COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995

THE "LESSONS" OF THE CUBAN blockade ofCuba was lifted).3 Soperipheral Warsaw Pact during the crisis, the events of MISSILE CRISIS FOR WARSAW was the alliance to the Soviet Union's han­ October 1962 did have important effects on PACT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS dling of the crisis that it was not until long the alliance, particularly on the nuclear com­ after the matter had been resolved that the mand-and-control arrangements that were by Mark Kramer Soviet Prime Minister, Anastas Mikoyan, established in the mid-1960s. This article bothered to inform the East European gov­ will draw on recentdisclosures from the East The role of the Warsaw Pact in the ernments about the Soviet Union's motives German, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hun­ Cuban Missile Crisis was negligible. All for deploying and withdrawingthe missiles.4 garian archives to show how the Cuban evidence suggests that the Soviet Union That the Warsaw Pact was ofonly mar­ missilecrisisinfluenced Warsaw Pactnuclear neither consulted noreven informed its East ginal significance during the Cuban Missile operations. No definitive judgments about European allies about the installation of Crisis hardly comes as a great surprise. In this matter are yet possible because the most medium-range and tactical nuclear missiles 1962 the Pact was still little more than a crucial documents are all in Moscow, and in Cuba before the deployments were re· paper organization and had not yet acquired the archival situation in Russia is still highly vealed by the U.S. government.1 Nordid the a meaningful role in Soviet military strat­ unsatisfactory.? Nevertheless, enough evi­ Soviet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact egy.s Moreover, the crisis was far outside dence has emerged from East-Central Eu­ allies about the removal of the missiles. the European theater, and East European rope to permit several tentative conclusions. Although the Pact declared a joint military leaders had resisted Soviet efforts to extend The article will begin by briefly re­ alert on 23 October 1962 (the day after the alliance's purview beyond the continent. viewing the "lessons" that the Cuban Mis­ President John F. Kennedy's televised rev­ Despite fears that the showdown over Cuba sile Crisis offered for Soviet nuclear weap­ elation of the Soviet missile deployments), might spark a NATO-Warsaw Pactconfron­ ons deployments abroad. It will then delin­ the alert had no more than asymbolic impact tation in Berlin, the situation in Germany eate thecommand-and-control arrangements and was carried out solely at Moscow's remained calmthroughoutthe crisis.6 Hence, that were set up in the mid-I960s for War­ behest.2 The joint alert was formally can­ the standoff in the Caribbean was a matter saw Pact nuclear operations, and examine celled on 21 November 1962, the same day for the Soviet Union to handle on its own, the East European states' unsuccessful ef­ that the Soviet Union ended its own unilat­ not a matter for the Warsaw Pact. forts to aIterthose arrangements. The article eral alert (and a day after the U.S. naval Despite the near-irrelevance of the continued on page 110 110 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

WARSAW PACT "LESSONS" Khrushchev decided not to give Castro any dural restrictions-at least for tactical mis­ continuedfrom page 59 directjurisdiction over Soviet tactical nuclear siles--even after he received the two tele­ will conclude with some observations about forces; indeed, the draft treaty on military grams "categorically" forbidding him to or­ the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis for cooperation between the Soviet Union and der the issuance or use of nuclear weapons Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, a legacy Cuba, which was due to take effect once the without express authorization. On October that endured until the Pactitselfcollapsed in presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba was 26 he sent a cable to Moscow in which he 1990-91. publicly revealed at the end ofOctober, would apparently mentioned that Castro wanted have left the "military units of the two states him to prepare for a nuclear strike and that, "Lessons" of the Cuban Missile Crisis under the command of their respective gov­ as a result, he had decided it was time to Several features of the Cuban missile ernments."11 Even so, the Cuban leader's move nuclear warheads closer to the mis­ crisis were ofdirect relevance to subsequent message on 26 October 1962 still struck a siles (though without actually issuing them Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Eu­ raw nerve in Moscow.1 2 It was a vivid to the missile units). Pliev then requested rope. The "lessons" that Soviet officials reminder of the dangers that might have that his decision be approved and that he be derived from the crisis were of course not resulted if the Soviet Union had delegated given due authority to order the preparation the only factor (or even the most important any responsibility for nuclear operations. of tactical missiles for launch if, as appeared factor) shaping the Warsaw Pact's nuclear Arelated lesson about the dangers posed imminent, U.S. troops invaded the island. command structure, but they seem to have by local actors pertained to the role of the Soviet leaders immediately turned down both been of considerable influence, at least im­ commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, Army­ of his requests and reemphasized that no plicitly. Although Soviet leaders had been General Issa Pliev, who was chosen for the actions involving nuclear weapons were to concerned well before the Cuban Missile post because of his long-standing and very be undertaken without direct authorization Crisis about the difficulty of retaining se­ close friendship with both Khrushchev and from Moscow.1 6 cure control over nuclear weapons and about the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Still, the very fact that Pliev sought to the danger of unauthorized actions, the cri­ Malinovskii. 13 At no time during the crisis have the restrictions lifted, and his seeming sis put these risks into a whole new light.8 did Pliev have authority to order the use of willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons By underscoring how easily control could either medium-range or tactical nuclear mis­ if necessary, provided a sobering indication be lost, the crisis inevitably bolstered siles, but it is now known that several weeks of the risks entailed in giving discretion to Moscow's determination to ensure strict before the crisis-in the late summer of local commanders. The risks would have centralized command over all nuclear op­ 1962-Malinovskii had considered the pos­ been especially acute in this instance be­ erations, including nuclear operations con­ sibility ofgiving Pliev pre-delegated author­ cause there were no technical safeguards on ducted by the Warsaw Pact. ity to order the use oftactical missiles against the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve as a One of the most disconcerting lessons invading U.S. troops if Pliev's lines of com­ fallback in case Pliev (or someone else) of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet munication with Moscow had been severed attempted to circumvent the procedural safe­ perspective was the potential for nuclear and all other means of defense against an guards. 