The Professional Journal of the Air Force from the editor's aerie

According to the official U.S. Army Air Forces History of World War II, the bombing of Japan affected civilian morale more in 1945 than had the earlier bombing of Germany. This was not because of more bombs, for substantially lower tonnages were dropped in the Far East than in Europe. The pace of attack was the thing. In Europe the buildup from the first attack in 1942 to the avalanche of bombs in 1944 was gradual. In Japan practically no bombs had fallen before November 1944. Yet, the ultimate horror was reached only four months later with the holocaust in Tokyo. In this issue, one of the Review's stalwarts, Dr. Herman Gilster (Colonel, USAF, Ret.), explores that subject of gradualism through historical and economic analyses. His "On War, Time, and the Principle of Substitution” concludes that too often Americans have been preoccupied with the weight of the attack and have not given enough attention to its timing. We have devised brilliant methods, but we have applied them so gradually as to give the enemy time to develop effective defenses. Our cover relates to that theme of Gilster’s article, the B-52 "Buff” representing the heaviest imaginable attack and an hourglass symbolizing that timeliness is critical in such an assault.

We have heard much lately about the relationship between leadership and management. Almost always the former is assigned the higher priority, but the latter is also deemed necessary. Nonetheless, we occasionally come forth with a package on management, and we are pleased with the one in this issue. USAF Captain James S. Seevers gives us the pro side of the management by objectives argument; Army Lieutenant Colonel Philip Perles delivers the con. Other Air Force men give practical advice on the subject: “Survival in the Management Jungle” and "MBO at the Micro Level.”

By the time you read this, I will have completed my thirty years and faded away like other old editors. I thank both readers and contributors for what I perceive to be rising support of the Review and ask that you continue the trend for my successor. The new Review editor is Lieutenant Colonel John F. Guilmartin, Jr., who assumes editorship in September, coming here from Hq Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, Scott AFB, Illinois. As I see it, "Joe” has a near-perfect balance of academic and professional qualifications for the job. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1962 and earned both master’s degree and Ph.D. in history from Princeton. His book, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century (1974), has received enviable reviews. On the military side. Colonel Guilmartin served two tours in Southeast Asia as a Jolly Green pilot, earned the Silver Star, and led missions into the city during the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975. I p re d ic t a rosy fu tu r e for the Review. Sawadee! articles

q On War, Time, and the Principle of " Substitution Dr. Herman L. Gilster Detente and an Adequate American Defense Lt. Col. Joseph W. Kastl, USAF Getting Traffic Moving on NATO’s Two-Way Street Maj. Dennis M. Drummond, USAF departments

POINT COUNTER POINT QC' Management by Objectives and Perfor- mance Appraisal Capt. James S. Seevers, USAF “You Will Implement MBO!” and Other 4 0 Reasons the Program Has Not Worked in the Military Lt. Col. Philip J. Perles, USA 40 MBO at the Micro Level: A Case Study Capt. Michael F. Turner, USAF 48 Survival in the Management Jungle CMSgt. C. P. Wilkson, USAF

IN MY OPINION r i Air Force Public Affairs: Stone Walls or Stone Bridges? Maj. Richard J. Oliver, USAF

BOOKS AND IDEAS 5 7 America, World Policeman? Dr. Alvin D. Coox Detente, Deterrence, and the Dilemma of National Security Dr. Joe P. Dunn 6 / Asia: Image and Reality Dr. James H. Toner 72 Potpourri 7 9 THE CONTRIBUTORS Only when an economic system is critically strained and time is running out can the type of bombing campaigns described in this article succeed in achieving their affirmed results. ON WAR, TIME, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION

D r . H er ma n L. G il st er

UT of the re- Substitution in warfare, of course, is not a cent conflict in recent phenomenon. History abounds with Southeast Asia examples of belligerent nations’ taking advan- Ohas emerged once tage of this age-old principle. For example, again evidence of the until perhaps this century, the process of subtle but powerful converting plowshares into swords was quite role that substitution characteristic of military preparations for plays in the art of war- warfare; advancements in peacetime technol- fare. Traditionally, na- ogy were later incorporated into the develop- tions under attack — ment of military hardware. John Nef, in his given sufficient time— evaluation of warfare and industrialism, have effected both concluded that, “Many weapons, from the product and factor crossbow to the bayonet, were apparently in- substitution to a degree vented, not for war but for the chase. . . it was that in large measure not until the nineteenth century that war attenuated the eco- replaced sport as the leading stimulus to nomic impact of mil- technical improvements in firearms,”1 and itary strikes against their industrial and logistics “Saltpeter and gunpowder appear in Western sectors. Seldom has a wartime economy been history as by-products of remarkable general so fully mobilized and fine-tuned that the loss progress in knowledge for peaceful pur- of a single part or function could not in some poses.”2 Gunpowder was initially used during way be compensated for through the process the twelfth century to blast through stone of substitution. Franklin’s “horseshoe nail” encountered at lead and silver mines. It was not dictum, so applicable in time-sensitive, tactical until two centuries later that we find references situations, loses much of its relevance over the of its use for military purposes in the tubes of long-term. This was particularly true of the cannon. The technology for producing the protracted war in Southeast Asia. cannon themselves was derived from the

2 PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION 3 peaceful endeavor of casting church bells, first indirectly and in the long-term related to noted in the eleventh century.3 battlefield success. Given sufficient time, plus As the demands of warfare increased some slack in her economy, a nation can through the seventeenth century and plow- normally improvise and adjust for strategic shares were increasingly converted into shortages that might be created. Germany and swords, many European nations found them- Great Britain, for instance, were particularly selves short of the vital metals required for adept at compensating for shortages during military hardware. It therefore became neces- most of the war. sary to reduce the more decorative and Let us look at the German experience a bit extravagant uses of this limited resource. The more closely. Burton Klein, in his classic study utility of armor, for instance, had by that time of Germany’s wartime economy, concluded been largely undermined by the evolution in that for the first five years of W’orld War II the firearms—the warrior of the day could no German economy contained considerable longer be protected at a weight that did not slack.6 It was not until after the Battle of restrict his mobility. Consequendy, the last Stalingrad and the initiation of large-scale raids vestiges of armor from the equipment of on her cities at the beginning of 1943 that soldiers were eliminated, and even the manu- Germany was shocked into the reality of total facture of breastplates was abandoned. The war and began to mobilize fully her national metal thus saved was used to produce the resources. From that time until mid-1944, the required firearms. Along this same line, peak of her war effort, munitions production Gustavus Adolphus is said to have sponsored increased by nearly 50 percent. During the several new models of light artillery—one a so- same period, the gradually expanding British called “leather gun” that consisted of a thin and U.S. air effort exacted only a 5 to 10 copper or bronze tube strengthened with iron percent reduction in military output. Begin- rings and covered with a leather skin.4 ning in the summer of 1944, however, the Although the primary purpose of his innova- tremendous weight of increased Allied air tions may have been to provide the king’s attacks, territorial losses, and manpower infantry units with maneuverable firepower, problems made it impossible to increase they also enabled him to conserve more scarce military' output further; subsequendy, these metals. Substitutions such as these let warfare factors brought about Germany’s economic continue, but on an admittedly more limited collapse. Still, by December 1944 total indus- scale than would have prevailed if the nations trial production was within 15 percent of peak of that age had possessed more advanced output, and munitions production had fallen scientific and administrative skills—factors by only 18 percent. that in large measure determine the extent to After the end of the year, military produc- which substitution can be carried.5 tion rapidly collapsed, and by March, the last month production data were collected, muni- Our Experience tions production was 45 percent below the with Germany December level. But paradoxically, states The art of substitution in warfare, further Klein, “even in March 1945, Germany’s total developed over the centuries, was applied with military output was at a substantially higher remarkable success by the more advanced rate than when she began her attack on nations during World War II. In one sense this Russia—an attack which was to have brought result was contingent on the advent of air complete victory by the summer of 1941.”7 power and its application deep behind enemy Although Klein gives Hitler’s Nazi regime lines against target systems that were only relatively low marks in their economic prepa- Continued on page 6 Axis oil facilities During World War II, primary target systems in Germany and Axis Europe of Allied bombing were the synthetic oil plants and dumps. An oil blending plant (right) suffered heavy damage— Also frequently attacked in the bombings were such plants as the Xenia (below) and Romana (facing page) oil refineries at Ploesti, center of the important Romanian oil fields.

6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ration for war, he still admired the resilience of The American command favored selective their economy. “What the Germans really or precision bombing, but these attacks met excelled in was in improvising. The measures with only mixed results. Planners fii;st searched taken to get around the shortage of ferroalloys for the small single “horseshoe nail” target were truly ingenious. The kinds of measures system, which if destroyed would cause a taken to restore production after bombing virtual stoppage of all military production. The attacks and the speed with which production selection of the ball bearing industry appeared was restored were remarkable.”8 a logical choice. Attacks on these plants alone From an incisive evaluation of target were to reduce German armaments production selection during the Combined Bomber Offen- by 30 percent, and, since production was sive by Mancnr Olson, Jr., we gain further concentrated in relatively few cities, the insight into the capability of the German industry could be easily destroyed. In the economy to withstand for so long the Allied subsequent raids, about one-half of the indus- strategic air campaign 9 Two distinct hypoth- try floorspace was destroyed and another half eses were promoted during the bomber of- severely damaged, yet Germany’s capacity to fensive. The British advocated area bombing wage war was not impaired. A limited amount of cities on the premise that the German of dispersal had already taken place, and losses economy was so fully and efficiently mobi- in output were restored between raids much lized that any transfer of resources for either more quickly than believed possible. Moreov- civilian or industrial restoration would subtract er, the Germans were able to manage with from the war effort. There is now, however, an fewer ball bearings than anticipated through impressive array of evidence that area bomb- redesign of equipment and the reduction of ing did not decisively affect either industrial excessive and often luxurious uses of bear- production or the German will to resist. ings.12 John Kenneth Galbraith, who along with his Olson feels that the economist’s fundamental other accomplishments was a director of the theory of substitution explains the shortcom- U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, cites as an ex- ings of both strategies cited above. In the case ample the bombing of Hamburg.10 For three of area bombing, the British could not expect nights the Bomber Command to destroy more than a small proportion of a subjected the city of Hamburg to devastating large number of industries. But when only “a attacks. A third of the city was destroyed, and small proportion of the productive capacity of at least 60,000 persons were killed. The an industry is destroyed, this capacity can be industrial plants that were around the edge of spared or replaced particularly easily.”13 For the city, however, were not greatly damaged, selective bombing the search for the small but and after several weeks of adjustment produc- indispensable industry proved illusionary. tion was back to normal. In fact, many persons “The enemy could always afford to replace previously engaged in nonessential occupa- most of any industry if that industry was small tions in the destroyed portion of the city turned enough. And it matters not how ‘essential’ an to the war industries for employment, thus industry might be if the enemy can easily alleviating a former labor shortage. Galbraith replace that industry once it has been de- concludes that, “In reducing, as nothing else stroyed.”14 could, the consumption of nonessentials and Contrast the results against the ball bearing the employment of men in their supply, there is industry, for example, with the success expe- a distinct possibility that the attacks on rienced in strikes against the German synthetic Hamburg increased Germany’s output of war oil industry. These raids, coming during the material and thus her military effectiveness.”11 final year of the war, put a tremendous strain PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION 7 on the German economic system. Throughout were improved, and bridges were replaced by the war oil had been exceedingly expensive fords and alternate structures less vulnerable to and in short supply. Having been cut off from air attacks. Construction material, equipment, their primary sources, the Germans had and workers were pre-positioned at advan- developed a synthetic process for making oil tageous locations along key routes in order to out of coal. The synthetic oil industry was effect quick repairs. large, extremely cosdy, and critically impor- Harrison Salisbury, tant to her war effort. Destruction of this correspondent who visited Hanoi in December industry’, which was already a substitute for a 1966, observed at firsthand many of the repair missing source of supply, in the final year of the activities instituted by the North Vietnamese.16 war foreclosed the opportunity to improvise The highways were rapidly repaired by simply further. Time had run out, and the limits of filling in the bomb craters with native clay soil substitution had been reached.15 and the railroads with steel rails, ties, and crushed gravel pre-positioned along the full Our Experience length of the roadbeds. More challenging were with North Vietnam the bridges, but on this subject Salisbury cites some impressive examples of North Vietna- With the preceding historical survey as mese ingenuity: background, let us now turn to the more recent If the bridge was completely knocked out, a conflict in Southeast Asia and investigate the pontoon was put into service. The pontoons could role that substitution played in the ability of not have been simpler in concept or easier to put North Vietnam to withstand U.S. strategic air into place. They were made by lashing together the required number of shallow flat-bottomed attacks. In contrast to Germany, North Viet- wooden canal boats, of which there were nam at the start of the air war was essentially an countless numbers available along the canals and agricultural country with only a rudimentary- streams. These sturdy boats, three feet wide and transportation system and little modem indus- perhaps sixteen feet long, made an excellent try of any kind. More than 90 percent of the bridge. A surface of cut bamboo poles was laid across them, without even being lashed or nailed population lived in primitive villages and in many cases. Or, if available, a surface of earned their living from the soil. Less than 2 bamboo planks. The trucks lumbered over the percent were engaged in industry’, and only the pontoons with a roar as their wheels hit the loose capital city of Hanoi and the port city of poles, but the pontoons seemed sturdy enough to Haiphong had populations of more than bear the heavy traffic.17 100,000 people. The boats and bamboo were positioned in The gradual escalation of the bombing the vicinity' of every bridge and could be put campaign in the north provided the North into place in a matter of hours. Moreover, these Vietnamese ample time and opportunity to temporary structures could quickly be re- make appropriate adjustments and institute moved and hidden in the morning to minimize countermeasures to the destruction rendered damage from air raids and reinstalled in the from the air. Both the military logistics system evening to handle the nightly truck traffic. and the civilian economy converted to highly The problem of keeping the railroads open dispersed and decentralized methods of was more difficult since the trains could not run storing and handling supplies. Hundreds of across pontoons, but here again native ingenui- miles of highway were constructed as bypasses ty came into play: and alternate routes, and the carry ing capacity If the rail line was blocked by destruction of a of the railroad network was improved by bridge or trackage, bicycle brigades were called conversion to dual gauge. Inland waterways up. Five hundred men and women and their Continued on page 9 High on the priority list of targets for Eighth Air Force daylight bombing during World War II were Germany s- largest rubber factories at Hanover. . . . The great Rubber production bombed Vahrenwalder-Strasse tire factory (facing page) was. bombed by both the RAF and the Eighth’s heavy bombers, by the latter on 26 July 1943; twenty-one direct hits re- sulted in smoke columns as high as 22,000 feet in the air. PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION 9

bicycles would be sent to the scene of the break. vulnerable to air attack. “Indeed, in all the time They would unload the stalled freight train, I rode about the countryside I think I was never putting the cargo on the bikes. Each bicycle more than two or three minutes out of sight of would handle a six-hundred pound load, balanced across the frame with a bar. The bicycles would some kind of supplies and equipment which be wheeled, not ridden, over a pontoon bridge, had come to rest in the most unlikely setting.”19 and on the other side of the break a second train Fifty-five-gallon drums in which petroleum would be drawn up. The cargo would be reloaded was stored, repair equipment, and crates and moved on south.18 containing weapons, munitions, and other In addition to the above, Salisbury observed hardware were randomly dispersed through- the grand scale to which fuels, supplies, and out the fields, rice paddies, and villages. equipment were dispersed to make them less Naturally this dispersal was costly to Hanoi in 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

terms of both manpower and materiel, but it met with untested people become routine. Asa was a price she willingly paid to continue the result of this alone, by 1966 Hanoi probably war effort. had a substantial and valuable investment in Although only 15 percent of North Vietnam’s learning, practice, and experience.22 Moreov- gross national product was provided by er, the quality of the manpower base was industry, portions of the industrial sector were further improved through formal training also dispersed, and many city residents were programs provided both in-country and evacuated to the countryside. In the main, abroad.23 Whatever technical skills that still however, North Vietnam depended on im- remained in short supply were imported from ports from the Communist bloc for industrial other Communist nations.24 products. Whereas Germany substituted alter- An adequate supply of labor was assured nate processes and materials to satisfy her through several programs. Curtailment and industrial needs, North Vietnam substituted suspension of nonessential civilian activities foreign aid to satisfy hers. In one sense the released some workers for the war effort, but it North Vietnamese operated much as the appears that the most common practice was to Dutch, who in the sixteenth century defended exact double duty from the laborers. In- themselves successfully for more than eighty country combat tasks were performed on top years against the strongest arms in Europe. of, rather than instead of, other employment. Having few natural materials themselves, the Production workers in plants substituted as air Dutch employed their greatest resources, defense gunners during air raids. Beside each which as Nef cites were “the sea with its inlets, production position was a rifle, and when the the good harbors and rivers, and the inland siren sounded, the workers would grab their waterways which they built . . . to get from rifles and take up posts at the windows and on Sweden, northern Germany, England, and the roof to fire back at U.S. planes. Agricultural Scotland the materials which they needed to workers in the countryside substituted as repair defend themselves.”20 Both nations substituted crews when called on by local authorities to foreign production for their own. In this sense, assist in repairing bombed-out roads and North Vietnam functioned more as a logistics railroads. Salisbury even cites what would funnel than as a production base for operations appear to be an extreme example of North in the south. Vietnamese Air Force pilots’ arising at 4 A.M., Some production, of course, did take place, working in the rice paddies for three or four but this was more in the nature of simple con- hours, and then flying their planes against the sumer essentials improvised by small-scale Americans.25 industry and handicrafts. A Hanoi news report, This may not be so far-fetched given the for instance, claimed that in one province “the specialized and constrained pattern of the U.S. population has collected 27 tons of bomb and air campaign at that time. In fact, the air strikes, rocket fragments to be worked on by the local normally conducted near midday, fashioned smithies, who turned them into more than the whole lifestyle around Hanoi. Commercial 16,000 plowshares.”21 If true, this is another activity thrived from 5 to 8 A.M., after which example of the substitution effected by the the shops closed and did not open again until North Vietnamese for limited natural resour- late afternoon. By 6 P. M. activity was again at a ces. high level, and the streets, beer parlors, and The North Vietnamese also seem to have bars were jammed.26 handled their manpower problems quite Salisbury’s observations lead one to believe adequately. With the passage of time, of that there was still considerable slack in the course, tasks that are novel at first and must be North Vietnamese labor force in 1966. Ob- PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION 11

viously, commercial and recreational pursuits operations in the south mainly by functioning had not been greatly curtailed. He also noted as a logistics funnel: a majority of the equip- that there had been an increase of from 80,000 ment and supplies came from other Commu- to 100,000 high school students and from 35,000 nist nations. Second, as indicated above, North to 46,000 college students in the last year.27 Vietnam possessed a manpower base of Although these students participated in part- sufficient size to effect any labor-intensive time agricultural and military functions, they substitutions that were required for continua- were still an untapped labor source for an tion of the war. Finally, the volume of supplies all-out effort. It is, of course, difficult to needed in the south was so low that only a small determine how many persons were engaged portion of the capacity of North Vietnam’s either full or part-time in war-related activities redundant and flexible transportation system in North Vietnam, but one Rand analyst was required to maintain the flow. guessed that it might run from 1 to 1.5 million There also can be no denying that the men and women, including the military. If this gradual escalation of the bombing campaign is true, only about 10 to 15 percent of the able- gave the North Vietnamese time to improvise, bodied adult population was so occupied.28 adjust, and develop the necessary countermea- Most industrial and logistics processes sures that in large measure attenuated the require some combination of labor and capital bombing impact. Note, for example, the as inputs. Within limits one can be substitut- following excerpt from a 1967 North Vietna- ed for the other. As an example, human por- mese military analysis on the same subject: tering, in many situations, is a viable alter- The might of the U.S. Air Force lies in the fact native to rail or truck transport. If capital has that it has many planes, modern technical means, been destroyed or is in short supply, a nation bombs and bullets, and available airfields in with a sufficient manpower base will normally Thailand and South Vietnam, and at-sea. It can attack us from many directions on many targets, turn to more labor-intensive methods to under different weather conditions, by day and maintain a given level of output. The bicycle by night. However, given their political isolation brigades employed to transport supplies past and the present balance of international forces, destroyed railroad bridges and the very labor- the U.S. Air Force is compelled to escalate step by intensive dispersal techniques cited by Salis- step, and cannot attack the North massively and swiftly in strategic, large-scale, surprise bomb- bury are two good illustrations. With an ings. Our North Vietnam can gain the time and apparently abundant labor force, the North circumstances necessary to gradually transform Vietnamese were able to effect many such the country to a war footing, to further develop its substitutions in their continuing support of forces, and to gain experience in order to deal the the conflict in the south. U.S. Air Force heavier blows.30 Time, then, becomes the essential factor that Some Comparisons dilutes the effect of strategic warfare. Only when an economic system is critically strained There exists a general consensus that the and time is running out can the type of bombing of the north from 1965 until No- bombing campaigns described in this article vember 1968 failed to alter significantly North succeed in achieving their affirmed results. Vietnam’s ability or will to continue the war in This can be illustrated with the three target the south.29 What then went wrong? Why was systems that received the most concentrated the world’s greatest power unable to bomb an attacks in Southeast Asia: the hydroelectric essentially second-rate nation into submission? power complexes; petroleum, oil, and lubri- Most experts feel that it was primarily due to cants (POL) storage facilities; and lines of three factors. First, North Vietnam supported communication (the transportation system). Continued on page 13

Vietnam, 1967

In Vietnam, USAF BS2s (facing page) dropped bombs from extremely high altitudes on unsuspecting ground troop sanctuaries, keeping enemy forces on the move. . . . Frequent targets of concentrated attack were petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage facilities and transportation systems. At the Thai Nguyen barge construction area (below) bridge sections and POL tanks were assembled.

