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Ma A MASTERING TACTIC S MASTERING TACTICS
A Tactical Decision Game Workbook JOHN F. SCHMITT
Marine Corps Association Quanfico, Virginia
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Credits Maj John F. Schmitt authored, coauthored, or inspired all game scenarios used in this workbook and wrote game discussions. SSgt Henry S Johnson collaborated with Scenarios #1 and #12; Maj Bruce I. Gudmundsson, with S nahos #3 and #5; and Cot John E. Greenwooddeveloped#11 as a direct follow-onto #10 “to insert a word of caution ab’ the difficultyof identifying gaps” Many people contribuLedto the preparation of this malerial for printing: Bonnie J. Martin did the typesetti Anne H. Wood, much of the proofreading;Robert R Fleischauer,the layout; and Richard H. Westbmok,the final prepa don on the maps.
Marine Corps Association
www.mca-marine s , org 866-622-1775
Copyright © 1994 by Marine Corps Association.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means, electronic mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, witho permission in writing from the publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to the Editor, Marine Corps Gazer1 P.O. Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mastering tactics: a tactical decision game workbook John F. Schmitt p. cm. Includes sketch maps, appendixes, and index ISBN 0—940328—14—3 1. Infantry Tactics. 2. Maneuver Warfare Doctrine. 3. Decisionmaking in Ground Combat.
ISBN Printed and bound in the United States of America
Iv This book is dedicated to the tacticians at the tip of the spear—to the Marine NCOs and officers who lead our combat units in the Fleet Marine Force. vii 2 6 ix xi 71 42 68 90 93 95 96 103 104 105 107 16.51 14.48 1145 18.53 10. 24.61 30. 36.81 20.56 32.74 22,59 26.64 28. 34.78 38.84 USMC Riper. Battle Organization in Van Brigade Revisited K. Continued Continued River River Swamp Paul
Contents Pocket Battalion Terms Pass Pass Ridge Bridge Bridge Giddy Symbols Expeditionary Quiz Napoleon? the the MajGen Decisionmaking Garagiola Garagiola Dusk Trowzer Infantry Bridge Map Narrow Narrow DISCUSSIONS by Cam-Pljuna on at Ambush Dadmamian the Mount Gazebo the olTactical Next Eleven of & Over Over the on on Orders Marine oCthe of of of ES in Symbol at on at the Marine Author LX to Weapons D Platoon Film Hole Raid Enemy Ambush Atiack AtLack Securing Gap Enemy Battle the Battle Battle You Battle 2 U.S. I Glossary Typical Glossary Combat EN and Organization # #3 #4 #5 #6 #9 #7 #8 Are #10 #11 #12 #14 Observations E. #13 #15 B. D. A. C. Foreword Preface ARTICLES SCENARIOS APP Solutions Index About Foreword I first metJohn Schmitt in February 1988at Quantico,Virginia,during a conference on Marine Corps doctrine. Though he was then a captain and one of the youngestand mostjunior Marines attending the meeting.he displayedconsiderable knowledgeand unusual insight throughout the discussions.I later learned that his exceptional tacti cal wisdomwas the result of a number of years of intense and dedicated study,which he had successfullysynthesized with his own experiences as an infantry and light armored infantry commander in the 2d Marine Division. When I returned to Quantico as the director of the Command and StaffCollegethe followingsummer, my association with Capt Schmitt was renewed. We soon found ourselvesengaged with others in long conversations on military matters. He was al waysable to hold his own in these talks and frequentlybrought newapproaches to the understanding of complex issues.It seemed natural, therefore, to turn to him for as sistance when I was looking for a better wayto prepare instructors to explain the rela tionships betweentacticsand operations, and operations and strategy.His answerwas to develop a three-leveldecision game that instructors could practice on and then use with students in the classroom. Not surprisingly,there was among the dozen experienced colonels and lieutenant colonels some skepticismthat a young captain could teach them much about tactics or operations, let alone strategy.Any doubt faded shortly after John described the his torical origins of the concept of “levelsof war” and launched into the game. Interest rose and understanding came quickly through his simple device. John refined the game into a powerful instructional tool, variations of which are still in use in Quantico’s schools. When the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen A.M. Gray. announced that he wanted to have a capstone manual written on warfighting,Capt Schmitt was detailed to the project.His knowledgeof tactical doctrine and his superb intellect and writing skills soon became so evident that he was assigned as the primary author and began working in close association with Gen Gray. That the Commandant, a four-stargen eral, was collaborating with a Marine captain on the Corps’ fundamental doctrinal publication surprised many a traditionalist. The book they produced, Fleet Marine ForceManual I (FMFMI). Warfighting,alleviated any concern, for it was rapidly and widelyacknowledgedinside and outside the Corps for the clarity and understanding it brought to a complicated subject. Promulgation of FMFM 1 proved to be a watershed event for professional military education within the Marine Corps.The manual was soon in demand by officersand noncommissioned officers alike. Though the material was complex Capt Schmitt’s writing style make it easy to read and grasp. Capt Schmitt soon followedup with a similar and equally successful work on campaigning. The value of his unique ap proach to presenting doctrinal ideas in short simple prose was further evidenced by the decisionof the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffin 1992to use the same tech niques and format in Joint Pub I, Joint Warfare of the US. Armed Forces. Throughout his research and writingeffortsCapt Schmittcontinued to create “deci sion games” as a means to learn and to enhance his understanding of military con cepts.He seemed to alwayshave a new battlefield situation available to challenge as-
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Nine-tenthsof tactics are ceain and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pooi, and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharp ened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex. —T.E.Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”) Are You The Next Napoleon?
.4general should sm w luniseif nuun’ unwc a dat: ffthe ho.cnlecJrnwwereto make us appearance in from. on mu right, or mi mu left. ii’hat should 1 (/0? —ivapoleun
In war there is no substitute for experience, no substitute for the intuitive skill that comes from repeated practice. Tacticaldecision games are a practice field for the tactical leader Thisarticle explains why and how
Think of the Great Captains of military history— and Development Center in the same Pt’chologvTh’ Alexander. Hannibal. Frederick the Great. Napole dat’ article: on. Genghis Khan. We hold these men in high re Ttie most important principle of skill performance is gard because we recognize them as military geniuses. thai skill depends on the knowledeebase. In general, as true maslers of the art of war whose mastery of the the more practice one has had in some domain, the art form clearly eclipses the mass of the merely com better the performance, and from all indications, this petent. Clearly, the art of war places high demands increase in expertise is due to improvements in the on the intellect of military commanders, and any pro knowledgebase. fessional continually strives toward mastery. The same principle applies to tactics—which have obvious similarities to chess—and to tacticians. And The “Myster of Mastery” that is where tactical decision games come in, But how are such masters made? Are they born Tactical decision games (TDGs) are a simple. fun, geniuses or the product of training? Napoleon’s and effective way to improve your decisionmaking quote makes it clear that he believed intellectual ability and tactical acumen—to improve your mas preparation was an essential factor. While natural terv of the art of war. Like most skills, you can im abilities are certainly a contributing factor, psycho prove tactical decisionmaking ability through prac logical studies show that Napoleon was right. The pi tice. The idea behind TDGs is to put you in the role oneering work to uncover the “mystery of mastery” ala commander facing a tactical problem. give you a was done by cognitive psychologists in the 1960sand limited a mount of time and information, and require l970s. using chess players as the subject. According you to develop a plan to solve the problem. By re to Robert J. Trotter in “The Mystery of Masten.” Psi peaiedly working through problems like these you chologv Todat’.July 1986: Ii had been assumed that the ability to think many moves ahead and consider the implications of each moe was shai separated the expert from the novice - . . the art of war places highdemands chess plaer. But in the mid 1960s. psychologist on the intellect of military commanders,and Adriaan (ICGroot showed thai neither experts nor novices think more than a t’ewmoves ahead. any professional continually strives toward Instead: mastery’. findings suugest ihat a chess master is someone who. after years of experience, can recognize as many as t(XUXX)meaningful board positions and make the best response to each. So instead a deep of being will learn not only to make better decisions, hut you thinker who can see many movesahead. the master will aLso learn to make decisions better—that is, chess piaxer is now seen as someone with a superior to ability to lake in large chunks of information, recog more quickly and efficiently. You will learn look nise problem situations and respond appropriately. at a situation and instantly take in its essential fea This explains how a chess master is able to defeat doz tures, to cut right to the heart of the problem. ens of weaker players in simultaneous play. For the most part, the master relies on pattern-recognition Coup D’oeil abilities, or so-called ‘chess intuition,” to generate po In short you will develop the skill Frederick the tential ly good moves. Great called coup doed (pronounced “koo dwee”). According to Robert Glaser and Michelene Chi of Coup doer] means literally “strike of the eye.” and the University of Pittsburgh’s Learning Research Frederick described it as:
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pieces.
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specific
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have
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perceives
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ahead
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Tactics
tactical take
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gains
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latter
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quickly
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exercised
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particularly appreciation
coup
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As
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opportunity master
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moves commencement
enemy
a superiority:
ly:
moment they
the
d’oci( general
two
As
Not
options.
greater
greater
of
complex
disarray
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tics
tics
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paying
more tions.
become
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tunities you. in.
see
situations
true
they
comprehend. concepts
behind
will important
prove
your
Improved
cisions
tactical
the
no
field
a
and
d’oeil Just concept through clearly: the overlay is a good way to issued their orders. So the rule is: “Orders first, then ensure this. But by the same token, it is equally im discussion.” ponant to develop a verbal order as well (whether or because words are the written oral), primary Solitaire Play means by which we communicate our plans. and we There are a couple of ways to play the games. Thc should practice using the same tools we will use in first is solitaire play, working combat. the scenarios just like you would solve a brain teaser or crossword puzzle. One advantage of TDGs is thai just as in “real This is the form the TDGs lake in these pages. The life.” there are no absolute right or wrong answers— time commitment is usually no than 15 no “schoolbook solutions.” Tactics are concerned more min utes to a half hour. This meihod exercises the only with what works. There are countless ways to decisionmaking process hut lacks advan— solve any tactical problem. However, some plans re certain lages of the second method. flect a truer understanding of tactical principles than others. The whole objective ofTDGs is to arrive at a Group Play truer understanding that eventually results in inasten’. The second method is to play the game in an in Nortnally the scenario is fairly simple and the in teractive group, with one player (usually the senior formation about it is far from complete. requiring us or most experienced member) acting as moderator. to make certain assumptions as the basis thr deci ‘[lie moderator describes the scenario to the sion—just as in combat. Unlike board games or their play ers, answers questions (some. hut not all) about the computer versions. TDGs have ver few rules or me situation, enlorces the time Iiinit, selects d hierent chanics to learn. In fact, there are really only two players to brief their phi ns to the group, and moder “rules.’ They are (I) the imposed time Iimit and (2) ates the critique of each p1an. ‘I’he moderator plays the requirement to give the solution in the Form of a devil’s advocate, introducing ‘‘What its” and asking combat order. Both are worth discussing briefly. There are Iwo reasons for the ime limit. First, it in troduces a certain amount of friction, in the form of stress. to the decision process. 1 he idea is to give the The ability to communicate clearly a player less time and information than he thinks he plan involvingthe participation of hundreds needs 10 formulate a good plan and vet require him or thousands of men and pieces of equipment to come up with one anyway. This is the reality of in an atmosphere of fog and friction is no war and precisely one of the abilities that makes for a successful com mander. Second, the game imposes a mean skill. Abrilliant plan muddledin the is time limit because combat is time competitive. Speed suing is a bad plan. relative to your opponent is essential, Not only must you make good decisions, hut you must make them quickly. If not, your decisions, no matter how sound. will be irrelevant because you will he too late. For a “Why did youdo that?” The advantages of group more detailed discussion of the efkcts of time on play are: decision making. see the article “Observations on • A built—in sense of pressure and competition. Decisioninaking in Battle” that follows. Players’ abilities are on display for others to see. The reasons fir requiring the solution in the form • Inimcdi ate tëedbae k. Each pLiver gets a eritiq Lie of a combat order are also two—ibId.First com mu n— of Ins plan from the moderator and other players. ications skills improve with practice. The means that • Practice giving orders. Etch player must actual comma inlers use to com mu nicate insi rttclions to ly issue his order to the grou p. subordinates is through combat orders. either [till • See other solutions. Plaers can see how others operation. orders or fragmentan orders. The ability approached the same problem. gn iii ng insights to communicate clearly a plan involving the partici that ilies can add to tlicir own repefloi re. pation of hundreds or thousands of men and pieces • Teamwork. Especially within operating units. of equipment in an atmosphere of fog and friction is these roup sessions can help develop intuiti e no mean skill A brilliant plan muddled in the issti— utidersta nd ing among mem hers. inc is a had plan. l:tictie communication means • Generates discussion in tactics. As happened in not only clarit. hut also orcelulness and. clue to the the Qua ntico group. the TDG5 become a catalyst iced ir speed. ccineiseness, It is no coincide ice thaI or sharing tactical ideas, 01’ Scenario #9. “The so tnan\ o( the great itilitan leaders sere also iii— Enemy Over the Bridge.” A!CG.Jun90. Cpl J. R. spiring commu nieators. Second. tactics deiiia od ac Murph wrote: tion. not an academic of discussion the merits of this I liase shown your article to three other Marines. or that scheme’. Decision, not debate. “The essential and hase been inwlved in three heated conversa thing is action.” wrote Hans von Seeki. once chief of tions regarding the scena rio and hat course of ac— staff of the German army. “Action has three slages: tom the frac order should initiate. This simple iool the decision born of thought. the order or prepara that you ye published has the demonstrated ability tion for execution, and the execution usd1’.” The to really turn on sonic minds. third. and really meaningful, stage—execution—can This method is ideally suited to omeers’ or NUOs’ not happen without the first two stages. The TDGs calls or professional development sessions within printed here and in the Gazette ask players to submit units. (In Ihet. Scenario #7, “Securing Cam explanations of their plans, but only fler they have Pljuna.” was specifically developed for the 2d Bat-
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Vietnam.
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Nor decision science. sound 13c
is skill those the
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The
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Observations
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But
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human
flexible
perhaps
is
activities
is
environ
info
state
disposal,
decision
own
about
to
must
the
the
increasing
presence
battlefield.
and
factors,
the
the
and
uncertainty.
information
general,
info
Certainty
his
A.
definitely
his
in
Martin
absolute
and
the
information
battle,
from
of
B.
at
the
but
commander
inaccurate,
In natural
commander. effectiveness
improving
but
these
of
and
Pt.
a
a
certainty
developing
developing
and
Vt.
be
on
information
Referred
has
of
Decision.
developing
is
The
seeking
when mission-type
in
makes
last
constitute
high slowly.
plan.
complete sion
At
fought.
hut matically.
scarce
effectiveness
At
a
degree
intentions,
underslood.
heat
decisions
commander
a
by
by as:
be
of
historian
1
forces:
his
and
pervades
trait
the
to
information. knows
(SOPs),
state,
usually
battle
for
certainty—about
pursuit
The
issuing
is
available
in make
contradictory. process.
together
clearly is information.
certainty
radioactivity
the
accept
decisions. of
Information
War,
Figure
for
make
to
environment, its
will
be
war
commander
agents:
to
enemy’s
of
that
contingencies.
that
for
of
a
his
to
command
in
essential
the
is
the
uncertainty
can
must
about
intent
the
quest
for
forces.
factor
Effectiveness
even
Information
decision
nature
uncertainty
an
procedures
However,
he
of
terrain
commander
B
courage
his Effect
warfare
factors
desire
is
own
which
the
compensates
subordinates,
function
impossibility.
the
enemy,
reduce
the
effective
very
incomplete, endless
in
the
certainty
well. The
enslaved
certainW
in
war.”
describes
a
second
to
he
his
Potential
moral
an
planning
the
one’s
and
as
information
Command
An
be
specific
the
of
making
sometimes
commander
more
in
meni
of
least
operating manifold
intentions
er chemical
only
the
Early
The
The
While
In
ation the
about
will
more
tempts Information
the.more ways
largely
tive and
ing
uncertainty
plans.
“fog more
tainty become
which trait
The
The Certainty
Creveld a 4 situation so that he can observe them directly and important consideration. The commander must circumvent the delays and inaccuracies that result evaluate each possible course of action in terms of from passing information up the ?hain of command. relative risk. If the degree of risk is unacceptable. he As the amount of information increases to a point. must seek another solution. the time necessary to make an effective decision de creases. Beyond this point, however, additional in The Decision formation has the opposite effect: it only serves to The complex interaction of these basic factors cloud the situation, causing the commander to re poses the commander with a dilemma. His task is to quire longer to reach the same effective decision that select a course of action with reasonable certainty of he could have reached sooner with less information. success and an acceptable degree of risk and to reach The commander has more information than he can his decision more quickly than his foe. As stated at the outset there is no formula for this process: it is a complex and often subconscious act. It is also a skill “ Third, the commander must have an which improves with practice: thus the use of TDGs. understanding of when he has An improved understanding of the factors that work intuitive on the commander’s ability to make tactical deci reached the point at which additional in sions will help him to make those decisions more ef formation only serves to delay the decision feclively. Below. I have summarized the lessons as I or when additional certainty will not jusfil5i see them. Keep them in mind when playing the TDGs. effort it. the time and spent gaining First, the commander must have the moral cour age to make tough decisions in the face of uncertain ty—and to accept full responsibility for those deci sions—when the natural inclination is to put oft the digest quickly, and he has difficulty lbcusing on key decision pending complete information. To delay ac factors. See Figure 2. Consequentl. the commander tion in an emergency because of incomplete infor must he carful io limit the amount of information mation shows a lack of energetic leadership and he considers to those essential elements that allow courage. him to make his decision quickly and with reason Second. the commander must have the moral able certainty. He must be able to identify and focus courage to make hold decisions and accept the nec on the central circumstances influencing a given de cision. and elsewhere he must exercise economy of thought, Focus ofefibri applies to decisionmaking as • • . in the heat of baftle, perhaps the well as combat power. only certainty is that available information Risk will always be incomplete, will usually be A commander’s decision invariably involves the inaccurate, and will sometimes even be estimation and acceptance of risk, Risk is inherent in war and is involved in every mission. Part of risk is contradictory. ,, the unconirollable element of chance. Risk is also re lated to gain: normal lv. greater pole ntiaI gain re quires greater risk. Further, risk is equally common essan’ degree of risk when the natural inclination is In hot h action and inaction. to choose a less ambitious tack. The practice of concentrating combat power at the Third. the commander must have an intuitive un focus of ellort and economizing elsewhere by its na derstanding of when he has reached the point at ture requires risk. Willingness to accept risk is anoth which additional information only serves to delay er element of the moral courage of command, the decision or when additional certainty will not Ft is human nature to try to minimize risk by justify the time and effort spent gaining it. On one choosing a less ambitious course. But Napoleon ad hand, the commander should not make rash deci vised that “in audacity and obstinacy will he lbund sions based on insufficient information. Gen A.A safety.” I do not propose recklessness, hut I suggest Vandegrift warned: “Never allow’yourself to he unduly that more decisions sufter from attempting too little rushed or stampeded. There is usually ample time than from attempting too much. Field Marshal for considered judgment even during battle.” But, on Erwin Rommel wrote: the other hand, the commander must not squander opportunities while trying to gain more complete in Bold decisions give the besl promise of success. But one must differentiate between stralegical or tactical formation. boldness and a military gamble. A hold operation is And finally, since all decisions in battle must he one in which success is not a certainty but which in made in the face of uncertainty and since every situa the case of failure leavesone with sufficient forces in tion is unique, there is no perfect solution to any bat hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A tlefield problem. Therefore, the commander should gamble. on the oilier hand. nan operation which can not agonize over one. He should arrive at a reason lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of able decision quickly and execute it swiftly and (Inc’slbrce. aggressively. To quote Gen George S. Patton. Jr.: “A Although the commander avoids unnecessary good plan violently executed now is better than a per risks, the accomplishment of the mission is the most fect plan executed next week.” usMc Scenarios
The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special cases, the actual situation which is covered by the mists of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly, and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly. —Helmuth von Moltke
9 Scenario #1
Ambush at Dusk
SITUATJON your Marines trips a booby trap. suf You are the squad leader of 1st fering a severe leg wound. Suddenly. Squad. 1st Platoon. Company C. 1st the enemy opens lire with automatic Battalion. 9th Marines. You are light weapons From the village to the wesL. ing in a tropical area against guerrilla and the platoon commander is hit. Forces armed with small arms. light The steady volume of lire from the vil mach ineguns. and sometimes mortars lage has 2d and 3d squads pinned and rocket-propelled grenades. Re down in the rice paddy. After tending cently. Company C has been conduct to the lieutenant, the corpsman coura ing patrols in a populated region to geously makes his way forward under counter increased insurgent activity. flre to your position. followed shortly Today, your platoon with a machine- by one machinegun team. The corps is a had gun squad attached is running a security man tells you the lieutenant in patrol along a designated route. You are way. You wish you had a radio, but the to attack and destroy any enemy forces platoon’s radioman is pinned down you locate. Dusk is approaching with near the lieutenanL The enemy lire in the hour. Your squad is the point of against your position is sporadic: the two squads in the paddy are returning the platoon patrol column, some 200 lire but appear unable to move. You forward of the platoon’s main yards estimate that the sun will disappear body, advancing north through a rice within a half hour. You have no paralleling a 2-loot-high dike paddy. communications with your platoon right. You have learned from to your sergeant. What do you do? experience not to walk on the dikes or trails because they are Frequently boo REQUIREMENT by-trapped: although uncomfortable. the In time of live minutes. draft rice paddies are generally the safest a limit would issue to your places to move. To your west is a vil the frag order you any addi lage. East of the dike is another rice team leaders and describe paddy and another small village. tional actions you would take. Include an overlay sketch and provide a brief As your squad crosses a trail at the explanation of the rationale behind ifj northern edge of the paddy. one of your action. I -t’,,ifls. t
PTtomdrHit à .aEXIM :z4_:ti - L -: : /_/, , m II 4/ ..— ‘- —- ,. — 3 /. —-tr I •e’,4.,_ — -
,t,I,II,,IIItItItJI,III’4 — — — - ‘9% Trail 4 Booby Trap Dike Rice Paddy N Dislance - Meters
I I I I 0 25 50 100 Scenario #1 For discus5lon, see pp. 42-44. Game appeared In Madne Crnps Gazette. Nov91; solutions, Jan92
H Scenario ion.
ing rolling 1st ma been pat
an voys
The frequently from kilometers
There macli a
tenant iiiotc
b tached
in
barrel.” log Run.
when squad.
tach the
by “[asks.” high site.
following
You
u
I!
haljdo,en nder
ambush 51) ml
Phttoon.
enemy the
handli 1st
bridge
ed.
a
to
rued
You ci rallying to convoys
the inegun the l)e
grou
beli are ‘‘It’ll
nib
Vi
isa plans
en
When lie Marines.
road
your ith maeliinegun
te
move tel
pot.
will
lie #2
Ill
rest
ambush.
ush rrai
i the will the tie.
Is n
used
SITUATION
springs id
instructions:
forces
along
east nlanttv
be the
says. rI strong
to
position
tWO
one
Company
von of just
jeep pointi.
s
to Ii
ii.
we
In
e to
second
lieutenant
supplies from
be rotect
Ii
or tie like the
the
usually set
by
miss
ic
get the
his 60mm You Your
of
SQ
I He
my
Ii
east
Ii a
‘I
hat in
at
Sc) platoon
in
enemy nked
enemy
you
nest, lie
LI
the main
to
shooting Ibrces
to is east
a the
patrol ion
ads the front
squads
plans hues
Depot.
have
an
squad
the
the provide
ben covered
platoon
o
05
will
pl
mortar
I
A.
I
ambush.
con
of 10 L—shaped
to other ambush
a gives
detonating 01W supply rwaid
a l3eave
pl
i supply
while
(0011
lol to
in ted
been
tW lid garrisoli
order niove
the the 1st
to
conduct
a
Si
leader
at
establish
loon
lowed
[he
wooded.
security
ii lish
Platoon SI
blow
will
about
lotijecIve
learn han ambush Iwo Battal
ambush
wit
a
r
trucks.
it
on
(west)
out light
cc)
route
ol under
bend 1) coti—
sets
Your Heu
in site. Ii
am—
move
k
m—
am
of
the
as
the by a
first
the
at ol
a
of
for 5 a
I—
it a —
in
cain draw
OR tin
your
good narrow You cover
mortar direct hut
your ty saying. metit
Be
Everything
ii.
out phone
runner! trom bush
you stay can ing approach. ambush Depot objective
P. pro’
forces son. important it lbrces that 01W peratiie. you
until
the
lb
reach
i
each ‘ithdra”s
one
attention position. ng
From
of
the pos
re
lay.
and
30
concealed a
ide
to animal sta connection
A Meanwhile,
understand
you ‘OL1 site.
the
one
sonic
Surprise
and izood dejia so tr
coil]
AT4
green—star cover
Depot mm
lit)
i of
your
protection
You
is
inlormation
ambush ing under yoti area
concealed
the
ith
can
Find
When 60iii
n sprung
position
LCpI
that ing
your
goes Ltles
rti
view
kind? to
per
to to track
you.
En
can
OR
destination from
hook
the
by
ng
and
withdraw
the
from
Road. is
lii
gel all
the a Ambush
\oLl
Itter. L
engaging
lire sq
‘.ou
of as P essential. is ptu has route
on cluster
road position
He’ll you
something ooley OH’.
circumstances. what
110
fbr in stay
you not
Clad
you and
had: back
southeast.
u which
ihe
the
planned
delay
ot
been
t team. p or
gel nt
ide
You
lie will
the
You’ll
on
pot.
to
run
Its
the send
tile
you not out. rout! lube
iii
l)cpot
the
is
back
ii
neither
earls
to
patrol
Ii
t round. platoon a
sprung.
inc
your lily
isolate
e
that
lie sc’
the especiall an
set
Once
iid
inbe
convoys the open position.
ha vu In
the
You
plaucHin
other
cross
take
toward
it’s
1st attracts east enem
tid
warn to 10
ti
out signal
Move in find
garri
gives
addi—
‘Vi
react
map.
.t1fl
rs
ill you Ii that
par
the the
im— ca Fire
lire
the
the
got
(lie re
as
ne.
a
by
to
is
a is ii
a
Tea pen
re 20) you
I mo\ do
on very
the
you gage
peat ready
awayr. h road coming a
igli goi miles
scribe order
of actions
nates.
Lu moti
‘‘WIi
Filleen
Did liell
“Roger. Thu
‘Negative’
What lt
Au
In
ou
the your
ii
hg rn
t
isi
ask.
i
at
yards
on
way.’ ng bad.
nd
mach to
until
your
to
5.
a
lie
a
at per
tn
to enemy two
ibr
you
Make landhine.
your least
think the
they
out
couple
cli no.
the
into
a and
plan.
time
do
get Ii the
REQUIREMENT ccl
minutes
to
I
hour. cc
iii
a
after
bend.
machunegu south,
east.
em.
message.
comes
of
will
copy
you
a
get
actions egu see he
k
through
interesting. view. e
delnsive an seven
sure nil
voure
you
loot limit
Provide Ii it
you
The says
of through
reat
the
n
Re
you?’
explanation. out.
give do?
but
and
about
s
th
later.
say. auto
to
moving
me
patrol.
iii
at
the Ii
got.
ambush
convoy
trucks,
of
talkitig
and
lie
the
a -
UpI
t
mites.
to nclude
m ith poi tid lie n
the
As
a
preparations.
5
lie replies.
weapons 1st
301 jeeps
to
C
repl. connection
your
sketch
n tiLs
issue
a
return
you
minutes.
convoys 1
pl
r, 20—25
the oods
about
)—40() grin.
approaches
Fite
u
and
dii to!
goes.” do
down mci
the
r
ho] try
suhordl’ platoon
the
ngs
ii
“We’re of
me
Team about to
‘Whoj
‘t
intent yards mcli.
to owed
niore 15—25
and
taps
your
su—
Irag
eti—
rT
the
are on
de
re
is LI
hP-St dclDOSUO1SSfl2S!p10J
is
is
no
up
on
for
re
en
and
can
pre im
flees
it
con
issue
your
area.
is
make
battal
attach
the
to
Include
Narrow
Narrow
It’s
firefight
the
you
battalion
limit
somewhat
Transmis
Except
What the
movement
casualties.
your
there
supporting
significant
Pass
battalion
opening
would
onto
On
would
engagement
and
scheme,
the
the
a
of
in
are
of
woods
intent.
major
the
time
fled,
the
you
by
you
Western
a
arms
net
machineguns
taking
bridge.
your position
hear
use
immediately
body
cannon.” near
transmissions
flanking
position.
is
your
that
thick
that
the
of
leaders
firefight.
laterally.
northeast
the
activity
later
the is
you
orders
your
appears halted
that
the
do?
at
main
the
right
and
post
tactical
it
enemy
10-minute
headquarters.
radio
net
and
for place
your
a
enemy
“loose
in
of
toward
a
frag the
guess
squad
overlay
you
a supporting
to
the
REQUIREMENT
been
but
enemy
post
From
fire
the
including
force
out
an
do
on
Moments
From
any that
best
of
higher
plans of
position
communications
several
chain
has
listening
ridge
your
taking
support
Within
being
any
ments,
with tening
arms, any
to
the pare
unclear, attempting
sign What
Bridge. directing
against duct
the in
emy sions see
is
Pass.
the northwest ion enemy
breaks east Your
clear
mean
Narrow
a
a
4
is
headquarters?
at
de
us
down
6th
full
two
Pla
to
nar
mis
not
a
plain
(with
relief.
of
plain.
Ridge
guard
a
3
makes
a
contin
it—you 1st
compa without
be
helicop
and
been
numbers
weapons
to reinforce
is
the this
with
besieged.
to
the
approach
landed
Sanctuary
fighting
of
battalion’s
does
to
higher
to
on
in
and
launching
teams in
up
severe
squad
undeveloped
about
wide
in
on
The
to
you
Battalion.
have
of
onto
small
the
from
there intention
been
not
Sanctuary
and
as
weapons
plain
force
and
become
3d
parallel
point
gully
already
the
appears
of
with
City.
Dragon
meters
I. Implied
forces
make
But the
have
initiative
2015:
company
instructions
has
along mission
from
passage
commander
your
20
Marines
with
squads
is
two
what
rocky
rugged have
coordinate
into
south
you
the
you
37 SITUATION
Moving
with
the
with
It
trail—but
vegetation
6th
and infantry
force
to
enemy
and
contact
dry.
north
with
has
platoon—reinforced
forcing
offensive.
and
are
will
Company
Sanctuary
trackers) a
attack
foot
is
thick
flank.
terrain
enemy
flank
deep 3/6
helicopterborne
tanks.
the
Acting
generally
You
Your
ports
portant
Marines. near
toon. helicopterhorne
Plain
terborne tacking
ue
machinegun the
making and relief is moon. stroying
night ny—advances feet sion
platoon row contact primarily
left that with
The of
cross
The
Checkpoint
Attack
#3 Scenario
14 I __
‘‘II’’
I eIg; trg
Scenario # 3 a iôo 250 500 who
For dlscussslon, see pp. 48-50. Game appeared In Madne Corps Gazette, Mar91; solulions, May91.
5 at
to
he
of of
hit
at was
en
had the ad
the
fled
that
you
ene fur
pre
Your
time
Pass.
force
Anx
north
other
to make under
recon
again.
meters
would appar expla of
[or
you
and
any
is out.’ have
up
That
been
got
The
intent
reporl
traffic
overlay limit,
contact
then. It which
you
do?
brief and
company battalion
that
would
sizable
and
to
unable
you sound
a wait
Narrow plans an comes
has
a
the
LP
or
battalion now.”
you
any)
lime
casualties.
radio leaders only
hundred “We’ve
you
are the
flank.
since
give
any ago:
position.
ridge has
“Just (if
do
the
arms.
the contact
nears
returns
The
about
enemy on
it
taking
rationale.
platoon either squad
maneuver,
the
Then
hour
battalion your battalion
reports
you
order
couple
What
activity
5-minute enemy up including
machineguns
From as an of
Include
are Worse
of
agitatedly.
services.
a
a
companies
estimales—revving
worry your
half from
also
your
sergeant [rag REQUIREMENT that
the
help,
a fire
2200.
was
to
of
he ridge. and supporting open
pass.
direction.
Iwo
to
He
west
plan.
your
to Narrow the
reached
enemy
battalion. time
enemy armor—a
snaps communications
that scheme
of
the
the
Suddenly,
now
Within
ters
about
no platoon to he noitered made
my tilost, west. each heavy of this The hard: at gaged ent vance discern ious S—3 things offer is
pare issue use tachments. ther your nation any with
a
it
of
let
At
an
de the the
ap
pa on
any due had
rifle fire- me-
near ene
atta
wesL
corn
west arms
resist
silent
along
in
adjust
into
Gazette enemy
enemy
a
Continued: you
you
submit
corpses.
an size
the the
Scenario
you
the
repel
whence the Battalion
fall
three
again.
guard
road
the on
hut can
of
in
Bad cant and engages
to
with
hundred
corps sergeant
to
that
eastern
squad
moving
enemy
position
continuation your
situation
from
you
problem
supporting
also based
north scene
suppress the
hurriedly
northwest:
and
set
the
squad. reconnaissance
the
is two
platoon to
east-west
that
several
battalion. that
about
situation orders on is
the
Marine with outflanked
position
preparing
the
You platoon
You machineguns
maehineguns. try
out
(hr
of
and
blocking
the
the
small
37.
your SITUATION
to
gun
arms assist
a
a
your
explicit
recover
know
from
#3
put.
contemplate withdraws
own
your on
to impacts
advancing
Pass, several
approaching
in
scenario
check patrol
suppress
enemy
2130
are Checking
Attack along with
you
machinegun that
is
solution position.
stay
you by decide
to
your
enemy
successfully
From ridge.
patrol
you
Based
This
The
mon ted Scenario readers. #3. position
flank squads cide trees
best enemy battalion sending You supporting north Checkpoint ern gun trol ched the and has fight, as and my enemy came. proaching about
Artillery
#4
Scenario
i
-1
[ I
it *
a) > z0
C 0
0 0 a a a) U, a) a) N a) 0 0
C’) 0 u0 in‘-a)a ‘-C a a)
0 -Sm oLaOa = a
00 u.0
I
there
advances assigned
guns sult. kilometers kilometers As weeks,
forward seRice wheeled
the enemy tance the move proiding
phibious
in and friendly supported Company
structures tense chat
than mount fighting
normally
ix
Scenario
Oasis
You
the
adobe
region.
front
you
equipped
are
offers
small
is
in
ighting
of
ground
are
Ibrces
your
the
support
supply
in
no
is
and
that
and
known
long
your
all—round
vehicles
security
north,
are
F,
withstand
#5
by
is
the
dwellings, the
an
The
south
north
battalion
clear
arms.
