern blankets, 2,310 INGC blankets, 447 kitchen sets and 1,360 jerry-cans in five villages and two TACs • distributed agricultural tools, with vegetable and bean seed, to 523 families • provided ACF with 1,200 similar seed and tool kits for distribution Gaza Concern, Emergency phase Not stated Nazarene • construction of 364 latrines Church, • cleaning 50 wells and rehabilitation or World Relief, improving 20 Oxfam, MoH, • distribution of 2,956 kitchen sets, 9,406 and local blankets, 8,922 jerry-cans, 8391 plastic authorities tarpaulins, and 101 tents to 8,505 displaced families (with Caritas and

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ World Relief) • distribution of 1,083 supplementary seed and tool kits in Massingir • distribution of 5,082 seed and tool kits for main planting season • distribution of 10,000 insecticide- treated bed-nets and carrying out detailed before and after surveys • various nutrition surveys in conjunction with Oxfam, MSF, MoH, and UNICEF • support to 11 local crèches with 3,184 children Sofala Concern, local Rehabilitation phase Not Stated authorities, • rehabilitated the secondary school and LWF the boy’s dormitory in Buzi town • built two primary schools with latrines and teachers houses • rebuilt one block of Gwara-Gwara primary school • rebuilt one block of a primary school in Buzi Town • built latrines at all schools except the secondary one • rewired and fitted electrical installations for night-time use for adult education wherever electricity was available • provided school furniture as necessary Gaza Concern, local Rehabilitation phase Not stated authorities • rehabilitated eight school buildings • rehabilitated three health posts • repaired 4.8km of tertiary road with retaining wall and cross drains Total 990,789

A10.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC Concern Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. For others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health - 4.5% Water/sanitation 36,146 1.8% 8.8% 21% Food 31,956 1.6% 1.2% 133% Agriculture 215,220 10.7% 9.8% 110% Shelter 370,509 18.5% 9.0% 205% Household items - 7.2% Blankets and clothes - 0.5%

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Education - 2.1% Other 253,355 12.7% 7.5% 169% Sub-total 907,186 45.3% 57.7% 78% Non-personnel costs Procurement 356,002 17.8% 0.4% 4434% Transport 156,158 7.8% 8.5% 92% Storage/security - 0.5% Office 56,296 2.8% 2.7% 105% Other 59,134 3.0% 0.2% 1414% Sub-total 627,590 31.3% 14.2% 220% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 155,892 7.8% 5.2% 151% In-country expatriate 78,608 3.9% 4.9% 81% Off-shore staff - 0.3% Other - personnel 46,504 2.3% 0.5% 507% Sub-total 281,004 14.0% 12.9% 109% Personnel support 109,539 5.5% 8.0% 68% Other costs - 2.9% Agency management 77,013 3.8% 4.1% 94% Contingencies - 0.1% Total project cost 2,002,332 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 990,789 49.5% 66.4% 75%

The large costs for procurement refer to the total costs of purchasing materials rather than to the cost of procurement itself.

A10.07 Where Concern stood out

A10.07.1 USING NATIONAL STAFF Concern made extensive use of national staff from its development programme. This gave Concern’s programme a depth of quality, and ensured that these staff will be well placed to deal with any emergencies in their programme areas in future.

A10.07.2 MAINTAINING AN EMERGENCY STOCK Concern maintains a stock of emergency material in Rotterdam that allows it to respond quickly in an emergency. Concern reviewed this stock as a result of the Mozambique experience.

A10.07.3 A CENTRAL COMMITMENT TO EMERGENCY RESPONSE Emergency response is a central plank in Concern’s policy as it realises that failure to intervene can lead to communities slipping into states of extreme poverty and vulnerability. This means that Concern’s emergency response is probably more integrated into its overall programme than may be the case for other agencies.

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A10.08 Areas needing attention

A10.08.1 ABRUPT TERMINATION As with Oxfam, Concern carried out relatively long-term programmes, such as bed- net distributions, in areas where it did not continue working. Also like Oxfam, it relied on LWF to complete some of its planned work in the education sector. While there may be good reasons for agencies not to remain in an area after an emergency, the evaluation team felt that termination should be phased out rather than done abruptly. If the programme is to be continued by partners, the question arises as to whether it is not more efficient to fund these partners from the start rather than opening a short-term programme.

A10.08.2 NOT MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Although Concern has run emergency management training in the past, it is some years since its last course. While it planned to carry out some disaster preparedness training using DEC phase two funds, it would have been better not to have had a gap in the training.

A10.09 Concern’s plans for the future Concern has already closed its emergency programmes in Gaza and Sofala. It continues to work in Manica, though not in the flood-affected area.

A10.10 Recommendation to Concern Management Where no ongoing programme of work is planned and complex works have been undertaken, Concern should provide some presence and support for a reasonable period after an emergency to resolve outstanding issues. A continuing presence could involve as little as short monitoring visits to check if any problems have arisen that Concern may feel morally obliged to resolve. Even when work is sub-contracted to another agency there is still a need to follow up.

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Appendix 11: HelpAge International: Summary of activities

“Help the Aged works for disadvantaged older people all over the world as a member of HelpAge International, a global network of organisations that was founded in 1983 by Help the Aged (UK), Help the Aged (Canada), HelpAge India, HelpAge Kenya and Pro-Vida Colombia. There are now over 50 member organisations. Help the Aged (UK) continues to play a leading role in support of HelpAge International.

In some countries, where disaster, conflict or social transition has created particularly acute situations, or where there are no organisations working with older people, HelpAge International runs its own programmes to provide assistance to vulnerable older people.

HelpAge International focuses on income security, health (particularly ophthalmic health), training, age care, rehabilitation, relief, advocacy and the provision of information about age-related issues. A priority of HelpAge International is to work through and support local organisations assisting older people.A”

A11.01 Context HelpAge International (HelpAge) is the international arm of Help the Aged. While Help the Aged is the DEC member agency, it is HelpAge that carries out the work overseas. HelpAge is based in Help the Aged’s London office. HelpAge has a longstanding development programme in Mozambique having worked in the country since 1988. They work through a variety of partners and members as well as implementing a development programme in the central Province of Tete. In 1994 HelpAge were active in a resettlement programme in the Province of Tete, when Mozambicans returned from Zimbabwe after the end of the war. HelpAge staff comprises a Country Director, with nine programme and administrative staff in Maputo, and a field office in Tete Province that employs a further fourteen local staff. HelpAge is active in advocacy issues concerning the elderly as well as supporting partner projects to improve the welfare of the aged in Mozambique. HelpAge is also part of a forum for older people active in advocacy issues in Mozambique.

A11.02 HelpAge International’s Approach HelpAge worked with member and partner organisations in the aftermath of Cyclone Eline. The main partners were Mozambique Retired Association (APOSEMO), and VUKOSA a local NGO based in Chokwe, where the town and surrounding countryside was deeply affected by the floods. HelpAge was also active in promoting the rights of older people among all the agencies responding to the floods, including the other DEC agencies. Best practice

A http://www.helptheaged.org.uk/

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literature was distributed and HelpAge encouraged other NGOs to consider the elderly.

A11.03 The HelpAge International Network HelpAge is a network of organizations made up of members. In many countries there are local HelpAge organisations with local boards of management. In Mozambique HelpAge continues to be a direct implementation programme, but works closely with partners and members of the network.

A11.03.1 HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL’S RESPONSE TO THE FLOODS From early February HelpAge worked with partner VUKOSA and member organisation APOSEMO to offer immediate relief in Maputo and Chokwe through needs assessments and distribution of vital goods. During this critical period HelpAge was active in supporting the partner organisations by providing logistical and financial support for the relief efforts. In the weeks that followed, HelpAge was actively involved in seeking funds to implement a full-scale programme for Maputo and Gaza Provinces supporting 7,500 older people and their dependants. Help the Aged UK opted into the DEC appeal, and the proposals for the funding were prepared in a timely fashion.

A11.04 HelpAge International’s DEC-funded activities Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Gaza and VUKOSA Relief items 163,673 Maputo APOSEMO • Food x 6 months x 1340 families. • Distribution of survival kits, hygiene items, blankets, and capulanas. Gaza and VUKOSA Shelter 46,605 Maputo APOSEMO • 661 houses constructed or rehabilitated. Gaza and VUKOSA Rehabilitation and Revival of Agriculture 56,499 Maputo APOSEMO • seeds and tool/ 1,340 elderly. • distributing oxen for draught power. Gaza and VUKOSA Income generating activities 7,699 Maputo APOSEMO • Revived VUKOSA kerosene project. • Established village shop. • Promoted communal vegetable planting for sale. • Supported brick moulding venture – APOSEMO. • Held two 2-day workshops on Income Generating activities with both partners. VUKOSA Capacity Building with partners 8,522 APOSEMO • Held 8 workshops – raising awareness of role of older people in emergencies, and practical assessment tools. • Logistical and administrative support to partners.

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• Revived VUKOSA . Total 282,998

A11.05 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC HelpAge International Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health 6,512 1.3% 4.3% 31% Water/sanitation - 8.4% Food 64,059 13.1% 1.0% 1306% Agriculture 56,499 11.5% 9.8% 117% Shelter 46,605 9.5% 9.7% 98% Household items 22,870 4.7% 6.7% 70% Blankets and clothes 61,392 12.5% 0.2% 5065% Education - 2.0% Other 16,221 3.3% 7.9% 42% Sub-total 274,158 56.0% 56.8% 99% Non-personnel costs Procurement 8,840 1.8% 1.7% 105% Transport 11,161 2.3% 8.6% 27% Storage/security - 0.4% Office 17,902 3.7% 2.7% 136% Other - 0.4% Sub-total 37,903 7.7% 15.7% 49% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged - 5.5% In-country expatriate - 4.9% Off-shore staff - 0.3% Other - personnel - 0.6% Sub-total - 3.6% Personnel support 80,541 16.4% 7.6% 215% Other costs - 2.7% Agency management 32,036 6.5% 4.0% 162% Contingencies - 0.1% Total project cost 489,693 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 388,123 79.3% 64.8% 122%

High spending on blankets and food reflects the costs of the survival kits and of the food distributed.

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A11.06 Where HelpAge stood out

A11.06.1 ADVOCACY HelpAge carried out some excellent advocacy work with other agencies, and raised agency awareness of the needs of older people in emergencies. A timely distribution of an excellent “Best Practice” publication in Portuguese was also carried out.

A11.07 Areas needing attention

A11.07.1 LACK OF BROADER MONITORING While HelpAge’s promotion of awareness of the needs of the elderly was excellent, this was not followed up. It would have been more effective if HelpAge had visited project areas throughout the country and had monitored how other agencies were treating the elderly. The evidence, in the lack of age-disaggregated data collected by other agencies, suggests that targeting of the elderly was not adequate.

A11.08 HelpAge’s plans for the future HelpAge held a “lessons learnt” workshop with its member and partner organisations that had worked together during the emergency period. HelpAge continues its commitment to strengthen local organisations working with the elderly. It appears that the emergency work has consolidated some of these relationships and that they will form part of an on-going long-term commitment by HelpAge in Mozambique. In particular HelpAge will work with VUKOSA, the Chokwe based NGO, to strengthen their institutional base and develop plans for the support of the elderly in the district.

A11.09 Recommendation to HelpAge Management HelpAge has relatively small resources and cannot hope to reach all of the elderly in any emergency. HelpAge has made a very good start towards advocacy for the elderly, but could leverage its specialist expertise by monitoring the actions of other agencies. In future emergencies, HelpAge should consider establishing a programme of broader monitoring to identify whether other agencies are adequately targeting the elderly. This could include looking at whether agencies are collecting age-disaggregated data, as well as ensuring adequate access to the elderly to the services that they are providing, and that preconditions for aid (e.g. a labour contribution) do not exclude the elderly. While such monitoring could be more effective if it were carried out with the consent of the other agencies, the evaluation team felt that this was not a pre-requisite as it would check whether the elderly were getting the humanitarian assistance to which they were entitled.

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Appendix 12: Merlin: Summary of activities

“Merlin is a UK-based, non-profit, non-partisan NGO, which provides live- saving healthcare for people in crisis and disaster situations, regardless of race, religion or political affiliation. We specialise in reaching the poorest countries with the most difficult environments and complex emergencies, supporting vulnerable people when local infrastructure has broken down. Our work directly impacts in the fight against poverty – helping people back to work and education.

Since its foundation in 1993, Merlin has gained a reputation for excellent project management and the ability to deliver. It is a charity for a small planet, prepared to assist anywhere, no matter how inaccessible. Currently our target population is 10 million people, including in Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Russia and Tajikistan. We do not build new health services but seek to work in partnership with existing local health structures, helping to develop capacity by supplying essential drugs and providing training and education in healthcare and disease control.

Our programmes are staffed by international volunteers and locals with expertise in medicine or logistics. In the last two years we trained over 3,000 local health professionals, supported 500 local health facilities, immunised 500,000 children, provided antenatal care, "safe motherhood" programmes and therapeutic feeding centres to combat malnutrition. Merlin provides key primary healthcare and specialises in disease control, particularly of malaria and tuberculosis (including drug-resistant strains).A”

A12.01 Context Merlin had no history of working in Mozambique and responded as part of the DEC appeal to the floods. Its speciality is to work at the acute phase of emergencies to provide essential curative and preventive health care.

A12.02 Merlin’s Approach Merlin worked with the INGC, provincial and district health authorities, and local and international partners. They provided health care and preventive care to flood victims both in camps and within the population. Merlin worked in close collaboration with the National Malaria Programme and UNICEF in a bed-net distribution that took place outside their operational area, and with local and international partners in the urban areas.

A http://www.merlin.org.uk/

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A12.03 The Merlin Network Merlin is an independent agency and does not belong to any Merlin-specific network. It is a member of a number of international networks.