In the almost four-year bombing campaign, generating electricity. Even during the large B- over 80 percent of the central electric generat- 52 raids in December 1972, when all of Hanoi’s ing capacity of North Vietnam was either major power sources were rendered inopera- destroyed or rendered inoperable; yet there ble and the capacity available from the was sufficient redundancy in the system to national power grid was reduced by some 75 permit the most essential operations to be percent, electricity continued to be supplied to continued. Possessing only a limited industrial priority users, such as selected government base, North Vietnam, of course, did not require buildings, important industrial installations, a huge amount of electric power. Moreover, all and foreign embassies.31 In summary, then, the critical elements of their military' and govern- essential requirements for electric power did mental agencies had alternative means of not put an overbearing strain on the remaining

13 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

capacity, and the redundancy in the system ing halt in North Vietnam. Although the strike? permitted the North Vietnamese to substitute against the industrial base and energy sources for destroyed and damaged power elements. already described might more appropriately The results against POL storage facilities be termed strategic bombardment, strikes were similar although the underlying substitu- against lines of communication fell into the tion mechanism was quite different. North interdiction category. These strikes took two Vietnam had no capability to generate addi- forms: attacks of delay against the railroad and tional POL internally; however, she could road network itself and attacks of destruction obtain the required stocks elsewhere. This is against vehicles and supplies on the network. illustrated in the assessment of the concentrat- The purpose of these strikes was to reduce the ed POL strikes conducted in 1966. Although flow of men and materiel to a level below that the intelligence community estimated that 70 at which offensive operations in the south percent of North Vietnamese storage capacity could be maintained. had been destroyed, it concluded, “There is no Since the initiation of air interdiction mis- evidence yet of any shortage of POL in North sions during World War II, these strikes have Vietnam and stocks on hand, with recent been the most controversial of all. Unless they imports, have been adequate to sustain neces- are executed concurrent with major ground sary operations.”32 The North Vietnamese operations in which the enemy is forced into a were able to supplement their reduced re- high expenditure rate, it is difficult to prove serves immediately with imports of more POL that they significantly influence the outcome of products. Outside aid was substituted for a a battle. Notable successes were registered missing source of supply, and operations were during World War II and the first year of the continued. Korean conflict, but with the advent of Contrast these results with those achieved protracted war in which there is no clear against the German synthetic oil industry by outcome, it has been virtually impossible to Allied air strikes during World War II. Coming establish a positive payoff for these strikes. as they did in the last year of the war, when Guerrilla warfare requires only a minimum of POL was critically needed by the Germans in supplies, and since the option to fight or their effort to halt advancing Allied ground withdraw remains open, the volume and forces, these strikes severely crippled the timing of replacements are not vital to success. German war machine. The oil industry was Although the true impact of interdiction in large and costly, and there was insufficient Southeast Asia may never be known with time to develop an alternate source of supply. certainty, I feel that it was within the range of Consequently, the German war effort rapidly North Vietnamese tolerance.33 Admittedly, collapsed.. political restraints against a full-scale interdic- The third target system, lines of communica- tion effort, including naval blockade, mitigat- tion, received by far the greatest weight of ed somewhat the impact of theU.S. effort. Yet, effort during the war in Southeast Asia. Strikes Communist needs in South Vietnam were not against lines of communication were conduct- great—not more than 50 tons a day were ed not only around Hanoi and Haiphong, the required from the Ho Chi Minh Trail—and general area on which the previous discussion they could easily make whatever adjustments has concentrated, but also in the lower were necessary within their logistics system to panhandle of North Vietnam above the keep this amount flowing and accumulate a demilitarized zone and along the Ho Chi Minh surplus for future operations. Trail of southern Laos, where strikes were To be sure, the North Vietnamese were concentrated after the November 1968 bomb- fighting a protracted war, and a protracted war PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION 15

implies time. With time, substitution becomes were tremendous. There was insufficient time a viable option. Temporary structures replace remaining to create substitutes for these destroyed bridges, bypasses circumnavigate industries even if the capability existed. The interdicted route segments, and men and situation was quite similar to that in which materiel are diverted from less essential to Japan found herself at the end of World War II. more critical functions. The operations and Faced with a highly compressed, intensive repair activities observed by Harrison Salis- bombing campaign against her industrial base bury were characteristic of North Vietnam’s and an impending Allied invasion which she no efforts along these lines. The North Vietna- longer had the means to repel, Japan soon mese transportation capacity was more than capitulated. adequate for the type of war they were Primary' elements in the conduct of warfare, fighting, and time was not a critical factor. This then, must be both the time and ability to effect set of circumstances was quite different from successful substitutions. Given these two the one in which the Germans found them- factors, a nation can go a long way toward selves during the final year of World War II. mitigating the impact of the most devastating According to Olson: bombing attacks. And so it was with the North The German railroad industry was strained to Vietnamese. Only in the latter part of 1972, the maximum near the end of the war by the after strikes against the north were resumed demands at the front and the extra transport and the flow of imports was restricted, was required because of the dispersal of factories there any evidence of a reduction in the North subject to the bombing attack. Thus, when this Vietnamese ability or will to continue the fight. industry was bombed repeatedly and mercilessly, the Germans had nothing to turn to but canal But by that time the North Vietnamese Army transport, truck transport, and air transport. But had suffered severe losses in an imprudent by this time the Nazi beast had been cornered: the invasion of the south. canals were breached at the same time, while As Olson makes quite clear in his evaluation trucks could not run for lack of oil and the allies of target selection during the Combined had control of the air.34 Bomber Offensive, “it was not that air power As with the German oil industry, time had could not destroy what it set out to destroy: the run out, and the opportunity' of substitution problem was rather that what it destroyed was had been foreclosed. not after all indispensable. The fault was not one of airmanship, it was one of economics.”35 Given time, a resource they possessed in O f THE primary target abundance, the North Vietnamese were able to systems struck in Germany during World War make those substitutions necessary to their II, the most notable successes were scored continued participation in the conflict. Surely, against the synthetic oil and transportation the cost of operations increased as one type of industries. Both of these industries were large labor, good, or process was continually and costly, making them difficult to replace. substituted for another, thus giving rise to the Perhaps even more important is that the weight law of diminishing returns. Yet, for the most of effort against these industries came in the part, labor was plentiful, and materiel needs final year of the war when the German could be satisfied through increased imports. economic system was severely strained. Fol- Whatever costs were incurred could be paid by lowing the successful Allied invasion of cutting down on nonessential production and Normandy, German forces were heavily consumption. committed on two fronts, and the resulting History is replete with examples such as demands placed on the German war machine those described. Most industrial and logistics Continued on page IS The substitution principie The North Vietnamese made any adjustments necessary to continue the fight. Air attacks along Route IA (top) pitted the roady but it was soon repaired and cargo trucks waited at the ferry Crossing. . . . Trucks cross over a pontoon bridge (beloxv), bypassing the bombed out Dong Lac highway bridge. . . . Although repeated bombings had destroyed the bridges and roads along this important North Vietnamese supply route (facing page), bypass routes were quickly constructed, including new bridges.

t

18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW systems were far more resilient than originally of Europe. And it was when he deviated from assumed. Prewar assessments on substitutabili- this strategy that he began to fail. ty have been predicated almost entirely on the This lesson does not appear to have been lost availability of materials and processes existing on the Russians. Most experts now agree that in peacetime economies. Only when wartime Soviet forces in Europe are structured to fight a necessity forces their discovery do many very short, intense war. The high concentration substitution possibilities become known.36 of armor in the Soviet force structure, the high Equally important, however, is that most ratio of combat-to-support units, a military assessments have also failed to make adequate doctrine that emphasizes rapid advance into allowance for the mitigating effect of time. enemy territory—all lend credence to this Consequently, strategic plans based on these assessment. Moreover, recent qualitative and assessments have not succeeded, at least to the quantitative improvements have added to the degree originally conceived. Soviet’s quick-strike offensive capability. What is called for is a return to the concept of It is imperative that NATO forces be the blitzkrieg. The blitzkrieg model would structured and positioned to halt the kind of appear to be the logical foundation on which to blitzkrieg that the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact base U.S. conventional war strategy. The forces are designed to fight. Otherwise we may greatest successes of both air and ground have insufficient time to bring in reinforce- forces in modern times have come in short, ments and make the substitutions necessary for intense combined arms campaigns: the Ger- continued combat operations in the event of an man blitzkriegs of World War II, the Nor- invasion of Western Europe. As Senator Sam mandy invasion, and the Six-Day War in the Nunn has stated, “There is no point in being Mideast, to name a few. This suggests that able to bring full defensive weight to bear in 60 military doctrine should be structured so that days if a force cannot survive the first 20.”3ft This air power is used in conjunction with other means that the blitzkrieg should form the forces in fast and dramatic moves which give cornerstone of our defensive, as well as no opportunity for the principle of substitution offensive, strategy. Not only must our forces to come into play. It was with such a strategy be able to launch blitzkrieg offensives, they that Hider quickly conquered almost the whole also must be able to repel them. Washington, D.C.

Notes November 1962; hereafter cited as "The Economics of Target Selection.’ lam 1. J o h n U. N ef. War and Human Progress (Cambridge, Massachusetts: indebted to Olson for much of the discussion that follows. Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 129. 10. John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York: The New World 2. Ibid., p. 27. Library. 1958), pp. 131-33. 3. Ibid., pp. 26-28. 11. Ibid., p. 132. 4. Ibid., p. 239. 12. As with ball bearings, the Germans were able to alleviate many 5. Mancur Olson, Jr., "American Materials Policy and the 'Physiocratic shortages by improvising and substituting plentiful for scarce resources. Fallacy.'" Orbis. Winter 1963, pp. 682-83: hereafter cited as “American Copper was saved by substituting iron radiators for copper radiators in motor Materials Policy.” vehicles and by cutting the amount of copper used in U-boats and locomotives 8. Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War (Cam- by 50 and 90 percent, respectively. Alloys using scarce metals, such as nickel bridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959). See pages 225-38 for a and molybdenum, were replaced with alloys using plentiful metals, such as fuller treatment of material cited herein. vanadium, in critical products like gun tubes. For other substitutions, see 7. Ibid., p. 229. Olson, "American Materials Policy," and Edward S. Mason, American 8. Ibid., p. 236 Security and Access to Raw Materials." World Politics. January 1949. 9. Mancur Olson, Jr.. "The Economics of Target Selection for the 13. Olson, "The Economics of Target Selection," p. 313. Combined Bomber Offensive," The Royal United Service Institution Journal, 14. Ibid., p. 132. PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION 19

15. Albert Speer believer that the campaign against the bull bearing industry example, were employed un tile railroads Ibid , footnote, p. 8. would also have been successful if it were not for the long pauses between the 25 Salisbury, p. 145. major raids of August 1943, October 1943, and February-March 1944 in which 26. Ibid . pp. 113-14 some production was restored. This is, however, but another example of time's 27 Ibid . pp 129-30. role in strategic successes and failures. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich 28. Hoeffding. p. 7. (New York. Macmillan. 1970). pp. 339-41 29 The Pentagon Papers. The Senator Gravel Edition, vol. IV (Boston: 16 Harrison E. Salisbury, Behind the Lines—Hanoi! New York: Harper and Beacon Press. 1971). Row. 1967). pp 86-91 30. Quoted in Patrick J McCarvey, Visions of Victory: Selected Vietna- 17 Ibid., p. 88. mese Military Writings. 1964-IS68 (Stanford, California: 18. Ibid., p. 89. Although railroad repair was more difficult than road repair, Press. 1959). p. 156. the North V ietnamese maintained the railroads in case gasoline and oil impurts 31 Herman L. Cilster and Robert E. M Krady, Linebacker II USAF were cut off. Locomotives were fueled with local coal and wood. Bombing Survey (Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, April 1973), pp. 12-14 19. Ibid., p 91. 32 Pentagon Papers, vol IV, p. 111. 20 Nef. p. 117. 33. Herman L. Cilster, "Air Interdiction in Protracted War:An Economic 21 Quoted in Oleg Hoeffding. Bombing North Vietnam. An Appraisal of Evaluation," Air University Review. May-June 1977. Economic and Political Effects (Santa Monica. California: The Rand 34. Olson, '"The Economics of Target Selection," p. 313 Corporation. RM-5213, December 1966). footnote, p. 29 35 Ibid., p. 310. 22. Ibid., p. 15. 36 Carl Kaysen, Notes on the Strategic Air Intelligence in World War 23. North Vietnamese sources claimed that nearly 80,000 technical workers lltETO). (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation. R-165, October and cadres were graduated in North Vietnam in 1965 and that 5000 North 1919), pp. 14-15. Vietnamese were being trained in Communist countries, Ibid., footnotes on 37. Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultz, editors. Setting National Priorities: pages 8 and 16. The Next Ten Years (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1976), pp. 63-70. 24. An estimated 40,000 Chinese engineers and construction workers, for 38 Reported in the Baltimore Sun, November 2, 1976, p. 6

Military strategy (working definition): The manner in which one chooses to use military force to deter war or to achieve the desired outcome of war. Military strategy translates the abstractions of doctrine into practical application after due consideration has been given to policy considerations, one’s military capability, and the threat environment. Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic Air War College DETENTE AND AN ADEQUATE AMERICAN DEFENSE

L ieu t en a n t Colonel J oseph W. Kastl

ocjia6j]eme On the eve of his visit to the United States HaffPflxeHKW in June 1973, Secretary Brezhnev asked his advisers what he should seek in America. One adviser recommended cars, another computer factories, still another atomic power stations. No, replied Brezhnev thoughtfully, ril just ask them to build us Communism.1

HAT is detente? Are the Russian and U.S. versions different? And is detente compatible with long-range WU.S. defense interests? Detente is a popular catchword in interna- tional relations; while it now perhaps has passed from official favor,2 it still serves to convey instantly a well-understood attitude toward complex world relationships. Will detente prove advantageous to the West in the long run? This continues to generate significant and heated debate, both within and outside the LPS. military community. In any event, the subject is of seminal importance to the military profession: Detente (or something similar to it) DETENTE AND AMERICAN DEFENSE 21

represents a fact of life that influences our • an attempt to transcend historical and foreign policy and our defense posture today. ideological differences so as to address a In analyzing detente, I propose to divide the common problem: how to slow down the subject into three parts: (1) defining the term spiraling arms race.6 more specifically, given the realities of 1979; • an effort to embed our adversary in a (2) viewing detente as it is seen by both those network of cooperative agreements while who support or reject it; and (3) weighing the maintaining (but restraining) U.S. military pros and cons of detente, vis-a-vis long-term power;7 or American defense interests. • a guise, which, lulling the U.S. into a lack of vigilance, permits the to surpass us militarily.8 Defining Detente Today Does detente have a different meaning in the Read the 1950s rhetoric of the — Soviet world? Perhaps. Many would assert that few would disagree that the pendulum has to the Soviet leadership detente is merely sw ung from a clear-cut contest of strength to another method—albeit one less dangerous— some new relationship based on an essential of continuing the class struggle. As proof, they equivalence of strength between the U.S. and point to Chairman Brezhnev’s February 1976 the Soviet Union. Today, ideological purity speech before the 25th Soviet Congress. apparently has mellowed into pragmatism, Essentially, the Soviet interpretation of detente economic issues often influence events far assumes a lessening of the forces of war more than purely military considerations, and paralleled by increasingly mutually advantage- bizarre, novel friendships and crosscutting ous cooperation between states with different coalitions thrive. social systems; nonetheless, detente does not It is a cockeyed world: parochialism, abolish the rivalry of the ongoing class struggle regionalism, and cosmopolitanism flourish side as a sacred duty of Marxism.9 by side. It is an alienated world: four “faiths” that promised much — secular humanism, Contradictory Conclusions technology, orthodox Christianity, and ortho- dox Marxism—no longer appear, in the eyes of Thus far, few might dispute the basic facts many, to motivate humanity. And it is a world stated. Yet, when an interpretation of these of confusion: political transformations are so facts is attempted—particularly when we ask, radical that the nation-state, which dominated “What should the U.S. do next?”—analysts five centuries of history, no longer may be begin to reach clearly contradictory conclu- either the driving force or the highest expan- sions. ° sion of political activity.3 Given this sort of world, what does detente progressives mean? Beyond the generally accepted idea of a relaxation of tensions, it is extremely difficult Progressives generally insist that America now for Western commentators to concur in any safely may explore beyond the rigid, doctri- one definition of detente. To some, detente is: • an ever-changing attitude of negotiated •Lest labels such as “conservative" or "liberal” semantically interfere with exposition of contrasting viewpoints. I will refer to those generally in favor of accommodation to avoid nuclear war, provide detente as progressives. Often, they are centrist or liberal in viewpoint, believe the Cold War is past, and assume that—given a changing political world—a for nuclear arms agreements, and contain new methodology for dealing with the Soviets is in America's best interests. In opposition to them stand those who might be called loyalists. Generally, they Soviet global power.4 are traditional or conservative in outlook, adhere to the basics of the • an overdue recognition of the realities of prcdftentc era as furnishing time-tested l f.S. responses to unchanging Communist aspirations, and view detente with great suspicion in the face of foreign policy.5 Soviet military growth. 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

naire approach of the Cold War era. They The Soviets still spend 40 percent more than believe that the twin tensions of Soviet the West on military forces, 250,000 troops still ideology and Russian military adventurism occupy central Europe, and there is little have subsided, and viewing the contest as a evidence that the Russians have surrendered death struggle with godless communism is a their aspirations of world domination. In the travesty. To the contrary, the real world is one face of this, say some traditionalists, the “siren where socialism is a fractured monolith, with song of the pacifists and U.S. unilateral Soviet ambition compromised by the shadow disarmament advocates” is particularly dis- of nuclear war.10 Moreover, it is a world where turbing, for it would cause an uninterrupted the Russians have discovered that neither raw slide into second place and imperil our military power nor foreign aid and cultural freedoms. The most telling point of recent diplomacy permit the Kremlin to dictate other Kremlinology is not Chairman Leonid Brezh- nations’ decisions. Instead, today’s world is far nev’s speech at the 25th Congress but rather the more influenced by monetary considerations, remark he is supposed to have made after the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Helsinki meeting: (GATT), and the Common Market—areas . . . trust us, comrades, for by 1985 . . . a decisive where, incidentally, the Soviet Union has little shift in the correlation of forces will be such that say so.11 Therefore, say the progressives, now is . . . we will be able to exert our will whenever we the time when wise leadership can draw the need to.14 Soviet Union into the ranks of cultured Therefore, traditionalists conclude, detente international nations, sensitive to the needs of represents a classic case of self-delusion.15 constraint, discipline, and cooperation.12 De- True, the Soviets so far have not lacked tente thus becomes a methodology for manag- prudence, but they are building up to a nuclear ing the East-West rivalry. True enough, war-winning primacy. If they someday choose America must maintain sturdy military de- to bully us, the West will face a painful fenses, but they should be spare and no greater dilemma: nuclear war or American surrender.16 than the basic levels necessary for adequate national security. not all black or white In fairness, few on either side of the discussion loyalists would dismantle a strong and viable military To thinkers of more traditional persuasion, force.17 Nevertheless, what separates the two Soviet intentions and capabilities are crucial, schools of thought—and what is at the heart of and they remain ominous. There is every fear their argument—is the degree to which the that the Soviets are seeking nuclear superiority; Soviets may be trusted today. in turn, this resurrects the dangers of either Generally, progressives belittle a Soviet nuclear confrontation or, more likely, Soviet first-strike intention as “more or less mytholog- expansion through international blackmail. ical.”18 Given the present Soviet leadership, the The future might be bright, loyalists argue, if U.S. can successfully persuade the Russians to only Soviet military programs reflected a live recognize a bipolar world and forego Soviet and let live attitude. Yet, quite the contrary is preeminence. Over time, outmoded commu- evident; notice how General George Brown nist doctrine will be chipped away, strengthen- commented in the introductory remarks to his ing East-W'est accommodation.19 In contrast, FY79 Posture Statement that Soviet force loyalists insist that a major risk indeed exists, improvements “have been deliberate, steady, that progressives naively misapprehend true and impressive.”13 Soviet intentions, and that the struggle must DETENTE AND AMERICAN DEFENSE 23

continue between a messianic, expansionist commercial war of influence but sees herself Russian state and the West.20 losing, traditionalists think she may launch on military adventurism out of exasperation or overreaction. Then, too, detente also suggests Is Detente in the strongly to some that we condone a perman- American Interest? ently divided Germany or Korea. More tellingly, detente carried the danger that the The rhetoric of John Foster Dulles—or even U.S. might draw down its arms and defensive of Kennedy—is out of style; today, the U.S. alliances to a point where the West is too weak seldom strides across the international scene, to resist a major Soviet military initiative.22 intrepidly announcing that we will neither be Alexander Solzhenitsyn asserts the traditional- outgunned nor bullied. And no longer do we ist fear quite tellingly: feel compelled to respond to events, however minor, everywhere in the world. Now, of course, they have become more clever in Yet is the world truly changed, or does a our country. Now they do not say “we are going to bury you” anymore, now they say “detente.” virulent communism remain ready to rush Nothing has changed in Communist ideology. forward if we show a willingness to meet it half The goals are the same as they were, but instead of way? the artless Khrushchev, who could not hold his Consider the alternatives. If war has become tongue, now they say “detente.”23 an unworkable option, detente can be an excellent approach. We could begin achieving the sweet dream of eventually beating swords ferreting out Soviet intentions into plowshares. No longer fearing , the Soviets could relax. It is conceivable that What are the Soviet Union’s true, long-term Europe could be “demilitarized,’ thus barring intentions? As suggested earlier, the division a European conflict from leading the major between loyalists and progressives essentially powers to the abyss of war. as in 1914. The East turns on this. European Warsaw Pact nations could gradual- One is reminded of the old Indian story of ly wrest from the Kremlin greater freedom of the emerald test. Allegedly, one can discover if action and move toward polycentrism. Russia a stone is an emerald by dipping it in acid. If the could delight in technology', consumerism, and acid eats away the stone, the candidate truly commercial ties with the West. We could was an emerald. But to run the test, the stone create a cooperative world. A diminished U.S. must be destroyed. military budget would afford greater domestic It is the same way with the Russian succor and concomitant greater freedom of intentions. If we seek accommodation, we action for free enterprise. (Then, to turn the have entered into a type of emerald test. phrase around, Coca-Cola, IBM, and Ameri- Addressing this matter, progressives would can farm know-how would “bury” the Rus- reason that the Soviets do not aspire to world sians, not the other way around.)21 conquest today; so long as we maintain a Yet to traditionalist thinkers, we risk too sufficient military force, the Kremlin hardly much in a unilateral stand-down. Our national seeks to occupy the United States. Thus, say security' interests are jeopardized by detente, these commentators, America now may lower since nothing has evidenced a Russian willing- its military guard, reconcile itself to a blander, ness to demilitarize. To the contrary, detente less proselytizing communism, and enjoy the suggests we may' be willing either to abandon good life. If the Russians bluster from time to our allies or even forsake our own vital time, it should be chalked up to mere interests. If Russia finds that detente involves a rhetoric—no more than jousting with words. 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

After all, Christians and Moslems coexisted for ings of Clausewitz as to the meaning of war and centuries; so can these two isms. of Mahan on geopolitics continue to hold The nagging trouble with the argument is telling significance in the nuclear era. this: If we emphasize negotiating, putting aside • Finally, we must nurture our unique Cold War slogans and armament, and moving national heritage and our will to survive as a from confrontation to collaboration, we may proud world leader. Without chauvinism or have at least dipped into the acid bath. What if overemotionalism, there is great room for our stone truly is an emerald? What if the reemphasizing the role of patriotism and the Russians really do intend to bury us? unique American contribution to world free- dom. Indeed, it can be argued that in the broad historical perspective, the Soviets are the Sparta of the new era and we the Athens. After S WE continue the search for all, we have promoted an amazing degree of peace, it might be well to keep several points in individual freedom and potential, consistent mind. with the minimum necessary political disci- • Regardless of whether personal analysis pline to prevent anarchy. And on the interna- of the data results in a progressive or loyalist tional scene, we have fought world wars when viewpoint, we must realistically plumb Soviet our shores were not yet directly threatened, intentions and measure Soviet capabilities. We then bound up the wounds and healed our simply cannot assume peaceful and restrained former enemies, and ultimately sought a united behavior by a potential adversary. In short, and peaceful world by offering a fetching, idealism must be paired with pragmatism. openhanded friendship to all. • WTe must hedge our bets—at a minimum, In no-nonsense terms, we have an idealistic with equivalent military might which cannot streak in our American character that is both be trumped by new technology advances. admirable and well worth preserving. It • We must analyze new political follows that, in the final analysis, there is a stark initiatives—strategic arms limitations, mutual contrast between us and them. In our historical force reductions, demilitarization—in detail; past, we had disagreements between Adams ours must, however, never be a passion for and Jefferson; our ruling leader sent his arms control or peace at the price of our opponent philosophical letters, and in retire- integrity. On the other hand, neither must we ment they became cordial correspondents. In be so rigid that we cannot accommodate to their historical past, they had disagreements genuine offers of reduction and limitation of between Trotsky and Stalin; it would appear arms. that their ruling leader sent his opponent an • We-must recognize that the basic teach- assassin—all the way to Mexico. Washington, D.C.

Notes 5. One of many definitions listed in Richard Rosecranee. "Dfrtente or 1. Cited in Theodore Draper. "Appeasement and D6tente," Commen- Entente." Foreign Affairs. January’ 1975. p. 464. tary, February 1976, p. 2. 6. Suggested by Keith A. Dunn,"Detente and Deterrence: From Kissinge 2. James R. Schlesingcr, “The Evolution of American Policy towards the to Carter." Parameters, vol. VII, no. 4. 1977, p. 46. Soviet Union."- International Security, Summer 1976, p. 42. 7. R. J Rummel, "Detente and Reality," Strategic Review. Fall 1976, p. 3. See Seyom Brown, New Forces in World Politics (Washington: 34. Brookings Institution. 1974). pp. 109-10, 213; Robert Legvold, "The Nature of 8 Robert Constant et a)., "Is Detente in the American Interest?" cited in Soviet Power." Foreign Affairs. October 1977, pp. 52-53. Dttente and Defense, edited by Robert J. Pranger (Washington: American 4. Schlesinger. pp. 41. 46. Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976). p. 212. DETENTE AND AMERICAN DEFENSE 25

9. This may be merely Soviet propaganda, intended for home consump- p 40: Statement of Secretary of Defense Brown, Office of the Assistant ion. Leonid 1 Brezhnev, Report to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Release, 15 September 1977, p. 8; )f the Soviet Union. 24 February 1976, cited in Pranger, p. 188. Overall, the Legvold. p. 71; Schlesinger, pp. 42-43. For a far more optimistic view of Soviet Soviets appear to view detente with clearer vision than does the West. Writing intentions ("For some time, the Soviet Union has not been a revolutionary (n a Russian journal. A. Nikonov stresses that detente has come about primarily state; its conservatism is obvious not only in its foreign policies but in the nature due to the increased power of the Soviet U nion; that peaceful coexistence does of its economy and social life"), see Alan Wolfe, "TbeTrilateralist Straddle." not lessen the ongoing class struggle; and that the aggressive nature of The Nation, 31 December 1977, p. 713. imperialism, to Soviet eyes, remains untamed. A. Nikonov. "Military Detente 18. Hartmann, p 46 Perhaps the strongest condemnation of the loyalists and the Transformation of International Relations," World Economics and comes from Bernard T. Feld, He argues that the nation is being blanketed by International Relations. June 1977, pp 28-39, reprinted in Soviet Press, "one of the most insidious campaigns in recent history; an attempt to turn the Selected Translations, Nos. 77*9, and 77* 10, Directorate of Soviet Affairs. Air clock back to the worst days of the Cold War." Mr Feld insists that it is Force Intelligence Service. September and October 1977. "demonstrably clear (to all but far-out hawks and ignoramuses) that the 10. Legvold. p. 70. current situation is quite the reverse" of loyalist claims—i.e., the American 11 Legvold. pp. 55-58 nuclear arsenal is clearly superior to that of the Russians. The article cautions 12. Helmut Sonnefelt. “Russia. America and Detente." Foreign Affairs. that we may be entering a new, spiraling nuclear arms accumulation Bernard January 1978. p 291. T. Feld. "Where Is the Present Danger?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 13. Ceneral Ceorge S. Brown, United States Military Posture for FT 1979, February 1978, p. 28. 20 January 1978, p. 19. 19 , "U S Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," 14. Ira C. Eaker, “The Disarmament Conspiracy." , 2 cited in Pranger, pp. 68-70. January 1978, pp. 15-16. 20 Marvin Stone, "The Nation's Security,” U.S. News Ir World Report, 15 See generally the remarks of George J Keegan, Jr., in "Soviet Strength February 1978. p. 76; Paul H Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of and Fears." World Issues. October-November 1977, pp. 22. 24. 29 DFtente." Foreign Affairs, January 1976, p. 1: Rurnmel, pp. 38-40 16. Rurnmel, pp. 39-41. 21. See generally Seyom Brown, pp. 9. 23 17. See. for example, the views of Alvin Z. Rubinstein. "The Elusive 22. Ibid., pp. 20, 48, 59. 65. 86. Parameters of Detente," Orbis. Winter 1976. pp. 1344-57; Frederic H 23. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "America: You Must Think about the World," Hartmann. "The Detente Debate." Naval War College Review, Summer 1977, cited in Pranger. p. 243.