SITUATION
exceptional
entire
2d
direction
enemy
tracked
mounted
generally
a
arid
the
ago
only
at
combat
commanding
company
point
detachment
platoon
with
battalion.
local
to
the
the
delineation
two-story
hut
fbr
of
The desert
operate
(AAV5).
learned
company.
source
security,
MCSSD
territory:
at
the
vehicles.
a
commander
heavy
front
population
anything
which
still
on
element
and
mobile
Oasis,
only
of
to
environment
to
mobility
front.
small
3d
Does
assault
in
of
another
the
establish
for
the enough
commu
(MCSSD).
rear
machine—
officer
Irregular
the
Marines.
masonry
After
will
water
between
plans
some
as You
combat
several
impor
(GCE)
‘Film
While
trucks
north.
larger
area.
a
the
lives
duty
am
has
not
are
for
ni— in—
re
25
25
in
to
of
to
a
enemy
Cs equipped
of
and town Oasis
down pletely population center
cage tenaciously. Some pects less
the helhre ing support fields
forces rounds pelled perience mander as
der he
needs
more rounding
150
ty
Li
The
As
center
have the
mates
the
no
next.
skills
comes
strong.
than
possibly
of
has
you
you
than
are
their
of
by
grenades
of
will
time
of
surrendering:
secured
adult
the
enemy,
way
to
tells
Ihr
a
In “short”
a
enthusiastic.
and
looking
die
are
you
with the
town
to
1200
of
satisfy the
small
at
act
that.
S—2.
up is
critical
is
arms:
He
the
However, have
the
of
grumbling these
you
of
m
light
males
local
1400.
the
buildings
know
from
to small
tomorrow,
i by
the
although
is
the
Ii
case
(RPG5).
anticipating
can
militia
enemy
U
crops
their
l’or
you
he
the pump
ma
that
a
a
mortars.
The
MCSSD
units
same
people.
of
one
vulnerability to
large
tell
of
any
arms.
wants
only
Eleven
nv
that
settlement
and
sense
he there
time.
Ihrce
the
Oasis,
MCSSD
that
about
is
fire
machineguns.
house.
settlement
are
eth you
excuse
vary
hetwe
their
and
plaza.
a
each
says:
sometimes
rocket-pm
The
settlement
The
to
consisting
comman
nic
From
off
seems
meet few
of
how
irrigated
nothing
the
greatly,
the
occupy
he
n
aciual honor
group
In
to
a
fight
com ‘One
com
oasis
local
light
Sur
100—
S—2
Ii
few
the
ex
ex
the lay
the
n—
you to
to
can
other
Then
Oasis?
ci towa
structions got
and you you
cus so
fires,
rationale
for a
ing tion
here.
are
thing own
recognize.
whose hut
secure
news
team
more
them
looking
ude
You
right
take
a
you.”
of
my approach
introduced
exploit?
will
RI
is.
keep
weapons
I little
I
thinus
straight. recognizable
a
they and
eflhrts.
thing:
provide
team
do
covering
You’re
the
want
If
smug. the
to
job.
statement
20
REQUIREMENT
for
issue
for
not
you
time
them
know
Oasis.
can
for
an
He
news
minutes.
comes
to
it
to
your
there’s
a
any
glad
feel
the tiw
Captain.
sections could
mustachioed
an
overlay-
to
accompany
worn
the
says:
to
he
little
to
our
out
what’s
Cooperate
plan
to
plans
team,
particularly
problem
of
your
plan.
that
explanation
right
the
camera
equipped
camera
keep
a
your
of
“Lets
he
action.
Write
operation
about.
you
cable
for
correspondent
The
of
for
going
and
hut
rifle
trouhle.”’fht
where
emharrassin&
me
intent
once
r
of
your
supportinr
you
operation.
with
public
get
the
crew.
you
van.
How
TV
lace
your
from platoons
securing
I’ve
friendly
on
with
the
vouve
of
as
some
order
them
plan.
that’
a
have
new’
ovei
will
Yoi
bIt
yol
yol
ha
do’
the
In-
in
ac•
fo it’ For discussion see pp. 53-55. Game appeared In MarineCorps Gazette, Jun90; so4ullons,Aug90
I’) Scenario #6
ii :1 Hole in the Trowzer Pocket
SITUATION tram the vest, Make face—to—facecoil— look right. The activity is not Fox at tact it tile Insea ii Ureek Bridge. As all; it is enetiiy inlatitry lbrces moving You are tlie commander of Corn pa— tite senior cutlltlia tider. the Fox CO is south in a steady out of the pocket. ny K, 3d Battalion, 24th Marines. in o\eratt cc,,ntiiatid at the BR Corn— Fox Corn is to ocT. lighting in roiling, wooded terrain pan nowhere he Iou meucing 03(8). destroy etiemy torces in \btt’re lucky to escape back toward against enemy foot infantiw lorces. ‘,titlr sector trying to escape south Ott, your cotii pa in vi thout hei rig detected. Regiment Iias been attacking general ol tlte pocket. The detailed plan ill You are positive of your location. ly south (or over 2 weeks. A sizable en— toltuw. You call up Fox agaiti, but the corn— cnn owe has managed to hold out. Using the ‘Half Rule.” you brief you matider itisists that lie also is iti the creating a salient in the vicinity of the platoon corn ma nde rsa nd gi\t them correct locatioti on Hill SI. He reports town of lrowzer. You are called to the ample time to prepare. After the oper no sign oF etie my activi it is now battalion command post or instruc ations order arrives, you make minor t tions. where you learn that regiment 0245. I lie enemy is by tiow moving adjustments to your plan and move south in increasing tittmbets just vest phins to destroy the enemy pocket by out. ou are able to move yottr ct)mpa— an encircling attack. The battalion of Hill Xl; it is clear to you that this is ny undetected around the enemys part of an organ ized vi thdrawa I. You corn mande r gi•es you the f IIowing flank and arrive in position by 0130. explain the problem to battalion, which warn flu order on Ihe regimental plan: Using the established brevity code. relays to regitiient. But since h-ox [lie main enemy lorce is holed up in you en nt act I—oxCompany by radio to Cotiipanv insists it is in the right posi lnn/er to Oie south. Regiment in let them know you are in position. tion, about all regiment can say is: tends io tim e one conipanvaniuntl ‘Roger that, same here. comes the re “Straighteti it out. The attack goes on each of the enemy lan ks under cover ply. Alter givingyour executi’.eotlicer as scheduled.” otdirkncss to occupy a hlockiniz posi— and artillery f rward observer guid lion on the lo’ ridge south ot Iro’s— About iliis t tue. your 1stP1atoon re ance to supervise the defensive lire— zer.At (14(8).the other tour cutflpittiies ports a ii a rtiIlen u iii t liead ing sottth lottebattalion is in reserve]will attack planning, you move to the bridge to on t he road fronuTrowze r. approach south tltrottuh lrowzer to crush the coordinate with Fox. arriving at (1200. ing the brtdge. What do you do.’ enetn against the BP.A classic ham— You wait 15minutes hut the Fox com ncr—and—anviloperation. mander does not show up. You con Kilo. youwill be part of the am il. tact him again by radio and he replies: (_onhlnencitw at 2100.you will infil— ‘Rouer. Fm in position waiting br REQUIREMENT Irate by Route Red around the eastern you.”To the west you can see and hear In a tithe limit of 5 tiiituutes. give the lank of the enetnv to establish a HP Fox moving around in the icinit\ of orders ott would pass to your subor— in the vicittit’,of Hills XXand 82. on— Hill XL “Prett poor noise and light din ates. to include the in Letit of you tilted north. Your left houndan is discip11neT you think to vourselF.Thti lila o and your lbcus of ellons. Provide 1nn icr Road exclusive. Coordi ni te a sketch of your oil ‘.our left with lox/2/24. ‘ho will he decide 10 walk up to Hill NI to ii nil the plan. any guidance the uttter half of the anvil in the vicin cornpatw corn mander. but as you ap br supporting amis. and a brief expla— ity of Hilt St. [ox witi be coming in proach you decide the situation doesn’t tiation of your plati.
Remember to keep iti mind the intent of your higher comrnanderstj
2mm C Li? C Co a a C C U, C 0 U, U, C U, V 0 Scenario #7
Securing Cam-Pijuna
SITUATION The battalion commander calls you hours located antiair positions (twin— You are the commander of Compa to the coin ma id post to tell you that barrelled 23mm AA guns) on Hills 425 ny F, 2d Battalion. 2d Marines, con battalion will undertake operations in and 307. a tiiortar position on the west ducting peacekeeping operations in a tended to relieve the cities under con ern edge of town and prepared de lb rd Worid count n torn by ethnic trol of the Early Retirists. As the first fenses (which may not all he perma civil war. The terrain is mountainous. phase of this campaign, he gives your nently occupied) east and south of rugged. a id thickly vegetated. Most co mjiany the following iii ission: town. The Early Retirists regularly lo cate their positions among the local roads are vol nerable to ambush from In the next 48 hours, capture ant se the nea div Iiigli ground. Veliides are cure the town of Cam—Pljunain order dwellings. restricted to roads; loot forces can to facilitate immediate relief opera The battalion commander gives you move anywhere (though slowly and tions by helicopterand/or ehicle and this additional guidance: sometimes wiili difficulty) except the to facilitate subsequcnt operations to • Mini inize collateral damage to lo steepest terrai it Your region is con relieve Pendjetan and tlensjkula. You cals, their homes. atid crops. are the battalion’s main effort. trolled by a action known as the Early • It is not necessary to clear the Retirists. who are opposed to the ma— [he S—2telIs you that Ca iii—Pljuii a Cam-Pljuna Road: follow-on forces jo riiv local population and who are normally Iias a population of several will be responsible for their own prone to iii istrea t the locals and to har thousand, b tft it is und ear how tn any route security. ass peacekeeping lorces. The mountain have fled the city in recent weeks. ‘[he • If you can secure the landing zone city of Cam—U una some 10—12kilo local population is not expected to (LZ), battalion can reinforce with one meters to your north west is strategical cause trouble but cannot he counted compatiy by helicopter within 3 hours. ly.important because it isa gateway to on for much assistance either. The • Any weapons company assets you the nio on talimos interior and controls permanent garrison of Early Retirist require are available. the mai ii roads to the cities of Pend— forces at Cam—Pijuna is estimated be jelan and Bensjkula, All three cities tween 50—75.Their training and mo li;tve been cut off Fr a couple wceks nile are estimated at poor—to—average. REQUIREMENT and are in need of food and medical They are equipped with small arms. In a time limit of 30 minutes, devel supplies. Cam- Pljuna is important light machineguns and mortars. Their op the plan you ould use to accom also because it is OflC of the few places night—vision capability is limited. A plish your mission. Remember to in with enough open Ilatland for a large motorized mach inegun unit of four or clude your intent. lbcus of efforts, any helicopter landing zone, through which live vehicles based at Petidjetan regu plans for the use of supporting arms. relief supplies can he introduced into larly patrols the route Pendjetan— and any coordinating instructions. the interior. Cam—Pljuna is accessible Cam-Pljuna—Bensjkula. Any enemy Decide what weapons company assets to vehicles only by way of the narrow rcinihrcemeims will conic fwtii Pend you need. Then provide a sketch and switchl,ack road 1mm the southeast. jetan. A flyover within the last 24 give a brief explanation of your plan.
What weapons company assets do you need, and why? 09-6S dd SOS UOISSflOS!pOd Scenario #8
Raid on Gazebo Ridge
SiTUATION my position and move directly across Ii is predawn. after a typically chaot Gaiet,c, ridge, in between. giving the your front to the other hank. Th rough ic and bloody desert baltIc during Op Indigenous boys a heating. Our divi Sian relieve lie pressure your the eration HOLYWARRIOR.You are the has orders to binoculars you see enemy the Indigenous Division. Unldr— first sergeant of Company A. 2d Light on tank commander look over at you, ap iunatelv. fuel is low. Division has parently without recognition, and wave. Armored Infantn Bawd ion. The corn— enough hr a limited operatitni. s tuch You return the greeting. pany’s last remai iii ng commissioned naturalt will he us. We will make a You tn to raise battalion on the ra olhcer was killed in Ihe ape ni ng mo— raid directly mb the enenn rear while dio. hul comm is dead. The Charlie cents of yesterdays battle: since then the rest ol the division pulls back for ou have commanded the company. replenishment. First sergeant your Company comniander tells you lie will relay messages to battalion. As of this morning. All a Corn pa ny boys will he on the right: I can give You see consists of six light armored vehicles voii a seciioii of two OW Cidi ras in an artillery batten position in the hollow of with 25mm cliai n guns (LAV—25s) diicc! support. 13ravo on the left: the crescent pounding each cartwing only two or three scouts: Cia rIiea nd Delta arc reserves,on the away at (lie friendly threes to the east. right and left respectively.Initial main You see trucks and clusters of troops twci assault gun varia nts ILAV—AGs): elh,rbis Al[a. \Wl I Iiave one hatberyof going disinterestedly about their morn— Iwo -lOW Variaii ts LAV—ATsI: antI an ( sd led in direel support. lpropel arty i ng clinics. You see air—clelenseariant with Stinger and a cluswrs of five or I can’t give you an) instructions six tanks on either flank of the posi— 25mm gun tL7\VAD). the 25mm about whal to do until we meet the en— ti L.AV—25Ii Ii on. the crews milling about dis— cliain gui o ii the res igh cnn. I in doubt, raise as mncli havoc mounied. and field guns lining the es— explosive (I-IL) and armor piercing as ou can—inindlil of the fuel sittia— carp ciciii. also firing to the east ..At the (AI’) iou ntis vi Ii a max ici UHi dice— non—hut do not get cotnmitied to a the range in sour practical experi set baitle. lIthe enemy striks back in center of (lie crescent. aniong a cluswr of smaller vehicles, enor— ence) of ahou 1.500 mc teis. i’h e nice, pull hack: use oti r superior you spot an 105mm LAV—AG has an eliective speed to hrcak contact, lb t it’s iinper— mou 5. tw’o—ston’com nia nd veliid e. ati \ e tftat ou act hiddl) to take some range of about 2.500 meters. ‘the bat— which you recognize as a captured pressureoff our friends in the east. We utlion has been in inlense combat for U.S. model. Ani azi ngly. the ccc niy move out in one hour. Any qtieslions? seems unaware oL or at leasi 5 days running, and you are hoping uncon You arrange vi th the Cob ras to Iiov cerned about, dr a day off to pull ma inIctiance. No your approach. er out of sight to your rear on til called such luck: as your gunner heats up the You are now nearly within the and organize your three as shown on cohee, a messenger arrives with in horns of the crescent. The cluster of the sketch. Uncertain as to what you structio ns to report to the hal tal ion enemy tanks on the far left starts to will encounter, you rem hid velucle show signs of life: one by one you see coin niand post inimcdi a(ciy. com ii a nde is of the co iii pa ny’s ‘Do as \ou arrive at the co ci ii and vehicle the diesel signatures of the engines I do: IhIlow die leade r” stacdi ng ope r— in the dark: the battalion commander. revving up. There is a sudden flurry of ating procedure. activity around a captain who began the campiligli as the tanks, You sense it is the ninmeot you r company corn ma nder, sa s with In the approaching dawn. vnu ap— of truth. a scii Ic. “G cod morning, skipper.” proacli the rear of the encniy posi— \hu don’t like the wa he is grinning don—a low, crescent—shaped escarp— REQUIREMENT at ow something must lie ui. Lucky meni—apparently unnoticed. You are In a time limit of 5 niinutes, de lie IiUt ou through all those tactical less than 4 miles awa. In the distance scribe the action you will take in the decision games. you niuse. lie gets to your left ou can see the veli ides of form of the fragmentan order you will down to business: Bravo Company advancing in dis— issue to your subordinates. Make sure PCrsed forni atm n towa rd Ilie ecc my to describe your intent We’rehere. Puinting on the map with and designate positions Iarthier north. You see an en your lheus of eflbrts. Include a pencil.l The Indigenous Division is an over here, lAnoiher jab sonic 25 miles to emy tank detach itself from a small lay and a brief explanation of your tIle east.l The enemy is here on cluster on the extreme left of the ene— plan.
24 (0 D • C, 0 C a) 0) •0 0 C 0 S C’, 0 4OIIt(g
0 0 C C,
0
0
0 Wi. Ici:i icli ijj
Aawto
0 0, z0 C 0
0
0 P 0) a 0
0
no pO —t “a co 0 I... L0 a Ct 00 C wQ0a a) o a 0 Co Scenario#9
Enemy Over the Bridge
infantry occupying ynir assembly area SITUATION in strengtli and continuing to rein You are the corn manding officer of’ force. The size of these enemy units is 2d Battalion. 6th Marines. Your bat unknown but estiniated to he at least a talion consists of two rule companies company. Further, the STA platoon on loot, one rifle company on trucks, a commander reports he has just meta weapons company. a lank company (mi reconnaissance team that was operat— nus), and a TOW section on HMMWVs. ing north of the river hut has been The Dragons and heavy mach inegu ns forced south across the river under of your tapons company have been lire. The reconnaissancelearn leader attached out to the rifle companies. reports there is no sign of friendly Friendly Ihrces hold the bridge and lbrces holding the riverline or the the river] inc. (You understand the riv bridge and that enemy infantrv units er to be unfordahie.) Reconnaissance with some light vehicles have been elements are operating nonh of the moving across the bridge for at least river. Tomorrow morning the division 30 miii utes.Th is is all the inform ation begins a major oflensive north across the ST4 and reconnaissanceMarines the river, with the division’s locus ot can tell you. effortsin 6th Marines’ zone. Your bat As the battalion co iii in an der, vliat talion will spea rliead the regiment’s will you do? attack, and as such will he the initial regimental focus of eflbrt. REQUIREMENT You are to occupy the assembly area With in a 5—minutetime limit give shown on the map west of Hamlet in your solution in the Form of the l’rag— preparation for the morning attack mentarv order youwould issueto your across the river commencing at 0400. subordinates—to include the intent You are moving north toward the as— behind your plan. your lbcus ofelThrts senibly area as shown. At 2000, your and any use of supportingarms—and surveillance and target acquisition support it with an overlay sketch. (STA) platoon, which is fonvard re Then give a brief explanation of the connoitering the route. reports enemy reasons behind sour decision.
Ask yourselC “iat is the cdtical element in this siwationT’
26
I
p
h
5] I - ______
Scenario #10
Gap at the Bridge
Knowing your enemy means under across the river—sooner than your di (STh) platoon report that H standing his capabilities and general vision can be ready to attack in shows no signs of enemy activit intentions. But it also means seeing strength. Your mission, which gives your leading company moves mt things the way he sees them, thinking you broad latitude in the manner of triangular wood west of HamleL an the way he thinks, with the aim of an— execution, it to take whatever actions STA team located on the high gr licipating his actions and thereby you can to forestall or disrupt the ene souihwesi of the wood reports an gaining the upper hand. This situation my attack in your sector. column approaching from the is the same as in Scenario #9 with one A patrol by one of your companies headed toward your position. lh very significant dilibrence: This time discovers that the enemy forces that team sends the following report: you are the enemy. were holding the bridge have with Enemy force.estimate at leastI drawn. The aggressive company com iL SITUATION ion strength.moving north on F mander has already begun to infiltrate road, at the intersection sciuitt I’! oliicer of You are the commanding his company across the bridge. You pass: covered trucks, jeeps. in 1st 5th Marines. Your bat Battalion, decide to exploit the situation by on foot: I can hear tanks in talion consists of one reinforced rule getting your entire battalion south of lance but do not have a visual. company on trucks, two reinforced ri the river with an eye toward mounting 1:1 Simultaneously. a short fir on foot, a tank platoon lIe companies a spoiling attack. In the process. one of breaks out with what appears to and an antitank (TOW) section on your companies has an engagement enemy patrol moving mb the tHat The Dragons and heavy HMMWVs. near the bridge with an enemy scout wood Prom the south. \‘oti sosf of your weapons com machineguns car, which flees west along the river may he the advance guard of(het are attached out to the coin- pany road. You contact regiment and ex column. As the battalion comm division is temporarily panics. The plain the actions you have set in mo what do you opt to do? halted. hut the division commander tion. The colonel tells you he will rein plans to resume the offensive toward force with all the forces he can muster: REQUIREMENT the south as soon as logistics can be infantry and tanks will begin to arrive Within a 5-minute time limi brought forward. You have been oper 2 to 3 hours. He designates your in your solution in the form of th ating north of the river against enemy battalion as the main effort. You have order you would issue to your so reconnaissance and security elements. the priority of fires for all supporting nates and support it with an 0 The enemy holds the riverline and the arms, he tells you. sketch. Then write a brief explal bridge in strength. (You understand 2000; darkness is your actions, giving the key c’ the river to he unfordable.) Intelli The time is about of of your assumptions that gence indicates that the enemy is descending quickly. Elements erations and acquisition decision. planning an imminent offensive north surveillance and target your
How lI kno\4ng how you reacted to “Enemy Over the Bddge (Scenario #9) influence your actions now that the combat boot is on the other foot? 1..
15 (it
06des ‘woqoe o8nr Guano aqs Lq p.jndd. euii 0L09 ‘dd set uajImcfl lCd Scenario #11
Enemy Over the Bridge, Continued: A Thwarted Plan
This situation is the continuation of teet the deployment and advance of Scenario #9, “Enemy Over the Bridge.” the main effort and divert the enemy’s The actions described here are based attention from the bridge. on a solution to that problem submit As executive officer, you moved be ted by Maj Claes Henrikson of the hind Company F and were coordinat Swedish Army. ing the attack of the two companies in the south. Briefing and preparation SITUATION for the attack by both mobile and foot You are the executive officer of the elements took longer than expected as 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, consisting troops were tired and had been look of a reinforced rifle company on ing forward to resupply and rest in the .1 trucks, two reinforced rifle companies assembly area. At 2130 Company G on foot,a tank company (minus), and an reported that elements on East Hill antitank (TOW) section on HMMWVs. heard loud explosions and an intense As the lead element in a major divi firefight to the northeast. It seemed sion offensive, your battalion was clear that the mobile force had con moving to an assembly area in prepa tacted the enemy, but neither you nor ration for an attack north across the Company G on East Hill were able to river at 0400 tomorrow morning. Al raise anyone with the mobile force on though the assembly area, bridge, and any radio net. Periodic small arms riverbank were supposed to he in couhi be heard for several minutes. friendly hands. at 20(X)your battalion then artillery began impacting in the discovered this was not the case. An vicinity of East Farm. At approximate enemy force of at least company size ly the same time. Company F reported has seized the bridge and occupied contact with the enemy south of the your assemblyarea. original assembly area. At about 2145. Recognizing the importance of the you receive a garbled. panicky report bridge and the need to move at once if from a radio operator on the conduct the division attack is to proceed as of fire net. The mobile force has been scheduled, the battalion commander ambushed with heavy casualties. It is directed the mobile force of Company stopped on the road, disorganized. fire. E (in trucks), supported by Company and now under artillery As the what A (tanks) and the TOW section to at battalion executive officer, do tack the bridge by East Farm Road you do? within one hour. As this was the main effort, he accompanied the force with REQUIREMENT his mobile command group. Com Within a 10-minute time limit re panies F and G were directed to attack spond by developing the instructions immediatel to the northwest across or frag order you would issue and the East Hill toward Hamlet, the original reports you would make. Explain the assembly area and West Farm. The in rationale supporting your decisions tent of this attack was to gain control and provide a sketch map depicting of the main roads leading south, pro- your decisions.
30 Ic
a6ea SUODflIOSO63O 9JJ9799 S&03 QUPV U! pajeedde ewes €LLL dd SS UDISSnOSIPJOd
-3 a
a
to
in
in
6&
get or
feel
ene
sure in
Your
for
been
west min have
com
mini
plan.
forces
enemy heap would officer sorties
a
can of an 12
artillery
three
your
possibil support
has
of
reports
you
at
don’t the air
he
will LAR
river. Make
you your
passes battalion
it
he
the for
lake are
enemy
Your Garagiola designated
of
that,
the
you you Checkpoint since the Garagiola
a
Your
couple
tanks
explanation.
or
and tank
any
estimates
orders
disrupt
the “a
What
statement
a
but
believe
stage
now.
a
sketch
liiling enemy. mechanized
company
swim
the
brief
Tragedia. guidance
and
units?
you
assures
a
enemy ahead
a
nol
dekai
with
considering or.
along
subordinates.
to
this
support.
the
get
to Tragedia
days go
any
LAR
critical, company
the
and
minutes.
At
rate, approaching
by delay
is REQUIREMENT
River does
eneniy fire
is
zone
So been nient
of
your
officer can develop
battle
30 through
to
AAVs
provide
your
a
Colonel?
this
to
LAR
to
he
statement?
west regi lead.
arms
of your FA—l8s.”
include
As
At Time
subordinate
mission in mum advance.
your the ward my sizable the mander detected The massed already ity liaison of rushed. says utes of pass proaching couple about ders. to ing
Then
for
mission
to
a
for
fog
op
two
you
Bat
Riv You
with lank
con
with
tasks Ene after
Corn—
situa
along mech
slowly (LAR) a
gener
moves
aggres
3d
enemy.
of
and infantry
combat.
forced regimeni
force
Androida,
of Androida.
weeks
will
heavy and ihe while
power.
amphibious
indude
east
2 maintaining
at
of
enemy
halted
moving enemy
close infeasible
been to
GaraL’iola
to
with is resistance
it battalions,
enemy attacking
last river,
is
company
and for
the east
enemy
battalion
the
dismount
engagement.
enemy
operations? consisting
order
trucks assault
contact,
have due
combat
the
the
the
to
Battle west
superior
of
mechanized
reconnaissance
The
on
near the on make LAR
last
commander tank
of
contact
a
frag
and
L
For
thai
K own a
reserve
infantry
overrun
section
contact
battalion
is
SITUATION
Garagiola
the
the from
necessary
Marines L.
emphasize of obscured
lost
lacing
in
prefers
west
your
rces
to
down
and
visibility banks your
(AAVs)
your
C
I reestablish
are you
concept
4th armored
your
upon
you
has
effort?
and
TOV
learned a
been
try
since when to
hack
river, ladies
momentum.
Company
You
Poor Sleep
Does
light
panics
talion. vehicles er. Call a company have company anized The Company mechanized have my posing wearing serving sively consisting the ally tanks only which
lately the tion While west
tent? main
#12
Scenario
I,.
iii
[[I
II
r I I a a ii
ID
of
so
ef
in
of
of
re
re
are
the
you
and
My
and
pos
have
hour
ene
of
into
Make
posi
use
to
across
secure
which
enemy
as all.
enemy
Take
time,
you
missiles)
a
the
What
Tragedia
half
company
you the
get
plan.
for
Androida,
company
sketch crossing
the
focus
road
orders
impassable
a
a
to
68.
armored
River.
reinforce
Battalions,
it
for
that
sonic
ideas.
and
quickly
next
battalion
continuation
near
to
are:
the your
tank
create
preparing
open
as
shorL
force
crush
how
a
for
intent,
antitank
engaged.
of
through
Tank
the
is
the
once
subordinates.
make
up
an
is
you
your
sonic
enemy
Provide
he
ready
us
Additionally.
and
River
to
mechanized
and
spotted
your
that
success.
Garagiola
and
of guidance
he
River
quickly
about
back
and
indicates
(with
your
will
time
1st
have
Checkpoint
finish
Within
attaches
Colonel?
to
arms.
moves
to
the
facilitate
wilt
been any
your
aggressively,
to
REQUREMENT
banks
is
to
opposing
The
report
fallen
leading
explanation
and
advance,
vehicles. include
pass
Garagiota
and
a
thinking
have
along
to
orders.
battalion
already
Garagiola
Garagiola
Garagiola
resent,
bridgehead exploit
force east.
has the the
goal
steep
instructions
sible
Attack
your
any lead
Tragedia.
brief
Although
Intelligence
a
supporting
forts,
minutes
sure
would
the
you
been
at
approaches your
connaissance
your
tanks
As
ceive
my
tions to
has
and
His
the
commander
of
to
of
of
his
the
the
the
has
am
Revisited
slow
#10, ene
Bat
seen
force
your
bring
eflèc
Thick
is
clever
the
enemy
gener falling
At bloody impor
part is
(TOW)
to
against
an
2d
force
days
point
includes
Dragons
the
it
and
a
managed
as
the
Company
regimental
can
of
the
II)
from
and supporting
tenaciously
through
enemy
attached
assault
and
game
#9
making
The
the
only
contact.
over
last
on
antitank
and of
inability
are
enemy
this
The
enemy’s
advancing
F
battalion
advancing
the
(AAVs).
#12.
battalion
obscured
understand
lakeshore
an
illustrate
engagement,
regiment
effective
fighting
the
situation
for
and
battle,
the
to
For
to
and
commander
the Scenarios
has
positions,
an
Your
been
the
and
terrain
the
breaking
lead
is
machineguns
E
disenagin
into
HMMWVs,
SJTUATJON
tank-mechanized
Frustrated
Marines
River
the
strength.
from
Company
of vehicles
action,
then
has
with
Scenario
tning
decisive
the
along
on
advance
situation
but
Irs.
9th
are
seeintz
a
of trucks,
as
before
before
waging As
u
delaying
heavy
use
of
time
enemy
engagement,
east
purpose
since
by regiment.
enemy
companies.
oc
give
on
The
You
the
rate
fog
nose situation.
my
tance
bin
to the
view.
this
last same
from
about
an tive back
been
and regiment battalion arms.
the delaying the phibious
ally section
Weapons G
talion.
Companies
Battle
#13
34 Sccuario For discussion, see pp. 78-80. Game appeared in the Marine Coips Gazette, Dec92; solutions, Feb93.
35
a
it
for
for
se
do.
the
the
lull
and
Bat
have
your
on’j
to
infan
to
subor
enemy
3d
time,
Furhurg
explana
Give
wu
Provide
issue
intent
exactly
first
your
on
contemplat
so
what
guidance
to
based
enemy
planning
is
brief
Battalion’s
to
some
Colonel?
is
your
the
It a
effort.
any
beginning
3d
long
been
minutes.
ideas
been
hours, for
of
pass
Gumbyville.
and
another
10
are
you
marching
48
orders.
plan.
While
have
have
good
is Describe
rationale.
that
focus
pressure.
scenario
arms
last
would
take
take
a
your
your
you
southwest:
occupies
REQUIREMENT
you
the
So
the
your
not
Swamp
of
units.
you
this
elements
pretty
are
reports
under
the
Furhurg.
contingency
of
for
regiment
Since
that
tion
supporting
sketch
designate
What
dinate
ing
some should
this orders
orders.
situation near
back
from
curity talion
regiment try
of
case
a
3d
in
of
on
in
ago
and
two
bat
You
light
flank
rein
of
num
of
east
bridges
Your
mission
battalion
Battalion
generally
officer
(AAVs).
hours
the
until
historical
the
the
Gumbyville.
Dadmamian
battalion
1st
24
Battalion
regiment
consists tank
limited
company.
of
southern
consists
reinforced
from
the
the
2d
one
with
a
hold
vehicles
The
the
west
with
Sphericberg.
which
enemy
advancing
(LAI)
action,
with
which
arrive
river
and
Battle
Battalion
is
across
bridgehead
commanding
now
An
trucks,
near
unit,
identify
a
the
1st
that
can
SITUATION
creek
the
protects on
east
hours.
company
infantry
west. of
You
tanks,
Marines,
you amphibious
the
reinforced
are
72
engagement
your
enemy
the
reserve
battalion,
of
LAI
west
4th
holding
an
in
An You
Can
is
Dadmamian
across
Following the
Battalion
in Creek.
withdrew
tered
from
bers are
forcements fantry
tank
about
battalions armored
the
assault of
#14
3(1 Scenario
I.. * II
it:I.
‘I! II Scenario #14
Fordiscussion, see pp. 81-63. Game appeared Inthe Maine Coips Gazette, Mar93; solutions, May93.
37 Scenario #15
Battle of Mount Giddy
This scenario is a little different of relative pa riIy the enemy being sh’e in that sector within the next 72 from previous ones Icr a couple of stronger in air defense assets, while hours. reasons. l:irsi. ii is of a broader scope you are stronger in offensive air assets. As it turns out, however, the enemy thai previous scenarios: you might Your ground combat element (GC E) buildup in the south is actually a well even argue that ii verges cii being an consists of a mu 10 rized infantry bat executed deception. Instead of striking operanoiul decision game instead of a talion (minus) in the vicinity of Mount Gooselub. the enemy attacks in strength U rely tactical one Seco ntl. it is a Ma— Giddy. one battalion on assault am— at Mount (3iddy supported by niassed rine air—ground task orce (MAGTF) phi bious ehi ides twar Goosel ub, anoth— ohlensive air power. The GCE corn problem—desined lbr a Marine cx— er along (lie rail road west of lied Lake. ma nder also reports that the LAI com— ped iiiona iy b riga (IC(ML B) co ni man— a reinlbrced light armored infantry pa ny and mechanized battalion (in der—in n hicli the requirement is or cc mpa in gun rding the right ha nk the right Hank are under attack but the broad integration of ground. air, twa r 13erra. a tid t ta ii k Iiatta Iion (iii i— holding their own, as is the battalion anti logistics elements rather than just nus) in reserve near Nevertheless. The at (3oosel ub. But lie re1iorts tIi the tactical control of subordinate at lie eliemy Iias ti pe rio riLv(IC roughly two ca ii tic t make co ii tact vi th the motor— units on the ground. to one in ground lorces. ized lialtalion at Mount Giddy, which SITUATION You plan it) conduct a delaying ac— apparently has been overrun. Within tion. trading space lb r lime. )U in— 12 \ou a Fe a ML 13CC)mm a nLIer 15gbt— \ hours scattered situation reports in— tend to fall intl in a coastal desert ihat itIThisexcel back only under pressure. dica Ic IIiaI enemy mccli aii ized and lent mobiliv and freedom for media— niaking the enemy pay 11weven inch armored lorces have reached Never— nized a lid motori/ed li>rees save br of terrai ii but avoiding decisive en Iheless. where they are being engaged the ridgelines. litch tend to canalize gagement. Since yours is a subsidian by elements of the resent lank battal mission. von 101 ‘cli ide mo enie nt. 1he theater st rate— do intend to force a ion. an ri are hegi in ng to bypass g\ calls Icr the Joini [ask Force dcci sion but ra the r Ic ores tall one. Huhi\ headed north along the littoral I lie JTF (lIT I—of nh ich t lie NII B is a part— ollensive has been untierwav plain. to mount a major hind oliensive to for nea rh a week and to t Iiis poi in the By all accoutits a niajor oliensive ward the north out of the Damoose re— ene my oti vuti r Ira nt has Iilaved fl IC) has pe net rated vuti r Icit front and is giun. [he ME Ks iii ission is to protect your hands by remaining relatively in pouring unchecked into your rear. As the ii F\ southern hank. i.e., its rear. active. prohi tig Liut tiCIt t Iirca (ciiing We MLII commander, what ill you you r lb rwa RI i as the ill attacks noril’. Yoti are au— del e is ye posit tons. He do? thorized to trade space Icr lime as has irregular lorces equipped i(Ii light vehicles long js ti deny tlie etieon the operatin out of the bar REQUIREMENT ren desert to (lie nest who Da ii oose—13rut Iitie. Brut being a key periodically Develop a NIEB plan that includes tn to ctit t lie I) amoose rail road, I an port a tid at rfie Id and )a moose being a general concepl of operations (with nportant oh a key l( gist cs node. line communication. In in tent) and brond niissio ns br your telligence has been reporting a buildup ui NIIL13Ct)fli 0 an d dc nieti t (CE) c;CE. ACE, and combat service sup of a rino in and brigade service support group enemy red and ccli an ized pt elements ts appropriate. (Leave it forces anti south of Gooselub BSSG ) are located at I)amoose. Your supplies to you r sta if to vu rk (int the details.) rs. (3—2 aviation combat element (ACE) is lo over the last 45 liou The antici [lie ii provide a brief expl a natio ii of cated at Brute. The air siluation is one pates the enemy will mount an of[en— our plan. I aI
S 4! bad. select pursue is Rommel problems; must then and Erwin One military compromise to aspects Marshal Any varied solution disadvantages. —Held and most ideal the no consequences. is the from advantages there best its accept has and seems
Discussions course which resolutely
NoaHy, it every that
MCCI
The
of bush
advisable
lieadqua
act lions
ple loll acti
geant, instructions.
tiole
loci
of
as
se
are
troduce
tainlv
a
action
42 sll
must
whether
fast.
p
I
Dusk.”