A12.04 Merlin’s response to the Floods On 20 February a request was made from headquarters to monitor the situation in southern Africa. On 4 March the first assessment team was sent to Mozambique, and by the first week in April the team were operational in Sofala Province. Merlin worked with the provincial health authorities in Sofala to identify the districts needing medical and preventive health care assistance. Merlin worked to provide basic health assistance and preventive health care to displaced and flood-affected populations in the Gwara-Gwara Camp in Buzi District, and affected populations in the same district. They also provided support to revitalise the primary health care network in the district. Merlin was active in promoting health and hygiene through a water, latrine, and health education programme in six areas of Beira City. Merlin were committed to working on malaria control, but was requested by Ministry of Health (MoH) to support the National Malaria Control Programme in Gaza in carrying out a controlled bed-net distribution programme with the back-up of UNICEF. Merlin also formed alliances with international NGOs who had working experience in Mozambique, namely Trócaire and Concern.

A12.05 Merlin’s DEC funded activities Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Sofala Health service support Not clearly supporting the provision of health services stated to: • 6,000 in Gwara-Gwara accommodation centre • 1,500 in Buzi town • 10,000 in Bandura camp • 7,940 in eight affected communities Sofala Merlin, MoH Training Not clearly held four refresher courses for health stated workers Buzi, Merlin, MoH Support to health facilities Not clearly Chibabava logistics and technical support for one rural stated and hospital, five health centres and28 health Muchanga posts note: these installations serve a total population of 260,209 Beira City ADC Urban sanitation programme 23,435 • 433 latrines constructed • installed six standpipes in five areas • carried out health education in three areas

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Gaza MoH Malaria Control Programme 54,868 UNICEF 20,000 family size bed-nets distributed Total 279,284

A12.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC Merlin Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health 57,674 19.0% 4.0% 470% Water/sanitation 29,874 9.8% 8.4% 117% Food - 1.2% Agriculture - 10.0% Shelter - 9.8% Household items - 6.7% Blankets and clothes - 0.5% Education - 2.0% Other 54,868 18.0% 7.7% 233% Sub-total 142,416 46.8% 57.0% 82% Non-personnel costs Procurement - 1.7% Transport 9,124 3.0% 8.5% 35% Storage/security - 0.4% Office 8,980 3.0% 2.7% 109% Other - 0.4% Sub-total 18,104 5.9% 15.6% 38% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 11,883 3.9% 5.4% 73% In-country expatriate 44,661 14.7% 4.7% 314% Off-shore staff - 0.3% Other – personnel 1,848 0.6% 0.6% 101% Sub-total 58,393 19.2% 12.9% 149% Personnel support 64,492 21.2% 7.6% 277% Other costs - 2.6% Agency management 20,880 6.9% 4.1% 169% Contingencies - 0.1% Total project cost 304,284 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 279,284 91.8% 68.1% 135%

The “other” line in the supplies and materials budget line is for the purchase of bed- nets for use by UNICEF in Gaza. The relatively high levels of personnel cost are typical of this type of emergency medical programme.

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A12.06.1 WORKING WITH OTHERS Merlin was at a considerable disadvantage having never worked in Mozambique. However, it was able to form strategic alliances both with the government and other actors in order to achieve their aims. This was done through effective communication and networking.

A12.06.2 PROFESSIONAL HEALTH SERVICES Merlin set up a very professional health facility in Gwara-Gwara - a remote area with a high risk of epidemic disease outbreak. They effectively provided health care for the displaced and resident population and controlled a small outbreak of cholera.

A12.07 Areas needing attention

A12.07.1 OPTING-IN As Merlin had no previous experience in Mozambique it faced an uphill struggle to establish a new programme. The costs of starting up a new programme can only be justified if Merlin delivers significant advantages from its intervention. It was not clear that the intervention delivered such significant advantages. Merlin were not able to undertake an impact evaluation was not possible due to the short-term nature of its intervention and the type of activities undertaken.

A12.07.2 GRANT GIVING Merlin gave grants to UNICEF in the form of bed-nets, and to a local community development NGO, Associação para Desenvolvimento Comunitário (ADC – Community Development Association). Merlin appears to have no experience as a grant-giving organisation and it is questionable if it should have experimented with DEC funds in this way. It would normally be preferable to return surplus funds to the DEC than to dispose of them in this wayA. The evaluation team note that UNICEF has still not reported on its use of the donated bed-nets, despite repeated requests from Merlin.

A12.08 Merlin’s plans for the future Merlin made a clear, strategic decision to exit Mozambique based on the following criteria: • the presence of a large number of established NGOs working in the field of health • Mozambique’s anticipated rapid return to a development phase

A Merlin do not regard this as a fair criticism as they asked the permission of the DEC Secretariat to spend money in this way before doing so. However, the DEC Secretariat will only object to spending plans that are clearly at variance with DEC rules, and rather than approving projects in detail in advance, relies on the back-loaded evaluation model for agencies to make sensible expenditure decisions that will “stand up to evaluation”.

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• no obvious niche in immediate or long-term malaria control as defined by NMCP prioritiesA

A12.09 Recommendation to Merlin Management Merlin should very carefully weigh the decision to opt-in to emergencies in areas where there are well developed health services and where Merlin does not have experience, language skills, or existing programmes. The presence of a functioning health service and the relatively rapid return to normality after the floods limited Merlin’s scope in Mozambique. There are many emergencies where this is not the case and where Merlin would have a much larger impact. Merlin should consider establishing a strategic relationship with another DEC agency to allow it to leverage its specialist expertise in medical services within a broader cost framework.

A This was despite the request from the Roll Back Malaria Programme to Merlin to become involved in Mozambique.

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Appendix 13: Oxfam GB: Summary of activities

“Oxfam GB is a development, relief, and campaigning organisation dedicated to finding lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world. We believe that every human being is entitled to a life of dignity and opportunity; and we work with poor communities, local partners, volunteers, and supporters to help this become a reality.”A

A13.01 Context Oxfam is the largest of the DEC agencies and typically receives about one third of the fundingB. Oxfam GB has been operating in Mozambique since 1984, working in partnership with local NGOs, and the municipal authorities. Initially this centred on emergency intervention and infrastructural rehabilitation. Oxfam had longer-term programmes in food security and basic education in Niassa and Zambézia Provinces, away from the flood zone.

A13.02 Oxfam’s Approach Oxfam sent an emergency assessment team to Mozambique following the initial flooding in Maputo and Gaza Province.C Based on this assessment, and given Oxfam’s distinctive competence in emergency public health, it decided to launch an immediate intervention in this sector. This intervention was based in their Humanitarian DepartmentD and involved bringing large numbers of expatriates to Mozambique to quickly install water systems, build latrines, and train health promoters. In addition to this directly implemented programme, Oxfam worked through local partners, especially in the distribution of household kits, and seeds and tools. Despite the early lead taken by Oxfam’s country director, Oxfam’s existing programme was only peripherally involved in these new projects. Oxfam also worked through international agencies. It funded CARE, a DEC agency that decided against opting into the appeal, to a total of £465,325 about half of what it would have received if it had opted into the Mozambique Floods Appeal.

A13.03 The Oxfam Network Oxfam GB is the lead member of the Oxfam International network. Novib, Intermon, and Community Aid Abroad, are all members as are the Oxfam labelled agencies (e.g. Oxfam Quebec, Belgium, Canada, US). Oxfam GB used relationships built up by Oxfam International partners to quickly reach local partners with which Oxfam GB had no recent relationship. The functioning of the Oxfam International network was seen as a success in Mozambique.

A From http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about.htm B A recent change in the DEC rules now limits the maximum share for any agency to 25% of the total. C The team had to evacuate from Chókwè when they were caught by the late February floods. D Formerly known as the Emergency Department.

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A13.04 Oxfam’s response to the Floods Oxfam’s response began before the late February floods that triggered the DEC appeal. A water and sanitation technical expert was diverted to Mozambique from an assignment elsewhere in the region on 14 February to make an assessment. The assessment began on 19 February, when the rest of the team arrived. The assessor returned to Chókwè to begin implementation on Saturday 26 February, but had to flee the major floods very early on Sunday morning. Prior to the floods of late February, Oxfam were planning a small two to three month programme in the accommodation centres. Oxfam’s first charter flight with water and sanitation materials arrived in Maputo on 27 February and this material was used for the initial response. With the increasing scale of the problem, Oxfam’s response was stepped up to include a very broad range of activities.

A13.05 Oxfam’s DEC-funded activities Oxfam carried out a wide range of activities with DEC funds with a broad range of partners. Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £A Macia and Oxfam GB, First phase flood response 403,530 Chókwè OMM • 1,000 taken to safety in search and Chókwè, rescue operation Servir • water to Sphere level standards for 60- 80,000 internally displaced persons 80,000 (IDPs) beneficiaries • 700 emergency latrines in Chiaquelane • promotion of good hygiene – no cholera outbreaks • 60 mobilisers trained Xai-Xai Oxfam GB, Xai Xai flood relief project 474,013 MoH, • 1,600 latrines Ministry of • 36 wells rehabilitated and repaired Public Works, • one hand dug well and nine boreholes Águas de Xai- • 200 basic houses constructed Xai • all supported by social software

63,857 beneficiaries Chókwè Oxfam GB, Flood response Chokwe District 2,415,980 district, • 10,674 latrines municipal and • 51 water sources drilled or dug central • over 250 training days for upgrading government local authority and Oxfam staff departments, • 31 septic tanks repaired and 1,279 UNICEF, RC, cleaned MSF-Swiss, • Chókwè town cleaned and six small WR, Concern,

A In some cases it is clear that the amounts quoted include a small amount of non-DEC funds also.

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £A and LWF towns cleared up • 27 new public tapstands 147,000 • 541 household connections beneficiaries • one town water system constructed and five rehabilitated • 8,495 Oxfam buckets distributed • rehabilitation of central market and other buildings • 3,000 rubbish bins provided, in use • 9,744 household visits • 28 community meetings • 322 health education plays • 392 health talks in public places • 392 puppet theatres in schools • water treatment plant set up • emergency pumps and bladders in two towns with trucking in one town • 27 wells cleaned and protected • nine water committees and 41 maintenance groups formed • 43 water committees trained • provision of tractors, trailers and sludge gulpers • tip site dug and maintained including 3,000 trees planted • 11 incinerators for health posts • six roads repaired • 437km of bladed maintenance • 170km drains maintained and 1,310m drain installed • 1,207 boxes of soap distributed • 9,500 sachets of oral rehydration salts to partners • 10,000 cholera posters and 12,500 pamphlets to partners Massinga, Ministry for Rain water catchment reservoir, 2,998 Inhambane the Co- Massinga Old Age Support Centre Province ordination of • construction of 30m3 rainwater reservoir Social Action • payment of water tankering until rains filled reservoir 80 note: HelpAge were also involved in this beneficiaries centre Gaza District Dept Reconstruction of schools 465,920 of Education • five masonry schools rehabilitated and and LWF. two replaced by prefabricated structures • 16 Rural schools (71 classrooms in all) 12,751 rebuilt

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £A students • computer, car, and training for district staff note: rehabilitation of 31 schools originally planned. Remaining 15 schools passed to LWF for completion through food-for-work Maputo and AMDU Nursery education for resettled 26,470 Inhambane • construction of a nursery school in Magoanine • 4x4 vehicle for the Govuro District programme note: primary school originally planned, but later changed to nursery school Maputo City CARE Rehabilitation of Polana Canico 231,580 International, Primary School Municipality, • repairs to large primary school. The Ministry of rains of Feb 2000 had left one block of Education classrooms in danger of collapse and another with severely undermined 3,647 Pupils foundations • strengthening municipality’s ability to carry out works in an accountable way Maputo UGC Rehabilitation of flood-affected 35,443 Province households 1,250 • shelter for 1,250 beneficiaries • latrines for 750 (remainder provided by other NGOs) • family kits for 250 • 60 boreholes Gaza and UNAC, Oxfam Rehabilitation of agricultural 158,997 Maputo Canada production for small farmers • seeds and tools for 5,163 families 55,125 • tools only for 5,862 families beneficiaries note: additional seeds were provided by others (including DEC, Oxfam and ActionAid) Maputo UGC, Oxfam Poultry rehabilitation project 225,022 Canada • 1,035,000 eggs incubated • 195,000 day-old chicks imported 21,000 • 30,682 breeder hens imported • 176.2 tons of chicken meal provided and veterinary supplies note: UGC’s project was also supported by CAFOD Maputo, Southern Accelerated multiplication and 153,912 Sofala, and African Root distribution of improved varieties of Gaza and Tubers sweet potato Network • support to SARNET to organise (SARNET) multiplication and distribution of sweet

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £A potato cuttings 146,670 • enabling the establishment of 53ha of beneficiaries multiplication sites • enabling the distribution of planting materials to 29,334 families • extensive public education and promotion campaign note: distribution of planting material continued after the end of DEC phase one Maputo UGC, Oxfam Rehabilitation of agricultural 56,003 Canada production for small farmers • distribution of over 167t of DEC-funded 48,035 seed to nearly 10,000 families beneficiaries • distribution of additional UGC- funded seed Chókwè Malaria control programme 455,734 town and 85,000 bed- • 60,000 bed-nets in rural areas district net • 25,000 bed-nets in Chókwè Town beneficiaries • malaria education for 207,000 persons • training of nearly 3,000 volunteers to spread malaria message • extensive surveys before and after • purchase of 50,000 bed-nets Gaza, Oxfam GB , Distribution of family kits 459,378 Maputo and FDC, AMDU, • developing a comprehensive family kit Inhambane UNICEF, with two blankets, five capulanas, Goal, donated knitted blankets, children’s Aposemo, knitted tops, three 500gm bars of soap, ADS, ADPP, 2kg salt, 2kg sugar, 1kg tea, pack of 12 Disability match boxes, set of three pans, four Group, plates, four cups, four spoons, four tea Maleyeru, spoons, one cooking knife, one wooden Malhalhe, and spoon, one paraffin lantern, one large local washing bowl, one paraffin stove, five authorities litres paraffin in a jerry-can, one litre water jug, 14-litre bucket with lid, 20m 52,005 strong cord beneficiaries • distributing the kit to 10,401 families (a further 4,397 kits were funded from other sources) CARE Shelter programme 233,745 International, • distribution of full house kit to 5,006 WR families Mozambique • distribution of partial kit to 283 families note: DEC funding accounted for nearly one 26,445 third of the total cost beneficiaries Programme support 303,832

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £A • deployment of specialist staff from Oxford • strengthening in-country support • administrative costs in Oxford Total 6,071,054A

A13.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC Oxfam Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health 629,372 8.9% 2.5% 358% Water/sanitation 1,568,719 22.2% 3.2% 697% Food 9,041 0.1% 1.6% 8% Agriculture 463,352 6.5% 11.1% 59% Shelter 579,196 8.2% 10.3% 80% Household items 592,638 8.4% 6.0% 140% Blankets and clothes 2,970 0.0% 0.6% 7% Education - 2.7% Other 598,343 8.5% 7.6% 111% Sub-total 4,443,631 62.8% 54.6% 115% Non-personnel costs Procurement 32,971 0.5% 2.2% 21% Transport 477,940 6.8% 9.1% 75% Storage/security 5,989 0.1% 0.5% 16% Office 333,791 4.7% 2.0% 241% Other - 0.6% Sub-total 850,691 12.0% 16.8% 72% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 451,276 6.4% 5.0% 128% In-country expatriate 453,130 6.4% 4.2% 153% Off-shore staff 33,968 0.5% 0.2% 281% Other - personnel 1,102 0.0% 0.8% 2% Sub-total 939,476 13.3% 12.9% 103% Personnel support 731,079 10.3% 6.9% 150% Other costs 55,268 0.8% 3.4% 23% Agency management 52,617 0.7% 5.3% 14% Contingencies 3,390 0.0% 0.1% 33% Total project cost 7,076,152 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 6,071,054 85.8% 57.5% 149%

A This total is not the sum of the column above, as it is clear from the Oxfam report that some of the Oxfam figures include small amounts of non-Dec funding (the overall difference is less than 0.5%).

