Ecision Games Wä.Fkbook

Mann Ma .4 A ecision Games Wä.fkbook Maj John F. Schmitt,EUSMCRFAO MASTERING TACTICS MASTERING TACTICS A Tactical Decision Game Workbook JOHN F. SCHMITT Marine Corps Association Quanfico, Virginia II, r r Credits Maj John F. Schmitt authored, coauthored, or inspired all game scenarios used in this workbook and wrote game discussions. SSgt Henry S Johnson collaborated with Scenarios #1 and #12; Maj Bruce I. Gudmundsson, with S nahos #3 and #5; and Cot John E. Greenwood developed #11 as a direct follow-on to #10 “to insert a word of caution ab’ the difficulty of identifying gaps” Many people contribuLed to the preparation of this malerial for printing: Bonnie J. Martin did the typesetti Anne H. Wood, much of the proofreading; Robert R Fleischauer, the layout; and Richard H. Westbmok, the final prepa don on the maps. Marine Corps Association www.mca-marine s , org 866-622-1775 Copyright © 1994 by Marine Corps Association. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means, electronic mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, witho permission in writing from the publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to the Editor, Marine Corps Gazer1 P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mastering tactics: a tactical decision game workbook John F. Schmitt p. cm. Includes sketch maps, appendixes, and index ISBN 0—940328—14—3 1. Infantry Tactics. 2. Maneuver Warfare Doctrine. 3. Decisionmaking in Ground Combat. ISBN Printed and bound in the United States of America Iv This book is dedicated to the tacticians at the tip of the spear—to the Marine NCOs and officers who lead our combat units in the Fleet Marine Force. Contents Foreword by MajGen Paul K. Van Riper. USMC ix Preface xi ARTICLES Are You the Next Napoleon? 2 Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle 6 SCENARIOS & DISCUSSIONS I Ambush at Dusk 10. 42 # 2 Platoon Ambush 1145 #3 Atiack on Narrow Pass 14.48 #4 AtLack on Narrow Pass Continued 16.51 #5 Film at Eleven 18.53 #6 Hole in the Trowzer Pocket 20.56 #7 Securing Cam-Pljuna 22,59 #8 Raid on Gazebo Ridge 24.61 #9 Enemy Over the Bridge 26.64 #10 Gap at the Bridge 28. 68 #11 Enemy Over the Bridge Continued 30. 71 #12 Battle oCthe Garagiola River 32.74 #13 Battle of the Garagiola River Revisited 34.78 #14 Battle of Dadmamian Swamp 36.81 #15 Battle of Mount Giddy 38.84 APP EN D LX ES A. Glossary olTactical Terms 90 B. Glossary of Map Symbols 93 C. Combat Orders 95 D. U.S. Marine Infantry Battalion Organization and Weapons 96 E. Typical Marine Expeditionary Brigade Organization 103 Solutions to Symbol Quiz 104 Index 105 About the Author 107 vii Foreword I first met John Schmitt in February 1988 at Quantico, Virginia, during a conference on Marine Corps doctrine. Though he was then a captain and one of the youngest and most junior Marines attending the meeting. he displayed considerable knowledge and unusual insight throughout the discussions. I later learned that his exceptional tacti cal wisdom was the result of a number of years of intense and dedicated study, which he had successfully synthesized with his own experiences as an infantry and light armored infantry commander in the 2d Marine Division. When I returned to Quantico as the director of the Command and Staff College the following summer, my association with Capt Schmitt was renewed. We soon found ourselves engaged with others in long conversations on military matters. He was al ways able to hold his own in these talks and frequently brought new approaches to the understanding of complex issues. It seemed natural, therefore, to turn to him for as sistance when I was looking for a better way to prepare instructors to explain the rela tionships between tactics and operations, and operations and strategy. His answer was to develop a three-level decision game that instructors could practice on and then use with students in the classroom. Not surprisingly, there was among the dozen experienced colonels and lieutenant colonels some skepticism that a young captain could teach them much about tactics or operations, let alone strategy. Any doubt faded shortly after John described the his torical origins of the concept of “levels of war” and launched into the game. Interest rose and understanding came quickly through his simple device. John refined the game into a powerful instructional tool, variations of which are still in use in Quantico’s schools. When the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen A. M. Gray. announced that he wanted to have a capstone manual written on warfighting, Capt Schmitt was detailed to the project. His knowledge of tactical doctrine and his superb intellect and writing skills soon became so evident that he was assigned as the primary author and began working in close association