Own
asking
wi
wait
have
been
the
Ii
the
bush.
easy.
to
Initiatiw
u
wing
roble
situation
Everone
u
decision,
tin
ou
a
action
While
thi
rwa
Tile
ii
ty
do
c—to
t
of
witllout
under
p1
fundamental
tl.
again
we
platoon
at Id
n
of initiative.
[Il
platoon
act
agreed
to
br
basically
atoo
The
be
the lilt)
a
rd—wli
not
Our
because
arid
We
us
to
to
I)iscussian
Dusk”
act
s
first movement. at’s
the
Ii
rters
case
nii,netha&’it’, I
reach
there
stm more
ave
the
hat
Cs
instructions,
we
to
rees
and
any
or
act
n
ill
den,
platoon
platoon
lire, or
tenlpo
squad
m
like
essential
rre
tll
the
who
coin This
scenario
go
on
nstructions
us the
that
platoon
the
no
no
in
to
not.
ic
e
Ut
(as
promptly
and
when
Speed
title
may
commander
and
tactical
casualties.
%ti
of
I
Ii seconds
this
case
us
hI
I
back
which
the
do.
coin
in
rest
killming
not
of
platoon
of
by
is
responded
is
is
We
r a
of
a
s a
\Ve’l
the
is
options:
irom
be Ii
lactics—titweliness
the
operations,
nde t
the single
Il
to
a
in
it
no
or
1101 need
wi
Scenario
element
wait
mu
dela
eadq
caught
We
is inns: corn
of
is
has—to
clear—cut into
appeared
no
I
which
be
which
problem,
I
only
squaLl
a
ni
r,
(2)
h
only
see
there
pretty
certainly
count,
n
pi
cannot
from
the
the
approved
cans platoon
leader
Thus
ica
sergea
in
I
taMe u
scenarios.
solved,
‘Am
casualty
pants
I
or
act,
the
or
the
act
it
a
We
u
ned
element
(who
lions rters
in
to
Ii
n
of
“Catch
Marines
platoon ‘reedoill will
platoon
ill
prompt
‘it
#1 includes
ask
straight— mea
bus ica
makes
and
and
killing
above.
exam
leader) on
Ambush
and
we
an ca
in
time
st
“Am
speed nt.
down,
delay
must
poi
some
is
tin
ru
ser
cer ii
riot l
with
ai
with
the
and
am
ye— our
in
has nd
or
so
we
We
c—
In
even
Il
ns
a
if
of
d
I
it
I
of
the
fire
action
better
enemy
ble
of
decisive
ask
right
trapped
A
the
cli (3)
effectively
vent
tention
coulpl
(2)
toon
emplaced
at,le
in
tire
will
rise tire
the
the
So, won
I) leave lay
doubleiime you a
the
ui
on
to
F
ire
The
Sample
sol
a
I
ire
ourself:
fragmentan
j\Vhile
Can
WhaI ‘Wright”
“What
hI
he
the
to
the
platoon
is
rest
mnedevac
teams
looking happen.
tided
and
for tron
ttown
I
or
The
utiotl:
as
to
team
to
;ly
ish
our
‘ye
one
expect
t
by
past.” flillowing
westi
in
action,
he
nove,
double
quickly
on
we
their
down
in
act
ment
fix-and-flank
opeti
get
moving:
the
the
FragO
man idea
Marines
leaders.
can
attack and
the
answer
can
enemy
a
the
one
do
to
and
up
Either
and
to
quickly
at through
bird
base
attack, north
the
and
killing a
of
tire.
to
move.
hittow
tsith us
I
both
to
the
nose
tile
I
base
behind
order
kill
as direction.
the
do
attack
that
squad
on
do
join
gets is
welt
we’re
by
hut
the
of
one
Once
linger.
iii
tire
possible?
bigger
the
rsel the
from
to
platoon
or
provided
ot
at
to
zone
me:
linger
fixing
order
tire
platoon
here.
for
with us.
and
as
he
at
gui
further lire
yes ut
casualty
enemy.
the
once!
we’ll
tea
movement.”
help
leader
e
the
is
an
the
Smnittv
I’ll
one
ns
1
ne
in
picture.
from
reacting
hen.
village
have
with
get Get
to
—Gen
err
[pointing
hile
o
to
mission’!
have
fire
example
cheng/
lo
explain
his base
leader].
the
will
things
relieve
poss’—
—Carl Guns.
to
the
not
move
to
until
your
pre
vet
than
here
on
jtlie
you
even’
the
at
and
Dusk
pla take
of
to
by
‘c
ac
we
as
George
to
von
kick
certaill
hesitate tb freedom
north.
tively
down.
toon—i.e..
by
force
nloves
im’ith
best
toon
ority
the
still
the
mea
has
ate
nearby idea.
comrades,
to
wounded
firepower.
the
ing
this?
save
Saving
on
gone
swer.
and
decided
alized
Linportantly,
Most
Clausewitz
n
The
him
want
rd
wounded
S.
ene
o
the
all
ns.
the
fronl
way
freedom
can
killing
crating
plenty
green-star
a
of
tire
the
nlv
decisive
First. macli
Irom
levi
Several
so
By
that
engage The
In
west
id
Patton
amount
immediate
my,
or
short
the
the o/ar’Um:
tire
to
rest
move. in
to
readers
far
jas
seize
platoon.
putting
ng
we
dc
order
until
swinging
which
that
part
inegun do
and
go
by
the
if
in
Platoon and While ti
gravity
paddy.
has
The
and
o/
procedu
per
as
merit
the
nger
can
of
zone
t’ron,
it
of
directly
it.
of
the this
rite
readers
response
the stri
cluster
to
[he
were
of
an
the
increase
the
of
to generating
km
hi’
able-bodied
also
Second.
the
pressure
etkctive
the
recognized
action.
team help
issue
platoon.
king
to
the
How
squad
of
ittitiative
problem
save
(he cover
squad it’s
case
getting
in
of platoon’s
by
i
re].’
village
to
tnmediate,
is
possible
the
sqttad
will
tll
provides platoon
tile
from to
squad
paddy.
not
suggested providing the
which
understandable
part
e
at
can
help
time,
is it’s
tile
enveloping
west
the
if
shift
leader
It’s
our
platoon
suppressing
p11111Cc’
situation
on
to
the
situation
the
lire
our
of
the
can
hack
not
is
we
standing
from
aid
back
to
platoon’s surrender
the
that
there
the
squad
evacuate
the
he’s
Marines
the ot’fers
his
trying
only
pinned
a
enemy
superi
best
norttm,
squad
evacu
a
simple.
the
et’fee—
of
has
(/01111
posi—
base
from
send
order
only
pla
wise
pla
that
even
the
into
the
our
are
right
and
base
an
do
is
op
a
re
is
to
of A _
fire on the village, we take pressure oIl 4 A_•’, . ‘__ platoon—maybe to the point where the ‘‘4’— _ the platoon regains its freedom of -‘ J’4’ I’. movement and can get out of the rice paddy or can even go into the attack.
ccompIishing the Mission Some MCG readers suggested we should be happy with preserving the platoon and should not try to engage the enemy any more than was neces
sary to allow the platoon to disengage. PRCmdrI4it - a On the contrary, I suggest that al •- -: though the platoon’s predicament is our first concern, it should not he our only concern. We should also be thinking about ways to force the ene :r my into a decisive engagement. As Maj Steven A. Hummer wrote in his .-: :: - solution to this problem. “Our mi.ssion is to locate and destroy the enemy and now is our opportunity.” The fact is — - . ‘ —‘ — II,,, —— __& ‘_ — .. — ‘, that the two ohjectives are not mutual ,III,IIIItI,iII,, i4,_ — 4 —. 2,t ‘ 4— ly exclusive: we can attempt to accom ——_ _,_ ‘ plish both at once. It is generally diffi cult to get a guerrilla enemy to stand and fight. Here we have located a fair -.‘ :—,_2’ — K t.lIfIHIf3flI’’ — .— — — ly significant enemy force and have a chance to destroy it.Although the pla 4r Tra.I toon’s situation is not good and the BoobyTrao — enemy clearly has the initiative, with Dke .,,.., Ricopaddy timely and aggressive action we can turn the tables. In order to do that we S Hootch need to launch a rapid and aggressive Dtstanco - Meters attack. If we generate lire superiority hut do not attack, the enemy will likely 0 25 50 100 withdraw. Likewise, the enemy will likely withdraw after dark, when the effectiveness of his fires has decreased. simple base of fire and enveloping at or distracts the enemy: the extraordi Either way. we have lost contact. Not (c/i ‘i)forces act when and s here tack in this scenario to the comple nan’ good. their blows are not anticipated. Should mentaty employment of the ground the encmy perceive and respond to a and aviation combat elements of a Complementary Forces: the Cheng and c/il maneuver in such a manncr is to Marine expeditionary brigade in Sce it, maneuver would aul Ch’i neutralize the nario #15. The ancient Chinese warri omatically become chcn’. Not only does this problem demand or-philosopher Sun Tzu wrote that offensive action, hut the situation of victon’: Morn recently. the lamed British milita fers a tailor-made opportunity for at ry historian and theorist H. H. Liddell tack. We don’t have to think in terms is due to operations of the c/il Hart wrote that: and the chetig Lnormall of making the attack all by ourselves. Iextraordinaryl In war the power to use two lists is an forces Generally.in battle,use the The platoon returning fire from the inestimable asset. To fint with one normal force to engage use the ex rice paddy is a ready-made base of fire fist and strike with the other yields an traordinary to win. , . . In battle there for a squad envelopment from the advantage, but still greater advantage are only the normal and extraordi north. Similarly, by taking the enemy lies in being able to interchange nary t&ces, hut their combinations under fire from the north, we may re them—to convert the feint into the are limitless . . For these two forces real blow as the opponent uncovers lieve pressure on the platoon enough reproductive: their inter are mutually himself. for the platoon to go into the attack. action as endless as that of inter This situation provides an excellent locked rings. And in the quote at the very beginning example ofa concept of such basic im of this discussion. Gen George Patton portance in tactics that we can call it a Marine BGen Samuel B. Griffith, Sun expresses the same thought in his own tactical fundamental: the use of com Tzu’s translator, explains: particularly eloquent way. plementary forces, sometimes various The concept expressed chcng, “nor The idea behind the eheng/chl or ly called the cheng and ch’i or fix-and- mal” (or “direct”) and c/i I. “extraordi fix-and-flank is to prevent our enemy flank, We’ll see the concept time and nary” (or indirect”) is of basic itnpor from reacting eflectively to us by fix again in infinite variations, from the tance. The normal (cheng) force fixes ing his attention in one direction
43 while we strike from another. In other not he too difficult. As Capt James R. supporting us by fire (and will he re words, we eliminate his freedom of ac Sinnott pointed out, any number of questing supporting arms), and will he tion. Without our cheng to occupy or simple methods exist to signal the pla ready to shift those lires as appropriate. hinder his efforts, the enemy can shift toon to cease or shift its fires (which As Sgt M. R. Hetzler succinctly to meet our thY with his lull strength. should he covered in unit standing op wrote of this scenario when it ap But by using complementary Forceswe erating procedures)—e.g. hand-thrown peared in the MCG: Force our enemy to disperse his efforts smoke grenades. pop-up pyrotechnics. If anything, this problem should show in different directions, while our ef or even M203 smoke rounds. As for the player the importance of mine forts. although coming from different supporting arms and the medevac. we diate action (IA) drills .., There is directions, have a converging effect. have to count on the platoon to take no time to think, only to act when The concept of complementary forces care of those. your buddies are under lire. If you’re applies to the defense as much as to following the prescribed drill, every one should know what’s going on. the offense. In the defense we strive to Immediate Action Drills establish positions that are ,nittita’ Speed.simplicth’.and aggrcssil’cncssare Perhaps the most important ele the keysto IA drills, and this supporting, so that in order for the ene situation ment in coordination in a situation clearly shows how they can he used to my to attack one he must first expose such as this is the mutual understand react to a situation and save the livesof himself to the fires of another. The ing and trust that must exist among your men while destroying the enemy. concept applies as well to the comple the different individuals and elements If the platoon commander has mentary use of weapons systems. in trained in the platoon. As discussed earlier. his Marines properly. “Ambush at which context we call it conthined this is a situation that calls for imme Dusk” will not pose a problem for our (inns. The complementary use of dii— diate action. Appropriately enough. squad leader fhr he will know just what lërent weapons systems creates a di immediate action drills are designed to do and just what to expect from the lemma for our enemy—in order to specilically for just such situations. A platoon. avoid the elkcts of one weapon he well-trained platoon will have prac must expose himself to another, With ticed “plays” for dealing promptly and Historical Note in a lire team, for example. we use the eikctively with likely situations. A typi This scenario was based on an actu squad automatic weapon (SAW) to pin cal counterambush drill for a ihr am al situation faced by 1st Platoon, an enemy down, which makes him vul— bush (such as this) calls for the elements Company D. 1st battalion, 9th Ma nerahle to the M203 grenade launcher. trapped in the killing zone to imme rines near Da Nang in the summer of If he tries to move to avoid the effects diately seek cover and return fire. 1966.as described in Francis J. West’s of the M203, we cut him down with the while elements not in the killing zone “Mines and Men,” Small Unit Actions SAW. immediately maneuver against the en— in Viernani: Sumnie,’ 1966. The booby emy. using the trapped elements as trap was intented to halt a Marine pa Coordination and Communications their base of lire. As the name indi trol in the open—which it did. The Part of our problem in this scenario cates, immediate action drills provide Viet Cong ambush was actually de is that we can’t communicate directly an immediate response to crisis situa signed specifically to get the key mem with higher headquarters. We do not tions. saving the critical moments bers of the patrol. The enemy did not have direct access to supporting arms needed to make a decision and issue open fire as soon as the booby trap or medical evacuation (medevac) for orders. Equally important. with estab went oIL hut waited until the platoon our wounded Marine. How do we co lished immediate action drills every commander, platoon sergeant and corps ordinate our actions with the platoon one in the unit knows what to expect man came forward to investigate—as and get the support we need? from the other elements, making it they invariably did. Fortunately, the First, we keep our plan as simple as easier to coordinate efforts, even with enemy snipers missed their marks, hut possible to mini mite the amount of out direct communications. Imine— the various elements of the patrol were coordination necessary. Our decisive diate action drills should he practiced separated and unable to communi course of action should be evident to to the point that they become second cate. Squad and fire team leaders had the rest of the platoon. Given a simple nature for the unit to act on their own initiative, and plan, the distances involved and the As squad leader in this situation we through aggressive action were able to nature of the terrain, even without di— know that the platoon expects us to mount a hasty attack and overcome mct communications hetween the squad maneuver against the enemy from the the resistance. The Viet Cong fled and the platoon, coordination should north; we know that the platoon will he from the village. *** * *
44 l)iscussion of Scenario #2
Platoon Ambush
‘in all operations a moment arrives when brave decisions have to be made if an enterprise is to be carried through.” —AdmSir Roger Keyes
“He wins who fires first and can deliver the heaviest fire.” —ErwinRommel
Seeing the “Bigger Picture” derstanding of the “bigger picture the platoon commander’s order and should provide a frame reference “Platoon Ambush” is a cough prob of theret’ore is not covered by the plan. or all our decisions. Furthermore, as 1cm. As with “Ambush at Dusk.” this Second, it poses a signiticant threat to scenario places a squad leader in a stt a general rule, we should think at least the saflty of the platoon and the ac ualion in which, on his own initiative. “two levels up” and not just one. In complishment of the platoons mis lie must make decisions and lake ac other words, a platoon commander sion. Therel’ore. we have to do sonic tions that impact at a higher level. The would consider the battalion situation thing about it. platoon laces a dilemma: a presuma in making his decisions. Likewise, a bly favorable occurrence in the ap squad leader would normally consider Critical Vulnerability—Ours proach of the convoy as expected and the company situation. (In this partic Another way to look at this is in a very threatening occurrence in the ular case the platoon is acting inde terms of critical vulnerability—in this unanticipated appearance of the ene pendently.) In making his tactical de case not the enemy’s vulnerability, but my patrol. Our hypothetical squad cisions the commander at any level our own. In this situation, are we criti leader is the most senior member of asks himselL ‘What can I do at my level cally vulnerable? Definitely. There is the platoon who sees the dilemma. to help the higher situation or further the the potential ‘or real trouble here. Of Unf&tunately. due to technical prob accomplishment of the higher mission?” the two enemy forces—the convoy or lems. Iiis landline communications In this scenario the platoon com the patrol—which is more likely to with the platoon commander aren’t mander’s orders did not specifically threaten us critically? Clearly, the pa working. He is thrust into the position cover what to do in the event of an en- Irol for it is moving toward the pla of having to make decisions at the pla cnn force coming in from behind the loon’s flank or rear and is in a position loon level. A lot of the responsibility platoon: the platoon commander anti possibly to destroy the platoon or cut for the success or survival of the pla cipated forces coming down the road it oil from its route of escape. toon in the next few minutes will rest from Depot hut not through the woods. on his shoulders. We could argue that dealing with any A New Situation Can Make Orders In order to act properly in this situa unexpected enemy movement from the Obsolete tion. we (as the squad leader) must east falls under our squad’s general The one thing the platoon comman think not just at the squad level, but at mission of flank security. But even if der’s orders were explicit about is that the plaloon level. We must look at Ihe this were not the case—if dealing with we were not to open fire until the aim bigger picture” and consider the efThcts the enemy patrol were clearly not part hush had been sprung. But those in of our decisions on the larger outcome. of our squad’s assigned mission—we structions clearly were based on con This concept applies at all levels should realize we must act anyway for ditions and assumptions that no longer and is important enough that we can a couple of reasons. First this enemy exist and are no longer appropriate call it a tactical fundamental. Our un development was not anticipated by given the new developments in the sit-
45 to
to
as
in
or
ar
it
hut ac as a
(I
the
the oil
al to
pre
the
the
risk the
the
this
pa’ deal be The
the the pa ele the
wait. leave Our po runs
site
in wait. this
zone, ene
light likely
might
forces
tipped
wait patrol is from
major
a
deploy
he let
to
(send
to
cut holding to
threat
wait by
give
wants
leave advan and the
a we io possible chooses. the
once.
the we to the might can’t whether
condo
begins platoon. in a patrol,
he
to with
to
abort
convoy
by
think
You at
he wt
more we
commander
greater
all
so
of killing road
is
we
I
that initiating
which choose
can
hut
have coni’Ol: squad trouble.
with the enemy
sacrifice elket able
enemy You
element
being deployed
the
patrol, will
with
regard
worst
patrol
ambush deal
squad the strike Of
he the
the
up. longer by that time we ambush
the
accomplishment commander
is
in longer
We
against become enemy and
what
patrol,
our the
the
to of
If will the if
much deal may
the firelight
that
or
both
longer only
ridge convoy
is to our patrol waiting
before with
no
option the reach platoon
and realize
the
tile
The
must to
west,
the
we to
commander riskvi situation
we
too
argue
convoy
by
thus
the rest to
platoon us
our the
the already
with Depot. Once
and are
the
Deploy
about
decide
through
Stoke
platoon platoon allow
and is
is
We
attack
once—the
patrol.
about platoon,
this
platoon,
on convoy,
3: the of Strike
is that
immediareW
might surprising
to
once. it
we
the
that
4: engagement nearby
moves at
we give between platoon The have poses by deal surprise
another
in
possible protect
And
5: once the
something’s highly the strike might
woods, commander pass ORP.
at
the mistake.
the
the platoon the
striking of
patrol just of
It disposed
to
u’orfl’
commander). to wait. mission. an We
of
it is
to as
and
reinforcements
a
we fact,
time to
the
option is to
to
the strike
in
the
the
so it that Option
both platoon argue
the
that to
the You on
woods, that
is
in
closer with the patrol Option run information
best
patrol.
.
in
Option
converge thinks
to direction
becomes
•
patrol. the of
pared • don’t tion gue more along
do. open letting off but the choice
off also However, platoon ing against
the to
it with
the scenario. from we
southwest gains patrol threat ORR ford
situation
fourth my ing up
platoon he ments platoon both think
trol:
one tageously. meanwhile, position
deal trol option. ginning element convoy, the sition against
ambush.
a
al
we
are is get
We for the
de
not
of
as
by def
am
at
in
mis
the
en
de
We sit
is
pla best
late.
run
that time is
could pla The
send
what
corn—
level
clearly
ask
the
send
deci
a
platoon do situa
Instead. leader
continue the
enemy
can’t
problem
the what the
the enemy by
His with. he
case, such
too
conclu
the It the
none I
from
situation inform
case isn’t and
him
to
any
that
or
the we
poses.
of can like ellectively
commander unforeseen
be the two
hurried
else.
the
this. this
factors to situation
nothing at
to
the
minimum, can accomplish platoon that
dealt this squad
make.
platoon, higher
squad we
even
parrot
the
the
In that
tactical information
all
definite mission?’
there gotten
of
up
with and
patrol. to argue
in
should
to he platoon:
a
the the of
of
decision. observation.
convoy the it situation, our speeds. the
the reach
the
his
actually
is
platoon isn’t
threat thinking decision,
do
Do? anyone
to we Doing
understands
certainly
to
have
the
deal right? the
of ‘What
a
the is
we
the
Ignore suggest intuitive
the
understands
to get time
niight
higher
that absolute the Report
his help
working,
We to I
leave
sketchy
each
communicate 1: of estimate
to
will
than
Assuming
is
2: leader’s development.
There
hack commander
relative
the
must
He the
argue, to
needs
considered
ftirther
the positions
great
beat
You
the
Do
almost
making make what
he
accomplishment hut
the
first-hand
option.
ignore
mLvsion. our
warn
By back
we
make commander were
of
not. the
all
himself, new
line of or
to
too
In
threat
At
Unfortunately.
their an to
site. better that
on
will on
the level
Option options? commander remember, Option
squad landline might
into possibly knowledge
What
commander)
of
it
that
the
Having that.
subtleties
relative
•
do.
him
ment tion asks sions my
Consequently,
our
So have initely here and ways cannot poses of the original sion. runner utsinienons. probably the bush cision you
platoon runner, for mander situation, to instructions ner. Furthermore. toon
person formation tire based
messenger. the the forces,
can’t to gree bottom
went based toon uation (who,
sion
it
it
If
of if
by in
is
the
is
the
en the
the
in—
best en an out we
not
not
that one
pla pur
de may led
am— the
giv
a
pa
you
don’t pres rela
con
possi
likely upon
of
a
should
is
the for west
safe
weap
attack
the doesn’t even patrol.
enemy
the
security our
rallying
patrol.)
leads, good.
case
coming
the position
platoon initiative
aware ill usual—
trail
given contains
is the it
will
vehicles
damage. target
the we
have thus the a most
our
approach
than check a a an
will extremely we ‘
ambush
patrol.
of
due
a
certainly— patrol with
use
not Again,
to the
on
at
And to
restrained good and not in
aware
trail other direction.
for planning
more
the
than
coming
the
to patrol
unit,
To?” Although
rearof us the some
likely—hut
and
with
which
enemy
is
big
he
the
likely
is
ignore time.
animal
exactly idea feel
bigger
merely and Also
platoon
the flank
platoon
way.
objective
seems do
look go. target.
protecting Up in heads patrol
ihe the probably with
discover
themselves away
whatever
will
planned. is
once
much
the
have although
When it
will before situation
after they’re
will
the
bigger
the it how convoy
are route depends
IF
strike
the another platoon. the had
the
it
area, as
can’t without the
includes
but it
if to
not is
What
combat maehinegun
into things too a let
enemy the we
don’t take lot
its oft?
where
the we
a
is
and
patrol,
which
which
Enemy and target
our
We
security.
into already of
sergeant on
from
area
if not
lucrative shouldn’t
rear
platoon the (A
to definitely conjunction
you
trail
follow
of
on lead good.
area, vulnerable strike
short,
even tactical
of presence. does
bite
coining that away Thinking ourselves not
support the
the for
A
eating
in
convoy
advance
to?”
we to nothing, it’s
the
convoy
to
our much things
can
is
If
the
is
Instead.
In
that
exactly
But rear
Force
Not
own does.
any
(ORP),
part
patrol
in
convoy,
situation.
up
security do
the likely
best
couple
beforehand, give
likely vehicles
ourselves. ambush
crossed, directly
presumably
team
platoon
bridge view. speeds itself
patrol
The
a handle, and
how
big.
In
a
the
the strike
rough
we
Compl
uation: them.
will new “What’s
ask judgment emy bility patrol pose.
platoon’s patrol. ambush. know our their loon. Follow very appears
we the will
fire point its emy’s the run hush
unlikely ut some good. the to
sprung—a ence of If patrol
definitely—arrive may ing tive
hush
Conversely, into voy. eight ambush, but ambush cided
too and
convoy by can ons, 46 especially by sion. based on our knowledge of the ploys against the patrol. A few explo Observations situation, that it is too ambitious and sions on the road some distance away For such a simple problem there are risky for the platoon to try to spring will not necessarily alert the patrol to a lot of difficult factors for our hypo the original ambush while also strik the possibility of the direct threat to it thetical squad leader to consider. Un ing the patrol. So we can send the mes self. We should probably plan to with like “Ambush at Dusk.’ in which one senger to the platoon commander with draw the mortar at some point to the general course ol’ action presented it the recommendation of foregoing the relative safely of the platoon position. selL this problem has several drasti convoy and going after the patrol in cally different solutions, any of which stead. Thus the patrol becomes the Option 6: .4mhush the coni’ov,flxtile might work. You might argue that any new target. Being a platoon-level deci patrol. There is another way besides commander would be hard-pressed in sion. this certainly would be a gutsy striking directly at the patrol to pre the time available to consciously con decision for a squad leader to make. vent it from threatening the platoon. sider all the factors we’ve discussed, but a better one than Option 4. That is instead of our be h going after And you’d he right. There simply isn’t cause it leaves less to chance. So what the parol. gelting the patrol to conic to enough time to deliberate on all the do we do about the convoy approach us. We can ambush the convoy our various factors and considerations that ing down the road? That’s a close selves. before it can converge with the weigh on the squad leader’s decision. judgment call that depends on time- patrol and become a real problem, us That’s exactly the point of doing prob distance factors. If the convoy is mov ing primarily our mortar, AT4s. and lems like this one. Through practice we intzfast enough to get through the kill M203s. This is another gutsy call by develop the ability to deal with such ing zone before well strike the patrol the squad leader because it is in direct considerations instinctively and in (but assuming that our messenger will violation of the platoon commander’s stantly rather than through reasoned arrive in time to warn the platoon explicit instructions, An enemy securi deliberation. We internalize the pro commander not to spring the am ty patrol would he compelled to turn cess. so that it occurs automatically bush). we might just let the convoy north to investigate. But they would and smoothly without our even being pass through. That way we have one not know that we’re already aware of aware of it taking place. less problem to worry about. (The their presence and are waiting pla for What’s the bottom line in “Platoon won can blow the bridge to prevent them. Alter ambushing the convoy Ambush”? That the squad leader must the machinegun jeeps from coming (making sure that we get the machine- continuously think beyond his own back.) Rut if thafs not the case—il it gun jeeps). we quickly shift to face the level and be prepared to act on his appears that the patrol will make con patrol. Our object is nol necessarily to own initiative in the best interests of tact first or the convoy and patrol will destroy it but rather to keep it fixed on the larger mission—even if it means converge on the ambush site about the us while the platoon (which the patrol making decisions usually resened for same time—we might think about presumably is not aware of) strikes it the platoon commander. As long as quickly dropping a few mortar rounds from the west—another example of you realized that you have to do some on the mad in order to disrupt and delay fix-and-flank. Like the others, this op thing about the enemy patrol which the approaching convoc We should tion is not without risk, If fail to e threatens to hit our platoon in the have already laid the mortar on the smash the head the convoy, of we flank, you’re on the right track. road and should he able to fire imme could be between a rock and a hard dialely while the rest of the squad de place. USMC * * * * *
47 Discussion of Scenario #3
Attack on Narrow Pass
“Undeniably, in a mountainous area a small post in a favorableposition acquires exceptional strength” —Carlvon Clausewitz
‘4Battlesare won by fire and movement. Thepurpose of the movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to place on the enemy. Thisis from the rear or flank” —Gen George S. Patton
Thinking Two Uevels Up—Again body. If nothing else, this illustrates flanks, attacking along the spine of the This scenario generated a lot of con the point that while diflèrent situa high ground to negate the strength of troversy when it first appeared in the tions may exhibit similarities, no two the enemy positions. MCG in March 1991.Although we dis situations are the same. We must solve What about Western Narrow Pass? cussed the importance of thinking at each problem on its own merits, not The patrol we ran into fled in that di least two levels up in the previous according to the way we solved a simi rection. The enemy almost certainly tWO scenarios, it’s a point of such sig— lar problem. Our solution to “Ambush has forces positioned there. The ques nificance that it’s worth making again. at Dusk.” for example. may not he ap tion is how many! Our platoon has al The basic problem in ‘Anack on Nar propriate in the “Attack on Narrow ready reached the east-west road and row Pass” is how the platoon com Pass.” the only enemy we have met are the mander can best l’uriher the accom listening post (LP) we chased off. My plish meni of the battalion’s mission, What’s the Enemy Up To? guess is that Western Narrow Pass is Some readers ‘cli verv strongly that As always, we should tn to get a not as heavily defended—although we the best way the platoon commander handle on the enemy’s intentions. We don’t know for certain. could support the battalion was to know that the enemy has a fairly What about the ridgeline between guard its (lank—as explicitly ordered— strong position at Narrow Pass. but the passes? Our vehicles may not he and nothing more. Others completely this doesn’t necessarily mean a large able to cross, but as Napoleon said, ignored the flank guard mission and force. As Clausewitz’ quote indicates. our infantry can go anywhere two men moved oil to strike the enemy in the the proper use of difficult terrain can can set foot. To this point our platoon flank, either at the bridge or at the confer exceptional combat power to has seen no sign of enemy (brces pass. to take pressure oil the battalion. even a relatively small force. The ene along the ridge. hut again we simply This scenario exhibits other similar my has seen lit to place an outpost don’t know for sure. There are possi ities to the previous ones. As in “Pla south of the dry gully to add depth to bilities here worth exploring. toon Ambush.” while separated from his defense. The fact that the enemy is And what about the enemy’s tanks, the main body with the mission of able to use his heavy machineguns to which we havent heard from yet? If I protecting its (lank, we a discover fire over the heads of his outpost at were the enemy in this situation I threat to the main body. but not from night indicates that this is no hasty po would prefer to hold my tanks in re our area of responsibility. As in “Am sition, but has been carefully pre serve north of the ridge on the Western bush at Dusk.” the main body is heav pared. Without question. this will be Narrow Pass road midway between ily engaged, while our unit enjoys free one tough nut to crack. In fact if we’re the two passes. As the enemy ap dom of action and is potentially in a going to take Narrow Pass. the way to proached one pass or the other my con position to directly help the main do it is not frontally but from the cept would be to drive south through the
48
4 0ther pass and strike the enemy flunk the battalion. As we’ve said before. this proach. Perhaps you know that your via the east-west road south of the would mean surrendering freedom of battalion commander is going to start hdee. action. If w&re intent on helping bat considering other routes across Sanc talion out of its predicament. there are tuarv Ridge and expects his subordi What Are Our Options? more far-reaching ways to do it. For nates to use initiative to develop So where does this leave us? example: opportunities. So you might establish a blocking position. with your Drag Option 1: Guard the flank, let the • Option 3: Launch a flank attack ons arid machinegu ns and most of the battalion COnInlandL’rworn’ about the against the Lqienn’holding the pass. You platoon, on the spur east \Vestern battalion. As LtCol S. A. Clay wrote; might argue that. looking at the bigger of Narrow Pass and at the same time The picture. we know we must do every- great temptation in this situation send a patrol up the spur to the crest of is to display excessive initiative aLthe thing we can to facilitate battalion’s the ridge to ascertain enemy disposi expenseof carrying out very clear-cut. getting through Narrow Pass. and that tions. We don’t know if the ridge specificorders The battalioncorn the best way to do this is to attack the or Western Narrow Pass will offer a way mander instructed the platoon leader enemy holding the pass in the flank. for battalion to get into Sanctuary to guard the battalion’s left flank. You might argue convincingly that the Plain: the only thing we know for cer There was nothing iffy.conditional, or actual problem to the battalion’s front provisionalabout the mission: “Guard tain is that Narrow Pass won’t. From a makes a possible threat to the flankof the left flank” The battalion com central position on the ridge, we are in less immediate concern. (1would ar mander clearly has the right to expect a liatik gue, however, that an enemy counter good position to either of the that his left flank will be screened and passes. or move against the enemy protected; at ihe very will attack with tanks east via Western least he be machinegun positions from the rear. If alerted if a significant threat emerues Narrow Pass is a likely enemy re we push out west along the ridge, we from the west along the road the rocky sponse and cannot simply be ignored.) are also in a uullv. or any of the adjacent terrain. In opposition you might argue that position to continue to protect the battalion’s left flank by Unlike Atnbush at Dusk” or “Pla closing down Westerti Narrow Pass. toon Ambush.” you might argue that in this situation the main body is not What About Battalion? in obviously Simply put, the idea dire straiLs: the battalion Unlike the previous scenarios, in is engaged, is to avoid enemy surfaces heavily true. hut who’s to and this situation our commander does say it won’t fight its way through with exploit enemy gaps. . . we try have communication with higher head out our help? Moreover, in this situa to avoid the enemy where and quarters. No matter what decisioti the tion we do have communications with platoon com mander makes, it’s im higher headquarters. As a result, do we when he is strong and strike him portant that he contact battalion to re have less of an excuse for acting where and when he is on weak or port the situation as he sees it from his our own initiative? Given the appar vulnerable. vantage point and to suggest any pos ently unimaginative tactics of the bat sible options ‘or battalion. talion, you might infer that our battal It’s perhaps a little unfair to put a ion commander will probably not he platoon commander in the position of too subordinates tolerant of who dem our platoon is not a big enough force having to make all these decisions onstrate too much independence. Be to overtake an enemy lorce that has about how the battalion ought to act— cause we’re concerned about battal managed to stop the battalion. But the although it could happen. Hopefull. ion’s success. at a minimum we may American niilitan historian S.L..A. our platoon commander is not the offer to direct supporting arms against Marshall wrote: only person thinking at the battalion the enemy machinegun positions. (We For the infantry soldier the great les level; hopefully the battalion coin might even go so far as to direct one of son of minor tactics in our time . . . is mander has got a few ideas himsell’. our machineguns at the western ene the overpowering effect of relatively Hopefully. our platoon commander is my gun betraying position. our own small amounts of fire when delivered not the only person in the battalion presence in the process.) from the right ground at the right who realizes that we probably ought to Option 2: Attack the enemy izear hour. . [flhe salient characteristic at least start looking at sonic other op Narrow Bridge.As with going directly of most of our great victories (and a tions for getting across Sanctuary few of our defeats) was that they piv to the platoon’s aid in “Ambush at Ridge. That decision ought to belong oted on the tire action of a few men. Dusk,” supporting battalion by this to the battalion commander, and this option is not a good idea, As Maj Dirk As we’ve already discussed, if anybody scenario could just as easily have been is to J. Vangeison wrote. “It ould be fool going take Narrow Pass, it’s prob designed as a battalion problem. If our hardy to rush directly to the aid of the ably going to he from the flank as op battalion commander is intent on battalion under confusing ciitumstan posed to frontally. forcing his way frontally through Nar ces, darkness, and with such a small Option 4: Protectflank while also de— row Pass no matter what, there may he force. This is especially true since tvloping other option.v Perhaps you’ve nothing our platoon can do to prevent battalion seems to he conducting an reached the conclusion that you can’t disaster. But the battalion commander attack around the enemy’s east flank— ignore your orders to guard the flank— certainly ought to be considering other i.e., toward us. Attacking east, we that, in fact an enemy counterattack plans and ought to he open to sugges would put ourselves directly in the line from the west is a distinct possibility. tions from his subordinates. The ques of friendly fires. Moreover, this option But at the same time you realize that tion is: What will it take for the battalion would put us under the fire of the battalion isn’t going to get through commander to shift his axis of advance same machineguns that are engaging Narrow Pass using its current ap away t’rom the Narrow Pass?