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The very high expenditures on health and water and sanitation reflect Oxfam’s concentration on public health in this emergency.

A13.07 Where Oxfam stood out The evaluation team found that Oxfam’s response was rapid, professional, and effective. This professional response was built on the capacity of Oxfam’s Humanitarian Department.

A13.07.1 SPEED OF RESPONSE Of all of the DEC agencies, Oxfam has the best emergency response capacity. This reflects both Oxfam’s commitment to humanitarian assistance, and its size. Smaller agencies do not have a broad enough programme to keep a large team of emergency response staff fully occupied with emergencies throughout the world. One agency said that by the time their assessment team flew in they could already see Oxfam materials in the cargo area. The ability to mount operations quickly is vital, as faster interventions are more likely to save lives. The evaluation team considered that Oxfam’s emergency response capacity added significantly to the quality of the overall DEC response in the acute phase.

A13.07.2 EMERGENCY WATER AND SANITATION Oxfam’s response was vital to the humanitarian effort. It quickly installed water supplies and latrines in the largest camp in the country at Chiaquelane and more than any other agency helped to prevent outbreaks of cholera.

A13.07.3 SCALE OF RESPONSE Oxfam’s response was on a very large scale, covering many different sectors and a very large number of beneficiaries. This was appropriate, although it stretched Oxfam management systems to the limit.

A13.07.4 COMMITMENT TO MONITORING Oxfam went to great lengths to monitor the effectiveness of the public health work it was doing. This is clear in the intense surveying that covered the health promotion and malaria control work.

A13.07.5 INTEGRATED PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMME Although there were cracks between the different parts of the programme, Oxfam had both the resources and the will to try to implement an integrated pubic health programme. Water supply, sanitation, and health education were all strong planks in the Oxfam programme, which covered everything from household water storage to cleaning up towns after the floods.

A13.07.6 TRANSPARENCY Oxfam reporting clearly identifies failings in their programmes, and Oxfam staff were very frank in discussing such failings. In their reporting Oxfam also clearly

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identified areas where partners were retaining DEC phase one funds for completion of works after the phase one period of expenditureA. Oxfam’s final report was clear and of high quality.

A13.08 Areas needing attention Those who do nothing do nothing wrong. Oxfam, with the biggest and most active emergency programme of all the DEC agencies, obviously had much more opportunity to get things wrong than other agencies. The comments below should be considered in this light.

A13.08.1 LACK OF CONNECTEDNESS WITH THE EXISTING PROGRAMME Despite rhetoric about a seamless “one programme” approach to relief and development, there were almost no links, other than at country management level, between Oxfam’s existing programmes and the DEC-funded emergency programme. What little integration there wasB proved not to be a success. This lack of connectedness meant that some of Oxfam’s emergency actions were taken without an awareness of the specific Mozambican context. Oxfam’s long-term programme did not contribute any senior national staff to its emergency programme. This is of particular concern in a country where emergencies such as floods and droughts are a regular occurrence, and where exposure of senior national staff to such programmes is likely to develop their capacity. The failure to commit senior staff from the national programme also raises questions about whether Oxfam’s commitment to humanitarianism is too centralised and expatriate- dependent.

A13.08.2 OVER-RELIANCE ON EXPATRIATES The second area of concern may have flowed from the first. The evaluation team were of the opinion that Oxfam relied too much on expatriates and did not do enough to recruit competent national staff for the emergency programme at an early enough stage. Oxfam’s final report acknowledges that this may have been a problem, but also points out that recruitment is difficultC. Many of the senior management and programme support staff in Maputo spoke no Portuguese and had little knowledge of Mozambique.

A The evaluation team have elsewhere recommended that the DEC should consider a formal mechanism for allowing this to happen. ActionAid also clearly identified such ‘carry-over’ funds. B The regular programme was initially responsible for administration and logistics support to the emergency programme, but the emergency programme eventually made their own independent arrangements after some frustration with the service they were getting (interviews with agency staff in Maputo).

C Oxfam point out that the pool of trained candidates is very limited and that there are only 23 secondary schools providing pre-university education in the whole country, while the main university graduates a mere 20% of the students who enrol each year.

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A13.08.3 NINE MONTH PULL-OUT The evaluation team was concerned that Oxfam regional management decided at the early stages of the crisis that its emergency programme would be limited to only nine months. While the evaluation team understand the context of this decision, set as it is against a background of emergency interventions that have continued for years in chronic situations, such decisions should be based not on regional policy, but on an assessment of the humanitarian needA. The evaluation team accept that Oxfam would have changed this decision if there had been a continuing humanitarian crisis, but note that Oxfam had no formal review mechanism for reviewing the level of humanitarian need. The evaluation team do not think that Oxfam should have continued with a full programme beyond the end of the phase one periodB, but do think that such an abrupt termination was inappropriate, and that the policy decision to do so should have been formally reviewed every three months. As well as poor endings to some excellent programmes, such as no follow-up for water committees, or incomplete spares for Água Rural in Chókwè, the evaluation team felt that an opportunity had been lost to learn from Oxfam’s apparently well designed experiments with wide scale public health education in emergencies.

A13.09 Oxfam’s plans for the future Oxfam’s intervention was effectively limited to the nine-month DEC-funding period. Closure of the emergency programme in 2001 was delayed by the response to the flooding along the Zambezi River. In this emergency Oxfam responded faster than the other agencies. The evaluation team note, that with the planned closure of the Oxfam office in MaputoC, Oxfam will be less well placed to respond at such an early stage of any future crisis.

A13.10 Recommendation to Oxfam Management Oxfam should carefully consider the relationship between emergency interventions and existing programmes in future emergencies, including the deployment and training of national staff. Where no ongoing programme of work is planned, Oxfam should provide some presence and support for a reasonable period after an emergency to resolve any outstanding issuesD. While Oxfam has been able to provide some support after the closure of its main programmeA this has been a mixture of planned work and serendipity, and the sharp closure of the programme has left many loose ends.

A Subject to “access to the necessary resources” as principle two of the Code of Conduct puts it. B It could even be argued, as one interviewee from an Oxfam International agency did, that many of the later programmes were more developmental in nature and that Oxfam GB’s earlier relief interventions were more appropriate, and that the programme went on for too long. C The Mozambique programme will, in future, be run from a provincial office. D This could be thought of as being similar to the 12-month guarantee period typical of building work, or the free support period offered with some computer software.

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Appendix 14: Save the Children: Summary of activities

“Save the Children is committed to narrowing the gap between reality and our ideal. We start by listening to children - learning about their lives, their hopes and views. We support practical projects which involve children and their families in improving their day-to-day lives. We also use our global experience and research to lobby for changes that will benefit all children, including future generations.

Save the Children is the leading UK charity working to create a better world for children. We work in 70 countries helping children in the world's most impoverished communities. We are part of the International Save the Children Alliance, which aims to be a truly international movement for children.”B

A14.01 Context Save the Children UKC (henceforth referred to as Save the Children) started working in Mozambique in 1984, placing technical advisers in the Ministry of Health to provide assistance in epidemiology, nutrition, logistics, immunisation, health information systems and information technology. It then expanded into Zambézia Province with a heavy emphasis on infrastructural rehabilitation - rebuilding roads, bridges, and schools. Save the Children also distributed relief items, improved water and sanitation, and supported livelihood projects and social welfare programmes. In 1994, it began a programme of social welfare and education work in Inhambane Province.

A14.02 Save the Children ’s Approach Save the Children’s main partner in Mozambique is local government, in particular the provincial and district directorates for social action, health, and education. Save the Children also works closely with UNICEF and other members of the Save the Children Alliance.

A14.03 The Save the Children Network The Save the Children Alliance is the primary Save the Children network. In Mozambique, Save the Children USD and Save the Children Norway had existing programmes. Alliance members in Maputo meet regularly and draw up common policies.

A One Oxfam-funded prefabricated school lost its roof in a storm in 2001. The cause appears to have been low quality workmanship by Oxfam’s contractor, which was not picked up by the local engineer who supervised the construction (on a contract basis) for Oxfam. Because Oxfam were following up on the Malaria Control Programme, they were able to deal with this issue. B From http://www.savethechildren.org.uk C henceforth referred to as Save the Children D Save the Children US is not a full member of the Alliance as it is unwilling to sign the Alliance Charter, which forbids the use of child sponsorship as a fund raising tool.

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A14.04 Save the Children ’s response to the Floods Save the Children began to respond to the flood emergency in the northern region of Inhambane Province in mid-February 2000. The southern part of the Save River basin was the principal focus in the acute phase of the emergency and work was later extended to other flood-affected districts in the region, specifically Mabote and Inhassôro. The first response was financed by internal reserve funds. Save the Children was one of four DEC agencies to get DFID funds to deal with the consequences of the first floods.

A14.05 Save the Children ’s DEC-funded activities Save the Children has carried out a range of activities, but has concentrated heavily on infrastructural rehabilitation. Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Inhambane SC (UK), Health infrastructure Not Stated MoH, • start of construction of hospital in GACOPI and Mabote to serve approximately 40,000 others people • start of construction of hospital in Doane 54,500 to serve 12,000 beneficiaries • start of construction of health post in Jofane to serve 2,500 • support for vaccination campaign • training in cold chain management • supported national nutritional survey plans with planning and transport • supplied essential drugs for clinics and basic materials for mother and child health care. This included scales, stethoscopes and paediatric equipment • training in drug management • facilitating visits by provincial pharmacist • provision of 10 HF radios to MoH to improve information flow in health sector • supporting seminar to evaluate the health sector emergency response • supporting contingency planning in the health sector • supporting international training for two senior health staff from Inhambane SC (UK), PSI, HIV/AIDS programme Not stated MoH • carrying out a participatory assessment of knowledge and perspectives of youths in northern Inhambane regarding sexual health and behaviour • training in blood safety for health

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ workers • providing AIDS training and distributing condoms to staff Nova SC (UK), Food distribution Not stated Mambone WFP, SC • visited over 2,500 families in their Mauritius homes to determine needs, and distributed 2,521 ration cards • transporting and distributing food to 10,249 people • verification of distributions using food basket monitoring • distributing rice donated by SC Mauritius to those removed from WFP rations roles • referring cases of child malnutrition to the local health centre for supervised supplementary feeding • providing a supplementary 5kg ration of Corn Soya Blend (CSB) to 298 people for a 30-day cycle • providing 15kg of CSB to 440 people during a second cycle SC (UK) and Social welfare Not Stated Ministry of • providing expert advice on child Women and separation from families Social Affairs • sensitisation of helicopter crews to risks of child separation • translating guidelines on child separation into Portuguese and distributing them to camp workers • supporting family reunification by ministry staff • funding training course for dealing with traumatised children SC (UK), Care Non-food distributions Not stated UK, MoEd • distributing over 5,000 blankets in five communities • distributing vegetable seeds to 5,585 families in eight communities • distributing kits with buckets, soap, pots and cups, to over 2,400 families Education Not stated • providing materials for 30 temporary classrooms • beginning the construction of 36 permanent classrooms • distributing school supplies to over 3,500 children, 13 schools and 56 teachers

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ note: while Save the Children did not complete any of these schools by the end of phase one funding, the evaluation team saw several completed schools in April 2001 Road maintenance Not stated • keeping the main road to Nova Mambone open employing a team of at least 50 people, including women, to continually repair the road. These were supported by trucks, tractors, and engineering plant • installing culverts to prevent washing out of sections of the road Total 2,556,772

A14.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC Save the Children Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. For others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health 377,088 14.1% 3.1% 455% Water/sanitation - 9.2% Food 38,755 1.4% 1.2% 120% Agriculture - 11.0% Shelter - 10.8% Household items 145,215 5.4% 6.7% 80% Blankets and clothes 10,586 0.4% 0.5% 81% Education 473,997 17.7% 0.2% 9501% Other 124,969 4.7% 8.2% 57% Sub-total 1,170,610 43.7% 58.3% 75% Non-personnel costs Procurement - 1.9% Transport 515,114 19.2% 7.2% 266% Storage/security 45,676 1.7% 0.3% 615% Office 137,544 5.1% 2.4% 212% Other - 0.5% Sub-total 698,334 26.0% 14.3% 182% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 119,428 4.5% 5.5% 81% In-country expatriate 351,858 13.1% 3.8% 342% Off-shore staff - 0.3% Other – personnel - 0.7% Sub-total 471,286 17.6% 12.5% 141%

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Compared to other DEC Save the Children Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. For others Ratio to others Personnel support 124,050 4.6% 8.2% 57% Other costs 12,624 0.5% 2.9% 16% Agency management 204,552 7.6% 3.7% 207% Contingencies - 0.1% Total project cost 2,681,456 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 2,556,772 95.4% 61.7% 155%

The above table shows the heavy concentration on health and education. With nearly one seventh of its budget spent on expatriate staff costs, Save the Children spent nearly three and a half times as much on international staff than the average for other DEC agencies (see below for further comments).