17 This is not to say that it would have weapons to be misused if the aims of local invasion had proven insufficient. A written been easy for Pliev to evade the procedural actors were not identical to Soviet goals. It order to this effect was prepared on 8 Sep­ limits-to do so he would have had to obtain is now known that at the height of the crisis tember 1962, but in the end Malinovskii cooperation from troops all along the chain Fidel Castro sent a top-secret cable to Mos­ declined to sign it. Thus, at the time of the of command-but there was no technical cow urging the Soviet Union to launch a crisis Pliev had no independent authority to barrier per se to unauthorized actions. nuclear strike against the United States if order the use of nuclear weapons or even to Thus, one of the clear lessons of the U.S. forces invaded Cuba.9 Castro appar­ order that nuclear warheads, which were crisis was the need not only to maintain ently had been led to believe that the Soviet stored separately from the missiles, be re­ stringent procedural safeguards for all So­ Union would be willing to go to war-and leased for possible employment. The limita­ viet nuclear forces, but also to equip those risk its own destruction-in defense ofCuba. tions on Pliev's scope of action during the forces with elaborate technical devices that Nikita Khrushchev's response to Castro's crisis were reinforced by two cables trans­ would prevent unauthorized or accidental plea indicates that the Soviet leader had no mitted by Malinovskii on October 22 and 25, launches. This applied above all to nuclear intention of ordering the use of nuclear which "categorically" prohibited any use of weapons deployed abroad, where the lines weapons, regardless of what happened to nuclear weapons under any circumstances of communication were more vulnerable to Cuba. without explicit authorization from Mos­ being severed or disrupted. 18 For Khrushchev, this episode was es­ cow. 14 One further lesson from the Cuban Mis­ pecially unnerving because he initially had The strictures imposed by the Soviet sile Crisis, which reinforced the perceived given serious consideration to providing leadership held up well during the crisis, as need for strict, centralized control over all Castro with direct command over Soviet the procedural safeguards for nuclear opera­ nuclear operations, was the role that acci­ forces in Cuba, including the nuclear-ca­ tions proved sufficient to forestall any unto­ dents played. The most conspicuous in­ pable Frog ("Luna") missiles and 11-28 air­ ward incidents. IS For the most part, stance came on October 27 when an Ameri­ craft. 1o (Only the medium-range SS-4 and Khrushchev's and Malinovskii'sfaith in Pliev can U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot SS-5 missiles would have been left under was well-founded. Nevertheless, it is clear down overCuba. 19 The rules ofengagement Moscow's command.) As it turned out, that Pliev wanted to ease some of the proce­ for Soviet troops in Cuba did not permit the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 111

WHEN AND WHY ROMANIA York for the opening of the UN General in Romania and offered the United States DISTANCED ITSELF FROM THE Assembly in tbe fall of 1963, a routinemeet­ any opportunityitwished to verify that fact. WARSAW PACT ing was arranged for October 4. Manescu (The absence of nuclear weapons accorded then arranged a private meeting with Rusk, with U.S. inteIligence, and the United States by Raymond L. Garthoff attended only by aninterpreter. It was the did not pursue. the verification offer.) first opportunity after tbe crisis nearly a year In view of the sensitivity of the matter, In April 1964, the Romanian leadership earlier for the Romanian leadership to ap­ any knowledge of this exchange was very issued a declaration in which it first ex­ proach the United States governmentatthis closely held in Washington, and no doubt in pressed pUblic dissatisfaction with the W ar~ level. Bucharest. It was not divulged to NATO saw Pact. Georghiu Dej, and after 1965 his Manescu told Rusk that Romania had governments. Sofar as is known, the Soviet successor Nicolae Ceausescu, increasingly not been consulted over the Soviet decision leadership did not learn of it~a1thoughthat distanced themselves from the Pact and to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, and was remains to be determined from the Soviet Moscow's leadership,although withoutcbal­ not therefore a party to the dispute. The archives. It did not "leak" in thirty years. I lenging the Soviet Union. Romaniaceased Romanian government wanted the United do not know if there is today any written to participate actively in the military com­ States to understand that Romania would account in either American or Romanian mand ofthe Warsaw Pactafter 1969. All of remain neutral in any contlict generated by archives. this small slice of history has, of course, such actions as the Soviet deployment of I was told about the exchange by Dean been well known. It has not been known nuclear missiles in Cuba, and sought assur~ Rusk soon after it occurred, and I recon­ why Romania launched itselfon tbat path at ances that in the event of hostilities arising firmed this· account ofit with him in 1990. It that particular time. Above all, seemed to me that with the col­ it has not heretofore beenknown THE FAR SIDE By GARY LARSON lapse of the Warsaw Pact, the that even earlier Romania es­ overthrow ofthe Romanian gov­ sentially repudiated its alle­ ernment, and the reunification giance obligations in a secret of Europe, the matter is now approach to the United States safely history, and should be­ government in October 1963, come a footnote to the historical promising neutrality in case of record. the outbreak of war. This was a It may be instructive, as stunning, unilateralbreachofthe wen as interesting, history. For central obligation of Warsaw example, as far as I am aware no Pactalliancemembership, which one has ever speculated on a Romania nominally maintained relationship between the Cuban until the very end, when the Pact Missile Crisis and the Roma­ dissolved in 1991. nianactions in distancing them­ What precisely happened, selves from the Warsaw Pact. It and wby? The precipitating is also interesting to reflect that event was the Cuban Missile despite that crisis and other se­ Crisis of October 1962. The vere trials, the two alliances did tensions generated by tbatcrisis hold together throughout the had reverberations throughout Cold War, and with relatively Europe. No country wanted to be brought from suchasituation,theUnites States would little evidentconcernover the risks involved, into a war over the issue ofSovietmissiles in notstrike Romania onthemistaken assump­ even in othercountrieshosting nuclear weap­ Cuba. Butwhile members