4’)
to
al
in
re
left
As
the
hut
this
dis
cer
that
this
situ
that
situ pla
him
from
Front
Does
More
flank
a
of
is
essen helbre
of
as
uSMC
caused
in
impor has
assign
the
and
the
redirect
the
the
decision
position
assump
mission,
is
informa
the
decision.
strength?
realizing
routinely
the
comman
about
is
Ilice
to
the
just
to
know
Pass?
One
in
platoon.
know
through
expects
disaster,
is
best
readers
be
situation.
the
it
from
to
surface
scenario
However,
gaps
guard
more
our
to
develop
commander,
What
consider
in a the
sound
enough
threat ready
the
ridge
can
protect
uncertain
battalion, platoon
information.
to
differing
book
informed
this
lot
should
for
in
gaps
a
Narrow
among
to
so
commander
he
a
ought
the
has is
information
flank
our
leads
our
an
this
commander,
is
‘pushing’
behind
struck
should
we
more
actual
of
needs
in
was
he
commander
unit
of
battalion
develop
Line
reason
cut
probe
widely
ourselves..
hold
good later
interpretations.
he
has
through
should
to
information. than
the
that
halttbaked
Western
gap.
making
make
gain that
the
decisiveness
There
platoon
A
original
for
a
he rear.
*
this
is
when
main
at
to
off
of
and
points
to
commander
to
amount
disagreement
when
battalion
Bottom
should
our
that
enemy
another
loose the
situation rather
power
the
battalion
commit
companies
actively
find
One
suggest
flank?
about
ation
know and
tion ation What
situation the
Indecisiveness
tial astrous,
we
main tain
going
tions complete
tance
lowed
the
such
to der The
and
his that ing
our
for
alizing
and
toon situation,
I to
the
If
of
fo
or
de bet
be
and
ac
usu
Puss
and
and
gaps
out, must
him
ene
*
Nar
the
north
these
won’t
possi
exploit
quick
There
weak
combat
support
LPs.
another enemy
an
through FMFM
words.
moral,
locus
can
surface.
unit vulner
will
We
in
them
war,
in physical
any
lind
reinforce
as act
he our
shift
a
but
continuous
his
or
the
must
we
our
Waighthig:
where
of
strike
and
to
be
commander
“pull”
patrol
presence
other
forces Narrow
we
of
by surfaces
if
I,
we
speed.
a
that
second
may
scenario.
surface.
power that
we
don’t
in
gaps, into
exploit
breach
weak
actual
dispositions.
our
and
may
surface
gap.
a
one
captured
nature
gaps
and
is
sending
the Or
a enemy
action
a
To
exploitable
it
find
the
out
our
[gapsj.
is
reconnaissance.
be
strength.
enemy
lfwe
FMFM platoon
oft’
is
to
know
he
*
Western
or
our
to
permanent
example,
elsewhere—we
platoon’s
combat
the
manner
idea
In
surface
technological,
in
sending
fluid
of
turned
take
any
gaps.
he
or strong
struck
a
our
We
locate
enemy’s
located
funneling
may
For
our
by
the
this
seek
our
avoid
fleeting.
we the
effort
hurn
through
flexibility
4.
when be
seeking
is
clearly
has
going
gaps
has
by
we
chased
continues:
a
enemy avoid
In
to
of
has
to
words
of
he
the
aegressive
rarely
1
put,
it.
enemy
in
is
ridge.
he
to
we
are and
until
he
Gaps
the
in
may
defended
the
redirect
Pass
gap
rapidly.
them unit of
effort
cus
Once
mands
and
vill actively
Due
alty
ridgeline
strongpoint,
capability
straight
Likewise,
try
Option
the
we
aware
actively
In
instructs,
*
ments
ble
ly
that
isn’t
FMFM
to the
In cause
1
is is
row
my
may
know
where
we
Simply
exploit
when ness—spacial. quotes
able. they tual
etc.
gaps
it
is
on
Si
so
its
on
to
the of
on.
or
in
ac
ac
the
D.
first
the
and
first
tor
ene
wat
ene
pours
swirls
new
point.
oF
sim
in
in
will.
it
side
strikes
gap.
to
idea
a
refer
It
Liddell
the
ground,
gain
the gaps
ages
down
earth constant
constant
tactical the
situation
Feeling
analogy
earth
concept:
Eventually
you
the
of avoids
to
shapes
straight
that
*
the
some and
the
for fairly
you
flanks
each not
no
no
lowlands,
tactics
behind
the
and
victory an
oF
Tzu. Michael
at
pour
likened
is
see
able
rush
what
the
on
the
its his
breach,
water
hearing against
enemy
has
war
with
waler
e
points.
it
“expanding
obstacle
to
Sun
water
leading
simply
divine.
Col
away
used
situation
bank one
widening
and
in
crack
the
whether
strength
around
as
all
the
This
another
crack
surfaces
or
important
call
the
water
maybe
the
so the
the
at
torrent
water
around
to
flowing
lobe
our
as
are from
path. Tzu
Says
strength
it
a
manages
Thus,
water
up
hastens
And
been
this
small
with
modifying
and as
as
us
gaps.
avoids
with
wearing
and army Gaps
its
tactics
of
a
of
towards said
accordance
cue
by
Sun
against
your
and
has
there
successive
army
just
in
side
watch
pent
in
he
testing
And any
weakness,
and
and
it
concept
his guises.
unimportant
extremely
army
‘or
finds an
one brings
developed
theory:
is
nature:
multaneously
each drawn
breach,
through
it
driplets
heats
‘rhe
and each
Through
liwe great
dam
may
my.
conditions.
form, cordance
flow victory height
cordance
so
weakness.
an
Now
er.
my’s
this
pitting
It
soft-spot
hut
5t)
This
rent”
Hart
Taking
t’rom
The
thinkers:
Wyly,
various
concept:
surfaces
ple Surfaces Discussion of Scenario #4
Attack on Narrow PassE Continued From Bad To Worse
“Gallant fe/lows, these soldiers; they a/ways go for the thickest place in the fence.” —Adm Sir John de Robeck
“Donot renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed. A mere reinforcement of weight is not sufficient change, for it is probable that the enemy will have strengthened himself in the process. —B. H. Liddell Hart
Different? What’s tion has become much clearer on both ridge, why not keep going . . . Based on the controversial, strongly fronts. Battalion has hit a hard spot divided response to “Attack on Nar and is in trouble while opposite us the What About (he Flank Guard Mission? row Pass” when it appeared in the enemy is weak. At this stage. the way things have MCG.this follow-on scenario was de developed. I would argue that a possi veloped in order to see what sort ofde What Do We Do? ble threat to the battalion’s left flank is velopments in the situation it would Our options are roughly the same as of less consequence than a yen real take to get the hardline “flank guard before. with the exception that “pull and significant th real to its t’ront. How cr5” to change their minds. ing” the battalion across the ridge west much worse can things get? However. What has changed from Scenario of Narrow Pass is probably no longer I think we have gotten lucky on this #3 to Scenario #4 that might (or viable (as we’ll discuss). count. I think that there is. in facL a might not) lead us to change our plan? Even if we decide to interprel our real threat to the battalion’s flank. It is In the Former scenario, battalion had mission narrowly and maintai ii a the group of vehicles assembling (some made contact with a sizable enemy blocking position to protect the battal what belatedly, in my opinion) north force—had hit a surface—hut was not ion’s left flank, 2dLts Brian J. Don of the ridge. Again (and always) trying necessarily in dire straits. Meanwhile, ovan and Thomas C. King suggest that to figure out the enemy’s plans. I think it seemed that the situation in our area we shouldn’t do it in the immediate vi the enemy intends to move his mobile might oiler sonic opportunities (in the cinity of Checkpoint 37. The enemy forces south via Western Narrow Pass form of gaps). although we didn’t yet has already located us there twice. An and strike east against the battalion. know for certain. In the latter, it’s be artillery mission has landed a short It’s the most logical enemy coun coming increasingly dear (to us at distance away. We’re just lucky he termove. So. how have we gotten least) that battalion is going for the isn’t more proficient with his support lucky! From the ridgeline we can pro “thickest place in the fence”—as Adm ing arms. (Or maybe he’s too busy fir tect the battalion by blocking the ene de Robeck had observed of the British ing at the lucrative target our battalion my move (befâre the enemy mobile forces making repeated fruitless frontal presents and can’t spare the fire mis force reaches Western Narrow Pass) assaults against strong Turkish posi sions.) The key concept here is obvi just as effectively as we can from tions at Gallipoli in 1915.Meanwhile. ous: if you can be located, you can he Checkpoint 37. But we have to actfasr: we have reconnoitered Sanctuary Ridge targeted. At a minimum we ought to the enemy appears to be getting ready to our north and have made contact move. The spur north of Checkpoint to move. with nothing more than an enemy lis 37 looks like a suitable position from tening post (LP). Additionally. we spot which we can control the east-west Key Terrain some motorized/mechanized activity road. (More on this later.) Of course, if This situation leads us to another north of the ridge. In short, the situa we’re willing to move up onto the key thought: the importance of terrain.
51
‘I.-,
the
that faces More sition Ii
all 37. sive
pos oilers
position ant
make
a
lbnd Not we 52
w
vet
Multiple
Hart
south
battalion break options.
being
position
protection
from
the platoon
be
moving
ridge. the
tions puts
against
ion controlling
torrent.’
Ii Why?
Sanctuan to
dcgree
ground.
mi thing
ti
Checkpoint
ow ii
that iërrai
terrain.
c/meter fact,
Inch
the
To
ii
old
d
We
ot
fli
The
only ici
last
i
in
he
ts
should another
tic)
one—establishing
Narrow
hack,
ii
and
ridge
enemy
only
opport suggested
against i
conti
is
and tactician:
might
pate
on
m
it
on open
us
position
our
gained.
ii
terrain is
sake.
at
should t
n
cut
of to
I
scenario
lie We
offers
discussion
Ii
u
p0
For
much
that
several
in Ii
Surfaces
on east—west
t
based
it
in
Options
detensive.
rough
to
the
on in
be
cit
Thmmi
lie But
decides
is
igh
gaps.
do
the
we Second.
we’re
tiue vntro/c
rta
cc
our
oil
is Hank
erou
Ridge—i.c
t
can a
u
hr
the
lie
lie
cited,
positions
valuable
posi Sa
several Pass
pour
ni
Ihe take
ii
the the
flank u
gap lit
nit
not
left it.
can
we
37
it’s
point
Ii
is
rses
r
ground
ridge. ii
alternative
that,
the
our nctu
to
a vicinity
next
con/en
s
cii
aider 5
priman
hundred ies
As
on
what
u
is
hung
pass.
thus
[ion on
tc
without
the
huge
ridue
not
flatik.
undeibnded
Ii
while
ni optic
I
c
tide
represents
make
not essential
to
engage and
a
Ii
more
it.
on
rca
like
ijth
battalions
of
being
in
inipoiloin
being just of
ply
discussion an
rough
the
whenever
Bi
Sanctuary
out
break
line
or
key
reasons.
no’
enemy l
Mo
simply
significant
br
t
was
to
concept.
move action
either
>ns.
out
lerrai turn
:\nd
t
Gaps
C
at
pan
ground
a
lie beca
offers tided
an
conipa
to of
an
Ridge
a
certain
east—west
discussed,
still
ott
that
more
terrain.
significance
make
e
t’eo
blocking
the
meters
risks.
able
of
enemy move
Narrow
on
nh
to
C
ene
a both
contact
objectives.
the cn/ranrage
rse
and
leads
to
Thxpanding
of
third.
use
n
heckpoi
ye
side
a
our hunch
operation dn.
is
something ene
providinu
ie
ridge
to
on/i
while
the
fat
I possible.
iii
taclics.
flank.
definite
Pont
First,
r.
ridge
is rison. yes,
at
to
options
Ii
of
We
north
Liddell
a Ridge
now—
able
north
against
it’s
ii
though. to
olien—
awa’..
m\
ha
if
of
:read’’
entire forces
once us
sonic—
a
more
move
hr
sur
road to
posi ridge
(rem
Pass
sic—
and
p0—
risk
tie—
Ii
the
a
tta
t
we
the
the
in
to
he
ii
igh out
we to
ii
the
to
by
a
—
its
of
d
to
I
in
to is
—
Screen
of
pttclied only
ness fight earlier,
else
short cannot
laterally engaged
hlv
ing” their
subordinates
plain
they
situation cou
boldness ordinates:
opportunities
larger can
manders live.
words,
their oh’
foe they ditiate
to ciii
opportu
and
bility eral
ploi west—either
1ilttooti.
Pass
Ideally. enemy
have along
There
in
pate more
for
harder
which
fives.
should
adaptability.
In
probe
developments:
used
rage
ii
no
tions.
battalion
have
viable
Ii
its
this do >es.
t
actions.
g
must
corn
conditions
order
range.
thetr
crc
the
ourselves,
shified
Versus
Ii
or
to
at effectively
battle
situation.
...whenever
longer leaders
the
our
to
is way
igli
they
iii
st
thieir
options
And
on
nities. across
situation.
anti
hut
“They the
by
Not
and
opportunity
tnanders for
constrained
possibly
offers
this
over
in
ro
for
take
must
keep
close
er
adjust
course
intent
ridge moreover.
for
igh
next
ngpoi
the
through
lowl
now
So
always
Guard
and
can
at
across ni
have
its
subordinates
di
finally,
developed
initiative
coin
stage
the
art
t
this
must
only
the
us
to
flexibility,
their
Narrow
rough
the
a
in
cotnbat
axis
have
while
must
be
a
no
must
represents
disenjiage
alternative t
and
move.
Third.
create
we nt. clearly
option.
the
another
ission
act
ii
is
line
and
I
ma
support
enemy quickly
must
process
a
ds.”
I
ridge
suggest
the
it
enemy’s
with
have
to
where
of
receptive
seniors
while
seniors
turn
do sound
make tide
developed been
us
like
battalion
exist.
opportunities
Western
seems
the>
act
lindinu
advance
they
of help
odge
to
Seco
Pass.
possible,
a
opportunities:
h
and
to
Lw
so
regard
-
tid senior
rs—
we
the
ave
itself—to
Battalion
and
way
develop
water
operation
with them
to
in
to
lu
to
it
an -
that and
fighting
to
a FirsL
tliei
must
that
rid.
battalion
appraised
must it
proba
basis
is
to
must
rt
work
that
in front
is.
intent initiative
the
act
soft
antici
objec
create
to
her
quick option
proba—
much
Narrow
a
to fleeting
‘‘pull
“loose
s
should r
flirt niove
i
to Lack
h when
nitia—
deal
cotn— ot
u
their
‘hast—
ivi
flexi
sub
gap
units
the
ho
spot.
stay
we
Lily
ex tIme en—
west
flir
sev
the the
lie
our
at
cx
tli
a is
of
icr
r—
the
take—and the
what cable
your changed Tlte
ally perate
hands? we
sus of
possi
coinniander
introduce yen
u
screen in
the
earlier,
(or sure
Ridge
of
the
force—maybe
l)ragons scope to
tnain
opera
main
tIme
having.
purpose contained
pendently sion
selfpresenation. screen
rect
l laying a
not
A
hand. sion,
against guard
physical a
to of
two
to
with
tal
St),
Of
tion
thi
having
niou
In
approach
face.
sereeti
A scenario.
larger
guard
cli
warning
guard
platoomis rest
ion’s
even
Bottom
flank
answer,
e
original
well lie
enemy
Ls
supporting and
the
third actions
securit>
di on
is
course.
first
provide
Ic
a
the
as
body
and
using
enough—for
force.
in
rests
Regardless
provides
die
we
nge
iii
is reports
force
of
cover.
action.
beyond
way
disorganizinu.
enough—has
question
the
fl
situation,
(since
to
from
of
lights
find
better)
dilem
the
of
the
the
seen
screen. that’s
to
mediate
protectioti
place.
a
can our
classification
siniph
tactical
scale
from
the
p1
take
ii
Line
who
nortiiahly (and
orders
you’re
intercepting,
hethre effi1cts
otknsive.
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to
k
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discttssion
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physical
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enemy
in
ma hi
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a
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thus
enemy
the
the
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arnis.
i
matters
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ssio
from
assigned
rti
Guard
flank
ssio
the ii
is,
are
of
a decision
screen.
can
lire
units self’
to
pred
your
over
that
helping
as
this
an
I
of
mai breed
ultimate
is
len he
‘vi
to
com
mission
you
main
Has
n
how
ii
to
conduct
just
suggest
no
tIme
enemy
thus
hut
with
thi
tanks)—and option
defCnsive,
it
relieve
in atop
from
forces
that
ivi from
action
and
ii
team
securi
scenario).
call
can
came
they
operating of’ into
role
and
the
range
lhrces
of
and ma
As
become longer
body protection. the the
engaging.
to
th
likely
you
the
as
lights
on
in
the
security
force
to
37.
screen
hat
and
beyond
the
(liner
to
nder
himself,
a your
Ha
ni in
ought
Satictuan
object
efkctively
attack
abandon
a
situation di
proi
discussed
guard
to
screen
direct
ng
deceivittg
it.
generally
of
position ni
the
analyze
the
and
another
mission eventu
nii
tal
a
f’ro
hut
usMC
dire
wit
Ic ti
change
are
it.
in
niay
avenue
higher
igh
appli
only
provide
for
k
the its
ion in
lb iii
m
or own
ide.
and des
Ii
pres
ni
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inde
guard ver
other
body
does
ma
mis mal
t self-
Sit—
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at
use
ear—
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I
A
A is ‘ 9iscussion of Scenario #5
‘Film at Eleven I
“Shouldone ask: ‘Howdo / cope with a well-ordered enemy host about to attack me?’ I reply: ‘Seize something he cherishes, and he will conform to your desires.’” —Sun Tzu
“Forto win one hundred victoriesin one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. Tosubdue the enemy without fightingis the acme of skill.” —Sun Tzu
Acting With Discretion only the lives hut also the dwellings of response to aggression is acceptable Given the relative strengths in this and crops of the inhabitants. and what sort is not. Even after being situation, there is little doubt we will Our plan should lirst include the fired upon. we don’t want to return lire seize Oasis one way or the other. The possibility of seizing Oasis without a indiscriminately. Since we have the goal is to minimize the cost to all con fight. In fact. we should make even ef time. we should make sure this is very cerned. Obviously, we want to mini fort to induce the militia to surrender clear throughout the unit. The bottom mize our own casualties. hut it’s equal without fighting. Certainly. prepara line is that we want to minimize collat ly important to minimize casualties ton fires are out of the question: un eral damage. while at the same time among the locals. In a response to this provoked firing, in addition to making tiii nimizi ng the risk of our Marines. scenario when it appeared in the MCG. Maj H. Heath Fox II gave this Center of Graity/Critical Vulnerability concise analysis: We should also stipulate We have already discussed the impor of pitting our strength against the A key to this situation.especiallysince general rules of engagement, tance were seizing the town for occupation enemy’s weakness, of striking here by the MCSSD IMohile Combat Serv such as what sort of response to the enemy is vulnerable. Rut thais ice Support Detachmentj. is not mak aggression is acceptable and only part of the equation. An enemy ing more enemies than we already what sort is not. Even after be may he vulnerable in a particular area have—particularly ones who are not precisely because that area is unim easily idenliftahie. Care must he exer ing fired upon, we don’t want to portant to him and so he hasn’t both cised when dealing with a mixed com return fire indiscriminately. 10 prolect it. In such a case, even hatant/noncomhatani populace. Any ered imprudence on our part will lead to though we would be attacking where unnecessary civilian casualties, create the enemy is weak,wewouldgain little further animosities toward us among for poor publicity. may convince the for our efforts. We must also commit the civilian population, and is sure to locals they have no choice hut to fight our strength whereand when it willdo he reported in a negative context by in self-defense.Weshould fireonly af the most good. In other words, we the TV news crew. Minitnizing civil ter being fired upon. But to prevent want to attack the enemy at somecriti ian casualties and collateral damage Marines from being passivetargets.we cal point or center of gravity.Wewant is in own best interests. our should have a simple and immediate togo aftertheone thing—theunit capa Since the MCSSD is going to he oper signal for transitioningfrom nonfiring bility.place.whatever—thatcontributes ating out of Oasis, it will simplify the to firing mode.Weshould stipulatewho most to the enemy’sability or will to security situation if we gain the coop has the authorityto givethis signal. resist, the one thing that if lost will eration, if not the actual support of We should also stipulate general contribute mostdirectlyto the enemy’s the locals. We should try to spare not rules of engagement such as what sort downfall. But we want to make sure to
53 by
of
so
as es
the
to
the we
this we
dis the
The will
our
that
this
svise out
make
open help case. make
sake
fight idea oppo
More
it town.
would would to much
to Oasis a
attack. time,
inthni—
would
locals. option
so
dust in
conduct with to
psycho
camera
way
platoon
like
think surprise.
for as
It
the
to with
be of know
shared
our this
make the
not
appear
is we
attack.
iron
the the
foot
solving
this
of could realize
rehearsal, would
the
is
some
becomes
the
to at to one
surrendered we for
In
fundamental
to even
much
it us:
by playing
much ovenvhelming
a
fbrce of he vehicles
to
than
Oasis
better
coordination,
contact
got prepared.
night of
surprise
would
daylight
as
danger
making front
object that
so
of as
outside
want into want see in
no have
would
disarm our us
dismounted
aim
action out them
up
is tinie Putting
having
element
leveled into
people
the
resistance.
the The
a
commodity made
before of
better
moving suicidal.
we
tactical,
of
we’ve
wouldn’t point
couple disinclination
a option Show broad
they expect.
achieve
Surprise
the
The
that than
advantages could
would we’re
a appear
is
our
near
fear.
and is approaches
I: vehicles,
2:
to
place. to drive the have
usually
was
option of
it
mean
allows
to that noise kicking even probably
it
this
to
that
smooth
We do.
are Perhaps up
enemy
getting
locals is speed
weapons
our
again. as
is When the
of give
natural he
use and convincing
once terrain.
during
the to
Time
sides,
and
by
organized
This tactical
the
what
its
little conspicuously Option
the
Option on
right by
would
would
difficult
different
psychologically There
•
snags, there and spend of which
nent Options easy. both ly problem.
arm hetter any probably over, since phase object
enemy, However, sential he compromise logical desert ing
locals’ thing resistance date. would that move resisting. powerful
townspeople we noise halt stay possible. to with we reinforcing owned van have most
option
a a a
is
it
of is
to
to
lo
on no
for
the the the
the
the
the mi
op
our fac
our
our
con of
ene
these
pret
effec
think is
early oper
com
build
the we’ve
to better Wrote
quick a opera supply, snags.
allows on
attack,
opera
station/ take
time and
reflect
on and certatn
accom
us
rely actually point
the
enemy’s over control give have we’ll
develop. is
for center
no expect.,
defensible
scenarios it’s
the two this
of
seizing and
prepared
act and is taking rehearsal.
a
an
to is
control
executing
Wellington
out
critical luxury
importance
Eleven.’”
for case to
water
last
we
a
By of hash’
When and gives
a the
plan.
key the
pump the
for order
us.
discourage so
are of By
deliberate itself at
we’ve and
success
deliberate time deliberately, symbol. should
Controlling
a
time
the in station.
we’ll
to The
is
this
a iron
have in not
breath
we fresh
stronger
usually
station This what
which .
level
irrigation The
seize
call iL
of for
however, we
prepare
that
with means is
. operations. previous
which in
and is eventually operations
to
population. scenarios, Duke
‘Film features of of Oasis.
to
town.
against
. in
hope
our a
than pump we
situation. any preparedness which usually
to
conduct
local
detailed
I That
in
use When
center, own
of options we while its
us
it optimal
the as
imponanL
time the
pump
five of
the
in
improvise
The relied
to get
conduct
this idea supply.
there mean
effort
think
coordinated
in
source
only terrain coordination, with
catch our
our time
to
in to that the community
and supply As plan.
rehearsal.
more
the
milita probably mtssion
plan problem
scenario,
us
building.
first
lack will
to
indication first most window is hours. a so
a quickly, should to
the resistance a of
control the
food on
prepare. key
out spend
center of because
which
time.
seizing
allows some
Deliberate
our
which ‘ln
situation more
this pick
our the
The
to 22
we Fox:
in to
doesn’t
the
By irol Oasis
and main cal water ravity ings position Not two tive community vigorous litia ability
time a
the
tempo. In lo
clear
Of
consider should
Just
Preparation first
ty required Maj tor. about tions. station, of got said. advantage ation. my. enemy’s our everything.” ly. ness. time next success static reason erations
Whatever side, plish seizure defenses us perhaps munity ling to 22-hour ing it smooth people develop way tion conduct got amount which
a
it of
is
to
to to
of
the
on
re
of and
the mi im the
to Be— to they Oa will ni
little
Car
ene
criti west
none
crop
ruth can Lion.
well. of
one tn
aimed lost com com md
hut
objec
in
to
literal
recog pump “going of way
most
the
attack.
Tactical
the
are sta
place, the as
enetnvs
if
the
very
i4lI
Oasis.
outside water enemy
ne center
the
the
of
and two-story form p gone.
the to
town,
any thus The
the
knife in
depend
how
locals in
the example arteries.
iii is
a
or
pri
critical
becomes also the
blood
one
wrote
the
the
into
the directly
definite
that
provides
moreover,
true
gravity from feasible
the
pu vessels iL
and
Gudmundsson of
and like
a The
readers
the
in
after the
on sense
the for I.
know
of run
station of
locals resist cover
useful
muscle
is
destroying the
a the community.
carotid
go
that
only
clearly
p a
center.
capability,
most
these ability
food.
contributes them suggested to
thing exploits
do. and,
throat,
will
m
thing
to vulnerable control
the
and
Pollionc
dont
probably
station
Other the symbolic
attacking that Bruce
and importance.
There’s downfall.
for
from center Ilu
Located
scenario:
is catalyst
protected. Attacking is
J.
that station
save is desert
very
we one
they and
unit, without
of
brain,
supporL
one
out—is a
them the
react,
outskirts P.
vein
to
provides vulnerability the
the it want
as readers Since
life. Lh
this
nec
(Mar93): this
building
way pump
fields
the bone. as
continue about the
is
enemy’s
is
neck north center.
pump Si
vi
to will a local
poorly
the
center
to
order
of
jugular.” to
community
We
however, station —the
contribute
enemy’s the
in
ye
in the
rying, from resistance Nature headquarters critical the are towards
vulnerahilities. cal from
observation jugular
Some only fields. servc these and portant tive. maneuver litia surrender. on The win
Ii
the
StMaj
What
probably
The
resist, thing—the the
will whatever—that to
ng
lessness my dolt for vulnerahilities.
describes Notebook 54
is not Not nation munity nized. liflline puiw masonry gravit Seize best sis? sponse next i munity litia As of psychological effect: if our psycho ly to consolidate our position. We information are powerful weapons, logical gambit does not work, we may should meet immediately with the lo particularly as they aflbct a nation’s have a light on our hands. cal leadership. We should tell the local resolve. We must use them to our ad leaders that we hold them responsible O,nion 3: Cordon and iiegotiate We vantage. The presence of’ the news for the cooperation and good behavior could surround Oasis, open com team in this scenario does not create the citizens. We should make it mullications. and appeal to reason. of the need to act with discretion, hut it clear that in return for the citizens’ co This way we would give the Oasians a certainly emphasizes it. If there is to operation and good behavior, we will clear opportunity to surrender peace be bloodshed at Oasis, we want it to he fjlly and in the process would appear harm nobody. will cause as little dis clear that it is not the result ol’Ameri ruption to the daily routine as possi misconduct. as nonthreatening a possible. The can ble, and will provide what medical proNe n with this option is that we as sistance we can. We should make it would he putting the Oasians in a po The Bottom Line known that we have taken over sinon to negotiate. A negotiated settle re This scenario di irs from the pre sponsibility for the protection of the merit could he a lengthy process. And vious ones in that restraint and discre village, that the local militia is at this are key if negotiations fail, we have lost any of tion considerations. In an age moment disbanded, and that the the tactical or psychological advan lead of low—intensity conflict, in which a ers have 30 minutes in which to collect tages of the previous options. grayish sort of’ pseudo-war blurs the and turn in all weapons. distinction hetwecti war and peace. questions about restraints on the use What Do We Do Once We Capture Dealing With the News Team of force are extremely important and Oasis? The problem of dealing with the sometimes extremely difficult. No malter what plan we use, once news team is an interesting one. In this usMC we seize the town we have to act quick- age ol’ electronic media. images and * * * * *
55 to
the the
for de
or
us
can
de
that
op
what our
situa
Am
on
us
restric
is
“Am
failed
the
wait drasti
whatever
and authori
by
in to
of
operations
Pass”:
scenario.
“Platoon
not
allows
based
here
has
of coordination. take
initiative
unravel
in allows prescribes
changing
saw
only
face
subordinate
this
for
to
does commander “Platoon
for
the
saw we
about the
in he tempo
the
to
his
“Narrow
senior
necessan’ Uninhibited
as
duty—in
we
and
situation
at
as
in
hut
appropriately
hiQh
execution
essential
the
as
The
freedom above,
(As
threatens the
actions
is
decisionmaking
I
talking
of informs
deems
dti’. act
the
done.
so
al decentralization
his be
my
Dusk” he this plans,
to
from
He my that we
decentralization
fore
eve
is
Slim
has
is
when
in
we’re
than
at
effectively
it
friction quickly. Pocket
tablishinu
method steps situation, It changed.
gree that laid lions permits
adapt tion. he
permission.
overrid
one
must
and
This
out
act
but
really
Clausewitz
What ty.
centralizing continue erate communications, bush bush”;
cally when
Moreover, best to
one
myself—the
commander
should—just
better
William
army
order
wrote
goat”
it
von
gone
the
the
performance,
to
never
Sir
es
we
the
draft
that the
the anti
is sub
of
by
name
never
a
in
It higher thefthy
have in people
accom
able
you accom do
mission
—Carl
subordi
big”
the
responsi
paragraphs, specifying
actually 1:
about
the to
will he
intended of
level
as
should),
of
of
requirement
best all accomplished. states—or
accomplishing
of
Marshal kind
to
corresponding worded burden
however, it orders could soldier assigning use be
war, of lot we
of
We
the
“think
just
hope
is
freedom—and without
length
achieve. can
a
FMFM
to
of
first subordinate,
the
be
to
(as of
the
at are
everything to the must
did, to
and
the
can
We the
who
interests I general
else,
—Reid manner
tactic
shoulders
to The
going
them
places need
mission
Trowzer
we
combat-
because him
act.
shortest the
short a tactics best
the
the talked
mission
it. operation
which
the
through
friction.
to
give
of
order
This
we’re
intends the
Tactics
far
the
of the
therefore,
leave by mission
According
incidents—the
on If
have anything before
in
this
also
responsibility
someone with
the
throughout
Mission
ordinate the how allowing implies: lower We
commander
will
falls act
We
of
to
features then, plish important, eliminate Mission deal nates. mission. subordinate’s to bility must tactics. with authority plish
of
had
minor usually
dozens
the
should,
never,
is
every
It
part
I
It
commander
most to
always
of
he
by
my
go
the
ter
the
was
The
nat
but trou One
deal always
in actual
prob
the the
“Fric
things
iinkup linkup to
I
in
terrain. can one
suppose sure
to
no
become
the
by expression
defining would
“I “Countless
of
the
go action the
is
incidents” call
the
that exercise,
was
dilierent
supposed
what
#6 it
had that self see—combine name, could. intention. will ways what to
the dominated ing iy himself”
to
problem
have
a ground.
“Hole
say.
will
planned.
piece
of
to
field
to
to on
thus
inspired
thought
said,
of
minor
were as
a
only
forces
high things
is enemy,
locating one
we
gone
was
Scenario
went
People addition
is
of
the
things
The
of
both
commander
lesson
In
Needless
During
Hole Murphy
each
what
another
by
of
smoothly simple
identifiable
Pocket”
“countless
As
on
wrong.
piece go
scenario had first
will.
Each
and
Friction
up
posed the
whatsoever order
feature.
we go
location. Clausewitz
not
easily
expected,
Discussion This
The
Friction
experience. force link
an
As
point
his ble rain
that did
wrong Trowzer will difficult
seemingly
ural wrong, lems that
with
tion.”