with Gen Gray. That the Commandant, a four-star gen eral, was collaborating with a Marine captain on the Corps’ fundamental doctrinal publication surprised many a traditionalist. The book they produced, Fleet Marine Force Manual I (FMFM I). Warfighting, alleviated any concern, for it was rapidly and widely acknowledged inside and outside the Corps for the clarity and understanding it brought to a complicated subject. Promulgation of FMFM 1 proved to be a watershed event for professional military education within the Marine Corps. The manual was soon in demand by officers and noncommissioned officers alike. Though the material was complex Capt Schmitt’s writing style make it easy to read and grasp. Capt Schmitt soon followed up with a similar and equally successful work on campaigning. The value of his unique ap proach to presenting doctrinal ideas in short simple prose was further evidenced by the decision of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1992 to use the same tech niques and format in Joint Pub I, Joint Warfare of the US. Armed Forces. Throughout his research and writing efforts Capt Schmitt continued to create “deci sion games” as a means to learn and to enhance his understanding of military con cepts. He seemed to always have a new battlefield situation available to challenge as- lx sociates. Some were historical battles disguised in modern settings and others were original. My favorite was a game which merely inverted the situation British Gen Allenby faced in his 1918 campaign through Palestine. This game had the added ad vantage that after a player’s solution was analyzed a “mirror” comparison could be made with Gen Mlenby’s actual operation. I am pleased he included an updated ver sion of this game in his book. It was not long before the value of Maj Schmitt’s informal sessions was recognized. In April 1990 the Marine Corps Gazette began to publish a series of tactical decision games, and the games became a formal part of the scheduled elective courses at the Marine Corps University. By then the games were most frequently referred to as 4T—D—Gs.” Their educational value was obvious, and commanders throughout the Marine Corps started including them in training programs for unit leaders. The inher ent value in playing such games was clearly understood. Military leaders are members of a profession that does not routinely practice its skills. Only constant war, a condition too abhorrent to even contemplate. would allow such practice. Thus, the honing and developing of military skills must be achieved in other ways. Field exercises, manual and computer-aided wargames. reading. and more recently simulators provide vicarious experience. Tactical decision games per form the same Function, but at less cost in terms of time and resources. Their ease of use allows them to be employed in those odd minutes that are too often wasted. By de sign they are equally effective for corporals and generals. Used correctly they can rein force other methods of education and training. Most importantly, they enable leaders and future leaders to gain experience that otherwise could not be gained. Only those who have challenged themselves with countless tactical situations in peacetime, only those who have refined their ability to make decisions and communicate clearly with subordinates, are prepared to command in war. Maj John F Schmitt and the Marine Corps Association have made an important contribution to professional military education with the publication of this workbook. I predict it will be in great demand with Marine leaders around the world and that that demand will soon make this edition the first volume of a multivolume set. When Marines next go ashore in defense of our Nation’s interest those leaders who have worked their way through the 15 decision games will be far better prepared for the unknowns of combat. Paul K Van Riper Major General. U.S. Marine Corps April 1994 Washington, DC wLc1 Preface This book contains 15 tactical decision games. designed to improve tactical skill and decisionmaking ability. Most of the scenarios have appeared previousl) in the iarhw Corps Gazette between 1990—1993: several have never been published before. The introducion article, ‘WAre You the Next Napoleon?” describes the intent behind the games and olkrs suggestions on how to get the most out of them. The second in troductory article. “Observations on Decisionmaking in Battle.” analyzes the problems of tactical decisionmaking in greater detail. The scenarios themselves range in scope from the rifle squad to the Marine expeditionary brigade. with the majority being designed at the company and battalion levels. The level at which the scenarios are de signed is not the significant thing.

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