ofNATOandthe tion that it w()uld be allied with the Soviet onsofthesuperpowers. Thus, remarkable as Warsaw Pact dutifullygavepublic support Union insueh a war. was the Romanian case, it was the sole to the United$tates and the Soviet Union, Secretary Rusk in response indicated exception to alliance solidarity~assuming respectively, some did so with considerable that the United States would take intoac­ the archives or informed officials do not trepidation. And in Bucharest, the l.eader­ count any country thatdid notparticipate in have any otbercease, on one side or the other, ship decided after that crisis that it would or permit its territory to be used in military to reveaL seek to disengage itseJffromany automatic actions againstthe United Statesoritsallies. involvement if their sUpefpQweralliance In this cmnnection, he said that it would be Raytl'Wn4L GQrthoff,aSeniorFellow atthe leader, the Soviet Union, again assumed important for the United States to know Brookings Institution, isa retiredAmbassa­ such risks. wnethertbere"were"nudearweapons onRo­ dor and a diplomatic historian. He dis­ Romanian-American relatimDsat>that manian soil,· and that if the United States closed this episode from the history of the time were minimal. .Nanetheless,.;:wben were given assurance that;ther~··were;none. Cold War in remarks at the January /993 Romanian Foreign Minist~rCornen~ that{'llCtwouJdbe taken intQ.accoUlntinUS. CWIH.P Mos~ow Conference on New Evi­ Manescu asked to meet withtheSec~af ~ R"Omani~os"s~bseqliJ¢:ntlyre~ tknceon Cold War History. State Dean Rusk. when both wereifl·New at1ib¢rewere\n()nllcle~we~ons 112 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN downing of American planes except those even the Romanian military was eventually ofan emergency.25 After the Cuban Missile carrying out an attack.2o When the U-2 was supplied with nuclear-capable Frog-7 and Crisis, those two agreements were supplanted shot down, no one in Moscow was quite sure Scud-B missiles. In all cases, the deploy­ by a much more far-reaching "Treaty Be­ what had happened-Khrushchev and most ment of these delivery vehicles was well tween the Governments of the USSR and others mistakenly thought that Castro had under way by the time of the Cuban Missile CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat ordered Soviet troops to fire at the plane­ Crisis. Readiness of Missile Forces," which was but everyone was certain that further inci­ The new East European weapons were signed by Malinovskii and his Czechoslo­ dents of this sort might cause the crisis to officially described as components of the vak counterpart, Army-General Bohumir spin out of control. The risks posed by "Warsaw Pact's joint nuclear forces" and Lomsky, in December 1965.26 The treaty accidents would have been especially great were later used for simulated nuclear strikes provided for the permanent stationing of ifthe local commander (i.e., Pliev) had been during Pact exercises, but all nuclear war­ Soviet nuclear warheads at three sites in given independent authority to order the use heads for the delivery systems remained un­ western Czechoslovakia. of nuclear weapons. After all, Pliev and der exclusive Soviet control, and the deliv­ This third agreement with Czechoslo­ other officers based in Cuba, whose lives ery vehicles themselves would have come vakia was concluded just after the Soviet were directly at risk during the crisis, were under direct Soviet command if they had Union had worked out a similar arrangement naturally inclined to overreact to unintended ever been equipped with warheads during a with Hungary.27 The Soviet-Hungarian "provocations" from the opposing side. To crisis. Moreover, the thousands of tactical agreement was signed by Brezhnev and the the extent that such overreactions could not nuclear weapons deployed by Soviet forces Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, and was be avoided in future crises, it was essential on East European territory were not subject kept secret from almost all other Hungarian that the consequences be minimized and to any sort of "dual-key" arrangement along officials. Much the same was true of an that further escalation be prevented. Obvi­ the lines that NATO established in the mid­ agreement that the Soviet Union concluded ously, it would be vastly more difficult to 1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exercises with Poland in early 1967.28 Only a few top regain any semblance of control if local included combat techniques for nuclear war­ Polish officials were permitted to find out actors "accidentally" resorted to the use of fare (as they routinely did from early 1962 about the document. The Soviet agreements nuclear weapons. on), the decision on when to "go nuclear" with all four countries covered nuclear war­ Hence, the accidents that occurred dur­ was left entirely to the Soviet High Com­ heads slated for use on delivery vehicles ing the Cuban Missile Crisis underscored mand.23 In every respect, then, the East belonging to Soviet troops stationed in those the need for rigid safeguards, both proce­ European governments had no say in the use countries. Some of the warheads were also dural and technical, to preclude the use of of the Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal. intended for weapons deployed by the local Soviet nuclear weapons except in the most The exclusivity ofSoviet command was armies, but in that case the delivery vehicles dire emergency. This lesson, like the others reinforced by secret agreements that the So­ would have been transferred to direct Soviet that Khrushchev and his colleagues derived viet Union concluded in the early to mid­ command. Under the new agreements East from the crisis, survived the change oflead­ 1960s with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, European officials had no role in the use of .' ership in Moscow in October 1964. Al­ Hungary, and Poland regarding the storage the Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal, nor any though Leonid Brezhnev altered many as­ of nuclear warheads in those countries. Al­ control over the reinforced storage bunkers pects of Khrushchev's military policies, he though all the agreements were bilateral, for nuclear warheads (or even the housing was just as determined as his predecessor to they were described as coming "within the for elite units assigned to guard the bunkers). retain stringent political control over Soviet framework of the Warsaw Pact." The first A senior East European military official nuclear forces. such agreements were signed with East Ger­ later confirmed that "the procedures for the many and Czechoslovakia before the Cuban defense and protection of these special-pur­ Nuclear Operations and the Warsaw Missile Crisis. The Soviet-East German pose storage centers for nuclear warheads Pact agreements, signed at various intervals in the were such that no one from our side had Nuclear weapons first became an issue early 1960s, covered some 16 storage sites, permission to enter, and even Soviet offi­ for the Warsaw Pact in mid-1958 when, all of which were controlled exclusively by cials who were not directly