A14.07 Where Save the Children stood out

A14.07.1 INFRASTRUCTURE The floods of 2000 caused major damage to infrastructure. While many DEC agencies did some infrastructure work, Save the Children placed more emphasis on this than the other agencies. This was appropriate given the much lower level of infrastructure in the Save basin compared to other flood-affected areas. In particular, Save the Children’s efforts to keep the Nova Mambone road open had a major impact on the town7.

A14.07.2 CONTINUING TO WORK IN FLOOD-AFFECTED AREAS Save the Children changed its longer term plans to give it a continuing presence in the flood-affected parts of Inhambane after the end of the present projects. This means that Save the Children has the opportunity to take advantage of investment it made in infrastructure during the emergency phase and to ensure that this translates into better education etc. for the pupils.

A14.07.3 COMMITMENT TO CO-ORDINATION Save the Children led co-ordination efforts in the South Save area. Co-ordination was a particular problem here because of the isolation of the area and the low number of agencies who had worked there before.

A14.08 Areas needing attention

A14.08.1 LACK OF ADVOCACY FOR RE-SETTLERS In Malovane a government minister instructed that settlers should be moved from the east of the main road to the west of the main road. This would involve a great deal of disruption to the community, who have not been able to complete their houses

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because of other labour demands. Save the Children accepted this instruction without question or without raising the negative impact this would have on the community.

A14.08.2 EXCESSIVE USE OF EXPATRIATES Save the Children relied heavily on expatriates to mount their emergency response. Some senior national staff interviewed complained that they had been sidelined by what they perceived as Save the Children’s excessive use of international staff. They also complained that Save the Children had subordinated experienced national staff to less experienced international staff. However, some of these problems may have stemmed from the expectations of senior national staff as to their role in the emergency. Save the Children spent nearly three times more money on international staff than on national staff. Only Merlin, which had no previous presence in Mozambique and a different type of intervention from other agencies, had a higher ratio.

Ratio of Expatriate to National Staff Costs in Phase 1 DEC reports. (Note: HelpAge reported no staff costs in their financial report)

HAI CAFOD Christian Aid Concern ActionAid World Vision Average for all agencies TearFund OXFAM BRCS Save the Children Merlin

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400%

The evaluation team was impressed by the quality of the Save the Children international staff that it met and accept that Save the Children needed to increase the number of expatriates in order to scale up its work rapidly and bring in new skills. Nevertheless, the evaluation team felt that Save the Children failed to make full use of its very experienced national staff and used international staff even for positions (such as logistician) for which good national staff candidates were reportedly available.

A14.08.3 REPORTING The evaluation team only received Save the Children’s final report in May, almost five months after the end of the period of expenditure. While there were special circumstances leading to the delay, such a long delay is indicative either of a low priority being attached to reporting, or to a lack of capacity. This is a serious concern.

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A14.09 Save the Children ’s plans for the future Save the Children will continue to work in the area where the emergency programme was carried out. Some of the planned activities will add depth and value to the work done with DEC funds.

A14.10 Recommendations to Save the Children Management Save the Children should consider how best to gain advantage from its prior investment in national staff, and how to achieve a proper balance between national and international staff. Save the Children should train its staff to understand the implications of the Red Cross Code of Conduct. Save the Children should devote some effort to improving its reporting, including possibly lessening administrative loads on staff, to give them more time for this vital function.

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Appendix 15: Tearfund: Summary of activities

“Tearfund is an evangelical Christian relief and development charity working in partnership to bring help and hope to communities in need around the world.”A

A15.01 Context Tearfund had no prior operational programme in Mozambique, but had funded five local organisations there. Tearfund’s main partner in Mozambique was AEM (Associação Evangélica de Moçambique: Mozambique Evangelical Association) an umbrella group of 35 small evangelical churches. Tearfund had been working with AEM since 1992, the year after AEM was founded. One very interesting aspect of Tearfund’s previous work in Mozambique was its disaster management training, which it provided to a number of partners in the early 1990’s. A training manual in disaster management for church partners was developed. Tearfund continued to support this activity through its partners in Mozambique.

A15.02 Tearfund’s Approach Tearfund typically works through local partners, who are either evangelical churches or related to them. “In partnership with other evangelical Christian groups and churches around the world, Tearfund proclaims and demonstrates the gospel. The gospel underpins all our work as we strive for the physical and spiritual well-being of people. Tearfund provides a channel for this partnership which is expressed through prayer, time and money”B. Tearfund’s base in the evangelical churches is probably its greatest strength. Even though it did not launch an appeal, its supporters contributed £2.3m to flood relief for southern Africa.C Tearfund decided that, given the large number of other international NGOs, the best response was to support local partners rather than setting up a separate operation. Tearfund’s Disaster Response Team (DRT) did run a programme in Mozambique, but this was limited to supporting both local partners and other NGOs.

A15.03 The Tearfund Network Tearfund is a member of the European Partnership of Relief Organisations (EPRO). This is a loose network of five European agencies which share the same evangelical

A From http://www.tearfund.org B From http://www.tearfund.org C Tearfund wrote to all of those contributing to this fund to inform them that the money would be used for southern Africa flood relief and not just Mozambique. Tearfund consulted the Charity Commissioners on this matter. The use of the funds in this way was appropriate, and Tearfund’s approach to this issue demonstrated the very correct way in which it deals with such issues.

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Christian viewpoint. The network partners meet to set agreed policy and procedures, to share human resources and training courses, and to pool knowledge.

A15.04 Tearfund’s response to the Floods Tearfund’s response began before the late February floods that triggered the DEC appeal. It gave its first grant for flood relief on 22 February, prior to the major floods. It also arranged for an assessment visit to Mozambique.

A15.05 Tearfund’s DEC-funded activities Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Maputo and ACRIDEC Emergency kit distribution (38% part- 19,096 Gaza funded by DEC) 13,400 • distributed 1,000 sets of vegetable seeds beneficiaries • distributed 1,000 kits of agriculture and construction tools (not the same beneficiaries as for the seeds) • 680 plastic sheets distributed in Makarita, near Chókwè Matutuine AEM Emergency food distribution (49% part- 4,704 funded by DEC) • distribution of emergency food rations (25 tonnes) note: this grant was made prior to the floods of late February AEM Logistical support (50% part-funded by 12,344 DEC) • purchase of a 4x4 vehicle for project accompaniment • insurance and tax for vehicle for 12 months AEM Capacity building (50% part-funded by 13,881 DEC) • purchase of office equipment • transport for project team • employment of assistant to the AEM Project Co-ordinator DRT OP DRT operations (39% part-funded by 76,433 DEC) • assessment of 80 wells • treatment of 59 wells • technical water and sanitation support for other NGOs • provision of 1,470 jerry-cans • training of partners’ staff Chókwè MCL Rehabilitation (50% part-funded by DEC) 7,991 • distribution of clothing, main crop seeds, 3,056 vegetable seeds, agricultural tools, and

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ beneficiaries roofing sheets to 382 displaced families Chókwè MCL Urban sanitation (47% part-funded by 3,269 DEC) • cleaning of public places and facilities (including markets, roads, and clinics) with a team of 400 ‘volunteers’ receiving food-for-work

Chókwè MCL Capacity building (50% part-funded by 4,531 DEC) • re-equipping of offices • one local staff salary • one motorcycle UK Tearfund UK Support costs. (33% part-funded by DEC) 7,752 • part payment for needs assessment • temporary UK staff Total 150,000A

A15.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC TearFund Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health - 4.2% Water/sanitation - 8.3% Food 7,169 2.9% 1.2% 241% Agriculture 39,646 16.1% 9.8% 165% Shelter 27,649 11.3% 9.7% 116% Household items - 6.7% Blankets and clothes 3,468 1.4% 0.5% 303% Education - 2.0% Other 15,188 6.2% 7.9% 78% Sub-total 93,120 37.9% 57.0% 67% Non-personnel costs Procurement 37,000 15.1% 1.6% 945% Transport 22,920 9.3% 8.4% 111% Storage/security 633 0.3% 0.4% 61% Office 12,242 5.0% 2.7% 186% Other 4,088 1.7% 0.4% 411% Sub-total 76,883 31.3% 15.4% 204% Personnel costs

A Due to a rounding error, the sum of the above amounts is 150,001 rather than 150,000.

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In-country locally engaged 8,259 3.4% 5.4% 62% In-country expatriate 8,000 3.3% 4.8% 68% Off-shore staff 1,000 0.4% 0.3% 161% Other – personnel - 0.6% Sub-total 17,259 7.0% 13.0% 54% Personnel support 18,867 7.7% 7.8% 98% Other costs 7,081 2.9% 2.7% 108% Agency management 32,410 13.2% 4.0% 329% Contingencies - 0.1% Total project cost 245,619 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 150,000 61.1% 65.1% 94%

The high budget levels for procurement reflect the high expenditure on equipment procured for the DRT, rather than procurement per se.

A15.07 Where Tearfund stood out

A15.07.1 CAUTIOUS APPROACH TearFund only took as much money from the DEC as they could sensibly use for the approach that they adopted. This contrasted with some of the larger agencies that were not able to use all the money they originally requested. Tearfund probably made a realistic assessment of their needs for DEC funds given that their traditional local partners had a very limited capacity. Tearfund decided that supporting the operation of others made more sense.

A15.07.2 WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT OTHERS RATHER THAN FLYING THEIR OWN FLAG The DRT that was sent to Mozambique did not try to set up an independent Tearfund programme. Instead they supported the work of others, including other DEC agencies. This was a better use of their limited resources than setting up their own programme would have been. While all the DEC agencies supported each other’s work in some way, Tearfund stood out as a particularly selfless example of this. This is particularly heartening when so many agencies are dominated by self-promotion.

A15.08 Areas needing attention

A15.08.1 SMALL SCALE Tearfund’s response was limited. This was in large part due to the limited capacity of those agencies that meet Tearfund’s strict criteria for partnership. The small scale of its response did not adequately reflect its overall capacity to contribute to the relief of suffering in the Mozambique floodsA.

A This does not contradict the earlier praise of Tearfund for making a realistic assessment of how much money it was going to use.

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A15.09 Tearfund’s plans for the future Tearfund continues to fund programmes with its partners in Mozambique, as well as the other flood-affected countries in the region. The DRT’s operational presence was limited only to the first few months after the flooding.

A15.10 Recommendation to Tearfund Management Tearfund needs to consider how it can maximise its impact in emergencies where evangelical partners have very limited capacity. One approach might be with heavier reinforcement of partner capacity, as Christian Aid did with some of its partners. Another might be to further develop the DRT mechanism. Clearly, greater participation by Tearfund in future DEC appeals would allow more beneficiaries to benefit from it’s ethically driven approach.

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Appendix 16: World Vision: Summary of activities

“World Vision is one of the world's leading aid agencies, currently working in nearly 90 countries and helping over 85 million people in their struggle against poverty, hunger and injustice.

World Vision is a Christian organisation, and a member of several major agency groups including the Disasters and Emergency Committee (DEC), British Overseas NGO's for Development (BOND) and the Consortium for Street Children (CSC)

World Vision receives the financial support of the UK Government, the European Union, charitable trusts corporate supporters - in addition to the 66,000 people who sponsor children in poor communities overseas.A”

A16.01 Context World Vision has worked in Mozambique since the early 1980s, initially in relief and rehabilitation work. Since the end of the war, World Vision has developed extensive development programmes in the fields of health, agriculture, food security, and infrastructure repair. Given the extensive emergency experience of World Vision International, and the depth of knowledge of the country through the country office, the organisation was in a good position to respond rapidly to the disaster.

A16.02 World Vision’s Approach World Vision co-ordinated its work with other agencies and the government to identify areas of the country in most need, and to avoid duplication. The government indicated that World Vision should focus its efforts in the district of Machanga in Sofala and the district of Xai-Xai in Gaza Province. World Vision worked with the provincial and district authorities. In Machanga, World Vision co-ordinated the NGO response in the district.

A16.03 The World Vision Network World Vision Mozambique is part of World Vision International. The Mozambique office is not yet an independent office with a national board of managementB. The programme is funded by donors who either fund World Vision Mozambique directly or through one of the World Vision national offices. World Vision UK funded the Mozambique programme with both DEC and private funds as well as two grants from DFID.

A16.04 World Vision’s response to the Floods By early February, World Vision was already active in assisting flood victims. Needs assessments were carried out, and by March the programmes had been designed and

A http://www.worldvision.org.uk/ B Neighbouring South Africa and Zimbabwe have national offices.

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funded. The overall aim of the World Vision emergency programme was to render immediate assistance to 17,100 families (85,500 people) in Machanga district of Sofala Province and in Xai-Xai in Gaza Province. After the distribution of basic survival items, the programme began to support infrastructure repairs in the two districts.

A16.05 World Vision’s DEC-funded activities Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Machanga World Vision Survival Kits Not stated and Xai- • 8,987 kits in Machanga. Xai • 5,507 kits in Xai-Xai. Machanga World Vision, Food Distribution Not stated and Xai- WFP • Distributed 4,410t food aid to 85,500 Xai beneficiaries. Note: Difficulties of access were so great, with much of the food having to be moved by boat with multiple handling, that World Vision had to use DEC funds to subsidise these costs. Machanga World Vision Health Systems Not stated and Xai- • Supply of essential medicines. Xai • 17,300 patients attended by World Vision. • Public health talks on sanitation and HIV. Machanga World Vision, Water and Sanitation Not stated and Xai- Kulima, • 34 boreholes rehabilitated. Xai Local • Distribution of chlorine: 13,219 people. Government • 500 latrines in camps. • 500 latrine slabs distributed. • 59 wells constructed/rehabilitated • 59 maintenance groups formed. • 10 boreholes (5 negative results). • Chlorine distributed to 4,500 families. • 68 demonstration latrines Machanga World Vision Agriculture Not stated and Xai- • Short season seed distribution to 15,501 Xai families. • Main season seed distribution to 23,005 families. • 6,500 families got tuber planting material in Machanga. • 41 groups formed in Xai-Xai to distribute material to 1,640 families. Machanga World Vision Infrastructure Repair Not stated and Xai- • 145km of road opened in Machanga. Xai • 3 large culverts built. • 2 airstrips renovated. • Road Repairs in Xai-Xai. • Two schools built.