The word "detente" can be simplistically defined as "the easing of tension between nations." The word is, in practice, however further defined by experience, as those nations evolve new means by which they can live with each other in peace. . . . We seek a world of peace. But such a world must accommodate diversity- social, political, and ideological. Only then can there be a genuine cooperation among nations and among cultures. President Jimmy Carter Statement made in address at Naval Academy Commencement Exercises, 7 June 1978

Let me say a word first about detente. I think clearly detente is a two-way street. It’s a street on which there must be a recognition of the concerns of the other party and action that is consonant with such a recognition. Secretary Cyrus Vance Statement made on "Face the Nation," CBS, 30 April 1978 GETTING TRAFFIC MOVING ON NATO'S TWO-WAY STREET

M ajor Den n is M. D r ummo n d ORTH Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO and Standardization (NATO) standardization has a lot in com- The call for standarization of Allied Forces' mon with the weather. That is, everybody equipment is almost as old as the alliance itself. Nseems to be talking about standardization, but, In 1949, the Military Production and Supply unlike the weather, something is being done Board was established “to promote co- about it. The Department of Defense now has ordinated production, standarization and an adviser to the Secretary of Defense for technical research in the field of armaments. NATO affairs, and Congress has spelled out .. .”3 This was not a serious problem in the early U.S. policy in the 1977 DOD Appropriation years, since the United States supplied most of Authorization Act: the military equipment. But as the European It is the policy of the United States that countries recovered from the war, they began equipment procured for the use of personnel of to produce more of their own weapons. the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Destandardization became the rule despite Treaty should be standardized or made inter- efforts by NATO commanders to coordinate operable with that of other members of the North developments. National considerations, espe- Adantic Treaty Organization.2 cially economic factors, took precedence over Across the Adantic, the European members alliance interests.4Standardization efforts con- of NATO are banding together in an Inde- tinued, but with less emphasis. Success with pendent European Program Group to pursue standardization agreements (STANAGs) wras cooperative efforts. In addition, the United limited because they addressed standardiza- States and four NATO countries have chosen tion of components rather than major weapon the F-16 as a common fighter. However, still systems. The withdrawal of France, with its more must be done. Duplicate development large defense industry, from active military- and logistics efforts are costing the alliance $11 participation in NATO in 1966 further frag- to $27 billion a year. Incompatibility of mented European cooperation. The next few ammunition, communication, fuels, and other years saw' the United States turn awray from equipment means a less effective NATO. Europe to Vietnam and its particular require- Recent DOD initiatives have been a step in ments.5 Despite these setbacks, NATO’s Con- the right direction, but the Europeans are ference of National Armaments Directors wary. They see standardization as a “tw'o-w'ay (CNAD) continued to encourage cooperative street,” with a greater percentage of European research and development, and it has several participation. To them, standardization does working groups dealing with future require- not necessarily mean “Buy American.” Moving ments. The CNAD has produced several joint traffic both ways on that two-way street will projects, including the British-German-Italian require more than policy statements. No one Tornado, a multi-role combat aircraft, and the nation can do it alone, but, obviously, the NATO Sea Sparrow, a shipboard defensive United States must take the lead by clearly missile system now under way for seven demonstrating its commitment. That commit- nations. Other multinational programs, such as ment must be broadly based and expressed in a the Roland short-range air defense missile, the vehicle that can move quickly, is flexible, and is F-16 fighter, and the Jaguar attack aircraft, fair to all NATO members on both sides of the have evolved outside the CNAD structure.6 Adantic. In this article, I propose a NATO Since the early 1970s, the NATO countries Defense Cooperation Act, which could be just have reawakened to the need for standardiza- the vehicle needed. tion and the potential benefits of such a move.

27 The modernization of the Warsaw Pact forces combined with pressures on Allied defense budgets to drive home the point that the NATO Allies can no longer afford to go their separate ways. Senators Dewey Bartlett and Sam Nunn highlighted the military problem in their 1977 report on “NATO and the New Soviet Threat.” They concluded that interoper- ability and standardization must be relentlessly pursued, since failure to do so serves only the interest of the Warsaw Pact.7 NATO com- manders, too, are aware of the military benefits of standardization. In November 1971, Air Marshal Sir Harold Martin, Commander 2d Allied Tactical Air Force, told a House of Commons committee that the ability to rearm aircraft at Allied airfields would increase the operability of the force as a whole by 200 to 300 percent.8 Effectiveness is just one side of the coin. Duplication of effort in research and develop- ment, production, and logistics is siphoning away precious resources. No one really knows the cost of these parallel efforts, but estimates run from $1 billion9 to $2 billion 10 in research and development alone, and from $11 billion11 to $27 billion12 in the total amount wasted each year in the alliance. Recognition of the military and economic costs of not standardizing has led to a reaffirmation of the 1949 goal. In May 1975, the Eurogroup Defense Ministers,13 the NATO Defense Planning committee,14 and President Gerald R. Ford addressed the need for more standardization. In his speech at the NATO summit, President Ford described NATO’s primary task as maintaining a strong and credible defense through more effective use of defense resources. He stated: We need to achieve our long-standing goals of common procedures and equipment. Our re- search and development efforts must be more than the sum of individual parts. Let us become truly one in our allocation of defense tasks, support and production.15 The F-16 has been chosen by the U. S. and four other NATO countries as a common fighter plane. In the four years since these words were

28 TRAFFIC ON NATO’S TWO-WAY STREET 29 spoken, policies have been shaped on both moted standardization. As early as 1963, it had sides of the Atlantic to further standardization. published DOD Directive 3100.3, “Coopera- The North Atlantic Council, meeting in tion with Allies in Research and Development London in May 1977, with the participation of of Defense Equipment.” In November 1975, heads of states and governments, concluded the Director, Defense Research and Engineer- that “Allies are determined to cooperate in all ing, noted the need for renewed emphasis of aspects of defense production.” One aim was those earlier policies and directed full consid- “to develop a more balanced relationship eration of standardization in weapon systems, between European and North American particularly those systems in support of members of the Alliance in the procurement of N A T O . 21 R e c e n t g u i d a n c e h a s b e e n v e r y defense equipment."16 specif ic, as in the March 1977 Defense Planning The commitment of the European allies to and Programming Guidance: improved cooperation is shown in the progress All Service development and procurement of the Independent European Program Group. programs . . . will include NATO standardization One of the group’s primary goals is to further and interoperability goals as fundamental consid- standardization and interoperability'. It has erations. . . . Cost-effectiveness of systems . . . begun to work toward this goal by selecting as should be evaluated on a NATO-wide basis... .22 candidates for cooperative programs those In August 1977; Ambassador Robert W. items of equipment with common replacement Komer was assigned as Adviser to the Secre- schedules in several countries.17 tary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for U.S. policy has been spelled out in a variety NATO Affairs, with the task of pulling of ways. Probably the most significant is the together all the strands of NATO policy and gradually increasing commitment expressed programs and advising the secretary on “how by Congress through legislation. One of the best to proceed with initiatives to strengthen first steps was a 1974 requirement that the N A T O ’ s d e f e n s e p o s t u r e . ” 23 Secretary of Defense assess the loss of effec- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has also tiveness in NATO caused by the failure to been on the road, taking the message of NATO standardize.18 In 1976, Congress adopted the standardization to the people. The theme is policy statement on standardization quoted repeated across the country: “We aim for more earlier. It also provided an exception to the Buy standardization of equipment . . . more of a American Act for equipment to be used in ‘two-way street’ in defense procurement.”24 Europe by authorizing the Secretary of “There certainly will have to be greater United Defense to determine that buying such equip- States purchases from European sources___”25 ment in the United States is inconsistent with “. . . standardization of equipment and training the public interest. The law also directed the is essential.”28 secretary' to report to the Congress any The policy seems clear on both sides of the procurement of a new major system that is not Atlantic, but policy is not necessarily practice. standardized or interoperable with the equip- It must be implemented, and the objective ment of other NATO members.19 As a result of must be considered together with the road- a request by the Department of Defense, the blocks standing in its way. Is the objective prohibition on buying specialty metals over- really standardization? There is general agree- seas was relaxed in 1977 by exempting ment that full standardization is neither purchases made to further NATO standardiza- necessary nor desirable. Standardization will tion and interoperability or to comply with not occur overnight, but intermediate steps offset agreements.20 toward compatibility, interoperability, and The Department of Defense has also pro- standardization are necessary now. There must 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW be room for specialization to support special determine whether standardization is crucial.28 missions, but when there is a common mission, But standardization as a philosophy must be forces must be capable of reinforcing and considered in the aggregate. Because of supporting each other.27 Since nations have European sensitivity to U.S. dominance, the different needs, replacement schedules, and U.S. approach to standardization should take budgets, each item must be analyzed to advantage of both American and European

That the United States is committed d to standardization and interopera- at bility with Europe is exemplified at th- least in part by U.S. production of the th Franco-German Roland short-range th missile. This tank-mounted antiair- craft system includes a radar disc that detects aircraft eleven miles distant. TRAFFIC ON NATO’S TWO-WAY STREET 31

technological and industrial strength.29 Thus, He envisions a structure in which the partici- the immediate objective is not full standardiza- pants are not mired in requirements, industrial tion but improved cooperation. property rights, or duties and taxes; broad Yet there are a number of roadblocks, goals are established; and the projects sort including restrictions on technology' transfer themselves out. The three-pronged American for security or commercial reasons;30 compet- initiative would address a North Atlantic ing foreign policy objectives (reducing world- common defense market, cooperation in civil wide arms sales conflicts with increased technology (especially energy), and open transfers in the name of standardization);31 (barrier-free) government procurement. The foreign military sales procedures that do not common defense market would be formally recognize the special nature of cooperative established through a treaty, but cooperative programs;32 and protectionistic economic effort would begin immediately. Treaty terms policies that virtually scuttle coproduction are outlined and goals established for full programs.33 These roadblocks on both ends of implementation in twelve years.36 the “two-way street” are not really the Callaghan’s approach has attracted a great problems. They are only symptoms of what deal of attention. In a 1975 report for the Dr. Walter LaBerge, NATO’s former Assistant Department of Defense, Ambassador Komer Secretary General for Defense Support, calls a stated that it provided the bold initiative lack of dedication in finding a solution. needed to lift the issue to the level where As far as I can see from my office in Brussels, the statesmanship can operate. However, he also leaders of the Alliance are not seriously studying recognized that the United States, with its non- how to provide the environment that allows the NATO needs, might be the slowest to accept nations on each side of the ocean to share their and that other efforts were needed.37 efforts.3,1 The common defense market might provide Dr. LaBerge is searching for an environment the appropriate environment, but it would that fosters teamwork. He notes that standard- require time to evolve. One could argue that ization cannot be legislated or dictated,35 but the negotiations for the treaty would create the that is not the objective. The goal is an initial environment, with interim objectives for environment to promote better cooperation, equitable two-way traffic further developing and I believe the enviornment can be legislat- the proper atmosphere. This may be true, but ed. the United States cannot create the atmosphere unilaterally. Objectives for U.S. purchases The Approaches from NATO countries would be established Three basic approaches toward creating the through negotiations. Experience with allocat- needed environment are the NATO common ing F-16 subcontracts in Europe has shown the defense market, the Defense/Commercial complexity of the task.38 Once negotiations Balance, and the Technology Exchange. Each were complete, any U.S. commitment to buy X must be examined in terms of timeliness, percent of its advanced weapons from other flexibility, and fairness. NATO countries would reduce flexibility of The first proposal considers the NATO action for the United States. This factor, alliance on a macroeconomic rather than a combined with political pressures and techno- project-by-project basis. Citing the 1941 Hyde logical considerations, renders this approach Park Agreement between the United States implausible.39 and Canada as an example of a viable form for The second approach is the Defense/Com- a common defense market, Thomas Callaghan mercial Balance. As described by Charles Drojected this structure onto the NATO scene. Wolf in a Rand Corporation paper, this ap- 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW proach links trade liberalization to standard- examples. Flexibility of action is retained, and ization in NATO. As an alternative to the both sides can maintain their labor and often inefficient quid pro quo offset agree- technology bases, assuming the existence of a ments that are part of weapons sales like the cooperative environment.43 The study on F-16, Wolf suggests lowering barriers to licensing recognized hurdles, such as technol- nonmilitary exports by NATO members to the ogy transfer and economic issues, and it United States. Commercial sales to the United identified some administrative steps by which States would be used to balance defense sales the Department of Defense could “facilitate to Europe. He identifies certain fields, such as greater use of licensing.”44 However, this electrical machinery, where European cost and approach has no overall framework for the supply might meet U.S. demands. The propos- greater emphasis in the future. al includes three elements: 1. A “NATO-round” of trade liberalization to NATO Defense help create an environment in which standardiza- tion can proceed more effectively; Cooperation Act 2. Encouragement of joint bidding by Ameri- can and European firms on defense R&D and The appropriate initiative to build the procurement contracting; framework could take several forms. Defense 3. Removal of Buy American restrictions on studies of groups of potential cooperative U.S. government non-military, as well as, military projects, presidential pronouncements, oi procurement.'10 more congressional hearings on standardiza- The first and major, part of the proposal is tion are possibilities. But since foreign policy is the most difficult to implement. Wolf himself a joint responsibility of the executive and identified time, legal obstacles, and the legislative branches, the two branches should traditional disconnection between economics act together to send an unmistakable message and defense as problem areas. Dr. LaBergehas through passage of a NATO Defense Coopera- identified a more serious flaw: diverting U.S. tion Act. This act would consolidate legislation funds to the commercial market would destroy related to NATO standardization and provide the financial base considered by the European the framework for working with NATO defense industry to be critical for technology partners in cooperative development, produc- development and, ultimately, survival.41 In the tion, and logistics programs. interest of fairness, the approach requires more Besides expressing the U.S. commitment, emphasis on cooperation. the proposed act would help to fill a void in The Technology Exchange is somewhat less existing legislation. Section 1 of the Arms idealistic than the other two approaches. The Export Control Act states: flow of traffic on the two-way street would be ... it remains the policy of the United States to primarily a flow of ideas and drawings. This facilitate the common defense by entering into can be done through licensing agreements. A international arrangements with friendly coun- 1977 study for the Department of Defense tries which further the objective of applying agreed resources of each country to programs and examined licensing of production as a means projects of cooperative exchange of data, re- toward greater cooperation and standardiza- search, development, production, procurement, tion. The study concluded that it was “a and logistics support to achieve specific national primary and workable mechanism for increas- defense requirements and objectives of mutual ing interoperability or standardization."42 It is concern.45 working now: the U.S. production of the Despite the lofty policy statement, the Arms Franco-German Roland and European pro- Export Control Act only authorizes sales; it is duction of the F-16 are the most obvious silent on cooperative effort. TRAFFIC ON NATO'S TWO-WAY STREET 33

The NATO Defense Cooperation Act would programs. By agreement, the surcharge was address the other areas in five chapters: policy, not applied to certain NATO countries with development and procurement, logistics and whom the United States had substantial support, review and approval, and general cooperative efforts. But, in 1976, the Congress provisions. made “an appropriate charge for administra- The first chapter would restate U.S. policy tive services” mandatory on all sales. By and consolidate in one place the concepts prohibiting surcharges or administrative expressed in the Arms Export Control Act and charges except as agreed on in NATO STAN- the various authorization acts discussed earlier. AGs, and by establishing workable concepts This chapter would also address the special for joint efforts in Europe and the United relationship between the United States and States, this chapter could go a long way toward NATO; this relationship serves as a basis for the demonstrating U.S. commitment to true coop- unique procedures in the act and exceptions to eration. other law. It would cover such thorny areas as The next chapter would contain provisions third-country exports of coproduced items. relating to logistics and support. It would (Because of overcapacity in production, the address overseas procurement of supplies and Europeans rely heavily on exports. Restrictions services for U.S. forces in NATO countries and on such exports would benefit intra-European cross-servicing of NATO units. cooperation at the expense of the United The fourth chapter would provide for ap- States.)46 This chapter could also spell out propriate congressional review and approval preferences for various approaches, such as of specific programs, perhaps using dollar multinational programs versus international thresholds similar to those now in the Arms consortiums bidding on national programs. Export Control Act. The current thresholds of Finally, it would assign responsibilities for $7 million for major defense equipment and implementation and describe the relationship $25 million for defense articles and services of the act to the Arms Export Control Act. could be increased to $25 and $50 million Chapter Two, “Cooperative Development respectively for NATO or NATO countries. and Procurement,” would outline the frame- Congress would still receive annual reports work for cooperative efforts. It would autho- listing all programs exceeding $1 million and rize bilateral or multilateral arrangements in a could continue to receive the annual standard- format appropriate to the type of agreement ization progress reports from the Secretary of and cover payment and credit terms. Because Defense. of the variety of possibilities, no single form The fifth and last chapter is perhaps the most would be prescribed, but there would be important chapter in the proposed act. In established principles that would apply either addition to administrative sections dealing to allied efforts in the United States or to U.S. with the effective date and definitions, this efforts overseas. The key to this chapter is that chapter would repeal or amend conflicting it would reinforce the theme of cooperation. legislation. The legislation falls into several According to Dr. LaBerge, “Europeans categories. In the first category are the various complain that U.S. Foreign Military Sales NATO policy statements that would be regulations frequently cause disagreeable superseded by Chapter 1 of the NATO working relationships.”47 They prefer to be Defense Cooperation Act. In the second treated as partners rather than customers. One category are those provisions of law that major bone of contention is the administrative should be repealed to provide a consistent charge of three percent levied on most sales to policy on NATO cooperation. These, for cover estimated costs of administering the example, include the constraints on foreign 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

research and development contracts and the When it is passed, the NATO Defense prohibition on the purchase of foreign buses.48 Cooperation Act will serve two purposes. It The last category includes all the laws that must will focus the attention of the President and be amended to exempt NATO, such as the Buy Congress on the entire NATO standardization American Act, the annual procurement and question, rather than on pieces of it. And it will specialty metals restrictions, and the Arms signal our NATO partners that the United Export Control Act, as it relates to foreign States is firmly committed to a two-way flow military sales. This final chapter is the capstone of traffic on the transatlantic highway. of the act. Air Com mand and Staff College

Notes 22 U.S., Department of Defense, Planning and Programming Guidance 1. CeneraJ David C. Jones made this remark during a visit to Air University (U) (Secret), 11 March 1977, p. 111-26. (ATC), Maxwell AFB. Alabama, in January 1978. 23. U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense (Public 2. U.S.. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. House. Affairs), "Ambassador R. W. Komer Appointed Adviser for NATO Affairs," Committee on International Relations. Legislation on Foreign Relations News Release No. 432-77, 15 September 1977. through 1976, vol. II, Joint Committee Print (Washington: Government 24. U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense (Public Printing Office. 1977), pp. 18-17. (Public Law 94-361, Sec. 802). Affairs), "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown at News 3 NATO Facts and Figures, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Informa- Conference, Friday, May 6, 1977." tion Service, 1976, p. 27. 25. Harold Brosvn, "To Strengthen the American Alliance: The Better 4 U.S., Department of Defense, Rationalization/Standardization within Training and Equipment in NATO Forces," Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 June NATO: A Report to the U.S. Congress by the Secretary of Defense, 31 January 1977, p. 525. 1976, pp. 49-50. 26 Harold Brown, in remarks at Mississippi State University, 21 October 5. U S Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, NATO 1977, quoted in Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 15 November 1977. Standardization: Political, Economic, and Military Issues for Congress, 27. Gardiner L. Tucker, "Standardization and the Joint Defense." NATC prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Committee Print (Washing- Review, February 1975, p. 13. ton: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 11-12 28. Walter LaBerge, "Standardization and Interoperability: Another 6 Rationalization/Standardization. 1976, p. 51; U.S., Department of Perspective," NATO Review. December 1976, p. 16. Defense. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "The 29. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.. "U.S. Mulls NATO Standardization Moves," Federal Republic of Germany the Seventh Nation to Join NATO Sea Sparrow Aviation Week ir Space Technology, 28 June 1976, p. 23, Project," News Release 61-77, 15 February 1977. 30. U.S.. Department of Defense, Rattonalizatton/Standardization within 7 U.S . Congress, Senate, "NATO and the New Soviet Threat," Congres- NATO: A Report to the U.S. Congress by the Secretary of Defense (U) sional Record, vol. 123, 25 January 1977, p. S1417. (Secret). 18 January 1977, p. 66. 8 Thomas A. Callaghan, U.S ./European Economic Cooperation in 31 Cecil Brownlow, "Export Curb, NATO Goal Clash," Aviation Week ir Military and Civilian Technology, revised edition (Washington: Center for Space Technology, 30 May 1977, p. 12. Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 35. 32 . The author became familiar with this and other issues involving foreign 9 Joseph Luns, Secretary General of NATO, quoted by Keith Williams, military sales as Chief. General Security Assistance Division. Electronic "20th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly." NATO Review, Systems Division, AFSC, Hanscom AFB. Massachusetts. February 1975, p. 21 33. Benjamin F. Schemmcr, "Pentagon Reevaluates Carter Arms Transfer 10 Admiral of the Fleet. Sir Peter Hill-Norton, "NATO in 1975: The Policy," Armed Forces Journal International, August 1977, p. 12. Military Issues at Stake," NATO Review. April 1975, p. 11. 34. Walter LaBerge "A Concept of a Two-Way Street," Defense Systems 11 Callaghan. U S./European Cooperation, p. 37. Management Review, Summer 1977, p. 5. 12. Elliot R. Goodman. "The Puzzle of European Defense: The Issue of 35. Ibid., p. 6. Arms Procurement," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Winter 1976/1977, p. 36. Callaghan, U.S./European Cooperation, pp. 57-61, 108. 110-25. 479 37. Robert W. Komer et a!.. Rationalizing NATO’s Defense Posture (U. 13. “Eurogroup Communique," NATO Review, June 1975, p. 31. (Secret), R-1657 (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1975), pp xxv, 27375 14 "Defense Planning Committee Communique," NATO Review. June 38. Edward H. Kolcum, "Fighter Effort Tests Collaboration Effort," 1975. p. 28. Aviation Week 6* Space Technology, 2 May 1977, p. 44. 15. U.S., President, W eekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 5 June 39. LaBerge, p. 5. 1975, p. 576. 40. Charles Wolf, Jr., "Offsets," Standardization, and Trade Liberalization 16 "North Atlantic Council Final Communique," NATO Review, June in NATO, Paper P-5779 (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1976), p. vi. 1977, p. 20. 41. LaBerge, p. 5. 17. Luciano Radi, "A European Initiative for Cooperation in the Armaments 42. Robert A. Cessert et ai„ NATO Standardization and Licensing Policy- Field." NATO Review, June 1977, pp. 8-9. Exploratory Phase, vol. I (McLean, : Ceneral Research Corp., 1976). p. 18. Legislation, vol. II, pp. 18-19. (Public Law 93-365, Sec. 802). 27. 19 Legislation, vol. II, pp. 16-17. (Public Law 94-361, Sec. 802). 43. LaBerge, p. 6. 20. Department o f D efense Appropriation A d, 1978, Public Law 95-111, 44. Gessert, p. 31. Sec. 823. (91 Stat. 904). 45. Legislation,vo\. II, p. 256. (22 USC 2751). 21. U.S . Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, European 46. Brownlow, p. 12. Defense Cooperation. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Research and 47. Walter B LaBerge, "Chanson de Roland," NATO Review. June 1977, p. Development and the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the 14. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 2d sess.. 1976, pp. 165-66. 48. Rationalization/Standardization. 1976, pp 7378. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

C aptain James S. Seever s

HE changing officer evaluation system formal reporting periods, and then only T used by the United States Air Force has superficially. In order to meet the challenges been the cause of much discussion, criticism,that come with a management position, a and frustration. This article is a proposal to supervisor must be constantly aware of the apply proven management techniques to any performance and potential of his people and formal evaluation program and increase genuinely concerned about their professional employee motivation while improving the development. Proven techniques and manage- appraisal process. It is a review of one of the ment concepts can assist today’s Air Force widely used, and also widely misused, manager in meeting these challenges, among concepts—management by objectives (MBO). them MBO. Behavior science studies have long empha- sized the need for objective feedback in terms management by objectives of constructive criticism and justified praise. Too frequently, individuals have been coun- The management by objectives concept, seled about their performance following although a basic technique, has many interpre-