responsible for allegedly in response to deployments by special troops assigned to the Group of So­ guarding and operating the buildings were NATO, Khrushchev warned that the Pact viet Forces in Germany.24 The East German not allowed in."29 would be "compelled by force of circum­ authorities had no say at all in the location or Thus, by the late 1960s the Soviet and stance to consider stationing [tactical maintenance of these facilities, not to men­ East European governments had forged a nuclear] missiles in the German Democratic tion the use of the munitions stored there. nuclear command-and-control structure for Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia."21 Soviet agreements with Czechoslovakia were the Warsaw Pact that gave exclusive say to Shortly thereafter, the Czechoslovak, East somewhat more complicated because no the Soviet Union. Even before the Cuban German, and Polish armed forces began Soviet troops had been present on Czecho­ Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders had been in­ receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and sur­ slovak territory since the end of 1945. Two clined to move in this direction, but the crisis face-to-surface missiles from the Soviet preliminary agreements were signed in Au­ greatly accelerated the trend and effectively Union. 22 The Bulgarian and Hungarian gust 1961 and February 1962 entitling the ruled out anything less than complete con­ armies also soon obtained nuclear-capable Soviet Union to dispatch nuclear warheads trol in Moscow. aircraft and missiles from Moscow; and immediately to Czechoslovakia in the event COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 113

Intra-Pact Debate about Nuclear however, were averse to any steps that would officials from Romania, Czechoslovakia, and "Sharing" even marginally erode the Soviet Union's Hungary renewed their bid for "greater rights The effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis exclusive authority to order nuclear strikes, of co-determination in planning and imple­ could also be felt, if only implicitly, when and it soon became clear during the meeting menting common coalition matters," includ­ the Soviet Union had to deal with com­ that Soviet views on such matters would ing (by implication) the use ofnuclear weap­ plaints from its allies aboutthe Pact's nuclear prevail. As a result, the PCC communique ons.40 arrangements. The lack of East European simply called for both German states to As on previous occasions, however, the input proved unsatisfactory to several of the forswear nuclear weapons, proposed the cre­ Soviet Union resisted whatever pressure was allied governments, who urged that they be ation of a nuclear-free zone in central Eu­ exerted for the sharing of nuclear-release given some kind of role in nuclear-release rope, and advocated a freeze on all nuclear authority. In September 1966, a few months authorization. Theirconcernswere prompted stockpiles.34 The implication was that ar­ after the Bucharest conference, the Warsaw in part by changes in Soviet military doc­ rangements within the Warsaw Pact were Pact conducted huge "Vltava" exercises, trine in the mid-1960s, which seemed to best left unchanged. which included simulated nuclear strikes open the way for a nuclear or conventional That stance was reaffirmed over the under exclusive Soviet control.41 The same war confined to Europe. Under Khrushchev, next few months in a series of conspicuous arrangement was preserved in all subse­ Soviet military doctrine had long been predi­ Soviet declarations that "the Warsaw Pact is quent Pact maneuvers involving simulated cated on the assumption that any war in dependent on the Soviet strategic missile nuclear exchanges. Thus, well before the Europe would rapidly escalate to an all-out forces" and that "the security of all socialist signing ofthe 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear exchange between the superpowers; countries is reliably guaranteed by the nuclear put a symbolic end to the whole nuclear­ but by the time Khrushchev was ousted in missile strength of the Soviet Union."35 The sharing debate, the Soviet Union had firmly October 1964, Soviet military theorists had same message was conveyed later in the year established its exclusive, centralized control already begun to imply that a European by the joint "October Storm" military exer­ overthe Warsaw Pact's "joint" nuclearforces conflict need not escalate to the level of cises in East Germany, which featured simu­ and operations. strategic nuclear war.30 Under Brezhnev, lated nuclear strikes authorized solely by the Soviet military analyses of limited warfare USSR.36 In the meantime, the Soviet mo­ The Lessons of the Crisis and in Europe, including the selective use of nopoly over allied nuclear weapons proce­ Allied Nuclear Arrangements tactical nuclear weapons, grew far more dures was being reinforced by the series of The legacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis explicit and elaborate.3l Although this doc­ agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, helped ensure that the intra-Warsaw Pact trinal shift made sense from the Soviet per­ East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, as debate in the mid-1960s did not bring about spective, it stirred unease among East Euro­ discussed above. The codification of exclu­ any change in the alliance's nuclear com­ pean leaders, who feared that their countries sive Soviet control over nuclear weapons mand-and-control structure. Had it not been might be used as tactical nuclear battle­ deployed in the other Warsaw Pact countries for the dangers that were so clearly revealed grounds without their having the slightest all but eliminated any basis for the East by the events of October 1962, Soviet lead­ say in it. European governments to seek a role in the ers might have been willing to consider an The issue became a source of conten­ alliance's nuclear command structure. arrangement for the Warsaw Pact similar to tion at the January 1965 meeting of the Yet even after the Soviet Union tried to the "dual-key" system that NATO adopted. Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Com­ put the matter to rest, controversy persisted When Operation "Anadyr" was first being mittee, where the assembled leaders dis­ within the Warsaw Pact about the allocation planned in the late spring of 1962, cussed NATO's plans to create a Multi­ of responsibility for tactical nuclear weap­ Khrushchev had toyed with the idea of giv­ Lateral Force (MLF) that would supposedly ons. At a closed meeting of Pact leaders in ing Fidel Castro broad command over So­ give West Germany access to nuclear-armed East Berlin in February 1966, Romania again viet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba as well missiles. The PCC warned that if an MLF pressed for greater East European participa­ as over all non-nuclear forces on the island. were formed and the West Germans were tion in all aspects of allied military planning, Ultimately, Khrushchev decided not to share included, the Warsaw Pact would have to and was again rebuffed.37 A few months or delegate any responsibility for the nuclear­ resort to "defensive measures and corre­ later, the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, capable weapons based in Cuba, but the very sponding steps."32 The nature of these "cor­ Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, publicly fact that the issue was considered at all responding steps" was never specified, but declared that the East European states should suggests that if the Cuban Missile Crisis had Romanian and Czechoslovak officials at the be given increased responsibility for the full not intervened, the Soviet Union might have meeting maintained that the obvious solu­ range of issues confronting the Warsaw been receptive to some form ofnuclear"shar­ tion was for the Soviet Union to grant its Pact.38 That same week, a detailed Roma­ ing" with its East European allies. Indeed, a Warsaw Pact allies a direct say in the use of nian proposal for modifications to the alli­ "dual-key" arrangement for the Warsaw Pact, nuclear weapons stationed on East Euro­ ance was leaked to the French Communist which would not have provided any inde­ pean soil. 33 The Romanians were especially newspaper, L'Humanite; the document called pendent authority to the East European coun­ insistent on having responsibility shared for for, among other things, an East European tries, could easily have been justified as a all Warsaw Pact nuclear systems, including role in any decisions involving the potential response to NATO's policy and as a useful those deployed with the various Groups of use ofnuclear weapons.39 Subsequently, at means of strengthening allied cohesion. But Soviet Forces. Brezhnev and his colleagues, theJuly 1966 sessionofthePCC in Bucharest, after October 1962, when Soviet leaders 114 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

I drew a number of lessons about the risks of tions by Fidel Castro-that this factor be­ event that has traditionally been depicted as ~ even sharing, much less delegating, nuclear came a paramount reason to deny any share a bilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Not I authority, the prospects of adopting a "dual­ of nuclear-release authorization to the East only must the Cuban Missile Crisis be thought 1 key" system for the Warsaw Pact essentially European governments. Although East Eu­ of as a "triangular" showdown; its repercus­ vanished, ropean officials could not have ordered the sions can now be seen to have been at least Although Moscow's willingness to use of nuclear weapons on their own, they as great for Soviet allies, notably Cuba and share control overthe Warsaw Pact's "joint" might have inadvertently (or deliberately) Eastern Europe, as for the Soviet Union nuclear arsenal would have been sharply taken steps in a crisis that would have caused itself. constrained even before October 1962 by NATO governments to believe that a War­ the lack of permissi ve-action links (PALs) saw Pact nuclear strike was forthcoming I. This statement is based on a perusal of documents from the East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish ar­ and other use-denial mechanisms on Soviet (regardless of what actual Soviet intentions chives. See, e.g.. "Odvolanie opatreni v zavislosti s nuclear weapons, that factor alone would were). That, in turn, might have triggered a usnesenim VKO UV KSC, 25.10.62 (Karibska krize)," not have been decisive if the Cuban Missile preemptive nuclear attack by NATO. Only 25 October 1962 (Top Secret), in Vojensky Historicky Crisis had not occurred. After all, when by excluding the East European states alto­ Archiv (VHA) Praha, Fond (F.) Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany (MNO) CSSR, 1962, Operacni sprava Soviet officials seriously contemplated al­ gether from the nuclear-release process could Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 8/25. lotting partial nuclear authority to Castro in the Soviet Union avoid the unintended esca­ 2. "V shtabe Ob"edinennykh Vooruzhenykh Sil stran 1962, that was long before Soviet tactical lation of a crisis. Varshavskogo Dogovora," Pravda (Moscow), 23 Oc­ weapons were equipped with PALs. The The risks posed by a "dual-key" ar­ tober 1962. p. 1. For the effects of the alen from 27 October through 23 November, see the series of top­ physical separation ofwarheads from deliv­ rangement could have been mitigated if the secret memoranda to the CPSU CC Presidium from ery vehicles, as had been planned for the Soviet Union had built in extra procedural Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii and the missiles based in Cuba, was regarded at the and technical safeguards, but this in turn Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Mikhail Zakharov, 5 time as a sufficient (if cumbersome) barrier would have created operational problems for November 1962,17 November 1962, and 24 November 1962, in TsentrKhraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii against unauthorized actions. That approach Soviet troops who might one day have been (TsKhSD), F. 89, Opis' (Op.) 28, Delo (D.) 14, Listy had long been used for tactical weapons ordered to use the weapons. If a future (Ll.) 1-8. deployed by Soviet forces in Eastern Eu­ conflict had become so dire that Soviet lead­ 3. "V shtabe Ob"edinennykh vooruzhenykh sil stran rope, and it would have been just as effica­ ers had decided to authorize the employment Varshavskogo Dogovora," Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 22 November 1962. p. I. cious if a "dual-key" system had been of tactical nuclear weapons, they would have 4. See the account by the Hungarian charge d'affaires adopted-thatis, ifthe East European armies wanted their orders to be carried out as fast as in Washington, D.C. in October 1962 (who later de­ had been given control over the Pact's possible, before the situation on the battle­ fected), Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpow­ nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. Not un­ field had changed. By contrast, East Euro­ ers: The 1956 Re\'olution and Realpolitik (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 137. til after the Cuban Missile Crisis was the pean political and military officials might 5. "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya option of relying solely on the physical have been hesitant about ordering the nuclear raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym separation of warheads and delivery ve­ destruction of a site in Western Europe, not predstavleniyam," Report No. 24762s (TOP SECRET) hicles deemed inadequate. In the latter half least because the launch of nuclear weapons from Col.-General P. Ivashutin. chief of the Soviet General Staffs Main Intelligence Directorate, to Mar­ of the 1960s, the Soviet Union began incor­ against West European targets might well shal M. V. Zakharov. head of the General Staff Military porating electronic use-denial features into have provoked retaliatory strikes by NATO Academy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv its strategic missiles, and the same was true against East European sites. The problem Ministerstva oborony (TsAMO), Delo (D.) 158. esp. of Soviet tactical weapons by the early to would have been especially salient in the Listy (L.) 352-353. 