JEMS 6 (2017), 2: 27–45 The Young and Clueless? Wheare, Vossius, and Keckermann on the Study of History Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow Abstract: In their debate on whether or not the young should be allowed to study history, Degory Wheare and Gerhardus Vossius quote Bartholomäus Keckermann and state that he wants to exclude the young from studying history, Wheare arguing for Keckermann’s purported position, Vossius opposing it. Their disagreement is part of a larger controversy on the relevance of history for moral instruction in general, contem- plating the question whether or not history is best understood as ‘philosophy teaching by example.’ But the interpretation of Keckermann’s position presupposed by both Wheare and Vossius is wrong. Keckermann’s Ramist predecessors argued against a cen- tral presupposition of Wheare’s views, i.e., the exclusion of the young from studying moral philosophy. Keckermann’s own position in this regard is not fully clear. But a closer analysis of his distinction between methods for writing and for reading history shows that Keckermann did want the young to study history. If Keckermann had be- lieved that such exclusion were necessary, it could only have been related to reading historical texts, not to writing them: writing texts about historical figures or events does not require moral precepts, but only the application of certain logical tools. But a view that implies that writing a historical text should be possible for students, whereas reading such a text would go beyond their capabilities, is absurd. Hence, we can assume that Keckermann expected the young to study both history and moral philosophy.1 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference “TheT ree of Knowledge: Theories of Sciences and Arts in Central Europe, 1400−1700” at the Faculty of “Artes Libe- rales,” University of Warsaw. I am grateful to the organizers, Simon J. G. Burton and Michał Choptiany, for this opportunity to have fruitful discussions, to Sandra Bihlmaier for stimulat- ing conversations on Keckermann, and Allen Shotwell as well as the reviewers of this journal for helpful suggestions. Support from the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, is gratefully acknowledged. 28 Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter Keywords: Bartholomaeus Keckermann, Degory Wheare, Gerardus Vossius, history of logic, university teaching, history of higher learning, Ramism, moral development, moral psychology 1. Introduction This paper addresses the dispute between Degory Wheare and Gerhardus Vossius on the question whether or not young students should be allowed to read historical texts. Their disagreement is part of a larger debate on the relevance of history for moral instruction. We can trace its roots back to the teaching of rhetoric in the late Roman republic and early empire: Cicero be- lieved history to be a “teacher of life” (De Oratore 2.9.36), Pseudo-Dionysius of Halicarnassus went so far as to claim that “history is philosophy teaching by examples” (De arte rhetorica 11.2.19).2 Seen through the lens of a contem- porary understanding of the tasks of the historian, such ideals seem to be of questionable value: “It seldom occurred to these classical authors that accurate representation of past reality was difficult to attain if the main purpose of the historian was to teach moral lessons.”3 A history written for purely edificatory purposes may be forced to omit those aspects of the historical record that do not fit with its overarching narrative. The question whether or not history should serve as a store of examples for moral instruction is not purely theoretical. It also influenced early modern reading practices, particularly the production of excerpts for private consump- tion in commonplace books and public access in compilations and florilegia. If the reader was expected to make use of the instruction to be gleaned from historical works, these ‘fruits of history’ had to be collected in a methodi- cal and structured manner.4 This raises questions for both the scope and the structure of such compilations. If the function of history is primarily moral instruction, this suggests that the gory details of history better be omitted from such collections, since the confrontation with the vices of humanity may pose a moral risk to the untutored reader.5 And the subject headings of such 2 Both quotes are taken from J. H. M. Salmon, “Precept, Example, and Truth: Degory Wheare and the ars historica,” in Donald R. Kelley, David Harris Sacks (eds.), The Historical Imagination in Early Modern Britain: History, Rhetoric, and Fiction, 1500-1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 11–36, at p. 12. The following summary is heavily indebted to his account. 3 Salmon, “Precept,” p. 13. 4 Salmon, “Precept,” p. 30. 