35 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tations. The application of this technique often tion and may become invalid due to increased succeeds or fails because of these interpreta- knowledge or changes in external factors. tions. As a basic review of MBO, George S. Objectives must be specifically defined to be Odiorne, director of the Bureau of Industrial used as the criteria with which to measure Relations at the University of Michigan, progress. Nevertheless, they must be flexible provides the following definition: enough to respond to changing conditions. In . . . the system of management by objectives can his book, Muddling Through, Roger Golde be described as a process whereby the superior supports this observation: and subordinate managers of an organization jointly identify its common goals, define each The very term “objective” acts to reinforce the set individual’s major areas of responsibility in terms of false expectations and feelings of inadequacy. of the results expected of him, and use these “Objective” implies something independent of measures as guides for operating the unit and the mind—something “real” or “actual,” the very assessing the contribution of each of its members.1 opposite of “subjective.” We talk as if we are managed and controlled by these concrete things Management by objectives is not a new called objectives. Nonsense! We do not serve technique. It was introduced as a supplemen- objectives, it is they that serve us. It is we who are tary management tool by Alfred Sloan in the in charge; it is management that creates and controls objectives, not the other way around. early 1950s; however, Peter Drucker is credited When progress toward an objective is checked with making it a central management concept along the way, unfavorable results are just as in his classic management book, The Practice likely to indicate a need to modify the objective as of Management, in 1954.2 to alter the type of actions being taken.5 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, MBO Unfavorable results, whether because of poor seemed to emerge as the dominant tool for objectives or improper action, often result organizational management. But many appli- from a lack of understanding by the people cations met with failure. The concept was involved. In commenting on the need for challenged, and many cast it aside as a communication in today’s highly educated theoretical idea that could not be applied in military organization, Captain James M. Grant practical situations. The causes of failure were warns, “Introducing MBO without first educat- in the implementation; they were not inherent ing people to the concept of participative in the basic procedure. management is to ensure the failure of the One of the primary causes of failure was the program.”6 inability to separate objectives from good Literature and seminars on delegation, intentions. Drucker states, “We can’t start MBO, and participative management repeat talking objectives until we know what they are. over and over again the following statements The things we desire are not objectives. . . . concerning objectives: (1) Objectives should When you'do not figure out the real objectives, be specific; (2) objectives should be complete, you substitute procedure for thinking.”3 fully specifying what is desired; (3) objectives Drucker also adds, “Management by objec- represent “ends”; they should be separated and tives works if you know the objectives. Ninety distinguished from “means” for attaining the percent of the time you don’t.”4 Confusion objectives; and (4) objectives should be stated results from replacing objectives with other in terms that permit measurement of progress organizational desires, such as values, policies, toward them.7 programs, and tasks. In addition to these mechanics of the MBO Criticism of the MBO process often points to process, the manager must be thoroughly the presumed infallibility of the objectives. aware of another, and perhaps more critical, Managers tend to forget that objectives are factor in the success of the measurement often established without sufficient informa- process. That factor is the effect on individual POINT COUNTER POINT 37 behavior and attitudes of such a strong that an adult can bowl for about three frames but emphasis on results. This emphasis is the main then becomes frustrated in not knowing how he is selling point of MBO; however, to certain types doing. And yet, every day in organization life, people roll the ball and knock down the pins, but of employees, it may seem extremely threaten- do not get any feedback." ing. Lieutenant Colonel Darryl Freed points out that even in an atmosphere of trust and Satisfactory and timely feedback is a shared confidence, employees who are extremely responsibility. It calls for managerial alertness insecure, who have retired on the job, or who as well as employee interest. Marion Kellogg have focused their energies in a different adds, “For best results, it should be focused.on direction, may perceive MBO as a threatening a specific incident or incidents.. .. The point is technique.8 to make the giving and receiving of feedback a This threat should be countered with useful, interesting experience for all involved education and communication. Once proper rather than a here-we-go-again event.”12 objectives have been established and an As an analogy, it is interesting to review the atmosphere of participation and cooperation repetitive steps in the adult learning process: (1) the gathering of information, (2) the has been created, MBO is well on the road to application of the information, and (3) feed- success. There are, however, other roadblocks back concerning the success of the application. that may occur during the process. Thomas P. Kleber cites several additional reasons why this Translating these steps into the work environ- technique has failed in the past. Probably one ment, managers’ decisions about employee of the most significant causes cited is the lack of improvements represent learning goals. Ac- effective feedback.9 Feedback is the central cording to Kellogg, the manager’s tasks in this situation include finding ways to: (1) move the theme of this article, since it is the bridge that employee to commit himself, (2) give the connects task-oriented management by objec- employee the information he needs in order to tives and appraisal by results. make the change or improvement, (3) provide him with opportunities to apply the informa- tion, and (4) give him timely and useful feedback and communication feedback for each successive try.13 Feedback and communication, the central arteries of any organizational life system, are critical in the MBO process. Management by the evaluation process objectives is based on clarity of communica- tion, and a successful manager dedicates his The development of human capabilities time to reinforce the multidirectional com- usually includes a formal evaluation process; however, the manager is teaching his subordi- munication flow. As one of the fundamental nates as well as grading them. “The manage- steps in the MBO process, Freed cites a ment that emphasizes grading and discipline mutually arranged system of feedback to both without thought to the growth and develop- manager and employee on employee prog- ment of its personnel may be a decaying ress.10 Scott Myers used the following illustration to management.”14 Unfortunately, the evaluation process is emphasize the need for a system of feedback: often considered an end rather than a means Suppose you were to be in a bowling competition, for development. Managers must recognize with a $100 prize to the one with the highest score. that appraisal is a subjective judgment made on To make things interesting, a curtain is halfway down the alley so that the bowlers can’t see the incomplete information. This judgment can be pins or the scoreboard. The experiment shows sharpened, however, by narrowing the scope 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

of information reviewed. Irrelevant informa- appraisal by objectives tion can only make the evaluation process more difficult and have an adverse effect on the final Appraisal by objectives, the application of report. The manager must also become MBO techniques to performance appraisal, is not a new concept. This method of personnel involved in the evaluation process long before evaluation followed closely after Drucker’s the formal performance report is due. Well in introduction of MBO. The definition offered advance, he must share with the individual by Theos A. Langlie in the Encyclopedia of employee the reason for appraisal and the Management shows the similarity of this characteristics or objectives on which the approach to the processes previously dis- evaluation will be based. cussed: Too often, managers get caught in the popu- larity trap. In order to maintain employee . . . the preparation by the subordinate appraisee loyalty, they feel they must avoid criticism by of written statements covering his understanding limiting verbal communication to favorable of the objectives of (a) his superior’s job; (b) his own job; (c) the proper criteria of performance comments and save unfavorable appraisals for from his viewpoint; (d) the situation, including written, and often confidential, reports. If the problems to be overcome; and (e) his plan of boss really wants to be kind, what he tells any action to accomplish the objectives. This report is employee will be consistent with the written discussed with the supervisor for purposes of communication, analysis, modification or approv- record, and both will be honest, fair, direct, al, and appraisal.17 and objective. Direct verbal feedback must be tempered, The development, application, and results of however, with understanding of individual this technique and MBO are so similar that personalities and needs. Many organizational most articles on MBO would need only be problems stem from management’s inability to modified to refer to the individual instead of cope with different kinds of people, and from the task and the discussion would remain valid. its failure to realize the complexities of The objectives of the individual are a function employee motivation. Golde points out that of the objectives of the larger unit of which he many people say they want feedback, when is a part; therefore, personal development what they really want is “favorable” feed- should be a major part in any MBO program. back.15 Managers must emphasize the value of But appraisal by objectives can also be applied constructive criticism as well as favorable independent of task-oriented MBO. feedback. Feedback, favorable or otherwise, satisfies a dual purpose: evaluation and motivation. “Because management is receptive M ANY of the benefits of each to information input and feelings, members of technique are the same. Mark Silber and V. the team are motivated to contribute their Sherman comment on the integration of knowledge and their suggestions. This commu- organization and employee goals: nication is further enhanced by management Organization 6Ian, the spirit of achievement, is giving feedback to employees on a regular based on the integration of organization and basis.”16 employee goals—that is, a congruence between Performance appraisal and the feedback the organization's objectives and the individual resulting from it should not be considered a interests and talents. Such a congruence engenders a closer identification of the em- chore but an opportunity to expand mutual ployee with the system. A climate of achieve- understanding and increase employee effec- ment is also generated by mutual trust and goal tiveness. One method of accomplishing these setting between the employee and his immediate goals is to apply the concepts of MBO. manager.18 POINT COUNTER POINT 39

The climate of achievement, like organiza- the appraisal by objectives technique since tional morale, is not a factor that is easily they are the same as those discussed during the measured, but the resulting productivity and review of MBO. Langlie provides an excellent efficiency are readily identified. discussion of the chain reaction that can occur As with MBO, a successful program with the when a program of appraisal by objectives is communication necessary to achieve desired implemented without adequate preparation. results requires commitment and dedication. If the planning is unrealistic, the implementation In order for the manager to communicate his will be disappointing, and the appraisal may then expectations effectively, he must invest the be inadequately descriptive of the employee’s time required to learn the perceptions, work qualities. Nevertheless, this approach is not only values, and objectives of his employees. sound for appraisal purposes, it is or should be a standard operating procedure in fulfilling the Through this knowledge, the manager can management functions of planning, leading, and achieve desired results in productivity by- measuring.22 achieving what Drucker terms “worker- Does this chain reaction occur in the Air responsibility.” “Indeed, one of the major Force community? If so, it is certainly not contributions of management by objectives is because of a lack of knowledge concerning the that it enables us to substitute management by- functions and principles of management. self-control for management by domination.”19 MBO is not foreign to Air Force managers. Communication and feedback take many From initial professional military education forms in an organization. Informal feedback is through senior service schools, the need for just as critical as the formal evaluation process. clearly defined objectives and adequate Kellogg states, “. . . the single most important communication is repeatedly emphasized. contribution to excellent performance lies in Lessons learned in the academic environment, the informal, day-to-day interaction between however, seem soon forgotten. an employee and his manager.”20 Silber and The management by objectives appraisal Sherman support the need for communication technique is not a panacea for all the problems as follows: of the Air Force performance evaluation Both the organization and the individual require system. It is, however, a tool to enhance the vehicles for accurate and relevant performance manager’s effectiveness and increase objectivi- feedback. Toward those ends, an organization ty in the evaluation process. should devote time and care to monitoring its performance feedback loops. Otherwise every- It is time to look beyond the evaluation one operates in a void—an organizational fog.21 paperwork and examine the application of the system and procedures used. It would be repetitive to review many of the determinants of success or causes of failure for Offutt AFB, Nebraska

Promotability: The Makingofan Executive (Sew York: AMACOM. 1974), pp. Notes 147-48. I John J. Tarrant, Drucker: The Man Who Invented the Corporate Society 12. Marion S. Kellogg, What to Do about Performance Appraisal (New (Boston: Cahners Books. Inc . 19(76). p. 78. York: AMACOM, 1975), p. 35. 2. Ibid., p. 77 13. Ibid., p. 45 3. Ibid., p. 82. 14. Silber and Sherman, p. 100. 4 Ibid . p. 2S7 15. Colde. p. 47. 5. Bolter A. Colde. Muddling. Through: The Art of Properly Unbusinesslike 18 Silber and Sherman, pp. 84-85. Management (New York: AMACOM, 1978). pp 7i-72 17 Carl Hovel, editor. "Performance Appraisal (Merit Rating)," Encyc- 8 AFRP 11-1, TIG Brief. 19 November 1978. p 4. lopedia of Management (New York AMACOM, 1975), p. 693 7. Colde. p 59 18. Silber and Sherman, p 46 8. Air Command and Staff College. Course IB. Lesson 5. Managerial 19. Peter F. Drucker. Management: Tasks. Responsibilities, Practices (New Techniquej (Air University: Extension Course Institute. 1974). p. 34 York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 440 9. Ibid., p 31 20. Kellogg, p. 34. 10 Ibid 21. Silber and Sherman, p. 44 II Mark B Silber and V. Clayton Sherman. Managerial Performance and 22. Hey el, pp 699-700. 11. “YOU WILL IMPLEMENT MBO!”

and other reasons the program L ieu t en a n t Colonel has not worked in the military Philip J. P er l es, USA

I mean to insure that in each of the various describe their experiences with MBO tech- Federal Programs objectives are achieved. niques. O f this group, 137 had prior experience in MBO programs, and the 114 remaining had J ohn F. Kennedy, 1963 had no MBO experience. Those with prior MBO experience were asked to describe their N 1977, a representative group of 251 lieu- best and worst MBO experiences and to Itenant colonels and colonels from all ser- comment generally on the overall value of the vices were surveyed to determine their expe- programs. Officers with no prior MBO expe- riences in management by objectives (MBO) riences were asked to express theoretical and their opinions regarding the effectiveness opinions regarding the value of goal-oriented of the MBO concept.1 At the time of the survey, programs. the officers were on active duty, and all of Fifty-two (or 46 percent) of the 114 officers them responded openly to the questions posed without MBO experience felt that MBO in the survey. The officers were asked first to strategies theoretically represent sound man-

40 POINT COUNTER POINT 41

agement practice. Sixty-two (or 54 percent) responsible for the failure of the programs, it expressed the opposite judgment for two nonetheless bears out, to some extent, the fears significant reasons: that such approaches of those officers who had only speculated on cannot work effectively because of the rank the potential dangers of such programs. structure, perceived role of the leader, and top- level support; and that MBO approaches are unworkable because of the military way of doing business—uncontrollable variables, such as rapid personnel turnover, crisis manage- S u C H empirical data support the ment, and time constraints. observation that, except in isolated instances, How do these theoretical assessments com- MBO in the military community is anything but pare with the opinions of the 137 officers with a raging success. Why? Certainly, this popular MBO experience? A dismal 8 (or 6 percent) management tool contains all of the elements unequivocally supported this management necessary to improve the effectiveness of any strategy, and 43 (or 31 percent) found the organization—participation, support, com- experience of little or no value. One can argue munication, clear goals, and job satisfaction; that the remaining 86 (or 63 percent) also fall they are bywords of success in any arena. But into this category except that these officers the basic question is: Can and should MBO be qualified their statements with the hedge that made to work in the military environment? “the techniques failed, but might have suc- There can be little disagreement that ceeded if. . . military organizations have always depended These officers’ best and worst experiences on objectives. Objectives are the catalysts for with MBO provide still another interesting choosing tomorrow’s chores and drawing up excursion. Almost unanimously the descrip- next year’s budget requests. They provide tions of the best experiences cited the oppor- continuity, put all members of the organization tunity to define objectives more clearly on the same track, and provide an excellent because of more open communication and medium for transition in a time of ever- formal statements of organizational goals. One increasing personnel turnovers. When one should note that many officers took a negative, recognizes that the military consists not of rather venomous approach to this particular whipping boys and mindless sheep but of question (e.g., “There was no best expe- people with individual needs and motivations, rience!”). the direction of an organization through a The responses regarding worst experiences participative, self-actualizing approach ap- read like a who’s who of Dale D. McConkey’s pears to represent a sound policy. In fact, one “20 Ways to Kill Management by Objectives.”2 can argue that systematic goal setting is the Variations of poor implementation top the list. very essence of an effective organization. Such experiences as excessive paperwork, Indeed, the hit-or-miss alternative to establish- unrealistic goals, poor follow-up, and lack of ing objectives is an extremely unpalatable top-level involvement were mentioned no choice. Can an institution even survive without fewer than 74 times. The perception that MBO a clear understanding of its goals? It seems that programs are no more than exercises in paper the military, with its diminishing resources, shuffling was expressed 17 times. The question expanding missions, and loving attention to of whether such programs are even workable such planning matrices as the planning- in a military environment because of rapid programming-budgeting system (PPBS) and changes in personnel, crisis management, and zero base budgeting (ZBB), would seize on the basic inflexibility arose 19 times. While it might industry-proven tool of management by be argued that these same officers were objectives. But such has not been the case. 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Apparently three major classes of problems circumstances, even the most disheartened and work against the successful operation of MBO poorly disciplined subordinates will group in a military environment. First, there are together to “take that hill” or to meet a universal dangers inherent in any MBO effort deadline. Over the long-term, however, the within the public or private sector. Second, conditions of the organization must be condu- serious problems arise in implementing the cive to such an atmosphere of mutual coopera- concept of MBO in the public sector. Finally, tion. MBO presents a special class of problems in the unique atmosphere surrounding the military. problems in the public sector

Much has been written about the MBO universal dangers approach in the public sector. These writings Regardless of the environment, most MBO suggest all of the usual do’s and don’ts, as well programs share several weaknesses. First, top- as a host of rules for dealing with the unique level managers, as a rule, are not equipped for arena of the public servant. However, I have no the multiple roles necessitated by an MBO knowledge of outstanding success stories of program. Today, the average supervisor in a any scope anywhere in the federal govern- fighter squadron or a branch of the IBM ment.3 This perception is enhanced when one Corporation does not customarily administer perceives MBO in such classical terms as joint discipline at one moment and then enter a identification of objectives, mutual support, conciliatory atmosphere of contract negotia- and participative methods. The Air Force tion at the next moment. On the other hand, Personnel Plan (AFPP), for example, uses an subordinates customarily perform their jobs excellent listing of milestones, systematically according to the requirements of their supervi- reviewed by the Executive Council and sors. True, most subordinates can be reorient- purportedly operating with the full support of ed, but there is little doubt that this is the the elite of the Air Staff. general atmosphere pervading contemporary I do not share John W. Gardner’s strong superior-subordinate relations. indictment of public servants, when as Secre- A second universal imbalance lies in the tary of the Department of Health, Education, manner of making the decision to implement and Welfare, he said: “When you figure out an MBO program. This decision is basic to how to hold a middle level bureaucrat everything that follows, and it is certainly not accountable, it’ll be comparable to landing on participative! Contracts and other alien tech- the moon.” Middle level bureaucrats are a niques that comprise an MBO program seem more responsive group than that described by inconsistent with this ominous beginning. A Mr. Gardner. However, his statement does new management technique is announced, encourage thought on the nature of the public followed by a four-hour mandatory training servant, his security needs, his motivation, and session, and, just that quickly, one is engulfed even his competence in some instances. in a new way of doing business. Here again, a Indeed, these factors contribute to the failure Little thought and a fair degree of finesse can of MBO programs in the federal sector. eliminate these problems of implementation. In a superb article written for MSU Business However, as noted earlier 74 officers expe- Topics, Edward J. Ryan, Jr., a faculty member rienced in MBO cited poor implementation as at Nichols College, points out some of the a major weakness in MBO programs. defects of MBO in the public sector.4 This Finally, cohesion obviously cannot be article summarizes a previous study of 71 high- dictated. In some extraordinary but temporary level government officials in the Internal POINT COUNTER POINT 43

Revenue Service, the Civil Service Commis- term, politically motivated objectives rather sion, the Department of Justice, and similar than broadly based management improve- organizations. Since he conducted the study ments. And to compound this problem, the two years after these agencies implemented short tenure of appointees works against the MBO, Dr. Ryan recognizes that his conclusions establishment of innovative or controversial may be premature, but I do not believe that objectives. time wall alter his findings. Professor Richard Rose of the University of The conclusions of the study suggest a Strathclyde in Scotland has, for several years, drastic failure of MBO where it has been conducted research on the relationship of the implemented in federal agencies. It strongly White House with various executive agencies. implies, for example, that highly placed Professor Rose concludes that the prospects for officials consider MBO as nothing more than strengthening MBO within the federal govern- semantics and faddism—another name for the ment are dim.5 He cites the statutory nature of planning-programming-budgeting system. objectives, division of power between the They also express resentment that MBO has executive and the legislative branches, and lack been forced on their departments by presiden- of personal or political incentive to become tial edict in a manner that leaves implementa- concerned with management reform. tion open to broad interpretation. Perhaps their A second critical problem in successfully most important reservation lies in their atti- implementing MBO in the public sector is the tudes about the permanence of the programs. problem of an ineffective reward system in There was widespread feeling that the MBO relation to MBO programs. There are simply will evaporate as soon as the brains and brawn no incentive awards to encourage the MBO behind the program in the Office of Manage- process to work. Rank and file public servants ment and Budget move on. In retrospect, their are more secure in their jobs than their hesitation to embrace the MBO initiative seems counterparts in industry. Their pay will justified. Thus far. President Carter has said scarcely be affected by anything accomplished nothing about MBO; he prefers instead to in terms of innovative management processes. emphasize ZBB as a way of life. They are content to do the best job of which Dr. Ryan identifies rapid turnover, statutory they are capable and to follow the directions requirements, organizational rigidity, ineffec- established by their supervisors. This is not tive reward systems, and poor accountability necessarily wrong, and it certainly is not as factors that retard MBO as an effective intended as criticism of public servants. management tool in the federal sector. Of these Indeed, everyone has known a few public factors, I consider rapid turnover of presiden- servants who have retired on the job and who tial appointees and the ineffective federal would not be amenable to change of any sort, employee reward system as particularly criti- but these individuals are very much the cal. exception. I refer primarily to those dedicated Incentives in the private sector for solid, but compartmented public servants for whom long-term organizational improvements are MBO, organizational effectiveness, job enrich- much more effective than is the appointment ment, and the like hold little opportunity for system in the federal sector. A new secretary or personal reward. agency chief is an extension of the person who Dr. Ryan draws some rather strong conclu- appoints him. In practical terms, his charter is sions concerning MBO in the federal govern- to direct his organization in a way that most ment.6 He suggests that: politically favors the position of his employer. • Federal participation in MBO has been The system thus becomes conducive to short- overpraised and oversold; 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

• A wide gap exists between prescribed and low in the need for independence, who programs and programs actually in effect; does not respond well to job enrichment or • Despite White House pressure, federal participation in the planning function, and who agencies simply have not seriously pursued neither functions nor feels better in such an MBO nor accepted it when implementation environment.8 I suggest that this individual was directed; and represents the most serious threat to the • Widespread acceptance of MBO at the implementation of MBO in the military. A brief federal level is not likely. scenario should illustrate this point: a military manager reluctantly agrees when he is ordered problems unique to the military to cooperate in an MBO program. His imme- Leadership remains the essential skill of the diate reaction, perhaps unconsciously, is to tactical military commander__ there is no way to subvert the program. Having earned a reputa- manage a . . . battalion up a hill in a fire fight.7 tion as a task-oriented authoritarian, he de- One often hears the statement that the military mands a fully cooperative team effort from his is an institution rather than an occupation. staff and at the same time admonishes them not Thus, military professionals may be justly to be concerned about disciplinary measures if proud of their unique sense of commitment, they fail to meet stated objectives. Business special traditions, wartime heroics, and un- continues as usual until the quarterly review of swerving loyalties to the mission and to progress, which is conducted in a manner that superiors in the chain of command. However has variously been described as the pink-slip commendable these traditional attributes, they technique and the brass-knuckles approach to run counter to a program of management by management. Although this scenario may objectives, particularly when they are added to stretch the real world just a bit, such an atmosphere is prevalent in the modern military the problems already discussed. The author- community. It results not in harmony but, itarian personality, the formal nature of the rather, in what Harry Levinson describes as rank structure, and the trend toward central- intense hostility, resentment, and distrust be- ized control present barriers of such formida- tween managers and their subordinates.9 ble proportions that they destroy any practical hope for a successful MBO program in the In addition to creating such a climate, our military environment. military manager frequently adopts a tech- The authoritarian personality. The cigar- nique that outwardly supports MBO, but, in chomping, desk-pounding colonel is alive and fact, is one in which he relinquishes none of his well! He retains command of broad functional authority. By this ploy, he simply chooses a areas; his subordinates generally admire him, subordinate to assume the full administrative but they .are terrorized in his presence; he burden of the program. The manager’s respon- makes seat-of-the pants judgments, and he sibilities thus take the form of admonitions to suboptimizes within the particular segment of his staff to cooperate and periodic glances at the organization he serves. For example, if one the paperwork stemming from the program as asks a senior-level Marine about his MBO he anticipates his own higher level review. program, he will forcefully state that his Either way, this common type of military charter is to fight and that he takes manage- manager ensures that the MBO program ment into consideration only insofar as it cannot succeed. conforms to his objective of achieving victory The fornml structure. Closely related to the over the enemy. problem of achieving a proper MBO climate This person has been described in kinder are the psychological effects of the formal terms as one who is high in authoritarianism military structure on the environment for POINT COUNTER POINT 45

participative management. Such an environ- management participation at lower levels is to ment is incompatible with the godlike image render such techniques a myth. Institutional encouraged in senior military officers, objectives and procedures determined at the personality-centered effectiveness appraisals, top leave little room for flexibility at the formal decision briefings, and emphasis on working levels. physical standards and their effect on perfor- mance. One may argue that such phenomena have no relationship to the methodology used T he combined effects of the dangers common to manage an organization. I submit that they to most MBO programs plus. the unique are so closely interwoven that they render any problems in the public sector and further truly participative program unworkable. How- complicated by the military style of manage- ever tough the MBO philosophy, it remains ment are indeed discouraging. The question is totally different from traditional military whether the results are worth the expenditure philosophy. Primary’ concern with satisfying of measurable and unmeasurable resources. the manager in such an environment overshad- From the practical standpoint, there is a ows any unbiased action to formulate and preponderance of evidence against such a accomplish commonly established objectives. program in the military. The few organizations I emphasize that I am neither'criticizing the that have achieved success in MBO probably structure nor advocating change. I submit that had the least need for such techniques. The vast we must stop deluding ourselves into thinking majority' of DOD organizations with ongoing that we can engage in MBO while we reinforce MBO programs are achieving far less than their the structure just described. resource outlays justify. A third category of problems that militate The message of this article is not complicat- against the successful adoption of MBO in a ed. With few exceptions, military managers military' environment relates to the trend away must change their way of thinking and from autonomy and toward centralized con- behaving for MBO to be a success. Such trol of even the most critical decisions. MBO changes cannot be legislated. The military, implies that participative involvement will therefore, must be content with letting MBO allow for immediate, on-the-spot decision- be used where it fits the personalities of the making to handle a given crisis, but such a people involved and discontinue immediately methodology opposes the existing chain of the practice of forcing it on other, less command premise in the military. The grow- receptive persons. Humanistic programs will ing library of regulations, codes, and similar never come about by top-level decree. directives has reduced the role of commanders University of California at all levels. The effect of this trend on Davis, California