5t’ srnhush.” the souad leader didn’t ordinate we should give both the task the contrary do not absolve us from time to send a runner to the pla to be accomplished and the intent be doing the right thing. lfwe act, we may toon commander with a situation re hind the task. The task describes in make a mistake, but not to act is inex port and wait for the runner to return quantitative terms the who,what,where, cusable. As Winston Churchill said: with instructions. He had to act) and when of the mission. The intent “Errors toward the enemy must be Contrary to popular belief, this is on the other hand, describes the why lightly judged.” By now it should be 0ot a radical, untried concept. but one behind the mission and, in qualitative clear that even though we are execut that has been proved in combat. Slim, terms, the end resuk we expect. Be ing our assigned tasks, our comman who inflicted the greatest defeat on tween the task and intent, FMFM I der’s intent requires us to do more. So Japanese ground forces of any Allied says: what’s next? comtnander in World War II. de— the intent is predominant. While • Option 2: Eigage the anhllen’ unit. scrihed his lessons learned in Burma: a situation may change. making the At a minitnum we can engage the ar obsolete, is more Commanders at all levels had to act task the intent per tillery unit a valuable target, Purists manent and continues to guide our more on their own: they were given will argue that the artillery unit is in actions. Understanding our comman greater latitude to work out their own Fox’s sector and that doctrine der’sintent allows us to exercise prohib plans to achieve what they knew was initi ative with its us from firing across boundaries, the Army commander’s intention. In in harmony the comman der’s desires. Boundaries are control measures es time they developed to a marked de tablished between adjacent units for gree a flexibilily ol mind and a firm The commander’s intent describes ness of decision that enabled them to his vision of the outcome of the action act swiftlyto take advantage of sudden in terms that relate to the enemy and information or changing circumstances the battlefield. The intent is not merely The task describes in to their quan without reference superi a restatement of the mission or the - . . This acling without orders. thadve terms the who, what, ors. concept of operations. It should not in anticipation ol orders, or without how where, and whenof the mission. waiting for approval. yel always with specify to accomplish the mission in the overall intention, must become (“Bypass enemy resistance: avoid gel The intent, on the other band, second nature in any form of warfare ting bogged down ) or simply describes the why behind the fight closely specify the intensity of the action (“Al where formations do not missionand, in qualitativeterms, en cadre, and must go down to the tack aggressively ). smallest units. It requires in the higher In this scenario, for example. our as the end result we expect. ,, command a corresponding flexibility signed task is to establish a blocking confidence in subordinates. of mind, position in the vicinity of Hills S’Sand power to make intentions and the 82 and, commencing at 0300. to en through the force. clear right gage and destroy enemy forces tning the purpose of coordination. They en Slim makes it clear that we cannot to escape south out of the pocket in sure a unit the freedom to operate have decentralized initiative without our sector. We know that the overall within its ownzone or sector without intent of the operation is to encircle interference from outside, and they re and destroy the enemy force holed up strict a unit from interfering in another in Trowzer. The final result expected unit’s zone or sector You might argue thingswill go wrotig. out of the blocking position is to pre that instead of violating the boundary Ptople will go to the wrong piece vent the southward escape of the ene we can request that higher headquar of high ground. The seem my. As the scenario unfolds we have ters shift it westso that the artillery unit is in our sector. Three problems ingly simple things will become no trouble with fulfilling our assigned task. We establish our blocking posi with this. First it’ll never happen in difficult. tion with no problem. Unfortunately’. time to get the artillery unit. Second. it becomes clear to us that although sse since Fox insists it’s in the right place. have performed our assigned task. our regiment has no reason to shift the some means of providing focus to the commander’s intent is not being sat boundary: regiment has already told various efforts. As FMFM I says: “To isifed. The enemy is escaping in siz us to work it out between ourselves. do so would be to dissipate our strength. able numbers out of the pocket. (It And third, the more ef’l’ectiveway 10 Weseek unity lofeffoni, not through im doesn’t matter that it’s not our fault. deal with such coordination problems posed control, hut through harnionious We’re not interested in who’s to blame: is lalerally—i.e.. directly with the adja initiative and lateral coordination.” we’re interested in accomplishing the cent unit—rather than vertically through It is essential that the senior com mission.) So where does this leave us? the chain of command. So then you mander provide his subordinates with might argue (quite correctly) that the the guidance and frame of reference Options more appropriate response is to con thaI allow them to exercise initiative OptionI: Executeassignedtask. In tact Fox Company directly and re more confidently and effectively. other words, do nothing for the pres quest permission to fire across the ent. First, the time to engage the ene boundary. Commander’sIntent my as stipulated in the order has not Since the Fox Company comman There are several tools with which arrived. Second, there is no enemy in der is convinced that he’s in the right the commander can do this. The first, our sector (the artillery unit on the place and that we’re the ones who are and perhaps most important as Slim’s road being in Fox Company’s sector). lost he’s not likely to give us permis quotes indicate, is the commander’s We certainly can’t be criticized for fol sion to start firing indiscriminately intent. In assigning a mission to a sub- lowing orders, right? Wrong. Orders to into his sector. What do we do when
57 a
to
to
it a in
it II
he
the
de
to
turn
de
com and
giv
if order mes
vision
in
intent the
alter impor
to
Ettore stress.
to
enemy
of
USjMC
order
in
suggests “The
or
the scenari escaping support
example: brevity.
different
issuing Defined.” result
dillicult statement
in the techniques
should
and order,
is
most
issue,
for
on
Capt ...
remembered
assigned 82 still expressing ability
For
from radio
position
Ettore
prevent
to the “
final
the most south.”
extreme to
are: purpose
determine intent
operation qualitative
Intent the As
L. begin to
intent by requires and
of example: intent
of and task
an focus intent,
a
the
is of easily remaining possible clarity
to
it
the to $8
of
skill
forces order “The
of
For
one
of pan it
intent
the
plan
with
each blocking
an
escaping concise more
a
statement. Hills
Michael
one
with do
express forceful. transmit
a
wants of desired
is
the
being enemy
sacrifice
of other
because definite bottom-line
Apr93). to
to workbook,
he
couple from subordinates
you
follow to also a
is statement conditions
out,
Capt and analyze
commander’s and its
parts
A commander’s * is any result is
from
“Commander’s
this
As
desires.
expressing
To don’t
As
how
your
easier in The
• to subordinate vicinity “Establish The south.” prevent in • (MCG, statement nal forces sired
dition tant tent prepare mander
out. of for
points clear is Hut under senger from
there well.
os good serves wards ing viate your
a
A
of
81.
ar a
for
lire or 87
87.
we
or the
SOD want
Fox ad- Pla
with mis
dark. only (hut in
west quite
com
option the * propo
Hill
enemy
the better
87 least if
assume that
without
Hill In Hill enemy
3d
88
posing
the
lire.
has
to escape.
85—87—68
eliectively
to own to
don’t some
not
flank,
ridge
This risky
with the and
in potential Hill
he
seems
is Hill
Even take.
a
toward much
road
(They’re
our 2d)
is,
format originally
control
up is it the
firelight.
engaging direct
Hills a of
87
shifting hut
right reconstitute
as
SI.
regimental the
nest as
wrong
enemy’s From must Fox
by in
this
would
even By
to
.coutl,nesr on
certainly
definite Company intent.
Hill
than our
well
bottle go Hill the
south coordinate he
casualties. a
the
to *
terrain,
we
as down
road here to to 85. crossing
Attack
Fox is Shift able
for particular where result
intent
preparations, to
effectively
intramural
certainly:
apart.) 4: and
a sector).
5:
tn
the 81—88—82
the 85 are
he
possibly no and
to
position original Hill
as an
that threat
any
Intent to
friendly
is things
prevent
our on
defensible There on
is
west
81. satisfying
moving therefore
mission
Hill on move
that
ability rationale Fox on
Option (and
Hills to
nite
knowing
Option in
might risk
less
•
Hill not
kilometer
There
mission. position
to is tillery units deli Fox’s the The der hold without out with sition. several which
Based
possible taken a toon we blocking vice dered, mander’s meters is still position would forces of’ More * commander’s
I
a
in us
in
as
a
by
to
for we of
Fox
you we
lire ex
they
and
arms in get
Good
an head
hut meant imply
proper
taking neither appro
where
hut center Iliend
“if
case
exist
decision.
unit. as to mission the
to
situation. ignore
are
location.
means know not
operation
prevent
boundaries
coordinat
laws. Moreover. responsible hearing
things.
longer units. say. this over a
actions.
is true; from *
to
located,
the
a higher Just
measure
used exactly
in
this Moreover, as
for
no
mean us not
dorit
.cuppofling
our tactical Fox’s fully it’s us
required,
tactical
ignore by
oiher
adjacent lire
for fire aren’t
might
indiscriminaiely.As
Quite we
he
quite For
boundaries
we’re
place, no boundaries coordination
adjacent disapprove don’t
for give
control right
measures.
impact request?
yourself
boundary he
protect I
is Direct
is.
that thinks a arms
should
mortars.
simply them to
what’s precedence
must could
current
that first to Among
purist is
the the
3:
81.
let
our
imposed
The
Fox
deiermine
measures
of
actions” there the Fox the of’ calling you
upon responsibility own iask We
the
support between
take we control should
across discussed,
Hill
should
argue
doing certainly
to In to
he
it
get
reason.
there.
of we
of way case our
Option denies where responsihilit lire
we Company your
tire
problem designed
supporting
exist
sound
lire.
he
siened frn1
should
the Control use tactics to this isn’t would priate “Fine.” take
boundary lór quarters, now full that west and already good ly are
Fox would the ing assigned mission. would with could the trying
actly The
5H Discussion of Scenario #7
Securing Cam-Pijuna
‘Weigh the situation, then move. He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach willbe victorious.Such is the art of maneuvering.” —Sun Tzu
“Originalityis the most vital of all military virtues.” —B.H. Liddell-Hart
Mission Tactics II In both cases t4 enemy force is not certain. The predominant feature of This mission is a straightforward particularly large. The problem will tactical decisionmaking is the pen’a— one, in which our battalion comman not he seizing the objective; it will he sive uncertainty that surrounds every der has given us broad latitude in the minimizing damage to ourselves and decision. Information will always be manner of execution. The only condi the locals. One key area in which the incomplete, will often he confusing. tion he has imposed is the deadline, scenarios dilTer. however, is that at and will sometimes even be contradic and even that is not particularly con Cam-Pljuna we can expect the enemy tory. If we wait for certainty before straining. Moreover, to guide us in our to resist. At Oasis the situation with re making a decision, we’ll never act. The actions he has explained the intent be gard to the enemy was much more am requirement is to recognize uncertain hind the operation and how the opera biguous. and that always complicates ty as a fact of life and to learn to deal tion fits into the scheme of the larger things. Knowing that we can expect the with it. upcoming campaign. He has further enemy at Cam-Pljuna to fight may not more made us the battalion’s main ef make accomplishing the mission any Flexibility fort. offering us any weapons compa easier, hut it certainly makes the situa Because the enemy situation is un ny assets we might need and ensuring tion less ambiguous. certain, our plan has to be flexible timely reinforcements by helicopter. to allow us to adapt to a variety of cir All in all, we have the opportunity to Uncertainty—A Fact of Life cumstances and developments. Our weigh the situation thoroughly and As at Oasis, we don’t know much initial operation order should not try the freedom to construct an original about the enemy situation. We know to cover the entire operation all the plan that we’re happy with. where his mortar and antiaircraft gun way through to conclusion, because emplacements are, and we know the there’s still too much about the situa Looking for Patterns defensive positions he has prepared. tion that we don’t know. Our initial ‘Securing Cam-Pljuna” shares sev But we don’t know the actual disposi order can probably cover the ap eral similarities with “ ‘Film at Eleven’ tions of the main enemy forces. Nor proach march in detail, but specific Both involve a straightforward mis do we know the current location of the actions after that will probably de sion to seize a specific location for fu mobile machinegun units, which may pend on how the situation develops. ture use. In both eases time is not a or may not be present when we make About the best we can do at this point particularly significant consideration: our attack. And of course, we don’t is to prepare our company for future we have a reasonable amount of time know with any certainty—and never actions by issuing warning orders to accomplish the mission. Both in will—the enemy’s exact intentions. which describe our broad intent, likely volve operations in populated areas, Even in this age of high-tech sensors, anticipated tasks, and possible con with the consequent need to exercise there will always he much about the tingencies. For the-units whose missions restraint so to limit collateral damage. enemy situation that will remain un we know with reasonable cedainty—tak
5’)
is
in
A
at
at
by he
by at
on
sit
the
dc
But
cer
val
and
line
and
fire
feint
keep
sake
three
ideal
rein
mor
mov
move
vehi noisy
to
atten
Do
in
weap
There
hut
would
opera
known
advan
around
to
occupy
take
of
usj
there another
the
by
he
capabil
as
minimal
very
teams
light
the
of
primarily
have
detection.
served
increased
The
other
capability
man-pack
necessary.
to
numerous
and
key
themselves
take
they
could
extra
for
he night-vision
the
terrain.
platoons)
not
to
Cam-Pljuna
able
machincgun
Assets
with
primarily us
machineguns
simultaneous
superior
another
well
threat, the
wave arrangements
with
without
differences.
the
developing
road—vehicles
enemy’s
brought roadblock
artillery.
travel time,
can
he
avoid
better
gear hold
on that as
positions
the
a
two
will
what
oIlers
guided
machineguns
do
poor
want
for
conspicuous
Dragon
to
concept
southeast,
could
on
the
to
to
be
we
allow
the
or
of
restriction
from
based
of
a
got
make
up
he
initial
mobility southeasL
we elements
armor
plodding
launch
arrange
Would
mobile
positions
behind
massing
three
be
reasonably
we
against
our
also
few
argue
even
Company
could
locals
for
with
of mountain
want
reinforcements
room
part
to
heavy
night
the
the
keep
that
a
weapons
will
terrain
plan
for
could
the
that
the
lire.
can or
on
instead
We
can
enemy’s
M60s
we’ve
bunker-busting
might
as
we
from
at
of
the
slow,
oriented
minimum
We
probably
to
reinforcement
in
surprise Attack
of
carefully
loss
deal
might
of
decision
would
rear.
enemy
Cam-Pljuna vehicles
this
we
would the
a
our
to we
attacks
of
the
plans.
We
to
I
enemy
bring (one
stop
Or
help.
both
the
the
Is
can
and
significant Weapons
Machineguns
within
forested
the our
sonic
the
battalion position
of
fixed
heavier
relying
base
290:
or the move
to
plenty
Perhaps
proper
with
Want?
enemy
to
primarily
our
depends moving
what
a
mobility’
no
Because
Assuming
We
op
By
tage ments
into
reserve advance—to tion capability.
up making ing Hill can positions.
situation the surprise
uation.
Perhaps What
requesting from ing road,
helicopter with damage tack
is most. firepower city We by tions.
tars, unit in ons lot
of’ forcements. ity even still
speed power? least would uable. worth over
tain cle. company?
carry opportunities section
because cause?
in
of
to
he
of
we
at
we
al
ex the
the
the
the
ap po
will
and
be
take
cap
plan
for
with
rein
it
rein
(LZ).
relief
to
to hand
prox
Pend
begin
devel
in
to
con
even
deci
to
mortar
advan
the
to
may
through
of
road.
sides we
time
to
ones
out
our
a
direction
positions
and
positions. develops.
points
require
Pendjetan
Bensjkula above
critical
the
our
can
wait
be
important
command
via
their If
zone
the
obsen’atton
and
always
for
is
enemy
town
the
defensive Attack
.
we
of
west
uncertainty
the
are
we
the
same
addition
them
position The
which
. around
they
introduction
of
no
has
block If
orders,
mortar immediate
in
mortar
off’
slopes
will often
-
via
in
Cam-Pljuna
continue
making
critical
This
better
the infiltrating
and
Pendjetan
sometimes
least
situation aeC
antiair
landing
take
reinforcements
cross
has
area,
introduction
our
approach
we
vulnerabilities
of
certainty—are
the
concept
at
early
and and
because and
Will
the
strengthens
west
the
the
the
residences,)
the
itself positions,
Will
south,
as
positions
force
an
northeast.
because
per
Moving
on recognize
north
can’t
never
any
before
northeast
The
early
LZ.
the
via
could
counterclockwise
blocking arms as
basic
the
facilitates
since
for
offering
enemy
enemy
how
to
and
the
and
a
natural
local
antiair
antiair
a
the
LZ.
it
town:
disposition,
the
(We
helicopters.
is
objective
the
to
antiair
gap
we’ll
he
road.
antiair the
Information with
putting
in
call
vice from
northeast
to
infantn
of
scenario—at
valuable
contradicton’.
the
the
for
the
scenario
woods
LZ.
the
the
matter
land
Meanwhile,
Thus,
An
The
asafactoflife.
ment
certaint sion,
fusing,
be
incomplete.
very
of
tage—being town—of
ploiting north road,
Likewise,
enemy know west
move around this
road secure
tack positions tantly.
Possibilities—Infiltration town,
forcements conic
the sitions
might parent
ture and jetan could
especially
to
imity
this the
reinforcements out
lows Ihrcemenis.
operations supporting
because no
It
to
at
of’
to
we
he
we
we
en
the
for
for
sit—
the
cur
will
cer
sees
spe
situ
both
with
their
must
units
have
units
mea
“You
com
even
infor
lbr
forces
in
enemy as
Impor
perfect
toward
do
to
clearer.
actively
Retirist
we
exploit.
in
units.
relative
the
less
on, specific.
plan
spots
who
situation
inlorma—
thc
a
defensive
will
road,
positions
questions
operating
keep succcss a
team
as enemy
Gaps.”
The
reconnais should
large
oriented
immediate
as
said.
specialized
directly
issuance
command.
is
can
in
levels
of
the
way
and
leaders
the
to
town,
fewer
a
mortar
in
Early
orders,
one
are
the
vulnerahilities
weak
of
area
Our
more
am
we
generate
of
the
activity
questions
and
initially
special
becomes
these
the
anyone
good
not
discussed
mortar
detailed more
the
much
long
to
and
machinegun
lowest
he
any
Patton
of
is
only
Vulnerabilities
that commit
Reconnaissance
main
standing
leverage?
or
for cohesive
a
answers:
we There
information chain and
information general.
about
the is.
Pandjeton
scenario
the
depend
reported?
too
is
elements
these lo
the
east—i.e., critical
adage.
Everyone
S. a
of
reconnaissance.
picture
instructed
In
know
the
go
dispositions
can
the
objective
throutzh
to
As
the
having
gain
and
to
that
on-going
them,
ability
the
will
this
last antiair
subordinate
any
Cam—Pljuna?
mobile
continuously
“Surfaces he
and
that
fragmentarv
our and
large,
and
to
what
antiair
Critical
are have
committed
for
important,
ready
the
preparations
will
There
reserved
northwest
of
develops
unit.
up later.
our
pass
the
on
he down
the
generate?
and
down
George
ourselves in
he
when
situation
bean the
enemy
through
drills
near
essential and
know
there
should
us.
to
where
develops.
to
Iasks.
that is
a
on
vulnerahilities back
open
south
never
should
Importance
answers
exploit
or
dividends.
by
Where
Are
Are out
and
the
blocking
few
Cam-Pljuna.
Are Reconnaissance
Equally come
Exactly
Gen
in
• forces?
still •
•
position rently
in
Exploiting the
probing
ward
defensive
can mission
should
section know
should 64)
emy
up
combat and
the tuition
tion mation
eyes ly.
at pany
held
sure
want example Cam-Pljuna
sance.” ation
clearing can cHic action procedures actions
should The tain Hut
pay improvised
trustworthy to
situation This example—we
ing or Discussion of Scenario ItS
Raid on Gazebo Ridge
“Speed is the essence of war Thkeadvantage of the ene my’s unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.” —Sun Tzu
‘The principles on which / planned all operations were: • The ultimate intention must be an offensive one. • The main idea on which the plan was based must be simple. • That idea must be held in view throughout and eve,y thing else must give way to it. • The plan must have an element of surprise.” —Field Marshal Sir William Slim
SSS&B This is a situation ripe with both all the concepts we have discussed to by making estimates. assumptions. an danger and opportunity. We have this point, there is none more impor alyses. and judgments. Based on that caught the enemy unprepared and tant than speed—the ability to think evaluation, we make our decision— have a chance to wreak havoc. But we fast, decide fist, act last, move fist. Ac i.e., we come up with a plan. Then we are also entering a lishhowl lined with tually. it’s not so much absolute speed put the plan in to ac tin ii. Having acted. with enemy guns and enemy tanks on that matters. hut speed relative to our we have changed the situation, and so both Ilanks that can make life miser enemy. .s militarv theorist Col John the cycle begins again. To he fister able for us. We are badly outnum Boyd. USAF(Rel). is fond of sayintz, it through the cycle once gives us the ad bered. Success and survival depend on doesnt matter if we’re slow, as long as vantage of being able to seize the initi— acting quickly and aggressively before the enemy is slower. ative. dictate the terms nt action, and the enemy can get his hearings. Nearly Back in the late R)s and early 1970s. force the enemy to react to us. But the a)) of the MCG readers who submitted BGen F. P. Henderson, USMC(Ret). side which can consistently and ellec— solutions to this scenario when it Iirst and other Marines were talking and tively transition through the SEDA cy appeared in Sep90 recognized that the writing about a sequence of essential cle or OODA loop faster—the side keys to success at Gazebo Ridge were combat actions referred to as SEDA which maintains a higher tempo— speed,smiphern’suiprice and boldness: (Sense-Evaluate-Decide-Act). Boyd pop gains an ever-increasing advantage Hit ftmt hit hard, and get out quick. ularized this theory using the term with each cycle. The slower antagonist “OODA loop” (Observation-Orienta falls Eurther and further behind in his Speed tion—Decision—Action)to describe the reactions and becomes increasingly In nearly all of the previous scenari fundamental time-competitive nature unable to cope with the deiednrating os—the possible exceptions being Film of contlict. The theory applies to any situation. With each cycle his actions at Eleven’ and Seizing Cam-Pijuna”— direct conflict, whether the antago become less relevant to what’s actually’ speed has been an important ingre nists are individual boxers, soccer happening, and he becomes increas— diem. Even in those two scenarios, in teams, military units in combat or ingly ineffective. hich we seemed to have plenty of businesses in a competitive market. It Its precisely because of the impor lime to develop our plan. once we put delines the cycle by which we make tance of speed that the TDGs general the plan into action and came into decisions in a competitive situation. ly have such a rigorous time limiL It’s conlact with the enemy. speed of exe Facing a competitive situation, we first not just the ability to move fast—al cution became important. In fact, of sense the situation. We then evaluate it though that certainly is part of it—but
6t the ability to think fast and decide fast emy to split his efforts. Surprise As a rule we want to do everything The second way we maintain sim We are vastly outnumbered and we can to improve our own speed: de plicity is to minimize the amount of outgunned in this scenario. The only centralize decisionmaking authority, direct coordination and positive con reason we can even think of attacking minimize restrictive control measures, trol necessary to make the plan work. is that we seem to have the element of simplify our plans, make maximum In this scenario, even if we come up surprise. A multiplier of combat power, use of immediate action drills and with a two-pronged plan. we want to surprise is a concept of such importance standing operating procedures. and make sure that each element can exe as to rate as a tactical fundamental. streamline our decisionmaking and cute its part of the plan independently. Clausewitz observed that the desire stall planning procedures. Likewise. without having to coordinate with and for surprise is “more or less basic to all since combat is time—competitive, we worry about interference from the operations. for without it superiority at want to dn everything we can to slow other element. The two forces can still the decisive point is hardly conceiv our enemy down. complement each other. hut in an in able.” Hut beyond being a necessary As this scenario demonstrates, speed direct way. In other words, the plan precondition for local superiority, sur also has a protective element. It makes fits together loosely.” What we abso prise is a Fundamental in its own right it harder to catch us, harder to hit us. lutely don’t want is a plan in which all because of its psychological effect. As and harder to fend oil our thrusts. the elements are precisely synchro FMFM I says. “Surprise can decisively nized and there is little tolerance for affect the outcome of combat far be Simplicity friction or anything going wrong. An yond the physical means at hand.” At Gazebo Ridge there is no time example of this is a plan in which A It is interesting that we should use for detailed coordination or instruc the “Raid on Gazebo Ridge” to intro tions: this will have to he a hasty and duce the concept of surprise because improvised attack with our suhordi we typically think of surprise as the
nates acting on their understanding of - - . the side which can product of some devious and round the commanders intent and the devel— consistentlyand effectivelytransi about scheme—anything hut driving opi ng situation. If this turns into a straight at the enemy in growing day lion the SEDA cycle or confused and chaotic melee, line: that through light by the most direct route. But in serves our purpose of distracting the OODA loop faster—the side fact, this scenario illustrates the im enemy. The bottom line is. the simpler which maintains a higher tem portant point that although we often the better. po—gainsan ever-increasingad talk about “taking the enemy by sur How do we get simplicity? First we prise,” surprise is not so much some develop a plan that has few “moving vantage with each cycle. thing the surpriser does. Rather it is a parts—i.e.. few different tasks or com state of shock on the part of the sur ponents. The more moving parts a prised as the result of some unex plan has. the more elaborate it be pected event that leaves him tempora comes. Fewer moving parts lessens the happens after B takes place. hut B rily unable to respond effectively. We need for coordination, detailed in can’t happen until C occurs’S,C has to may take certain actions intended to structions. control measures. etc. In happen simultaneously with D. etc. If surprise the enemy, but success in the our particular case it shouldn’t he any one part of the plan is disrupted. end depends ultimately on the ene hard to keep it simple, since we have the whole plan begins to fall apart. (In my’s susceptibility to being surprised. so few assets to work with. The general. plans with a lot ol’“on-order” Typically, for example. we seek to sur simplest plan would he to keep our tasks, in which the commander directs prise the enemy by striking his flanks, company together as a single unit and each action, are good examples of op but if the enemy expects a flank attack have the different weapons systems erations with little tolerance for the the surprise will he on us. In other engage appropriate targets as we pass. natural friction of war.) To make an words, surprise comes down to avpec Since we have only two sections of analogy, it’s kind of like the difference rat/otis. The first requirement, then, in LAV—25s(the backbone of our unit) between the music of a jazzhall band achieving surprise is to he able to anti we certainly don’t want to have any and an orchestra. In the orchestra, cipate the enemy’s expectations. We more than two main thrusts to our at each instrument must respond to the try to look at the situation from the en tack—in this situation, any more than positive control of the conductor and emy’s point of view. figure out his ex two thrusts will start to get difficult to he precisely synchronized with the pectations. and then do the thing he control. others: the music is, as the name indi least expects. As we’ve already done in LtCol Kenneth W. Estes suggested cates, orchestrated. The jazzhall band’s previous scenarios, we ask: “What’s task organizing into two platoons each music, on the other hand. is “looser,” the enemy up to?” with three LAV—25s,an LAy—AG,and with room for improvisation and cre While surprise can be decisive, be an LAV—AT—”Thatway I command ativity. The bottom line is that we want cause it is not completely under our two platoons of equal weight not four to he more like a jazzhall band and control, we should not count on it different sections.” In this case, there less like an orchestra. We want our alone for the margin of success. For is something to be said for a two- plans to fit together “loosely.” so they surprise to work it’s not necessary to pronged attack vice a single thrust. It do not have to be carefully orches take the enemy unawares. It’s only im would likely cause more confusion trated: so they are not as easily dis portant that he become aware too late and disruption, which is our ultimate mpted by fog. friction, and enemy ac to react As a result surprise is a prod objective. Moreover, as we’ve dis tion: and so we have room to impro uct of speed and secrecy—secrecy so cussed before, the use of separate hut vise and show initiative as the situa that the enemy does not become aware complementary forces compels the en- tion warrants. until too late. and speed so that once
62 quartersi. I proposed to act on my own he does become aware he doesn’t have commander to relay a sitrep to the bat talion commander, asking that Compa initiative. The plan I had in mind was the time to react effectively. ny C support me by lireand maneuver.] to make a charge in line abreast. solution, our straight towards the middle of the rear Boldness Notice Ihat in this of the German position. When we Boldness also is a key [actor in the company commander asks Company reached it we would swing north in Raid on Gazebo Ridge.” Much like B to the north to engage the enemy line ahead. and run along the whole surprise, boldness is a true force multi tank position on the northern end of length of the encmy lines blazing plier. As Clausewitz observed: the position and also asks the Compa away with exenthing we had before commander to support our corn ‘heeling out and away at full speed. It Indeed in what held ol human activily nyC has been was the son of recklessness that was. is boldness more at home than in puny. Because his company designated the main effort, our com in fact,pretty safe in execution. By the war? . . . It must he granted a certain time the Jerries had woken up to what over and above successful cal pany commander knows that the job posr was happening we would he in the culation involving space. time. and of the other companies is to support middle of them, every gun firing and magnitude of forces, for where it is su us. and so. in a pinch, without refer every tank going flat out. None of perior. it will take advantage of its op ring to the battalion commander, he their weapons would he ready for us: ponent’s weakness. In other words. ii can seek their support, and they are they were all directed towards the east is a genuinely creative force. obligated 10 respond. and the Indian division. They would Boldness can contribute to surprise not he able to engage us while we were and add shock effect to our actions. Historical Background right in their own position. By the would This scenario is based on an actual time w swung out again there so much consternation and confu A Sample FragO action from Robert Crisp’s excellent he sion. and we would he going so fasL The follosing Iragmentan order. memoir of the North African cam that I had even prospect of getting submitted by LtCoI Estes. is not meant Braze,?ChaHot.c paign of World War II. away with it scot-free—withoutlosing as the only ‘right” answer. but as an 19Th). (New York: Bantam Books. a single tank I was about to example of a clear and crisp excellent During Operation CRUSADER. Capt summon troop commanders to a quick ordcr for a quick. simple. and bold Crisp commanded an understrength conference back at my tank (it would plan: tank squadron as part ola raid against have to he darn quick) when one of Action right front: left platoon attack the rear of a German position pwssur them came on the air to report four enemy artillery: right platoon attack ing an Indian division south of Gazala. enemy tanks moving out from the left enemy command post: no decisiveen Crisp’s squadron was equipped with and coming across his front. L: to south and west gagemen withdraw Stuans, a light U.S. tank thai was Crisp was seriously sounded in the titrouch their lou train: watch out for outgunned by. hut faster than, the ensuing firefight while tn’ing to rescue the tanks to the south: make smoke: Marks. the crew of a disabled tank. inter NOW. Cobras. attack tanks on our German cepted ssireless message l’rom the head left, cover our withdrawal. FO. tn 10 As he approached the rear of the get immediate smoke and 1CMfire on German position in the daylight, ap quarters of the Afrika Corps revealed the northern tanks” parently unrecognized by the Ger that the Germans were evacuating the ask the Company B commander mans. Crisp lost communications with Gazala position. lucky in their opin to take on that tank unit (on the north higher headquarters. ion to have escaped a “steel trap.” ern part of the escarpment) as mutual USjMC [As] I was touch with support then call the Company C not in Ihead— * * * * *
63 Discussion of Scenario #9
Enemy Over the Bridge
‘Tomove swiftly,strike vigorously,and secure all the fruits of the victor,’is the secret of successful war.” —Stonewall Jackson
‘Themeasure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest are the safest.” —AdmLordNelson
Looking at the “Big Picture”—Again with security forces operating farther tial enemy forces to begin pouring Since “Enemy Over the Bridge”was forward. But we discover nothing is as across the bridge soon. If that’s the the very first TDG to appear in the it should be. There are, in fact no case, the enemy has beaten our divi MCG (Apr90). it is appropriate that friendly forces at the bridge or along sion to the punch. and we need to try this scenario returns us to the first of the river. A sizable enemy force occu to contain the problem. On the other the tactical first principles discussed pies our assembly area. We don’t extreme, this may be nothing more in this book—the importance of con know exactly how big the enemy force than a local spoiling attack, in which sideringthe larger situation. In this sit is. We don’t know what other areas, if case the enemy has succeeded in seiz uation, there is no way our battalion ing the initiative and threatening to commander can make the right choice hamstring our offensive. If that’s the unless he considers the division situa In any meeting engagement case, we need to regain the initiative tion. The key question is, What can I it is important to beat the enemy and get the division offensiveback on further the accomplishment of do to act quicklyand track. the division mission? to the punch, to aggressivelyto seize the initiative What’s Critical? Speed—Again and gain the critical advantage. What’s critical in this situation? And it is also significant that we see No matter what your solutionto Thinking strictlyat the battalion level, yet again that all-important concept of we might answer, “The enemy force maybe, it shouldre speed,which is critical to everytactical this problem occupyingour assemblyarea. Wewere situation. This scenario amounts to a flect a definite sense of urgency told to occupy that piece of terrain, meeting engagement, an unexpected in acting more quicklythan the and the enemy is preventing us from two doing it.” But how important is that meeting between forces not fully enemy. deployed for combaL In any meeting triangular piece of woods?Not very; it engagement it is important to beat the has no inherent tactical value and, in enemy to the punch, to act quicklyand any, the enemy has occupied. We fact, is hemmed in by the two hill aggressivelyto seize the initiative and don’tknow the enemy’sintentions. We massesto the south. Occupyingthe as gain the critical advantage. No matter have no idea what happened to the signedassemblyarea isno longerappro what your solution to this problem friendly forces that were supposed to priate since the situation has changed may he, it should reflect a definite be forward of us. About all we do dramatically An assembly area is sense of urgencyin acting more quick know is that the situation is not good merely a control measure designed to ly than the enemy. and is nothing like we expected.Con facilitate future preparations. As we’ve sequently, the instructions we’vere already discussed, we shouldn’t let Frictionand Uncertainty ceived are no longer appropriate.The control measures get in the way of Perhaps better than any of the bottomlineisthat wehaveto useour in good tactics. And how much of a others, this scenario also illustratesthe itiativeto retrievethe situation. threat does the enemy force really important related concepts of friction pose in its current position? Can the and uncertainty. On the surface, this What’s the EnemyUp To? division still use the bridge? Yes: as ought to be an easy situation for us. As we’vediscussed, we don’t know long as we can contain the enemy the We’remaking a simple administrative what the enemy’s up to. But we can division can still reach the bridge via move into an assembly area in our work through some possibilities. On the East Farm road. The hills south of own supposedly secure rear area. It’s one extreme, this action may he the the assembly area are important be not even a tactical situation. Friendly beginning of a major enemy offensive, cause if the enemy can control them forces hold the bridge and riverline in which case we can expect substan he can begin to solidify his bridge- over,wejudge any other secondary ef head.and ifwecan controlthemwecan south of the river desperate. forton how it supports the main effort. containthe enemy.As Maj Leonard A. FMFM I explains: observed, the east hill is more Blasiol Effort important of the two because it “con Focusof Efforts/Main Likethe commander’sintent, the fo It’s not enough merely to identify cus of effort becomes a harmonizing trolsboth of the roads available to the the enemy’scriticalvWnerability.There force.Facedwitha decision,we ask divisionfor its advance to the river.” is a corresponding concept involving ourselves: “How canIbestsupportthe Looking at the larger situation, we the focus of friendly effort*that ranks focus of effort?” realizethat the situation at the bridge as a true tactical fundamental. Having For example, we have already de is much more significant. If the divi identifieda criticalenemyvulnerability. cided that we can’t simply ignore the sionattack is going to go off as sched wemustgoafterit ruthlesslyand withall enemy in the assembly we must uled,we have to have the bridge. Even area; the strength we can muster. We must contain the enemy force there. So we if the attack will have to be delayed, can definitelyjustify allocating forces thesituation will get worse as long as to deal withthe enemy in the assembly theenemy holds the bridge. The ene area, but we want to allocate no more mycontinues to funnel forces across It’s not enough merely to bridge, so every passing minute forces than necessary. So how do we the identify the enemy’scritical vul meansmore enemy forcessouth of the distributeour forcesbetweenthe bridge and the assemblyarea? river that we have to deal with. We nerability.Thereis a correspond don’t want the division to have to ing concept involvingthe focus Becausetime is critical wedefinitely want to commit our most mobile launch its attack just to regain the of friendly effort that ranks as a bridge.And there is alwaysthe chance units—themotorizedinfantry and tank tacticalflmdamental.Having thatthe enemy will prepare the bridge true companies and the TOWs—to the fordemolition.The bottom line is that identified a critical enemy vul bridge.SeveralMCG readers suggested whole battalion to the although the enemy in the assembly nerability, we must go after it sending the be the immediate problem, bridge and fixing the enemy with sup area may ruthlesslyand 4iithallthe strength themorecriticalproblem is the bridge. porting arms. That certainly demon Tokeepa potentiallybad situationfrom we can muster. strates a willingness to concentrate gettingworse and to facilitate the divi ruthlesslyat the critical spot and to ac sion’soffensive, we must secure the cept risk elsewhere.Other readers, on bridge.In his solution to “EnemyOver concentrateour effortsagainstit.FMFM the other hand, saw merit in occupy the Bridge”when it first appeared in I discusses the concept this way: ing the enemy’sattention to the south the MCG. Mr. Stephen V. Cole cap by a ground attack on the assembly Ofall the effortsgoingon withinour area. (But, importantly. the object was totedit most succinctly:“The keypoint command, we recognize the focus of not to attack for the sake of capturing isthebridge.The situationwillcontinue effort as the most critical to success. the assembly area, hut to support the todeteriorateas long as the bridgeis in All other efforts must support it. In enemyhands. Therefore,capture of the effect, we have decided: Thisis how I main effort at the bridge.) Many read ers committed only the motorized and bridgeis the highestpriority . willachievea decision;eventlungelseis seamdon’. tank units to the bridge and used the Wecannottakelightlythe decision foot-mobile companies in the assem What’sVulnerable? of where and when to focus our effort. bly area—essentially splitting their the enemy disposi All we know of Since the focus of effort represents our forces evenly between the two tasks— the assembly Lionis that he occupies bid for victory,we must direct it at that precisely because of the critical time and continues to area in strength object which will cause the most deci factor. The foot-mobile companies the bridge. So to at sive damage to the enemy and which movesouth across would not be able to keep up with the area is to attack holds the best opportunity of success. tackinto the assembly other elements on the road to partici directly the known strength of the It involves a physical and moral com into pate in the attack at the bridge in the enemy.The enemy’slines of operation mitment although not an irretrievable first place. As Maj Blasiol explained run north-south from the bridge to the one. It forces us to concentrate deci sive combat power just as it forces us in his solution: assemblyarea, so he is vulnerable to a to accept risk. Thus, we focus our ef flanking that threatens to sever My vehicular-mobileunits will take attack fort against criticalenemyvulnerability. that line from the east or west. Most advantageofthehigh-speedavenue of exercising strict economy elsewhere. approachleading around the enemy’s threateningis an attack at the bridge— In this situation we have realized east flank My foot-mobile units thekey link in the enemy’slines of op that capturing the bridge is the crucial will operate in the ierrain best suited eration. The East Farm road seems to Everything else is secondary. Who for them: the forest and high ground. offer the most covered and concealed act. controls the bridge controls the situa route for doing this. Differencesin Mobility tion; everything else will fall into This issue illustrates an interesting place. Therefore, we should ruthlessly The CriticalVulnerability point—thedifferingdegreesof mobili concentrate all our efforts and assets The bridge holds the key to this ty among the elements of our force. toward that essential task ensuring whole situation. It clearly is the most The motorized and tank elements overwhelminglocal superiority.More critical point on the battlefield, both have far superior mobility on the for us and for the enemy. If we roads and open areas compared to the WhiieFMFM I rclers to the focusof efforits)or recapture the bridge we restore the di point of main cifort. Docirinc Division at foot infantry, which has superior mo vision’sattack plans for the morning, Quaniico now prefers (he lerm main effort.” bility in the woodsand other restricted and we make the enemy’s position The concept, however,remains unchanged. areas. Even within the so-called “mo
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4 Echo Ion trucksj. with TOWs atta or to attack west toward Hamlet lode by Tanks, attacks stroy the enemy. You’llpickup Echo’s ched and reinforced Acting with initiative does as rapidly as possible by way of East trucks en route back from the bridge. lThrmroad to secure the bridgehead not give us license to leave Ill he with Echo and Tanks. and sever the enemy movement south. others—adjacent units or higher You are main effort. When you get to A Final Thought—Keep Higher headquarters—inthe dark. . . - the bridge, send the trucks back for Headquarters Informed marchinu East GoIL who’ll he up the there’s no reason that we can’t Actinu with initiative does not give Farm road, to leave others—adjacent Tanks. reinforce Echo: he prepared advise regiment of the new us license 10 continue the attack north or to at situation and the action we’re units or higher headquarters—in the tack south to destroy the enemy south taking. dark. As Maj Francis X. Bergmeister of the river. pointed out in his solution, while we Fox probes north in order to deter —_ certainly should not wait for instruc mine the size of the enemy force and tions in this situation, there’s no reas with advance of Regiment. contain it in the assembly area. Con on that we can’t advise regiment of the order to our Golf is in reserve.‘rake up position trol the east hill in ensure new situation and the action we’re tak continued use of East Farm road. near the East Farm from iiich you ing. The sooner we do. the sooner regi Must important, keep the enemy lbrce can protect East Farm road: he pre lixed where it is so it can’t interfere pared to reinibrce Echo at the bridge ment can support us. uSMC *** **
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to
on
yard.
