COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995 THE "LESSONS" OF THE CUBAN blockade ofCuba was lifted).3 Soperipheral Warsaw Pact during the crisis, the events of MISSILE CRISIS FOR WARSAW was the alliance to the Soviet Union's han­ October 1962 did have important effects on PACT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS dling of the crisis that it was not until long the alliance, particularly on the nuclear com­ after the matter had been resolved that the mand-and-control arrangements that were by Mark Kramer Soviet Prime Minister, Anastas Mikoyan, established in the mid-1960s. This article bothered to inform the East European gov­ will draw on recentdisclosures from the East The role of the Warsaw Pact in the ernments about the Soviet Union's motives German, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hun­ Cuban Missile Crisis was negligible. All for deploying and withdrawingthe missiles.4 garian archives to show how the Cuban evidence suggests that the Soviet Union That the Warsaw Pact was ofonly mar­ missilecrisisinfluenced Warsaw Pactnuclear neither consulted noreven informed its East ginal significance during the Cuban Missile operations. No definitive judgments about European allies about the installation of Crisis hardly comes as a great surprise. In this matter are yet possible because the most medium-range and tactical nuclear missiles 1962 the Pact was still little more than a crucial documents are all in Moscow, and in Cuba before the deployments were re· paper organization and had not yet acquired the archival situation in Russia is still highly vealed by the U.S. government.1 Nordid the a meaningful role in Soviet military strat­ unsatisfactory.? Nevertheless, enough evi­ Soviet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact egy.s Moreover, the crisis was far outside dence has emerged from East-Central Eu­ allies about the removal of the missiles. the European theater, and East European rope to permit several tentative conclusions. Although the Pact declared a joint military leaders had resisted Soviet efforts to extend The article will begin by briefly re­ alert on 23 October 1962 (the day after the alliance's purview beyond the continent. viewing the "lessons" that the Cuban Mis­ President John F. Kennedy's televised rev­ Despite fears that the showdown over Cuba sile Crisis offered for Soviet nuclear weap­ elation of the Soviet missile deployments), might spark a NATO-Warsaw Pactconfron­ ons deployments abroad. It will then delin­ the alert had no more than asymbolic impact tation in Berlin, the situation in Germany eate thecommand-and-control arrangements and was carried out solely at Moscow's remained calmthroughoutthe crisis.6 Hence, that were set up in the mid-I960s for War­ behest.2 The joint alert was formally can­ the standoff in the Caribbean was a matter saw Pact nuclear operations, and examine celled on 21 November 1962, the same day for the Soviet Union to handle on its own, the East European states' unsuccessful ef­ that the Soviet Union ended its own unilat­ not a matter for the Warsaw Pact. forts to aIterthose arrangements. The article eral alert (and a day after the U.S. naval Despite the near-irrelevance of the continued on page 110 110 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN WARSAW PACT "LESSONS" Khrushchev decided not to give Castro any dural restrictions-at least for tactical mis­ continuedfrom page 59 directjurisdiction over Soviet tactical nuclear siles--even after he received the two tele­ will conclude with some observations about forces; indeed, the draft treaty on military grams "categorically" forbidding him to or­ the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis for cooperation between the Soviet Union and der the issuance or use of nuclear weapons Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, a legacy Cuba, which was due to take effect once the without express authorization. On October that endured until the Pactitselfcollapsed in presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba was 26 he sent a cable to Moscow in which he 1990-91. publicly revealed at the end ofOctober, would apparently mentioned that Castro wanted have left the "military units of the two states him to prepare for a nuclear strike and that, "Lessons" of the Cuban Missile Crisis under the command of their respective gov­ as a result, he had decided it was time to Several features of the Cuban missile ernments."11 Even so, the Cuban leader's move nuclear warheads closer to the mis­ crisis were ofdirect relevance to subsequent message on 26 October 1962 still struck a siles (though without actually issuing them Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Eu­ raw nerve in Moscow.1 2 It was a vivid to the missile units). Pliev then requested rope. The "lessons" that Soviet officials reminder of the dangers that might have that his decision be approved and that he be derived from the crisis were of course not resulted if the Soviet