Notes 1 At the request of the survey team. I cannot specifically identify the group 5. For an excellent treatment of MBO implementation in the federal surveyed I recognize that the survey is not statistically valid because of the government and current trends see Richard Rose, "Implementation and limited number of people surveyed. 1 feel, however, that the views expressed Evaporation The Record of MBO," Public Administration Review. are representative of the population in question. January/February 1977, pp. 64-71 2. Management Review. October 1372. pp 4-13. 6 Ryan, pp. 42-43. 3. The apparent success of the program at the Contract Management 7. Andrew P O'Meara, Jr„ "Who Commands Today's Army? Managers or Division (CMD), Air Force Systems Command, might be considered one Leaders?" Army, August 1975, p. 16. Emphasis added. exception. At CMD. staying power appears to have overcome resistance, and 8. Victor Vroom, Some Personality Determinants of the E jects ol their effort is described in glowing terms in some circles. Participation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, I960). 4. Edward j Ryan. Jr., “Federal Government MBO: Another Managerial 9. Harry Levinson, "Management by Whose Objectives? Harvard Fad?“ MSI/ Business Topics, Autumn 1976, pp. 35-43. Business Review, voi. 48, no. 4, i970. pp. 125-34. MBO AT THE MICRO LEVEL a case study C aptain Mic h a el F. T urner

a n a g emen t by objectives (mbo) The unit administration staff consisted of a is traditionally used as a manager’s master sergeant in charge of administration; a toolM to develop mutual goals with his subordi- staff sergeant chief clerk; two senior airmen; an nate managers in support of overall organiza- airman first class; and a basic airman. The tional goals. The boss and his subordinates morale and attitude of these six people seemed participate in interviews to agree on perfor- relatively low in July 1977, when I decided to mance goals that will achieve the objectives of implement an MBO program. The following the organization. problems influenced my decision to attempt As an Air Force captain responsible for the management by objectives: unit administration section of a munitions • Morale and enthusiasm for work were maintenance squadron, I felt that an MBO low. program would produce results at the office • Goals were not clearly established. workers’ level. • Statistics for administrative functions

46 POINT COUNTER POINT 47

were low for Airman Performance Reports enrich their jobs tied into the MBO approach of (APRs), orientation of newcomers to the what goals they wanted to follow. Motivation organization, hospital appointment scheduling and commitment are tied to a person’s and attendance, and paperwork accuracy. perception of making a personal, voluntary • The clerks complained that the chief clerk choice to follow a course of action. was not communicating with them or taking As long as all of the office functions were the time to explain the work. somewhat equitably assigned, what difference • Two clerks had been involuntarily dis- would it make who did a job, so long as he was charged during the previous year. capable and motivated? Perhaps a lower- • The clerks were limited in diversity of ranking clerk could do better a job that he experience and work performed. wanted than could a higher-ranking NCO who • Most of the major functions were either did a job strictly from necessity. It was decided directly accomplished or closely monitored by that interviews would be held to let clerks a captain, master sergeant, and a staff sergeant. request the job responsibilities most meaning- ful to them. Before implementing an MBO program, I A natural tie-in developed between MBO realized that the clerks needed more than a and job enrichment. A series of three inter- goal-setting program. They needed jobs that views between supervisor and subordinates were more stimulating and motivating. How, resulted in common goals plus an agreement on then, could these office jobs be improved? enriched job descriptions. Job enrichment, changing jobs to make them The key element in the program’s success more meaningful and fulfilling, was the was the total involvement and commitment of answer. A job is not enriched by merely all the clerks. I presented a short seminar on changing the tasks or functions to be per- MBO and job enrichment. Then, the chief clerk formed by the employee. I told the clerks that interviewed his subordinates. the following factors constitute an enriched In the initial interview, the clerks expressed job: their job preferences from a list of administra- • A real change in the job, not just adding tive duties. In most instances, an individual more tasks; requested some of his current duties but with • complete responsibility for a job; more total responsibility for a job task. In • training in the new area of responsibility; addition, the chief clerk was surprised to find • control and decision-making authority for that nearly every clerk asked to assume more the specific job area; and difficult and time-consuming responsibilities. • job results going directly to the employee In the second interview, each supervisor and as feedback. subordinate agreed on a job description and Dr. Rensis Likert, in his book Human discussed possible goals. Here, job enrichment Organization: Its Management and Value and and MBO complemented each other. In every in published articles,1 demonstrates the bene- instance a clerk was given increased responsi- fits of a participative group method of leader- bility and new duties. Concurrently, goals ship for making decisions affecting employees. were discussed by the individual and the I agree with Likert that, where possible, supervisor that related to overall objectives. employees should have a say-so in decisions I interviewed the master sergeant noncom- affecting them. Since these clerks spent a third missioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and of their time on the job, it made sense to ask found him somewhat at a loss because many of them what they would like to do on the job. his former duties were to be assumed by the Asking the clerks what they wanted to do to chief clerk and younger personnel. Hesuggest- Conlinued on pour 49 SURVIVAL IN THE MANAGEMENT JUNGLE

C hief Master Ser c ea nt C. P. Wil kso n

Usually, by the time an enlisted man starts “paint the ceiling” and be surprised by the replacing his initial clothing issue, he has result. On the other hand, if a subordinate gives picked up a smattering of management you an idea, do one of three things: accept it, techniques. By the time those cuffs start to fray, reject it, or ask for more time to think about it. a few catch phrases have worked their way into Noncommittal hums may get you out of an his consciousness. Even after all the schools, awkward situation but probably into one much these same phrases, like a shiny toy, are all that worse. The well-placed grunt will be interpret- remain. Knowing you are a 9-9 supervisor or ed as a yes or no—as you will find to your Maslow’s hierarchy of needs may make you surprise when your name is mentioned as a sleep better at night, but there is a possibility backer of a half-baked plan casually menti- that neither will replace common sense. oned in the hallway. Twenty-two years of scar tissue have given • Accept defeat gracefully. Present your me my own rules. All of them were learned side of any situation forcefully, but once a painfully; some like a bolt of lightning between decision has been made, embrace it. If you had the eyes, others after hours of laborious the final say, your boss would not have been reasoning as to why I failed. I present them involved in the process. Nowhere in your here in the hope they may stimulate some contract with the government does the clause thought on our management techniques. “except when I disagree” appear. If you • Be true to yourself. During your Air Force continue to react negatively after a decision has experience you will be tempted to become been made, it will reflect in the work and cynical. Everyone fails at something and is attitude of your people. Your subsequent congratulated or achieves a hard-won goal and failure should be expected. is ignored. People often say one thing and do • Always assume that any task you give out another. This is just human nature—the will be done wrong. This is not being cynical. It difference between people and machines. is a way of ensuring that you avoid unpleasant Accept it as such and press on. surprises. Build feedback into every job you • Listen. You will be doing more of this as a set, anything from coordinating on a draft to manager than any other single activity. Listen insisting on seeing the first of a finished to what your boss says and do that, not what product. This will reinforce two ideas in your you think he or she should have said. Listen to subordinates: that you are interested in what your subordinates. They, too, have minds and they are doing and that you really want them to something to offer. Nothing will lose loyalty to do it. Your routine checking will be accepted as you faster than looking up after a subordinate just that, routine. It will not be resented as has spilled heart and soul and muttering, “What prying. A fallout benefit will be that you just did you say?” You are telling them they are not might learn something new about the job. worth listening to. • Do not take yourself too seriously. This • Be specific. If you are giving directions way when someone punctures the balloon of and want a specific goal, say so. Unless you your pomposity, the hiss will not be quite so have a Michelangelo on your staff, don’t say loud. Cannon AFB, New Mexico

48 ed that he also needed some job enrichment month submitted late incorrect and volunteered to be unit career adviser. His July 1977 24 4 1 request was granted. He also moved into a August 29 1 4 private office farther from the administrative September 55 0 2 October 34 0 0 section, to allow the chief clerk more direct November 20 0 0 responsibility for decisions. December 23 0 1 The third and final interviews resulted in January 1978 34 0 0 agreement on objectives or goals. By this time, Table 11. Airmen Performance Reports the clerks had found ample opportunity to air complaints and make suggestions to a supervi- sor who had previously been “too busy to listen.” They began to be more open with both of some of our personnel, we started the cycle supervisors and each other about positive all over again. To measure the results of the approaches to improving attitudes and solving previous seven months (July 1977-February work-related problems. 1978), I will refer to statistics furnished by the One of the most noticeable changes of the base personnel office as well as comments of program was the delegation of authority to the the clerks themselves. lower-ranking clerks. In nearly every instance, Tables II and III depict the improvement the job functions of the office were given to made by the APR Monitor and the Individual- lower-ranking individuals. Table I illustrates ized Newcomer Treatment and Orientation the shift in duties after the job enrichment/ (INTRO) Monitor. MBO interviews. The APR statistics in Table II are especially By February 1978, the program had pro- significant, considering that in June 1977 there duced notable results. Because of the transfer were 19 late APRs in the squadron. The senior airman who assumed responsibility for APRs set a goal to achieve “0” late and “0” incorrect reports by November 1977. She achieved the Table l. Delegation of office jobs to lower levels goal a month sooner. The figures in Table III show a frustrating Duty Before After trend during the first five months. The clerk telephone control monitor Capt/MSgt SSgt meal card control monitors MSgt/A1C A1C functional area documentation manager (shift made Table III. Individualized Newcomer Treatment 6 months earlier) Capt MSgt and Orientation (sponsor) program success TDY orders clerk SSgt SrA/A1C distribution clerk SSgt A1C customer account received sponsor kit representative SSgt/Sgt Sr A and INTRO monitor Sgt Amn/A1C requested sponsor commander's letter file clerk Sr A A1C OER/APR monitor MSgt A1C yes no yes no % awards and decorations monitor Capt A1C July 1977 613457 administration August 14 2 8 8 50 punish monitor A1C A1C September 23 0 6 17 26 message OCR monitor SSgt A1C October 22 3 11 14 44 leave clerk Amn Amn November 15 188 50 security clerk SSgt Amn December 10 4122 86 commander's call January 1978 72 81 89 arrangements Capt SSgt February 13 10 19 483

49 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

involved stated that newcomers were not “We stressed to reach goals—wanted to do a receiving sponsor kits because they were good job.” arriving from Air Force technical schools “Looked forward to getting feedback. I before the unit received a request for a changed procedures in the INTRO program to sponsor. He solved the problem by sending a help me reach my goal.” package to the technical school as soon as The implementation of the program re- assignment information was received from the quired patience from supervisors to allow the Central Base Personnel Office. clerks to overcome the initial lack of knowl- The annual dental appointment no-show edge in their new jobs. However, this patience rate also improved. The no-show rate averaged paid off as noted in the cited statistics and 14 percent throughout 1977. Finally, because comments. of an administrative change initiated by the Health Scheduling Monitor in our office, the no-show rate plummeted to 3 percent M anagement by objectives and job enrich- for the months of January and February 1978. ment are not a panacea for problems in all Other areas difficult to measure statistically office situations but applied together will likely also improved, including correspondence improve communications, delegation of work, processing, typing accuracy, publication man- commitment, and participation. When office agement, and office security practices. clerks participate in forming their own job However, the most beneficial results of the descriptions and commit themselves to achieve application of job enrichment and manage- objectives, the human element and production ment by objectives techniques were the factors improve. improved motivation and communication in The attempt to apply the principles of MBO the office. The administrative clerks who had and job enrichment in the munitions mainte- previously complained about their supervisor’s nance squadron unit administrative section lack of communication with them made the reaped obvious benefits. The results of our following comments: program lend support to modern management “Talking with supervisors increased and theories that emphasize group participation helped us understand what was expected of and communication. us.” In our experience, we found it desirable to “I could talk to my supervisor and you start the job enrichment interviews and MBO [administration officer] to tell where you were program cycle over again after about seven coming from.’’ months. Although changes provided more “I didn’t really like my job much until I got stimulating work for our clerks, the best timing involved.’’ for change will vary, depending on the “Supervision was much better. Supervisors organization. Whether in an office or other talked to you more—made you want to do work setting, employees who participate in job better.” enrichment and goal-setting will probably “Felt more recognition when my job was contribute more to organizational objectives. Rhein-Main AB, Germany clearly defined; you could help others with their jobs. Others could see what I was doing.” “Morale and communication improved.” Note The following comments regarding goals were 1. See "Management Styles and the Human Component, Matujficmt'nt made: Review. October 1977, pp. 23-28. 43-45. in my. opinion AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS stone walls or -- .t stone br -s.

Major Ric h a r d J. Oliver

1

I built a wall Vd ask to know What I was walling in or walling out.

R obert Frost “Mending Wall”

AMES RESTON once wrote: “The con- J flict between the men who make and tlm men whp report the news is as old as time.” In ancient days, the bearer of bad tidings was often stoned4o death. Nowadays, his descend- ant, the "if^wsman, is more mercifully often merely “stonewalled.” Undoubtedly, some newsmakers still yearn for the ancient rite. The basftTissue remains—whether to build stone walls or stone bridges; whether to ^obstruct the newsman or build avenues of communication. I propose that, for communi- cation, stones are more productively used in bridges than in walls. Toe stonewalling of newsmen, like any art form, is practiced in varying degrees and manners, and sometimes it even goes unrecog- 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW nized by the practitioner. Stonewalling can be cooperation with the press, particularly when applied with thoughtless ignorance or cunning unfavorable publicity is anticipated as the intrigue. The most common form of stonewall- product. These reasons can be categorized into ing is the simple maneuver of delay, in the two primary areas: fear of exposure and hope that a reporter will lose interest and his inexperience in dealing with the news media. question die a quiet death. Derivative forms Fear of exposure covers such elements as are the invalid denial of information and exposure of mistakes, errors, scandals, mis- release of misinformation. While the “big lie” deeds, accidents, and other potential embar- tactic itself is rare, its alter ego, the half-truth, is rassments. Nobody likes to have his indiscre- more prevalent; and thus the concepts of tions aired in public. truthfulness and honesty often part company. Suppression of adverse news can also be Official Air Force public affairs policy in motivated by an ill-conceived notion of responding to unclassified news media queries, protecting the Air Force image. The reasons both favorable and unfavorable, runs counter can even range to more personal motives, such to the rites of stonewalling. This policy can be as fear of detrimental effect on promotion. As 'summarized as maximum disclosure with former Assistant Secretary of Defense for minimum delay. Often, however, the news- Public Affairs William I. Greener, Jr., phrased man who bears bad tidings in the form of a it to Air War College students: “Too many perceived unfavorable news query finds this generals have in the past lived by Socrates’ policy reversed to minimum disclosure with observation, ‘It is the mark of a good general to maximum delay. By design or by default, the reveal the good and hide the bad’; rather than newsman is, in effect, stonewalled. Alexander Hamilton’s conclusion, ‘It is a Many Air Force commanders, from squad- government of the people. They will govern ron level to top echelon, perceive the need for best when given the facts.’ communicating with newsmen but often show Granted, it is a rare individual who will a predilection for modified bridges—modified admit a mistake or indiscretion, and even more so that the good news gets out and the bad rare is the person who will volunteer it before news is not quite so available. Certainly, the Air public exposure. Aside from whether one Force is not the only practitioner of the art of accepts truth as its own reward, there are more stonewalling, but it does exist in the Air Force pragmatic reasons for cooperating with the as well as elsewhere. For those who doubt it, media, even under adverse circumstances— ask local newsmen. real or imagined. At the heart of this issue is not whether On his visits to Air University forums, stonewalling exists but, rather, the answers to Brigadier General H. J. Dalton, Jr., Director of three key questions: Why does it exist? More the Air Force O ffice of Information, has important, why should it not exist? And most reminded his audiences “While a commander important, how can it be corrected? The may survive and recover from many unpleas- purpose of this article, then, is to discuss this ant experiences in his career, from plane timeless trilogy. The target is current and crashes to IG visits, he will rarely survive the prospective Air Force leaders and command- mishandling of a public affairs crisis.”2 Often, ers, the critical players in the military-media however, it appears that commanders misin- relationship. terpret the phrase “public affairs crisis”; they become more fearful of the “public affairs” than the “crisis.” By responding to the wrong W hy does stonewalling exist? There stimulus with stonewall tactics, they unwitting- are a number of reasons for resistance to full ly produce a larger crisis. The point is, the crisis IN MY OPINION 53

itself is often not the problem but how the crisis ize the measures of the Soviet government. In is handled with the media. The public will America, the critics, especially those in the Nixon generally allow for mistakes and even blun- government, put it another way: the press should report what’s right about America, not what’s bad. ders, but they will rarely accept deceptions, It should be constructive, not destructive. The half-truths, and cover-ups—or the appearance point is, the difference is not substantial.5 of same. Failure to comprehend the newsman’s role, The second broad area of noncooperation then, is another product of inexperience in with the news media relates to inexperience in media relations. Whereas a reporter may be how to deal with them. Most commanders rise many things to many people, a cheerleader he to their positions from line jobs, where they usually is not. Most newsmen perceive them- have little interaction with the press; conse- selves in the multiple roles of watchdogs, quendy, they are unversed in media relations. judges, and independent, objective observers Such statements as “It’s none of their business” of events. Further, newsmen cherish the same and “They have no right to question me” are Constitution that the military is sworn to prime examples of this naivete. Probably, defend, particularly the First Amendment. As General William T. Sherman reflected this Justice Hugo L. Black commented on the attitude best in 1864 when he stated: “They are freedom of the press in the Pentagon Papers a set of dirty newspaper scribblers who are a case: pest and shall not approach me.” This inexperience is evidenced by com- In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers manders who decry efforts by the media to gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The make news of events that they personally press was to serve the governed, not the gover- consider unnewsworthy and even detrimental nors. The Government’s power to censor the press to “fostering good order and discipline.” was abolished so that the press could remain WilUam Randolph Hearst’s definition of news, forever free to censure the Government.6 while not universally accepted, certainly While many commanders may recognize expresses a point: “News is something some- their lack of experience in dealing with the body wants suppressed—all the rest is advertis- press, there are others who consider them- ing.”3 Suffice it to say, news is the information selves well versed in handling the press but are that the media wish to report; whether a not. In this category belong the self-styled commander disagrees rarely has any impact. media experts who are dedicated and devout This dichotomy in perception of what believers in the tenets of stonewalling. The constitutes news was aired during a military- prevalent attitude in this group is “Why give media symposium at the Naval War College: the press any information; they’re just going to . . . many of the War College students screw it up anyway with distortions and considered the news media’s proper role to be that deceptions.” of cheerleaders for the military. Time and again, the news media was chastised for failure to report Followers of this philosophy may find little “what's right” with the military and the country. comfort in Thomas Jefferson’s much quoted Newsmen responded by saying that it’s what’s comment that, “were it left to me to decide unusual that makes news, and the unusual is often whether we should have a government without unpleasant.4 newspapers, or newspapers without a govern- One can make an interesting comparison ment, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer between this “cheerleading role” for the media the latter.” The press critics, however, can also and Lenin’s totalitarian theory of the press: note that Jefferson did not consistently cham- The prime mission of the press is not to inform, pion the need for a free and accessible press. but to propagate Communist ideas and popular- On another occasion, he wrote: “The man who 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

never looks into a newspaper is better in- media and the American public not only have a formed than he who reads them, inasmuch as need to know, they have a right to know. he who knows nothing is nearer to the truth Former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNam- than he who is filled with falsehoods and ara recognized this obligation when he stated: errors.” "The people of this nation, in whose name and No one, not even the press itself, would deny by whose ultimate consent all high government that mistakes and errors are sometimes made— officials serve, have both the need and the right often more times than journalists care to admit. to be thoroughly informed on decisions.”8 This susceptibility to error reflects that they, Clearly, there can be little doubt what too, are human and liable to the same official Air Force policy is and that stonewall- inadequacies as others. Then, again, if report- ing plays no role in that policy. Realistically, ers had free and complete access to requested though, few people are naive enough to believe information, perhaps errors could be reduced. that all regulations are always followed in both Basically, then, stonewalling—to differing letter and spirit. One can usually find a Catch- degrees and in various forms—is still alive and 22 to subvert any policy. Beyond adherence to well in today’s Air Force. regulations, however, there are even better rationales for applying stones to bridges than to walls. W hy should stonewalling not exist? One such rationale is based on a physical An interesting point about this question is that it law—when a vacuum is created, something should not require an answer in the first place. will rush to fill it. As Theodore N. Vail of the However, stonewallers, whether at 'tjie neo- Bell Telephone Company stated many years phyte or journeyman level, tend to find little ago, “If we don’t tell the public the truth about wrong in the practice of stonewalling. ourselves, somebody else will.”9 The most definitive case against stonewall- The fact is, absence does not breed silence. If ing can be built on the grounds that it is against a commander refuses to respond adequately to all official policies and regulations—Air Force, an unfavorable news query, the reporter will Department of Defense, and presidential. And usually obtain the information elsewhere, be it while the policy and guidance are not new, accurate or not. The crucial point is that when they are continually reaffirmed. Secretary of this occurs not only has the Air Force lost its Defense Harold Brown, in a 1977 memoran- credibility and compromised its integrity, it dum to the military departments and agencies, has also lost the opportunity to relate its side of wrote: the story and perhaps put the release into a President Carter has pledged a new openness in better perspective. government. The President’s commitment to This leads to another important candid communications with the American consideration—credibility. Credibility, like people is firmly rooted in the conviction that, morale, takes time and effort to foster and given the facts, they will make wise decisions.. .. nurture and is subject to easy decay. Further, Information will be made fully and readily credibility’s primacy should be virtually available unless release is precluded by statute (as in application of the Privacy Act or the Freedom unquestioned, for it is the bedrock on which all of Information Act) or is precluded by current else is built in media relations. If trust and and valid security classification.7 confidence are not established and maintained with the media, and through them to the Air Force regulations have promoted this general public, then the entire information policy for many years. In line with this program of the Air Force is in jeopardy. Not commitment, it must be emphasized that the only will people doubt the responses of Air IN MY OPINION 55