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Location Partner Sector and activity DEC £ Machanga World Vision Counselling of Victims Not stated and Xai- • 95 people trained. Xai Machanga World Vision Shelter Programme Not stated and Xai- • 265 houses constructed in Machanga with Xai another 387 kits distributed. • Xai-Xai: 268 construction kits distributed (250 remaining for distribution). Total Of which £859,444 (21%) was funded by the 4,175,666 DEC

The activities listed were part rather than exclusively DEC-funded.

A16.06 Financial Summary Compared to other DEC World Vision Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Supplies and materials Health 1,213 0.1% 4.3% 3% Water/sanitation 14,554 1.7% 8.5% 20% Food - 1.3% Agriculture 2,377 0.3% 10.2% 3% Shelter 165,253 19.2% 9.4% 204% Household items 6,443 0.7% 6.8% 11% Blankets and clothes - 0.5% Education - 2.0% Other 31,876 3.7% 8.0% 46% Sub-total 221,716 25.8% 57.8% 45% Non-personnel costs Procurement - 1.8% Transport 123,528 14.4% 8.2% 174% Storage/security 3,590 0.4% 0.4% 99% Office 28,264 3.3% 2.7% 123% Other - 0.4% Sub-total 155,383 18.1% 15.4% 117% Personnel costs In-country locally engaged 55,274 6.4% 5.3% 121% In-country expatriate 48,944 5.7% 4.8% 120% Off-shore staff - 0.3% Other – personnel 6,048 0.7% 0.6% 118% Sub-total 110,266 12.8% 13.0% 99% Personnel support 75,591 8.8% 7.8% 113% Other costs 237,770 27.7% 1.8% 1508% Agency management 58,718 6.8% 4.0% 171%

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Compared to other DEC World Vision Agencies Expenditure As % of total Av. for others Ratio to others Contingencies - 0.1% Total project cost 859,444 100.0% 100.0% 100% Funded by DEC 859,444 100.0% 67.3% 149%

Note: The total project cost is only the total DEC-funded cost. The actual total cost was £4,175,666, for which DEC funds supplied only 20.5% of the total. The large expenditure for other costs appears to be for capital assets such as vehicles, motorcycles, and computers that some other World Vision donors were unwilling to fund.

A16.07 Where World Vision stood out

A16.07.1 STRONG NATIONAL STAFF World Vision’s work was often very professional, and some of this was clearly due to the high quality of its national staff who were often responsible for substantial programmes and knew what they were doingA. World Vision loaned road technicians to Save the Children.

A16.07.2 GOING THE EXTRA MILE World Vision was operational during the whole of the crisis period in one of the most inaccessible areas, Machanga, which made operations very expensive. World Vision opened up roads, and built at least one wharf to improve access. It should therefore be given credit for effectively reaching some of the most needy populations.

A16.07.3 IMPACT EVALUATION World Vision carried out an excellent impact evaluation to measure what was achieved against the original logical framework for the project. It’s use of the logical framework to plan activities and to carry out monitoring and evaluation was an example of best practice.

A16.08 Areas needing attention

A16.08.1 SOFTWARE ASPECTS While World Vision’s hardware (construction, boreholes, latrine construction) was generally very professional and of excellent quality, the same could not be said of the community or “software” aspects. The water committees seen by the evaluation team were not very effective. Part of this arose from an excessive focus on targets.

A World Vision’s commitment to its national staff can perhaps be best seen in its distance learning programme for staff offering courses accredited by leading universities up to Master’s level.

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A16.09 World Vision’s plans for the future World Vision will continue to work in Mozambique and took a very active part in the 2001 flood response. They will not continue to work in Machanga in the long-term, but the Xai-Xai programme is part of their development strategy for Mozambique.

A16.10 Recommendations to World Vision Management WV should adopt the impact assessment model based on the logical framework, as a general tool for project monitoring. The staff involved in projects should also be involved in the monitoring so that they better understand the software issues involved in project success.

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Appendix 17: Methodology

A17.01 Overall Methods The monitoring work has drawn on a number of techniques including: • semi-structured interviews with DEC agency staff, UN and government officials, and the staff of local partners • interviews with beneficiaries • direct observation in the field • short workshops with DEC agencies in Maputo • developing a reference database.

A17.02 Fieldwork This evaluation report is based very much on the fieldwork carried out by the evaluation team in July 2000, and in March and April 2001, as well as the beneficiary study carried out in November 2000. This extensive fieldwork was only possible due to the assistance of the DEC agencies with transport and logistics. The evaluation team is very grateful for the generous way in which they were received at the many locations they visited, and for the full co-operation given by the DEC agencies, even after there were last-minute changes to the plans.

A17.02.1 INITIAL FIELDWORK The initial fieldwork had three broad objectives: • Data capture – to visit projects that would already have closed and to interview persons who would have left by the end of the expenditure period, and to identify key documents and data sourcesA. • Monitoring – to identify what the evaluation team perceived as problems so as to allow the DEC agencies to respond to this perception during the expenditure period, rather than criticising the agencies for not doing so at the end of the expenditure period. • To better define the further work needed to complete the evaluation. The initial visit also gave the members of the evaluation teamB a good overview of the circumstances under with the DEC agency projects were being implemented. This background knowledge made the nine-month reports more useful to the team. Various members of the evaluation team visited sites in Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza, and MaputoC. The team interviewed agency staff, beneficiaries, UN, donor and

A This initial visit allowed the team to meet with some staff about to leave Mozambique or to return to their regular (non-emergency) duties in other parts of the country. B John Cosgrave, Lourdes Fidalgo, Alistair Hallam, and Kerry Selvester took part in the initial fieldwork. C The team briefly passed through Manica but did not interview anyone there, although agency staff who had worked there were interviewed during the second fieldwork.

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government officials, and regional specialists. The team travelled within Mozambique by boat and plane, as well as more than 2,000km overland. One hundred and eighty- two people were interviewed during the initial fieldwork.

A17.02.2 BENEFICIARY ASSESSMENT A sociologist based in Mozambique (Nelia Taimo) visited four provinces in November 2000 to interview beneficiaries and to assess the impact of the DEC agencies on them. The beneficiary assessment report is in the appendices. The sociologist interviewed 75 persons, 61 in depth.

A17.02.3 THE SECOND PERIOD OF FIELDWORK The second period of fieldwork was to follow up on the issues observed during the initial fieldwork, or highlighted by the agency final reports, and to form a view on the effectiveness and impact of the DEC-funded responses. At the request of the DEC Secretariat, the evaluation team visited the sites of the 2001 flooding to ascertain if DEC agencies had learned lessons from the 2000 floods. Members of the evaluation teamA visited sites in Maputo, Gaza, Sofala, Inhambane, Tete, and Zambézia Provinces. More than 124 people were interviewed and the evaluation team travelled even more extensively than during the initial fieldwork, adding a helicopter and light aircraft to the means of transport used.

A17.02.4 MAPUTO WORKSHOPS The DEC agencies were invited to two short workshops in Maputo where the evaluation team presented their initial findings after the fieldwork. These workshops were intended to brief the DEC agencies on the impressions formed by the evaluation team and to allow the agencies to raise any points of concern. The points raised by the agencies were taken into account in the reports.

A John Cosgrave and Lourdes Fidalgo.

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A17.02.5 REPORTS After the fieldwork, the evaluation team released an initial report in August 2000, to meet the monitoring component of this fieldwork. A more detailed monitoring report, based on detailed research, was issued in October 2000.

A17.03 Headquarter Interviews Evaluation team membersA visited the headquarters of all the opting-in DEC agencies plus Care in February and March 2001. Twenty-six senior agency staff were interviewed at headquarters.

A17.04 Peer review After preparation of the evaluation report it was circulated within the team and to peer reviewers selected for their knowledge of the DEC and of Mozambique. The report was then revised based on their comments. The report was further revised after taking comments from the feedback meeting in London on 11 June and the written agency comments. The final draft was also reviewed by the peer reviewers before finalisation.

A17.05 The reference database Part of the work in the initial period involved building a set of reference documents to support the work of the evaluation. The context and chronology sections of this report draw heavily on the reference database. The database was developed in order to: • build up as accurate a picture as possible of what actually happened • provide a much broader view of the crisis than could be afforded by agency reports and the interviews alone • resolve conflicts in reports from different sources. The last is important as information often needs to be checked against a number of sources to ensure its accuracy. Using a database of reports helps to separate “spin” from reality. For example, DFID’s press release of 17 March said that on 1 March “Four helicopters deployed from the UK with full crews and facilities funded by DFID at £1.15 million.” Several press reports and other DFID press releases show, however, that the helicopters did not leave the UK until 2 and 3 March and that the first two were only operational in Mozambique on 5 March. Even then, one of the helicopters had to abort its first mission as it had a communications failure8.

A17.05.1 DATABASE CONTENTS The evaluation team now have over 2,260 electronic documents relating to the Mozambique floods on file together with another general 264 electronic reference documents that are not Mozambique specific. Paper copies of other reference documents support the electronic database. The team prefers, where possible, to work

A John Cosgrave and Kerry Selvester

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with electronic copies as this allows easy sharing between the team members in Mozambique, Ireland and the UKA.

A17.05.2 THE CONTENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC DATABASE This database includes the original documents supplied to the evaluation team by the DEC Secretariat and the agencies as well as the regular updates supplied by some of the agencies. Other documents came from the UN document database on the Mozambique floods (an important source) as well as from media sources including: • Mozambique Press Agency (AIM) • The Times • The Guardian • The Telegraph • The Independent • The BBC • CNN • CBC • USAID • IFRC • Mozambique Government • South African Media • Bilateral Donor sites • DEC Agencies • Non-DEC agencies • UK Parliament • SANDF • DoD • Academic sources such as the Natural Hazards Center in Colorado • General web searches using specialised search tools • NOAA and other specialised weather sites As well as the Mozambique specific database there is a database of generic documents which include previous DEC evaluations, Sphere Standards, Code of Conduct, OFDA/CRED disaster database, and other standard reference documents. Maps, atlases, and other documents on Mozambique in paper format support these electronic references.

A A CD-Rom with copies of all the Mozambique specific documents will be supplied to the DEC at the end of the evaluation, together with paper copies of those documents for which there is no electronic copy.

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A17.05.3 SOFTWARE TOOLS USED: Most documents have been located on targeted sites using the sites’ own search engines. Non-site-specific searches have been carried out using the Google meta- search engine (http://www.google.com), but WebFerret has also been used for general background search. Download Mage (http://lctek.tripod.com) was used to manage downloads and various utilities were used to detect duplicates. Many of the downloaded HTML documents had scripts or calls to external images. These were cleaned using the code sweeper facility in the HomeSite HTML editor (http://www.allaire.com). In order to rapidly identify the location of minor village names appearing in some reports we developed a spreadsheet that used the 58,615 Mozambique place names in the US National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) data set to immediately locate the likely site of any place names on a map of Mozambique (http://www.nima.mil/gns/html/CntyFile/MZ.exe). Global Positioning System (GPS) data was collected during the fieldwork using a Garmin GPSIII (http://www.garmin.com). This data, and Tropical Cyclone tracks were processed using the GPS Utility programme (http://www.gpsu.co.uk). Any necessary image processing was done using Paint Shop Pro 7.0. (http://www.jasc.com). Finally, such a large database of documents would not be much use without the facility to rapidly access the information in it. The DTsearch text-indexing programme (http://www.dtsearch.com) was used to index the data and then to carry out full text searches on the database. This allows very fast and flexible searches, typically of 1 to 2 seconds for a straightforward search, of the whole database. References were managed using Reference Manager initially and later Biblioscape (http://www.biblioscape.com).

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Appendix 18: Persons met

Some key sources were interviewed several times during both the first and second fieldwork. In such cases, only the place and date of the first interview during each piece of fieldwork is given. Only the names of one or two persons are given for group interviews rather than the whole group. In many beneficiary interviews, bystanders prompted the interviewee with additional comments. Please note that this list, despite detailing over 400 interviews, is not complete.