Union had delegated given due authority to order the preparation the only factor (or even the most important any responsibility for nuclear operations. of tactical missiles for launch if, as appeared factor) shaping the Warsaw Pact's nuclear Arelated lesson about the dangers posed imminent, U.S. troops invaded the island. command structure, but they seem to have by local actors pertained to the role of the Soviet leaders immediately turned down both been of considerable influence, at least im­ commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, Army­ of his requests and reemphasized that no plicitly. Although Soviet leaders had been General Issa Pliev, who was chosen for the actions involving nuclear weapons were to concerned well before the Cuban Missile post because of his long-standing and very be undertaken without direct authorization Crisis about the difficulty of retaining se­ close friendship with both Khrushchev and from Moscow.1 6 cure control over nuclear weapons and about the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Still, the very fact that Pliev sought to the danger of unauthorized actions, the cri­ Malinovskii. 13 At no time during the crisis have the restrictions lifted, and his seeming sis put these risks into a whole new light.8 did Pliev have authority to order the use of willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons By underscoring how easily control could either medium-range or tactical nuclear mis­ if necessary, provided a sobering indication be lost, the crisis inevitably bolstered siles, but it is now known that several weeks of the risks entailed in giving discretion to Moscow's determination to ensure strict before the crisis-in the late summer of local commanders. The risks would have centralized command over all nuclear op­ 1962-Malinovskii had considered the pos­ been especially acute in this instance be­ erations, including nuclear operations con­ sibility ofgiving Pliev pre-delegated author­ cause there were no technical safeguards on ducted by the Warsaw Pact. ity to order the use oftactical missiles against the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve as a One of the most disconcerting lessons invading U.S. troops if Pliev's lines of com­ fallback in case Pliev (or someone else) of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet munication with Moscow had been severed attempted to circumvent the procedural safe­ perspective was the potential for nuclear and all other means of defense against an guards. 17 This is not to say that it would have weapons to be misused if the aims of local invasion had proven insufficient. A written been easy for Pliev to evade the procedural actors were not identical to Soviet goals. It order to this effect was prepared on 8 Sep­ limits-to do so he would have had to obtain is now known that at the height of the crisis tember 1962, but in the end Malinovskii cooperation from troops all along the chain Fidel Castro sent a top-secret cable to Mos­ declined to sign it. Thus, at the time of the of command-but there was no technical cow urging the Soviet Union to launch a crisis Pliev had no independent authority to barrier per se to unauthorized actions. nuclear strike against the United States if order the use of nuclear weapons or even to Thus, one of the clear lessons of the U.S. forces invaded Cuba.9 Castro appar­ order that nuclear warheads, which were crisis was the need not only to maintain ently had been led to believe that the Soviet stored separately from the missiles, be re­ stringent procedural safeguards for all So­ Union would be willing to go to war-and leased for possible employment. The limita­ viet nuclear forces, but also to equip those risk its own destruction-in defense ofCuba. tions on Pliev's scope of action during the forces with elaborate technical devices that Nikita Khrushchev's response to Castro's crisis were reinforced by two cables trans­ would prevent unauthorized or accidental plea indicates that the Soviet leader had no mitted by Malinovskii on October 22 and 25, launches. This applied above all to nuclear intention of ordering the use of nuclear which "categorically" prohibited any use of weapons deployed abroad, where the lines weapons, regardless of what happened to nuclear weapons under any circumstances of communication were more vulnerable to Cuba. without explicit authorization from Mos­ being severed or disrupted. 18 For Khrushchev, this episode was es­ cow. 14 One further lesson from the Cuban Mis­ pecially unnerving because he initially had The strictures imposed by the Soviet sile Crisis, which reinforced the perceived given serious consideration to providing leadership held up well during the crisis, as need for strict, centralized control over all Castro with direct command over Soviet the procedural safeguards for nuclear opera­ nuclear operations, was the role that acci­ forces in Cuba, including the nuclear-ca­ tions proved sufficient to forestall any unto­ dents played.