Force leaders to unfavorable queries but lar operating systems—be they aircraft or favorable releases will also be tarnished and media. Accordingly, recognition and accep- suspect. Stonewalling is not just slightly tance of five key understandings or concepts is detrimental, it can be the very generator of crucial to the enhancement of media relations. credibility gaps. Primary among this quintet are two basic Taking the positiv e viewpoint, one might understandings, both closely interrelated and well consider that maintaining good relations stated very simply. First, the propensity to can facilitate Air Force goals: stonewall does exist. Second, the need to Given the responsibility of a free press to correct it is worth the effort. Without accep- provide the public with a complete and unbiased tance and understanding of these two basic reportage of all elements of governmental premises, there is no correction, for there is no activity—including the military—and given the recognition of the problem. military’s apparent interest in assuring maximum The third major understanding is recognition public understanding of its function, it seems obvious that the reduction or removal of real or that corrective efforts must come primarily imagined obstacles to the flow of military news is from within. Admittedly, it is difficult to both desirable and necessary.10 perceive and correct a problem if one is part of the problem. As that learned observer Pogo Perhaps this beneficial aspect is best sum- once stated with remarkable insight: “We have marized by General Dalton, who succinctly met the enemy—and he is us.” It is somewhat states: “We need the media more than they futile and unproductive to castigate a newsman need us.”11 For example, if the Air Force is to for unfavorable publicity. He does not cause a maintain zero-draft recruiting goals, or obtain problem; he merely reports it. support for military' funding or against military The fourth understanding is recognition that unionization, it needs the support of the media an adversary relationship does exist between to help convey such viewpoints to the Ameri- the military (and others) and the media. The can public and Congress. media’s role is to test, investigate, and chal- As a closing argument against stonewalling, lenge governmental decisions; but the relation- it should be recognized that its practice is self- ship can be productive instead of antagonistic. defeating, often in the short-term, definitely in Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, then president the long run. Once initiated, stonewalling often of the Naval War College and now Central becomes its own master. The attempt to cover Intelligence Agency director, identified the an embarrassing incident behind a stone wall proper relationship in his closing remarks at a usually results in bad becoming worse. military-media symposium: I feel the adversary relationship is a healthy one and in the best interests of a free and effective W it h the realization that stone- media. . .. (We) must be prepared to go at least 70 walling exists and why it should not, the percent of the way toward meeting the media in most important question remains—how to this adversary relationship. ... What we need and correct it? While there is no magical solution, desire is that the military-media adversary no formula or checklist that will provide instant relationship be characterized by mutual respect and candor.12 and guaranteed relief, there are remedial measures. However, the recital of a common- The fifth and final understanding is that no sense litany of media do’s and don’ts would matter how well one may build stone bridges, serve little purpose by itself. A checklist he is not going to be successful with all functions only as an abbreviated memory newsmen on all occasions. Yes, Virginia, there device. Its value is predicated on a deeper are Darth Vaders in the universe- comprehension and acceptance of the particu- unscrupulous journalists who may report 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

insidious fabrications. Fortunately, such re- affairs problems, if thelO or the commander porters are few in number and usually are well needs additional guidance, it is readily availa- recognized for their biases by the public. Also, ble. There is no such thing as a commander’s even the good journalists will “blow it” periodi- private public affairs problem—it is an Air cally. Force problem. For press problems of national Finally, the adage “Be honest, be truthful, be significance, cases under litigation, or other quick” is particularly relevant to unfavorable irregular situations as well as the routine, publicity. Bad news cannot be suppressed Command, Air Force, and Department of forever; it will get out eventually. Then one has DefenseIOsare on call 24 hours a day. to contend not only with the original bad news O ne final challenge remains—will Air Force but the alleged cover-up. William Greener leaders and commanders correct stonewall- expresses the solution to mitigating the nega- ing? The answer should be obvious. William tive story very simply: “My answer is quit Greener expresses it well: figuring out how to say it, and try it simply and Y ou can teach a rat to go through a maze in three straightforward and as quickly as possible.”13 hours. If he touches one bar he gets an electric Probably the best overall advice for a shock, and if he touches the other bar he gets a commander on this subject is to use the piece of cheese. And for 19 years the United States Air Force has persisted in touching the bar that information officer(IO)—and use him (or her) gives them the shock. There is an absolute effectively. A qualified IO is more than one syndrome that says “Within government, we are who plans open houses, attends chamber of afraid of the press.” It’s amazing. I say, “Why are commerce meetings, and ghostwrites columns you afraid of the press?” and the answer is, for the staff. He is also trained and skilled in “Because they hit us on the head.” My answer to that is if you have someone that hits you on the public affairs and in working with the media. head once every week, it seems to me that sooner In essence, the IO is the stonemason for the or later you would say to yourself, “I wonder what bridges. However, the architect must be the it is I must do to stop that guy from hitting me on commander, for information is a functional the head?” And the answer is very simple: step up responsibility of command. and tell the truth, and tell it quickly.14 To be effective, the IO needs the opportunity Maximum disclosure with minimum delay to earn the complete trust and confidence of must become more than a token expression; it the commander. The IO should not be relegat- must be an ingrained characteristic of the ed to reciting a commander’s self-conceived professional Air Force. In the final analysis is responses but rather be involved in the policy the recognition that stones will not lie dormant. and decision-making process. He should be They must either be used in bridges or walls, allowed to offer public affairs guidance and and the problem with stone walls is while advice, even advice that may not be popular. “they” cannot get in, neither can we get out. As a final observation on dealing with public Hickam AFB, Hawaii

Notes 8. James Aronson. Deadline for the Media: Today s Challenges to Press, 1. William I. Creener. Jr., speech delivered during Media-Military TV, and Radio (Indianapolis: Bohbs-Merrill, 1972). p. 62. Symposium. Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 30 November 1977. 9. Major F. William Smullen, "Accountability at West Point,” Military 2. Brigadier General H. J. Dalton. Jr., interview at Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Media Review, vol. 4. no. 2. 1977. p. 4. 27 September 1977. 10. Major John Duncan Williams, "Interaction: The Military and the 3. Martin D. Carter, An Introductionto MassCommunications. Problems in Media,” Air University Review, November-December 1974, p 58 Press and Broadcasting (London: Macmillan and Co., 1971), p. 127. 11. Brigadier General H. J. Dalton. Jr., interview at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 4. Lee Ewing, "The Military-Media Battle: A Step Toward an Understand- 27 September 1977. ing," Air Force Times. Family Supplement. 21 February 1973, p. 4. 12. "Military-Media Symposium at the Naval War College," Naval War 5. John Tebbel, The Media in America (New York: Crowell, i974), p. 379. College Review. January*February 1973. p. 50. 6 Arthur Macy Cox, The Myths of National Security: The Peril of Secret 13. William I. Greener, Jr., speech delivered to Public Relations Society of Government (Boston: Beacon Press. 1975), p. 119 America. New York University, July 13, 1978. 7. Harold Brown. Commanders Digest. 1 September 1977, p. 2. 14. Ibid. succumb to the fate of yesterday's newspaper. Despite its copyright date, the substance of Intervention or Abstention unfortunately does not go beyond 1972. Consequently, in this fast- moving decade, no contributor was able to address events that have bedeviled American foreign policy in recent years: the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the civil war in Lebanon; the collapse of South Vietnam and the aftermath in Indochina; the crises in Angola, Mozambique, Biafra, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rhodesia, and South Africa; or the new problems of international terrorism and the safeguarding of endangered oil-producing regions. By the same token, instances of outdated allusion include the matter of Portugal in its erstwhile African colonies. The infusion of continuity into a collection is usually best achieved by bridges between selections. Higham provides no bridges, no AMERICA, separate conclusions, and no index. Passages in his 19-page introduction may puzzle some WORLD POLICEMAN? readers (American landings in the Dominican Republic in 1965 “raised all the old liberal resentments at home that have their roots in the Dr . Alvin D. C oox attitudes to British redcoats of colonial days”). Other readers will find portions of the introduction insulting to their intelligence (“The attack on Pearl Harbor was an affront HE editor of a broad-spectrum collection that could not be ignored”) or silly (Richard of essays must possess imagination, dis- Nixon was able to “reestablish the traditional cipline,T and stamina. Robin Higham of Kansas American-Chinese ties in a new Union Pacif- State University, the impresario who has ic”). Feeblest of all is Higham’s verdict that, in orchestrated a number of anthologies, evinces sum, the United States finds itself faced with these qualities to a large degree. His idea of “the twin dilemmas of intervention or absten- building a book around the long-standing tion, or even a bit of both at the same time.” dilemma of American intervention or absten- The case histories selected for examination tion abroad and of demonstrating that the include expected episodes: P. Edward Haley problem transcends the military dimension on Mexico (1914) and Dominica (1965); was certainly sound, t But, as with any Norman A. Graebner on Manchuria (1931-32); collection, Higham’s must address the question Theodore A. Couloumbis and M’Kean M. of whether it will stand the test of time or Tredway on Greece (1944-70); and P. Wesley

fRobin Higham, editor, Intervention or Abstention: The Dilemma of American Foreign Policy ( Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975, $14.75), 221 pages.

57 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Kriebel on Korea (1950-53). The , Graebner’s survey of American press reaction however, is examined from bipolar stand- to the Hoover-Stimson policy. In the latter points: domestic pressures for abstention (Ted case, one wonders about the editorial impor- Goertzel) and surrogate intervention through tance, in larger terms, of the St. Paul Dispatch, alliances and air power (Donald J. Mrozek). the N orfolk Virginia-Pilot, or even the Brook- Dennis Deutsch considers the Palestine ques- lyn Eagle. Deutsch has been outdistanced by tion only during the time frame of 1944-48, events, as he acknowledges in his postscript; focusing on American domestic pressures for viz., “Today we have a Republican administra- intervention besetting the president. Economic tion (traditionally more responsive to large factors receive the attention of Janice J. corporate concerns than Zionist interests) and a Terry—abstention vis-a-vis the Aswan Dam; Jewish secretary of state.” and of James C. Carey—intervention affecting As for Goertzel’s essay, some will find it Peru and Chile. William L. Richter injects the excessively polemical, as in his oration stating term “relative abstention” in his consideration that of India and Pakistan. A useful historiographi- while the business elite which led America into cal overview leads off the collection: Kenneth Vietnam is still largely in control of foreign policy, J. Hagan on the historical significance of we may hope that they have learned that domestic American naval intervention. To his credit, progress and tranquillity are at least as important Higham limited Kansas State University to the security and well-being of the [United States] as imposing anti-Communist dictatorships collegial participation to Carey, Mrozek, and on small nations around the world. Richter. This Vietnam-era rhetoric brings to mind The volume as a whole lacks definition of John Whitney Hall’s wry comment that “the terms. Couloumbis and Tredway act on their problem with argumentative overkill is that it own by carefully explaining, in a footnote, inhibits further inquiry.” their use of the terms “influence,” “interven- tion," “interference,” and “penetration.” Haley defines intervention and treats the conceptual I t WILL be noticed that none of gap between belief and reality briefly. The Higham’s contributors featured the most editor does require from each contributor a sensational case involving an American deci- bibliographic note and suggestions for further sion to intervene or to abstain, one which research. Only Couloumbis and Tredway brought the world to the verge of nuclear supply footnote citations to the text. holocaust for the first time: the Cuban The value of collected essays is enhanced imbroglio of 1962. Herbert S. Dinerstein has when the contributors adhere to the assigned performed a masterful analysis of the triangu- topic. I found the piece by Couloumbis and lar American-Soviet Russian-Cuban confronta- Tredway, however useful, to be relatively tion in his The M aking o f a Missile Crisis, t To a more centered on domestic developments certain extent it is unfair to conjoin the Higham inside Greece than on external American and Dinerstein books, apart from topical considerations. Discrepancies also appeared interlocking. Higham could allow each of his between the assessment of the importance of authors only 15 to 20 printed pages, whereas American public opinion in Deutsch’s probing Dinerstein has the luxury of 238 pages of text, of Zionist and other lobbying pressures and in

tHerbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, $14.95), 302 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 59

35 pages of statements and thematic analysis, primary duty of the professional historian to 20 pages of footnotes, and 8 pages of index. pose the right questions. The range of allusion Dinerstein is an established scholar at the and illustration is impressive: the early model- Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Interna- ing of communist parties on the Roman tional Studies and the author of four books on Catholic Church, and the comparability of communism and the Soviet Union; he has Castro’s political self-conversion to the explored his topic by intensive study of Russian dynastic-religious flexibility of Henry of and Spanish language as well as English Navarre and Henry VIII of England. sources. He writes with assurance, wit, and The Cuban crisis is examined in the world skill. Minor grammatical idiosyncrasies and context: Berlin, the Congo, Laos, the U-2 some poor proofing are counterbalanced by fiasco, and the overall U.S.-Soviet military clever expression and a rich vocabulary; e.g., balance (or imbalance). Dinerstein’s text gravamen, mental furniture, dubiety. abounds with quotable passages and sage The Making o f a Missile Crisis offers far deductions. His thematic analysis of the Soviet more and a bit less than the title implies. An government’s statement of 23 October 1962 entire chapter is devoted to the Guatemalan and of press editorials in Krasnaia Zvezda(Red emergency of 1954, which is soon seen to Star), Literaturnaia Gazeta, , and contain the seeds of subsequent crisis in the lzvestiia could be used profitably as required Caribbean. “Prophylactic intervention had reading in courses on international relations, removed the danger of Guatemala becoming psychological warfare, and diplomatic history. socialist,” writes Dinerstein, “but it smoothed Dinerstein also draws on a privileged source to the path for Cuba to adopt socialism.” In other describe a Soviet naval experience in facing words, “the tactical Soviet defeat in Guatemala down a French warship’s little-known effort to constituted a strategic defeat for the United intercept weapons bound for the National States.” The author then devotes a surprising Liberation Front (FLN) during the Algerian amount of space to the unfolding and inner war—an apparent Russian precedent for workings of the Cuban Revolution, the em- coping with the American naval quarantine of brace of Cuba by the Soviet Union (“Khrush- Cuba in 1962. chev looked to the new world to redress the Postulation of a direct relation between balance of the old”), and Fidel Castro’s political and military power, Dinerstein ultimate donning of communist garb. Only two argues, is simplistic. Neither Kennedy nor chapters treat Nikita Khrushchev’s introduc- Khrushchev wanted war in 1962; they “fright- tion and removal of Russian missiles in Cuba. ened each other into their senses—a rare The strength of the Dinerstein book is, there- instance in the history of human folly.” The fore, the making, not the dismantling, of the Soviet leader, like Kennedy at the Bay of Pigs, great crisis of 1962. Although few new facts “realized that he had been deceived by his own are introduced by the author, he dissects hopes and decided to cut his losses.” The questions of perception, mythology, leader- prerequisite had been that each party cease to ship, and decision-making with rare skill. Like act on “putative judgments of the other’s the best of teachers, he enlightens the reader intentions.” about semantics and terminology, such as Soviet-Russian use of the words for provoca- Is the United States still to wear the badge of tion and economism, the differences between self-appointed world policeman? Dinerstein, golden bridge, brinksman, and bargaining- for one, is convinced that the domino theory is counter strategies, the implicit distinction ready for retirement. From a reading of the between menace, warning, and threat, and the Higham collection and the Dinerstein mono- 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW graph, I think that we can agree with the latter’s [America’s] hand might be forced [one of contention that the United States and the Buchan’s characters observed] if anything went U.S.S.R. have “harmed the other remarkably wrong in the American continent itself, because of little” since World War II; “the most grievous her Monroe Doctrine----[Foreign complications] would be very awkward for her, and possibly wounds have been self-inflicted. Exaggerated very dangerous, and she would resolutely keep fears or misplaced confidence have produced out of them, unless they occurred, so to speak, a veritable catalogue of disasters.” Within that opposite her front yard, in which case she would catalogue, no case history, not even that of be bound to intervene. Therefore, if any one wanted to do her the worst kind of turn, he would Korea or of Vietnam, is more unsettling than stir up trouble in some place like South America. the Cuban crisis, centering on a defiant island regime, a mere 90 miles from Florida, which Were Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Castro, evoked John Kennedy’s grim warning: the one wonders, all fans of John Buchan? “The United States would “regard any nuclear shark is frightened,” Castro jeered, “and is missile launched from Cuba against any nation asking the other little sardines to devour the ex- in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the sardine, Cuba.” Perhaps Castro deserves this Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a last bit of piscatorial bravado. After all, like the full retaliatory' response.” latter-day descendants of Ho Chi Minh and Yet had the advent of the nuclear missile age Mao Tse-tung, he achieved his lifelong objec- invalidated John Buchan’s comments on tive, at great risk: to extract tacit but effective American intervention or abstention, or on a recognition of his country’s independence, in potential enemy’s mischief making, in the three spite of the mighty American policeman whose and more decades after The Courts of the global beats alternated between intervention Morning appeared in 1929? and abstention. San Diego State University Current trends portend serious dangers. The current administration, as did its predecessors, denies that the situation is as catastrophic as the critics suggest. Doubtless, the Soviet Union aspires to military superiority. The Soviets’ military ascendancy in recent years is undeniable. Unquestionably they have employed detente as a successful tactic. Yet their desire for detente is more than charade. The essential question, however, is whether the United States has slipped dangerously behind the Soviets militarily, or have we maintained what Kissinger referred to as “essential equivalence” and Carter calls “rough equivalence”? The debate is too often political and polemic rather than nonpartisan and analytical. It rages in the political arena, in the popular press, and DETENTE, DETERRENCE, in an ever increasing list of pseudoscholarly books. Fortunately, it exists on a higher plane AND THE DILEMMA OF as well. Groups such as the United States Strategic Institute and the National Strategic NATIONAL SECURITY Information Center are leading scholarly voices of protest.1 They are matched by an equally impressive array of government D r . J oe P. D unn defense analysts and academic and think-tank scholars. Several important books on the topic of detente and deterrence have appeared in the last few years. Three of the books reviewed EW issues are as vital as the current here speak to this issue on a scholarly plane. discussion over American defense policy. The other study addresses the antecedents of FMany military spokesmen and defense scholars the present condition: the growth of a national charge that America’s military might is erod- security deterrence mentality during the ing. Detente appears a one-way street. They origins of the Cold War. contend that the Soviets use detente merely as guise to deter U.S. military development, while the Russians continue full-scale military commitment. The critics allege that American HOST of books on the origins policy in recent years has been disastrous: of the Cold War emerged in the late sixties and SALT I emasculated U.S. strategic supremacy; early seventies. Their ideological tone and their the B-l and other weapon decisions limited quality varied greatly. Most were written military- options; and current manpower before the opening of State and Defense policies such as the all-volunteer military are Department documents for the crucial postwar expensive failures. Military unionization lurks years. Even the best of these studies must be on the horizon, and even one of the future read in this light. The so-called “revisionists” cornerstones of our strategic defense, the dominated the field. Their perspectives and cruise missile, is a subject of negotiation. conclusions varied, but all challenged the basic

61 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

assumptions held by the “traditionalists” or of the critic). The book, which attempted to “orthodox” explanations of the Cold War. analyze the full diversity of factors responsible Primarily, they questioned the axiom that the for the Cold War and to explain rather than to Soviets bore the major, if not the total, guilt for assess blame, quickly became the classic in the the emergence of postwar hostilities. They field. Several Ph.D. dissertations and books in contended that an aggressive American policy the Gaddis model followed. was far more than reaction to Soviet expansion. Few research areas are as potentially prolific Different authors assigned various levels of as the Cold War decade. Government archives responsibility and blame to the United States. are now open for years into the early fifties. The more extreme found the U.S. guilty of The amount of material available is over- capitalist imperialism and thus totally at fault whelming. Dozens more major studies of the for the Cold War. origins of the Cold War and the Cold War The revisionists raised new questions, elec- decade should appear in the next few years. No trified the issues, and inspired a second wave of work can hope to be definitive; the topic is too scholarship in response to their allegations. dynamic, too vast. The best that the scholar can Cold War traditionalists such as Herbert Feis, aspire to is that for a brief moment his book Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Hans Morgenthau, and may have its day in court, its contributions George F. Kennan offered new works accept- fairly assessed. ing some revisionist points but primarily taking them to task.2 By the early seventies so many different positions existed in the historiograph- ical debate that the old categories of traditional D-'AN IEL YERGIN stands at this and revisionist were no longer adequate. point, f First written as a Ph. D. dissertation at Revisionists ran a wide gamut from mildly Cambridge University in 1974, his book liberal to Marxist radical. Some early revision- Shattered Peace received significant publicity ist works that had caused significant stirs, such when published in 1977. It has been called, as Gar Alperovitz’s Atomic Diplomacy, had with some justification, the best study of the been proved shoddy even by fellow revision- origins of the Cold War to emerge since ists.3 A second wave of revisionist scholarship Gaddis’s book. Unquestionably, it is a bal- appeared more substantial: less dramatic, anced, perceptive, and insightful work. Defi- more scholarly, and better researched. Gabriel nitely in the Gaddis model, the study attempts Kolko established himself as the leading radical to move beyond the questions of responsibility exponent, and Thomas Patterson ranked as one and guilt to investigate the complex interplay of the soundest scholars of the less radical of international politics that resulted in the revisionists.4 Cold War. As the author states, “This is not a Meanwhile, an exceptional postrevisionist book for those who want a simple story, a study emerged, John Lewis Gaddis’s The morality play, a confirmation of prejudices, or United States and the Origins o f the C old War, a rationalization for or against present-day 1941-1947.5 The book received rave reviews, policies.” won several prestigious awards, and inspired Yergin’s major purpose is to explain the new terms such as “neotraditionalist" or development of the Cold War mentality that he “neorevisionist” (depending on the persuasion calls the national security state. He focuses on

tDaniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, $15.00), 526 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 63 the interplay between policy-makers, their which the U.S. could deal if patience and perceptions, and the basis for the hard understanding were employed. decisions rendered. He asks: “Was not some Yergin states that neither alternative had a form of detente—some explicit ground rules— monopoly on truth. In the end, however, the possible earlier, much earlier? Why did Riga axioms prevailed and provided the base diplomacy fail and confrontation become a for the national security state. The Yalta way of life?” He can examine only the Western axioms, the basis of detente, lay dormant. The side of the story. No nation is so open and author feels that the possibilities for diplomacy forthright with its diplomatic material as is the and accommodation were not played to the United States. Soviet materials remain totally fullest. Policy-makers exaggerated the “range closed. and degree of the Soviet challenge’’ and the The author’s concentration on top policy- “immediate military threat” to the United makers reminds one of Lloyd Gardner’s States. They operated on the premise that it Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in was safer to act on the worst possible American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949.6 Yergin’s assumption. Accordingly, the United States book, though, is a much better researched, armed itself, assumed unilateral defense of the fairer, and more balanced account. Still, he too Free World, and rejected any compromise may overplay the role of key individuals and with Soviet objectives. Compromise was not give enough attention to less tangible defined as appeasement, a doctrine proved factors such as bureaucratic inertia and bankrupt by the war. national sentiment. As he judges, Yergin admits that the historian Yergin contends that two competing as- has the advantage of hindsight in his assess- sumptions, two world views, two perspectives ment, and he does not bear the responsibilities on how to interpret and react to the Soviet of the moment that weigh so heavily on L’nion, vied for supremacy after World War II. participants. Still the historian has the obliga- He coins the terms the “Riga” and “Yalta” tion to search out the truth and judge as the axioms as shorthand for the two approaches. facts dictate; but he must be fair, honest, and The Riga axioms, named after the interwar compassionate toward beleaguered partici- American observation post in the capital of pants. Above all, the historian must not attempt Latvia, where the infant American Soviet to force the record to conform to preconceived Service developed, represented a hostile notions nor to support his current political attitude toward cooperation with the Soviets. desires. Yergin admirably meets these stand- Later, hardliners such as George F. Kennan, ards. Joseph C. Grew, Loy Henderson, and Charles I have some problems accepting Yergin’s E. Bohlen interned in Riga. To Yergin the term model entirely. It seems too pat, too simplistic. stands for the realpolitik, hardline, anticommu- But this is a good book, an interesting study that nist approach that triumphed in the Truman makes a significant contribution. It will not administration. replace Gaddis, but it is a fine companion The Yalta axioms, reflecting the spirit of the piece. Crimean conference in early 1945, represented the Wilsonian or liberal internationalist tradi- tion dominant in America for most of the first T HE other three books deal with the half of the century. This position, best exempli- current problems of policy-makers. Professor fied by Franklin D. Roosevelt and later Henry Patrick M. Morgan of Washington State A. Wallace, viewed Russia as a traditional University critiques current deterrence theory Great Power, a difficult nation but one with and assesses the proper role of deterrence in 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

present national security, f The book is a value against the Soviet Union, they play a theoretical study. Morgan begins with the major role in support of allies and in situations classic Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: where nuclear deterrence is not functional. Theory and Practice by Alexander George and These weapons have been and can be em- Richard Smoke as he strives to develop an ployed in confrontation situations. Unfortu- adequate definition of deterrence.7 He then nately, Vietnam contributed to an adverse discusses the mechanics and dynamics in climate for limited war and conventional practice. Finally, he turns to the proper role in capacity. The frustrations and mistakes of foreign policy. The author believes that too Vietnam intensified reliance on nuclear deter- much emphasis has been placed on strategic rence. nuclear deterrence. He explains that despite its Morgan’s book raises some interesting seeming logic it can easily fail and nuclear war points. It poses several dilemmas and impor- result. Confidence in it is misplaced: “The key tant questions, but it provides little practical contribution of a theory of deterrence should guidance. The author knows the literature in be to point out how it works, and thus how the field; he argues impressively. But like many tenuous it can be, to encourage steps to reduce theoretical propositions, it sounds better on the damage if it fails, and ultimately to paper than in practice. His case is premised on encourage efforts to move away from reliance certain assumptions that other defense experts on deterrence.” would challenge. For one, he misunderstands Morgan concludes that nuclear deterrence overkill, as the next study will demonstrate. has become less and less sensible. Yet deter- The book has certain scholarly interest, but it rence theory has not kept up with the present merits less serious practical consideration. reality. It proposes what the author considers oversimplified crises decision-making models, which may intensify the possibilities of tragedy by erroneously convincing participants that E dward N. LUTTW AK, Asso- they are in control of the situation. Finally, it ciate Director of the Washington Center of rationalizes excessive nuclear capacity, “justi- Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins fying overkill capacities that expand the University School of Advanced International possible costs of war without thereby enlarging Studies, an Associate of the Georgetown the national security.” Morgan is particularly Center for Strategic and International Studies, interested in bringing proliferating nuclear and one of the nation’s leading students of armament under more stringent control. He strategic power, offers the converse to Mor- asserts that the great powers have excessive gan’s argument, f f The thrust of Luttwak s stocks of unnecessary strategic weapons, excellent study is the efficacy and necessity of which invite higher levels of destruction should nuclear strategic deterrence. He declares that deterrence fail. As he claims: “There really is despite its dangers the balance of terror works. ‘overkill’ and it really is senseless.” However, he fears that deterrence is endan- As an alternative, Morgan advocates greater gered as American strategic power is falling emphasis on conventional military capabilities. behind the Soviets. While he stresses the While these forces have minimal deterrence complexity involved in assessing comparative