A18.01 Initial Fieldwork Name Position Place Date Agongona, João Beneficiary, Cruzeiro (had Cruzeiro 15/07/00 worked in SA) Ajala, Claudio Doctor – World Vision Divinhe 16/07/00 Alfredo, Angelina Beneficiary, Nova Mambone Mataçia 17/07/00 Amadeu, Frederico Food Monitor, World Vision Divinhe 16/07/00 Machanga António, Jone Elementary Nurse Marombe 13/07/00 Aroujo, António Kulima Delegate, Divinhe Divinhe 16/07/00 Barahona, Jose Emergency Co-ordinator, Maputo 07/07/00 Luis Garcia ActionAid, Mozambique Bastable, Andy Public Health Team Leader, Chokwe 20/07/00 Oxfam Chokwe Bayer, Gary Agricultural Officer, World Maputo 10/07/00 Vision Mozambique Beattie, Alison First Secretary, British High Maputo 10/07/00 Commission Bede, João Bairro Secretary, Mataçia Mataçia 17/07/00 Bernardo UGC Beneficiary, Nova Magoanine 25/07/00 Augustine Magoanine Bernardo, Roberto Gaza Relief Co-ordinator, World Xai-Xai 12/07/00 Vision Bia, Rabeca Luis Beneficiary Chiloane 16/07/00 Macunha Blonge, Bernado Supervisor, Office of Public Gwara-Gwara 13/07/00 Works, Buzi Bomba, Monitoring and Evaluation Nova Mambone 17/07/00 Emmanuel Officer, Save the Children, Mozambique Bonifácio, Estévão Administrator, Nova Mambone Nova Mambone 17/07/00 Bucuia, Eduardo Hatchery Technician, UGC, Maputo 25/07/00 Maputo Bule, David Activist, Concern, Chókwè Chiguidela 21/07/00 Buxton, Josie Education Programme Manager Maputo 11/07/00 Cardoni, Jordi Programme Manager, OXFAM Xai-Xai 13/07/00 Cariorio, Mateus Headmaster, September 25th Buzi 13/07/00 Paulo Primary School, Buzi

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Name Position Place Date Carrol, Justin Irish Embassy, Maputo Maputo 19/07/00 Chembe, António Provincial Delegate, INGC, Beira 12/07/00 Sofala Chevito, Salamão Bairro Head and Deputy Massavasse 20/07/00 Secretary, Massavasse Chicamisa, Beneficiary, Divinhe (was Divinhe 16/07/00 Gabriel travelling peddler before floods) Chichava, Beneficiary Massavane 20/07/00 Lourenço Chicumbe, INGC Director Beira 11/07/00 António Chiguane, Inora Beneficiary Massavane 20/07/00 Chirizane, Ivone Nurse Divinhe 16/07/00 Cigarro, Laurinda Shop owner, Casa Arminda Chiloane 16/07/00 Shop, Chiloane Conlay, Tony Member of DFID Emergency Maputo 19/07/00 Response Team Cossa, Celina President, UGC Maputo 25/07/00 Cossa, Lina Beneficiary Massavane 20/07/00 Costa, Maguel Oxfam Doctor Chókwè 20/07/00 Crickshank, Oxfam Health Co-ordinator Chókwè 20/07/00 Roberto Curarama, Head of Civil Administration, Divinhe 16/07/00 Domingos Chiloane Dan Gaza Representative, WFP Xai-Xai 13/07/00 Daniel, Gaspar CCM representative, Save Save 18/07/00 Vilella Darangwa, Beneficiary, Cruzeiro Cruzeiro 15/07/00 Augusto Dario, Dr Provincial Health Director, Gaza Xai-Xai 14/07/00 Dausse, Luke Head of Education Programme Save 18/07/00 Davies, Barry Construction Engineer, Oxfam, Chokwe 20/07/00 Chokwe De Vasco, António Water Engineer, Oxfam, Chokwe Mwaxicolane 20/07/00 Manuel Delfina Food Security Officer, ACF, Muxungu 14/07/00 Sofala Dima, Albertina Beneficiary Chiloane 15/07/00 Djedje, António Vukoxa President Chókwè 22/07/00 Dode, Alberto Vukoxa Member Chókwè 22/07/00 Dykes, Tony Team Leader, Christian Aid Maputo 11/07/00 Southern Africa Team, London Ede, Nigel Country Director, ActionAid, Maputo 07/07/00 Mozambique Eduardo, Rafael CVM Delegate Beira 11/07/00 Elisa Christina President of Co-op Union, Magoanine 25/07/00 Nyungu Magoanine

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Name Position Place Date Erneste, Juliette Nuevo Fronteira Beneficiary, Magoanine 25/07/00 Nova Magoanine Evans, Hugh Road Engineer, Oxfam, Chokwe Chokwe 20/07/00 Farebrother, John Operations Manager, Save the Vilanculos 18/07/00 Children, Mozambique Fernando, Beneficiary, Punga Punga 14/07/00 Cristina Figueiredo, Head of Gaza Water and Xai-Xai 14/07/00 Antonio Sanitation Department Filipe, Luisa Beneficiary, Gwara-Gwara Gwara-Gwara 13/07/00 Francisco, Monitor, CCM Xai-Xai 12/07/00 Henrique Fraser, Susan Emergency Co-ordinator, Beira 12/07/00 Concern, Mozambique Gallipoli, Executive Director, UCG, Maputo 25/07/00 Prosperino Maputo Gonzalvez, George UNDP/INGC Liaison Officer Maputo 11/07/00 Gordon, Renato Relief Direction, World Vision Maputo 10/07/00 Mozambique Greene, Nancy Project Co-ordinator, Concern, Beira 12/07/00 Sofala Hanlon, Joe Author and journalist Johannesburg 04/07/00 Hess, David Deputy Director, USAID Maputo 17/07/00 Hlunguane, Assistant Co-ordinator of CCM, Xai-Xai 12/07/00 Arnaldo Carolino Xai-Xai Horne, Kate Country Director, Oxfam Moz. Oxford 23/08/00 Janota, Felizberto Delegate, CCM, Muxungu Muxungu 15/07/00 João, Jaime Village President, Punga Punga 14/07/00 (interviewed with 12 elders) Johnsone, Medicine Preventive Agent Divinhe 16/07/00 Joaquim Jorge, Mario Flood-affected Gaza resident Xai-Xai 14/07/00 Jose, Alexandro Roads Ganger, Save the Nova Mambone 17/07/00 Children, Nova Mambone Road Juma, Fernandes UGC Beneficiary, Nova Magoanine 25/07/00 Magoanine Kelly, Charles Programme Co-ordinator Beira 12/07/00 (outgoing), LWF, Mozambique Kiewied, Tilleke Emergencies Co-ordinator, Novib Maputo 26/07/00 Langa, Clements Secretary General, Gaza Red Xai-Xai 14/07/00 Cross Langa, Deputy National Director, INGC Maputo 17/07/00 Gumercindo Lavender, Sally Nurse, Merlin Marombe 13/07/00 Lester, Brad Emergency Programme Nova Mambone 17/07/00 Manager, Save the Children, Mozambique Lestrade, Isabel Nurse, Merlin, Mozambique Beira 12/07/00

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Name Position Place Date Luis, Lorenço Clerk to Regulo, Maluvane Maluvane 18/07/00 Luis, Roberto Provincial Co-ordinator, Maputo, Maputo 07/07/00 ActionAid, Mozambique Mabunda, Octavio Project Co-ordinator, AEM Maputo 20/07/00 Macamo, Persida Vukoxa Member Chókwè 22/07/00 Machava, Special Assistant to the Save 17/07/00 Felizberto Governor, Inhambane Macuacua, Celina Beneficiary Chókwè 21/07/00 Macuacua, George CVM President, Chokwe Chokwe 21/07/00 Maezane, Manuel CVM Vice President Buzi 12/07/00 Mafaia Elisa Beneficiary, Divinhe Divinhe 16/07/00 Mahuari, Virgilio Regional Co-ordinator, CCM Xai-Xai 12/07/00 Maibasse, Samuel Gaza Provincial Co-ordinator, Xai-Xai 14/07/00 Save the Children (US) Majare, Manuel CVM President Buzi 12/07/00 Maluvane, Regulo, Maluvane Maluvane 18/07/00 António Manduana, Beneficiary Chiloane 16/07/00 Amelia Manjate, Zelina Beneficiary Chókwè 21/07/00 Mapolica, Mariana Beneficiary, Gwara-Gwara Gwara-Gwara 13/07/00 Marena, Florencio Logistician, World Vision Machanga 15/07/00 Marerua, Project Support Officer, World Chiloane 16/07/00 Florencio Vision, Machanga Maria, Marta Resident of Taninga Manhica 18/07/00 Resettlement Camp Mariquele, Oxfam Health Promoter Chókwè 20/07/00 Domingos Mascame, Headmaster, Pande Primary Pande 18/07/00 Gonçalves João School Masiva, Denis Teacher, Machacame Primary Machacame 18/07/00 Jose School Mason, Robin Emergency water and sanitation Maputo 17/07/00 adviser, USAID Matabira, Belles Water Engineer, World Vision, Chiloane 16/07/00 Machanga Matumo, João Beneficiary, Gwara-Gwara Gwara-Gwara 13/07/00 Maxari, Teresa Emergency Co-ordinator, Manhiça 18/07/00 ActionAid, Manhiça McCluskey, Jean Public Health Engineering Team Maputo 10/07/00 Leader, Oxfam, Chokwe Meque, Meme Beneficiary, Nova Mambone Mataçia 17/07/00 Miguel, Gonzaga Worker Gwara – Gwara 13/07/00 Mite, Ermelinda Nurse Divinhe 16/07/00 Mokude, Severino HelpAge Co-ordinator Chókwè 21/07/00 Mondlane, Abilio Vukoxa Member Chókwè 22/07/00 Moreus, Josao Agriculture Official, World Xai-Xai 12/07/00 Vision, Gaza

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Name Position Place Date Morgan, Oliver Technical Adviser, OXFAM Xai-Xai 13/07/00 Moss, Sarah Water Engineer, Oxfam, Chokwe Massavasse 20/07/00 Mpofu, George Beneficiary, Cruzeiro (had Cruzeiro 15/07/00 worked in Zimbabwe for 35 years) Mucavel, António UGC Beneficiary, Nova Magoanine 25/07/00 Magoanine Mugabe, David Pump Operator, Oxfam, Chokwe Massavasse 20/07/00 Murray, George Country Manager, Merlin, Beira 12/07/00 Mozambique Mutisse, Rosalia Office Manager, HelpAge Maputo 11/07/00 International, Mozambique Myers, John Programme Director, Save the Maputo 10/07/00 Children (UK), Mozambique Nassir, Hansat Team Leader, Concern, Buzi Gwara-Gwara 13/07/00 Ngugi, Lynn Programme Manager, Oxfam, Chokwe 22/07/00 Chokwe Odisse, Jose Aldeia Secretary, Massavasse Massavasse 20/07/00 Candido Olivera, Bento Food Monitor, Save the Children, Nova Mambone 17/07/00 Inhambane Olupona, Omo Health and Nutrition Director, Maputo 10/07/00 World Vision, Mozambique Orlando, Mario CVM, Chókwè Chokwe 21/07/00 Pacho, Deolinda Seeds and Tools Program, World Maputo 10/07/00 Vision, Mozambique Papio, Esteri Beneficiary, Gwara-Gwara Gwara-Gwara 13/07/00 (interviewed with three other unnamed beneficiaries) Paulo, Isaias Agronomist, World Vision, Divinhe 16/07/00 Machanga Perreira, Jose Assistant Administrator, Chibuto 13/07/00 Carlos Chibuto District Peterson, Erik Project Co-ordinator, LWF, Beira 12/07/00 Sofala Pickard, Matt Emergency Programme Johannesburg 04/07/00 Manager, Christian Aid Pinto, Senhor Deputy Director, LINK Maputo 20/07/00 Porsche, Ilona Programme Support Officer, Maputo 25/07/00 CAFOD Portugal, Road Technician, Save the Nova Mambone 17/07/00 Ernestino Children, Inhambane (on loan Road from World Vision) Purvis, Ian Head of Delegation, IFRC sub- Beira 12/07/00 delegation, Sofala Rafael, Amos Logistician, World Vision Machanga 15/07/00 Rafael, Charles Delegate, CCM, Sofala Muxungu 14/07/00 Chamo

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Name Position Place Date Rigby, Nicola Programme Officer, Christian Maputo 11/07/00 Aid Southern Africa Team, Maputo Rombo, Nita Beneficiary, Punga Punga 14/07/00 Rosa, Maria Beneficiary, Divinhe Divinhe 16/07/00 Saiza, Luisa Beneficiary, Punga Punga 14/07/00 Salamao, Joao Chibuto Co-ordinator, ORAM Chibuto 13/07/00 Sampaio, Delfina Nurse Gwara – Gwara 13/07/00 Sandison, Peta Emergency Programme Co- Maputo 11/07/00 ordinator, Oxfam, Mozambique Schembri, Emergency Project Support Maputo 10/07/00 Gabrielle Officer for Mozambique, Save the Children (UK), London Schultze, Tore Water Engineer, LWF, Chokwe Chokwe 21/07/00 Sebastião, Edgar Medical Chief, Buzi Rural Buzi 13/07/00 Hospital Simango, Salmina Beneficiary Chókwè 21/07/00 Smith, Mel Environmental Sanitation Chokwe 20/07/00 Engineer, Oxfam, Chokwe Smith, Tanya Sanitation Engineer, Oxfam, Chokwe 20/07/00 Chokwe Spumbulu, Joanna Beneficiary, Nova Mambone Mataçia 17/07/00 Steiner, Klaus Shelter Programme Planner, Maputo 19/07/00 IOCC/Christian Aid/CCM, Mozambique Stolk, Leo Programme Officer, Novib Maputo 26/07/00 Thomas, Jo Country Director, Concern, Maputo 11/07/00 Mozambique Tierney, Niall Programme Manager, Concern, Chokwe and 21/07/00 Chokwe District Timoteo, Sr water and sanitation official, Xai-Xai 12/07/00 World Vision, Gaza Tivane, Angelina Beneficiary Chókwè 21/07/00 Tivani, Constance Nurse, Muianga Health Post Muianga 21/07/00 João Tome, Justino Head of Civil Administration, Divinhe 16/07/00 Divinhe Tonks, Phillip Agronomist, LWF, Chokwe Chokwe 21/07/00 Udoyen, Inyene Information Officer, WFP Maputo 19/07/00 Valdes, Hugo Relief Manager, World Vision, Maputo 10/07/00 Sofala Veer, Bridget UNICEF, Gaza Xai-Xai 14/07/00 Vilanculos, Gerdo CCM Representative, Chokwe Chokwe 21/07/00 Ricardo Vinho, Domingos Logistician – World Vision Machanga 15/07/00 Vorster, Barry Water and sanitation Machanga 16/07/00 Consultant, World Vision, Mozambique

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Name Position Place Date Westraad, Wimpie Water Engineer, Tearfund Xai-Xai 12/07/00 White, Chris UNICEF Malaria Expert Xai-Xai 14/07/00 Wiersing, Klaus Head of Africa Desk, OCHA Maputo 11/07/00 William, Alberto Provincial Delegate, INGC Xai-Xai 14/07/00 Wilson, Mark Head of Delegation, IFRC Maputo 07/07/00 Woldemariam, Emergency Assistant Project Muxungu 15/07/00 Zenabia Manager, World Vision, Sofala Woldegeorgis Wolstenholme, Member of DFID Emergency Maputo 19/07/00 Paul Response Team Xavier, Angelina water and sanitation adviser, Maputo 19/07/00 UNICEF, Gaza Xaviera, Ersilia Activist, Concern, Chokwe Muianga 21/07/00 Xile, Francisca Financial Comptroller, UGC, Maputo 25/07/00 Maputo Zamissa, Joao Head of Planning Department, Maputo 17/07/00 INGC Zimba, Pastor Secretary General, AEM Maputo 20/07/00 Francsico Zucula, Cazaro Head of Taninga Resettlement Manhica 18/07/00 Camp