411-412. 423, and 400. I am grateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing me with mid-1970s. Concerns in Moscow about the case of East German officials who would a copy of this document. physical security of nuclear weapons were have been asked to go along with nuclear 6. This point is stressed in the top-secret cables adduced hardly negligible before October 1962-in strikes against targets in West Germany. in note 2 supra. part because of the possibility that requisite Thus, even though Soviet officials could 7. On the state of the Russian archives, see Mark Kramer. "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and procedures might not be followed-but it have developed a hedge against the risks that Pitfalls," CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), I, 14-39. was not until after the Cuban Missile Crisis emerged during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 8. "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya that Soviet leaders fully appreciated the the safeguards needed for this purpose would raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym magnitude of this risk. have been extremely burdensome, depriving predstavleniyam," pp. 332-333. 9. "Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym The Cuban Missile Crisis also height­ the Pact of the ability to respond in a timely i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," ened Soviet concerns about the particular manner. From the Soviet perspective, it Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR (Moscow) dangers posed by crises. To be sure, Soviet made far more sense to circumvent the prob­ 24 (31 December 1990),67-80. esp. 7]-73. leaders were hardly complacent before Oc­ lem entirely by eschewing any form ofshared 10. Ibid., 73-75. This point was reemphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyan during their conversations tober 1962 about the need to maintain tight authority. in November 1962. See "Zapis' besedy A. 1. Mikoyana political control over nuclear operations; Itis ironic that the Cuban Missile Crisis, s prem'er-ministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitel'stva indeed, the stringent centralization ofnuclear which barely involved the Warsaw Pact at Kuby F. Kastro," 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and command was a consistent theme in Soviet all, would have had such an important long­ "0 besedakh A.!. Mikoyana sF. Kastro," 20 November 1962 (Top Secret), both published in Mezhdlazarodnaya military planning. Even so, it was not until term effect on the alliance. It is also ironic zhizn' (Moscow) 11-12 (November-December 1992), after the Cuban Missile Crisis-and espe­ that the actions of a third party, Fidel Castro, 143-147 and J47-150, respectively. See esp. 149. cially in light of the unexpected interven­ posed one of the greatest dangers during an II. It should be noted, however, that a decision to send COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 115

901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6 bombs to Cuba claim had already been contradicted by the Soviet Planungen des Warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: for the Frogs and 11-28s was not finalized until 8 officer who was in charge of the "central nuclear base" Eine Studie, February 1992, p. 5; for an English trans­ September 1962, by which time Khrushchev may al­ (i.e., the storage site for all nuclear warheads) in Cuba lation, see Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., "Warsaw ready have changed his mind about the command-and­ during the crisis, Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations control arrangements. See "Nachal'niku 12 glavnogo testified in late 1992 that "nuclear weapons could have From the East German Archives." CWIHP Bulletin 2 upravleniya Ministerstva oborony," 8 September 1962 been used only if the missile officers had received (Fall 1992), 1, 13-19.. (Top Secret), Memorandum from Defense Minister R. orders via their own chain-of-command from the Gen­ 28. Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (Potsdam), VA­ Mal inovskii and Chiefofthe General StaffM. Zakharov. eral Staff, and only if we, the officers responsible for Strausberg/29555/Box 155. in TsAMO. "Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu 'Anadyr' ," storing and operating warheads. had received our own 29. "Dohoda CSSR-ZSSR 0 vzajemnych dodavkach F. 16, Op. 3753. It is eminently possible that the special codes. At no point did I receive any signals to vyzbroje a voj. techniky v rr. 1963-1965," in VHA nuclear-capable weapons would not have beenequipped issue warheads for either the medium-range missiles or Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO. 1960-1962. OS/GS, 26/2. with nuclear warheads if they had been placed under the tactical weapons," See Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi 30. "Dogovor mezhdu pravitel'stvami SSSR i ChSSR Castro's command. yadernyi kruiz," 2. Beloborodov reemphasized this o merakh povysheniyaboegotovnosti raketnykh voisk," 12. "Dogovormezhdu pravitel'stvom Respubliki Kuby point several times during an interview with the author 15 December 1965, in VHA Praha, F. SekretariatMNO, ipravitel'stvom Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh in Moscow on 28 September 1994: "No nuclear muni­ 1960-1962, OS/GS, 2/16. Respublik 0 voennom sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi tions of any type, whether for the medium-range or the 31. See the reports on "Hungary: USSR Nuclear oborone," undated, Article 10. tactical weapons, were ever moved (byly dostavleny) Weapons Formerly Stored in Country," translated in 13. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya (Mos­ out of storage during the crisis. Nor could they have U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Nuclear Pro­ cow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," been moved without my knowledge." Beloborodov's liferation, JPRS-TND-91-007. 20 May 1991, pp. 14­ esp. p. 12. I am grateful to Khrushchev's son. Sergei, account was endorsed by General Leonid Garbuz, the 16. for providing me with a copy of the 3,600-page tran­ deputy commander ofSoviet forces in Cuba in 1962, in 32. "0przedsiewzieciu majacym nacelu podwyzszenie script of his father's memoirs. For an English transla­ an interview that same day in Moscow. gotowsci bojowej wojska," 25 February 1967. in tion of most of the account about the Cuban Missile 18. The exact contents of Pliev's telegram on the 26th Centralny Archiwum Wojskowy. Paczka 6, Tom 234. Crisis, see Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost are unknown. but the numbering of telegrams that are 33. Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak General Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter and available makes clear that he sent at least two that day, Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, inJan Bauer. "Jaderna Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and the second of which is the one in question. (His first munice: Asi tady byla," Ceske a moravskoslezske Company, 1990).170-183. telegram on the 26th, which was declassified in October zemedelske noviny (Prague), 4 July 1991, p. I. 14.Maj.