5 Ann Blair, “Historia in Zwinger’s Theatrum humanae vitae,” in Gianna Pomata, Nancy Siraisi (eds.), Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 269–296, at p. 278, discusses the problem with regard to one of the most extensive florilegia of the early modern period: Zwinger believed such moral selectivity to be misguided. The Young and Clueless? 29 collections might best be taken from the disciplines of practical philosophy, so that the connection between example and precept is immediately obvious.6 But there exists an alternative to a moral sanitisation of history, namely to allow only mature students to apprehend the historical record in its totality. The dispute between Wheare and Vossius on the question whether or not the young should study history should be seen in this wider context.7 This paper focuses only on one aspect of this complex debate, namely the reception of the writings of the Gdánsk philosopher Bartholomaeus Keckermann by both Wheare and Vossius. Both did not really do justice to Keckermann’s stance, because they based their reading only on the historical methodology devel- oped in De natura et proprietatibus historiae commentarius (1610), ignoring the theory of philosophical education to be found in his logical and ethical works. From these additional sources a somewhat paradoxical picture will emerge: On the one hand, Keckermann defends a quite traditional understanding of the role of history in the education of the young, namely as furthering their moral development through the study of the past. On the other hand, he achieves this goal through an innovative and prima facie highly counterin- tuitive redefinition of the roles of writing on the one hand and reading or excerpting history on the other hand. The author of a historical text does not use moral categories, but only logical ones. Only the reader of a historical text subsumes its exempla under subject headings taken from the disciplines of practical philosophy. This has interesting implications: the author of a his- torical text uses only logical categories and disregards the moral dimension of events. It is the reader who is obliged to take a ‘moral stance’ towards events of the past and to incorporate them as examples into his moral worldview. The overall argument of this paper can be summarised as follows: Both Wheare and Vossius quote Bartholomäus Keckermann’s writings. Both authors believe that Keckermann wants to exclude the young from studying history. Wheare agrees with what he takes to be Keckermann’s view. Vossius opposes this thesis. But Wheare and Vossius misunderstand Keckermann’s position, because they do not take his broader views on the methodology of history into account, as they are articulated in his Systema Ethicae (1607) and as part of the applied 6 See Merio Scattola, “‘Historia literaria’ als ‘historia pragmatica’: Die pragmatische Bedeu- tung der Geschichtsschreibung im intellektuellen Unternehmen der Gelehrtengeschichte,” in Frank Grunert, Friedrich Vollhardt (eds.), Historia literaria: Neuordnungen des Wissens im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007, pp. 37–63, at pp. 53–57, on the problem of topics for history in Bodin and Keckermann. See also below, footnote 41. 7 It is surprisingly difficult to pinpoint the views of early modern ethicists on who exactly should count as ‘young.’ A rare exception is John Case, Specvlvm Qvaestionvm Moralivm, In Vniversam Aristotelis Philosophi summi Ethicen, Francofurti: Sauer, 1594, p. 15, who classifies those older than 35 as adults. Keckermann taught ethics in the third year of his philosophy course. See Joseph S. Freedman, “The Career and Writings of Bartholomew Keckermann (d. 1609),” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 141 (1997), pp. 305–364, at p. 312. 30 Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter logic in Gymnasium Logicum (1608) and Systematis Logici Plenioris Pars Altera (1609). Keckermann’s Ramist predecessors (Talon, Goclenius, Scribonius) ar- gued against a central presupposition of Wheare’s views, the exclusion of the young from studying moral philosophy. Keckermann’s own position in this re- gard is not fully clear. Still, an indirect argument that relies on his distinction between methods for writing and for reading history can show that he did not agree with Wheare. Keckermann wanted the young to study history. If Keck- ermann had wanted to exclude them from this subject, this exclusion could only have referred to reading historical texts, not to writing them: writing texts about historical figures or events does not presuppose the precepts of moral phi- losophy, but only the application of certain logical tools. However, a view that implies that writing a historical text should be possible for students, whereas reading such a text would go beyond their capabilities is not very convincing. Hence, we can safely assume that Keckermann expected young students to ap- ply themselves to both history and moral philosophy. Keckermann thus allows for a didactic role of history, but preserves at the same time the notion that the historical record should not be subjected to moral censure.