JPatrick M . M organ, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1977, $6.00), 216 pages. tfEdward N. Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and Political Unity (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1976, $3.00), 70 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 65

strategic power, he postulates conclusions on misleading. Far too much of the debate on the the current balance. strategic balance revolves around such simplis- First Luttwak details why a “minimum tics. One cannot assess the balance without deterrence force” is inadequate. Such a limited addressing variables such as throw-weight, force could deter the Soviet Union from a vulnerability, flexibility, number of indepen- direct “out of the blue” attack on the U.S. by dent warheads, and reliability of systems. promising retaliatory destruction of Soviet Despite Soviet buildup and numerical advan- cities and the prevention of any Soviet counter- tages, American technological superiority has force effort. But this kind of situation is not maintained parity. Luttwak points out that this likely to occur. Both adversaries realize that is a precarious kind of security. The Soviets are mutual destruction would be the end result. A fast closing the gap and have surpassed the more likely scenario would involve attacks on U.S. in several critical areas. He questions American allies or against U.S. forward base whether the United States can continue to stake systems. With a minimum deterrence force, the security on technological superiority over the U.S. would have to employ forces slated for Soviets. Undoubtedly were he writing today, the ultimate defense of the homeland (the he would be even more dubious. Armageddon capacity so to speak) to respond The author also notes that the Soviets have to this situation. Minimum capacity does not proved more effective negotiators than the allow flexibility- of response. Obviously, more Americans. The Russians employ their numeri- force than just that to protect the homeland is cal advantages as bargaining chips. While they necessary; the question is how much excess. accept any U.S. concessions, they concede Luttwak explains that a nation must have little themselves without quid pro quo. They forces capable of responding to every- possible have been most effective in extracting trade- challenge by hostile nations without encroach- offs for any action taken. They tend to ing on the forces designated in the last resort to maintain outdated missiles in their arsenal until annihilate the enemy homeland. The amount they can garner concessions from the U.S. to of force necessary is relative to the potential of deactivate them. The LkS. approaches weapon the enemy. Overkill could exist only when one systems from a military and economic stand- nation’s power is excessive after preparing for point; cost effectiveness is important. The every- logical eventuality. The United States Soviets are more interested in the international does not enjoy such security; thus the popular political role their weapons play, what they can overkill metaphor is naive, a myth perpetrated gain in negotiation, than in the impact military- by those innocent of power realities. Finally, spending has on the domestic economy. Luttwak notes that nuclear strategic power Luttwak concludes with a brief discussion of plays a role in international politics beyond its the U.S. strategic bomber force. He is a strong use only in warfare. Power gives a nation exponent of the strategic bomber and the B-l. options in many realms. He argues that few weapon systems have the The bulk of the book details the comparative capability and flexibility of the B-l. Finally, he strategic weapons balance of the United States injects a plea for greater emphasis on civil and the Soviet Union. Although he employs defense, a major Soviet concern but a low pages of charts and tables, Luttwak explains American priority. that mere numbers themselves mean little. The Although slightly dated, as are all studies in Soviets’ obvious numerical advantage codified this area the minute that they come off the in the SALT I agreements is not conclusive press, this is an outstanding book, a succinct, evidence that they have strategic superiority. clear, scholarly treatment of a complex and Comparisons based on any one criterion are vital subject. It should be widely read. 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

FINALLY, we turn from strategic to nonnuclear war can shift automatically to a tactical nuclear weapons. In January 1976 the nuclear posture if the necessity arises. National Strategy Information Center, an The remainder of the book consists of organization committed to serious study of questions posed by National Strategy Informa- national security issues, met in private confer- tion Center president and conference chair- ence to consider the role of tactical nuclear man Frank Barnett and a series of unattributed weapons in the defense of Western Europe. responses. The consensus definitely supports The resulting book contains an introduction by NATO’s employment of tactical nuclear weapons. eminent military historian and analyst Bernard Brodie, an article by Samuel T. Cohen and This is a difficult book to evaluate. The topic is important, and the study makes a contribu- William R. Van Cleave, and a summary of the conference discussion, f tion; but it barely scratches the surface of the issue. More important, its concern may be a bit Brodie begins with a brief history of the passe as NATO is moving toward a more changing doctrines of tactical nuclear weap- tactical nuclear capacity. ons. Since the Korean War, strategists have wavered back and forth and still today have not worked out an accepted doctrine. Military T he Carter administration and those following commanders appear to be ambivalent. Brodie will continue to grapple with these vexing cautions that the Soviets are prepared for issues. An intense national security debate will tactical nuclear warfare and would probably continue to rage in Congress, among civilian employ it in any strike into Western Europe. and military experts, and in the larger public Yet NATO remains wedded to a conventional arena. Detente and deterrence are controver- response to conventional warfare. sial and difficult problems. Correct answers Cohen and Van Cleave develop these points and effective policy are essential, but the further. They emphasize that NATO has problems are much easier to define than to neither coherent doctrine nor strategy for solve. We will continue to exist in a world of tactical nuclear weapons. Neither is NATO ambiguity and uncertainty. One truth rings postured to withstand nuclear attack. Revamp- clear—as General Hoyt S. Vandenberg ex- ing to defend against such a possibility requires pressed it, “. . . the only war a nation can really fundamental changes in force posture and win is the one that never starts.” That is what structure as well as logistics practices. It is deterrence and detente are all about. dangerous to believe that the same forces Converse College organized, equipped, and trained to fight a Spartanburg, South Carolina

Notes Vintage. 1965). 1 For the thinking of the United States Strategic Institute, see any issue of 4. See Cabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States their journal. Strategic Review. The National Strategic Information Center Foreign Policy, 1943-1945(New York: Random House, 1968); JoyceKolkoand publishes extensively: agenda papers, strategy papers, and other book length Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign offerings. The best expression of their thought on current defense issues is Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper 6t Row, 1972); and Thomas C. Patterson, Francis P. Hoeber, David B. Kassing, and William Schneider, Jr., Arms, Men, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1979 (New York: Crane, Russak & the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). Company, 1978). 5. John Lewis Caddis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 2. See Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: T he Onset o f the C old War, 1945- 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 1950(New York: Norton, 1970); Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 6. Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects o f Illusion: Men and Ideas in American and Hans J. Morgenthau, Origins o f the Cold War (Waltham, Massachusetts: Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970). Cinn-Blaisdell. 1970); and Ceorge F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: 7. Alexander L. Ceorge and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Little, Brown 6c Co., 1967). Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 3. Car Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: 1974).

t Toward a New Defense for NATO: The Case of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (N ew York: N ational Strategy Inform ation Center, 1976, $2.00), 61 pages. whatever data subvert those beliefs. Students of military intelligence will be reminded of the work of Roberta Wohlstetter and others who have lucidly demonstrated that responsible statesmen and high-ranking officers are as susceptible to wishful thinking as are any other people.2 According to Wohlstetter,

There is a good deal of evidence, some of it quantitative, that in conditions of great uncertain- ty- people tend to predict that events that they want to happen will happen. Wishfulness in conditions of uncertainty is natural and is hard to banish simply by exhortation—or by wishing.6

That the tendency to wishful thinking is not something just recently diagnosed by some social psychologist is attested to by the Apocryphal Book of Sirach (written about 200 B. C.): “Empty and false are the hopes of the senseless, and fools are borne aloft by dreams. ASIA Like a man who catches at shadows or chases the wind, is the one who believes in dreams.” image and reality (34:1-2) Not for nothing has the renowned American civilian strategist Bernard Brodie D r . J ames H. T oner testified that “good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology.”4 Apparently human beings have a stub- Most Americans are of European descent. born attachment to old beliefs and an We feel comfortable with most European equally stubborn resistance to new mate- manners, customs, religions, and languages. rial that will upset them. We even felt comfortable, in one rather odd application of that adjective, fighting certain R oberta Wohlstetter1 Europeans during the world wars. Such is not the case, however, with respect to Asia. Relatively few Americans are of Asian descent. T is, of course, impossible to distill the We feel less comfortable with most Asian Ibehavioral research of the past two manners, customs, religions, and languages. or three decades into a single shibboleth. Still, And one need hardly dwell on the “discomfort” if one had to reduce that research into its gist, of the Korean and Vietnamese Wars. Ameri- perhaps there would be agreement about this cans simply do not have a good understanding chief principle: human beings see things pretty of Asia. Even in the midst of the Pacific War in much as they want to see them. One need not 1942, for example, a poll indicated that 60 know the arcane argot of seasoned social percent of the American people could not scientists—who are sometimes given to elabo- locate China on a map. And, at a meeting in the rate explanations of defense mechanisms and State Department in 1945, the U.S. Secretary of of cognitive dissonance—in order to recognize State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., is said to have that human beings tend to accept whatever asked one of his subordinates to tell him where data reinforce their beliefs and tend to reject Korea was.

67 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Even to the American reading public, Asiais creation of a stable world order.” That is the sometimes—I hate to use this hackneyed tone of the essays in the book. The China word—“inscrutable.” Whatever fault there is scholar will find little here that is seminal, but for such inscrutability as exists is manif estly not the serious, general reader will find essays that that of the Asians; it is, rather, a blatant are clear, concise, and cogent. U seful, too, is a discredit to us Americans that we should for so fourteen-page bibliography. One should note long persist in viewing Asia and the Asians that, while political prudence dictates Ameri­ through stereotypical spectacles. To some, it can conversation with China, human decency seems as though the more they look at Asia, the itself requires that Americans not behave more it shifts, defying their Occidental under- supinely—one is reminded of the etymology of standing. the word “kowtow”—before the govemment Since the Spanish-American War of 1898, of Hua Kuo-feng, the Chinese Communist which led to direct American involvement with Party chairman. In a recent column, WilliamF. Asian political and military affairs, the United Buckley, Jr., in describing the current situation States has been a protagonist on the Oriental in China with regard to the human rights of the stage. While we have been reluctant to 800 million people there, said: “The scandal is relinquish our role, we seem to know relatively so egregious—the persecution of Chinese little about the script. The Asian continent people is on a scale so awesome, so awful—that covers about a third of the world s land area inevitably what one would expect to happen and has about three-fifths of the world’s people has happened: we have all got used to it.”I *5 I n (about 2.5 billion). American diplomatic and short, in dealing with contemporary China, the military policy toward Asia has too often been statesman must deal with political realities as characterized by a rampant ethnocentrism or they are, in hopes of eventually bringing into provincialism. Because we so often tend to see existence his image of things as they should be. in Asia precisely those images we want to see, Dragon and Eagle, while too bland about rather than the realities that are there, one can events in the 1984 we call China, is nonetheless greet with some enthusiasm serious books a book to be commended to scholar and about Asian politics. Scholarship alone cannot generalist alike. cure American myopia toward the Far East, but it may provide us a new prescription for glasses through which we can take a fresh look at the forty-one nations of Asia. CVEN though the Korean War has been over—actually, it is only in recess—for a quarter of a century, we still do not fully understand such things as how the war started I HE book Dragon and f is a or how the war will (finally) end. The Korean worthwhile collection of fourteen essays that War, edited by Francis H. Heller,f f makes a deal, primarily, with China. As the editors genuine contribution to our efforts to come of the volume point out, . . the American in- fully to grips with the American role in the terest is an increasingly prosperous and inform- Korean War of 1950-53. The book is a record of ed China, able and willing to contribute to the a conference convened in early May 1975 at the

tMichel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam, editors, Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations: Past and Future (New York: Basic Books, 1978, $13.50), 384 pages. ttFrancis H. Heller, editor, The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977, $13.00), 251 pages. BOOKS ANDIDEAS 69

Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. The As Gabriel Almond once put it, papers given and the remarks made by such . . . [A] genuine diplomatic virtuosity in the scholars, diplomais, and soldiers as Lawrence United States cannot develop without a thorough Kaplan, John E. Wiltz, Robert Simmons, understanding of the uniqueness of cultures and Richard Leopold, Matthew B. Ridgway, J. nations and their component parts. Each nation Lawton Collins, W. Averell Harriman, Clark and culture reacts according to its special history, social structure and values.7 M. Clifford, and others will be of interest to students of the Korean War and of the early But this was the heart of the problem with 1950s. With the exception of the essay by Wiltz, the American drive on the Yalu; administration “The Korean War and American Society,” leaders simply did not appreciate or under- vvhich is a good general essay on the impact of stand the Chinese frame of reference.8 Ameri­ the Korean police action on the United States, cans customarily expect people in other this book will be of most use to close students countries to act like Americans. During World of that war. Although some of the remarks of WTar II, for example, President Roosevelt and the participants may be new to scholars, there Secretary James Byrnes continued to hope, is little in this volume that is not generally even in the face of disappointment, that Soviet available elsewhere. leaders would react “like Americans" to offers of compromise.9 President Roosevelt was intent on getting Stalin to accept “Christian T his is generally true, too, of the ways and democratic principies” and in getting study by Chin O. Chung. f The single value of him to adhere to the Atlantic Charter.10 The the Chung book, which probably will not be of explanation of what George Kennan has interest to the general reader, is that it collects referred to as “our inveterate tendency to judge in one place the history of the rather strained others by the extent to which they contrive to relationships among Pyongyang, Peking, and be like ourselves,”11 may in part be explained Moscow. The Chung study does raise the because since the time of Andrew Jackson, question of which leaders, Chinese or Russian, Americans have been so much alike.12 This were perceived by North Korean President particular political and sociological phenom- Kim Il-sung as being the closer to his own enon inspired Tang Tsou to write: interests and desires. With these predispositions [a political tradition It is interesting to speculate, as peripherally insulated from the experience of social revolution these three books do, on the probable State of and continuous and deep social cleavages], af fairs in the world had General MacArthur not American observers and commentators looked at driven to the Yalu in late 1950. The United China, a country which is particularly difficult for States had informed the Chinese that the Westerns to understand precisely because of her rich cultural heritage and long history. They United Nations command had no intention of tended to define and reconstruct Chinese things in invading China. The idea—customary for terms of an American image and to judge affairs American statesmen—was that if the threat of by American standards—a natural tendency in all misunderstanding between the U.S. and China peoples which was aggravated in the United could be obviated, then conflict would be States by the moral unanimity and uniformity of the American society.13 impossible. As Stanley Hoffmann has ob- served, “Americans like to judge others by their In short, because the administration expect- actions or capabilities, but tobe judged on their ed the Chinese to act like Americans, it devised intentions.”8 a policy of dangling mellifluous assurances that

tChin O. Chung, FYongyang between Peking and Moscow (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1978, $15.00), 230 pages. 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the U.N. army would surely stop short of imperatives is at home. David McLellan’s Chinese territory. American leaders were summary is to the point: simply unable to relinquish their rather pater- There is a real danger of attributing the Korean nal attitude toward the Chinese;14 they were tragedy to a deadlock in role-playing and thereby unable intellectually to grasp—let alone empa- of ignoring the part which human passion and thize with—the new political reality in China;15 prejudice play in political affairs. There is also a and they were unable to understand, even for a danger of minimizing the limitations of American experience and of overlooking dangerous under- moment, that the Chinese government looked lying social and psychological tendencies in on the United States as the heir to imperial American foreign policy. The advance to the Yalu Japan. is a prime example of an American propensity to As John Spanier put it, “Since American take the righteousness of its actions for granted declarations of goodwill were estimated as and to ignore the objective reality which its behavior represents to others.19 constituting sufficient assurances for China’s Communist leaders, the latter’s threats of Serious books that help us comprehend the intervention were considered as bluff.”16 situations of others are invariably worthy of Perhaps the principal reason that China was attention, and it is in that spirit that one can not taken seriously by the administration, pursue with profit the works by Chung, Heller either militarily or diplomatically, is because et al., and Oksenberg et al. Books like these the administration expected the Chinese to help drive home the point succinctly made by view the world through American eyes; the Stanley Hoffmann: “To put it bluntly, a Chinese had the temerity to use their own eyes. prerequisite for effective foreign policy is Gabriel Almond has written that . . our awareness of the foreignness of other nations, foreign policy must be informed by an of the fact that they have objectives and anthropological appreciation of cultural differ- concerns, experiences and expectations, re- e n c e s . ” 17 I n K o r e a , m a n i f e s t l y , i t w a s n o t . flexes and memories different from our own. The advance to the Yalu was, to a great Good diplomacy knows not only how to thwart extent, the result of a mistaken image that irrevocably hostile designs but also how to administration leaders had of China. That accommodate differences.”20 image was a product of national stereotyping, By discerning realities, instead of compla- much the same problem that presented itself cently subscribing to mere images or to idle before World War II when many Americans dreams, we will learn to understand others— subscribed to the idea that all Japanese wore and ourselves—much more clearly. The poet thick eyeglasses and so could not see well Robert Burns wrote: enough to fly planes.18 This patently ridiculous Oh wad some power the giftie gie us notion of national stereotypes should not for a To see oursels as others see us! moment be confused with efforts to under- It wad frae monie a blunder free us, stand those cultural imperatives exercising An’ foolish notion. influence on national policy. As with charity, Norwich University the place to begin the study of those cultural Northfield, Vermont

Notes 1 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, An excellent example would be Barton Whaley, Codeword Barlmrossa California: Press, 1962), p. 393. (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973); a mediocre 2. The genre of books dealing with psychological considerations in military work would be William Blanchard. Aggression American Style (Santa Monica, and diplomatic policy-making is wide-ranging, both in scope and substance- California: Goodyear, 1978). BOOKS AND IDEAS 71

3. Wohlstetter, p 397 Press. 1983). p 588. 4. Bernard Brodie. M ur and Politics (New York: Macmillan. 1973), p 332 14. See John Stoessinger, Why Nations Co to War (New York: St. Martin's 5. William F. Buckley. Jr.. "On the Right," National Review. 25 November Press, 1974), pp, 95-97 977. p. 1385 15 Tsou, p. 235 An excellent little collection of essavs was edited bv J.C 6 Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War (New York: Praeger, 1965). p. 175. Farrell and A. P. Smith, Image and Reality in World Politics (New York: 7, Gabriel Almond. The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). Praeger. 1960). p 23 16. John Spanier. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean 8 See Alexander L. Ceorge and Richard Smoke. Deterrence in American War (New York: Norton. 1965), p. 98. Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 17. Almond, p. xxx. 1974). pp 213. 215 18. Thomas A Bailey, The Art ol Diplomacy: The American Experience 9. Almond, p. 149 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 216. For valuable back- 10 W illiam C Bullit, "How W e Won the War and Lost the Peace," Life, ground. see Robert Jervis, The Louie of Images in International Relations August 30. 1948, p. 94. (Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, l(j70), or his article 11. Ceorge F Kennan. American Diplomacy. 1900-1950 (New York: "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics. April 1968, pp. 454-79. Mentor. 1951), p 111. 19. David S. McLellan, “Dean Acheson and the Korean War," Political 12 See Louis Hartz. The Liberal Tradition in America (New York Science Quarterly. March 1968. p. 39 Harcourt. Brace & World, Inc . 1955). p. 302 20. Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, or The Setting of American 13 Tang Tsou. America's Failure in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Foreign Policy (New York: McCraw-Hill. 1968), p. 322.

Basis of Issue AFRP 50-2, Air University Review, is the professional journal of the Air Force. . . . Requirements [for distribution] will be based on the following:

1 copy for each Active Duty Air Force, Air 1 copy for each full time student attending Force Reserve, and Air National Guard schools of professional military education general officer and colonel; such as Air War College, Air Force Institute of 1 copy for each civilian employee in grades Technology, and NCO Academies; GS-16 thru GS-18 and each Public Law 313 1 copy for each 10 faculty members of such appointee; schools; 1 copy for every 10 officers in the grades of Lt 1 copy for each Office of Information; Colonel thru 2d Lt assigned to HQ USAF, and 1 copy for each Air Attache office; to each Headquarters of major commands, separate operating agencies, numbered Air 1 copy for each office listed in Chapter 1, HQ Forces, divisions, wings, depots, districts, USAF Headquarters Pamphlet 11-1, hospitals, military assistance advisory Directory of Air Force Representation on groups, missions, detached special activities Committees and Non-Air Force Activities; and offices; 1 copy for each library in the following 1 copy for each Air Force Reserve and Air categories: master publications, academic, National Guard major headquarters in states base or general, branch, contractor- or regions, wings, groups, squadrons, and operated, field, special and technical; separate activities; 1 copy for each 89MAW and T-39 aircraft.

If your organization Is not presently receiving Its authorized copies of the Review, consult your Publications Distribution Officer. The Editor POTPOURRI Politics and History offers several chapters of especial interest to the military professional, such as “The Philosophy of History” and “The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought.” The overall level of Aron's writing, however, will require the average Politics and History: Selected Essays by Raymond reader to scale unaccustomed heights. For those Aron, collected, translated, and edited by Miriam who would understand the theoretical arguments B. Conant. New York: Free Press, 1978,274 pages, behind the realist view of international relations, $15.95. however, the book is essential.

Beyond the smoke, statistics, and polemics of the Major Patrick O. Clifton, USAF SALT II debate, there is a question that lies at the Air Command and Staff College very heart of international relations. That issue Maxwell AFB, Alabama concerns the role of force in the contemporary environment. Many political scientists (see Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane’s Power and Interdepend­ ence and Stanley Hoffmann’s Primacy of World The Last Half-Century: Societal Change and Order) now argue that force has lost its utility in Politics in America by Morris Janowitz. Chicago: international politics and that military power alone University of Chicago Press, 1978, 583 pages, no longer determines the hierarchy among nations. $25.00. Raymond Aron, a leading political realist of the twentieth century, rejects such thinking as a theory Professor Morris Janowitz’s The Last Half- of hope, not reality. In the book Politics and History, Century: Societal Change and Politics in America is his essays provide students of the arms debate with a thought-provoking treatise, which focuses on the seminal information on the role of force in history. notion of social control. Janowitz defines “social control” as “the capacity of a social group, including There is no prohibition against attempting to define international society on the basis of the a whole society, to regulate itself.” (p. 3) Self- state of peace instead of the risk of war or against regulation, according to the author, permits us to considering tests of strength and military compe- escape coercion by others, but its maintenance tition as exceptional situations rather than essen- implies a set of “higher moral principles beyond tial features of international relations. . . . But those of self-interest.” (p. 3) considering the long history of complex societies Utilizing systemic analysis, Janowitz provides an . . . any definition that fails to take account of the overarching view of the major trends since the post- basic characteristics of international relations, World War I era in American society—indicators of which is rooted in the legitimation of the resort to the levels and effectiveness of social control. These force, neglects both a constant factor in civiliza- major trends are political participation, social tions, one that has had tremendous effects on the stratification, military institutions, and war; all are course of history and the human meaning of military activity, (p. 176) underlying sources of disarticulation as societies transcend from the industrial to the advanced Aron’s rather pessimistic (realist?) view of man industrial status. and the course of international relations is based on The United States is the focus of Janowitz’s study, his historical analysis. In these selected essays he although other Western societies are also examined. explains why one must pursue history to truly His basic hypothesis is that Western democracies understand the contemporary world. His studies have tended to be weak and political regimes unable concentrate on the interaction of historical expe- to resolve conflict. In other words, parliamentary rience and political will. He believes that it is our institutions continually face increasing difficulties in perception of the past that shapes our will to act in mediating conflict and resolving social and econom- the future. The message he offers is unequivocal: “If ic strife. This, conflict does not stem from gover- men have no consciousness of what they are and nance by elites but is endemic in a society that have been, they do not attain the dimensions proper disperses political influence and thereby mitigates to history.” the creation of meaningful majorities to govern