A18.02 Headquarter Interviews Name Position Place Date Baritaud, Maud Desk Officer for Mozambique, Dublin 23/02/01 Concern Byrne, Hugh Policy Director, Concern Dublin 23/02/01 Carter, Matthew Emergency Unit, CAFOD London 01/03/01 Day, Will Chief Executive, Care London 08/03/01 Doull, Linda Senior Health Adviser, Merlin London 01/03/01 Dykes, Tony Regional Desk Officer, Christian London 26/02/01 Aid Featherstone, Humanitarian Department, Oxford 27/02/01 Andy Oxfam Ferreira, Carla Desk Officer, CAFOD London 01/03/01 Horton, John Southern Africa Regional Teddington 08/03/01 Manager, Tearfund Kennedy, Bríd Regional Director, Concern Dublin 23/02/01 Kennedy, John Disaster Response Team, Teddington 08/03/01 Tearfund Liz Holmes Senior Programme Officer for London 06/03/01 Africa, HelpAge International Martin, Jone Desk Officer, Tearfund Teddington 08/03/01 Michael Gaouette Head of Emergency Unit, Save London 05/03/01 the Children

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Name Position Place Date Myers, Mike Desk Officer, Southern Africa, London 28/02/01 BRCS Nadia Siam Emergencies Officer, HelpAge London 06/03/01 International Nolan, Anne Operations Officer, Merlin London 01/03/01 Pickard, Matt Emergencies unit, Christian Aid London 26/02/01 Platt, Adam Programme Director, HelpAge London 06/03/01 International Rees, Rob Head of Region, CAFOD London 01/03/01 Richard Rumsey Desk Officer, World Vision Milton Keynes 02/03/01 Rouse, Harriet Assistant Desk Officer, Southern London 28/02/01 Africa, BRCS Sandisson, Peta Regional Adviser, Oxfam Oxford 27/02/01 Wallace, Ian International Operations Teddington 08/03/01 Director, Tearfund Yates, Rodger Head of Emergencies Unit, London 08/03/01 ActionAid

A18.03 Second Fieldwork Name Position Place Date Ablin, Carolina CEDES cash-for-work Sabie 27/03/01 beneficiary Agusta, Beti CCM housing beneficiary Chibuto 22/03/01 Amelia Schoolchild Mapapa 17/03/01 Amosse, Maria CCM housing beneficiary Chibuto 22/03/01 Antonia, Mariam ORAM housing beneficiary Chibuto 22/03/01 Antonio, Melodin CEDES cash-for-work Sabie 27/03/01 beneficiary Antonio, Perpeto CEDES cash-for-work Sabie 27/03/01 beneficiary Artur, Lena Schoolchild Mapapa 17/03/01 Balane, Elisa Administrative Assistant, Manhiça 27/03/01 Eugenio ActionAid Bambo, Armando Logistics, World Vision Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Banjamin Vice-President, CVM Nckolechi 09/04/01 Bernardo, Monitoring and Evaluation Co- Maputo 20/03/01 Fernanda ordinator, ActionAid Bernardo, Roberto Project Manager, World Vision Caia 09/04/01 Bero, Paulino World Vision programme officer Divinhe 04/04/01 Bila, João Pump committee member Xai-Xai 22/03/01 Vincente Bila, Raquelina World Vision beneficiary Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Bila, Zaida Faftin Traditional Healer and WV Xai-Xai 23/03/01 beneficiary Boi, Cardina CDM beneficiary Boane 30/03/01 Maiela

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Name Position Place Date Bomba, Emannuel Monitoring and Evaluation, Save Vilanculos 02/04/01 the Children Budiya, Isabel Pump committee member Xai-Xai 22/03/01 Bunguane, HelpAge housing beneficiary Chókwè 14/03/01 Salmina Buxton, Josie Deputy Emergency Programme Maputo 19/03/01 Co-ordinator, Oxfam Camões Agricultural Technician, UGC Maputo 28/03/01 Cecilia Schoolchild Mapapa 17/03/01 Chacha, Saroma HelpAge housing beneficiary Lhate 13/03/01 Chibiel, Flora CCM housing beneficiary Xai-Xai 22/03/01 Chirindza, HelpAge housing beneficiary Lhate 13/03/01 Carolina Cossa, Clemencia Água Rural delegate, Chókwè Chokwe 26/03/01 Cossa, Maria HelpAge housing beneficiary Chókwè 14/03/01 Cruikshank, Emergency Programme Co- Maputo 19/03/01 Robert ordinator, Oxfam Dausse, Luke Projects Manager, Save the Inhambane 02/04/01 Children de Aguiar, Roque Food Security Officer, ActionAid Manhiça 27/03/01 Dias, Sergio Project Officer, CEDES, Sabie Sabie 27/03/01 Dode, Alberto General Secretary, Vukoxa Chókwè 14/03/01 Jossias Domingos, Policeman Chiloane 04/04/01 Francisco Domingos, João Construction Supervisor, Manhiça 27/03/01 ActionAid Ede, Nigel Country Direction, ActionAid Maputo 21/03/01 Elizabeth Save the Children housing Doane 03/04/01 beneficiary Ernesto, Amelia CCM housing beneficiary Xai-Xai 22/03/01 Fernando, Infrastructure Co-ordinator, Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Américo World Vision Frame, Emma Infrastructure Project Manager, Vilanculos 02/04/01 Save the Children Gallipoli, Fr Executive Director, UGC Maputo 28/03/01 Prosperino Glorin, Marieta Assistant storekeeper, World Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Vision Horacio CCM housing beneficiary Xai-Xai 22/03/01 Howker, Alan Manager, World Vision, Beira Machanga 04/04/01 Isabel, Margarida Project Manager, UGC Maputo 28/03/01 Japobe, Pedro Barefoot Doctor Machacame 03/04/01 Numbe Jasse, Nicolas Commodity Tracking, World Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Vision Jenks, Nicholas Emergency Officer, USAID, Maputo 12/04/01 Mozambique

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Name Position Place Date Langa, Alberto Assistant Bairro Secretary Boane 30/03/01 Langane, Beneficiary Mapapa 17/03/01 Domingos Lhuane, Ralina CCM housing beneficiary Chibuto 22/03/01 Vasco Lucia Schoolchild Mapapa 17/03/01 Luis, Roberto Maputo Programme Co- Maputo 20/03/01 ordinator, Action Aid Mabunda, HelpAge housing beneficiary Lhate 13/03/01 Domingos Macame, Aniceto Finance Assistant, World Vision Xai-Xai 23/03/01 H. Machai, Teresa District Co-ordinator, Manhiça, Maputo 20/03/01 Action Aid Machange, Eliza CCM housing beneficiary Xai-Xai 22/03/01 João Macuacua, Celina HelpAge housing beneficiary Chókwè 14/03/01 Madose, Isabel CCM housing beneficiary Xai-Xai 22/03/01 Malam, Rosa Consultant Water Technician, Sabie 27/03/01 LWF Malate, Project Officer, ActionAid Manhiça 27/03/01 Constantino Mangone, Antonia World Vision housing beneficiary Divinhe 04/04/01 Mangono, João World Vision housing beneficiary Divinhe 04/04/01 Manjate, Zelina HelpAge housing beneficiary Chókwè 14/03/01 Manuel, Eliza CEDES cash-for-work Sabie 27/03/01 beneficiary Maosse, Alberto Director, Cumbane Primary Cumbane 23/03/01 School Marentimbi, Eliza World Vision beneficiary Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Marerua, Administrator, World Vision, Machanga 04/04/01 Florencio Sofala Marimane, HelpAge housing beneficiary Chókwè 14/03/01 Rosalina Matabira, Belles Water Engineer, World Vision Caia 09/04/01 Matsombe, Emergency Programme Gaxa 22/03/01 Felizardo Manager, CCM Mazanga, Ze Village Secretary, 2000 Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Chilumbane Two Mbondo, Ester CCM housing beneficiary Xai-Xai 22/03/01 McNichol, Peter Programme Office, Concern Maputo 30/03/01 Moises Project Officer, CDM Maputo 30/03/01 Moujane, Samuel Finance Officer, World Vision Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Muai, Virgilio Provincial Officer for Community Xai-Xai 22/03/01 Development, CCM Mucare, Catariana HelpAge housing beneficiary Lhate 13/03/01 Mucavele, Josias HelpAge housing beneficiary Lhate 13/03/01

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Name Position Place Date Muianga, Eugénio Emergency Co-ordinator, Marracuene 28/03/01 ActionAid Mukwe, Rolalina CdM Beneficiary Boane 30/03/01 Mulata, Eliza CCM housing beneficiary Xai-Xai 22/03/01 Jacinta Mulla, Veronica Director, Zimilene Primary Zimilene 23/03/01 Issias School Mutisse, Rosalia Office Manager, HelpAge Maputo 20/03/01 Mutisse, Rosalia Office Manager, HelpAge Maputo 20/03/01 Myenge, Silva World Vision housing beneficiary Divinhe 04/04/01 Myers, John Save the Children Maputo 21/02/01 Myungla, Matilda CCM housing beneficiary Xai-Xai 22/03/01 N’yhod, Nuzre World Vision housing beneficiary Divinhe 04/04/01 Neasse, Chevise CCM housing beneficiary Chibuto 22/03/01 Nyuvale, Isabel CCM housing beneficiary Chibuto 22/03/01 Vincente Oliveira, Joaquim Project Officer, Concern, Chimoio Maputo 30/03/01 Osvaldo Schoolchild Mapapa 17/03/01 Pascoal, Ivone District Co-ordinator, Maputo 20/03/01 Marracuene, Action Aid Paspetto, Adriano Village Secretary Machacame 03/04/01 Pedro, Elias Project Officer, CEDES Maputo 27/03/01 Pequenino, Filipe Food Security Co-ordinator, Marracuene 28/03/01 ActionAid Petune, Ernesto Infrastructure Project Officer, Sabie 27/03/01 CEDES, Sabie Porsche, Ilona Project Accompanier, CAFOD Maputo 20/03/01 Porshe, Ilona Project Accompanier, CAFOD Maputo 20/03/01 Preso, Manuel World Vision housing beneficiary Divinhe 04/04/01 Barros Raimundo, Extension worker, ActionAid Marracuene 28/03/01 Figueiredo Ralilar, Quissé Water and sanitation specialist, Xai-Xai 23/03/01 World Vision Rigby, Nicola Emergency Project Officer, Maputo 20/03/01 Christian Aid Ritter, Johan Jesus Alive Manager Save 03/04/01 Saveca, Laura CCM housing beneficiary Chibuto 22/03/01 Festine Senda, Josephino Assistant Village Secretary Machacame 03/04/01 Simango, Salmina HelpAge housing beneficiary Chókwè 14/03/01 Spinks, Anthea Programme Officer, World Vision Maputo 21/03/01 Stolkene, Paulino President, CVM Nckolechi 09/04/01 Tamale, Maria Water Committee Member Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Jaime Tomás, David Poultry Technician, UGC Maputo 28/03/01 Tovei, Paregar CEDES cash-for-work Sabie 27/03/01 beneficiary

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Name Position Place Date Valdez, Hugo Emergency Co-ordinator, World Maputo 21/03/01 Vision Victorino, Traditional spirits seller Chiloane 04/04/01 Francisca Vilanculos, Costa Beneficiary Mapapa 17/03/01 Virgilio, Vergina Teacher, Zimilene Primary Zimilene 23/03/01 Feliciana School Wilson, Mark Head of Delegation, IFRC, Maputo 29/03/01 Mozambique Zaida Schoolchild Mapapa 17/03/01 Zandamela, Sara Finance Officer, Help the Aged Maputo 20/03/01 Zandamela, Sara Finance Officer, HelpAge Maputo 20/03/01 Zavier, Laurence Director, 2000 Chilumbane Xai-Xai 23/03/01 Primary School Zunguene, Filipe General Secretary, CDM Maputo 30/03/01

A18.04 Beneficiary Assessment Name Position Place By Alberto, Amélia Inhambane Nelia Alberto, Justino Teacher Inhambane Nelia Albino, Lerço Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia Albino, Teresa Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia Alexandre, Elima Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia André, Alberto Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia Antonio, Single parent Inhambane Nelia Augusto, Laura Inhambane Nelia Boneze, Paulina Sofala Nelia Chambae, Cristina Elderly widow Gaza Nelia Chiriro, Helena Sofala Nelia Chizongane, Tailor Sofala Nelia William Chuma, Fatima Sofala Nelia Cossa, Natália Disabled Gaza Nelia Cubai, Laura Single parent Gaza Nelia Davale, Filismina Gaza Nelia Justino Dique, Amélia Widow Inhambane Nelia Domingo, Chigalo Inhambane Nelia Fabião, Anita Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia França, Arnaldo Fisherman Sofala Nelia Bongo Gilberto, Amélia Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia Gomes, Jeque Teacher Inhambane Nelia Maguald Guitira, António Fisherman Sofala Nelia

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Name Position Place By Isé, Arminda Disabled widow Inhambane Nelia Issufo, Hanchura Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia Jeque, Adriano Elderly traditional healer Inhambane Nelia Joana, Lena Sofala Nelia João, Armando Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia José, Romão Disabled Gaza Nelia Jossai, Zito Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia Macama, Maria Gaza Nelia Vitória Macarangue, Sofala Nelia Joaquim Machusse, Inhambane Nelia Domingos Macudo, Manuel Elderly Sofala Nelia Mangalhele, Widow Maputo Nelia Marieta Manhepe, Elderly Inhambane Nelia Ucheque Manjate, Salda Widowed and pregnant Gaza Nelia Massacamiss, Elderly widow Inhambane Nelia Laurinda Massicame, Teacher Inhambane Nelia Gonçalves Mate, Rolalina Widowed Gaza Nelia Matilde, Estene Sofala Nelia Matsombe, Elderly Gaza Nelia Angelina Mbire, Artemisa Maputo Nelia Melisse, Joana Widow Inhambane Nelia João Meque, Julia Inhambane Nelia Mimbire, Cecília Maputo Nelia Júlio Mimbirre, Amelia Elderly widow Maputo Nelia Duzenta Modumani, Kafani Elderly with orphaned Inhambane Nelia grandchildren Mucasse, Maria Maputo Nelia Agostinho Muchunga, Ana Single parent Gaza Nelia Gabriel Mucucha, José Elderly Inhambane Nelia Dias Datizwa Mundau, Luis Elderly Maputo Nelia Mundiko, Dokolo Elderly Sofala Nelia Nassone, Antonia Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia Ndwembe, Joana Inhambane Nelia Ndzuengo, Maria Sofala Nelia

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Name Position Place By Ngonhama, Alice Maputo Nelia Zantida Novela, Julieta Elderly disabled Maputo Nelia Ntimane, Bai Elderly Maputo Nelia Nzwane, Celestina Elderly Maputo Nelia Pelmebe, Nelson Disabled Gaza Nelia Pereira, Mazivona Inhambane Nelia Ponda, Firmina Elderly Sofala Nelia Raimundo, Daniel Schoolchild Inhambane Nelia Sitoe, Fabião Maputo Nelia Saquisso Sitoe, Maria Filipe Widow Maputo Nelia Timane, Antonio Maputo Nelia Cinquenta Tivane, Absalo Gaza Nelia Tsana, Amelia Elderly Gaza Nelia Tsandazane, Maputo Nelia Virginia Joseia Ubisse, Vitoria Gaza Nelia Vilankulos, Maputo Nelia Augusto Lampião Vilói, Ana Elderly Gaza, Bairro Nelia Lionde Zimba, Maria Maputo Nelia Zucula, Fernando Elderly and disabled Gaza Nelia Filipe

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Appendix 19: Index of Appendices

Access...... 13, 16, 23, 26, 27, 61, 73, 87, CCM.8, 22, 30, 36, 60, 61, 64, 111, 112, 101, 103, 109 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120 ACT ...... 8, 61 CDC...... 9 ActionAid ...8, 36, 38, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, CHAD...... 9, 42 82, 86, 110, 111, 113, 117, 118, 119, Chiaquelane ...... 40, 41, 43, 44, 80, 85 120 Chibabava...... 38, 75 AdeM...... 8, 37 Chibuto ...... 37, 114, 115, 117, 119, 120 ADPP...... 8, 83 Chicamba...... 43, 44 ADRA ...... 8, 46 Chickens ...... 24, 25, 31, 56, 82 Advocacy ...... 15, 65, 70, 73, 93 Chiguidela ...... 110 AFP ...... 8, 129 Chiloane22, 38, 110, 111, 113, 118, 121 ARA...... 8, 36, 39, 43 Chimoio...... 65, 120 ARA-SUL ...... 8 Chissano ...... 32, 33 Associated Press...... 8 Chókwè ....22, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 79, 80, BBC...... 8, 39, 108 83, 87, 96, 97, 110, 111, 113, 114, Bed-nets ...... 66, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 83 115, 118, 119, 120 Beira.39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 51, 53, 75, 111, Cholera ...... 39, 43, 44, 50, 77, 80, 85 112, 114, 118 Christian Aid...8, 39, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, Beitbridge ...... 39 63, 64, 99, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120 BHR...... 8, 37 Clothing ...... 13, 27, 30, 96 Blankets...27, 51, 53, 56, 66, 71, 72, 83, 90 Code of Conduct .15, 17, 55, 87, 94, 108 Boane ...... 36, 56, 118, 119, 120 Concern 9, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 75, 80, 110, 112, 114, Bomba ...... 110, 118 115, 116, 119, 120 Botswana ...... 34, 38, 51 Congo ...... 74 Bridge...... 33, 34, 88 Co-ordination...8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, British Red Cross ..8, 39, 50, 51, 52, 53, 36, 37, 38, 41, 44, 45, 61, 62, 81, 92, 54, 117 100 Buzi ...... 37, 39, 43, 44, 67, 75, 110, 113, CSB ...... 9, 22, 27, 90 114, 115 Customs ...... 14, 38 Cabora...... 39 CVM...9, 22, 37, 50, 51, 53, 54, 63, 111, CAFOD.8, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 82, 113, 114, 117, 121 114, 116, 117, 120 Cyclone ....28, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, Cash-for-work.61, 62, 63, 117, 119, 121 44, 70, 109, 129 CBC...... 8, 108 Cyclone Eline.13, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41, CCGC ...... 8 70

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Cyclone Hudah ...... 43, 44 Frelimo ...... 9, 32 Dam...... 43, 44 Gaza ...20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 33, 36, 38, 39, 43, 44, 51, 56, 61, 66, 67, 69, 71, Deaths13, 28, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 75, 76, 79, 81, 82, 83, 96, 100, 101, 42, 43, 44 105, 106, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, DFA...... 9 115, 116, 121, 122, 123 DFID ....9, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 51, GDP...... 10 66, 89, 100, 107, 111, 116 GIEWS...... 10 Disaster1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, GIS...... 10 36, 38, 39, 50, 69, 70, 74, 95, 100, 108, 116, 129 GNP ...... 10, 32, 33 Divinhe.27, 38, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, Government of Mozambique.10, 13, 20, 115, 117, 119, 120 37, 38, 39, 43, 108 DNA ...... 9 Govuro ...... 22, 37, 82 DoD ...... 9, 10, 38, 41, 108 GTZ ...... 10 DPCCN ...... 9 Guija ...... 37, 63 DPOPH ...... 9, 37, 46 Gwara ...... 66, 67, 75, 77, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115 DPS ...... 9 Handpumps ...... 51 DRT...... 9, 95, 96, 98, 99 HAST ...... 10, 38 Early warning...... 10 Health ..9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 21, 22, 25, Education.21, 22, 28, 29, 32, 33, 47, 52, 33, 37, 38, 44, 47, 50, 52, 57, 62, 65, 57, 62, 65, 67, 68, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 67, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 97, 100, 90, 91, 92, 97, 101, 102, 110, 111, 101, 102, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116 113, 119, 120, 121 Helicopters.....26, 28, 29, 34, 36, 37, 38, El Niño...... 9 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 90, 106, 107 ENSO ...... 9 Help Age International...10, 21, 24, 70, EPC ...... 9 71, 72, 73, 81, 113, 114, 116, 117, European Union ...... 9, 41 118, 119, 120, 121 EVI ...... 9 HF ...... 89 ExCom...... 9 Humanitarian Assistance...... 10, 41 Expatriates ....47, 51, 52, 57, 63, 68, 72, Hygiene Education...... 10 76, 79, 84, 86, 92, 93, 98, 102 ICRC ...... 10 FAO...... 9, 10, 41 IDP...... 10 Fixed Wing Aircraft...... 40 IFRC ..10, 37, 39, 40, 42, 44, 50, 51, 53, Flood wave ...... 44 54, 108, 114, 116, 121 Food..2, 9, 12, 21, 24, 44, 46, 47, 52, 57, IMF ...... 10, 44 62, 67, 71, 72, 76, 84, 90, 91, 97, 101, Incomati...... 33, 34, 36, 37, 43, 44 102, 110, 111, 114, 118, 120 inflatables...... 37 Food-for-work ...... 9, 21, 43, 62, 81, 97

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INGC..10, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 106, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 66, 74, 111, 112, 116 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123 INGO...... 10 Massavasse...... 111, 114 Inhambane.....20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 34, 36, Massinga...... 81 38, 39, 43, 61, 81, 82, 83, 88, 89, 92, Massingir...... 66 105, 106, 113, 114, 118, 121, 122, 123 MCC...... 10, 36 Inhassôro ...... 89 MDM...... 10 International Rescue Corps ...... 41 MdS...... 10 IOCC ...... 10, 115 Meetings ..16, 17, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 61, IPM ...... 10, 37, 60, 62 80, 107 ITN...... 10, 40 Merlin ....44, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 93, 112, JLOC...... 10, 41 114, 116, 117 JTF...... 10, 40, 41 MERLIN ...... 11 Kariba ...... 40 Missing ...... 33, 34, 37, 40, 42, 44 Limpopo ...13, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43, Moçambique ...... 8, 9, 10, 22, 32, 50, 95 44 MoD...... 11, 39, 40 LLDC...... 10, 33 MOPH...... 11 Lugela ...... 34 Morbidity ...... 14 LWF ...10, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 69, 80, Mortality...... 14, 32 81, 112, 114, 115, 119 Mosquito ...... 51 Mabote ...... 89 MOU ...... 11 Machacame...... 113, 119, 120 MSF ...... 11, 22, 37, 66, 80 Machanga 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 44, 63, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 110, 113, Muianga...... 115, 116, 120 114, 115, 116, 118, 119 Muxungu ...... 63, 111, 112, 115, 116 Macia...... 41, 80 Mwaxicolane...... 111 Magoanine ...... 82, 110, 111, 112, 114 Nampula ...... 44, 65 Magude ...... 44 National Malaria Control Programme Malaria ....21, 25, 43, 44, 74, 75, 76, 78, ...... 11, 75, 78 83, 85, 88, 116 NFI...... 11 Malawi ...... 34, 40, 42, 44 NGHA ...... 11 Mambone .21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 40, NGO ...10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 21, 23, 37, 41, 90, 91, 92, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115 44, 60, 65, 70, 73, 74, 77, 100 Manhiça ...22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 45, Niassa ...... 65, 79 46, 47, 48, 113, 117, 118, 119 NLG ...... 11 Manica ...... 38, 65, 66, 69, 105 Nova...21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 40, 90, Maputo.....2, 8, 9, 10, 20, 22, 33, 36, 37, 91, 92, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 70, NOVIB ...... 11 71, 79, 80, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 96, 105,

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Nutrition....2, 22, 25, 66, 74, 88, 89, 90, Save River ...... 37, 38, 39, 44, 89 114 Save the Children12, 21, 22, 27, 36, 37, OCHA...... 11, 16, 36, 37, 39, 40, 116 38, 39, 40, 42, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 103, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, OECD...... 11 118, 120 OFDA ...... 11, 108, 129 SCHR ...... 12 OSC ...... 11, 39 Search and Rescue ....12, 13, 15, 29, 34, OSOCC...... 11, 38 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 80 Overseas Development Assistance9, 33 Sebastião ...... 115 Oxfam...9, 11, 21, 22, 25, 27, 38, 40, 44, Shelter13, 18, 23, 29, 31, 41, 46, 47, 48, 63, 64, 66, 69, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 52, 56, 57, 61, 62, 66, 67, 71, 72, 76, 86, 87, 88, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 82, 83, 84, 91, 97, 102, 115 115, 116, 117, 118 SNV...... 12 Pemba ...... 36 Sofala .20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 33, 34, 36, 38, Period of Joint Action...... 11, 43 61, 66, 67, 69, 75, 82, 100, 101, 105, PHE...... 11, 37 106, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 119, 121, 122, 123 PHP...... 11 South Africa...12, 28, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, PNS ...... 11 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 100, 108, 110 Punga ...... 112, 115 Sphere...... 17, 55, 80, 108 Quelimane ...... 44 STD ...... 12 RAF ...... 11, 41 Sussundenga ...... 66 Rain...... 34, 81 Swaziland ...... 34, 36, 43 Rapid-UK...... 41 TAC...... 12 Records...... 34 Tanzania...... 42 Red Cross...9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 22, 25, Tete ...... 34, 70, 106 37, 50, 53, 54, 64, 80, 94, 112 Tropical Storm...... 13, 43 RedR...... 12 Umbelúzi ...... 36, 37, 43, 44 Regulo ...... 113 UN..9, 12, 32, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, Renamo ...... 12, 32 105, 108 Resettlement..22, 25, 38, 44, 60, 70, 82, UNDAC.....12, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44 113, 116 UNDP ...... 12, 38, 112 RFA ...... 12, 40, 41, 42, 43 UNICEF...12, 16, 22, 37, 38, 40, 66, 74, RNLI ...... 12, 41 75, 76, 77, 80, 83, 88, 115, 116 Road Transport...... 43, 91 US 10, 11, 12, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, Roads..21, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 42, 43, 46, 42, 43, 44, 79, 88, 109, 113, 129 56, 61, 62, 66, 67, 80, 88, 91, 92, 93, USAID ...... 12, 108, 112, 113, 119 97, 101, 103, 112, 114 Vilanculos ...... 112, 115, 118, 121 Roll Back Malaria ...... 12, 78 Wat/San ...12, 13, 18, 21, 37, 38, 45, 46, SANDF...... 12, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 108 47, 50, 51, 52, 57, 58, 62, 67, 72, 75,

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76, 80, 84, 85, 88, 91, 96, 97, 101, Xai-Xai.37, 38, 40, 43, 44, 80, 100, 101, 102, 112, 113, 115, 116, 120 102, 104, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 WFP ...12, 21, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 66, 90, 101, 111, 115 Zambezi ...... 33, 34, 40, 87 WHO ...... 12 Zambézia ...... 34, 44, 45, 79, 88, 106 Wind...... 28, 38 Zambia...... 34 World Vision ..12, 21, 22, 30, 38, 40, 42, Zimbabwe 12, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41, 70, 44, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 110, 112, 100, 114 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121

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Appendix 20: References for Volume 2

1 Sources: Britannica CD, Version 99© 1994-1998. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc; World Bank - Mozambique at a glance – 32/08/2000 – World Bank; World Bank –World Development Report 2000/2001 – 2000 – World Bank, Washington 2 Sources: Britannica CD, Version 99© 1994-1998. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc; Cárdenas, S. and Fink, K. A Desk Study of US assistance to Mozambique’s Complex Humanitarian Emergency. International Resources Group, Washington – September 1998 – Unpublished; AIM various reports 3 . AFP (2000) Donors pledge 453 million dollars in flood aid to Mozambique – 4 Map 2000 – AFP, Rome 4 Emergency Flood Relief (Provision of Supplies) to the Republic of Mozambique (report #1) - 18 February 2000- Japan International Co-operation Agency 5 World Bank - A Preliminary Assessment of Damage from the Flood and Cyclone Emergency of February-March 2000 – March 27, 2000 - World Bank, Washington 6 Sources: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – http://www.cred.be/emdat/ - Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels – Belgium; Various AIM reports 7 Interviews with local government officials 8 Dynes, M (2000). British Pumas start flood relief flights. The Times . 6-3-2000. London

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