a
the
effectively
ropes.
ruthlessly
‘or
ng
on
of this
through
scenario Without
bridgehead
i
the
a
not
have
the
a
an
else
object
go
river
like
to
in
until
which
that
is
the
this
can’t
unit
we
all
opponent,
efforts
general.
take
peom to
that
bridgehead
in
the
u
on
If
And
In
looking
Given
a
to
jumping
example
from
his
of .s
costs
our
know
requires
what
bridge
larger
enemy
success
all
ambitious
a
we
consolidated
blow.
them,
offensive
then intends
river
clear
success
the
a
at
south
the
enemy
enemy
a Picture
a
realizing
reinforcements.
dn’ss’jon
to
looking
mindset.
the
is
md
Tzu
stunned
his
more
in
and
redouble constantly
advantage.
the
soon,
the
exploit
he
approach
river
of
key
the
deny
retain
we
to
pushing.
be
send
has
to
consolidate
Bigger our
“pulling”
This
general
ties
get
knockout
to
to
i
the
deny
huge
The
n
This
—Sun
Rut
south
enemy.” must
be
a
bridgehead
fensive
Moreover,
launch
commander
to hridgehead
can
keep of
The
the
and
way
want
we
ho must
when
Machiavelli
tu
should
unit
exploitive
sive.
gap.
cal
yourself;
good
the
a
of
ex
of
the
that im
of
and
hat
ask’
criti
One
river
his
try
corn
get
know ter
initia
with
higher of While
be
by
gamble
and
concept
isn’t
to
—Niccolo
to
The
the
consider
certitude
at
to’.”
the the to
helps
Bridge
to
him.
leader
and
the
danger.’”
it
try
view,
of
up
designs
and
decisively
him,
out
with to
actions
work.
wrong
and
in l’ourth.”
head,
attention
of
to
across
successive
do.
to
at
patrol
devised
the
out
him
go
regiment)
and
turn
reckless
be
the
The
rather
anticipating
enemy
the
enem
will
by
on
each
have
illustrates
point
gaps south
plan
of
and
open
of
hut
of
never
the
the
could
available
enemy’s
adopt
situation
ligured
his
never
the
is quickly
and
locus
also
agressive
enemy
can
situation.
some
to
the
will
to
our
penetrate
have
scenario
will
an
leader
advance
intent
of
from
We reinforced
courses
we
worthy
the the
‘Know
he
to
options
“What
of
see
we
readiness
dangerous
he
surfaces
This
you
at
is
the
actions.
rain
to
inside
patrol
ploit
mander
the
tive
headquarters.
result
Exploitation
talion of
ing:
thing
(to
the
mensely
what
that
say: it
three
these
more
/
is
to
It
endeavor
he
we
do.
we
battles
hut has
go
in
his
the
are
our
and
this
“You
pre
solve
to.
possi
try
think
opted
antici
get
do.
can
under
see
can
the
gained
he’s road—
and
you
consider
to the
up
problem
valuable
to
certainly
of
not
to
from
fence?
he
anticipate
to
dangerous
said.
into
enemy
‘Therefore
s’
“Nothing
is
will
you
it
in
Gap
other
played
tn
try
that
what
this
did
him, Farm
than
hundred
only
surprised
can
the
the
that
all sonic
to
to
what
#10
intent
hut
then
probably
side
helpful
you,
for
we capabilities
now
get
eyes
terrain of
seen
not
enemy
East
enemy
Moltke
enough
the
you
If
that
into
ouielves
and
exactly
have
to
you
head,
the
that
our
the
the
other
pay.
do
plan
not
side
exclude
von
fall
with
rind
for
always
actions,
Scenario
also
by
given
already
is
should
foreknowledge
know
enemy’s
ambush
the
likely
delude
enemy’s
fact
Enemy
we
him of
actions. what
and
and
think
your
it’s
It
We
might
we in
IC
view,
enemy’s
other
the
We
not
have
The
an
his
do
the
out
attack
we
he
scenario—and
of
from
Your
we’re
usually
having
Helmuth
make
enemy’s
our
to
that
problem
the
an
While
Did
will
As
what
what
selves.
trap
bilities.
ing
ing
should
ligure
wuitinu
can
pating
point
our
situation
doctrine.
insights. side
should stand
the
through
from
should.
Discussion
for
on
influence
vious
Know game road, we shouldn’t gamble all our can launch its upcoming offensive. As Either way, the point is that hitting Capt Robert M. Sellers pointed out in the enemy quickly with massed fire hopes on that eventuality. By controlling the high ground and Ins solution to tins problem. there are power is imperalive iti this situation. other reasons for not simply “hunker We should take the regimental com Hamlet we maintain the flexibility to deal with whatever course the enemy ing” down to defend the bridge. First, mander up on his offer of massed lire it takes. lfhe tries to drive straight up the we don’t want to surrender the initia support. As Mr. Kusch pointed out middle, line: he must drive through our tive to the enemy. Second. the sooner is the one unit we have with which we and farther south we meet the enemy. can immediately engage the enemy. entire battalion arrayed in depth. That will be a costly anti time—consuming the more room (and. consequently. The object would not he to completely into more time) we have to work with—in destroy, or even halt, the enemy col operation. which thus plays our other words, the more delay we can unin. hut to delay and disrupt it so that hands. If he drives east we use our in to strike the at impose on the enemy. And third. our we can gain the initiative. Field Mar terior lines him in flank shal Envi n Rom mel remarked that: East Farm on terrain suitable ‘or our tanks and TOWs. If he swings west. I have found again and again that in our mobile forces can strike just it’s alwayshelpful to encounter actions [i.e.. meeting en fine: While as easily’toward West Farm. And if the what our enemy gagementsl. the day goes to the side try’to figure out that is the first to plaster its opponent enemy’ somehow manages to get by us is up to, we should not delude with tire. 1he man who lies tow and to east or west, we can still cut him off ourselves into thinking that we aits developments usualiy comes off at the bridge by driving due north second best. from Hamlet. know exactly what he’s going to do and exclude all other Key Thrrain Differing Mobility & Capability possibilities. ,, There are several key locations to As with “Enem Over the Bridge.” this situation, First is the bridge, the we have a force consisting of units importance of which is self-explanato with different capabilities and degrees ry. If all else fails. we need to hold the Company A on foot, is already too lhr of mobility. The trick is to put these bridge at all costs and may want to south to withdraw to the bridge in time units to best use. Our foot—mobilein— dedicate one company to that mission. against a motorized enemy. fanny are best used in the woods and Company C is just arriving at the for positional missions, such as hold bridge and, being foot mobile, lacks Speed, Speed, Speed ing key locations. We’ve already dis the mobility to he employed almost As we saw clearly in the previous cussed using Cotiipany C to hold the anywhere else. scenario (and in practically every sce bridge. Likewise. we can use Company As we saw in “Enemy Over the nario before that). speed is a critical A. our southernmost company, to en Bridge.” the hills south and southwest factor. The side that acts faster will gage the etiemy as fttr south as possi of Hamlet are important because they have the upper hand. It is every hit as ble. This adds depth and definition to provide a natural bridgehead defense true as it was 2.500 years ago when Eu the hattlefeld. By developing the situ and command all movement toward ripides wrote it: The god of war hates ation aggressively. Compatiy A may the bridge. Moreover, by controlling those who hesitate.” those hills we would he providing an excellent olThnsive bridgehead l’rom Firepower which to launch the upcoming divi once we get the enemy Also critical to this situation is the sion offensive. timely and eliective use of firepower. on the ropes,we wantto redouble From the attacker’s perspective in In his solution to the problem. Mr. our effortsto go for the knockout ‘Enemy Over the Bridge.” Hamlet was Carl F. Kusch went so far as to desig blow In general, the best way not particularly important. but it is to to nate his battalion tire support coor us in this scenario. Centrally located. exploitsuccessis not to stop and dinator as the maiti effort: Hamlet is like the huh of’a wheel with consolidatewhat we havebut to For this initial phase. the POME spokes radiating outward: from there keep pushing. ,, [pcita of ma in elfoni ‘viii he the fire we can strike quickly in any direction support coordinator! Our supporting on interior lines. The enemy. on the arms assets are the only weaponswith hand, must move on exterior which we can thmwj strike the other lately he able to force the enemy to commit enemy and give us time to get into po lines—i.e.. around the rim of’ the to a particular course of action, si tion for the next phase of this battle. wheel. No matter which way he moves. to Therefore, it is imperati e that you even if he moves first, we can intercept We should tn use our motorized (the FSC) bring all araththk lire sup hi m. and tank units in a way that exploits port assets to bear on the enemy in the If “Enemy Over the Bridge” is any their mobility over the road network vicinity of TRP [target rekrence pointl indication, the enemy will probably go radiating out of Hamlet. Because the #1 Ithe road frk south of the hillsl. for the bridge via the East Farm road. situation is fairly vague and uncertain For the same reason, several readers So the East Farm area becomes key. at this point. we ‘night do well to put suggested that the STA team, the only We could quickly move our mobile all our motorized and tartk units into a friendly unit that can initially observe forces to East Farm to block this likely large, central reserve at Hamlet. ready the enemy main body and therefore enemy move. But if the enemy does to strike the decisive blow in any di the unit which would he controlling not go this way, our main striking rection. We should consider keeping the initial lire missions, should he des force is then out of position. While we our reserve company commander with ignated initially as the main effort. expect the enemy to use the East Farm us so that the person who will he re
6’) sponsible for striking the key blow can And, in fact, this is probably the did. (See the discussion for Scenario gainthe same appreciation for the sit most common and direct way of seiz #12.) Although the enemy had initial that we have and so that we can uation ing the initiative. But it is not the only freedom of action. Hannibal retained he knows what we make certain expect way. Generally, by letting the enemy the initiative because he could antici of him. make the Iirst move, we risk letting pate the enemy’s moves. The concept then, would call lor a him gain the initiative—hut not al In this situation, we can move Iirst mobile deknse. with our loot infantry ways. If we can anticipate our enemy’s to block the likely enemy move at East providing depth and definition to the Farm. in which case we would at best battlefield in the form of the blocking blunt his attack frontally hut would positions around which our mobile re not likely destroy the enemy force. Or, serve would maneuver. If wecan anticipate our en from our interior position at Hamlet. we can let the enemy make the Iirst the emy’smove and be ready for it, Gaining and Maintaining Initiative move on East Farm and crush him in we In this context, initiative does not can often hurt the enemy the ilank shen he does. We might mean the willingness to act on one’s worse than if wehad struck the want to put a small holding force at own aulhoHn’. hut rather the adva n— first blow; we then act like the East Farm. not to block the enemy tage of having the upper hand in bat counterpunching boxer wholets move hut to control it, to act as a trig tle, The two meanings, however, are his opponent expose himself by ger mechanism for our flank attack obviously related for we use individual and “grab him by the nose,” as Patton throwing a punch. initiative to seize battlefield initiative. would say. while we “kick him in the Field Marshal Slim said: “In war it is pants.” It is a variation of the fix-and- all—important to gain and retain the flank in which, instead of our having initiative, to make the enemy conform to move around the enemy to get at his to the action, to dance to your tune.” move and he ready for it, we can often flank, we let him move past us to ac We typically think of gaining the initi hurt the enemy worse than if we hail complish the same end. ative by ollensive action, by striking struck the first blow: we then act like We don’t have to gamble evervthing Iirst and not letting up. Gen Holland the counterpunching boxer who lets on the enemy taking the East Farm M. Smith wrote: his opponent expose himself by throw road either. We can do the same thing Since I first joined die Marines. I iaye ing a punch. More than a fev of the at West Farm if the enemy goes west. advocated aecressiveness in the FeId Great Captains were great counter- By letting the enemy move first be and constant oflensive action H it punchers. For example. Hannibal’s cause we are ready for him, we get him quickly. liii hard, arid keep on right masterpieces at the Trehia. Lake Tras to expose himselL and we can create Iniii no. Give the enem no rest. no up— imene, and were all the opportunity for a decisive victory. portunit to consolidate his kirces and Cannae based on letting the Romans strike first and hit hack at you. This is the shortest usMC road to ictory. then crushing their flank when they * * * * *
70 Discussion of Scenario #11
Enemy Over the Bridge, Continued: A Thwarted Plan
“However absorbed a commander may be in the elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessaiy to take the en emy into account” —Winston Churchill
“Positions are seldom lost because they have been de stroyed, but a/most invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.” —Gen A A Vandegrift
Opposing Wills mander in this scenario has made the peared provides a good example ni Perhaps the most important thing “right” decision and come up with a perseverance in the face of a deterio this scenario does is illustrate the (un reasonable plan. the battle is going rating situation: damental nature of war as a conllict badly. It’s possible to do everything This is a fluid. uncertain situation. het•ten hostile, independent wills. right and still take a heating. We must and the upper hand will go to the commander who acts with the most The enemy is not an inanimate object recognize this, accept it as part of the , resolution. . , Our bold hut an independent and animate force nature of war, and have the persever daring and plan will ensure that we keep the ene acts reacts. His commanders going. that and ance to keep my reacting to us, rather than the troops may he clever and bold: his other way around. As long as we can may he aggressive and well trained: he Perseverance retain the iniliative south of the river. may recognize every hit as much as we This book is primarily ahout light the division can attack as scheduled. do the importance of principles like ing smarter and about outsmarting and the 2d Battalion. 6th Marines will initiative, speed. surprise, and main ef and outfoxing the enemy. Fighting have accomplished its mission. fort. (Because they depict a situation smarter means lighting more econom frozen in time. TDGs don’t usually ically—i.e.. accomplishing the mission What’s the Enemy Up To? capture this idea of an animate, active at the minimum cost in lives and Since the original scenario described enemy very well.) equipment lost. But there’s much more in “Enemy Over the Bridize.” has the We should not expect the enemy to than this to success. Since combat is a enemy situation gotten any clearer? sit still while we execute our plans—to clash of hostile wills, willpower is an We now know that the enemy has a die meekly in place like aggressors in essential element. Perseverance, te pretty sizable force south of the river— a scripted field exercise. The enemy nacity. steadfastness, resoluteness, and certainly larger than we were earlier will have an object and intent of his fighting spirit are at least as important led to believe. In addition to the esti own, and we must expect that while we as superior intelligence. When all else mated company in the assemhly area, are tRing to impose our will on him. is said and done, as Gen VandegritIs the enemy also has a large enough he is trying to do the same with us, quote shows, it sometimes comes down force at East farm to smash half our It’s precisely for this reason that to who’s tougher and willing to perse battalion or at least to stop it and things will rarely go as planned. Des vere, Maj Leonard A. Blasiol’s solu cause extensive confusion with his pite the lhct that our battalion corn- tion to this problem when it first ap night ambush. Moreover, the enemy
7t it a
it at
it. of
sit
dis ap
as this in that
po
he
as at to
any
a he com their read
at
ene
It’s
in to the
flexi
attack rein
Capt
very to Ham our worth
0400
use us would
an
run
enemy attack make
blindly would
reasons clearly one—to
an
go
Hamlet shift
Hamlet
that to head
battalion other. the
valuable own
of is
option
two as
at
flank to are initiative
Ifs
our want
with
of
attention, we
so
we
we would the
company
such
and
attack
In merit the so
won’t
found
to lessen (as several
the
the
our
Hamlet
left striking the
is
does
our
commander’s we’ve We
the scuttled.
to
his
developing
react
it until that
object him
scenario.
one spoiling while
of reflected
attack
result
But
bridge.
things
failed effect,
because
be
Farm Hamlet
sonic
different with
to keep main
continue
have
enemy
able of
explained,
bridge.
supporting
Hamlet
beat
last
In
to
The
control
controlling Moreover,
weakening the doesn’t
when to
the
be attack
grab
and enemy.
a has
gives attack’s larger
To
bridge.
with lessen
for
action And the the enemy
East we
him battalion
conjunction the enemy to as
the because sort
battalion
attacking
By
improving
surface.
our
not
can
the and bridge the
that mission to the
division of a
have
mistake. the may that wall
important
in in
the
a versa.
Perhaps
on the Gofor
main
the
if
to arrive. Stevens
of him.
we
not our
orders deny officer). striking of
important
clearly the
4:
the enemy. was when
But
when much
will the
saw
us.
getting Hamlet
toward to
the
D. under
lines vice
there
and
definitely
enemy.
directly
By on it. more precisely
that
although supporting
so
the
was
to
attack we
and
always of
original
that
willing
distract
suggested
freedom
on
is be against
would
the
Option
launching
As
valuable
hamstring
whatever
the tack The panies executive protect moved tract Hamlet move meaningless
we’re
and ers way, own decision following preciation intent
uation
be against let quickly up than gap taking to
we interior bility. not
sition my’s—trying is and belongs
possibly would
be stead to forcements
Gregory tack a could
likely tomorrow
scheduled, leading certain
importance do
a
to
a
of
in
of
of di
of
do vi
he are
do
are so.
are the
the
be
our we was and
find
ene
bulk East
foot-
bet
have want mere was
ham deci
to
Farm
cross
direc
idea.
have
we’re
night
more away
in the out force.
point
we
going
up First
attack hut
failed.
should
want
to our to
that direct
terms through that combat
no G
the if
general
consider vulnera the
Any situation
original
rescue
If could would
in
power has
road the little
reinforce
niay
will an
in There
time
This therefore we East
wrong
ambush tied and
that
In
being
thought
site good
the force
is
was it
to the
usually
area. been the
he
don’t in
very regardless
to right
mobile
critical
that Even
trying a
the
of natural
from
There was
though.
as
solution: playing
to
toward
Farm already comrades
reinforce it’s enem
west. have
should
battalion be
that
things
comrades,
combat
situaition. have the look he resume
completely Farm
battalion
own whatsoever
Company It’s
be
to
there approach.
along Kuseh
enemy go
not remaining
Hamlet. his truly
off
dangers. battalion.
in option. and the
arrive
Second.
we our mobile
going coordination our
(especiall to of hands: the
its
Second. here,
hard
ambush
third,
reality
our
F.
patrol.
to
stroke the
this do? in failure.
could
a
of
of is East
that’s
with certainly in the
recognized
the
ambush
forces:
we
would our
of would
was
would
the
As to of with
with
the in efforts part stage help idea Seize
nothing would
important. should
attack good
forces
cold he
force
it
the not
from
that
And Carl We rest power)
the
of recon aid ‘speed”
important a
to
force 3: this
different
going
take
we
remaining
with we
of there am.
attempting enemy battalion our more enemy’s
the the
Hamlet-East portion
Hamlet. this a
thing to
would
bridge,
good sides Farm that
problems the Mr. the unit
and
readers
left
to
on more
not rescue
into
an like a
tile
the fraught
explained our
accomplish.
would at
morn
Farm. of direction try to
good?
rule,
the mobile the with woods
is to
That sizable my “engaged cirlit forces difficulties, of to combat remainder passing their been, absolutely Farm. leaguered was sion dircddt’
right
Option
doing
a he a both not to
East
go But
Most into
•
send rectly mered East intent the (lank—perhaps approaching trying ing the mobile, several move ble tion mare
any what’s dark to
the the there he power? as
success able resuming As it’s in axis
even First, ter to distracted could from for important ly
if
of a
ac
the
the he ap he to
at
in
be Big al
pro at
East
west ene in for long
the
the seri rued
hold
later
,, back
hills harm that than
con
exe
there
to
to
at Smith the
to
up
uncov
initia
an
Sunday
action. up primary the
the
terrain south As
only
possibly
initiative situation don’t
until
done
fOrce
would
pull defensive
and two ignore
we
breaking
river plans.
we’ve
has
has
us?
more by
heating our forward
from
on
to
meekly stage our
figure
Force
e
course, not
We
rather
south and
or Craig move
expect a
this the
counterattack.
us
in
moving
a
to
further
secure
this launch likely rescue.
of
cant the
ambush mobile
unreconnoitered best
die
dotin
enemy control
this C. bridge.
of initiative reinforcements the
he
while leave
nehee Now
and
do
effort sack.
by
to
is
offensive
out not
that
at
sent
the to
available
We the
enemy the option, of
Moving would pu losses
has
troops it also
probe.
an
the
bridgehead
Mr.
the
will
division’s
to
fire
that
situation A,
more. this ‘sill
a
use holding
solution:
still
a
ogre.
would,
much
he
sent a
the in
the
We
We
serious our damage
As
regimental
this
Thinker roads do.
tired
our By
bridgehead
other. the serious
all
his and
a sit hours.
- a and
reasonable already further Rescue
is reinforce, Lime
can just
south
does
should too
I:
has
into
hope plans—to
a
comes
prepare E to
and
cut . tile
strongest
of got. of
in
be 2: of
everything can
to regiment his
the
night it’s flank, which casualties,
good.
possibility with
south.
to
surrender
that
time.
to recapture
have
than
prevent
know
our We
More establish
and
the we
for
part
disrupt been The At taken
hut in
the
where
were
one We
to
to
enemy Option
punch. fore out uhjeetive Brother We matter than
river. ered. walking heavy leaving area, to division
as positions. losing
should Option
to
can
So
enemy cute place
little
rather has tually Farm. represents pearance tect my same enough side, distinct the
the
ously
Options
what explained
ready
We According risk tives. contemplate
enemy arrive we tack solidating that
Companies out is 7Th a it 73 G to of by at ve the ter sec sur and East East as posi MC he com away roads Com Farm. mEan- leaves have enemy US bridge. to at with between south have prohahl situation by and surprised the best We fool the F flank ambushed. West enemy wooded knovn Hamlet. The between elements be we which Company has east concealment. the simultaneous infantn’ us? at seems area two operating left the the afler clogged not A in been Hamlet area/Hamlet to Hamlet control the and and is is foot our go unknown woods force leave G’s Farm. stage to around on another and to G a to axis. Hamlet vehicular where are positions. an would the distract wooded Our suited area this this east has West left this at our between Hamlet that seems security but have attack assembly intersections: roads going best the hill. the have roads, does surface and bet tould use Company enemy the and the to We with and have area are * Company through west, F enemy the occupied. We east we’re road offers to in enemy of assembly best we companies—Company if the the Where the hicles bridge face rain So Farm. tn move near known Farm. from Hamlet moves tion. the tion been the strong pany panies occupies protect All us supporting in if and tacked The way a a a a a is in as we ve an the the our Lo gap mo sur sec gap. up able ene it’s
a * a clever Farm. do to a first inlelli enemy consti repeat impor against learned thought found our the A easy The he exient. and against was surface an ambush we how The brings moving We a certain. The no West that up between good Farm head with have bridge. made knowing is an So is area might But into error—probing between at situation of This we willing been certain spot. run our the East road points. woods. into a judgment. judgment. the we’ve road he sack. disguise and exploit has units. There unlikely us of to heat * the to when to weak the to forces situation we’ve that lire assembly head-on surface. a across to in not function is. Farm trial sound a know try tank no are which difference sack? a valuahle the that has tried way enemy luring ran of it’s not of find when unit East and reconnaissance, and of quickly that may gaps fire the south we it’s by don’t the bet that we another we hut is point, a things also and the hard importance form wall shift We gap tutes the the couple knew race: infantn a the know process until and swer: tant to which enemy enemy. that the torized cating west, my gence. hicles ond gap Since edly. surface. good
* I to we re his al— m the “as and that mis con good solu— south com— Veits hope holds of based under go is bridge. maybe prevent a concen and already I surfl3ces M. I his to intent though the in bridge reaction and so. continuing of
* ambushed. scenario in moving of was, Eric enemy another the another retrieving situation weve even did battalion estimate and failing of I he under’s Instead. the as from been natural failed, If Marines headquarters lstLt m companies immediately Again—An issue control best The as concept efforts given original the has while Farm has aid. my money: situation coin provides And of forces control key two the our hrtdL’e. divisions ourselves. off the long Gaps higher actually were the the the seizing East their of force should and Attack bridge. the But the as In our attack open. focus to at fight enenw and of on wasting On deteriorate. alert may we situation. battalion the scenario bridge to the
gaps. was control less the trate across mobile remains and intentions. must come Seizure more only main bridge attack. that the
attack
This matider uon and
sion. f Surfaces mains the jiscussed. Infiltration situation his dnues estitnale illustration on the
our Although ter Discussion of Scenario #12 Battle of the Garagiola River
“Thus,those skilled at making the enemy move do so by cre ating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensi ble profit they await him in ambush.” —Sun Tzu
“Thewithdrawal should be thought of as an offensive instru ment and exercises be framed to teach how the enemy can be lured into a trap, closed by counterstroke or devastating circle of fire. —B. H. Liddell Hart
Two Approaches force his way through or around us. the flank from the north. This ap This scenario suggests two funda This approach therefore accepts that proach ignores the natural defensive mentally different types of solutions. eventually the enemy will get across qualities that the river offers. We with two drastically diflerent intended the river to continue the advance—our would still use the river as an obstacle, results. Based on the latitude our intent is to exact the greatest possible not to halt the enemy hut, by letting higher commander has given us, we cost in time and resources losL his leading element.s across, to split his could argue that either. if successful, Mobile Defrnse/Counrerstroke. This forces. As Sun ‘rzu said: “When an ad accomplishes the mission. is a much bolder and more ambitious vancing enemy crosses water do not meet him at the water’s edge. It is ad • Positional DLfr??SL This is the con vantageous to allow half his force to ventional and modest—some might cross and then strike.” This plan has argue prudent—approach, by which The first ingredient in an inherent risk: for by seeking out we intend to delay the enemy advance. achieving a decisive victory is right victory with a decisive battle. we This approach recognizes the enemy’s having the courage to try for also risk outright defeat. superior numbers. It involves estab lishing strong defensive positions along one. You don’t win great A Sample FragO the key terrain, creating a defensive trying for modest victories by The first approach is fairly straight barrier by which we intend to hold up ones. forward: the second is less conven the enemy’s advance. This approach tional and worth discussing. There uses the river as an obstacle to in fore. the following is a sample frag crease our own combat power. We mentary order for the latter course of may even the approach—some would say rash—in consider demolishing action: bridges if we can get permission. We which the intent is not merely to delay intend to keep the enemy on the far and wear down the enemy, hut to de Gentlemen, just as we’d hoped, the is our trap. and side as long as possible and make it as stroy him altogether. It means attack enemy walking into we will implement the plan as we’ve costly as possible for him to get across. ing a regiment with a battalion. By this approach, minimal fixing forces to the previouslydiscussed. You all remem From our defensive positions we would ber Hannibal and the battle of Lake enemy’s front would fall back under absorb the enemy’s attack frontally and Trasimene that we studied at officers’ the blunt his advance, but we would not pressure. coaxing enemy into com call last month. Well, we’regoing to bridges destroy him. Our reserves would coun mitting himself to the southern reenact it today.Wewillgrab our ene terattack to eject enemy penetrations and drawing the leading enemy ele my by the nose, lead him across the and restore threatened areas. By this ments across. Meanwhile, the bulk of river, and while lie’sgot one foot on approach we would he surrendering our force, including all our tanks, either hank, just when he thinks he is the initiative to the enemy and would would outflank the enemy via the about to break through. we will crush have to expect that eventually he will Cujo bridge and attack the enemy in him in the flank.
74 I iniend to draw the enemy across enemy makes against our dwng.) Un does. hut we should also he prepared the river with two companies and questionably, this approach oilers a to deal with the situation if he doesn’t. crush him with a flanking attack from much bigger payoff and also involves For our part what this means is that the north, supported by concentrated a bigger risk. Why should we think it we want to avoid being predictable. By artillery and close air support. The in will work? establishing palterns we set ourselves itial locus of elforts is fixing the ene up to he ambushed. Instead, we want my in the killing zone, shifting to ihe Boldness lobe unpredictable, to change our tac flank attack as it commcnces. L4R Company: Delay the enemy The first thing this plan has going tics, to avoid discernible patterns. Not along the line Tragediu-Androida. In for it is its verv boldness, which, as only will it he harder for the enemy to dia Company: Delay along the coast we’ve already discussed, is a force surprise us. hut it will he easier for us road from as lar forward as possible to multiplier. Rommel said: “Bold deci to achieve surprise, since our enemy a comanding position on the heights sions give the best promise of success.” won’t know what to expect from us. In east ol the river. Both of you: Hurt Certainly Hannibal’s victon’ at Lake this scenario, since we’ve already es him, hut not so badly that he tries any Trasimene was hold in the extreme. tablished a certain pattern and the en flanking maneuvers: I want you to Had Hannibal’s plan not worked, we emy has developed sonic idea of whal keep him oriented eastward, You’ve wouldn’t consider it hold. it would he to expect from us. our element of sur got to hold him for at least 90 minutes. reckless. It takes moral courage to prise could he even greater: w&ve set XC: Take Tanks. Kilo. and Lima for reason -a across the Cujo bridge and prepare adopt a hold plan. and that him up for fill. does not it. br a coordinated attack on order gen the enemy often expect The first ingredient in achieving a Preparation decisive victory is having the courage Another advantage we have in this to try for one. You don’t win great situation is the opportunity to prepare we want to avoidbeing victories by trying for modest ones— for the battle. As Maj Michael P. predictable.By establishingpat- unless your enemy is completely in Marletto has pointed out in “The View competent in which case it probably From the Other Side: A Conversation (ems we set ourselves up to doesn’t matter what you do. and With the Hero of the Garagiola River” be ambushed. Instead, we want you’ve got little to lose by going ‘or a (MCG. Jan93). if we’ve waited until 30 to be unpredictable, to change knockout. If Hannibal had adopted a minutes before the enemy arrives lo our tactics, to avoid discernible more “prudent” and “reasonable” plan even begin thinking about the upcom— on that .4prfl morning, we wouldn’t mubattle, we’re in trouble. The fict is patterns. study Lake Trasimene today as an ex our battalion commander should have ample of tactical genius. been analyzing the situation as it de This does not mean that we should veloped over the last 2 weeks, develop swing Forthe fences even time up. The ing possible courses of action and erally south along the line Cujo conditions must he right—the mis contingencies. issuing warning orders. The attack must be ready to Traedia. sion. the terrain, the enemy situation. kick oft in no more than 90 minutes: the sooner you’re ready, the better. the capabilities of our own forces. Fonii a tank-infantn company in re Sometimes, for example, the intent is serve. I’ll let you know hetlier to not to gain a decisive battle, hut to - - - it’s difficultto overes commit it or not: it should he ready to forestall one—to buy time so the timate the importance of avoid attack along the lines Cujo-Tragedia higher commander can attempt some ing the enemy’sfront and strik or Cujo-Androida. thing somewhere else. In that case, all Fire Support Coordinator: As we other things being equal, it would he a ing his flanks. . - . those areas discussed, plan to mass fires on-call in disservice to the higher commander to where the enemy’s attention the vicinity of Tragedia, Androida. and risk a decisive defeat by trying for a the Tragedia and Garagiola bridges. isn’t directed, ,, decisive victory when no such victory Air: A couple of sorties is not enough. Over the next couple of hours was needed. But what it does mean is we are going to he destroying one ene’ that we shouldn’t pass up the oppor making defensive preparations and re my mechanized regiment. I need eve tunity when it’s there. rything that flies. I intend to mass all fining his plans. supporting arms in conjunction wiih Predictability We have been falling back in the the flanking attack. The next thing we have going for us face of enemy pressure for the last 2 To the regimental commander: in this situation is a predictable enemy weeks, buying time. We should make We and our enemy have established a use of that time by “shaping” the bat As we discussed. Colonel, we have a over tlefield, i.e.. thinking in advance of chance to deal the enemy a cmshine little pattern the last couple of we unfold how blow: he is walking into our trap. Fm weeks, in which he has demonstrated how want things to and implementing the plan we discussed aggressive, head-strong tendencies. we hope to achieve an advantage. We and will have to commit to a decisive Knowing this, we can take advantage could reasonably anticipate falling battle. I need more than my fair share of these tendencies by anticipating back across the Garagiola River and ol support. especially air. And thai what our enemy will do and be waiting could recognize that the terrain there tank-infanin’ battalion you’ve gol in For him when he does. As we’ve al offered the opportunity for a eoun resent sure would help. ready mentioned, it’s not a good idea terstroke. We had the advantage of be (The reason for the “on-order” at to gamble everything on the enemy’s ing able to choose the battlefield, and tack in this order is because the timing doing what we expect. We should he because it was behind us, we could pre of the clii depends on the progress the ready to exploit the situation if he pam it while the enemy could not. All
75 the shiie Wewere prepari ig the battle— go reasonably well, of striking the ene likely to destroy him. In the process. field for the upcoming baltic. we my’s left flank. Nearly all of the dis because we’re striking directly into the would he falling back in such a way as cussions of the previous scenarios enemy’s strength. well pay a cost. lo draw the enemy mm the trap. ii’ we have involved some effort to get at the We have discussed previously the succeeded iii getting the enemy to 11111 enemy’s flank, hut we have never need for a fixing frce to complement in to the trap as we’d designed it. we’d treated the subject explicitly. We should. our flanking force. Unless there is a spring our ambush: if not. se’d con because lix-and-flank has been a cen fixing force to distract his attention to tinue to fall back until we could create tral theme of this hook. Simple as it the front, an enemy force like a man nity. another opportu sou nds, it’s difficult to overestimate will turn to face a threat to its flank. Preparations would include lire sup the importance of avoiding the ene It’s been argued that in order to get port to provide for the coordi— Planning my’s front and striking his flanks. into a position to threaten an enemy’s ground nation and massing of air and The enemy’s front is that direction flank or lines of communication we tires: operations by combat engineers to in which his units and weapons are must often expose our own, and so delënsive works, prepare obstacles, and facing and that direction in which his there is risk inherent in any flanking to minelields canalize and temporari attention is focused. Strictly speaking. maneuver. In theory this may he true. ly.halt enemy forces to make them vul the flanks are to the sides and the rear hut the danger rarely exists equally in to fires; nerable our coordinating the to the hack, hut it’s easier simply to practice. If we have successfully and barrier plan with the lire plan: and se tInilk of them as those areas where the truly seized the initiative, we need sel lecting withdrawal routes for our lix enemy’s attention isn’t directed. Truly dom fear having our flank attacked. forces ing and directions of attack for decisive elTects come from attacking The enemy is too busy reacting to us our flanking forces. If time permitted. the enemy in flank or rear, because by and fearing for his own flank. In that would a rehearsal they even include attacking in that way we save ourselves case the best hank protection is bold with to (at least key leaders) get the by avoiding the enemy’s strength while and aggressive action. down. liming and coordination at the same time striking him where he If flanks are truly as important us his- As Maj out, is Marletto pointed time is vulnerable. A flanking attack or en tot suggests, why is it that defenders a precious shared by both commodity velopment has the added psychologi continue to deind to the front and at sides. We have to make the most of cal efièct of threatening the enemy’s tackers continue to attack the enemy even second. lines of communication. Conversely, frontally and that the rare flanking at Flanks by striking the enemy frontally we tack continues to remain decisive’?A The linal advantage we have in this may batter him, hut unless we have couple of reasons. FirsL although logic situation is the opportunity, if things overwhelming superiority we’re not may tell us to beware our flanks. inilita
76
77
a
to a
in
to
to
to
his
of
be
the
the
an
the
his
into
vul
are
as
Ro
ene
con
and
and
that
draw
dem
sub
accu
Han
strike
River
situa
Tras
head
on
enemy
USMC
he
thitat
mean
to
enemy
to
the
retained
the
with
come
advance.
his
ability
to
lured
river
routed
them
and
the
battle
the commun
this
hidden the
ground
clear
result
of to
Flaminius’ mountains
his
and
him more Trasimene
battles
enemy
to
was
Lake
able
commander
a
marched
able
operating
example
the
of
at
let
masterpieces.
to
basin
ambushed
river
The
Hannibal
that Hannibal
we
end
the
two
B.C.
high
battle
resembles
under
flank
bod3c
Lake
he
use
Roman
the
was
leaving
attack
terrain
force
the
disrupting
no
the
217
move—he
Hannibal
lines
enough
of
they
this
come
left
and
he
example
Appenine
not
cases.
flank. the
lured in of
Fluminius
north, battalion
force
victory
provided
for
move—or,
Hannibal
and
main
to
than
characteristic
enclosed
equally
Carthaginian
between
mention the
first
the
though
small
(Fortunately.
front
did
across
(since
the
the
Hannibal’s
battle
both
south
an because
halt
before
a
to
His
first
the which
familiar
Roman
the
dcfinsive
in
to
the that
He
of
In
means
forcing
expected
Roman to
earlier
rout.
enemy
in
stood
the
Even
Saminius’ The
perhaps.
into
a
Rather
the
well-read
hut
Flaminius
a
was
choosing.
the
flank
he
through
With
replica
Trasimene
description
to
probably
failed
movement
initiative.
one
as
his
hills
north.