72 BOOKS AND IDEAS 73 effectively. It is, however, through political parties understanding advanced industrial society. and, in general, the electoral system that citizens are Professor Janowitz has written this work for his allowed to articulate their needs and achieve their students. Although it is a synthesis of political and goals. sociological research, he cautions his readers that Industrial societies today make continuous de- “this is a difficult and at points tedious task.” (p. xi) mands for an expanded government role despite “Therefore, ‘sophisticated’ scholars and ‘hardened’ their eroded confidence in political institutions and critics must proceed through this volume at their parties. Why? Not because of economic, psycholog- own risk.” (p. xi) It is a risk, in the end, well worth the ical, or societal factors; nor because individuals have effort required to digest this impressive work. lost interest in politics. Rather, it is a result of Dr. James Brown complex governmental structures which make it Professor of National Security Affairs “more and more difficult for the individual citizen to Air Command and Staff College calculate his self-interest.” (p. 547) Agencies for effective social control are not on the horizon. According to Professor Janowitz, the mass media highlight “the vulnerabilities of the citizenry to A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 by appeals and content which weakened personal Alistair Horne. New York: Viking Press, 1978, 640 control.” (p. 363) He pointedly criticizes television pages, $19.95. reporting and advocacy journalism as failing to contribute to the clarification of a citizen's political To Americans seeking insights, answers, and self-interest; they are “more likely to strengthen lessons from our tragic years of the Vietnam War, mistrust and suspicion.” (p. 548) Accordingly, the Alistair Home offers a solid historical precedent in mass media do not generate consensus or coordina- his brilliant analysis of the Algerian W'ar—a war rich tion. Furthermore, they fail “to contribute adequate- in parallels to Vietnam. Rather than let the passage ly to the articulation of the institutional sectors of of time dilute the rendering of historical fact, he has society and to contribute to the socialization profited from the cooling of emotions and from required for" effective social controls.” (p.363) As a interviews with former leaders on all sides of this result, the consumers of mass media see themselves bitter struggle to present a study of revolutionary as victims of forces they are unable to control. conflict that shows the motivation of fellah. As Janowitz sees it, society must have the capacity Frenchman, “Pied Noir,” and “Para” in memorable to regulate itself within a moral framework that objectivity. transcends self-interest. Is this possible? Perhaps! Horne sees as basic to an understanding of Algeria On the other hand, is there a need for a leader? an appreciation of the semantic complexities that Perhaps an enlightened leader? Janowitz, at this separated the Algerians and the French. For one the point, is not at all clear whether social control war was “the Revolution,” for the other "La Guerre requires a “social controller,” but it would appear D’Algerie,” a war to maintain the territorial integrity that he leans in this direction as a necessity for of metropolitan France. implementing and completing societal tasks. The The was a long one, as was the LLS. more fundamental considerations that should be presence in Vietnam. From his perspective as one of examined are the types of institutions, rules, England’s finest contemporary historians, Horne regulations, and social and interpersonal relations analyzes the Algerian War as seven separate, that will create a more viable society. Janowitz coincident wars: the fighting war; the political believes that social scientists can assist in this struggle for the moderate middle ground; a civil war institutional building enterprise that is so necessary. between Algerians; an internecine struggle with the This book, in my opinion, is Professor Janowitz's National Liberation Front (FLN); a battle of wills major work. It is relevant and fascinating yet a between the French Army in Algeria and Paris, difficult text to assimilate. In it Janowitz has ending with the overthrow of the Fourth Republic synthesized empirical social science research of the and the revolt of the generals against de Gaulle last fifty years in a very coherent fashion, providing himself; the “Pied Noir” and Organization of the reader with an excellent backdrop for better American States’ cabal against France and fellah 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

alike; and, last, the propaganda war for the Philip Ardery’s Bomber Pilot contains all the sympathies of the world, including the people of elements noted above. First, Ardery was different France. from the average crew member in World War II. He Horne skillfully sketches native Algerian frustra- was older, entering the air arm in 1940 at what tion at French half-measures in response to political seemed like the ripe old age of twenty-six. He was aspirations; the weary reaction of a France, which also better educated, with a bachelor’s degree from had not known peace since 1939; the bitterness of a the University of Kentucky and a law degree from French Army which, faced with an “un-winnable” Harvard. Further, he had much more flying conflict, found the tactics and will to turn the experience than the average bomber pilot of the situation around; the radicalization of the “Pieds war, having amassed 1800 flying hours, 1000 in Noir” and their effect on the army; the corrosive heavy bombers when he joined his combat unit. effect of institutionalized torture on all parties; the Second, Ardery flew B-24s with the 389th Bomb political action teams that held out the hand of Group during the hottest portions of the air war over friendship to loyal Algerians and, at times, helped to Europe, flying his first combat mission on 6 July have the FLN “on the ropes”; and then the final 1943 and his last on 6 June 1944. His flight log negotiations at Evian, where de Gaulle knew he had includes such famous missions as the low-level raid to yield and saw all his bargaining counters slip against Ploesti on 1 August 1943, Vegesack on 8 through his fingers as FLN persistence and single- October 1943, Gotha on 22 February 1944, and mindedness won the day. Berlin on 8 March 1944. His recollections from the Combining the pace of an adventure story with pilot’s seat of both the Ploesti and Berlin missions are the detail and precision of a scholarly case study in especially well done and valuable to students of the public policy, Alistair Horne has assembled one of European air war. A strong point of the book is the finest studies of a “war of national liberation” Ardery’s viewpoint, not only as a combat flyer but ever written. It is to read and studied by anyone also as a squadron commander and as a staff officer seriously interested in comprehending modern at both the group and wing level. Third, his glimpses warfare in its political setting. of stateside training, his marriage one day before Pearl Harbor was attacked, wartime Britain, and Lieutenant Colonel John J. Kohout III, USAF tenting in Africa complement the powerful scenes Strategy Division from the cockpit. Fourth, the author overcomes DCS Operations, Plans and Readiness other difficulties during his overseas service besides Hq USAF German flak and fighters; he rises in rank and position and survives the war, body and soul intact. Finally, the book is well written, for Ardery combines a novelist’s eye and poet’s touch. The material is interesting in its own right but is Bomber Pilot: A Memoir of World War II by Philip enhanced by the author’s ability to fit it all together. Ardery. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, One could hope that this book will spur other 1978, 226 pages, $9.95. veterans of the “big war” to dig out their old letters, diaries, and memories. Even if they do not approach The formula for a good war novel traditionally the excitement and eloquence of this effort, they has four elements: an unusual main character, many may have the stuff from which history is written. perils, other interesting experiences, and a trium- Perhaps such material could be sent or willed to the phant ending—all of these written in an eloquent Air Force Academy for historical research. Bomber style. While a number of novels incorporate most of Pilot is highly recommended for anyone interested these elements, few memoirs do. Since World War in war or World War II and especially for those II, the two best memoirs of the strategic bombing interested in the air war. You will not be disappoint- operations against Germany to appear are Bert ed. Stiles’s Serenade to the Big Bird and Keith Schuyler’s Elusive Horizons. Now, almost 35 years after the Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell close of that conflict, a new memoir on a par with Radford College these two has bgen published. Radford, Virginia BOOKS AND IDEAS 75

Airships for the Future by William J. White. New The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon by York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1976, 160 pages, Gunther E. Rothenberg. Bloomington: Indiana pictures, charts, glossary, $8.95. University Press, 1978, 245 pages, appendices, William J. White’s Airships for the Future bibliography, index, $12.50. combines a history of airships, a technical descrip- With this volume, Professor Rothenberg adds to tion of their construction and operation, and an his reputation as military historian. His purpose is to argument for their future use. His history is sketch the trends and changes in warfare during the interesting and concise but not the complete or final Napoleonic era. He performs his task superbly, for word on airships and dirigibles. The technical the work is an extremely well written and informa- description of the construction and operation of tive look at a dynamic and important period of airships provides the layman with a basic under- military history. standing of airship principles, and the heart of the Rothenberg begins by giving an outstanding book gives White’s view of the present and future summary of the strategy, tactics, and conduct of the uses of lighter-than-air craft. limited warfare practiced in Europe during the White, however, overstates the case for the century preceding Napoleon. Chapter three, “The airship. Today, he says, modem material technolo- Soldier’s Trade," is perhaps the most enlightening gies allow for greater rigid or semirigid airship and well-written section of the book, showing what strength that can withstand high wind loads and a typical battle looked, sounded, and felt like to the gusts in inclement weather. White feels that a participants and why the confusion produced by the stronger rigid airship design can permit the con- smoke and fury of battle is called the “fog of war.” struction of behemoth airships for commercial use He describes the standard weapon employed in that would be even greater in size than the giants of these batdes, the musket, in fascinating detail, along the past like the Hindenburg, Akron, Macon, and with its method of use and misuse. Pre- Shenandoah. He believes the potential lifting Revolutionary battle had been characterized by an capacity of the proposed super airships could make exchange of brutal, unaimed volley fire at close them profitable. In the age of scarce energy, the range. It took years of rigorous discipline to induce helium-filled airship could lift several thousand tons soldiers to withstand such fearful combat. The of cargo over long distances, inexpensively. conscripts of the French revolutionary armies did White’s argument, founded on a detailed cost not have such training and discipline; something had study and on the wishes of a lighter-than-air to be done to compensate for this lack. The answer aficionado, is less than convincing. He offers no real to many appeared to be the column formation rather proof that airships could move bulk cargo cheaply than the line. The column lacked the firepower of or that such craft can be actually built to withstand the line but seemed to offer greater mobility and the weather forces that destroyed the airship shock effect. It also seemed to require less training. industry two generations ago. His conclusion that The author discusses the relative merits of the line “we now stand at the threshold of a new airship and column and demonstrates, somewhat surpris- technology” is only partially valid. True, modem ingly, that it was the deadly firepower of the British technology may enable a stronger airship frame, but line that eventually reigned supreme in battle over White presents little proof that it could work as he the massed columns of the French. advocates. Another particularly well-done section describes As an airship picture book, this work encourages the strategy and tactics of a typical Napoleonic the readers in flights of fancy. As a credible campaign. Diagrams illustrate Napoleon’s classic argument for future employment of the airship, the maneuvers at Jena, Ulm, and Waterloo. The book is hardly convincing. A commercial or military description of this complex subject is unusually user of air freight services might well be skeptical. clear. The book really is but the wishes and daydreams of a Rothenberg also examines the organization, hobbyist turned lobbyist for the rigid airship. strategy, and tactics of Napoleon’s main enemies: Captain Thomas F. Menza, USAF Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia. As he points 916th AR Squadron out, Napoleon had a tremendous influence on these Travis AFB, California very armies he had previously so decisively 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW defeated. The vanquished learned from their criticism is merely pedanticism as selection is a conqueror, and, eventually, it was the Napoleonic matter of judgment or personal taste. Still, one system that was used to defeat Napoleon. In reality, would think that the category “Women in Aviation” however, these changes and reforms were of limited would by now contain more than just three books duration. Using British, French, German, and and one article. Austrian sources, Rothenberg points out that More serious are the several technical defects in although Napoleon seemingly revolutionized tactics the book. On page 12, de Seversky’s Victory and strategy, his legacy is basically a conservative Through Air Power is credited to Basil Collier; on one. The French Revolution and Napoleon precipi- page 281 this journal is cited as a quarterly though it tated enormous social and economic as well as has been bimonthly since the early sixties; and the military change, but the rulers of Europe were not same mistake is made again on page 226, where the willing to reform their armies entirely along the Air University Review is erroneously cited as the Air French pattern if the price to be paid included social University Quarterly Review. On pages 16 and 212, reform as well. the renowned Basil H. Liddell Hart was given credit In summary, this book is an outstanding study of for having written “The Employment of Tactical Air military strategy and tactics in the age of Napoleon. Power,” which was written by Captain Michael O. 11 should be the first book read by anyone wishing to Wheeler for the Review. Ordinarily it is bad form study warfare during this era. The prose is clear, the for a reviewer to dwell on the mechanical faults of a documentation thorough, and the insights numer- book rather than its substance. In this case, however, ous. the imperfections are numerous enough and the special purpose of the work is such that they should Captain Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF be removed in subsequent editions. Department of History A strong feature of the volume is its end matter. United States Air Force Academy Included are a bibliography of bibliographies, a list of relevant reference works, and an excellent summary of the special collections available to the scholar of air and space affairs. Also included are An Aerospace Bibliography compiled by Samuel lists of magazines, journals, and the like having Duncan Miller. Washington: Government Print- special relevance to the field and two competent ing Office, 1978, 341 pages, $4.50. indices, one on authors and one on subjects. This end material is well conceived to enhance the value of An Aerospace Bibliography, sponsored by the the book as a tool for researchers in various fields. Office of Air Force History, is an updated version of That value is so great that I recommend that every the original Annotated Bibliography by Carl Berger serious military scholar acquire this bibliography and Mary Ann Cresswell in 1971. This continuing and that the Office of Air Force History continue its project of the Office of History is a major service to impressive effort to make subsequent editions even the community of military scholars, and no student more accurate and comprehensive. of air power history or of military affairs in general can afford to be without it. Also, it must be added D.R.M. that the work is still imperfect, and readers who note defects would do us all a favor by bringing them to the attention of the compilers. An Aerospace Bibliography uses a topical organi- Dropshot: The United States Plan for War with the zation and is divided into thirty-eight subjects. Soviet Union in 1957 edited by Anthony Cave Though the proliferation of categories and subcate- Brown. New York: Dial, 1977, 330 pages, $11.95. gories leads to a bit of duplication, such an organization probably does facilitate the re- Even before V-J Day, U.S. defense officials searcher’s work. The bibliographer’s task is neces- began planning their postwar military establish- sarily an eclectic one, and, thus, he is always ment, believing the Soviet Union would be Ameri- vulnerable to criticism on what he has included and ca’s most likely adversary in the coming years. With what has been left out—and very often such this view, staff planners conceived a number of war BOOKS AND IDEAS 77

plans after 1945 covering various contingencies. naivete on Brown's part but is more probably an These early war plans, however, were not highly attempt to shock the reader. developed, and only after the Berlin blockade of As the prologue draws to an end, Brown contends 1948 did the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) agree to an that war was always imminent between 1946 and integrated war plan for all the services. At the time, 1949. For support, he cites a 1977 study by the few thinking Americans would have been surprised Brookings Institution, which lists Soviet and Ameri- or alarmed had they realized the existence of war can actions since 1945 that might have precipitated planning—Pearl Harbor was less than a decade past. war. (Ironically, the large numbers of incidents only In the early 1970s, the JCS began declassifying confirms the wisdom in war planning.) much of their official record to include parts of war Brown does, however, bring forth a very valuable plans drawn up between 1945 and 1950. Suddenly and critical point, one that most Cold War scholars Cold War historians gained access to documents have neglected. He is shocked, and rightly so, that in many had only dreamed of seeing, documents all probability Strategic Air Command (SAC) could which provided new insights into a neglected not have achieved its objectives given its force element of cold war studies—military capability. structure in 1949. On this point, Brown is correct; a The JCS files also gave authors an opportunity to comparison of SAC’s strength before the Korean edit and publish extensive primary material of War and the ambitious objectives of “Dropshot” will interest to both scholars and the general public. lead nearly all readers to the same conclusion. Anthony Cave Brown’s Dropshot is such an effort. Despite the work’s tone, Dropshot is a contribu- In a single JCS folder at the National Archives, tion to the scholarly community—it provides a Brown found a largely declassified war plan. The useful document to historians unable to visit the JCS had prepared the plan in 1949 predicated on a National Archives and to sift through the JCS possible war in 1957 between the Soviet Union and documents. But had Brown taken greater care with the United States. “Dropshot,” code name for the his prologue and had he refrained from inserting a plan, became the title of Brown’s book, which is sense of high drama, indignation, and sensational- essentially a reproduction of the war plan. As editor, ism, his work would be more credible. Brown offers a twenty-nine-page introduction Major Harry R. Borowski, USAF explaining the cold war climate and providing Department of History background for “Dropshot’s” development. He USAF Academy inserts editorial notes throughout to clarify points or to share his interpretations. Brown’s effort suffers from two flaws. First, he fails to inform the reader about war planning in Famous Fighters of the Second World War by general. Fundamentally, nations draw up war plans William Green. Second revised edition. Garden preparing to gain objectives by military means or, City, New York: Doubleday, 1976, 276 pages, more usually, to defend their interests and $9.95. security—specifically, by responding to an adver- sary’s offensive thrust. Unfortunately, Brown paints This new edition of an old classic should be a a dark aura around the routine function of war welcome addition to the airman’s bookshelf. planning. Famous Fighters contains concise, well-illustrated To this feeling of suspicion and misunderstand- narratives of the development, production, modifi- ing, Brown adds rash statements and dashes of cation, and significant improvements of twenty- sensationalism. He questions the Joint Chiefs’ eight fighter aircraft of the Second World War. motive for declassifying the war plan and making it Combat operations are briefly summarized. available to the general public. He also expresses Compared to the 1957 printing, the new edition astonishment that the United States would have such adds ten aircraft and incorporates a number of large an “offensive plan"; one, if revealed, could not cutaway drawings. The texts of the articles are “endear America to Russia.” To suggest either nation unchanged, however. should not have prepared war plans or did not The employment of air power rests in great part realize its adversary had done likewise may reflect on the capabilities and the utilization of inanimate 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

machines. Too many aviation books concentrate on Defense University Press, 1979, 121 pages. such peripheral matters as markings and war stories, devoid of a hardheaded look at the airplane as a technological instrument of war, flown by men who The Missing Man is the initial product of a new must pit the performance of their craft against the publishing effort by the Research Directorate of the asymmetric performance of the enemy. William National Defense University. The author of the Green has always established the opposite standard. present volume, now at the National War College, Famous Fighters is a book that describes the nuts was a fighter pilot in the Vietnam War, though he and bolts of aircraft technology as it came to the air never was a prisoner or missing in action (MIA). His battlefields of World War II. The aircraft reflect the study looks at the MIA problem through an abilities and shortcomings—political, industrial, examination of the manner in which the services doctrinal—of the warring nations that constructed administer their status determination processes and them. The Me-262, for instance, was hampered by an analysis of the way domestic and international Hitler's insistence that it become a “blitz bomber.” politics affected the whole affair. The roughhewn construction and easy maintainabil- Captain Clarke is forthright in his conclusion that ity of the Yak fighters represented Russia’s “no the MIA issue was used by the Nixon administration frills” approach to aircraft design (as does the MiG- to deflect the criticism of antiwar groups away from 25 today). The British Gladiator reflected the itself and consequently increased the agony of traditional doctrine of British fighter planners in the grieving families and created later political dilem- 1930s. In telling these stories, Green writes with rare mas for itself and the two succeeding administra- skill and an eye for lessons learned. Any airman can tions. The use of the issue for short-term political study the book for profit as well as enjoyment. gains built up the expectation among MIA families and their friends that a more or less complete Captain Donald Bishop, USAF accounting for the missing would be forthcoming. Department of History Clarke argues that such an accounting has never USAF Academy been possible for past wars and that it could not be done now. Thus, the expectations are forlorn hopes; they cause unnecessary grief, and they limit the flexibility of current U.S. policy in Asia. The Missing Man: Politics and the MIA by Captain The Missing Man is a worthy first effort and is Douglas L. Clarke, USN. Washington: National recommended reading for the professional officer. D.R.M.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Strategic Implications of Enhanced Radiation Weapons: A Preliminary Analysis” by Dr. Donald M. Snow, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, as the outstanding article in the July-August 1979 issue of the Review. the fl/%,contributors

Major Dennis M. Drummond (M.A., Central Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Perfes, USA Herman L. Cilster. Colonel (USAF. Ret), Michigan- University) is assigned to Los (M S.. Ceorge Washington University) is the (USMA; PhD., Harvard University) was Angeles AFS, California He has managed a Professor of Military Science at the University director of International Economic Affairs in variety of acquisition programs at the Arma- of California at Davis. Recent assignments the Office of the Assistant Secretary of ment Development and Test Center, Aero- have included Chief of Plans, U S. Army Defense for International Security Affairs, on nautical Systems Division, and Electronic Communications Command, and Deputy his retirement. July 1979. Other assignments Systems Division, AFSC, and was assigned to Commander. United States Army Signal have been as B-47 commander. Strategic Air the DCS for Research and Development, Hq Support Agency, Mediterranean. He has Command; Associate Professor of Econom- USAF. under the Air Staff Training Program. taught business administration courses at the ics, USAFA; Air Force Research Associate, Major Drummond is a graduate of Squadron University of Maryland and Cochise Com- Brookings Institution; and in operations Officer School and a Distinguished Craduate munity College. Douglas, Arizona. Colonel research at Hq Seventh Air Force, PACAF, of Air Command and Staff College. Perles is a graduate of U.S. Army Command and USAF He has been a frequent contribu- and Ceneral Staff College and Air Command tor to the Review, and his articles have been and Staff College. published in other professional journals. Dr. Cilster is presently employed by the Boeing Aerospace Company. Seattle, Washington.

Captain Michael F. Turner (M.P.A., Brigham Young University) is Commander, Frankfurt Captain James S. Seevers (USAFA; M B A., Armed Forces Courier Station, Rhein-Main Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Kastl (J.D., Louisiana Tech University) is Chief. Techni- Air Base. Germany. His previous assignments Northwestern University; M.S.E., Troy State cal Guidunce Branch, Air Force Management include chief of administration, executive University) is Deputy Legal Adviser and Engineering Agency. Randolph AFB, Texas. officer, and section commander for various Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Other assignments have been with Strategic Air Force squadrons. In 1975, he assisted with Chiefs of Staff. As an Air Force judge Air Command in intelligence management the closing of Nakhon Phanom and Udorn air advocate, he has served as an instructor at the and as a data systems analyst and wing target bases in Thailand. As an instructor of manage- Judge Advocate Ceneral's School, legal intelligence officer in Japan and Korea. ment, he has taught for the University of adviser at a unified command, and Staff Judge Captain Seevers has completed Manpower Maryland and Golden Gate University Gradu- Advocate. He is a graduate of the Armed Management School (Honor Graduate), ate College. Captain Turner is'a graduate of Forces Staff College and has completed Squadron Officer School (Distinguished Squadron Officer School and was recently numerous legal and professional military Graduate), and Air Command and Staff selected as one of the Outstanding Young Men education courses. College. of America for 1979.

79 commander assigned to the 6594th Test Croup (AFSC), Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Prior flying assignments have included the KC-135 and C- 130. He served as a Center Staff Information Officer, Armament Development and Test Center (AFSC), Eglin AFB. Florida, where he became intimately familiar with the problems and opportunities inherent in the military- media relationship. Major Oliver is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and a Distin- guished Craduate of Air Command and Staff College.

Joe P. Dunn (Ph D., University of Missouri) is Assistant Professor of History and Politics and head of the International Affairs major at Converse College, Spartanburg. South Caroli- na. Previously, he spent three years with the Chief Master Sergeant Charles P. Wilkson University of Maryland (European Division), is NCOIC, Consolidated Base Personnel Of- teaching in Greece, Turkey, Cermany, and ficer, 27th Combat Support Croup. Cannon Spain. He has read papers at several historical AFB, New Mexico, a position he held with 81st conferences and has published over 50 book Combat Support Croup, RAF Bentwaters, reviews in scholarly journals. Dr. Dunn is a England, until recently. All of his service has Vietnam veteran and a former member of the been in the personnel area, ranging from South Carolina Army National Guard. detachment level to numbered Air Force. He is a graduate of the Headquarters Command NCO Academy and the Senior NCO Acade- my.

Alvin D. Coox (Ph.D., Harvard Univeristy) is Professor of History and director of the Center for Asian Studies at San Diego State University, where he teaches courses in Asian and military history. Once a U S. Army operations analyst, military historian, and Air Force intelligence analyst. Dr. Coox is a widely published author. The latest of his James H. Toner (Ph D.. University of Notre eight books is The Anatomy of a Small War: Dame) is Assistant Professor of Government The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for Changku- at Norwich University and a fellow of the feng/Khasan, 1938 (1977). lie was the 1973 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces winner of the Outstanding Professor Award and Society. He was assistant professor at by the Tnistees of the California State Notre Dame, where he taught international University system. relations. Dr. Toner served as an officer in the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1972. In 1973. he was selected as a General Douglas MacArthur Statesman Scholar. His articles and reviews have appeared in Army, Military Review, Review of Politics, International Review of Major Richard J. Oliver (USAFA; M.A., History and Political Science. and the Naval University of Denver) is currently a flight War College Review. editorial staff advisers

Lieut en a n t Colonel David R. Met s, L'SAF Colonel RobertJ O'Brien, J r . Editor Hq Aerospace Defense Command M ajor T heodore \1 K luz. I'SAF Major Gener a l J ohn W. Hest on, Chief Associate Editor Office o f Air Force History J ack H. Mooney Colonel Ric h a r d K. Kin g Managing Editor Hq Air Force Systems Command J ohn A. W est c ot t Lieu t en a n t Colonel David J. Shea Art Director and Production Manager Hq Air Training Command E nrique Gaston D r . K ennet h J Groves Associate Editor. Hq Air University (ATC) Spanish Language Edition Lieut en a n t C olonel Louis A. T orraca, J r . Lla Mido si May Pattebson Hq Military Airlift Command Associate Editor. F rancis W. J ennings Portuguese Language Edition Air Force Service Information News Center W il l ia m J De Paola Colonel David O. Schillerstrom Art Editor and Illustrator Hq Strategic Air Command Rudol ph W. Morgan C olonel John H. Price Financial and Administrative Manager Hq Tactical Air Command Lieut en a n t Colonel Robert W. Hunter Hq United States Air Force Academy Colonel G lenn E. Wa sson Hq United States Forces. Japan Professor I. B. Holley, J r ., Duke University Major General. Air Force Reserve attention The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Training Command, or Air University. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed.

Address manuscripts to Editor Air University Review Bldg 1211. Maxwell AFB. AL 36112 Printed by Government Prinl- ing Office Address subscriptions to Superintendent of Documents, GPO. Washington DC 20402. yearly $13 00 domestic. $16 25 foreign single copy $2 25 domestic. $2 85 foreign Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2 Authority to publish this periodical auto­ matically expires on 26 January 1980 unless its continuance is authorized by the approving authority prior to that date The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force