-General(ret.) V. Makarevskii, "Oprem'ereN. 1992, pertained only to air defense operations against 34. See, forexample, Col.-General I. Glebov, "Razvitie S. Khrushcheve, marshaIe G. K. Zhukove i generale 1. possible U.S. air strikes.) The text of the Soviet operativnogo iskusstva," KraSflaya zvezda, 2 April A. Plieve," Mirovaya ekonomika i meZhdunarodnye leadership's response to Pliev's second cable is avail­ 1964, pp. 2-3: and Col.-General S. M. Shtemenko, otnosheniya (Moscow) 8-9 (August-September 1994), able (see next note), and, combined with retrospective "Sukhoputnye voiska v sovremennoi voine i ikh boevaya 197. Makarevskii served for many years under Pliev's comments by ex-Soviet officials, it suggests that Pliev podgotovka," Krasnaya zvezda. 3 January 1963, 2-3. command. Pliev' s close friendship with Khrushchev referred to Castro's efforts and requested authority to See also Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii et al.. Voennaya and Malinovskii is overlooked in the jaundiced assess­ move the warheads (though not yet authority for actual strategiya. 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), 373­ ment offered by General Anatolii Gribkov in Operation use). 374. This theme is also evident in "Razvitie voennogo ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cu­ 19. "Trostnik-tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 76639 (Top iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniyaraketno-yadernoi voiny ban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994),25-26. Secret), 27 October 1962. reproduced in Operation po sovremennym predstavleniyam." passim. 15. "Komanduyushchemugruppoi sovetskikh voisk na ANADYR, 182. See also Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear 35. See, forexample, Col.-General N. Lomov, "Vliyanie o. Kuba," 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), in TsAMO, Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Sovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogo "Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu .Anadyr' ," GSU GSh, Missile Crisis," 46; and Pavlenko, "Bezymyannye iskusstva," Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil21 (Novem­ F. 16, Op. 3753; reproduced in Operation ANADYR. motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu," 4. ber 1965), 16-24. 183. For a discussion of this matter and relevant 20. Marshal V. F. Tolubko, "Glavnaya raketnaya sila 36. Cited in "Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," citations, see Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weap­ strany." Krasnaya zvezda, 19 November 1963. I. Pravda, 25 September 1965, p. 2 (emphasis added). ons. Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Mis­ 21. See Khrushchev's comments on this point in 37. "Stenografische Niederschrift der Konferenz der sile Crisis," CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993),40-46, esp. Vospominaniya. Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," p. 18. kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des 42-43,46. 22. Army-General Yu. P. Maksimovetal.,eds., Raketnye Warschauer Vertrages," January 1965 (Top Secret), in 16. "Trostnik-tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 4/389 (Top voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya: Voenno­ Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen Secret) from R. Malinovskii (Direktor). 22 October istoricheskii trud (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 109-110. der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales 1962, reproduced in Operation ANADYR, 181. This Detailed first-hand accounts by high-ranking Soviet air Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, J IV, 2/202/130. directive was reaffirmed three days later after a request defense personnel who took part in the shootdown are 38. "0 zasedanii Politicheskogo konsul'tativnogo for clarification from Pliev; see Lieut.-Col. Anatolii available in "Voina ozhidalas's rassvetom," Krasnaya komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dokuchaev, "I OO-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," Krasnaya zvezda, 13 May 1993,2. Dogovora 0 druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi zvezda, 6 November 1992. 2. See also Sergei Pavlenko, 23. The rules of engagement are spelled out briet1y in pomoshchi," Krasnava zvezda, 21 January 1965, I. See "Bezymyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu the cable from Malinovskii to Pliev, as cited in also Colonel V. F. Samoilenko, Osnova boevogosoyuza: 'stoyat' nasmert' ," Krasnaya zvezda, 29 December Dokuchaev, "IOO-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2. More Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoi moshchi 1994, p. 4. Forfurther discussion and relevant citations, elaborate rules are specified in documents now stored in sorsialisticheskogosodruzhestva (Moscow: Voenizdat. see Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Com­ the Russian General Staff archive; see "Dokumenty po 1981),259. mand Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," 45-46. meropriyatiyu 'Anadyr'," in GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 39. See, for example, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, 17. In early 1994, General Anatolii Gribkov claimed 3753, D. I, Korebka 3573. "Moguchii strazh bezopasnosti narodov," Krasnaya that Pliev not only wanted to move several nuclear 24. Krushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, "Karibskii zvezda, 13 May 1965, 3; Marshal A. A. Grechko, warheads out of storage on 26 October 1962, but had krizis," pp. 17-18. "Nadezhnyi shchit mira i bezopasnosti narodov," actually issued orders to that effect without authoriza­ 25. "Vystuplenie glavy Sovetskoi delegatsii KommUllist vooruzhenykh sil . No.9 (May 1965), 13; tion from Moscow. See Operation ANADYR, 63, and Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. and Marshal A. A. Grechko, "Boevoi soyuz bratskikh Gribkov comments at a 5 April 1994 meeting at the Khrushcheva na Soveshchanii Politicheskogo narodov," Pravda, 13 May 1965. I. (emphases added) Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., orga­ Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov 40. "Informacna sprava 0 vysledkach cvicenia nized by the Cold War International History Project. Varshavskogo Dogovora 24 maya 1958 goda," Pravda. ·OktobrovaBurka'." I6-22 October 1965 (Top Secret), However, Gribkov produced no evidence to back up his 27 May 1958, p. 3. in VHAPraha,F. HlavnaPolitickaSprava(HPS), 1965. assertion that warheads were actually moved out, and in 26. Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe, 1945­ HPS 112. a lengthy interview with the present author in Moscow 1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 41. "Konferenz der kommunistischen und on 29 September 1994 he said he could not be certain 1970), 150-151,487-489. Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages: that Pliev had given such an order. Gribkov's initial 27. Der Bundesministerder Verteidigung, Militarische continued on page 160 160 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

WARSAW PACT "LESSONS" CLINTON EXECUTIVE ORDER CARTER-BREZHNEV continued from page 115 continued from page 143 continuedfrom page 154 Stenografische Niederschrift," February 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA. IV 27/208/85. cation of state of the art technology within a presentedthe dualAmerican proposalin his talks 42. "Oplot mira i sotsializma," Krasnaya zvezda, 14 U.S. weapon system; in Moscow with Soviet leaders, in particular May 1966,5. (5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans Foreigll Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, on 28-30 43. "La Roumanie n'a formu1e aucune demande en ce that remain in effect; March 1977. The Soviet sideflatly rejected both qui concerne Ie Pacte de Varsovie: Mise au Point du (6) reveal information that would seriously variants in the American initiative, insisting on ministere des Affaires etrangeres a Bucarest," and demonstrably impair relations between the strict adherence to the Vladivostok framework L Humanite (Paris), 19 May 1966, 3. and refusing to table a counter-proposal. 44. "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender United States and a foreign government, or Reprasentanten der Bruderstaaten des Warschauer seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing The dispute quickly broke into public view in Vertrages," July 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB,ZPA, diplomatic activities of the United States; a series ofdueling press conferences. On March IV 2/202/431. (7) reveal information that would clearly 30, Vance told reporters in Moscow that "the 45. "Komplexny material: CVicenie 'VLTAVA' ," in and demonstrably impair the current ability of Soviets told us they had examined our two pro­ VHA Praha, F. HPS, 1966, HPS 30/2; and United States Government officials to protect posals and did not find either acceptable. They "Vyhodnotenie cvicenia 'VLTAVA'," VHA Praha, F. the President, Vice President, or other officials proposed nothing new on their side." [n Wash­ Sekretarial MNO, 1966, OS/GS, 412. for whom protections services, in the interest of ington the same day, Carterdefellded the propos­ 46. Maksimov et aI., eds.. Raketnye voiska als as a "fair, balanced" route to a "substantial Hrategicheskogo naznacheniya, 125-) 26. national security, are authorized; 47. Sec, e.g., ibid.. 125-126. See also "Razvitie voennogo (8) reveal information that would seriously reduction" in nuclear arms. Next, in his own, iskusstva vusloviyakh vedeniyaraketno-yadernoi voiny and demonstrably impair current national unusual press conference, Gromyko angrily de­ po sovremennym predstavleniyam," pp. 325-334. security emergency preparedness plans; or nounced the proposals Vallce delivered as a 48. See ibid.. 330-336 and passim. (9) violate a statute, treaty, or international "cheap andshady maneuver" to seek U.S. nuclear agreement. superiority, described as "basically false" Mark Kramer is a research associate at Brown Carter'sclaimthatVallcehadpresenteda "broad University's Center for Foreign Policy Development [Ed. note: For the full text of E,G, 12958, see disarmament program." and complained, "One and Han'ard University's Russian Research Center. the Federal Register, 20 April 1995 (60 cannottalk ahout stability when a new leadership An earlier version of this article was presented at a Federal Register, pp. 19825-19843).) conference on "The Cuban Missile Crisis in Light of arrives andcrosses out all that has been achieved New Archil·al Documents, ., co-sponsored by the Rus­ before. " sian State Archival Serdce and the US. Naval Acad­ Those interested in additional information emy, in Moscow, 27-29 September 1994. Oil this acrimonious episode in U.S. -Soviet rela­ tions and the SALT II negotiations may wish to COLD WAR consult, in addition to the memoirs offormer INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT officials (including Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, Kornienko, etal.), the accounts byStrobe Talbott, The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson Interna­ Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New tional Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C" in 1991 with the help of the lohn D. and Catherine T. York: Harper & Row, 1979; RaymondL. Garthoff, MacArthur FOUndation. 'The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet governments on all sidesoftheCold War, andseeks to disseminate new infonnation and perspectives Relations from Nixon to Reagan. rev. ed. (Wash­ on Cold War history emerging from previously inaecessib1e sources on" the other side"--the fonner ington, DC: Brookings [nstitution, 1994), esp. Communist bloc-through publications. fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The 883-94; Q/zdforthcoming publications emerging project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst C.) and from the Carter-Brezhnev Project.] consisting ofMichael Beschloss;Dr. James'Billington(Librarian ofCongress); Prof. Warren I, Cohen (U. of Mary1andlBaltirnore); Prof. JohnI.ewis Gaddis (OhioUJAthens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, lr. (Deputy Director, Wilson Center); andProf;Sbaron Wo1chik (George Washington U.), Within the Wilson Center, CWIHPiSWlder theDivisionoflnterniltional Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak. I. [Ed. note: The texts of those messages, as well as and is directed by Dr. lames G. Hershberg, R.eaders are invited to submit articles, letters. and Update Harriman' srelated records ofconversation with Carter, items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP's endorsement ofauthors' can be found in the Harriman Papers, Library of Con­ gress, Washington, D.C.] views. Copies available upon request. are free 2. [Ed. note: The State Department had protested the arrest on February 3 of Aleksandr Ginzburg, a promi­ Cold War International History Project Bulletin nent dissident, for alleged currency violations.) Issue 5 (Spring 1995) 3. [Ed. note: Evidently an allusion to Carter's support­ Woodrow Wilson Center ive Ietterto Andrei Sakharov, disclosed on February 17, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W. 1977.J Washington, D,C. 20560 4. [Ed. note: When shown this translation by the editor Tel.: (202) 357-2967; Fax: (202) 357-4439 ofthe CWIHP Bulletill during an informal discussion at the May 1977 Carter-Rrezhnev conference in Georgia, e-mail (editorialinquiries):[email protected] Vance denied the accuracy of the comments attributed e-mail (requestsforcopiesONLY);[email protected] to him here by Dobrynin, saying that perhaps the Soviet Ambassador had exaggerated his response. ) Editor: lames G. Hershberg 5. [Ed. note: Evidently a reference to the use ofthe "hot Associate Editors: PJ .. Simmons, Bonnie Terrell line" for this letter noted by G. M. Kornienko in his Researchers: Mark Doctoroff, Michelle King, Stephen Connors, Helen Christakos, Daniel Rozas introduction.]

"CWIHP: Helping to Change the C>bjective Correlation of Sources."