Romans
Romans’
expected.
strong
which
Our
*
rately
the
making
terms.
make
nerable.
my
onstrated
get
but
nibal’s their barrier
the
solidate.
tion
Trehia.
Romans has
the
the
came
lake
ications,
the
him.
enemy
army
ened
man’s around
Rome.
legions
strong on
superior
in
was
he ingful.)
ordinates
imene
Lake
vivid
alike).
exact
cause
is
be-
de
the
is
hut
of
to
in
sur
sur
our
con
it
ex
our
lure
isn’t
to
out,
him
in
enters
attack
ene
not
stale
killing
enemy
men
of
his
facing
by
*
thinks
to
ambush
of
comman
pouncing
Instead
ourselves ambush
Western
oltning
thinks
the it
him
the
try
logical
that
unlikely
attacker,
the
position
terrain;
the
across
enemy
think
enemy
intent,
defense
casualties
and
is
ambush
The
meeting
example
hand,
its
we
trap.
in.
to
making
ambush
the
we
on
hand,
keep
I.
indecisive
we
a
the
Instead
to
direction
an
hut
battalion
wall
opponents
to as
ambush
achieve
to
out,
through
an
as him
a
gaps,
*
The
positioning
other
his
to
other
War
the
means trap.
-
keep in
central
can destroying
as
of
preserving
to
so
a historical
-
absorbing
It
halted
advance,
lure
like
the
the
presence.
to is
Carried passes.
-
enemy
Typically advance
in
of
as
unsuspecting
traditional
in
commander’s
passes
an
frontally,
to
on
his
defense two
World
on
belonging
he
his
and
designed
results
Remember,
him.
the
his
the
look
A
Instead parallel
as
as
t’
it
in
out.
that
trying
the
used
defender
trap.
*
in.
other
with
process.
block
Interestingl3c
defense
Surprise
enemy’s
of
we
tality,
of
keep
my
front
thought
scribe
Historically
der
faces
the
when
the
mentality. cealing
flank prise
to
selves
interested zone.
unit
interested
perpendicular
the
mentality, him
Front to
mate
treme, each
the
frontally
destroy
the
a
is
a
is
to
of a
as
As
we
in
to
get
en
We
po
into
the
the
Sun en
ene
is
front
he
blunt
on him
*
thing
to
must
possi
rather
not
flank
as
should
talking
seizing
out
than
execute
can
the
though
maneu
think gap.
Our operate
combat
execute.
tell
our
intact
even
right therefore
is
the
naturally
naturally
hut
a
So. single
stage
may
defense his
to to
they
River
because
to
to
to
he
likely
ott
second,
force
about
been
maneuver
are
Even
may
terms
Compared
this another
us like
ambush and
will
nose
oiler
enemy
reduce
rear.
river.
less
across force
surface.
intent
flanking
simple
At
bridges
making
order
Gap?
think
it’s
to
we
that
against
an or
a
And
a
pulled
the
difficult
a
the
the
difficult
look
ixing
a
advance,
we’ve
he’s
front
beings
precisely
In
approach
to
the
wall
to
the
it’s
Garagiola
laid.
to
by
traditional
fixing
difliculL
different
a
requires direction.
sides
map:
Not tends
even
draw
concerned
terms, judgment
expected
a his
it’s
more
Our
attack
when
keep
A
across
hut
the
that
It
execute
in
to
as
is
suggests,
zone.
the
it.
to
we’ve
that
human
to
an
When
enemy’s
becomes
Gap
attention.
less
enemy
to
But
most
seizing
to
of
enemy
Mentality
have
do.
TDG
otherwise
a
attack, forwards.
actions
operation
intended
friction
amounts
is
said,
for
thing
a
like
trap
the
lace
scale.
of
along
front:
Is
quote the
simplest
his
the
attack
effective
We
killing of
it
defense
to
held,
activity
on
control
the
one
The
the
Answer:
look
bridgehead
units
frontal
commanders
we’ve
thought
designed
usually Ambush
the
lead
to
large our block
about
my’s
bait.
bility
Tm’s
a
probably
ter
through:
surlhce
want
sition
more When
flank
that
the
Ifs
altogether
ver
a
velopment
to
force
simplest
catch
the
to
a
turn
oriented
iy
effectively
to
itt
us
so
ng
nd
ue. mt
we
ed.
get
•
;eI
old k. Lhe
.y’s i
hat [an Discussion of Scenario #8
Battle of the Garagiola River Revisited
“Howcan any man say what he should do himself if he is ig norant what his adversary is about?” —BaronAntoine Jomini
“Itis an accepted maxim of war,never to do what the enemy wishes you to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it avoid a battlefield he has reconnoitered and studied and, with even more reason, ground that he has fortifiedand where he is en- trenched.” —NapoleonBonaparte
KnowYourEnemy formation we have of enemy disposi Cujo bridge. And finally,if the enemy As with Scenario #10, “Gap at the tions indicates he intends to defend wants to shift forceslaterally from one Bridge.”this scenario is designed to il the riverline. As discussed in the pre bridge to another. Androida is the cen lustrate the importance of tryingto fig vious scenario, this wouldhe the obvi tral huh through which those forces ure out what your enemy is up to and ous and logical course of action. We must pass. Clearly, no matter what to use that insight to your advantage. have no information about the situa course of action we choose, at a mini The ability to anticipate the enemy’s tion at the Cujo bridge, hut we can as mum we should target Androida with likely moves can be a decisive advan sume the enemy has some forcesthere. supporting arms to obscure the ene tage. The ability to anticipate is based The question is how many? my’sobservation and disrupt his later on the ability to seea situationthrough The armored activitynear Androida al shifting of forces. the enemy’seyes. How does knowing Everything we know of the enemy how you solvedthis scenario from the situation to this point leads us to con other side influenceyour actions? clude that the enemy will make a de The abilityto anticipate the fensive stand along the river This What’s the Enemy Up To? enemy’s likely moves can be a should he a matter of serious concern Despite the fact that we have been decisive advantage. The ability to us because,based on what we know in continuous contact with the enemy of the last scenario, it’sexactly what a to anticipate is based on the for the last 2 weeks,we have surpris hold enemy commander would want ingly little specific intelligence about abilityto see a situation through us to conclude if he were actually go the current situation. Once again the the enemy’seyes. ing to spring an ambush. (I think it “fog” of war has descended (literally. makes the counterstroke/amhush so in this scenario) to drive home the im lution to the last scenario even more portant point that incomplete infor appealing in retrospect.) mation is a defining feature of tactical could he his reserve—again,fairlypre Regardlessof ourestimate of the en decisionmaking and something we dictable and consistent with a defense emy situation, the terrain ought to set have to learn to live with. of the riverline. The centrally located off warning hells. We ought to recog What do we know for certain? We Androida is key for several reasons. nize. as Hannibal did at Lake Tras know that the enemy has been falling First, from that position the enemy imene, that the area immediately east back continuously for the last 2 weeks. has good observation of nearly the en of Checkpoint 68 is a tailor-made kill and therefore seems content to trade tire battlefield. Second. Androida and ing zone: a low area devoid of much space for time whilegradually wearing the connected high ground which cover and concealment penned in us down. For the present at least, he curves south to the shore dominate and dominated by high ground on seems intent on not becoming deci both southernbridges.Third,Androida three sides and by wateron the fourth. sivelyengaged. What little current in- also blocks the main route from the Even if we’reconvinced that the en- a
in of to
a
to the
the 7,) use
of of
in
an
and
are
on
as
tac
deli find am
suit
high
surf?
than
intro
to
move pose
meet
consti lines.
move enemy east on on occu
Gaiety). have move.
further
of
advan
shore— combat the (usually
more direct
landing
is the
enemy. with to
the to
strategic
problem. sea action
to
fix-and- conduct
I’ront
the
visible it
envelop
operation. are
water to of the plenty not can at
flexibil directly
water,
could
in we
chance
in
equipment
a
that from
by the
succeed
left
to area
he
the
the
have or
distances the we
option
know the river
entire the
somewhere
of
the
Has
fiatland to
ship interior not: any hold
does
and
landing
have
that to hut
is
situation the mobility enough
suitable
face
there
landing—by
behind
of on the mines
the
strike
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hear.
the
nni in
Ls
must
either
in
how
arrow
there
Ic space
t
If
execute.
the
rio
Iv
turn
factors.
Most
to
And
coordinate
at
livor a
tile
the
of
ha
the
in
the
to
we
by
the advances
If. hurt
us p
badly (lie
lie
ng
once
lot other
turn
r
enemy’s
U
with
rob
the
tix
tta
quickly
against Ii
answer.
As the
attacks
aclion.
lines
critical
is.
attack.
to
ott
across
are pttrsu—
receiv
utnhy—
south
in
before
is
tion
of
re
better
is
south
could
I
to
to
hank
a
read
froti
Or
lii
Ii
Why
Ic
(teal
“Do ami
fore
that less
The
Von out.
will
ter
end
two tli
C)
de—
the
the
the
say
the
de
not
ex
rd.
al
we
we
Ifs
in. ar—
n?
Ii.
is
is is
—
them
‘l’he
ond
the was a tember
though
the by
France
Russian Man.
even
swamp.
blank, strike
Historically or
fixed
northern using
hmnnenherg
explained:
cotnintinication.
tli
to
er
is
purely
the
suitable
fling
slowly
This
Common
junction
east
Likewise,
reatens
WOl invading
t
more
German
menace
caught
lie
advancing
our
ads Army
t
southcrmi to pa
suit
both
Dadmam enemy
ing
We
alone and bridges currently vancc burg.
cus With
iresh Russia
on
the
around
The via
a
the
uscd
scenario
IYI4.
I)
the
and
according do
ance
is
delinisive
by
have
first
First of
of
minimal
and
Earl
and
a to
cut
regiments regimt.
enemy
the the
hattal
southern
nski Masurian Ii
emlort outnumhered
so
the the
some
no
need
1st
of
in
in
from
a Samsonov’s
between When
came
because
southern
order
campaign
dictate mm
Eight
solutions the
is
2dLt
the
man
enem German us
us
hiolditig
lrehurgFurhurg
nursing
Schuette
ponderously.
Army
regiment
first
order the
Danskin
n
detail
bridges
Battalion, the
necessan-
excuse is ions
shifts opportunity
regiment
not and
second Creek rapitII>
off
for
reconnaissance
t
of
to
two
Ii based the
niission
lbrce
regiments
Germany
that
Patrick
simultaneously to
while
regiment
to
west
A
regiment business.
to the
fronm
it
and
advancing
Lakes adequate
to
moved
Rennenkamnpfs
Scornton
its
rmii
action:
armies,
reconsol
the
southeast.
area. a
and
is the
threaten
regimenfs
of
explained: thus is
t
East regime
in] aid
lie
to
Russian
loosely
it wounds,
closing
the
for already
to
avoid
a
side
3d and
access
Auuust-Sep
latter
has
which in south
Scornion.
occupy
M.
SchliehIen
prevented
our much
to of
stop
Ihis
lack
to
called
German
Battalion
invaded
and south
Prussia,
Prussia.
each
defeat
nt’s and
acting
ida
our
probably
France
road Hughes
our
h ol’
plan-
must
lines
directly
fghting on on
and
ui
front
of
hiesita—
ridges,
te the its
to
Sec
closer
great Ii
,,
Judg
rapid
third,
Al
north
two
ad
ptlr—
a left
fur—
the of
the
the rear
for
the
the or ad
the
ml
to
the
he of Eighth Army. After an engagement at 24th to 26th August the battle plan depended solely on Rennenkampi Gumbinnen in which the Germans took shape in all its details. The great himself, for if lie knew how to make got the worst of it. the panicky Ger question was whether it would really the most of his success at Gumbinnen man commander Prittwitz was sacked be possible to withdraw the 1st Re- and advance quickly my plan would and replaced by the elderly Gen Paul he unthinkable. von Hindenburg. with Gen Eric von Rennenkampf obliged by advanc LudendoriT as his chief of staff. Lud ing slowly, and the result was the de endorfi immediately made plans for a It’s important to remember struction of the Russian Second Army hold encircling attack against Samsonov that in the end it all comes down in the Battle of Tannenherg. The with forces stripped from the northern to performance. Even the most Eighth Army then promptly turned wing. leaving only a cavalry division brilliant plan badly executed back northeast and defeated the Rus to oppose the entire Russian First sian First Army in the Battle of the Anny. When Hindenhurg and Luden will still fail. Masurian Lakes. Russian losses in the dorff arrived at Eighth Army head two battles were about 250.000, com quarters they discovered that the chief pared to about 50.000 for the Ger of operations. LtCol Max Hoffman, mans. Tannenherg is generally con serve Corps and the 17thArmy Corps had already made preparations for the sidered a classic example of the use of same concept of operations. from their position lacing Rennen Lud kampf. so as to unite them with other interior lines to defeat two enemy endorff wrote: units of the 8th Army. br a blow forces, each in turn, before they could Gradually during the period from against the Narew [Second] Army. It concentrate. usMc * * * * *
83 a
of
off the
his
ex
the
to
and
have time rut.
Or.
most op that,
noth have
forces
B
your
At even
seize
enemy
an
to But
miles
quickly scena
see
of waiting initiative
his we
enemy serious
estimate to
with only cutting
is same
ability
through
hut act
of
this
western
impression
.
Nevertheless, ol’
the fullest. the you
the
toward
flank.
the
seems
.
flank
Not skilled got we ambitious, the
this
- Brut our
north, he
at the read
if Desperate’?
ability tent did
Sonic
left
sometimes He main deal
situation—perhaps lie’s of
in to to
ourselves,
bold, seized
toward and immediate
penetration Full
it you
to
enemy
alternative.
The
ing A
the own while
racing
as your
plain.
Ii
left
blow’.
has
demands him
recognized no
is
seems retreat
question. Half
your
however,
his huge
situation, Terrible?
indications,
with
Was
of a
counierstroke. massive forces
dangerous everyt
and
desert you
was
have
the of
exploiting a
all sword
effort turned
time, Glass
crushed?
war.”
desperate. situation
aggressively
as
is opportunities. Bad?
between lines or
opportunity of
we
of
knockout
of Without
(he
be
Schlieffen
the
What
a thrown
ing Clausewftz breach coastal have probably the ground protecting main tremely from and even commander same and decisive the but Is
of rio? ness
even portunity? front that to Giddy spot opportunities
von flashing
defensive.”
von
h/stan,’
in
the us
not
us
pre to
the one (in
and dis
is
to entire
that
mis
mis
to fooled
prov
in break
of
Alfred
tactical
—Carl ensure
concen
objectives
secondary
the duped
whole
the time
the
dealing
to massing his to
a
danger
local to
attack—the
assign
key
of
on point
and
guidance a
the
olThnsive remained in
one
to massing
to
the superiority
threatens
but
—Count
of
toward
completely
is
at
with commanders
actually
So specific
was
have managed
exploited
major
system
subordinates. eye
treading
has
brilliant
was
proide
he
MEB. enemy
rear.
initiative
we an
Mount has
has
object
he
content
endangering
transition
JTF’s
those essence
the
the our and He
aviation)
he strategy.
most
with
by
Hf’s enemy
The Nol
of the without
accomplishment while
subordinate suffidently
overwhelming
to
when
the
thinking
intelligence
the the
is
The
of sions our the are sion ince
theater, north seizing in
empt theater
just
vigorous
into our place another. trate persed. place cluding success, through
and
a
attack
all is.
of
an
we
re dif lo
By
the
and
have spe
a
com
joint bold
other
swift service
a the
that
respon combat a
on
combat
integra
from detailed employ
We
MAGTF like.
have
MAUTE.
vengeance—is
“Flank “A
(MAGTF),
with
Rather, operations
with
#15 (GCE) the
subordinate
probably of
with
the
we
the
missions
longer
ground organization. looks and relations, combat
overall force
in
command of
tactical that.
are
sufficiently
To?
treading aviation ground,
our
it
war
different As no
the we Battle
task for
and to accomplishment
Up
are is assign
the subordinates. element
assets;
ScenariO our the
are
responsibility
coordinate
to
military
the
with
on
of
of elements stroke, detailed that involved
we coordination is
command.
without we
of win headquarters—e.g.,
those
government
because
Enemy
of
civil-military’ the (JTF)—and for
Operations combat elements.
combat the we (ACE)
to
whose
of
units
scenario
guidance
air-ground
of
ensure
type the
all
object
of
for
commander
sting
are
higher to
force
of others inspired
mission
concerned
Discussion civilian
addition, This
ground The
Trying
MAGTF the ferent Marine aviation consi support commander ment sible a mander Nor elemeni employment ACE are tion In task with sponsible aspects cal commanders the provide cific province What’s and where others spot crises. Are you more front Numerous readers suizuested that on Option #2. Notice that it doesn’t concerned with what the enemy can we Fall back to a subsequent position provide detailed assignments for sub do to you than with what you want to from which we continue our mission ordinate units within the GCE or For do to the enemy? The commander of delaying the enemy. This approach detailed operations of the ACE: who is overly concerned about having is doomed to failure. The enemy is al My intent is to bottle ritecncm\ up in lus own flank is turned nt likely to pull ready behind us and racing north at the narrow coastal plains and destroy oil many envelopments. breakneck speed. while our own situa jim there by a coordinated air’groond This is not to suggest that attitude is tion is in disarray. How do you get in attack. To do this. I envision a two all that matters; hut at the same time Front of an enemy who is already past phase operation. In the first phase. the we shouldn’t underestimate the im you and moves as fast as you do? You GCE, supported by the ACE, attacks portance of the commander’s state of’ don’t. While our original mission was with all available combat power gen eratly east and mind, which will he reflected through to Forestall a decision on this Front northeast cutting off Ins tine of operation. taking him in the out the entire unit. As Hans von Seekt this is no longer an option. The enemy flank, and pinning turn against the wrote: “The will of’Frederick and Na is intent on a decisive at battle, and coast. Meanwhile, the ACE attempts poleon was a living force in the this point he’s calling the shots. By humblest to fix the enemy h delaying and dis grenadier.” piercing our defense he has forced us mpting his advance toward Bwt. The Ini commander who sees danger to take decisive, and also risky. action. tial main effort is the ACE until we evenwhere he looks and whose aim is Option2: Flank cou,stersrroke:As can uet the enemy under control and with options covered in the discus the GCE hack into action. In the sec ond phase. sions of Scenarios lO and #12. the the GCE and ACE will launch a coordinated attack to destroy intent here is to crush an advancing the enemy forces trapped along the The ability to seize oppor as enemy’s flank he goes by. The dif coast. The CSSE Iconthat service sup’ tunities demands the ability ference is that in those scenarios we port element] and ACE are responsi to spot opportunities, some did this by design: in this one we are ble for the defense of Damoose and exploiting an dpportunity presented Brat respectively. times even where others spot by the enemy. The way to deal with a crises. penetration such as this is to chop it Fix-and-Flank off at the base. Sonic of the leading en- This plan is yet another example of cnn forces may get through to Brut the fix-and-flank concept that is so just to stave oil disaster can expect to hut given the distances involved, if we accomplish nothing more than that successfullysever the enemy’s line of’ and may likely accomplish much less, operations. he won’the able to sustain And conversely, as c’ve previously an organized advance. We can have a The commander who sees much greater effect by attacking into discussed, the first prerequisite in danger everywhere he looks and achieving a great victory is having the the enemy’s flank and rear. The nar whose aim is to stave nerve to try For one. row coastal plains, which arc bordered just off by the sea on one side and mountains disaster can expect to accom Critical Enemy Vulnerability on the other. arc a natural bottleneck. plish nothing more than that If we can pin the enemy there against In order to have any hope of seizing and may likely accomplish much the initiative from (lie enemy and re— the coast. he will he vulnerable to co trievi ng this situation, we’ve got to hit ordinated massing of our aviation and less, him where it’s going to hurt the mosi. ground forces. How do we do thai? The natural incli Option 3: rIck frif rcmjorcenwnts. nation is to tr to catch his leading ele Obviously, we’ll he talking continu ments, which are doing the most dam ously with higher headquarters. ap fundamental to tactics—but with a age. Hut this would he striking directly praising our higher commander of the twist.What makes this example differ into his strength. Moreover, it would developingsituation. As we discussed. ent is the composition of the comple he ‘utile—like trying to deal with a this development endangers the entire tiientary Forces.The clii. or flanking break by trying to dam scoop up in JTF situation and so is clearly of con force,consists of our GCE supported buckets all the water ihat has already cern to the JTF commander. Obvious by the ACE, The cheng. however. escaped rather than by trying to plug ly, the JTF commander doesn’t want doesn’tconsistof forceson the ground. the break, to strip forces from his ofl’ensivc to re hut of the firesof the ACE.It is prima ‘The enemy has penetrated deeply inForce our area, hut he may feel he rilyour aviation firepowerthat will fix on a very narrow front, and conse has no choice—he can’t afford to lose the enemy force.Although the ACE is quently has long, exposed lines ot’ Brig and Damoose. His decision will at the same time providing some sup communication. In other words, he’s depend in part on how niuch faith lie port to the GCE. it is not merelya sup got a huge flank. Given the distances still has in our ability to accomplish porting element, hut has a priman he’s got to travel. he can’t afford to the mission. If he does decide to send mission of its own. (As the MAGTF have his lines cut. That’s what we’ve reinforcements, he will send the mini commander well have to give guid got to strike, mum necessary to stave off disaster. ance on how much of its assets the ACE devotes to its fixing mission and Options A Sample Plan how much to its missionof supporting So what arc our options? The Following is a sample concept the GCE.) Moreover, it’s conceivable Option I: Fall back, reconstitute for the employment of the MER based that the GCE could support the ACE
55 in the accomplishment of the fixing mission, lithe narrow coastal plains are a bottleneck, we might think about providing a cork by lifting a small ground force (battalion?) by helicopter to establish a blocking position south of Brut. Since we gave responsibility for fixing the enemy to the ACE, we might consider having the small block ing force on the ground working for the ACE.
Adaptability & Flexibility This battle which the enemy has forced on us is not going to be over in a matter of hours or probably even in days. Were looking at an operation lasting a week or more. in which the situation is continually going to devel op and change. We have to realize that hatever decision we make in this in stance, it is not the final decision. We will have to adapt and modift our plans as the situation develops. issu inti new orders as appropriate. Any so lution we develop to this scenario should he simple enough that it holds up under changing conditions and should be flexible enough that we can easily adapt it as those conditions change. As Gen George S. Patton said:
Pta ns must he siinplcand flexible.Ac— luatly they only form a datum plane from which you build as necessitydi rects or opportunity offers. Historically Students of military history may recognize this scenario. On a slightly different scale and with modernized equipment and organization, it is roughly a mirror image of the situa— lion lacing the Turks in Palestine late in World War I. On 21 September l9lN. Gen Sir Edmund Allenhvs in— fanny had just pierced the Turkish front along the Mediterranean coast at in the Jordan Valley near Jerusalem army. So convinced were the Turks the Second Battle of Megiddo. His De when in fact he was concentrating that the attack would conic near Jeru sert Mounted Corps had “found the G overwhelming superiority opposite Meg salem. the story goes. that an Indian in gap.” as the cavalt’vmen liked to say, iddo. He commandeered the largest deserter who disclosed the true plan to pouring north along the Plain of Sha hotel in Jerusalem and established a the Turks on the eve of the offensive ron and breaking out through the nar sprawling headquarters there. He moved was dismissed by the Turks as an ob row passes above Haifa into the great units east along dusty trails by day vious ruse. Plain of Esdraelon, some 40 miles in light and sent them back west under The Turks had three “armies” hold the Turkish rear, headed for Beirut. cover of darkness. He established pho ing the line from the Mediterranean in Nazareth, Deraa. and Damascus. At ny assembly areas in the Jordan Val the west to Amman in the easL (Each the same time. I E. Lawrence’s Arab ley. The assembly areas which he had Turkish army was roughly the equiva Force had swept out of its desert base established in the west weeks before lent of a British corps.) Allenhy’s ini at Azrak to cut the Hejaz railway—the were intentionally much larger than tial plan was much less ambitious Turks’ main line of retreat—and was needed, so that as more forces concen than the one he actually executed, in waiting in Deraa as Allenhy’s cavalry’ trated there it was not necessary to ex volving a shallow envelopment aimed arrived. pand the assembly areas. He ordered at Nablus which might have destroyed Through an elaborate deception Lawrence in the east to procure all the the Turkish army along the coast but plan, Allenhy had, over the course of forage he could get his hands on— which would not have unhinged the weeks, simulated the massing of forces enough for the needs of an entire entire Turkish position. (Remember:
86 Decisive victories are the result of am- bilious plans.) How did the Turks re act to Allenhy’s holder move? Essen ually. they did not—or at least their re action was a clear case of too little, too late. Their countermove withonly one battalion to bottle up Allenhy’s caval rydivisions in the Plain of Sharon was too slow. With their lines of retreat se vered at Haifa. Nazareth. and espec ially Deraa. the Turkish armies cmrn bled. The Battle of Megiddo in the
Any remotechancetheTurks had lay in a bold, decisive, and immediatestroke,but anychance they had they surrendered by their indecisiveness.
opening act was the only pitched light ing of the entire campaign: the rest amounted to a rout In S weeks. Allenhy’s army had advanced 360 tniles to Aleppo, captured some 78,000 prisoners and 360 guns, and destroyed the 3 Turkish armies. The Turks sued for peace. What could the Turks have done? Perhaps nothing. Arguably. once the Desert Mounted Corps had success fully broken out of the constrictive Plain of Sharon by way of the narrow passes above Haifa. the issue was set tled. Allenhy’s biographer. Gen Sir Archibald Wavell, wrote: The campaign had, in fact, been prac sivc. but of its imminence and its Any remote chance the Turks had lically won before a shot was fired. weight they had no conception. Fhcir lay in a hold, decisive, and immediate and Allenhv realized it better than traditional Ottoman stubbornness and stroke, hut any chance they had they anyone The Turkish armies may skill in defence were of no avail to surrendered by their indecisiveness. have stirred a little uneasily on the them here. This was to be no soldiers’ evening of September IS. 1918,with battle. hut the manoeuvre of a great some sense of an impending olfen master of war.
87 89 as them flexi Patton build and S. issue you time; simple George in which be out from —Gen must them plane Plans get . . offers. . datum shod; a can. form orders you if opportunity only own or voice they your by
directs Appendixes
Actually Keen necessity personally ble. Appendix A Glossary of Tactical Terms
In order to ensure effective communications, it is er. made by troops. ol’ten under enemy lire. Distance important to use terms that are universally covered in one movement by a unit advancing by understood. The following basic terms are taken bounds. WointPub 1—02) from Joint. Marine Corps. and U.S. Army doctrinal Boundary—Line by which areas of responsibility be publications. tween adjacent units are defined. Joint Pith 1—02) Bridgehead—An area of ground held or to he gained A on the enemy’s side of an obstacle. (Joint Pub 1—02) Advance Guard—Detachment sent ahead of the main Bypass—To move around an obstacle, position or force to ensure its uninterrupted advance: to protect enemy force to maintain the momentum of advance. the main body against surprise: to facilitate the ad (Fall 101—5—1) vance by removing obstacles and repairing roads and brigades: and to cover the deployment of the main C body if it is committed to action. (Joint Pub 1—02) Canalize—To restrict operations to a narrow’ zone by Ambush—A surprise attack by fire from concealed po use of existing or reinforcing obstacles or by lire or sitions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM bombing. (Joint Pub 1—02) 101—5—1) Checkpoint—A predetermined point on thc ground Assault—The culmination of an attack which closes used as a means of controlling movement. (Joint Pub with the enemy. (0116—1) 1—02) Assault Position—That position between the line of Close Air Support—Air action against hostile targets departure and the objective in an attack from which which are in close proximity to friendly forces and forces assault the objective. (FM 101—5—I) which requires detailed integration with the lire and Assembly Area—An area in which a command is as movement of’those forces. (kim Pub 1—02) sembled preparatory to further action. (Joint Pub I— Commander’s Intent—Commander’s vision of opera 02) tions—how he expects to light and what he expects Attach—To place units or personnel in an organiza to accomplish. (FM 101—5—1) tion where such placement is relatively temporary. Command Post—A unit’s or subunit’s headquarters The commander of the formation, unit or organiza where the commander and the staff perform their lion receiving the attachment will exercise the same activities. GiointPub 1—02,) degree of command and control thereover as he does Concealment—The protection from observation or over the units and persons organic to his command. surveillance. (Joint Pub 1—02) (Joint Pub 1—02) Concept of Operations—A clear and concise state Attack Position—The last position occupied by the as ment of the line of action chosen by a commander in sault echelon before crossing the line of departure. order to accomplish the mission, (Joint Pub 1—02) Job,r Pub 1—02) Normally contains a scheme of maneuver and fire Attrition—The reduction of effectiveness of a Force support plan. caused by loss of personnel and materiel. (Joint Pub Consolidate—To organize and strengthen a newly I4i2, captured position so that it can he used against the Axis of Advance—A line of advance assigned for pur enemy. (Joint Pub 1—02) poses of control: often a road or a group of roads, or Contain—To stop. hold, or surround the forces of the a designated series of locations, extending in the di enemy or to cause the enemy to center activity on a rection of the enemy. (Joint Pub 1—02)Compared to given front and to prevent his withdrawing any part direction of attack. of his forces for use elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1—02)Also holding attack. B Counterattack—Attack by part or all of a defending Hauler—A coordinated series of obstacles designed or force against an enemy attacking force, for such spe employed to canalize, direct restrict delay or stop the cific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off movcment of an opposing force. and to impose addi or destroying enemy advance units, and with the tional losses in personnel and equipment on the op general objective of denying to the enemy the attain posing force. (Joint Pub 1—02) ment of his purpose in attacking. (Joint Pub 1—02) Base of Fire—Fire placed on an enemy force or posi Cover—I. Protection from the effects of fire. 2. The tion to reduce or eliminate the enemy’s capability to mission assigned a covering force. interfere by fire and/or movement with friendly ma Covering Fire—Fire used to protect troops when they neuver elements. (FM 101—5—1) are with range of enemy small arms. (Joint Pith 1—02) Blocking Position—A defensive position so sited as to Covering Force—A force operating apart from the deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent main force for the purpose of intercepting, engaging, his advance in a given direction. (Joint Pub 1—02) delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy be Bound—Asingle movement usually from cover to coy- fore lie can attack the main force. (Joint Pub 1—02)
94) -
Cross-Attachment—The exchange of subordinate Fire Plan—A tactical plan for using the weapons of’a units between units for a temporary period. (FM/UI— unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. 5—1) (Joint Pub 1—02) Fragmentary Order—An abbreviated form of an oper D ation order that eliminates the need for restating in Decisive Engagement—An engagement in which a formation contained in a basic operation order. (Joint unit is considered Fully committed and cannot ma Pub 1—02)Also frag order or FragO. neuver or extricate itself In the absence of outside Frontal Attack—An offensive maneuver in which the assistance, the action must he fought to a conclusion. main action is directed against the front of the enemy (FM 101-5—1) forces. (Joint Pub 1—02) Defense in Depth—The siting of mutually supporting defense positions to absorb and progressively weak G en attack. prevent initial observations of the whole Gap—Any break or breach in the continuity of tacti position by the enemy. and to allow the commander cal dispositions beyond small-arms coverage. (FM to maneuver his reserve. (Joint Pub I—UI) 101—5-I) Defllade—Pmtection from hostile observation and fire Guard—A security element whose primary task is to provided by an obstacle such as a hull, ridge or bank. protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while (Joint Pith 1—02) also observing and reporting information. (Joint Pub Delaying Action—An operation in which a force un 1—02)Advance guard, flank guard and rear guard. Com der pressure trades space for time by slowing the ene pa red to screen, cover. my’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without becoming decisively engaged. H (Joint Pub 1—02) Hasty Attack—An attack in which preparation time Deliberate Attack—A type of offensive operation is deliberately traded for speed in order to exploit an characterized by preplanned coordinated employ opportunity. (Joint Pub 1—02)Compared to deliberate ment of’ firepower and maneuver. (Joint Pub 1—02) attack. Compared to hasty attack. Demonstration—An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the Infiltration—I. The movement through or into an aim of deceiving the enemy. (Joint Pub 1—02)Com area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy pared to diversionary attack. troops or organizations. The movement is made, ei Direction of Attack—A specific direction or route ther by small groups or by individuals, at extended that the main attack or center of mass of the unit will or irregular intervals.When used in connection with follow. The unit is restricted, required to attack as in the enemy. it infers that contact is avoided. dicated. and is not normally allowed to bypass the (Joint Pub 1—02) enemy. (.IointPub 1—02)Compared to axis of advance. K E Killing Zone—An area in which the commander Envelopment—An offensive maneuver in which the plans to force the enemy to concentrate so as to de main attacking force passes around or over the ene stroy him by fire. (Joint Pub 1—02)Also engagement my principal defensive positions to secure objectives area. to the enemy’s rear. (Joint Pith 1—02)See also turning movement. L F Linkup—An operation wherein two friendly forces Feint—A limited-objective attack involving contact join together in a hostile area. (0116—1)Linkup point. with, the enemy, varying in size from a raid to a sup porting attack. Feints are used to cause the enemy to 1 act in three predictable ways”.to employ his reserve Main Attack—The principal attack or effort into improperly, to shift his supporting fires, or to reveal which the commander throws the full weight of the his defensive fires. offensive power at his disposal. An attack directed Fire and Maneuver—The process of one or more ele against the chief objectiveof the campaign or battle. ments establishing a base of fire to engage the enemy (Joint Pub 1—02)Compared to supportingattack. while the other element(s) maneuver to an advanta Main Effort—The main or most important task to be geous position from which to close with and destroy performed in the accomplishment of the overall mis or capture the enemy. (FMFRP 0—14) sion; receivespriority of firesand other support. The Fire and Movement—A technique primarily used in term sometimes refers to the subordinate unit as the assault wherein a unit or element advances by signed that task. Also focus of effort(s).point of main bounds or rushes with suhelements alternately mov effort. ing and providing covering fire for other moving Maneuver—Employmentof forces on the battlefield subelements. Fire and movement may he done by in through movementin combinationwith fireor firepo dividuals (personnel or vehicles) or units (such as tential to achieve a position of advantage over the ene fire teams or squads). Usually, fire and movement my. (JointPub 1—02) are used only when under effective fire from the ene Meeting Engagement—A combat action that occurs my because it is relatively slow and difficult to con when a moving force engages an enemy at an trol. (FMFRP 0—14) unexpected time and place. (Joint Pub /—02)
1
to
to
is
is
to
to
of
by
at
the
tac by
lev
per
is
force
exe
meet
(Jo/ut
ene
(Joint
a
larger
luirce. l—02t /—02)
/—02)
com
could
objec
action
fire
itiibr
an
which
a
enemy
the
carried
to
to
a
over he
creating
the
the
designed
enemy
task
enemy
an
/—02)
Pit/i
influence
Fr
formed control
or
Pub
the
of’
obtain,
objectives.
of to
Pub
and
force.
of covered
upon
action.
prematurely
of
of to
secure
which
envelopment
the
which
employed
the
/—02)
to
which
and
by
below
defense.
forces
the
Pit/i
he
to
1—02)
opposing
(Joint
methods.
on
plan
in
the
assigned (Joint
to
(Joint
Pith
the priman’
around operation force
an
unit
force
is
process
enemy
forces
notice while
of
assigned
Pu/i
attack (Joint
unit. reserves
in
under
major
resources
or
to
by
offensive
following:
or
assembling
target
time.
an
fire.
subdivision
or
withdrawal
Gboint
The
to maneuver
information,
positions
tactical
oruanizatioti
passes
vhose
6—1)
undertaken
seize or
detection
the
occupation held
and
which
(.Joini
degradation
rear
attack main
2. Z
enemy
T
required
operation
attack:
sector
S
divert
to
ofknsive
a
1—02)
of of
system
from
An
commit
mission,
variation
attack’,
(OH
to
force
or
mission,
1—02)
report
follow.
specific
area.
target.
weapon to
tactical planned
other
force,
maneuvering
covering
task,
cover.
applied
preliminary
tactical
area
planned
whose
Pit/i
main
with down
clement
its a mission
hostile
a
a
to
order
more
defensive
forming
a or
enemy’s
activities
Pith main
a
and
—02)
tid
See
planned
is
self-preservation.
of
at
in
as
enemy:
I
the
or
pin
of
weapons
/—02)
the
assigned
guard,
(kin!
on-call
enemy
the
position
the
attacking
with
fulfill
a
in
or
the
specilic
disengages
grou
Attack—An
part
(Joint
Pit/i
Maneuver—The
to
Compared
to
in
security
one
/—02)
generally
with
force
indecisive
to
a
1—02)
of ‘Target—A
Fire—An
the
the
responsibility
his
individual,
Action—A
the Order—A
which Pit/i
impair
organization.
Attack—A
a
principal
identify
Movement—A
of
ends
about
of
an
of
process
only
of
an conjunction
action.
out
the
Pub
delivered
Organization—I. observation
hinder
an by
It
Pub
unit:
deep
1—02)
(Joint
1—02)
force
in
destroy
threat.
deceive
control
in
(Joint
by
contact
order
commander
which
the
achieve
needed
he
nterlère
i d.
will
or
h.
a.
c.
tical
area,
Zone Pith
in
Withdrawai—.4
or
Pit/i
tives
the Warning
abandon
enemy’s
in
formance such
earn
Task
Turning
(Joint Suppression—Temporan
el
to
in
Supporting
tack.
lire
seriously out
lights Spoiling
Sector
observe,
Scheme Screen—A Compared
to cuted future
Scheduled mation
Compared
(Joint Reconnaissance—A Reserve—A
my.
the
pletion
tions. visual
a
or
of
to
he
a
it
the
the
of
of
de
the
to
in
in
re
Pit/i
pur
their
de
ele
a
to
infor
them.
unit
ene
mis
utili
(Joint
taken.
objec
how
is
selected installa
catch
with
the
enemy.
than
seeks
ability holding
nilitan’
one out
the
(Join!
Order
when
101—5—I)
which to
adjusted.
defense.
in comman
and
involving
an
operation.
disrupt total
actions
his
afterward.
for
or
movement
purpose
lower
plan.
the
secure
reinforcing. position
2.
a
the
obstruction
in
breakthrough.
OP.
maintain
baltic
action
defense.
an
between
and
movement
to
from
(FM to
the
operation
other
or
or
out
escape,
by
the
and
near
which
which on
which
final
to
scale,
with
of
carrying of
specifying
mission. to the
communications:
Also
position
destroy
in returns
Also
the
diverts
its
seizure
designed
lire.
for
delivered
1—02)
sent
disposed
1—02)
urea
contact.
or
of
it
to
to
mobile
defense
is
issued
terrain or
from
target
issued
is
small
decisive
the
directed
placed
to
existing
territory’
an
ment
organization
to
defense
or
Pith initiative
1—02)
contact
Pub
of man-made
1—02)
location
offensive
is
localities
fire
the
without
commander’s
R
olTensive
security
Forces
headquarters.
P
of
the
fire
execution
which
object
the
support
0
force
or
launches
Pith
with Order
or
01’
Pu/i
operation
attempting
of
technique
either
the
or
type
(Joint
to
usually
immediate
(b/nt
restricts,
feature,
hostile
appropriate
position
to
enemy,
advance
directive
planned
to
as
which
Compared
enemy’s
iL
commanders
higher
information
1—02)
seize
where
of used
reliance
control
mission
(Joint
Point—A
and
the
force
harder.
accomplish
Compared patrol
(Joint
defended
form
with
reestablish
on
a
is
to
made,
the
to
Also
natural
the
a
physical
lactical
Pub
delays,
1—02)
tactical
or
offensive
Contact—An
the
the
Order—I.
See
delnding
to
coordinated
area
are
Post—A
operation.
]—02
possesses
detachment
in
essential
and
to
system.
target
mopping—up,
Order—A
1—02)
classified
hostile
Defense—A
1—02)
Pith
positioned Rallying
confuse
the
localities
terrain
the
Target—A
is gain
which
gathering
Principal
(Joint
element
destroying
a
perform
‘flepe
airborne.
accomplished.
Defense—Defense
through
Pit/i
subordinate
penetration
to
is
of of
maneuver
of
Pub
definite
to
of
Pith
off
01W.
forces
he
he
which
101—5—1)
1—02) includes
force: assigned
a
to canalizes,
(Jobit
from
objective
a
which
to
Raid—An
mation,
swift
Pursuit—An
cut
Position fought. unit
(.1cm, aim
positions tactical
the
bulk
pose
Patrol—A 1—02)
structive.
defensive
Pelletration—A
break
ment
another
Ovenatch—A
effecting
der scheduled
On-Call Operation
(Joint quested.
may
and
Observation e.g..
Objective—The Pith my.
of
tive Movement
Also Objective Mobile
the zation (Joint is
(FM observations signed a
of which sion
that
that Mission
Obstacle—Any 92 93
by
one
for
the
*
over
(3)
repre
Heavy
one
or
defense,
can
depicted
air
size: indicates
are multicolor
f
a I
*
shaft
symbol
Med
on
appropriate,
indicate
antitank,
the
the
equipment.
symbol.
Test
of
Red
of
of
i.e.
units:
the
equipment Vehicles
where
of
or
weapon
base
right color J
I I
and I
a
pieces
Light
Symhol
lines
system
right
The
of or following
Bn
using
lower
Unit
the
Regt,
by
Mar
shaft
lower
double the
for
Weapons
installations Recon
heavy.
lnf
weapons
Bn,
Enemy (1)
to
weapons
the
Symbols the
11th
Bn
for
2d
of
to
using
the
the
units, Gun
(Enemy)
Mech
Expeditionary
G, Assault
symbols Gun
ways: two
of
by
Armored
Launcher
EN
across
IstBn,
4th Div
Co (AT)
numeral
MarDiv Mar
2nd
(2)
number
A
Enemy Draw B,
three 2d Bn. Marine Amphibian
PIt, 1st Light
22d
Brigade
Bars
Rocket Missile
Depicting
of lay, putting
3d
1st
1st Co BtryC,
7th
medium, function
etc. sent
Air-Defense Antitank AT
AT Howitzer Machinegun/Automatic Mortar Weapon
Tank
Map
of of
sit the
In
can
the (+)
(Bat sym
or
use of
Hand
activity.
describe
improve
the
x xxx
andlor
misunder around
or
the
to
of
of
right
(-)
symbol.
discussion
and
for
left
concept
the
by (Mechanized
in
commander
symbols
to force)
the
basic
Post
minimal
Operational
Infantry
the to
plan,
installation
Infantry
task
the
information
a
map
detailed
(Marine
see
symbol.
with
of
Activities
locations
directly Armor
unit,
represented
the
information
directly
top
Logistical Installation
more
Observation
overlays
Squad Platoon/Detachment Battalion/Squadron that
are Brigade Corps/Force
Light Mechanized Rcconnaissance Motorized
MACfE
Tank
air-ground
on
a
additional
101—5—I.
of specific example: quickly
of
inside
Xj2
measures, provided
in
standardized
For
symbol.
provided
communicate
this
is
use
provides
directly is
i in
Installations,
the
Regiment)
requircs
I
the
I Manual
provided
detachments
of
control
II
provided is
xx
Ill
0
or
located is
shown
II
Glossary
symbols.
characteristics
Units,
______I and
communicate Marine
right
Field I appendix
symbol
is
effectively as
or
headquarters
terminology,
designation
Thfonnation.
to
or
Battalion)
Through (2d
size
indicator
and
B
This basic upper
Symbols
with
(1st
tactical
6—]
higher Amphibian
symbols Si:e
unit attachments
symbol,
role unique
the
Indicator
ability information
As
functions
Team
Each
fantn) talion)
bol. symbol. to
Defense
(AA)
Basic
Additional
mc
The
Unit
The The Any
our standing. quickly uation. basic book map
Rule
Unit
Headquarters
the basic
This - -
-
- -
Fire • Scciion
Company/Battery Regiment Division
Air
Antitank Assault Atlillcry
Engineer Infantry
Appendix ______
Movementand Activity Light Armored Vehicle Attack Arrowhead > )> Main Supporting Feint Assault Amphibious Vehicle Axis of Advance (Ground)
Axis of Advance (Helibome)
Delaying Action Control Measures Points, Areas, and Lines.
Ambush Direction of Attack
Follow and Support Assembly Area
Attack Position Reconnaissance or Security
Battle or Blocking Position (BP) c:: Withdraw
Battalion 0 Boundary
Checkpoint S
Coordinating Point • Miscellaneous
Antitank Ditch I Linkup Point 5 Fortified Line flJ1JlJ1 Objective
Antitank Minefield . . Phase Line I P1 RED PLnE0 Antipersonnel Minefield Target y • • I I I
Bridge or Gap \../
Wire
Landing Zone
Trace of Forward Dispositions (Friendly) 94 Appendix C Combat Orders
A word is in order about combat or While the format of the order may needs to be done and what the in ders. They are the means by which help to organize information, it is far tended end result of the action is. comma nders at all levels communi less important than the contents or • The concept of operations—a broad cate (heir decisions to subordinates substance of the order. Regardless of description of the overall plan. nor and the means by which you’re re format, if the order communicates the mally including a scheme of maneurer quired to present your solutions to the essential information clearly and force and afire support plan. TDGs. Depending on the situation. fully. it’s a good order. The elements of • The main effort—the main task or and especially on the amount of time information that an order should con component of the plan around which available, the commander’s instruc vey include: the others revolve and which the tions may take one of several forms. • Any changes or elements in the sit others support. They may he a full operation order— uaüon that will significantly influ • Tasks to subordinate units—what at lowerlevelsoften called a five-para ence the actions of the unit. each unit is to do. and why. graph order because of its format. • The mi.csion—what needs to be • Any coordinating instructions to They may be a fragmentary order, an done. ensure coordination between subor abbreviated form of the operation or • The commander v intent—why it dinate units. der that contains only the elements of the full order essential to the situation. Or. instructions may take the form of a warning order, by which the comman der tells his units to prepare for an cx— pecied operation hut not yet to execute it. As with a fragmentary order, there is no prescribcd format to a warning order: the commander tells what he knows at the time in order to give his subordinates whatever information lie can to help them prepare. Once opera tions have begun. fragmentary orders and warning orders are the norm. To maintain a Iiigh operational tempo. we rely on simple. concise orders is sued orally, and we generally try to avoid length3c written orders.
Following the prescribed format of ten helps to communicate this infor mation. But you shouldn’t become a slave to the format. You should adapt the format to support your tactics, and not vice versa. It’s more important to worry about ii’haryou’re trying to say than whether it’s in the proper format. Anyone interested in the precise for mat for combat orders can find that information in FMF1I! 3—LCb,nniand and Staff .4crion. or any number of other doctrinal publications. For samples of fragmentary’ orders. see the discussions to scenarios #1. S. 9. and 12. For an example of a fairly complete warning order, see scenario #6. In the July 1992issue of the Marine C’orp.cGazette. Maj Dirk J. Vangeison describes a system units can use to is sue warning orders on a more timely basis. USMC
95 ___
Appendix D U.S. Marine Infantry Battalion Organization and Weapons
INFANTRYBATtALION USMC USN QEEENL QEE£NL 44 685 3 66
I I RIFLECOMPANY LWEKPONS COMPANY H&SCOMPANY USMC USMC USMC USN QEE E QEE liL QEEEfAL DEEEfik 6 176 5 175 21 182 3 66
• SUPPLY OFFICER IS SERVICE PLATOONCOMMANDER
96 RIFLE COMPANY WEAPONS Em Iam 3 M16A3 Rifles I M203 Grenade Launcher I SAW
1111kSijsijailLeader I M16A2 1111kPlatoon j 4 M16A2
Wnz Platoon 6 M240EI Machineguns 3 M224 60mm Mortars 6 Mk153 SMAWS
WEAPONS COMPANY WEAPONS
Mortar Platoon 8 M252 81mm Mortars
Antiamior Platoon 24 M47 Dragons 8 M220E4 TOW2 (8 HMMVWs)
Heavy Machineun Platoon 6 HMMVWS 6 M2HB .50 cal Machineguns 6 Mk19 40mm Machineguns
97 lbs
USA
22.08
star
and
im
pla
can
and
grip
box):
accu
It
Nadonale, Nationale
(area)
(point)
(cyclic)
reduces CS.
per in (sustained)
rd
and (burst) plaloon.
(semi) and
it
m
M203: m
lbs
individual
1pm
as
per
rpm
nine
greater
rpm
removed
the
Corps.
rpm shoulder-fired
1,000
8.8
butt,
800
550
w/200
Fabdque
85
in
Fabrique
725
90
45
mm magazine-loaded
nine
give
mm
was
magazine
riflemen.
team,
to
or
used
action,
Range:
Marine
Fire:
5.56
fragmentation.
Range:
Fire:
5.56
fire
(loaded
team,
Rifle
(loaded):
emergency,
SAW
of
option
Elf
of
stifler handguard. Corp&
Eff
U.S.
hipod-mounted
an fire
pump
each 30-round belt-fed
rounds
in
auto
the the
and
the
Rates Caliber: Max M249 Weight Manufacturer:
purpose. per of
or
Caliber: Max Manufacturer: M16A2 Rates Weight
of
in
full
20-
one
accept
40mm Also,
dual
a
the
utilized
of
rifle heavier
air-cooled.
can
rifleman
weapon
climb.
only
either
First,
basis
breech-loaded.
made
standard
SAW
explosive,
set-vice
the
uses
was
ways.
primary nine
The
muzzle on
high
automatic
of
4
normally
of
gas-operated.
WEAPONS
the
is
the
a
barrel
standard
single-shot.
to
total
is
reduce
the
commonly
a
the
allocated
number
(canopy),
mid-l980s.
a
as
remains
are
help
16A2
in
magazine
Then,
the
(SAW)
to
assigned M
smoke
in
weapon. lightweiuht.
is
There
1967.
PLATOON
MI6AI
MIOA2
a
The
added
in
option.
is
weapon
rifle.
the
SAW
30-round
Corps
The
(ground).
was tO
the
The
M
material.
to
multipurpose
M16A2
launcher the
smoke
replaced
a
introduced
bayonet.
automatic
the
is
to
M7
(area) stronger
l6Al.
(point)
compensator
three-round-hurst
a
M16A2
M in
grenade
squad the M203
in a
although
introduced performance.
Industries
parachute.
new
the
the
m
from
150
350
The
a
attached
with with
first
launcher
star
M203
Colt
on M249
400
1984.
and
mm
weapons
made
fitted
The
Lbs
The
In
Range:
40
practice.
3 weapon cluster,
the toon.
weapon ammunition,
replaced racy are be proved
Grenade
Et’f Range:
Max Max
M203 Caliber: Weight:
Manufacturer: In
or
a
the
in
set
the
is
was can
(sustained)
(cyclic)
fired
on
m
It
of
It either
ofam
selected
correct weighs
section bipod Defense
mounted prevent weapons
be
increase
action
rpm
a rpm
gun to
to
on
to
1,100 system 1985.
can
select
types
baseplate
saw
Saco
100
round
it 550
in
with nun
Variants mortar
to
weapon.
lbs gas
excess
order
or
M7
added order four
120mm
coaxiafly
M60 In
the
the
fire
Range:
in Fire:
7.62
18.5 fired
Machinegun mounted
in
was
the
uses
the
of
is
be
Eff
tripod
platoon.
explosive
a
procured
and
standard
M60E3.
mortarmen
can change,
indirect M60E3 machinegun to
notch
l950s.
currently
M60E3 Caliber: Max Rates Weight: Manufacturer:
high
mortar located
has
to
the
is
the
and
the
late
they
sear
weapons
of
fitted
The to
so
its
the
60mm
he
M224s easier purpose Corps
bipod
which (LAV—25s)
allows
configuration, in
in
high-angle
double
the can The
them the
a
three
made that
vehicles.
practice.
general
vehicle rate,
are
located
construction with
and
was
and
fuze
M60E3
improvemenLs
the M60 introduced
haseplate.
machinegun
wheeled
mode modifying to There
WEAPONS The commander’s
failure hipod.
barrel
MS is M6OE3s armored
muzzle-loaded,
and
further
the
the
grip
six
delay.
and
light
multioption
venerable
applied
still
Originally
illumination,
or
weight
a has
air-cooled
under
for
tracked
the
spade
lighter,
company.
mechanical were
conventional
has
a
of
M60E3
Corps’
on
liuhier
smooth-bore,
maintainability.
weapon.
the
low opted
added
and
COMPANY made the the
there
company
and
the
in
j
detonating,
and
infantry
phosphorus.
on
for
models was
was
rifle
gas-operated,
Corps
M240E1,
usinti
meters.
gun
either
point
each
learned
grip
white
the
M2400’s
the lightweight,
crew-served
in
Each earlier
a
M60E3
1.814
helicopters
reliability,
mode
ways:
chain the
is
1989
pistol
belt-fed,
of
the
on
Nafionale
of
airburst.
a In
replacements
(sustained) hipod.
m
(cyclic)
platoon
explosive,
(sustained) is
addition, (maximum)
replaced
as
25mm
low
used
mortar automatic, range
tire.
Arsenals
second
tripod. War—lessons
different rpm
In
rpm
handheld
result a
m
a a
1,800
rpm
high rpm
a (total)
also
(baseplate-M8) (bipod)
(barrel)
Fabrique fully
m
performance,
the attached two
on
Army
U.S.
18
M242
has
600 100
mm
30
M60E3
lbs
60mm
M2400
weapons deficiencies,
tank.
lbs
As 1,814
in
its lbs lbs lbs
are
45
airhursi.
mm
the
the
Vietnam
lbs.
or
fired
Range: the
fire:
The
The
7.62
23.9
Machinegun
Fire:
The
60
44.0
14.4 14.4 15.2
noted
simplified, uncontrolled M60 belt-fed, the from munition: be weapon up 3.2 high
of
of
Mortar
with of from mounted MIAI LAVs. Eff
Range:
Range:
Manufacturer:
Max M240G Rates Caliber: Weight:
Manufacturer: Max Rates Mm M224 Caliber: Weight: m
Douglas
1,800
Barrett
(HEAA)
(HEDP)
of
lbs
mm
lbs
the
tel ac
the
m m a
rocket
feet
SASR for
heavy
of
rather
Range:
12.7
(hunker integral
32.5 with 7
SMAWs
cannot.
29.01
500
250
MS2AIA
antiarmor
battalion.
McDonnell either Eff
six
barrel
rifles
mm
section rocket
The of
M2HB
material
fiberglass
5-round M82AIA Caliber: Weight: Max Manufacturer:
Range:
83
SMAW
penetrate
S—2
a
(loaded):
infantry
the
heavy
total
other
horesighted explosive
to
Eff
a
153 the
A
the as
and
(HEDP)
against
that in
and of
has
variations. able accommodate
high
Mk Caliber: 41’eight Max
Manufacturer:
It
is
to
stock
armor.
smoothbore,
round
It
tube
The
armor
purpose
snipers
section rule.
primarily
the
company.
explosive
fuze.
same
5—2
of
dual
designed
scout
armor. used
fiberglass
rifle is
the
the
a
side he
the
in
special
penetrating
bolt—action steel homogeneous to
for
each
has
or
fires
time-delay
right
of
explosive,
in 700
and
one-man-operable,
launcher,
snipers
rolled
the
a
slow
high inch
the
of designed
M4OAI
to
is
I
or
(SASR)
is ranges MS2AIAs
of
scout
platoon
The incendiary,
or
The
two Remington the and
side
rifle
inches
quick
to
attached a sight.
for
(SMAW) the
left
reaching
23.4
weapons of
rifle the
concrete,
telescope.
seoped
either
vision
the
to
magazine
of
allocated weapon
lOx
of
s
armor-piercing.
allowance
version
with a box
night
accurately in
spotting
penetrating
inches
ol
attached
with assault
of
section 8
M4OAI
special ( application
impact
9mm
a
modified
used
is
a
on
available detachable
eight
mount. AN/PVS—4
Arms
capable
is
a
is
assault
capable
hunker.
is special
are 6-shot.
in
the
m is
Rifle
There
a
the nIle
sight
always
or
I
and
round
detonate is in
n There
The 1,000 with
rocket
rounds
sight
Remington battalion.
will
and
shoulder-launched
M82AIA M4OA
mm 10
lbs
personnel.
12.7mm
located
The
The
Range:
The
7.62
14.5
Scout/Sniper
launcher. launcher escopic buster) wood-reinforced (HEAA) are curacy magazine.
machinegu
carrtes than The infantn
Eff
3
M4OAI Caliber:
Weight: Max Manufacturer:
11)0 21-TBBrowning Machinegun ,ber: 12.7mm ‘-“t: 128lbs (total) 60 lbs (receiver group) lbs (barrel) 44 lbs (tripod) 24 fax Eff Range: 1,830 m :es of Fire: 40 rpm (sustained) 450—550rpm (cyclic) Tanufacttircr:Saco Defense
The Browning .50 caliber heavy barrel (HB) machinegun is a belt-fed. recoil-operated. air-cooled, crew- operated weapon. The machinegun is capable of flringsingle shotas well as automatic fire.The M2HB fires seven types of ammunition: ball tracer, armor—piercing. incendiary armor—piercing incendianc armor— piercing incendiary tracer, and blank. The .50 caliber is also mounted on tracked and wheeled vehicles. Six M2HB machineguns—along with six Mk19 40mm muchineguns and six high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs)—are located in the heavy machinegun platoon of the weapons company of each infantry battalion.
FM%
The M2HB depicted here is mounted on a HMMWV.The two-man crew may employ the .50 caliber in a number of ways, to include against light armored vehicles and low-flying enemy aircraft.The Mk19 40mm machinegun and the M220E4 TOW 2 (both described below) can be mounted similarly on the HMMWV.
N1k19Machinegun Caliber: 40 mm Weight: 75.6 lbs Max Eff Range: 1,500 m 11 Rates of Fire: 40 rpm (sustained) 325—375 rpm (cyclic) Manufacturcr: Saco Defense
P The Mkl9 40mm is a belt-fed, air-cooled, blow-back (weapon is operated by the exploding propellant charge) heavy machinegun. The Mk19 fires three types of rounds: the M383/M384, a high-explosive antipersonnel round, which can be fuzed for point detonation or graze/impact that has a casualty produc ing radius of 5 meters; the M430. a high-explosive, dual-purpose (antipersonnel/armor-piercing) round that can penetrate 2 inches of steel armor; and the M385 practice round. As noted above, there are six Mkl9s— along with six M2HBs and six HMMWVs—in the heavy machinegun platoon of the weapons company of each infantry battalion. Additional Mkl9s without dedicated personnel have been allocated as follows: four per H&S Co and one with the TOW section in the antiarmor platoon of the weapons company, both within the infantry battalion, and eight per regimental headquarters. missile)
2
Douglas
Aircraft
m
or
in
the
the
has
in—
in
in m
The the
(loaded)
and
defeat
of
train
(1’OW
(launcher)
3,750
of weap
meters.
65
m
lbs 2
missile
to
each
safety
Hughes
range
lbs
1,000
lbs missile
vehicles,
65 the
in
Dragon.
mm
McDonnell course
support. 5.733
section of
2A
3
course
252.4
TOW
Range:
205 its
152mm 47.4
Range;
the
of
lbs
greater
I
lire
designed
Range: the
114.
Range:
Eli
31
wheeled
Eli
illumination,
TOW
TOW
maximum
is
Like
company
sight-guided
tracks
platoon
Dragon Eli range
Eli
its
a
and
the
a
M220E4 Caliber: Manufacturer: The Mm Max Weight:
adjust provides
in
Manufacturer: M47 Mm Caliber: Weight: Max
missile
has
fires
missile
continuous
can that
weapons
covers
assistant.
target. It
tracked
antiarmor
phosphorus.
the
pin
and
the
an
on
on
on
euided
the it
red
of
pounds.
gunner
missile
in
HMMWVs
and 9
tiring
close
weapon. II
and
the
keep
on
for sensor
to (TOW)
mounted
olatoon
A
weighs
gunner white
Thus,
used
Dragon
a
launchers
removable
antiarmor
tripod,
gunner
24
by a barrel. mortar
mounted
a
round The
the
are missile.
the
has
weapon
explosive,
by
1mm
in
the
command-link TOWs
target.
also
fire
manned
there
8
fiberglass
high
by
explosive
fired
the is
wire
altered
are
and
located
he
medium-range
M252
see
and
he
high
indirect
trailed
of2.
can
smooth,
battalion.
The
can
There a
It
can
tracked, M252s
he
M889
crew
wires
ammunition:
has
as a
battalion.
of
meters.
eight
The
course
infantry
line
second.
that
high-angle,
has
man-portable.
fortifications
long
are its
optically a
helicopter.
the a
of4O
types
per the
as
is
so
is
of
infantry
field
six
training.
There
Dragon
an launcher
radius
(sustained) flight (maximum)
meters
Ordnance
and
uses
AH—IW mortar
through of
and
in
m
The
Dragon
platoon
200
rpm
rpm
(total) burst
the m
(baseplale)
wire-guided
misrres.
of
a
Royal
15 tube-launched,
(barrel)
(mount)
armor
30
SImm
while
is mortar battalion.
lbs recoilless
M47
on
lbs
rmor
5.733
signals
100
mm
a
has
lbs
lbs practice.
company seconds.
The
nm
speed
The
Fire: 81
The
90.5
a heavy 27
35 28.5 used antia
TOW
ing
SI fantrv and clearing
Mortar 11.2
from relays missile
ons
of
Range:
Range:
M252 Caliber: Rates
Weight: Max Mb Manufacturer:
102
I SRIG
E [41 endix
I MEB COMMAND DET ELEMENT
ACE GCE CSSE MARINE AIRCRAVr INFANTRY BRIGADE SERVICE GROUP REG II ENT SUPPORT GROUP
VMFA/VM FA(AW)/ HEADQUARTERS VMA/VMA(AW) BATFALION COMPANY
HMM/HMH/ HMLA/VMO MOTOR VMAQ/VMGR TRANSPORT DETACHMENTS COMPANY
MARINE AIR ARTILLERY LANDING SUPPORT CONTROL GROUP BATFALION COMPANY (DETACHMENT)
MARINE WING TAN K SUPPLY SUPPORT COMPANY COMPANY SQUADRON
LIGHT ARMORED \IAI NTE NANC E MARINE AVIATION RECON COMPANY LOGISTICS COMPANY SQ UADRON ASSAULT ENGINEER AMPHIBIAN SUPPORT COMPANY COMPANY
CO N’IBAT BULK FUEL ENGINEER COMPANY COMPANY
COLLECTING AND RECONNAISSANCE CLEARING PLATOON COMPANY
ANTITANK SURGICAL (TOW) PLATOON SUPPORT COMPANY
DENTAL DETAC H M ENT
TypicalMarine &peditionan’ Brigade
103 ______
Answers to Unit Symbol Test ... 3dPlt,CoG,2dBn, G12 2d Mar IKJ
Co B, 2d Assault, Amphibian En B 2
BtryC, 1st En, 11th Mar c • 11 (En designation not needed; only 1st En has Btiy C.)
1
1st En, 47th Mech Inf Regt, 22d Div (Enemy) Or (Div designation not needed; only one 47th Mech Inf Regt.) r>.-ciII 47 1L5-”&jEN
1st Light Armored Recon Bn, 1 1 1st MarDiv
x 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade 7
104 los 77 62 73. 79. 68. 76. 78 81-2 75. 52. 73, 85 51. 54, efforts 82 59 84 79 83 64, 82 76, 75-6, 79 of 51, 50. 72, 51. 38. 82, 79, 59. 65, 78, 79 81-2 86 56-7, 28, 82 42, 95 69 62 72, 49. 69, 50. 60 focus 69, 44. 75. 75, 64 28, 71. 79 20. 69-70. 9. 7-8. 75 76 69, 64, 71 gaps 61 see 42-3. battlefield 54. 7. 62. 84-5 4. 75 52, 69-70 51-2. 42.44. 54, wills 61, operations 65-6. options order and attack the operations 54. tactics 59. 45. 66. lines support 48. loop 52 61 42. of effort: factor Interior Mission MAGTF Main Lines Spoiling Multiple Reconnaissance Simplicity Speed Mobility Predictability Preparation Security SEDA Shaping Patterns Penetration Perseverance Surfaces Surprise Mutual Reserve Screen Suppression Rehearsal Uncertainty Opposing OODA Time Warning Terrain 85 85 71. 95 64-5, 79, . 91. 70. 90 60. 69. 84 69, 59, 53, 74-5. 66. 91 82, 57. 91 87 58. 84-5 85 45, 62. 90, 91 85. 52. 66-7, 84 81, 71-2, 57. 76. 67 26, 90 84-5, 43. 44 —C”l!-fl_KZ. 52. 69. 79, 49, 86 63. 85 81. 64 84-5 18. 75, 91 52. 68. 70. 57. 85 77, 77 ‘— 75, 51. 84-5 65, 46. -. 42. 84 82, 48, 80. 95 74. 73, 64, 53 49, drills 47, 71. 49 76-7. 44. forces 50, 49. 68, 44, 68-9, — 4. 52 81. 59-60. 28. 45. 75. 45, 79. intent 70. 48. 60. 16. 43, 44. 78 64, 76 49, 12. 42. 48. order 28, 63. 77. 42. 43. 2-3 arms 46. 28, action gravity 69, 45-6. 56. 48. 8, 1 10, 16. Force 14. orders efforts vulnerability 5, of picture 28. attack 16. 72-3. 14. of d’oell Bigger Boldness Ambush Cheng/Ch Center Combat Commander’s Combined Complementary Concentration Coordination Counterstroke Coup Decisiveness Enemy Covering Envelopment Exploitation Critical Firepower Flanks Fix-and-flank Flexibility Focus Fragmentary Frontal Friction Initiative Immediate Infiltration
Guard ha
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at
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6—),
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Handbook
Company
I—I
currently
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Marine
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the
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the
FAIFM
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Operational
for
Basic
Marines
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and
Resene.
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spaniels.
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6th
the
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About author in
from
cocker
the
assignment
Warfighti,ig;
is
two
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schools
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FMFM
Corps active
Illinois.
active—duty
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his
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Company.
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Marine His
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hicle sky
ons erations: