Mapping Government Presence in the Northern Triangle:

A Comprehensive Study on the Human Security Systems of the Northern Triangle, and Why

Indicators of Government Presence are Difficult to Map

Mara Belle Royse

Senior International Relations and Global Studies Capstone Project

15 May 2020

Completed thanks to the invaluable assistance of Andrés Ruiz Sors, translator and research

assistant, and the superb mentorship of Dr. Michael Mosser.

———

In service to the Department of State and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs Diplomacy Lab. 2

ABSTRACT AND PURPOSE OF RESEARCH:

After a surge of migrants in seek of security and asylum attempted to cross the United States’ southern border in 2019, U.S. officials have grown increasingly concerned with the condition of their neighbors to the south. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) are attempting to identify and categorize indicators of government presence in the Northern Triangle region of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras), specifically in the sector of public security. Ideally, research gathered for this project would include a map of the collected addresses of public institutions that provide some form of essential human security to the region (i.e. public law offices, hospitals, police stations or outposts, etc.). The map would include details like numbers of staff per capita in a given area, and level of efficiency and efficacy. The information and data collected would assist the DOS and INL in targeting (with extreme accuracy) which precise locations need more resources and development to increase their response and service capabilities, and would allow agents to determine what areas of the overall systems of security require reform and restructuring. Due to the characteristics of the problem outlined within this document, the task of mapping locations through the ArcGIS geospatial information system was nearly impossible. However, through the research process, the author was able to ascertain the complexities of the problems that plague the Northern Triangle region. The following report (1) highlights the statistics and context of crime and instability in the Northern Triangle; (2) spotlights the areas of concern within the security sector, including law enforcement, border security, penal systems, and judicial processes; (3) taps into the failures of traditional government capacities related to security – like medical, educational and humanitarian services; (4) evaluates rule of law and the effect of systemic corruption; (5) and analyzes the assembled addresses of government presence indicators, shining a light on the difficulties of obtaining public information. In addition to these areas of focus, the emergence of the novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has further exposed and exacerbated issues within the region, to an extent that the international community has been unable to ignore. Therefore, an additional section is provided with the most up-to-date information available, focused on the effects of COVID-19 on human security in the Northern Triangle. 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 – Figures and Tables

5 – Executive Summary

10 – Background of Problem in Today’s Context

13 – A Turbulent History

18 – A Disadvantaged Geographic Location

22 – Inequity, the Informal Sector, and a Poor Distribution of Resources

36 – Rule of Law, Government Corruption, and Human Rights

52 – Crime Statistics and Information

58 – Broken Security and Justice Systems

68 – COVID-19 Pandemic and the Security of the Northern Triangle

71 – Findings and Takeaways: Indicators of Government Presence

75 – Suggestions for Future Research and Policy Guidance

77 – Appendix of Addresses and Corresponding Coordinates

98 – References

4

FIGURES AND TABLES

19 – Table 1: Agriculture in the Northern Triangle

24 – Table 2: GDP and Employment in the Northern Triangle

25 – Figure 1: Demographics of the Northern Triangle

26 – Table 3: Poverty and Wealth Distribution

27 – Table 4: Disparities in Access to Clean Water, Sanitation Services, and Literacy Rate in the

Northern Triangle

31 – Table 5: Healthcare Capacity of the Northern Triangle

37 – Table 6: Rule of Law Indicators in the Northern Triangle (rank out of 128 countries, index

scale of 0.0 to 1.0)

38 – Table 7: Rule of Law – Highest and Lowest Scoring Countries

52 – Figure 2: Northern Triangle Homicide Rate per 100,000 from 2009-2019

55 – Figure 3: Rate of Male Homicides in the Northern Triangle (per 100,000 residents in that

age group)

55 – Figure 4: Rate of Femicide in the Northern Triangle (per 100,000 residents in that age

group)

56 – Figure 5: Rates of Other Serious Crimes in the Northern Triangle (per 100,000 residents)

62 – Table 8: Police Counts & Actual Homicide Count versus Suspects, Arrests, & Convictions

64 – Table 9: Prosecutions versus Convictions of the Northern Triangle

64 – Table 10: Prison Capacity of the Northern Triangle

5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

In FY19, the United States saw a surge of migrants from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arrive at the southern border – approximately 608,000 people, compared to the 265,000 average number of migrants that arrived annually from FY14 to FY18. Since FY16, the U.S. has spent over $2.6 billion in aid to assist in development and improve security systems; the Northern Triangle countries have pooled $9.985 billion since 2016 for their A4P initiative, also geared towards development and security. International institutions and FDI have contributed to resources and funding for the Northern Triangle as well. Despite tremendous efforts and funding, the number of internally and externally displaced peoples have increased dramatically, indicating that governments in this region still lack the capacity to provide opportunity and security for their citizens. Currently, U.S. officials are attempting to determine how the U.S. can better focus resources within the isthmus. In response to this problem, the DOS and INL have been tasked with answering the question: where are there physical indicators of government presence, especially those that determine security, located? This may include public law offices, hospitals, police stations/outposts, etc. Answering this question is one of the first steps in observing which citizens are more vulnerable to insecurity and would be more likely to migrate. The author attempted to find and map as many addresses as possible, but had little luck. Still, through researching the problems that plague the Northern Triangle, the author was able to establish areas of state that need improving and regional vulnerabilities that influence patterns of migration.

A turbulent history contributes to the broken social contract between citizens and the government. Due to a series of bloody civil wars (ending in the nineties) and intense authoritarian responses from the state that resulted in over 275,000 deaths, citizens have a lack of trust towards the government, and the government does not feel complete responsibility to its citizens. The civil war also brought a huge wave of migrants to the U.S., where they were forced to live in areas with high levels of poverty and gang activity. This led many to join or establish gangs (like MS-13 and M-18), for self-defense. In 1996, thousands of illegal immigrants involved with gangs were deported back to Central America. Today, there are approximately 60,000 active street gang members in El Salvador, 36,000 in Honduras, and 14,000 in Guatemala.

The Northern Triangle suffers from a disadvantageous geographic location; drug cartels move much of their stock through the region, since it is the only land passage connecting South America to the U.S.: the biggest consumers of narcotics in the western hemisphere. Thanks to limited border security, Northern Triangle countries are extremely porous, attracting smugglers. In the 2000s, Mexican cartels like the Sinaloa group and los Zetas started expanding their territory of operations within the Northern Triangle. Since 2004, around 90% of all cocaine and 89% of all heroine that made its way to the U.S. has come from Latin America. 6

Geographic location also determines climate vulnerabilities. Agriculture plays a large role in the economy, providing employment for a significant portion of the labor force (see Table 1). The region relies on the La Niña weather phenomenon to bring water to crops, but due to an extended El Niño drought beginning in 2014, several seasons of crops were lost in recent years. In 2016, the UN FAO estimated at least 1.6 million people in Central America faced constant food insecurity because of climate change. Additionally, 70% of coffee farms (a major agricultural export in the region) have been infected by coffee rust since 2012, causing up to an 80% drop in crop yield. Farms can generally survive one bad season, but successive seasons of failed crops eventually force families to migrate in search of food and employment.

Thanks to generations of inequities on ethnic lines and a poor distribution of public resources and services, many are forced to turn to the informal economic sector or criminal activities for work. In 2017, for example, the labor force of the Northern Triangle increased by 353,000 people, but only 35,000 jobs were created in the formal sector that same year, forcing over 300,000 people to look for work in the informal economy. This leaves citizens without employment benefits and safety nets and minimizes tax revenue to GDP ratio, as informal jobs are not regulated by the government, leaving less money available public spending. Around half of the GDP the Northern Triangle goes towards the informal, shadow economy, with a rate of 63-73% informal sector employment (see Table 2). A significant number of Northern Triangle residents live below the national poverty line or are living in extreme poverty, and wealth is distributed extremely unevenly – with the richest 20% making around 50% of all income, and the poorest 20% making just 3-6% of all income (see Figure 1 and Table 3). Poverty rates are higher for those that live in rural communities and those of indigenous descent. Rural and indigenous residents also have less access to clean water, sanitation services, and education than non-indigenous and urban residents (see Table 4). In general, access to clean water is limited; water supply is usually intermittent and polluted due to poor waste management, overexploitation, and unpredictable rainy and dry seasons. The education system is mismanaged and often severely influenced by teachers’ unions, which lobby funding away from pupils and towards teacher salaries. Healthcare capacity is limited (see Table 5); there are not enough staff or hospital beds to adequately provide basic primary care services. El Salvador only has 100 ICU beds in the entire country. Additionally, most hospitals are located in urban areas; in Guatemala, for example, there are 0.81 physicians per 1,000 people in urban areas, but 0.15 per 1,000 people in rural areas. Most hospitals only provide services in Spanish, but many indigenous are monolingual; this makes accessing healthcare even more difficult for this demographic. In all states, but especially in Guatemala, most of the health expenditure is paid for by household out-of-pocket spending (83% in Guatemala). In all three countries, the ministry of health insures 72-83% of all residents, but only a small amount of money is available per person.

7

A weak rule of law and government corruption produce ideal conditions for violations of human rights and severe insecurity and exposure to violence. El Salvador is ranked 84th of 128 countries evaluated by the World Justice Program for rule of law, Guatemala is ranked 101st, and Honduras is ranked 116th (see Table 6). Corruption is the primary reason for these results. Corrupt officials steal and embezzle hundreds of millions of dollars from public expenditure, benefit from partnerships with street gangs and wealthy organized crime groups, and manipulate the judicial system to maintain a high level of impunity for their crimes. Corruption extends from the top to the bottom of the state hierarchy; nearly a third of all Latin Americans are forced to pay bribes to obtain public services from low-level providers (i.e. doctors and nurses, street cops, and primary school teachers). Thanks to efforts by the CICIG and MACCIH in Guatemala and Honduras, two independent international anti-corruption institutions, significant progress has been made in past years. Throughout its twelve years of operation, CICIG helped reduce Guatemala’s homicide rate by 32%, dismantled 60 criminal networks, indicted 680 individuals, helped obtain 310 convictions, and helped arrest several high ranking officials – including presidents, vice presidents, and congressmen – for their involvement in extensive corruption schemes. A recent poll shows 83% of Guatemalans supported the CICIG (making it the most trusted institution in Guatemala), while 72% and 65% reported having little to no trust in the police and government, respectively. Unfortunately, CICIG was dismantled in September 2019, after the president at the time, Jimmy Morales, came under investigation for corruption himself. MACCIH, inspired by CICIG, was created in 2016, but quickly dissolved after its mandate expired in January of 2020, despite 61% of Hondurans in a 2019 poll expressing they wanted MACCIH to stay. Experts speculate that these institutions were essential in helping break the cycle of corruption and impunity; the future of anti-corruption efforts without these institutions is unclear. Human, indigenous and environmental rights activists, protestors, and journalists are all targets of corrupt officials, who fear dissent and backlash. They are exposed to extrajudicial methods of engagement, including violence, threats, and defamation. Those who express their freedom of speech against the government are sometimes referred to as terrorists or enemies of the state by officials, and police have used tear gas and live ammunition to suppress crowds.

Weak rule of law and corruption enable high levels of criminal activity (see Figure 2, 3, 4, and 5). Women are particularly vulnerable to violence in this region; El Salvador has the highest rate of femicide in the world. Men ages fifteen to twenty-nine have the highest rate of homicide of all genders and age groups, by far. Proliferation of small arms since the era of civil wars contributes greatly to violence; firearms are used to commit 70% of all murders in the Northern Triangle. Approximately 737,000 civilian-operated firearms are estimated to be in El Salvador, 2.062 million in Guatemala, and 1.171 million in Honduras – this outnumbers the estimated number of firearms held by police and military (combined) by a factor of 4.7 in El Salvador, 10.1 in Guatemala, and 8.6 in Honduras. 8

Most crime is attributed to street gang activities and organized crime, but private businesses are also guilty; many mining companies, for example, bribe or threaten government officials in order to pass inspections. They also use violence to silence demonstrators – with little to no repercussions from state systems.

Broken security and justice systems further exacerbate weak rule of law. To support their ‘tough-on-crime’ agendas, governments use military forces as police, which leads to numerous extrajudicial killings, torture, and other human rights violations. Police receive limited training, little pay, and often lack equipment – like vehicles, gas, communication devices, and ammunition – to properly perform their jobs. Most resources and personnel are granted to cities and popular tourist areas Rural and indigenous communities may receive two to four police, if any, and they are left with the fewest resources to combat crime. Police often take hours to respond to crime scenes and emergencies, if they do at all. Border towns are the least secure, with no regulations for crossing the border thanks to the CA-4 agreement, giving organized crime the perfect opportunity to set up shop. Where official border crossings are located, they are usually without electricity, toilets, or firearms – and sometimes are left unstaffed. Border communities are used by organized crime to expand territory, along with recruitment and training. Everyday farmers and community leaders help launder money and smuggle people, weapons, and drugs, which in turn results in border towns experiencing the fastest rate of regional growth in each of the Northern Triangle countries. Overall, police and justice systems have limited capacity for crime (see Table 8 and 9), and prosecutors and police tend to fail to communicate, leading to a low rate of conviction. 6.5% of all homicides in Guatemala received convictions in 2014; 7.8% of all homicides received convictions in Honduras 2016. 13.2% of all prosecutions get convictions in El Salvador; that number is just 0.8% in Guatemala. Judicial systems’ ability to act independently is inconsistent; presidents and congressmen often choose to ignore judicial decisions, establish legislature to interrupt judicial efficiency and efficacy, and even replace judges whose decisions they disagree with. A swift replacement of four of the five supreme court judges by president Hernández in Honduras led to a judicial decision allowing for presidents to run for a second term. Controversially, Mr. Hernández won his reelection and is now serving his second term, met by mass protest from Honduran citizens. A crackdown on crime combined with a limited justice and penal system leads to overflowing prisons (see Table 10); El Salvador prisons are 215.2% capacity, Guatemalas are 357.6% capacity, and Honduran prisons have a 193.5% occupancy level. Over a quarter of all Salvadoran and half of all Guatemalan and Honduran prisoners are pre-trial detainees or remand prisoners. Overcapacity leads to poor hygienic conditions, outbreaks of illness, devastating fires, and leaves prison guards outnumbered. Gang members almost always control prisons, and are able to smuggle in weapons, drugs and cell phones. They often use prisons as a temporary base, orchestrating criminal activity from inside their cells. 9

Crumbling security systems force citizens to take justice into their own hands. The rich can afford private security. One half all all security in El Salvador and Honduras and three- fourths of all Guatemalan security is privately owned. Private security members are contractually obliged to their employer, and not to the citizens of the Northern Triangle; they are able to establish their own rule of law and therefore have the potential endanger citizens. The poor, especially in rural and indigenous communities that lack security services, turn to vigilantism. They administer justice via lynchings, stoning, and immolation. Police choose not to intervene as they fear for their own safety. Citizens build blockades and hold officials hostage in order to have their demands met, and regularly face zero repercussions for their actions.

COVID-19 has exposed further issues of insecurity and corruption. Because the majority of people are informally employed and rely on day-to-day income to get by, citizens are left without food. Those that protest are met with tear gas, threatened with guns, or detained. Journalists are also threatened for leaving their homes, and are given limited access to updates on government activities and other commonly public information. Prisoners fear for their lives, knowing that overcrowded prisons are already hotbeds for respiratory illnesses like tuberculosis. In El Salvador, president Bukele cracked down on criminals after a series of murders, subjecting inmates to humiliation and inhumane treatment, mixing rival gang members together in cells and boarding the cells over with metal sheets. Guatemalan health ministers were fired over a conspiracy of corruption and defrauding of funds during the pandemic.

Addresses were difficult to locate due to limitations on access to public information in all three countries. Addresses that were available were often incomplete, informal, or generally non-specific. Limited infrastructure and street markings made it difficult to find matching coordinates for most addresses. Police outposts were the most difficult to find, especially in rural areas. Hospitals were typically located in urban areas and were better marked on the GPS than other institutions. As previously stated, rural and indigenous communities have far less indicators of government presence compared to non-indigenous and urban communities.

The author recommends (1) encouraging better organization of data within government systems, focusing on resource accessibility (for example, by including indigenous language options for websites and official documents); (2) establishing formal streets and addresses (infrastructure) across the country to improve accountability and accessibility; (3) working with GPS programs to ensure addresses can be located easily; (4) focusing on improving logistics, organization, supervision, and infrastructure before attempting to further bolster security; (5) integrating/coopting indigenous and rural citizens into the police structure to increase trust and rule of law in those regions; and (6) expanding the capacity of the formal economic sector. Future attempts to map government presence will require researchers to be on location and collaborate directly with Northern Triangle officials. 10

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM IN TODAY’S CONTEXT:

From Fiscal Year 2014 (FY14) through FY18, approximately 265,000 people on average have attempted to emigrate from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in search of hope, opportunity, and safe haven each year.1 The majority were headed for the United States border.

In FY19, the number of migrants more than doubled; U.S. authorities apprehended nearly

608,000 Northern Triangle unauthorized migrants who made the dangerous and arduous journey north.2 Of those apprehended, 81% were family units or unaccompanied minors seeking asylum.3

Considering the amount of funding and aid that the U.S. and Northern Triangle countries have dedicated to development within the past four years alone, it is rather alarming for there to be such a sudden spike in the migration of Central Americans. From FY16 through FY19, $833.2 million was directly allocated to the Northern Triangle countries through the U.S. Strategy for

Engagement in Central America;4 $1.2 billion was designated for the region (all seven Central

American countries to include the Northern Triangle) through the Central America Regional

Security Initiative (CARSI); and $378.9 million was allocated for use in Central America through other means of regional assistance (i.e. the State Department’s Western Hemisphere

Regional program, the Inter-American Foundation, etc.).5 Of this foreign assistance, 40% was used on development assistance, 33% on international narcotics control and law enforcement,

20% on economic support, 5% on foreign military financing and international military education

1 Peter Meyer and Maureen Taft-Morales, Central American Migration: Root Causes And U.S. Policy (Congressional Research Service, 2019), page 1. 2 Peter Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2019), page 1. 3 Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement, page 1. 4 Note: In FY19, the amount of aid dedicated to the Northern Triangle by the U.S. was significantly diminished: El Salvador and Honduras both received no direct aid, and Guatemala received $13 million ($95.5 million less than the previous year). FY20 aid has been requested but not yet accepted or allocated, with the three countries proposed to receive a total of $180.9 million in direct aid. CARSI program requested $250.3 million for FY20; other regional assistance requested $6 million. 5 Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement, page 13. 11 and training, and 2% was spent on ‘other’ – appropriated through the Global Health Programs account, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism,

Demining, and Related programs account.6

Beyond the contributions made by the United States, the Alliance for Prosperity (A4P), funded solely by and used exclusively for the Northern Triangle countries, has provided $9.985 billion of investment for continued efforts in development from 2016 through 2019.7 Each country has committed a considerable amount amount of their fiscal budgets towards this initiative; El Salvador has given $2.461 billion, Guatemala $3.716 billion, and Honduras $3.808 billion.8 The goal of the Northern Triangle’s A4P has been to strengthen and develop the four

“strategic pillars” of Fostering the Productive Sector, Developing Human Capital, Improving

Citizen Security and Access to Justice, and Strengthening Institutions and Improving

Transparency.9

With all of the money that has been allegedly strategically spent towards development in the Northern Triangle, along with other aid and investments by international, state, and non-state entities, the questions become: is the money being properly distributed? Are things improving?

How are governments investing in their people, and where can government indicators be found throughout the country? Unfortunately, these questions do not have simple answers. The strategies established by the U.S. and the Northern Triangle to address security and development have only existed for the past four years, and with the slow implementation of each plan, these programs have only actually been in effect for the past three years (as of spring 2020).10 Beyond

6 Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement, page 14. 7 Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement, page 17. 8 Ibid. 9 El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle: Main Progress and Achievements 2017-2018 (IADB, 2019), page 5. 10 Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement, page 18. 12 the delays inherently burdened by bureaucratic institutions, massive structural change is not something that comes quickly or easily – especially not in countries that only started considering democracy in the nineties, after suffering years of devastating civil wars between guerrilla combatants and authoritarian regimes. Indeed, a legacy of instability and conflict is difficult to extinguish. The complexities of a broken state with fragile institutions must be approached with a high level of innovation and initiative, and with the greatest amount of dedication and collaborative effort from the actors involved.

There is neither a “magic bullet” nor an “out of the box” solution to the problems of the Northern Triangle. Most of the solutions are relatively straightforward but politically hard and involve a mixture of economic, development, political, and security reforms. The problems of the region are, in fact, solvable, but they require sustained attention from the United States, political will in the NCTA countries, including cooperation rather than obstruction from elites in these societies, and ultimately strong and inclusive economic growth to go with strengthened governance.11

- Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies

As Runde describes, a problem in one sector is often greatly influenced by problems in adjacent sectors. Beyond that, factors outside of the government’s scope of abilities further exacerbate problems within the public sector. The Northern Triangle is also made particularly susceptible to sustained instability and corruption due to a variety of unique vulnerabilities and areas of weakness, discussed throughout the body of this publication.

11 Daniel Runde and Mark Schneider, A New Social Contract for the Northern Triangle (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2019), page 1. 13

A TURBULENT HISTORY:

Each Northern Triangle country has faced a history of violence and inequity, a trend traced back to when the Spanish conquistadors first invaded Central America. The ancient indigenous peoples’ socio-economic order was rapidly replaced by a Spanish-controlled plantation economy, first reliant upon harsh forced-labor tactics against the indigenous, and then later (after a ban on indigenous slaves) dependent on slaves from Africa.12 The indigenous civilizations, including the great Mayan empire, were effectively destroyed with their people scattered throughout Central America, forced to live in squalor as the Spanish profited off what was once their homelands.13 The countries finally gained independence from Spain in 1821, but the indigenous and mestizos (those of mixed European-Native descent), comprising the majority of the population, were still marginalized; second class citizens to those who identified as having strong European bloodlines.14

Each country was ruled by a long series of military dictatorships until the mid-to-late

1900s. In El Salvador year 1932, a peasant revolt lashed out against the ruling dictatorship, but due to the strong, militarized government and powerful European elites, 30,000 civilians were massacred within just a few weeks – in what was dubbed ‘la matanza,’ the slaughter.15 The majority of those murdered were indigenous people, whose traditional dress and languages made them easy targets.16 Deadly political violence between left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary death squads throughout the 60s and 70s eventually led to full-scale civil war. In

1981, when the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) launched an all-out attack

12 Guatemala – CJA: “Silent Holocaust”: The Mayan Genocide” (Center for Justice & Accountability, 2016). 13 The Mayan Genocide. 14 El Salvador – CJA (Center for Justice & Accountability, 2016). 15 El Salvador – CJA. 16 Ibid. 14 on the government (dominated by the right-wing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) party), the U.S. Reagan administration came to the Salvadoran government’s aid, seeking to squash another Cold War-era communist revolution.17 The government-backed forces produced systematic human rights violations, using terror tactics including torture, mutilation, forced disappearance, extrajudicial killings, indiscriminate bombing, mass executions, and mass rape against the FMLN and the civilian population.18 During the twelve years of the civil war between

1980 and 1992, approximately 75,000 Salvadorans were killed.19 ARENA and FMLN remain the two dominating political parties of El Salvador to this day.

The stories are similar in Guatemala and Honduras. In 1944, after decades of suffering military dictators in Guatemala, a civilian government was elected, but was soon overtaken in a coup orchestrated with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1954; a right-wing military dictator was then successfully installed.20 A leftist guerilla movement formed in the 60s and 70s; some indigenous Maya supported the movement hoping that, through these guerrillas, the economic and political marginalization of indigenous communities might cease.21

Unfortunately, the government determined that this sentiment linked all the Maya to insurrection, and in 1982, a ‘scorched earth’ operation launched against the Mayan communities; villages were systematically razed, crops destroyed, and inhabitants were raped, tortured and murdered.22

Between 500,000 and 1.5 million Mayans were displaced internally and abroad by the violence, and of the 200,000 deaths accumulated from 1960 to 1996, the United Nations Historical

17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Theodore Leggett, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007), page 35. 20 The Mayan Genocide. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 15

Clarification Commission (CEH) found that 83% killed were indigenous.23 Today, human rights groups international judicial bodies label the attacks against the Mayan people as genocide, and attempts are made to try war criminals with crimes against humanity. However, little progress has been made due to various amnesty laws endorsed by corrupt officials and judges in

Guatemala. Former Guatemalan president Jimmy Morales reportedly said that he did not believe any act of genocide had been committed during the civil war.24

In the 1980s, Honduran military forces were trained by the CIA and Federal Bureau of

Investigations (FBI) instructors in enhanced surveillance and interrogation. After receiving additional U.S.-funded instruction from Argentine counterinsurgency experts – which included practicing electro-shock, freezing temperatures, and suffocation on live prisoners – the notorious

Honduran death squad, Battalion 316, was formed.25 Standard operations of Battalion 316 included abducting victims in unmarked vehicles, interrogation and torture, and summary execution – followed by dumping bodies into unmarked graves.26 Although Honduras did not experience a bloody civil war of left versus right-wing entities like El Salvador and Guatemala, the goal of Battalion 316 was to take out suspected civilian leftist opposition supporters, the reason being to thwart any communist threat. Surrounded on all sides by conflict (Nicaragua also had a civil war with some 60,000 dead),27 the U.S. used Honduras as its base of operations to monitor and support its allies in Central America throughout the Cold War.28

Because of the violence experienced by the civilian populations of the Northern Triangle throughout this turbulent period, citizens’ lives were completely disrupted, and the majority were

23 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 35. 24 Maureen Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations (Congressional Research Service, 2019), page 8. 25 Honduras – CJA: Battalion 316: Torture & Forced Disappearance, (Center for Justice & Accountability, 2016). 26 Battalion 316: Torture & Forced Disappearance. 27 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 35. 28 Battalion 316: Torture & Forced Disappearance. 16 forced to pursue a limited number of coping mechanisms and methods of escape: obtain weapons for self-defense and learn how to fight to survive, or migrate to escape death. Around 550,000

Salvadorans were forcibly internally displaced during El Salvador’s civil war, and 500,000 more sought refuge in other countries – entire communities driven from their homes.29 Many

Salvadorans ended up in pre-existing Hispanic communities in Southern California.

Unfortunately, those areas in particular suffered from gang problems, and after being targeted by local gangs, Salvadorans and other Central American refugees were forced to either join gangs or create their own for self-defense. In 1996, after the end of the civil wars in Central America, the

U.S. cracked down on immigration, and many gang members were deported back to the

Northern Triangle, where they brought back the street gang culture with them.30 Approximately

60,000 street gang members operate in El Salvador today,31 with another estimated 36,000 members in Honduras and 14,000 members in Guatemala.32 There are hundreds of small street gangs, but the most prominent are the rival gangs Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and Barrio 18

(M-18), the largest and most powerful street gangs in the region – originally established in the

U.S. After the end of the devastating civil wars, these youth gangs reintroduced heightened levels of everyday crime and violence into the Northern Triangle.

Much of violent crime experienced in the Northern Triangle can be attributed to street gang activities (especially in El Salvador), which include renta (various methods of extortion), forced recruitment of youth and young adults, sexual exploitation and abuse, territorial disputes between rival gangs, and conflicts between gangs and the police;33 however, violent crime can

29 Vickie Knox, An Atomised Crisis: Reframing displacement caused by crime and violence in El Salvador (Relief Web, 2018), page 13. 30 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 16. 31 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020: Events of 2019 (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2020), page 187. 32 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 60. 33 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, pages 19-20. 17 also be attributed to major organized crime units, like the Sinaloa group and los Zetas, who utilize the porous rural border regions of the Northern Triangle countries for money laundering and drug, weapon and human trafficking activities.34

34 Ralph Espach and Daniel Haering, Border Insecurity in Central America’s Northern Triangle (Migration Policy Institute, 2012), pages 6-8. 18

A DISADVANTAGED GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION:

Drug trafficking was common in the Northern Triangle in the 1980s, as it was a means of funding the conflict,35 but in the early 1990s, anti-drug operations in the Caribbean region led

Colombian cartels to favor overland routes through Central America and Mexico, increasing the flow of drugs through the Northern Triangle countries.36 In the 2000s, Mexican cartels, seeking to make more profit, moved to expand operations from just trafficking products to buying products from the source (Columbia and elsewhere), overseeing production, and controlling region-wide transit.37 Since 2010, evidence has indicated that the Sinaloa and Zetas drug cartels have increased their presence in the Northern Triangle, especially in Guatemala and Honduras, expanding operations to include recruiting, training, drug processing, and increased local sales – which fuels local gang activity and increases violence.38

Drug trafficking is heavily concentrated in this region due to the biggest consumers of

Latin American product living north of Mexico. Since 2004, around 90% of all cocaine39 and

89% of all heroine40 that flows through the U.S. borders comes from Latin America. As the only land corridor connecting South America to Mexico and the U.S., the Central American isthmus is deeply penetrated by the trafficking network. However, high levels of drug trafficking are only one negative outcome of the geographic location of Central America.

The Northern Triangle is a part of what is known as the ‘Dry Corridor,’ an area that is exposed to intense fluctuations in weather phenomenon known as El Niño and La Niña, the

35 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 12. 36 Espach and Haering, Border Insecurity, page 2. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 46. 40 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 50. 19

irregular pattern of dry and wet seasons.41 Table 1 below shows the importance of agriculture to

the El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras economies.

Table 1: Agriculture in the Northern Triangle

% of land dedicated % of GDP from % of labor force Key agricultural exports to agriculture agriculture in agriculture

El Salvador 74.7% 12% 21% Coffee, sugar, corn, rice, beens Guatemala 41.2% 13.3% 31.4% Sugar, coffee, bananas, vegetables Honduras 28.8% 14.2% 39.2% Bananas, coffee, citrus, corn, sugar Sources: Central America – The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020).

Due to crop diseases like coffee rust and increased intensity and erraticism in the wet and

dry seasons as a result of climate change, the agricultural industry has suffered in recent years,

starting with El Niño extreme drought conditions in 2014; this was when the U.S. began seeing a

sharp increase in irregular migration from the Northern Triangle.42 Coffee leaf rust caused by the

fungus Hemileia vastatrix, which damages major coffee farms in all three countries, began

infecting crops in 2012, and by 2014, entire farms were crippled by the disease.43 In 2013, for

example, small coffee farm Finca El Valle in Guatemala was producing 140,000 pounds of

Arabica for several American coffee-roasters; in 2014, the same farm harvested a meager 28,000

pounds of coffee – an 80% drop in yield – and the next harvests were even smaller.44

Smallholders in Central America, with each less than 7.5 acres of land, produce 80% of the

region’s coffee; some 70% of these farms have been affected by a combination of coffee rust and

41 Gena Steffens, Changing Climate Forces Desperate Guatemalans to Migrate (National Geographic Partners, LLC., 2018). 42 Food Security and Emigration: Why People Flee and the Impact on Family Members (United Nations World Food Programme, 2017), page 5. 43 Jeff Koehler, Coffee Rust Threatens Latin American Crop; 150 Years Ago, it Wiped Out an Empire (National Public Radio, 2018). 44 Koehler, Coffee Rust Threatens Latin American Crop. 20 low coffee prices, and over 1.7 million coffee workers have lost their jobs in recent years, forcing many to migrate and find work elsewhere.45

Because the people and economy of this region are so dependent on agriculture, crop failure due to diseased crops and climate change ultimately lead to job loss, economic insecurity, and food insecurity. The drought in 2014 left at least 96,000 families in El Salvador alone without adequate food, and the harsh prolonged droughts continued in the region through 2016.46

In previous years, families affected by a bad year of harvest would seek labor work on commercial farms, so that they could at least purchase basic food staples for their families.

However, in 2018, there were no longer any jobs to be found; successive years of drought left even well-established commercial agriculture ventures unable to produce – and many no longer have the seeds to try to grow more food in the next season.47 Families that rely on subsistence farming are no longer able to obtain basic medicines and food, leaving citizens starving and dying on the streets, and increasing the level of robbery and violent assault as families try anything to survive.48

According to the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP), nearly 50% of children under five years of age are considered chronically malnourished in Guatemala (peaking at 90% or higher in many rural areas), and without a reliable source of potable water, water borne illnesses are increasing – compounding effects of malnutrition and taking the lives of many children and adults alike.49 In 2016, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that at least 1.6 million people in Central America faced constant food insecurity because of climate change, and

45 Ibid. 46 Heather Gies, Once Lush, El Salvador is Dangerously Close to Running Dry (National Geographic Partners, LLC., 2018). 47 Steffens, Changing Climate Forces. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 21 a 2017 WFP survey of Central American migrant families, nearly half of those surveyed reported that they left their country because of lack of food.50 According to the World Bank, climate change could lead at least 1.4 million people to migrate in the next three decades, forcing the people of Central America to become internally or externally displaced and exposing them to the abuse and influence of gangs and criminal networks.51

50 Ishaan Tharoor, How Trump’s Border Crisis is Driven by Climate Change (The Washington Post, 2019). 51 Tharoor, Trump’s Border Crisis. 22

INEQUITY, THE INFORMAL SECTOR, AND A POOR DISTRIBUTION OF

RESOURCES:

Citizens are made vulnerable to additional violence and insecurity because of inequity and poor distribution of resources and opportunities, problems tracing back to before the turbulent Cold War-era conflicts. Generations of state-sponsored violence suffered by citizens of the Northern Triangle has led to a lack of government trust and support by citizens. At a fundamental level, citizens are unable or unwilling to invest in a government system that provides little opportunity, development, or basic security; governments feel no obligation to citizens that don’t pay taxes, and are unwilling to commit to changes necessary for improvement, especially if these changes take power or money away from corrupt government officials. This weak social contract between citizens and the government is exacerbated by extortions of businesses and individuals by gangs, limited employment opportunities in the formal economic sector, and public corruption.

Extortion is one of the greatest obstacles plaguing both small and big businesses alike. In

El Salvador, citizens pay an equivalent of 3% of the country’s entire gross domestic product

(GDP) annually in extortion fees;52 extortion fees are the primary source of income for

Salvadoran gangs, with an estimated 93% of small businesses reporting having to pay up.53

Larger businesses and transport operators negotiate extortion fees, which are built in to their financial models.54 According to a survey by the World Development Report in 2005, 80% of

Guatemalan and 61% of Honduran businesses reported criminal activity such as extortion to be a major constraint on the success of their business.55 The annual cost of crime and violence each

52 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 42. 53 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 19. 54 Ibid. 55 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 76. 23 year averages at 5.9% of GDP in El Salvador,56 and the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) estimates that the cost of violence to Guatemala is about 7.3% of GDP.57

Billions of dollars are lost to criminal activity and violence each year, meaning that governments are already planning for deficits before they can even create feasible budgets for public services each year.

Poor development and insufficient distribution of wealth forces citizens to search elsewhere for safety and economic stability, frequently leading to emigration, joining a gang, and other methods of obtaining income within the informal economic sector. Work within the informal sector includes everything from selling produce from a street cart to distributing illegal drugs; essentially, any activity that is not regulated by the government is informal. In 2018,

Instituto Nacional de Estadística found that 71% of the population of Guatemala held informal employment; percentages were even higher for women, people ages fifteen to twenty-four, and rural and indigenous segments of the population.58 Guatemala also recorded the lowest tax-to-

GDP ratio in the region at 12.6% compared to 22.7% average for Latin America; the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) calls for an increase to at least 15% of GDP in order for

Guatemala to address its social, security, and infrastructure needs.59 Table 2 below shows the average annual GDP growth, tax collection to GDP ratio, informal economy employment rate, and percent of GDP that ends up in the informal ‘shadow’ economy.

56 Clare Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations (Congressional Research Service, 2019), page 12. 57 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 18. 58 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 17. 59 Ibid. 24

Table 2: GDP and employment in the Northern Triangle

Annual GDP GDP per Percent of GDP Employment Shadow economy’s % skilled labor growth rate: capita that comes from rate of informal share of formal that emigrates 2015, 2016, 2017 (2017) tax revenue economy GDP (2003) annually El Salvador 2.4%, 2.6%, 2.3% $8,000 17.8% (2017) 63% (2018) 48% 31% Guatemala 4.1%, 3.1%, 2.8% $8,200 12.6% (2018) 73% (2017) 52% 24% Honduras 3.8%, 3.8%, 4.8% $5,600 17.3% (2015) 76% (2017) 52% 24% Sources: Central America – The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency; GDP growth rate, GDP per capita); Tax revenue (% of GDP) (The World Bank Group, 2019); Meyer and Taft-Morales, Central American Migration (Congressional Research Center, 2019) (Guatemala tax revenue); Informal Employment (% of total non-agricultural employment) (The World Bank Group, 2019); Leggett, Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire (UNODC, 2007) (shadow economy, skilled labor emigration).

Although jobs are created each year in the Northern Triangle, the majority are created in

the informal sector, where citizens suffer from little job protection, benefits and regulation, and

governments in turn receive less business and income taxes. For example, in 2017, the Northern

Triangle’s labor force increased by 353,000, but fewer than 35,000 jobs were created in the

formal economy that year.60 According to the World Bank, approximately 47% of Salvadorans,

56% of Guatemalans, and 52% of Hondurans are under the age of twenty-five, and because of

their relatively young demographic, all three countries are expected to see a continued rise in

prime working age population over the next two decades.61 Therefore, if the rate of formal

employment opportunities does not increase, the Northern Triangle will continue to see problems

in the economic sector and a high level of informal economic activity.

Other important indicators of a poor economy with limited employment opportunities are

remittances to GDP ratio, which indicate the amount of citizens that have decided to look outside

their domestic job markets in order to earn more and support the struggling families they leave

behind in their home countries. In 2018, 20.7% of El Salvador’s GDP, 12% of Guatemala’s

GDP, and 19.9% of Honduras’s GDP came from remittances.62 78% of households in the

60 Meyer and Taft-Morales, Central American Migration, page 1. 61 Ibid. 62 Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) (The World Bank Group, 2019). 25

Northern Triangle receive monthly remittances from abroad, of which 42% cite as their only

source of income, and more than half of the funds received are used to buy food – followed by

agricultural investments, investments in small businesses, education, and healthcare.63 These

remittances are not only necessary to keep families in the Northern Triangle afloat, but

contribute significantly to the overall state wealth each year. Without remittances, the countries

would likely see much higher levels of poverty and experience some level of economic collapse.

In order to fully grasp the issues of inequity that further aggravate the poor economic

status of the Northern Triangle, it is important to understand the demographic distribution as

well. Figure 1 presents basic key demographics relevant to the region. The approximate total

population of El Salvador is 6.5 million, Guatemala 17.1 million, and Honduras 9.2 million.64

Below that, Table 3 shows the overall poverty and extreme poverty rates, along with the levels

of wealth distribution (richest 20% versus poorest 20% of population).

Figure 1: Demographics of the Northern Triangle

El S alvador 0.2 86.3 13.4 El S alvador 73.4 26.6

Guatemala 43.5 56 0.5 Guatemala 51.8 48.2

Honduras 7 90 3

Honduras 58.4 41.6 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

% I ndig enous 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 % Amerindian-European Mix % Urban % Rural % Other (white, African descent, etc.)

Source: Central America – The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency.

63 Food Security and Emigration: Why People Flee, page 6. 64 Central America – The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). 26

Table 3: Poverty and Wealth Distribution

% living below % living on less than Poorest 1/5th of Richest 1/5th of national poverty $1.90 per day population’s share of population’s share of line (poverty) (extreme poverty) income / consumption income / consumption El Salvador 29.2% (2017) 1.5% (2018) 6.2% of all wealth (2018) 45.3% of all wealth (2018) Guatemala 59.3% (2014) 8.7% (2014) 4.5% of all wealth (2014) 53.6% of all wealth (2014) Honduras 61.9% (2018) 16.5% (2018) 3% of all wealth (2018) 56.1% of all wealth (2018) Sources: Meyer and Taft-Morales, Central American Migration (National poverty rate 2018), Poverty & Equity Data Portal (The World Bank Group, 2019) (extreme poverty rate and wealth distribution data)

From the Data in Table 3, it becomes clear that there is a serious discrepancy in the

distribution of wealth. Since 2014, the poverty rate in El Salvador has declined by nearly seven

percentage points, while poverty rates have remained relatively unchanged in Guatemala and

Honduras.65 The reason for this decline in Salvadoran poverty is due mostly to efforts of the left-

wing FMLN party, which finally held the majority in the government in 2009 (after almost two

decades of right-wing ARENA party dominance); the poverty rate was 50.1% when FMLN first

gained power in 2009, and the extreme poverty rate was 17.1%.66

In Guatemala, the poverty rate in the indigenous population is 1.7 times greater than the

non-indigenous population: 79.2% compared to 46.6% live below the national poverty line .67

39.8% of indigenous versus 12.8% of non-indigenous are extremely poor, living on less than

$1.90 per day.68 The poverty rate for the rural population is 1.8 times greater than the urban

population, 76.1% compared to 42.1%, and 35.3% of rural inhabitants were extremely poor

versus 11.2% of urban inhabitants.69 Despite indigenous and rural communities making up nearly

half of all Guatemalans, they are the majority of those impoverished. Similar patterns in

disparities of wealth can be seen in Honduras, where 63% of rural inhabitants live in extreme

65 Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement, page 19. 66 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 13. 67 Health in the Americas: Guatemala (Pan American Health Organization, 2020). 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 27

poverty, unable to satisfy basic nutritional needs.70 In Guatemala and Honduras, European

descendants are only half as likely to experience poverty than those of indigenous or African

descent.71 Those that live in low-income households are disproportionately affected by violence

and displacement; poverty is the number one risk factor for displacement in El Salvador, and

unfortunately, displacement only causes further financial losses and deepens poverty –

perpetuating a devastating spiral of poverty and exposure to violence.72 In 2018, El Salvador

recorded 246,000 newly internally displaced persons,73 and at the end of 2019, an estimated

247,000 Hondurans were internally displaced.74

Poverty and wealth disparity are only one figure representative of poor distribution of

public goods and services. Poor communities, most often indigenous and/or rural, tend to be

victims of limited access to essential services like healthcare, clean water, sanitation services,

and educational opportunities. Table 4 displays the percent of those with access to basic

traditional government services.

Table 4: Disparities in Access to Clean Water, Sanitation Services, and Literacy Rate in the Northern Triangle

% urban pop. % rural pop. % urban pop. % rural pop. Literacy rate: without access without access without access to without access to Male & female to improved to improved improved sanitation improved water source water source services sanitation services El Salvador 2.5% 13.5% 17.6% 40% 90.6% & 86.7% Guatemala 1.6% 13.2% 22.5% 50.7% 87.5% & 76.3% Honduras 2.6% 16.2% 13.3% 22.3% 87.1% & 87.3% Sources: Central America – The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency.

Although the majority have access to improved water sources, the real access to drinking

water is often much lower. The World Bank reports that the actual amount of Guatemalans using

70 Peter Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations (Congressional Research Service, 2019), page 8. 71 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 12. 72 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 29-41. 73 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 7. 74 Freedom in the World 2020: Honduras (FreedomHouse, 2020). 28 safely managed drinking services (not contaminated by solid wastes or toxic chemicals) is only

56%.75 In Honduras, 90% of water supply is intermittent (dependent on the rainy season), and only 44% of water purification facilities purify water effectively.76 Of the fifty-two sewage systems registered by Honduras’s Regulatory Entity of the Drinking Water Services and

Sanitation (ERSAPS), only 52% have a purification system; the others pour wastewater directly into the final receiving body of water.77 Additionally, due to poor infrastructure, only about 9% of overall water supply is actually distributed and consumed each year.78 In Tegucigalpa,

Honduras’s capital and most populous city (1.4 million inhabitants), residents have been living through an extreme water shortage since February of 2020 (still in effect as of the date of this publication); the Honduran water authority (SANAA) has been delivering water to residences once per week.79 As the drought continues, deliveries may become less frequent or stop with little or no notice.

In El Salvador, failures to regulate water usage has led to overexploitation and pollution, effecting a quarter of all Salvadorans and leaving more than 600,000 people without access to drinking water.80 Experts say that untreated sewage wastewater and runoff from industrial and agricultural facilities make it so none of the country’s main rivers can be purified for drinking through conventional methods; the Salvadoran Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources reports that more than 90% of all surface water sources are contaminated.81 Because the government prioritizes big businesses over the health and safety of their citizens, water disparities are again amplified. For example, in Nejapa, a town sitting on a large aquifer,

75 Physicians, Hospital Beds, Nurses (Etc.) (Per 1,000 People) (The World Bank Group, 2019). 76 Health in the Americas: Honduras (Pan American Health Organization, 2020). 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Health Alert: Tegucigalpa (Honduras), Extreme Water Shortage (Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2020). 80 Gies, El Salvador is Dangerously Close to Running Dry. 81 Ibid. 29 thousands of Coca-Cola cartons are filled every day, while water only flows to residents a few days a week or less.82

The World Bank explains that both water quality and access to hygienic sanitation facilities are major determining factors of human poverty, education, and economic opportunities.83 Without access to clean drinking water, people are left not only exposed to disease and illness, but to economic insecurity and violence. For those living in rural areas, many women and children are forced to walk miles to retrieve water for simple domestic uses multiple times a day, exposing them to greater risks of robbery, rape, and other forms of violence.84

Indeed, access to clean water is one of the most fundamental necessities; without it, the rate of human insecurity and opportunity for violence increase.

In regards to education and literacy rates, beyond the male to female ratio imbalance indicated in Figure 5 (especially in El Salvador and Guatemala), there are again notable disparities between urban and rural populations and indigenous and non-indigenous populations.

In 2014, the Guatemalan National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) reported a literacy rate of 71.4% in rural compared to 86.1% of urban Guatemalans.85 Rural women had a literacy rate of 64.7%, and indigenous women were the most educationally disadvantaged, with a literacy rate of just 57.6%.86 On average, non-indigenous Guatemalan children receive twice as many years of schooling as indigenous.87

In El Salvador, gang-related intimidation and insecurity along with teen pregnancies are the two primary reasons why only about half of eligible Salvadoran youth complete grades seven

82 Ibid. 83 Physicians, Hospital Beds, Nurses. 84 Gies, El Salvador is Dangerously Close to Running Dry. 85 Health in the Americas: Guatemala. 86 Ibid. 87 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 16. 30 through nine (of these, only half complete secondary school).88 Harassment by gangs led around

39,000 youth to abandon school in 2016 alone.89 One in three pregnancies are adolescent pregnancies, and those with child are encouraged to leave school and take care of their children, as abortion is punishable by imprisonment in El Salvador and therefore is not an option.90

Dropout rates are high not only because of violence and gang intimidation, but also because education is not seen as a means of finding success and opportunity; economic opportunities are lacking, and therefore education is not of the utmost importance.91 The International Labour

Organization (ILO) reports that El Salvador has the highest percentage of youth (ages fifteen to twenty-four) that are unemployed or not enrolled in school or vocational training in the world, at a rate of 28.4%.92

Even though Honduras is the fourth largest investor (in terms of GDP expenditure) in education in Latin America, it continues to have one of the lowest investments per pupil in the world, and 90% of the state’s education budget goes to teacher salaries.93 Education is highly politicized thanks to strong lobbyist-teachers’ unions; education reform is often disrupted by union leaders, making change to the educational system difficult.94 Due to the poor allocation of funds, parents usually carry the burden of paying for expenses like textbooks, security services, and school renovations, but these funds are mismanaged as well, with the latest textbooks and computers shipped to schools resold on the streets at the benefit of school staff.95 Honduran school teachers are famous for emigrating while leaving a substitute – often a family member

88 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 14. 89 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 15. 90 Freedom in the World 2020: El Salvador. 91 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 15. 92 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 15. 93 Alessandra Fontana, Teachers and Taxis: Corruption in the Education Sector in Honduras (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2008), page 2. 94 Ibid. 95 Fontana, Teachers and Taxis, page 3-4. 31 with no teaching qualifications – to show up for classes and collect paychecks in their family member’s absence.96 Seeing as education can become an expensive formality with little reward, children tend to abandon school to seek opportunity elsewhere, evidenced by the school enrollment rates. Although Honduras has a high enrollment of primary education for grades one through six (92.5%), only 39.7% of children eligible for grades seven through nine are actually enrolled in school.97 Access to a comprehensive primary education is yet another fundamental factor that determines human security, economic opportunity and development.

Healthcare access is yet another indicator of human security; analyzing patterns of state spending on health and the capacity and accessibility of the healthcare system is essential in understanding a state’s ability to attend to the healthcare needs of its citizens. Table 5 indicates measurements in healthcare spending and capacity in the Northern Triangle. For further comparison, the United States’ healthcare expenditure is currently 17.7% of the total GDP

(2019), and nationwide, the U.S. has 2.9 hospital beds, 2.6 physicians and 8.6 nurses and midwives per 1000 residents, and fifty-five specialist surgical workers per 100,000 residents.98

Table 5: Healthcare Capacity of the Northern Triangle

Healthcare Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of nurses & Ratio of specialist Expenditure hospitals beds physicians per midwives per surgical workers per (% of GDP) per 1,000 people 1,000 people 1,000 people 100,000 people El Salvador 7% (2016) 1.3 (2014) 1.6 (2016) 2.3 (2016) 22 (2009) Guatemala 5.8% (2016) 0.6 (2014) 0.4 (2016) 0.9 (2018) 3 (2014) Honduras 8.4% (2016) 0.7 (2014) 0.3 (2016) 0.9 (2017) 56 (2017) Sources: Central America – The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency (Healthcare Expenditure data only); Physicians, Hospital Beds, Nurses (The World Bank Group, 2019). The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends a minimum of one physician for every 1,000 people, and 2.8 nurses per physician.99 According to the data above, only Honduras

96 Fontana, Teachers and Taxis, page 4. 97 Fontana, Teachers and Taxis, page 2. 98 Physicians, Hospital Beds, Nurses. 99 Carlos Avila et. al., Guatemala Health System Assessment 2015 (USAID, 2015), page 10. 32 has enough nurses per physician (three, while El Salvador only has 1.45 and Guatemala has 2.25 nurses per physician), and El Salvador is the only country that has more than one physician per

1,000 people. Neither Guatemala or Honduras are equipped to provide adequate primary care coverage, as the WHO estimates that at least 2.5 medical staff (physicians, nurses and midwives) are necessary for such an endeavor.100 With a low number of hospital beds and other basic healthcare equipment, these countries’ healthcare systems are unable to handle disaster relief; for example, in El Salvador, there are only 100 intensive care unit (ICU) beds in the entire country, leaving Salvadorans without access to life-saving equipment during the current COVID-19 pandemic.101

There are again great imbalances between urban and rural population’s access to services.

Rural and indigenous communities suffer from a lack of facilities and primary care services in all three Northern Triangle countries. In Guatemala, for example, in the Ministry of Health and

Social Assistance (MSPAS) healthcare network in the Department of Guatemala, the most densely populated department in Guatemala, home to the country’s capital (Guatemala City), physician density is 0.81 per 1,000 residents; In Alta Verapaz and Huehuetenango, two rural departments, there are only 0.15 and 0.16 physicians per 1,000 residents, respectively.102 Another major challenge for health service delivery in Guatemala is monolingualism, especially among

Mayan women, who speak Mayan – but not Spanish, the official language.103 Despite the Maya and other indigenous people comprising 43% of the population, there is little effort to provide

100 World Bank: physicians / hospital beds / nurses (etc.) per 1000 people. 101 Flora Charner, Tatiana Arias and Hollie Silverman, The President of El Salvador Has Authorized Lethal Force by Police and Military against Gangs after a Deadly Weekend (Cable News Network, 2020). 102 Health in the Americas: Guatemala. 103 Ibid. 33 translation for effective service; most service providers are monolingual and speak only Spanish, even when posted in a region with a higher rate of indigenous residents.104

Honing in on the healthcare system with the most information available in the Northern

Triangle, Guatemala stands as an example of the poor healthcare of Central America. Although universal healthcare coverage is a right of all citizens according to the Guatemalan Constitution, the state spends the least amount of government resources per capita on health than any other country in the region ($176 per capita compared to the average of $436).105 The majority of health spending is dominated by the private sector, accounting for 4% of the GDP, which consists of 83% household out-of-pocket spending.106 1.1% of GDP was spent by the Guatemala

Institute of Social Security (IGSS) on an estimated 17% of the population; this form of healthcare covers employers and employees of the formal economic sector, and beneficiaries are the ones primarily financing the IGSS budget.107 Meanwhile, only 1.0% of the GDP was spent by

Guatemala’s MSPAS, which is meant to provide coverage to Guatemalans who are unable to acquire public health insurance through their employment (IGSS) or other private insurance;108 this is representative of 83% of the entire Guatemalan population.109 Those covered under IGSS receive approximately $225 per capita, while those under MSPAS coverage – the majority of citizens – receive an estimated $60 per capita in health care spending.110

The lack of public spending on healthcare is due in great part to a tight budget, as

MSPAS requests much more money than it actually receives. In 2016, MSPAS requested a

104 Ibid. 105 Avila et. al., Guatemala Health System, page 8. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Thomas Fagan, Fiscal Space for Health in Guatemala: Prospects for Increasing Public Resources for Health (Health Policy Plus, 2017), page 3. 109 Avila et. al., Guatemala Health System, page 8. 110 Fagan, Fiscal Space for Health in Guatemala, page 3. 34 budget of $1.2 billion, but received only $830 million – 32% below the requested amount.111 In

2016, MSPAS successfully advocated for an annual increase in budget up to $3.3 billion by

2022; however, annual GDP growth projections by economic experts show that the government will only be able to afford an MSPAS budget of $1.6 billion in 2022.112 Additionally, changes in most senior and middle management positions at MSPAS are frequent and highly politicized, leading to inconsistent healthcare agendas. Position decisions take place at the beginning of each president’s four-year term, and is usually accompanied by new institutional priorities and a rejection of the previous management’s plans.113 With a small budget and high turnover rate of upper-level positions, little progress is made year to year and even decade to decade.

Similar systems of healthcare (facing virtually the same problems) exist in both El

Salvador and Honduras. In El Salvador, the amount of money allocated for public health depends on your occupation. The Ministry of Health, like Guatemala’s MSPAS, covers the majority of

Salvadorans (72%); the Salvadoran Social Security Institute (ISSS) covers 25.1% of residents, the Salvadoran Institute for Teacher Welfare serves 1.6% of residents, and the Military Health

Command covers 1.1% of all Salvadorans.114 The real discrepancy is in the amount of money allocated per capita between each public healthcare provider. The Ministry of Health, despite providing the coverage to the most people, only allocates $137 per person; the ISSS has enough money for $236 per person, the Military Health Command allocates $349 per person, and – despite accounting for only 1.6% of all Salvadorans – teachers covered by the Salvadoran

Institute for Teacher Welfare are allocated $509 per person for their healthcare needs.115 As 4.1

111 Ibid. 112 Fagan, Fiscal Space for Health in Guatemala, page 4. 113 Avila et. al., Guatemala Health System, page 7. 114 Health in the Americas: El Salvador (Pan American Health Organization, 2020). 115 Health in the Americas: El Salvador. 35 million Salvadorans (64% of the total population) live in the country’s fifty most violent municipalities,116 better healthcare coverage is necessary to provide relief to areas that face frequent conflict, where people need access to effective emergency care on a daily basis.

In a Honduran Gallup poll taken in May of 2019, 86% of those surveyed were dissatisfied with the direction their country was going, citing unemployment (30%), corruption (19%), and poor health care (15%) ahead of insecurity (11%) as the top problems in the country.117 It is estimated that 17% of Hondurans have no regular access to any health services.118 Limited access in each country is only intensified by gangs whose revenue streams and power base rely on territorial control; these gangs will create unofficial borders that will limit residents’ access to healthcare, education and employment opportunities so that they can be kept under strict supervision and control, remain obedient, and are forced to remain silent about gang activities.119

116 Ibid. 117 Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, page 4. 118 Health in the Americas: Honduras. 119 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 19. 36

RULE OF LAW, GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:

In order for government presence to be effective and positive, it is necessary for countries to have a strong rule of law. According to the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index

2020, there are four “Universal Principles of Rule of Law”120:

1. Accountability – The government as well as private actors are accountable under the law. 2. Just Laws – The laws are clear, publicized, and stable; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and contract, property, and human rights. 3. Open Government – The processes by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced are accessible, fair, and efficient. 4. Accessible and Impartial Dispute Resolution – Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are accessible, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.

Strong rule of law is a sign of functional security and justice systems that work for citizens’ best interests in any given country. Over the past five consecutive years, WJP has used the following eight factors and their sub-factors to numerically quantify rule of law and measure how well countries adhere to the four universal principles:121

1. Constraints on Government Powers: It comprises the means, both constitutional and institutional, by which the powers of the government and its officials and agents are limited and held accountable under the law 2. Absence of Corruption: The factor considers three forms of corruption: bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of public funds or other resources. 3. Open Government: Factor 3 measures the openness of government defined by the extent to which a government shares information, empowers people with tools to hold the government accountable, and fosters citizen participation in public policy deliberations. 4. Fundamental Rights: This factor focuses on a relatively modest menu of rights that are firmly established under the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are most closely related to rule of law concerns. 5. Order and Security: Security is one of the defining aspects of any rule of law society and is a fundamental function of the state. It is also a precondition for the realization of the rights and freedoms that the rule of law seeks to advance. 6. Regulatory Enforcement: Factor 6 measures the extent to which regulations are fairly and effectively implemented and enforced. Regulations, both legal and administrative, structure behaviors within and outside of the government.

120 Rule of Law Index 2020 (The World Justice Project, 2020), page 10. 121 Rule of Law Index 2020, pages 22-29. 37

7. Civil Justice: It measures whether civil justice systems are accessible and affordable as well as free of discrimination, corruption, and improper influence by public officials. It examines whether court proceedings are conducted without unreasonable delays and whether decisions are enforced effectively. It also measures the accessibility, impartiality, and effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 8. Criminal Justice: An effective criminal justice system is a key aspect of the rule of law, as it constitutes the conventional mechanism to redress grievances and bring action against individuals for offenses against society. An assessment of the delivery of criminal justice should take into consideration the entire system, including the police, lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and prison officers.

Table 6 shows how the Northern Triangle countries rack-and-stack amongst the 128

countries that were evaluated by the WJP, and displays both the overall rank and score along

with the ranks and scores for each of the eight indicators described above. The score for each

indicator is scaled from 0.0 to 1.0, with 0.0 being the lowest score, failing to meet that indicator’s

standards, and 1.0 being the highest score, the most ideal representation of the indicator’s

standards. For comparison, a chart with the highest and lowest scoring countries overall and in

each major category is displayed below, in Table 7.

Table 6: Rule of Law Indicators in the Northern Triangle (rank out of 128 countries, index scale of 0.0 to 1.0)

Overall Rank (out of Overall Rule of Law Constraints on Gov’t Absence of Open 128 countries) Index score (scale of Powers rank & score Corruption Government 0.0-1.0) rank & score rank & score El Salvador 84th of 128 0.49 of 1.0 77th 0.50 97th 0.38 52nd 0.53 Guatemala 101st of 128 0.45 of 1.0 69th 0.53 108th 0.34 60th 0.51 Honduras 116th of 128 0.40 of 1.0 119th 0.34 114th 0.32 96th 0.42

Fundamental Rights Order and Security Regulatory Enforcement Civil Justice Criminal Justice rank & score rank & score rank & score rank & score rank & score El Salvador 73rd 0.54 96th 0.65 58th 0.51 66th 0.53 116th 0.31 Guatemala 70th 0.54 116th 0.59 107th 0.42 121st 0.37 118th 0.30 Honduras 111th 0.41 93rd 0.66 117th 0.39 112th 0.41 123rd 0.26 Source: Rule of Law Index 2020 (The World Justice Project, 2020)

38

Table 7: Rule of Law Highest and Lowest Scorers and Scores

Overall Top & Overall Rule of Constraints on Absence of Corruption Open Government Bottom Law Index score Gov’t Powers (scale of 0.0-1.0) 1st Denmark 0.90 of 1.0 Denmark: 0.94 Denmark: 0.95 Norway: 0.89 128th (last) Venezuela, RB 0.27 of 1.0 Venezuela, RB: 0.17 Congo, Dom. Rep.: 0.16 Egypt: 0.22

Fundamental Rights Order and Security Regulatory Civil Justice Criminal Justice Enforcement 1st Denmark: 0.92 Singapore: 0.93 Denmark: 0.90 Denmark: 0.86 Norway: 0.83 128th (last) Iran: 0.22 Afghanistan: 0.29 Venezuela, RB: 0.20 Cambodia: 0.26 Venezuela, RB: 0.13 Source: Rule of Law Index 2020

Notably, Northern Triangle countries only slips into the top half of the Rule of Law

rankings on two occasions, once for Guatemala’s open government ranking, and the other for El

Salvador’s regulatory enforcement ranking. El Salvador ranks in the bottom third three times,

Guatemala ranks in the bottom fourth overall and for five out of eight indicators, and Honduras

ranks in the bottom tenth overall and for three out of eight indicators.

Within the sub-factors not displayed above, corruption is notably high in all three

countries, including within the executive branch, the judiciary, and the police/military, with the

most exceptional amount of corruption present in the legislature.122 The right to due process,

non-discrimination, labor rights, and the right to life and security are all only partially enforced

in the Northern Triangle countries.123 The civil and criminal justice systems are both notably

ineffective and fractured, especially in Honduras, with the lowest criminal justice scores among

the three nations (ranked in the top five worst criminal justice systems in the world).124

Corruption is the main reason the rule of law indicators for the Northern Triangle are so

low. Corrupt officials orchestrate great efforts to steal or embezzle money from public projects,

manipulate the judicial system to their favor by politicizing the supreme courts systems and

122 Rule of Law Index 2020, pages 70-84. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 39 passing corruption-friendly legislation, and partner up with wealthy organized crime groups and cartels in order to get in on the dirty money business. Not wanting to get caught or jailed for their escapades, human rights violations are frequent in efforts to silence dissent, and police face little repercussion for extrajudicial activities and violence. In addition, much of the information that would likely be public information in a true democracy is kept secret, or is made extremely difficult to access.

It is estimated that Latin America’s average annual economic losses to graft are at least

10% of the region’s GDP.125 In El Salvador, with the support of the United States, Attorney

General Douglas Meléndez (2016-2018) was able to bring corruption cases against the past three

Salvadoran presidents, who are estimated to have stolen more than $750 million in public funds.126 Officials often embezzle and steal money meant to be used for disaster relief efforts; former president Flores allegedly embezzled donations destined for earthquake relief during his presidency,127 estimated at about $15 million.128 Former president Saca has also been charged with corruption, the Supreme Court ordering him to return $260 million to the government; former president Funes, who fled to Nicaragua in 2016 while he was under investigation for corruption, has been accused by the attorney general’s office of embezzling up to $351 million.129

Because of the government’s love affair with corruption, Current president Nayib Bukele has called for the establishment of an independent anti-corruption institution, like those tested in

Guatemala and Honduras, but Bukele has been criticized for negotiating with criminal actors like

125 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 21. 126 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 9. 127 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 13. 128 Freedom in the World 2020: El Salvador. 129 Ibid. 40

MS-13 for access into gang-controlled areas during his time as mayor of San Salvador.130

Political parties sometimes hire gangs to provide security for their events, and politicians have paid gangs to coerce or intimidate voters into casting ballots for particular parties or candidates; payments to gangs include dealing gang members special access to politicians, or investing in social services for gang members and their families.131 Other groups are also used to sway political opinions and votes, and methods to take out the opposition commonly rely on violence.

Observers of of the 2019 Guatemalan election reported that at least ten candidates were killed in the run up to the elections, and armed groups and criminal organizations – and even a group of military veterans – attempted to sway the results of some local races using weapons and threats of violence to intimidate and coerce voters.132

Thanks to efforts by an international anti-corruption institution, Guatemala has the most exposed cases of corruption within the Northern Triangle, and put forth the greatest public effort in improving the rule of law. In Guatemala, after illegal armed groups and criminal networks appeared in the countryside, Guatemalan officials requested help from the UN that led to the establishment of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in

2006.133 The CICIG worked with Guatemala’s Public Ministry (MP) to help combat criminal networks that threaten democratic institutions through corruption, intimidation, and criminal violence; it strengthened rule of law by supporting Guatemala in building an independent justice system, and proposed public policy reforms to strengthen transparency, anti-corruption, and law enforcement institutions.134 In order to prevent conflict of interest or interfere with the

130 Parker Asmann, US Corruption List Highlights Northern Triangle Presidents’ Criminal Ties (Insight Crime, 2019). 131 Freedom in the World 2020: El Salvador. 132 Freedom in the World 2020: Guatemala (FreedomHouse, 2020). 133 Mark Schneider, Democracy in Peril: Facts on CICIG in Guatemala (Center for Strategic & International Relations, 2019). 134 Schneider, Democracy in Peril: Facts on CICIG. 41 sovereignty of Guatemala, CICIG only advised and aided in investigations – it did not have the power to prosecute. In CICIG’s twelve years of operation, homicides were cut by 32%,135 sixty criminal networks were dismantled, and 680 individuals were indicted – with 310 convictions thus far from their efforts, including many members from the los Zetas cartel, murderers, and traffickers.136 Several landmark corruption cases were pursued, including the La Linea case that exposed an extensive customs fraud network, leading to the arrest of dozens of people and the resignation of then-president Molina, vice president Baldetti, and other officials in 2015.137 The serving Attorney General at the time affirmed that La Linea represented “just a sliver of a sprawling criminal enterprise run by the state,” evidenced by the substantial quantity of subsequent La Linea-related corruption cases that implicated dozens of high-level government officials and private-sector individuals.138

The most recent president, Jimmy Morales (who was replaced by Alejandro Giamattei in the 2019 elections), ran on a 2015 campaign platform of transparency and the rooting out of corruption, publicly supporting CICIG and using the slogan “Neither corrupt nor a thief.”139

Ironically, former president Morales is now being investigated for corruption. In 2017, Morales’s brother and son were both arrested on corruption charges, and shortly thereafter the CICIG requested to lift the president’s immunity to prosecution so they could continue their investigations.140 Just two days after the CICIG’s request, Morales publicly condemned CICIG and demanded they leave the country immediately, despite advocating for an extension of their mandate prior to coming under investigation. In August of 2018, Morales announced he would

135 A 5% average annual decrease in homicides, contrasting 1% average increase in homicides in other countries in the region. 136 Schneider, Democracy in Peril: Facts on CICIG. 137 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 9. 138 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 10. 139 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 1. 140 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 3. 42 not be renewing the CICIG mandate, and deployed U.S.-provided armored vehicles (meant to be used for counter-narcotics operations, to outside CICIG headquarters, and to embassies of the

U.S. and other CICIG donors as an act of intimidation.141

Morales claimed that CICIG “jeopardized the security, public order, and governability of the nation,” accusing CICIG of “selective and partial justice,” and even asserting that CICIG was a “system of terror… whereby those who think differently are persecuted;” Morales additionally insisted that CICIG was collaborating with the Russian government, and that they were involved in “witness tampering, illegal negotiations with convicted criminals, and prolonged preventive prison as a form of psychological torture.”142 Despite all the allegations made by former president Morales, no evidence of corruption within the CICIG has been found, nor has CICIG ever been suspected of investigation tampering, torture, or bias. They only had the power to advise and assist the MP, never had the authority to overrule decisions made by the MP or make decisions for them, and never organized any of the prosecutions.

Defamation campaigns like this are common against judges, human rights activists, and organizations that are aimed towards anti-corruption efforts; tactics to silence anti-corruption actors have escalated and become more frequent since 2017.143 In one instance, corrupt members of Guatemalan congress have fought back anti-corruption efforts by moving forward with amendments to the penal code that would prevent imprisonment of people older than seventy, limit pretrial detention to one year, free many former military officers convicted of crimes against humanity and prevent the imprisonment of others – and it would free many people convicted or charged for corruption.144

141 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 11. 142 Schneider, Democracy in Peril: Facts on CICIG. 143 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 4. 144 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 13. 43

Unfortunately, CICIG was dismantled in September 2019 once the mandate expired. U.S. officials and experts in democratic peace fear that, without the CICIG, twelve years of progress in reducing homicides, strengthening institutions, and increasing transparency could be lost or reversed; there is a high degree of speculation that Guatemala is not prepared to faced corruption on its own, and that it needs an independent structure to help strengthen its institutions – or at least needs some time to transition and come up with a new way to independently battle corruption.145 Guatemalan citizens also mourn the loss of the CICIG. In a 2016 Transparency

International survey, citizens reported being most concerned about the use of public office for private gain, including graft, influence peddling, extortion, bribe solicitation, money laundering, obstruction of justice, nepotism, and violation of political finance regulations.146 In 2017,

AmericasBarometer conducted a survey that found that one third of Guatemalans believed all politicians are corrupt, and another third believed more than half the country’s politicians are corrupt.147 A recent opinion poll found that 72% of Guatemalans have little to no trust in the police and 65% have little to no trust in the government, while 83% said they had supported the

CICIG and the Public Ministry, making them Guatemala’s most trusted institutions.148 It has been less than a year since CICIG has dismantled, but the effects of dissolving arguably the most successful anti-corruption institution in Latin America is disheartening and alarming; the future state of Guatemala is unknown.

Honduran authorities discovered that at least $300 million had been embezzled from the

Honduran Social Security Institute during former president Porfirio Lobo’s administration,

145 Schneider, Democracy in Peril: Facts on CICIG. 146 June Beittel, Spotlight on Public Corruption in Latin America (Congressional Research Service, 2018), page 1. 147 Elizabeth Zechmeister and Dinorah Azpuru, What Does the Public Report on Corruption, the CICIG, the Public Ministry, and the Constitutional Court in Guatemala (Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2017), page 2. 148 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 3. 44 triggering a series of mass demonstrations demanding the establishment of an international anti- corruption organization.149 At the time, president Hernández was reluctant to create an independent organization like the CICIG, since that organization had helped bring arrest several former presidents in recent years. However, in order to calm protests and appease citizens, in

2016 the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption in Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) was established.150 Sadly, MACCIH was designed in a way that only allowed for limited involvement in anti-corruption and anti-crime efforts, and thanks to suppressive endeavors by congress to delay bills proposed by MACCIH and install new court procedures (i.e. removing certain crimes – like the embezzlement of public funds – from the jurisdiction of courts),

MACCIH’s actual ability to help prosecute criminal corruption schemes was severely crippled.151 In any case, some progress has been made. Thus far, MACCIH – working alongside

Honduras’s Special Prosecution Unit to Fight Corruption-related Impunity (UFECIC) – has presented fourteen cases,152 uncovering corruption networks involved in activities ranging from the use of social security funds for personal expenses, to awarding government contracts to narcotics traffickers in exchange for campaign contributions.153 Around 133 people are facing prosecution, including over seventy cabinet ministers, legislators, and other government officials.154

Unfortunately, unlawful delays within the court system postponed the first MACCIH- assisted trial to March of 2019. Honduran elites quickly grew concerned over MACCIH’s

149 Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, page 5. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Héctor Silva Ávalos and Seth Robbins, A Death Foretold: MACCIH Shuts Down in Honduras (Insight Crime, 2020). 153 Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, page 6. 154 Silva Ávalos and Robbins, A Death Foretold: MACCIH Shuts Down. 45 tentative progress, leading them to pursue other methods of interference.155 In order to stop

MACCIH’s efforts, the Honduran congress attempted passing a law to block investigations into legislators’ mismanagement of public funds, and tried to introduce a new criminal code that would reduce penalties for narcotics trafficking, embezzlement, fraud, illicit enrichment, and abuse of authority – which would allow some corrupt officials to avoid serving any time in prison.156 Although many analysts assert that Honduran public prosecutors would struggle to continue anti-corruption efforts without MACCIH or another source of international assistance and political support, and despite more than 61% of Hondurans expressing that they would like

MACCIH to remain in Honduras in a 2019 opinion poll,157 MACCIH’s mandate expired in

January of 2020, and MACCIH has since been completely dissolved.158 It was an effort doomed to fail from the start, with president Hernández originally creating MACCIH as a formality in reaction to public outrage and international insistence. Given the amount of obstacles MACCIH faced during its time of work, it was clear that the government had no intention of keeping the institution around for long.

The U.S. State Department and Attorney General have conducted many arrests and have accused many Northern Triangle officials of corruption in recent years. In May 2019, over fifty current and former senior officials of the Northern Triangle were accused of engaging in or facilitating corruption by the DOS, including eleven Salvadoran officials, twenty-seven

Guatemalan officials, and thirteen Honduran officials.159 El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí, the

Vice Minister of Foreign Investment and Funding in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and his

155 Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, page 6. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid. 158 Silva Ávalos and Robbins, A Death Foretold: MACCIH Shuts Down. 159 Asmann, US Corruption List. 46 brother were accused by U.S. officials to have diverted over $400 million through various shell companies to offshore accounts in Panama and elsewhere.160 Former Guatemalan presidential candidate Mario Orellana was arrested in Miami for seeking between $10 to $12 million in campaign funds from Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel in exchange for facilitating the group’s drug trafficking activities.161 Former Honduran congressman Fredy Montoya was indicted on drug trafficking charges for his role in facilitating cocaine shipments from Colombia and through

Honduras to Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel.162 Current Honduran president Hernández’s brother, Tony, who U.S. prosecutors allege was a “large-scale drug trafficker,” was arrested in Miami on drugs and weapons charges in late 2018.163

The Department of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Southern District of New York has recently charged the former Chief of Honduran National Police with drug trafficking and weapons offenses, tying him to Tony Hernández and Fredy Montoya.164 On 30 April 2020, Mr.

Juan Bonilla Valladares allegedly used his high-ranking position to influence those working for him, and protected politically connected drug traffickers through the use of violent force.165 Drug traffickers paid bribes to public officials, including certain Honduran presidents and members of congress and the national police, and were then allowed to move cocaine shipments through

Honduras and on to the U.S.166 The more he aided the trafficking of narcotics, the higher the position Bonilla Valladares was awarded by participating corrupt officials, until he eventually became the head of the Honduran National Police.167 Bonilla Valladares also planned and

160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Jim Margolin and Nicholas Biase, Former Chief of Honduran National Police Charged with Drug Trafficking and Weapons Offenses (The United States Department of Justice, 2020). 165 Margolin and Biase, Former Chief of Honduran National Police Charged. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 47 executed a mission to murder rival drug traffickers using Honduran forces, so that the drug traffickers that were paying him could gain more territorial control. Bonilla Valladares is now charged on three counts of criminal activity, and is expected to receive a minimum of forty years to a maximum of life in prison in the United States.168

Corruption and crime is built in to the structure of each Northern Triangle country’s government. Because many officials are unwilling to strip the system of corruption, and would rather reap the short-term benefits of participating in criminal activity, rule of law remains flawed and weak. Additionally, corruption at the top trickles down and infects even the lowest level of public workers and civil servants. A system with no accountability only leaves room for the breeding of more and more criminal acts. For example, people recurrently have to pay hefty bribes in order to receive basic public services. A 2016 Corruption Perception Index poll indicated that nearly a third of all Latin American respondents had paid a bribe for a public service – like healthcare or education – from 2015 to 2016.169 In Guatemala, the average amount of bribes paid annually by Guatemalans is estimated to be $147, which is a lot of money considering much of the population is impoverished, and many live on less than $1.90 per day.170

When the rule of law is not present in any portion of the public sector, it becomes increasingly difficult for citizens to act freely and for just security to be provided.

Corruption endangers fundamental civil and human rights. Salvadoran president Nayib

Bukele of El Salvador has used violent crimes committed by gangs as an excuse to use heavy- handed policing techniques, and has also used the military several times to intimidate congress into passing bills. In February of 2020, Mr. Bukele marched armed soldiers into the

168 Ibid. 169 Beittel, Spotlight on Public Corruption, page 1. 170 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 20. 48 congressional debate hall, coercing lawmakers to push through a bill acting on COVID-19, seeking additional funding for the military, and thus triggering a constitutional crisis.171 Many local and international human rights community members have since warned that Mr. Bukele is sliding toward dictatorship, but polls show that more than 85% of the population approves of the president; Salvadorans, tormented by gangs, admire his tough-on-crime attitude and actions.172

The Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that, due to the crackdown on crime implemented by Bukele and a 2016 law classifying gangs as terrorist organizations, police have been able to get away with extrajudicial methods of engaging with citizens.173 For example, seven reports of elite police units burning victims were brought to HRW in 2019; in one case, agents of the National Civil Police’s Tactical Operation Section allegedly beat and strangled a blindfolded, handcuffed youth whom was suspected of gang membership, and set fire to the field where they left the victim unconscious.174 The Lethal Force Monitor organization reported that

1,626 people had been killed by Salvadoran police and soldiers between 2010 through 2017; authorities claimed that 90% of the victims were gang members and that nearly all were killed in

“confrontations” or “shootouts.”175 However, in 2019 the Office of the Attorney for the Defense of Human Rights of El Salvador (PDDH) reported that in 70% of the cases, witnesses said the victims were unarmed; in 37% of the cases, witnesses said they saw police move the body or place or hide evidence, and in 30% of cases, the body showed signs of torture, including sexual assault.176 Salvadoran male youth are targeted as potential gang members and harassed or

171 Natalie Kitroeff, Young Leader Vowed Change in El Salvador But Wields Same Heavy Hand (The New York Times, 2020). 172 Kitroeff, Young Leader Vowed Change in El Salvador. 173 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 187. 174 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 186. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 49 arrested for charges of “illicit association.”177 These repressive state responses trigger Salvadoran gangs to recruit even younger – hoping to use young children less likely to be targeted in raids to carry out their criminal activities.178

In Guatemala, human rights issues are equally as dense; in March 2017, forty-one adolescent girls were killed in a fire at a government-run shelter, and now three public officials are due to stand trial for involuntary manslaughter and breach of duty.179 In March 2019,

Guatemalan Congress passed the second of three required approvals of a bill that would provide amnesty for genocide and other past atrocities.180 Political officials tend to work closely with former military officials, who encourage congress to favor amnesty; government officials work hard to ensure their former military associates are kept out of jail, in exchange for monetary and political favors. This favoritism leads to a bias against Mayans, and other indigenous who suffered during the civil war, within the justice and legislative systems; the Maya are poorly represented within the government, despite making up 40% of the population, and official government documents are usually only printed in Spanish – limiting the Mayans’ ability to participate in civic engagement.181

In Honduras, the Special Commission for Police Reform Restructuring, charged with removing active members of the National Police who do not comply with their duties, have evaluated more than 13,500 police officers as of June 2019, and almost 6,000 members have been dismissed – a step in the right direction towards justice.182 However, local human rights

177 Ibid. 178 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 20. 179 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 245. 180 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 244. 181 Freedom in the World 2020: Guatemala. 182 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 259. 50 organizations reported that the crackdown on public demonstrations between March and July of

2019 killed at least six people, wounded eighty, and led to forty-eight arbitrary detentions.183

Journalists, demonstrators, human rights activists and environmental activists (especially those of indigenous descent) that are critical of the government, or that protest large private projects, are often silenced by officials through the use of threat or violence. In Honduras 2017, following the elections at that time, twenty-three protesters were killed in a police crackdown on demonstrations against the results, and hundreds were arrested; election-related protests continued into 2018, with police firing teargas at some demonstrators and opening fire on others.184 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) reported that between

January of 2014 and August 2018, at least sixty-five Honduran civil rights defenders were murdered, and over 1,232 attacks on human rights activists were recorded between 2016 and

2017.185 The laws in each Northern Triangle country permitting access to information and freedom of speech are poorly respected, and are undermined by vague laws that help protect and withhold information that might be “harmful to the state;” meanwhile, journalists are physically attacked and forced to self-censor when covering sensitive topics.186 In Guatemala, scholars have received death threats for questioning past human rights abuses or continuing injustices, and the Unit for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders in Guatemala (UDEFEGUA) registered three killings, five attempted murders, and 361 attacks on Guatemalan human rights defenders from just January to July of 2019.187

183 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 261. 184 Freedom in the World 2020: Honduras. 185 Ibid. 186 Freedom in the World 2020: Guatemala. 187 Ibid. 51

Women and girls face excessive amounts of domestic and sexual assault in the Northern

Triangle, and commonly see little justice – many of their cases are dismissed or ignored.

Abortion is illegal under all circumstances in each of the Northern Triangle countries, and women who abort, along with those who aid in the abortion, face years of imprisonment; women even face charges for aggravated homicide or manslaughter for miscarriages and stillbirths.188 In

El Salvador and Honduras, abortion is illegal in all circumstances – including rape and incest, when a woman’s life is in danger, and when the fetus will not survive outside the womb – morning after pills are also illegal; Guatemala recently approved a new version of the “Life and

Family Protection” bill which expands the criminalization of abortion to a similar extent.189 The

LGBTQ+ communities are discriminated against as well, with little to no protection granted by government entities and limited access to the justice system – at times, they are even subject to hate crimes by the police. In July of 2019, three Salvadoran police officers were charged in the assault and murder of a transgender woman deported from the United States, and in October, three other Salvadoran LGBTQ+ members were murdered and another was declared missing.190

With little regard for human rights or freedom of speech, residents of the Northern

Triangle are left with an absence of justice, forced to look outside of their own governments and towards NGOs and international institutions for help. Due to the corruption within the security systems, police are seen as incompetent, or even as instigators of crime themselves, rather than as indicators of justice and stability, which only adds to levels of insecurity.191

188 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 188. 189 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, pages 188-264. 190 Freedom in the World 2020: El Salvador. 191 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 19. 52

CRIME STATISTICS AND INFORMATION:

To understand the failures and issues of Northern Triangle security system, it is important to understand the type and volume of crime that the region faces. This section of research documents the most relevant and most current crime statistics, and the information surrounding areas of crime.

Figure 2 below shows the variation in homicide rate from the past ten years of data, 2009 through 2019, for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. For comparison, the U.S. state with the highest homicide rate in 2018 was Louisiana, with a rate of 11.4 homicides per 100,000 residents; the state with the lowest rate was South Dakota, with a homicide rate 1.4 per 100,000 residents, and the U.S. as a whole had an average of 4.9 homicides per 100,000 residents.192 Figure 2: Northern Triangle Homicide Rate per 100,000 from 2009- 2019

El S alvador Guatemala Honduras

120

105.4 100

85.1 84.3 80 83.1 76.1 74.3 71.4 70.6 65.7 64.7 66.9 60 62.4 61.8 57.5 56.5 51 45.4 40 40.7 41.7 41.7 41.2 38 40.2 40 Homicides per 100,000 33.8 33.7 36 31.4 29.4 27.3 26.1 20 22.4 21.5

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Year

Sources: International Homicides (per 100,000 people) (The World Bank Group, 2019) (for 2009-2017 data); Marina Pasquali, Homicide Rate 2014-2019 (Statista, 2020) (for 2018 and 2019 data)

192 Number of Murders: U.S. Homicide Rate (Statista Research Department, 2019). 53

The noticeable valley and peak shown in El Salvador’s data can be explained by a failed truce between MS-13 and M-18 orchestrated by the government. From 2012 to mid-2014, the national government, eleven municipal governments, and the two largest gangs (MS-13 and M-

18) all adhered to the truce;193 when the truce broke in 2014, violent crime exploded, and El

Salvador experienced the highest homicide rate since the civil war in 2015.194 Experts from the

Congressional Research Service (CRS) believe that the truce backfired and strengthened the gangs’ internal cohesion, giving them the time and reason to expand their methods of operation.195 2019 data from El Salvador is likely incomplete, as the Salvadoran government announced in July of the same year that it would stop including deaths resulting from encounters with security forces in official homicide data, which potentially obscures the homicide rate and draws attention away from extrajudicial killings perpetrated by police.196 Additionally, forced disappearances rose by over 20% in the first eleven months of 2019 compared to 2018, suggesting that the crackdown on gangs executed by Mr. Bukele has only encouraged gangs to pursue a different approach towards carrying out their criminal activities; this shift in tactics may also serve to explain the lower number of homicides in 2019.197

The proliferation of small arms and other weapons greatly contributes to the murder epidemic experienced by the Northern Triangle. According to the Small Arms Survey’s (SAS)

Civilian Firearms Holdings record from 2017, there are approximately 737,000 civilian-operated firearms in El Salvador (12 per 100 residents), 2.062 million in Guatemala (12.1 per 100 residents), and 1.171 million in Honduras (14.1 per 100 residents),198 outnumbering the

193 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 187. 194 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 20. 195 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 7. 196 Freedom in the World 2020: El Salvador. 197 Ibid. 198 Civilian Firearms Holdings, 2017 (Small Arms Survey, 2018). 54 estimated firearms held by police199 and military200 combined by a factor of 4.7 in El Salvador,

10.1 in Guatemala, and 8.6 in Honduras.201 In 2009, the Government Accountability Office found that an estimated 87% of traceable arms seized in Mexico had originated in the U.S., suggesting that lax gun regulations of the United States are likely aiding in the proliferation of weapons towards the south.202 The most recent data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicates that firearms are used to perpetrate over 70% of all homicides in the Northern Triangle.203

In Figure 3 and Figure 4, homicide data has been separated by gender and age, to show with great detail those who are the most affected by violence. El Salvador maintains the highest rate of femicide – the killing of a woman or girl, often committed by a man, because of her gender – in the world.204 Femicides have been linked to domestic disputes, gangs, and other crimes like human trafficking.205 Males ages fifteen to twenty-four, an age group that represents the majority of street gang members, are the group most susceptible to murder.

199 Law Enforcement Firearms Holdings, 2017 (Small Arms Survey, 2018). 200 Military Firearms Holdings, 2017 (Small Arms Survey, 2018). 201 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 16. 202 Michael Shifter, Council Special Report No. 64: Countering Criminal Violence in Central America (Council on Foreign Relations, 2012), page 21. 203 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 16. 204 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 6. 205 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 15. 55

Figure 3: Rate of Male Homicides in the Northern Triangle (per 100,000 residents of the same age group) 600

500

400

300

200

100

0 Male Total 0-14 yrs 15-29 yrs 30-44 yrs 45-59 yrs 60+ yrs Honduras 101.2 4.3 167.4 173.4 120.8 72.9 Guatemala 55.8 1.6 91.9 108.8 77.7 38 El S alvador 159.2 8.6 296.5 264.4 137.3 55.4 Sources: DATAUNODC Database Notes: Most up-to-date data used (El Salvador and Honduras 2016, Guatemala 2014)

Figure 4: Rate of Femicide in the Northern Triangle (per 100,000 residents of same age group)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 Female Total 0-14 yrs 15-29 yrs 30-44 yrs 45-59 yrs 60+ yrs Honduras 10 1.6 16.6 15.4 10.8 7.5 Guatemala 7.8 1.3 12.3 13.2 8.7 6.4 El S alvador 15.5 2.1 22.8 27.2 17.3 7.9 Sources: DataUNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020) Notes: Most up-to-date data used (El Salvador and Honduras 2016, Guatemala 2014)

56

Figure 5 shows the rate of other serious violent crime recorded by security systems in each of the Northern Triangle countries, including rates of sexual violence, serious assault, robbery and kidnapping. Types of crime were chosen based on the information available.

Figure 5: Other Serious Crime Rates in the Northern Triangle (per 100,000 residents)

15.5 Sexual Violence 62.6 68.5

21.8 Serious Assault 11.2 58.6

120.8 Robbery 25 59.4

0.2 Kidnappings 2.5 0.2

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Honduras Guatemala El S alvador

Sources: DataUNODC Notes: Most up-to-date data used (El Salvador and Honduras 2017 for all data, Guatemala 2012 for Serious Assault, 2015 for Kidnappings, 2016 for Robberies and Sexual Violence data)

Most crime is attributed to street gang activity and violence surrounding large organized crime groups. Thousands of pound of drugs, including amphetamine, methamphetamine, heroin, marijuana, and especially different forms of cocaine are seized every year by anti-narcotic units,206 and money laundering is common practice in border towns.207 Private businesses are also guilty of crime, thanks to poor regulations, weak institutions, and state officials eager to work with businesses and foreign investors.

For example, several junior mining companies over the years have taken over mines in

Guatemala originally explored by larger companies, but the companies have had little or no

206 DataUNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020) 207 Espach and Haering, Border Insecurity, pages 6-7. 57 experience bringing deposits into production, and have not had prior experience operating in

Latin America.208 These companies go about seeking approval for their Environmental Impact

Assessments (EIA) through criminal means, using bribery and threats of violence as interchangeable means of acquiring government signatures.209 Those with more political connections pay off mid-tier and high-level officials; low-level government workers who visit the mines for routine inspections usually find companies are not adhering to the law, but are met with threats at gunpoint or threats to the safety of their family members, so they are compelled to agree with the companies’ demands.210 These companies are surrounded by violence. They have been involved with kidnappings and murders of local protestors and anti-mining activists, and are met with little or no legal repercussions.211

Honduran president Hernández, in an effort to attract foreign investors, is moving forward with a controversial plan to establish “Employment and Economic Development Zones,” where private companies and investors (like the mining companies in Guatemala) would be granted administrative autonomy to enact their own laws, set up their own judicial systems, and carry out other duties that are usually exclusive to state entities.212 This would give companies more freedom to veer from set laws and escape international standards, and even create biased justice systems targeting activists’ freedom of speech and right to demonstrate.

The security and justice systems in place are insufficient in responding to all forms of criminal and illegal activity.

208 Michael Dougherty, By the Gun or By the Bribe: Firm Size, Environmental Governance and Corruption Among Mining Companies in Guatemala (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2015), page 9. 209 Dougherty, By the Gun or By the Bribe, page 13. 210 Dougherty, By the Gun or By the Bribe, page 14. 211 Dougherty, By the Gun or By the Bribe, pages 8-9. 212 Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, page 7. 58

BROKEN SECURITY AND JUSTICE SYSTEMS:

As discussed in the section on human rights and corruption, security institutions are prone to administering extrajudicial force and lethal tactics, even against those who are unarmed, and are supported by heavy-handed government agendas aiming to crack down on gangs. Police are supported by military personnel, who take on the role of police, even though they were originally trained to occupy and defeat rather than protect and defend; the U.S. estimates that roughly 8,000 of all 17,000 Salvadoran armed forces are involved in public security at any given time.213 In

Guatemala, the government has responded to municipalities’ requests for military troops to augment their ineffective police forces, using a constitutional clause to ‘temporarily’ support police in combatting crime.214 The Hernández administration of Honduras has also deployed military troops, using them to violently silence protestors, and has deployed a military police force, PMOP, and a military-trained police unit, TIGRES, to conduct intensive patrols of high- crime neighborhoods.215 The PMOP has been implicated in numerous human rights abuses as of today, including thirteen killings documented by the UN OHCHR after the highly contested 2017 election.216 Military presence in domestic security, rather than aiding in providing security, only blurs and obstructs the rule of law further, leading to increased levels of insecurity.

Low ranking police are poorly paid, and tend to live in areas where gangs are more active, which heightens the risks to their personal and familial well-being. Therefore, police will choose to reach ‘hazard agreements’ with gangs in their community, where each party agrees to leave the other in peace.217 Pressures to collaborate and follow gang leaders’ orders increase as

213 Seelke, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations, page 11. 214 Taft-Morales, Guatemala: Political and Socioeconomic Conditions, page 6. 215 Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, page 9. 216 Ibid. 217 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 24. 59 government-ordered crackdowns are implemented, provoking violence and increasing gangs’ enmity toward police.218 The more police target gang members’ families and loved ones, the more police and their families are targeted by gang members, creating a cycle of endless violence.219 With poor equipment, limited resources, low moral, and limited public support, it is safer and easier for police to cooperate with gangs and organized crime, rather than fight them.

Although rural and indigenous communities see less street violence, their exclusion from political, social, economic and cultural life have made rural residents and especially indigenous communities easy prey for criminal organizations seeking to expand their territory.220 In all three

Northern Triangle countries, police presence is small relative to population size, and most police are concentrated in major urban areas – with only a two to four police officers stationed at rural outposts, if any.221 In rural communities where police are present, jails and courts are often several hours away by road, limiting effective police activity and security; many of these police units lack working vehicles, fuel, and reliable communication systems.222 Those limited number of police that are stationed in indigenous communities tend to be from urban areas, have a limited understanding of indigenous customs, and are unable to speak the indigenous language; this leaves police feeling distrusted by the local population, as well as outnumbered.223 Some choose to avoid patrolling far from their stations, simply because they fear causing any disruption that might trigger an attack from residents; they even avoid responding to crimes and emergencies for fear of angering villagers.224

218 Ibid. 219 Knox, An Atomised Crisis, page 28. 220 Shifter, Countering Criminal Violence in Central America, page 8. 221 Espach and Haering, Border Insecurity, page 6. 222 Espach and Haering, Border Insecurity, page 5-6. 223 Espach and Haering, Border Insecurity, page 6. 224 Ibid. 60

Border towns are particularly ignored by their states, and border security points are concentrated along just a few major highway crossings, with little oversight or protection set in place. Many official crossing points are primitive, without access to electricity, phone service, or bathrooms, and are manned by unarmed agents.225 Organized crime use these porous borders to carry out their business, laundering money and smuggling drugs, weapons, and people with the help of local farmers and community leaders, coopting local political parties, mayors, and legislators – using their money and influence to expand their trade even further.226 Thanks to the money and illicit activities flowing through border towns, they are some of the fastest growing economic regions in the Northern Triangle, one indicator that criminal organizations are creating miniature islands – parallel states and governments – within the borders of Northern Triangle countries.227 However, border towns cannot simply be walled off from the neighboring country, as townspeople conduct business and rely on goods and services from both sides. Being so disconnected from their states’ affairs, the concept of a border line bears little to no influence on border residents; the settlements exist regardless of the affairs of their associated states, whom townspeople rarely associate with. Because border towns often leach into each other, residents of the Northern Triangle frequently travel between neighbor countries; because of this, and because there are few resources to improve border security, the CA-4 agreement was established. This agreement allows for residents of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to enjoy inspection-free movement at land crossings; citizens are not required to state their purpose of entry.228 These relaxed border regulations, accompanied by a lack of police presence in border towns, only enables and empowers organized crime to expand and perpetuate their operations. Overall, the

225 Espach and Haering, Border Insecurity, page 4. 226 Espach and Haering, Border Insecurity, pages 6-7. 227 Ibid. 228 Honduras 2019 Crime & Safety Report (Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2019), page 4. 61 lack of police presence and security resources have led to increased impunity of criminal actors, and have forced citizens to take matters of justice and security into their own hands.

Across the Northern Triangle, police units are poorly staffed, poorly trained, and have limited resources to carry out missions. Equipment shortages include radios, vehicles, fuel, and ammunition, which are essential for successfully carrying out regular police duties.229 In El

Salvador, police investigative units have shown great promise, but routine patrol techniques, anti-gang work, and efforts to suppress crime have remained difficult challenges.230 Guatemalan police were debilitated in 2019, with multiple waves of mass firings depleting upper-level, experienced officers. Within the year, the National Police had three different directors general, four different deputies, five different investigations chiefs, four operations chiefs, and four logistics chiefs.231 The high rate of turnover has demoralized the policing institution, and forced lower level, inexperienced officers into senior positions ahead of schedule.232 Beyond the crisis at the top, street police are severely under-trained and under-funded, with the annual police budget virtually unchanged year-to-year. Guatemalan police are not required to have a high school degree, and receive as little as six months of official police training before they are permitted to enforce the law.233 Honduran police lack the resources to investigate cases, and for this reason, police may take hours to respond to emergency calls or scenes of violent crimes – if they respond at all – allowing for criminals to act with a heightened degree of impunity.234 The

Honduran government generally provides the highest levels of security and policing in popular tourist areas, protecting the tourism industry that provides Honduras with a substantial portion of

229 El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 2019 Crime & Safety Reports (Overseas Security Advisory Council, 2019). 230 El Salvador 2019 Crime & Safety Report (Overseas Security Advisory Council), page 6. 231 Guatemala 2019 Crime & Safety Report (Overseas Security Advisory Council), page 11. 232 Guatemala 2019 Crime & Safety Report. 233 Ibid. 234 Honduras 2019 Crime & Safety Report, page 6. 62

GDP each year; this is at a loss to the citizens, however, who are left with less police dedicated

to keeping them safe.235

Table 8 demonstrates the limited police capacity, displaying the limited number of police

per 100,000 residents, and using the example of real homicides compared to those arrested or

suspected of homicide, and the number of homicides that actually get convictions. For further

interpretation of the data below, El Salvador provides one officer for every 280 residents,

Guatemala provides one officer for every 554, and Honduras has one police officer for every 683

residents. Comparing these statistics to the U.S., the national average is one officer for every 292

residents.236 El Salvador has a better ratio of police officers to residents thanks to the crackdown

on crime pushed forth by president Bukele that has increased force size in recent years.

Table 8: Police Counts & Actual Homicide Count versus Suspects, Arrests & Convictions

Number of Police Total formal contact Total number Total number of % of recorded count & rate per count: persons arrested or of recorded homicide homicides that 100,000 residents suspected of homicide homicides convictions get convictions El Salvador (2015) 23,093 & 365.11 2,704 6,656 No Record Found Unknown Guatemala (2014) 30,841 & 193.69 253 4,998 326 6.5% Honduras (2016) 13,319 & 143.66 1,743 5,150 400 7.8% Source: DataUNODC

In general, there is a lack of cooperation between police, prosecutors, and corrections

facilities, which leads to many criminals escaping conviction and keep prisons overflowing with

pre-trial detainees.

The broken, highly politicized judicial systems increase levels of impunity. In Honduras,

president Hernández replaced four supreme court justices who struck down a pair of high-profile

government initiatives; the same replacements installed by Hernández struck down Honduras’s

constitutional ban on presidential reelection, allowing Hernández to run for a second term (which

235 Ibid. 236 Duren Banks et. al., National Sources for Law Enforcement Employment Data (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2016) page 2. 63 he won).237 Replacements like this are frequent, and legislators often pick and choose when they agree to abide by constitutional and supreme court rulings. In Honduras 2013, the legislature decided to revoke the right of citizens to challenge the constitutionality of laws, undermining not only the power of the supreme court’s constitutional chamber, but also the power and fundamental rights of the people.238 Judges and prosecutors are commonly pressured by politicians to push their political agendas, and can be intimidated or bought off by organized crime; a prosecutor in Guatemala were targeted by gunmen after he had ordered the investigation of several serving and retired military officers.239

In El Salvador, dozens of sham law school facilities have opened up in the past twenty years, most with a large direct financial stake of high-ranking members of the judiciary.240 These law schools were discovered to be ways for people to pay for the receipt of a certification in law, and because the ‘schools’ have ties with judicial officials, who have the power to appoint lower court judges, those with sham certificates are easily able to participate in the judicial system.241

Because of the disorganization, politicization, and corruption that limit the capabilities of the judicial system, many prosecutions fail to result in convictions, and many more go months or years in prison while awaiting a fair trial. Table 9 shows the ineffectiveness of the judicial system in the ratio of all prosecutions to all convictions in a given year.

237 Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, page 3. 238 Freedom in the World 2020: Honduras. 239 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 31. 240 Tamara Lothian, The FUSADES Strategy for El Salvador: Priority Areas for Judicial Reform and the Problem of Corruption (Bepress, 2003), page 20. 241 Lothian, The FUSADES Strategy for El Salvador, page 20. 64

Table 9: Prosecutions versus Convictions of the Northern Triangle

Total persons prosecuted Total persons convicted % of prosecutions that (all crimes) (all crimes) get convictions El Salvador (2015) 53,544 7,068 13.2% Guatemala (2014) 446,385 3,524 0.8% Honduras (2015) No Record Found 5,726 Unknown Source: DataUNODC

Comparative to the above data, in the United States, 79,834 total persons were prosecuted and

67,877 were convicted in 2015, which translates to 85% of prosecutions receiving convictions.242

It is clear by these numbers alone that the courts are failing, meaning that honest police work

might be in vain.

A combination of crackdowns on crime, a limited justice system, and lack of initiative to

improve or expand the penitentiary systems have left prisons overflowing, especially with

inmates who have yet to see trial and those who have already served their time and are waiting to

be released. Table 10 displays basic data on prisons of the Northern Triangle, showing the

limited capacity of the penal system.

Table 10: Prison Capacity of the Northern Triangle

Number of Prison Official Occupancy Prisoners per % of all prisoners pre- prisons population capacity of level 100,000 trial detainees or total prison system residents remand prisoners El Salvador 25 38,114 (2019) 18,051 (2018) 215.2% (2018) 590 26.60% Guatemala 21 25,419 (2020) 6,800 (2018) 357.6% (2018) 143 46.50% Honduras 27 20,506 (2018) 10,600 (2018) 193.5% (2018) 229 53.10% Source: Central America: World Prison Brief (Institute for Crime and Justice Policy, 2020).

The state of extreme overcapacity causes prisons to become death traps for those locked

within. For example, in 2012, a devastating fire burned 360 inmates alive in their cells at a

Honduran prison; due to the tragic disorganization and lack of protocol among the guards who

worked at the prison, gatekeepers couldn’t find the keys to the cells, and firefighters were kept

242 DataUNODC. 65 outside for thirty minutes as the guards awaited authorization to let them in.243 This was not the first case of a devastating prison fire in Honduras; a 2003 fire killed sixty-eight inmates, and a

2004 fire killed another 104.244 Fires, however, are less common and deadly than the outbreaks of respiratory illnesses and other diseases; overflowing, hot cell blocks allow disease to fester and spread quickly, and so those imprisoned are six times more likely to contract illnesses like tuberculosis.245 The total mortality rate is significantly higher in prisons then outside of them; per

100,000 prisoners, the mortality rate is 294.07 in Salvadoran prisons, 73.27 in Guatemalan prisons, and 280.10 in Honduran prisons.246 The mortality rate per 100,000 prisoners by homicide in prisons is perhaps even more alarming, with 55.7 in Honduran prisons and 104.15 in

Salvadoran prisons.247 This is likely due to the guards’ inability or unwillingness to intervene in conflicts that occur on prison grounds.

UNODC reports that the total number of prison staff in El Salvador amounts to 2,775 guards; in Honduras, the total number of guards equates to 2,221.248 That means the ratio of guards in each country are 13.73 prisoners to one guard and 9.23 prisoners to one guard, respectively. Seeing as the United Nations recommends no less than one guard per every three prisoners, it is clear that prisons are not only overcapacity, but also understaffed.249 Because they are understaffed, guards are often too scared to enter facilities, as gang members make up the majority of inmates and overpower prison staff with sheer manpower; these gangs are usually the ones that actually run the prisons and control other inmates within them.250 Due to ineffective

243 Mike McDonald, Caging in Central America (Public Radio International, 2012). 244 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 34. 245 Health in the Americas: El Salvador. 246 DataUNODC. 247 Ibid. 248 Ibid. 249 McDonald, Caging in Central America. 250 Stephen Moss, The Gangs of El Salvador: Inside the Prison the Guards are too Afraid to Enter (Guardian News & Media Limited, 2020). 66 prison security measures, gang members are able to easily smuggle drugs, weapons and cell phones into their cells, and they treat prisons like headquarters of sorts, even directing outside criminal operations from within their cell blocks.251

With the police, justice, and prison systems incapacitated, citizens turn to other means of security. The rich invest in private security, rather than investing to help improve state security, which would likely benefits all citizens in the long run. Private security officers outnumber all police in the Northern Triangle. Over one half of all security forces in El Salvador and Honduras are estimated to be private security members, and an estimated three-fourths of all security members in Guatemala are privately operated.252 In 2007, there were an estimated 235,000 private security guards in Central America.253 These private security members are a threat to average citizens, whom they have no social contract to protect; they are only obligated to adhere to the contract of their employer, and may still take violent action against whom they choose as long as it does not breach the given contract.

Those that cannot afford private security forces become vigilantes of justice, especially in rural and indigenous communities. Guatemala is particularly notorious for vigilantism and alternative methods of trying offenders. For example, there was a 400% increase in reported lynchings from 2004 to 2012, with 131 cases recorded in just the first nine months of 2011.254

Other ways villages have served justice have included stoning and immolation.255 Police tend not to interfere with vigilantism for fear of becoming targets themselves; they are often outnumbered or without proper resources. For example, in January of 2019, more than 200 Guatemalan

251 McDonald, Caging in Central America. 252 Leggett, Caught in the Crossfire, page 20. 253 Shifter, Countering Criminal Violence in Central America, page 12. 254 Ibid. 255 Guatemala 2019 Crime & Safety Report, page 3. 67 officers became isolated in the town of El Naranjo, located in a remote region of Peten, accessible only by ferry.256 After police arrested four locals, residents seized control of the only ferry, while another group of residents blocked the only road into town, preventing police and military response to the incident. Locals additionally threatened to burn down the police station, and the officers were only freed after the police released the four detained individuals.257

Communities have increased the use of their blockade tactics since, using them to hold elected officials hostage until demands are met. In August 2018, for example, residents of

Coatapeque held their mayor hostage for two days until he agreed to turn power back on after a blackout; no one was arrested or prosecuted for this incident.258 Vigilantism like this has further undermined the legitimacy of state-sponsored institutions, as citizens are free to create their own version of the rule of law without facing backlash from their governments. Because of such a great quantities of insecurity, it is often every man for himself; the poor, with the least amount of assets and resources to secure themselves, are disproportionally affected by this failure of the state to produce basic security measures.

256 Guatemala 2019 Crime & Safety Report, page 4. 257 Ibid. 258 Ibid. 68

COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND THE SECURITY OF THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE:

COVID-19 has exposed security flaws and government corruption to an even greater extent. Because of the high rates of poverty and overall economic instability, there has been a heightened amount of civil unrest, and those who rely on things like street vending to provide day-to-day money for essentials are left starving on the streets.259 In Honduras, protestors desperate for food and essentials have reportedly been met with tear gas, and one protester was even threatened with live bullets.260

Journalists have also been met with disrespect, and many fear for their safety if they were to get detained for going outside; most are forced to stay inside while government activities go underreported.261 According to the Journalist Protection Board of El Salvador, operations of the offices for access to public information have been recently been suspended due to the COVID-19 crisis; the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH) recently published that, from the beginning of the mandatory home quarantine on 21 March through 20 April, 581 cases of human rights violations have been registered at the national level – 100 of them were violations of the right to access public information.262

The UN OHCHR reports that governments have been using the emergency to expand their powers, turning many governments from unstable democracies into repressive authoritarian regimes.263 In prisons, where respiratory illnesses are more prevalent due to overcrowding, fears of the coronavirus have led prisoners to riot and have resulted in mass breakouts across Latin

259 Anna-Cat Brigida, Central America: Unrest, repression grow amid coronavirus crisis (Al Jazeera Network, 2020). 260 Brigida, Central America: Unrest, repression grow. 261 Teresa Mioli, Latin America sees Decline in Respect for Press Freedom; Coronavirus Pandemic Exacerbates Existing Crisis for Media: RSF (University of Texas at Austin Knight Center: Journalism in the Americas, 2020). 262 Paola Nalvarte, Journalism in the Americas: Salvadoran government reinforces limits on freedom of expression and the press during COVID-19 pandemic (University of Texas at Austin Knight Center: Journalism in the Americas, 2020). 263 ‘Toxic lockdown culture’ of repressive coronavirus measures hit most vulnerable (UN News, 2020). 69

America.264 In March, for the first time in El Salvador, there were two days in a row where no homicides were recorded; gangs had shifted their focus from criminal activities to enforcing the coronavirus lockdown using, baseball bats and threatening phone recordings as tactics of engagement.265 However, after a weekend of deadly violence that left at least fifty dead across the country, president Bukele authorized the use of lethal force by police against gang members, calling them ‘terrorists’ that were taking advantage of a vulnerable nation in crisis.266 The president subsequently put all incarcerated gang members in a twenty-four-hour shutdown, asserting that gang leaders had directed the violence from behind bars; Bukele ordered that cells be covered with metal sheets, and that members from opposing gangs be put in to the same cells, as punishment.267 Bukele shared shocking images on his Twitter account of hundreds of inmates crammed together in prison yards, naked besides a thin pair of briefs, pressed up against one another in long lines on the ground while they were being searched – part two of their

‘punishment’ – which has alarmed many civil rights activists, U.S. officials, and international bodies.268 In Salvadoran prisons, it is clear that health and social distancing is not the priority, but instead the situation is allowing for president Bukele to find opportunities to look good for his supporters that admire his tough-on-crime stance.

Guatemala and Honduras have both been facing coronavirus-related issues of their own.

Two deputy health ministers in Guatemala were fired amid revelations of an alleged corruption ring inside the ministry conspiring to defraud state funds during the pandemic.269 In Honduras, analysts fear that, because of years or underfunding, corruption, and a big scandal involving the

264 Chris Dalby, Coronavirus Lays Bare Faultlines of Latin American Prisons (Insight Crime, 2020). 265 Kate Linthicum, Molly O’Toole and Alexander Renderos, In El Salvador, gangs are enforcing the coronavirus lockdown with baseball bats (The Los Angeles Times, 2020). 266 Charner, Arias and Silverman, The President of El Salvador Has Authorized Lethal Force. 267 Ibid. 268 El Salvador inmates crammed together in prison lockdown (Al Jazeera Network, 2020). 269 Sandra Cuffe, Guatemalan health officials fired, investigated for corruption (Al Jazeera Network, 2020). 70 embezzlement of hundreds of millions of dollars out of the healthcare system, hospitals are not prepared to face a pandemic disaster; speculating that the virus will only further deplete the healthcare system, leaving it barren for years to follow.270 Guatemalan officials are also worried that their limited health systems will be overwhelmed, and have suspended the accepting of deportations from the U.S. after seventy deportees tested positive when they arrived in

Guatemala.271 The U.S. has since threatened sanctions against any country that does not accept deportees during the time of crisis, and countries are forced to choose between positive diplomatic relations and the health of their citizens.272

COVID-19 has exposed glaring flaws in government and healthcare systems around the world, but the outbreak is especially dangerous for countries like the three in the Northern

Triangle; ones that have fragile government and healthcare institutions, and where the majority of economic activity is located within the informal sector. It will be extremely difficult for El

Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to pull out of this, and the three countries will likely see further deterioration of public services, security, and rule of law.

270 Anna-Cat Brigida, Coronavirus crisis exposes another pandemic in Honduras: Analysts (Al Jazeera Network, 2020). 271 Mary Louise Kelly and Molly O’Toole, Guatemala Suspends Deportations from the U.S. After 70 Test Positive For Coronavirus (National Public Radio, 2020). 272 Kelly and O’Toole, Guatemala Suspends Deportations. 71

FINDINGS AND TAKEAWAYS – INDICATORS OF GOVERNMENT PRESENCE:

Unfortunately, due to the level of corruption and opacity of the Northern Triangle governments, public information is difficult to find online and is generally obscure, fragmented, or hidden within disorganized and overly-complicated government websites. Public information is equally as difficult to retrieve by direct requests to the corresponding offices. This is partially due to public information restrictions recently implemented by each government, like the

Honduran Secrecy Law adopted in January of 2014, which allows the Honduran president and his ministers to classify official information and restrict its public access for different time limits

(five to twenty-five years) depending on its category.273 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reports that the secrecy law enables state entities to restrict any information, documentation or material relating to the “internal strategic framework of state agencies and whose revelation, if made publicly available, could produce undesirable institutional effects on the effective development of state policies or the normal functioning of public sector entities.”274 Because these words can be interpreted broadly, a variety of information essential in determining degrees of state accountability could be and possibly already have been hidden from public view.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented increasingly restrictive measures on journalists by Salvadoran President Bukele in 2019, when he criminalized the media using rhetoric that framed journalists critical of his actions as ‘lacking objectivity’ and ‘targeting the government in a campaign of defamation’.275 Police have been used to bar reporters from a 2019 press conference, veteran’s protest, from visiting homicide scenes, and from the presidential inauguration; police threatened journalists who resisted orders to erase photos or turn over

273 Paola Nalvarte, Honduran Secrecy Law Endangers Access to Public Information: RSF (University of Texas at Austin Knight Center: Journalism in the Americas, 2014). 274 Nalvarte, Honduran Secrecy Law Endangers Access to Public Information. 275 Human Rights Watch World Report 2020, page 189. 72 equipment.276 Four journalists reported that since June of 2019, police have even required presidential press office approval before discussing details of homicides.277 Restrictions on access to public information have only increased in the past year in El Salvador.

In general, public information is difficult to access online or by request. When reviewing the official government websites, the author was overwhelmed with how disorganized and overly-complicated websites were to use; especially the national police websites of all three countries. The police websites278 read like tabloid news sites, with home page images composed only of arrests and police crackdowns (until those were replaced with images of police wearing masks for COVID-19). Compared to the Austin Police Department’s website279, which focuses on displaying images of community-building and showcasing positive relationships between citizens and police, the Northern Triangle police websites appear to be dumping grounds for political propaganda – a means to show off that tough crackdowns are working, and crime is being halted. User-friendliness and accessible emergency information seem to be secondary in terms of importance. For at least a week during the author’s conducting of research, the

Honduras National Police Website280 was completely inaccessible, with the page pulling up a

‘bandwidth exceeded’ message, meaning that the Honduran police had failed to pay their internet bill; during this time, citizens would be unable to access essential emergency services online.

The author scoured government websites searching for addresses of indicators of government presence –addresses of hospitals, courts, police stations and prisons – but could find only partial addresses, or addresses that listed streets in areas where streets were unmarked on

276 Ibid. 277 Ibid.. 278 Policia Nacional Civil - Gobierno De El Salvador - Inicio (Gobierno de El Salvador: Ministerio de Justica y Seguridad Pública, 2020); Ministerio De Gobernación (Policía Nacional Civil De Guatemala, 2020); Honduras Policia Nacional (Gobierno de la República de Honduras: Secretaria de Seguridad, 2020). 279 Police: Austintexas.gov (City of Austin, 2020). 280 Honduras Policia Nacional. 73 online map databases. The few partial databases the author located consisted of Salvadoran

Police addresses,281 Salvadoran hospital addresses,282 Guatemalan Police addresses,283

Guatemalan Public Health addresses,284 Guatemalan prison addresses,285 and Honduran hospital addresses.286 The only pre-marked addresses that could be searched and found online were that of the National Police Headquarters buildings, halls of the Supreme Courts, and other significant public offices and hospitals located in urban settings; smaller outposts, especially in rural areas, were difficult to access. After searching tirelessly with limited results, the author attempted to contact the public information offices of each country to request more information on addresses.

The author only received one automated reply back from the Guatemalan public information office, which read that the request had been received.

In the end, the most complete records were that of public hospitals and prisons, but police stations had the least amount of accessible information available, and the most conflicting and non-specific addresses recorded. For instance, although over 500 police ‘addresses’ were collected from El Salvador, the majority of them do not exist, and many outposts share the same street addresses, just located in different towns – but in most cases, neither the street or building number actually exist. This is cause for speculation, as presenting numerous duplicate addresses that were unverifiable suggests the record of addresses may be a formality; perhaps El Salvador wishes to portray that their police have extensive coverage around the nation, which would tie in with the administration’s message of being tough on crime.

281 POLICIA NACIONAL CIVIL SUBDIRECCIÓN DE ADMINISTRACIÓN Y FINANZAS DIVISIÓN DE INFORMÁTICA Y TELECOMUNICACIONES DEPARTAMENTO DE TELECOMUNICACIONES (Policia Nacional Civil, 2012). 282 Medical Assitance (U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, 2020). 283 Comisarías - PNC Policía Nacional Civil. Teléfono Y Dirección En Guatemala (Guatemala Telefonos, 2020). 284 Directions And Phone Numbers Of Public Hospitals (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social, 2020). 285 DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DEL SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO (Gobierno de Guatemala, 2020). 286 Honduran Hospitals (U.S. Embassy of Honduras, 2020). 74

In many cases, addresses were ‘located between x street and y street,’ which often covered a huge area – sometimes the entire town was located between those two streets. Some addresses given for a specific town were located on streets well outside of the town limits, in the forest or the next town over. For developing countries like these, addresses are more informal, using landmarks or approximate locations. For example, one entry read “located on the south side of the church,” although this address was still impossible to locate due to the number of churches in the region. In fact, the easiest locations to see on a map, and frequently the only ones that receive formal addresses in a given town in the Northern Triangle, are churches.

For all of these reasons, the ArcGIS map created is only a partial representation of approximate addresses for public institutions that indicate government presence in the Northern

Triangle. Thanks to the information gathered in previous sections, the author has been able to determine that government presence is scarcest and the most ineffective in rural, indigenous, and especially border communities. The rule of law does not extend to these areas, and public services are too far away to be accessible or useful for practical use, leaving residents with little assistance, and lacking economic and educational opportunities.

75

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND POLICY GUIDANCE:

For future research, the author recommends collaborating directly with officials from the

Northern Triangle to collect data and record addresses of government institutions. If possible, data collection should take place on the ground, so that physical locations can be confirmed and coordinates will be accurate. If the author were to suggest a course of action for policy makers, it would be:

1) To encourage better organization of data within government systems, perhaps by creating

an office with the focus of citizen services and resource accessibility;

2) To create more accessible routes towards obtaining information through user-friendly

websites with multiple language options (for Spanish and indigenous monolingual

speakers);

3) To establish formal streets and addresses across the country to improve accountability

and make it easier to provide more effective remote supervision to isolated outposts;

4) To work with online mapping databases like Google Maps to provide exact coordinates

and ensure that addresses provided are accessible via global positioning systems (GPS).

The author asserts that the focus should be on improving logistics, organization and infrastructure before attempting to bolster security measures and rule of law through increased levels of equipment and personnel (although those steps should quickly follow). The author also recommends that more efforts be made to lead from the bottom up, like integrating or coopting more indigenous peoples into the police structure so that rural and indigenous communities are more willing to cooperate and abide by their government’s rule of law. Finally, in order for the governments to regain control and order, the author recommends expanding the capacity of the 76 formal economic sector, increasing the amount of formal sector jobs so that citizens are not instead forced to turn to informal economic opportunities and gang membership.

Ultimately, addressing the problems that the Northern Triangle face are beyond the abilities of this author and the scope of this project. As Danial Runde said, “there is neither a

‘magic bullet’ nor an ‘out of the box’ solution to the problems of the Northern Triangle;” the author recognizes that efforts to improve the state of the Northern Triangle will take time, commitment, and cooperation by government officials, NGOs, international institutions, and citizens alike. The Northern Triangle is still a region of budding democracies; instability and insecurity are expected, but in no way should efforts to end corruption, dismantle organized crime, or strengthen rule of law be slowed or halted. Efforts have made a meaningful difference, and should continue into the future – for the sake of our neighbors, the citizens of the Northern

Triangle, and for the purpose of increasing U.S. border security by slowing the flow of displaced peoples through our southern borders.

77

APPENDIX OF ADDRESSES AND CORRESPONDING COORDINATES:

El Salvador Public Hospitals Addresses Coordinates

Hospital de Diagnostico y Paseo general Escalón y 99 Ave Norte Plaza Villavicencio 13°42'13.5"N 89°14'49.7"W Emergencias (ESCALON)

Hospital de Diagnostico y 21 Calle poniente y 2a diagonal #429 Urb. La Esperanza 13°42'36.7"N 89°12'09.2"W Emergencias Hospital de la Mujer Between 81 & 83 Ave. Sur Calle Juan J Cañas Colonia 13°42'06.8"N 89°14'16.5"W Escalón Hospital Centro Ginecológico 2a Diagonal Urb. La Esperanza 13°42'32.1"N 89°12'08.5"W Hospital Bloom (Pediatric Hospital) 25 Avenida Norte (downtown) 13°42'50.4"N 89°12'14.6"W

Hospital Militar Central Avenida Bernal y Calle Constitución 13°43'09.1"N 89°12'56.8"W

El Salvador Police Stations Addresses Coordinates POLICIA RURAL DE CANTON METAYATE, FTE. A DESVIO DE AGUA 14°06'01.1"N 89°11'51.0"W CHALATENANGO CALIENTE, CHALATENANGO POLICIA RURAL DE SANTA FINCA EL AGUILA, CALLE LOS ELIZONDOS, UNABLE TO VERIFY ANA COATEPEQUE POLICIA RURAL DE CANTON LLANO DOÑA MARIA, CASERIO EL UNABLE TO VERIFY AHUACHAPAN {APANECA} CENTRO, MUNICIPIO, AHUACHAPAN POLICIA RURAL DE CANTON Y COOPERATIVA SAN ISIDRO, IZALCO UNABLE TO VERIFY SONSONATE SAN ISIDRO POLICIA RURAL LA LIBERTAD C. PPAL., CANTON ZAPOTITAN J. DE CIUDAD ARCE UNABLE TO VERIFY DE ZAPOTITAN POLICIA RURAL DE SAN CANTON LA VIRGEN, CARRETERA UNABLE TO VERIFY VICENTE PANAMERICANA KM 50, JURISIDICCION NVO. TEPETITAN, SAN VICENTE POLICIA RURAL DE CUSCATLAN UNABLE TO VERIFY CUSCATLAN POLICIA RURAL DE LA PAZ Cton. San Jose La Loma,c. Ppal., fte. Al centro Escolar 14 UNABLE TO VERIFY de abril, Santiago Nonualco,La Paz POLICIA RURAL DE NEJAPA CANTON CAMOTEPEQUE, 500 MTS. AL SUR UNABLE TO VERIFY PONIENTE DE HACIENDA MAPILAPA, MUNICIPIO DE NEJAPA,SAN SALVADOR POLICIA RURAL DE USULUTAN CANTON TIERRA, CALLE PPAL, JIQULISCO, UNABLE TO VERIFY USULUTAN POLICIA RURAL DE CABAÑAS KM. 54 CARRETERRA QUE DE S.S. CONDUCE A UNABLE TO VERIFY SENSUNTEPEQUE, CTON. SN FCO. IRAHETA, JURISIDICCION DE ILOBASCO. POLICIA RURAL MORAZAN CASERIO MONTECRISTO, CANTON LLANO DE UNABLE TO VERIFY SANTIAGO , MUNICIPIO DEL DIVISADERO, CALLE RUTA MILITAR, KILOMETRO 156, A 300 METROS AL ORIENTE DEL SUBESTACION ELECTRICA DE JOCORO., DEPARTAMENTO DE MORAZAN. POLICIA RURAL DE SAN AV. FCO. MARTIN ZALDIVAR NO. 14B, SAN UNABLE TO VERIFY ANTONIO SILVA / SAN MIGUEL ANTONIO SILVA, SAN MIGUEL POLICIA RURAL LA UNION Carretera Panamericana kilometro 175 1⁄2, Desvio los UNABLE TO VERIFY Mangos, Canton Sirama, Departamento de La Union. DIV. REGION CENTRAL DE Av. Melvin Jones y 4 Calle Oriente, No. 2-7, galerias 13°40'21.4"N 89°17'14.2"W SEGURIDAD PUBLICA tecleñas, Nva. San salvador, La Libertad DIVISION REGION BARRIO EL SANTUARIO 5 CALLE ORIENTE Y 10 13°38'43.8"N 88°46'47.6"W PARACENTRAL DE AVENIDA NORTE, No. 65, SAN VICENTE SEGURIDAD PUBLICA SAN VICENTE DELEGADO S.A.F. REGIONAL Bo. SAN FRANCISCO, COL. LOS ANGELES, C. PPAL. UNABLE TO VERIFY ORIENTAL No. 57, SAN VICENTE DELEGACION DE SAN 7 Avenida Norte No.418, entre la Juan Pablo II y 5 Calle 13°42'09.3"N 89°11'40.5"W SALVADOR CENTRO Poniente S.S. PUESTO MOVIL FTE. A UNIV. 20 Avenida Norte y 29 Calle Poniente, al costado Poniente 13°42'44.0"N 89°10'54.1"W TECNOLOGICA del INFRAMEN, San Salvador 78

PUESTO MOVIL FTE. A COLONIA IVU, CALLE PRINCIPAL, FRENTE A UNABLE TO VERIFY TERMINAL DE ORIENTE EDIFICIO No. 27, SAN SALVADOR. DELEGACION DE SAN 1 CALLE PONIENTE Y 31 AVENIDA NORTE , CASA UNABLE TO VERIFY SALVADOR CENTRO No. 1931, SAN SALVADOR. SUBDELEGACION DE CENTRO 5 CALLE PONIENTE No. 152, CONTOGUO A UNABLE TO VERIFY HISTORICO PARQUEO DE LA PRENSA GRAFICA, EDIFICIO FRIDA, DEPARTAMENTO DE SAN SALVADOR. SUBDELEGACION COLONIA MIRAMONTE , AVENIDA SIERRA 13°42'34.0"N 89°12'59.6"W MIRAMONTE NEVADA ENTRE CALLE TOLUCA Y CALLE SISIMILES, PASAJE No. 7, SAN SALVADOR. SUBDELEGACION SAN CALLE 15 DE SEPTIEMBRE Y CALLE FRANCISCO 13°41'20.6"N 89°11'35.0"W JACINTO MENENDEZ No. 122-1B, CENTRO COMERCIAL CANDELARIA, BO. MODELO EN SAN JACINTO,S.S. PUESTO DE COLONIA F. 75a. AV. SUR PJE. B No. 7-2, COL. ESCALON,S.S. 13°41'58.0"N 89°14'03.4"W ESCALON PUESTO DE COMUNIDAD C. PPAL. No. 2552, URBANIZACION DON BOSCO 13°41'50.5"N 89°10'28.8"W IBERIA PUESTO DE CASTILLEJA RPTO. LAS CASTILLEJAS, CALLE LOURDES, SAN UNABLE TO VERIFY SALVADOR PUESTO DE LA CHACRA C. PPA. No. 2552, COL. LA CHACRA 13°42'04.3"N 89°10'03.4"W PUESTO DE EL REFUGIO COL. EL REFUGIO , AV. SAN LORENZO, S.S. 13°43'13.2"N 89°11'46.3"W PUESTO EL MANGUITO ALAMEDA MANUEL ENRIQUE ARAUJO, FTE. A 13°41'14.8"N 89°13'56.1"W PARQUE DE PELOTAS SATURDINO VANEGAS, S.S. DELEGACION DE SOYAPANGO- BLVD. SAN BARTOLO, CTON. SAN BARTOLO 13°42'02.1"N 89°06'17.7"W ILOPANGO ILOPANGO. DEPARTAMENTO DE ZONA INDUSTRIAL Y COM. DE ILOPANGO, 13°42'02.4"N 89°06'17.4"W CONTROL AEROPUERTO DE AEROPUERTO ILOPANGO ILOPANGO SUBDELEGACION DE COL. MONTECRISTO, CALLE CIRCUNVALACION, UNABLE TO VERIFY ILOPANGO No. 2 SUBDELEGACION CENTRO DE Avenida principal y Pje. Granillo, Barrio El Progreso No. UNABLE TO VERIFY SOYAPANGO 4, Soyapango, Departamento de San Salvador. PUESTO PNC CONACASTES COLONIA CONACASTE, PASAJE No.1PONIENTE, UNABLE TO VERIFY CASA COMUNAL, FTE. RUTA 7D, MUNICIPIO SOYAPANGO, SS. SUBDELEGACION DE SAN 4a. AV. SUR No. 15, SAN MARTIN UNABLE TO VERIFY MARTIN PUESTO DE SAN JOSE COL. SAN JOSE, CALLE 7, POL. 8, No. 14, UNABLE TO VERIFY SOYAPANGO SUBDELEGACION DE CALLE VENECIA PRUSIA, POL. 11, CASA 27/28, 13°41'34.8"N 89°08'40.4"W SOYAPANGO SUR (SIERRA URBANIZACION SIERRA MORENA, 1 ETAPA, MORENA) SOYAPANGO PUESTO DE APULO INTERIOR TURICENTRO APULO 13°42'02.0"N 89°04'38.7"W PUESTO DE COLONIA LAS URB. LAS MARGARIT. II FTE. PUNTO 41-D UNABLE TO VERIFY MARGARITAS PUESTO DE CIUDAD CREDISA C. CUSCACHAPA No. 28, CIUDAD CREDISA UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CANTON EL COL. VIA ALEGRE No. 81, CANTON EL LIMON, UNABLE TO VERIFY LIMON SOYAPANGO SUBDELEGACION DE Polígono “O” Pasaje No. 38, Casa No. 185, Residencial 13°44'07.9"N 89°04'58.6"W ALTAVISTA AltaVista, Soyapango, San Salvador. SUBDELEGACION DE URBANIZACION SANTA EDUVIGES, CALLE UNABLE TO VERIFY SOYAPANGO NORTE (PUESTO EUCALIPTO, POLIGONO 20, No. 3, SOYAPANGO DE SANTA EDUVIGES) UNIDAD DE EMERGENCIAS CALLE Y AV. K NORTE, POL. 57, 4 ETAPA, RES. 13°44'08.5"N 89°04'55.5"W 911- ALTAVISTA ALTAVISTA, SAN MARTIN DIP/SOYAPANGO BLVD. SAN BARTOLO, CTON. SAN BARTOLO 13°42'02.3"N 89°06'17.4"W ILOPANGO. U.D.I.N. DE SOYAPANGO LOTIFICACION LA CUCHILLA, No. 5 CALLE 3°41'47.2"N 89°07'39.2"W ANTIGUA A SOYAPANGO PUESTO MOVIL SAN FELIPE ALTOS SAN FELIPE, CALLE EL SAUCE, MUNICIPIO UNABLE TO VERIFY ILOPANGO PUESTO MOVIL LOS ANGELES CARRETERA PANAMERICANA RPTO. LOS UNABLE TO VERIFY ANGELES, C PPAL. PQUEO PPAL, MUNICIPIO DE ILOPANGO, A LA ALTURA IGLESIA LUZ DEL MUNDO 79

PUESTO PNC CENTRO DE SAN CENTRO URBANO SAN BARTOLO, RES. UNABLE TO VERIFY BARTOLO VILLALOBOS, DIAGONAL EL SAUSALITO, No. 2, ILOPANGO, SS PUESTO CENTRO URBANO SAN CENTRO URBANO SAN MARTIN,CALLE PPAL. A UNABLE TO VERIFY MARTIN SAN MARTIN, No. 23, MUNICIPIO DE SAN MARTIN,SS DELEGACIÓN DE SAN Colonia Cuscatlan, (Urb. Mango/Limon) Calle Principal UNABLE TO VERIFY SALVADOR NORTE Block B No.3 y 4 Apopa S.S. SUBDELEGACION CENTRO / COL. EL ANGEL BLOCK B No. 1, KM. 14 C. A UNABLE TO VERIFY PIP-COM QUEZALTEPEQUE APOPA. U.D.I.N. DE APOPA COL. CUSCATLAN, C. PPAL. No. 1 Y 2, APOPA, UNABLE TO VERIFY COSTADO PTE. PERICENTRO APOPA DIHO APOPA COL. Cuscatlan, C. PPAL., APOPA, Costado PTE. UNABLE TO VERIFY Pericentro APOPA ODAC Col. Madre Tierra, C. Ppal. Pol. D, Apopa UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE 5 Av. Norte y 8 Calle Poniente, Barrio Guadalupe, UNABLE TO VERIFY AGUILARES Municipio de Aguilares SUBDELEGACION DE C. C. EL GOLGOTA Y AV. 14 DE DIC. Bo. EL UNABLE TO VERIFY TONACATEPEQUE CALVARIO. UNIDAD DE EMERGENCIAS Col. Maria Elena KM. 12 1/2 C. Quezaltepeque No. 535, UNABLE TO VERIFY 911-APOPA Apopa DELEGACION DE SAN C. A CONTIGUO A INA, COL. MADRE TIERRA I POL. UNABLE TO VERIFY SALVADOR NORTE D, APOPA. PUESTO DE NEJAPA EL ROSARIO, AVENIDA ISAAC ESQUIVEL No.23, 13°48'55.9"N 89°13'50.6"W NEJAPA, SAN SALVADOR PUESTO DE URBANIZACION URBANIZACION SAN ANDRES, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY SAN ANDRES No. 87, APOPA PUESTO DE RESIDENCIAL LA RESIDENCIAL LA LIBERTAD BLK. 23 POL. 23, CASA UNABLE TO VERIFY LIBERTAD 91/92, TONACATEPEQUE PUESTO DE SANTA TERESA DE BLK. 36, PJE. 18, No. 15-16, COL. SANTA TERESA DE UNABLE TO VERIFY LAS FLORES LAS FLORES, APOPA PUESTO DE GUAZAPA KM. 24 1/2 , CARRETERA TRONCAL DEL NORTE, UNABLE TO VERIFY FTE. CANCHA TEXTIL, GUAZAPA. PUESTO DE VALLE VERDE C. PPAL. PJE. P NTE. CASA No. 1, URB VALLE UNABLE TO VERIFY VERDE APOPA. PUESTO DE DISTRITO ITALIA BLVD. LA PAZ C. LOS CONACASTES No. 1Y 2, 13°48'42.1"N 89°08'52.7"W MANZANA No. 7 CASA No. 12, CARRET. A TONACATEPEQUE. PUESTO DE MIRAMUNDO CALLE AL CEMENTERIO, ENTRADA RES. UNABLE TO VERIFY MIRAMUNDO, APOPA, SAN SALVADOR PUESTO DE EL PAISNAL C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE LAS JACARANDAS PJE. J PTE. POL. 15 No. 2, COL. LAS JACARANDAS UNABLE TO VERIFY APOPA. PUESTO MOVIL VALLE DEL COL. VALLE DEL SOL, CONTIGUO A INSTITUTO 13°49'16.1"N 89°11'22.5"W SOL NAC. APOPA PUESTO MOVIL POPOTLAN COL. POPOTLAN, CALLE FERNANDEZ IBAÑEZ, FTE UNABLE TO VERIFY A FOSALUD, APOPA DELEGACION DE CIUDAD COL. Y EDIF. LA AURORA KM. 10 1/2 C. TRONCAL UNABLE TO VERIFY DELGADO DEL NTE. D.I.H.O DE CIUDAD DELGADO kilometro 4 Carretera Troncal del Norte, Calle Central de la 13°43'38.2"N 89°10'10.3"W colonia Bolivar de Ciudad delgado, san salvador UDIN CIUDAD DELGADO kilometro 4 Carretera Troncal del Norte, Calle Central de la 13°43'38.2"N 89°10'10.3"W colonia Bolivar de Ciudad delgado, san salvador ELA (ANTIEXTORCIONES) CALLE PRINCIPAL Y AVENIDA PALECA, CASA 13°44'06.8"N 89°10'00.8"W CIUDAD No.51, CIUDAD SUBDELEGACION DE CIUDAD AV. JUAN BERTIS CASA No.100, BARRIO LAS 13°42'44.8"N 89°10'18.0"W DELGADO VICTORIAS, CIUDAD DELGADO,S.S. UNIDAD DE EMERGENCIAS C. PPAL. CONTIGUO IGLESIA CATOL. 13°43'22.4"N 89°10'39.4"W 911- CUSCATANCINGO PUESTO DE HABITAT-CONFIEN C. PPAL. URB. HABITAP CONFIEN ZONA B, CASA UNABLE TO VERIFY S/N, CIUDAD DELGADO. SUBDELEGACION Final Calle Ichanmichen y Avenida El Tempisque, Ciudad 13°47'02.5"N 89°11'06.4"W CUSCATANCINGO DE CIUDAD Futura Fase I, Cuscatancingo, Municipio de Ciudad FUTURA Delgado PUESTO DE COLONIA LOS C. SUIZA No. 13, CIUDAD DELGADO UNABLE TO VERIFY ALPES 80

PUESTO LAS VICTORIAS COLONIA SANTA ROSA, FINAL AV. LAS UNABLE TO VERIFY VICTORIAS CASA No.8, CUSCATANCINGO, CIUDAD DELGADO. PUESTO DE LIRIOS DEL C. PPAL. PUNTO DE BUSES 6-A, URB. LIRIOS DEL UNABLE TO VERIFY NORTE NTE. MARIONA. PUESTO DE SAN ANTONIO C. REAL MADRID COL. SN. ANT. KM. 11 CARRET. UNABLE TO VERIFY TROCAL DEL NTE. DELEGACION DE MEJICANOS EDIFS. 41-A Y 41-B, CENTRO URB. José SIMEON UNABLE TO VERIFY CAÑAS MEJICANOS. SUBDELEGACION DE Colonia Independencia, Calle 15 de Septiembre, Casa No. UNABLE TO VERIFY MEJICANOS 106, Mejicanos, Departamento de San Salvador. SUBDELEGACION SAN RAMON COL. SAN JOSE, CALLE SAN JUAN, CASA No. 6-7, UNABLE TO VERIFY SAN RAMON, MEJICANOS PUESTO DE COMUNIDAD AV. MONTREAL PJE. WILLINGTON No. 34, UNABLE TO VERIFY MONTREAL MEJICANOS PUESTO DE SAN ROQUE URBANIZACION SAN ROQUE, CALLE PPAL. S/N UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION C. EL ZUNZAL No. 9, COL. HERRERA UNABLE TO VERIFY AYUTUXTEPEQUE D.I.N MEJICANOS FINAL 29 AVENIDA NORTE No. 27 y CALLE EL 13°44'12.1"N 89°12'12.7"W BAMBU, COLONIA SCANDIA, MUNICIPIO AYUTUXTEPEQUE, DEPARTAMENTO DE SAN SALVADOR DELEGACION DE SAN ENT. A COL. LAS CAMPANITAS KM. 11 CARRET. A 13°38'59.1"N 89°10'56.2"W SALVADOR SUR COMALAPA. SUBDELEGACION DE SAN C. 25 DE ABRIL OTE. No. 62, SAN MARCOS UNABLE TO VERIFY MARCOS SUBDELEGACION DE PLANES KM. 10, FINCA SAN JORGE, SOBRE CALLE BALBOA UNABLE TO VERIFY DE RENDEROS Y 911 UNIDAD DE EMERGENCIAS C. ANTIGUA A ZACATECOLUCA KM.4 1/2, COL. EL UNABLE TO VERIFY 911-SAN MARCOS (Z-13) TRANSITO, C.PPAL.POL. LL, SAN MARCOS U.D.I.N. DE SAN MARCOS 1 CALLE ORIENTE, PASAJE No. 2 CASA No. 19, COL. 13°39'52.5"N 89°10'54.1"W EL MILAGRO, SAN MARCOS , MUNICIPIO DE SAN SALVADOR PATRULLEROS DE CAMINOS / KM. 18 CARRET. A COMALAPA, EX PEAJE SANTO UNABLE TO VERIFY SANTO TOMAS TOMAS PUESTO DE COLONIA VALLE COL. ALCAINE, AV.COLONIAL No. 7 13°38'59.1"N 89°10'56.3"W SAN MARCOS PUESTO CENIZAL C. PPAL No. 11, BLOCK C, COL. EL CENIZAL SAN UNABLE TO VERIFY MARCOS PUESTO DE COLONIA 10 DE COL. 10 DE OCTUBRE , C. PPAL. POLIGONO 5, BLK UNABLE TO VERIFY OCTUBRE A, SAN MARCOS PUESTO DE PANCHIMALCO C. PPAL., Bo. SAN ESTEBAN UNABLE TO VERIFY SECCION TURISTICA-PARQUE EDIF. ARTESANIAS, PQUE DE LA FAMILIA UNABLE TO VERIFY DE LA FAMILIA PUESTO DE SANTIAGO COMUNID. LAS MERCEDITAS CASA No. 1, FTE. A UNABLE TO VERIFY TEXACUANGOS REDONDEL. PUESTO DE ROSARIO DE Bo. EL CENTRO, C. PPAL. CONTIGUO INST. ARCE UNABLE TO VERIFY MORA S/N PUESTO DE SANTO TOMAS Calle principal, Barrio Las Mercedes, Colonia Santa UNABLE TO VERIFY Monica, Poligono No. 1, Casa No. 1, Municipio de Santo Tomas, Departamento San Salvador. DELEGACION DE CALLE MORAZAN, CASA No. 52, BARRIO EL UNABLE TO VERIFY CHALATENANGO CALVARIO U.D.I.N. DE CHALATENANGO HACIA 4 AVENIDA NORTE CASA No. 2, BARRIO EL UNABLE TO VERIFY CALVARIO, CHALATENANGO, FTE. A PARTIDO FMLN. DELEGACION DE BO. SAN JOSE , 1 CALLE PTE. No. 7, UNABLE TO VERIFY CHALATENANGO CHALATENANGO SUBDELEGACION CENTRO BARRIO SAN JOSE 1 CALLE OTE. ENTRE AV. UNABLE TO VERIFY CHALATENANGO FAJARDO Y 2 AVENIDA NORTE, ATRÁS EX MERCADO MUNICIPAL POLICIA DE TURISMO CANTON RIO CHIQUITO, CASERIO LAS CRUCES, UNABLE TO VERIFY CHALATENANGO JURSIDICCION SAN IGNACIO, CHALATENANGO SUBDELEGACION DE LA C. LOTIF. CAYAGUANCA KM. 83, Bo. EL TRANSITO, UNABLE TO VERIFY PALMA CHALATENANGO SUBDELEGACION DE NUEVA 2a. C. PTE. CASA S/N. UNABLE TO VERIFY CONCEPCION 81

CASETA POLICIAL DE AMAYO DESVIO HACIA AMAYO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE AGUA CALIENTE CALLE AL CANTON CERRO GRANDE, BARRIO EL UNABLE TO VERIFY CENTRO PUESTO DE ARCATAO C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE AZACUALPA AV. CENTRAL CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CITALA C. MAXIMILIANO HDEZ. MARTINEZ, Bo. SN. FCO. UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE LA LAGUNA BARRIO LAS VICTORIAS,CALLE PPAL., MUNICIPIO UNABLE TO VERIFY DE LA LAGUNA, CONTIGUO A ESC. RURAL, CHALATENANGO PUESTO DE CONCEPCION C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY QUEZALTEPEQUE PUESTO DE LA REINA Bo. EL CENTRO, PJE. PARROQUIAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE LAS PILAS CANTON LAS PILAS, JURISD. DE SAN IGNACIO UNABLE TO VERIFY DEPTO. DE CHALATENANGO. PUESTO DE POTONICO C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE REUBICACION C. PPAL. REDONDEL INTERIOR COL. UNABLE TO VERIFY REHUBICACION II CHALATENANGO. PUESTO DE SAN JOSE LAS C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY FLORES PUESTO DE TEJUTLA C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CALVARIO, EX-CENTA UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE DULCE NOMBRE C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY DE MARIA PUESTO DE EL CARRIZAL C. PPAL. Bo. El calvario UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE EL COYOLITO KM. 50 CARRET. TRONCAL DEL NTE. CASERIO EL UNABLE TO VERIFY COYOLITO PUESTO DE EL PARAISO C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE EL POY Bo. EL POY, CARRETERA TRONCAL DEL NORTE . UNABLE TO VERIFY CITALA, CHALATENANGO PUESTO MEDIO AMBIENTE EL C. OBRERO EL REFUGIO, CATON EL GRAMAL LA UNABLE TO VERIFY REFUGIO PALMA PUESTO DE NOMBRE DE JESUS C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY FRONTERA DE EL POY Bo. EL POY, ADUANA TTE. CITALA UNABLE TO VERIFY DELEGACION DE LA Av. Melvin Jones y 4 Calle Oriente, No. 2-7, galerias UNABLE TO VERIFY LIBERTAD CENTRO (SANTA tecleñas, Nva. San salvador, La Libertad TECLA) DELEGACION DE LA CARRETERA AL PUERTO DE LA LIBERTAD, KM. 11, UNABLE TO VERIFY LIBERTAD CENTRO LOCAL EXMOP, CONTIGUO MOTEL DORAL, L.L. UNIDAD DE EMERGENCIAS CALLE L-1 Y BLVD. BAYER, EDIFICIO UNABLE TO VERIFY 911-SANTA TECLA SALAVERRIA CACERES, SANTA TECLA, LA LIBERTAD SUBDELEGACION CENTRO 4 AV. SUR No. 17 CALLE DANIEL HERNANDEZ, UNABLE TO VERIFY FTE. A ESC. DANIEL HERNANDEZ,NVA, SS U.D.I.N. DE SANTA TECLA / 1 CALLE OTE. No. 4-2, SANTA TECLA UNABLE TO VERIFY CAFETALON S. A. T. I 1 CALLE OTE. No. 4-2, SANTA TECLA UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE ANTIGUO 2 CALLE PONIENTE No. 4-2, ANTIGUO CUSCATLAN, UNABLE TO VERIFY CUSCATLAN LA LIBERTAD PUESTO DE EL MATAZANO KM. 12 1/2 C. AL PUERTO DE LA LIB., FTE. A RES. UNABLE TO VERIFY VILLAS DEL MAR, CTON, EL MAT. PUESTO DE COLONIA C. REAL ENTRE PJE. 2 Y 3. COL. QUEZALT UNABLE TO VERIFY QUEZALTEPEC PUESTO DE SAN JUAN LOS KM. 21 CARRET.DE STA. TECLA A UNABLE TO VERIFY PLANES QUEZALTEPEQUE, CANTON SAN JUAN LOS PLANES JURISDIC. DE QUEZALTEPEQUE DEPTO. DE LA LIBERTAD. TALLER DE SANTA TECLA CARRETERA AL PUERTO DE LA LIBERTAD, KM. 11, UNABLE TO VERIFY LOCAL EXMOP, CONTIGUO MOTEL DORAL, L.L. DELEGACION DE LA 4 AVENIDA NORTE Y 2 AVENIDA SUR, No. 215, 13°43'31.1"N 89°21'57.3"W LIBERTAD NORTE (LOURDES, PASAJE PABLO NERUDA, LOURDES COLON COLON) 82

SUBDELEGACION LOURDES AVENIDA MAQUILISHUAT Y PASAJE DIVINA UNABLE TO VERIFY COLON PROVIDENCIA, LOURDES COLON, LA LIBERTAD , POR ES ESCUELA NACIONAL LAS ARBOLEDAS, CONTIGUO A IGLESIA CATOLICA PEQUEÑOS HERMANOS DE MARIA. SUBDELEGACION DE CAMPOS AVENIDA MAQUILISHUAT Y PASAJE DIVINA UNABLE TO VERIFY VERDES PROVIDENCIA, LOURDES COLON, LA LIBERTAD , POR ES ESCUELA NACIONAL LAS ARBOLEDAS, CONTIGUO A IGLESIA CATOLICA PEQUEÑOS HERMANOS DE MARIA. DELEGACION LA LIBERTAD KILOMETRO 25 CARRETERA HACIA SONSONATE, UNABLE TO VERIFY NORTE 911 LOURDES LOTIFICACION LAS BRISAS LOURDES COLON Y CALLE DALTON, LOURDES COLON, LA LIBERTAD DELEGACION LA LIBERTAD AVENIDA GENERAL MAXIMILIANO MARTINEZ Y UNABLE TO VERIFY NORTE CALLE GERARDO BARRIOS, LOURDES COLON, LA LIBERTAD.. PUESTO MOVIL ODAC Avenida Quezaltepeque, Senda 11, Norte, Urbanizacion UNABLE TO VERIFY BOTONCILLAL LOURDES Los Chorros Etapa No. 1, Municipio de Lourdes Colon, COLON Departamento de La Libertad. PUESTO MOVIL ODAC Departamento de La Libertad. kilometro 21 1⁄2 de la UNABLE TO VERIFY CAMPOS VERDES= POLIEDRO- Carretera CA-1, de Poniente a Oriente a 15 metros de la LOURDES COLON Gasolinera ESSO EL POLIEDRO, Municipio de Colon, Departamento de La Libertad. PUESTO MOVIL ODAC DESVIO CANTON SITIO EL NIÑO,LOT. SANTA MARTA, CA UNABLE TO VERIFY SAN JUAN OPICO/SITIO EL PANAMERICANA KM. 29 1/2, DESVIO SAN JUAN NIÑO/COM 21 OPICO, LA LIBERTAD/GASOLINERA ALBA NOVIEMBRE/CAMPOS VERDES DELEGACION DE 7 Calle Poniente, No.36 Barrio Guayabal, Quezaltepeque, 13°49'55.0"N 89°16'28.4"W QUEZALTEPEQUE La Libertad SUB DELEGACION DE 10 Calle Ote y Avenida Independencia FTE. A Colegio San UNABLE TO VERIFY QUEZALTEPEQUE Jose, Quezaltepeque DELEGACION DE BO. EL TRANSITO, 6 CALLE PTE. No. 34, UNABLE TO VERIFY QUEZALTEPEQUE QUEZALTEPEQUE, L.L SUBDELEGACION DE SAN 2a CALLE ORIENTE Y 4 AVENIDA NORTE, Bo. EL UNABLE TO VERIFY JUAN OPICO CENTRO No. 2,SAN JUAN OPICO PUESTO VILLA SUTCHI KILOMETRO 34 C DESVIO OPICO QUE CONDUCE UNABLE TO VERIFY QUEZALTEPEQUE PUESTO DE ATEOS KM. 31 1/2 C. A SONSONATE CANTON ATEOS UNABLE TO VERIFY SACACOYO SUBDELEGACION DE CIUDAD 3a. AV. NTE. No. 2B, CIUDAD ARCE, LA LIBERTAD 13°50'32.0"N 89°26'45.6"W ARCE PUESTO DE COMASAGUA C. ALEX MARTINEZ FTE. PARQUE CENT. UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE JAYAQUE 5a. C. PTE. Y AV. STAVEN, Bo. EL CARMEN UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SACACOYO AV. PPAL. NORTE , No. 2-6, BARRIO EL CALVARIO, UNABLE TO VERIFY SACACOYO PUESTO DE SAN MATIAS 1a. AV. SUR, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN PABLO 5a. AV. NTE. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY TACACHICO PUESTO DE TEPECOYO C. SOTELO LAINEZ Y 4a. AV. SUR UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE TALNIQUE C. PPAL. CASA S/N, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE JOYA DE CEREN C. B, CANTON JOYAS DE CEREN J. DE SAN JUAN UNABLE TO VERIFY OPICO CASETA DE VILLA TZU-CHI C. SAN ANTONIO CHANMICO, KM. 34 ,HDA. UNABLE TO VERIFY CHANMICO, CTON CHANMICO, SAN JUAN OPICO, L.L. BASE G.T.A. 11 Y 114 COL. CIUDAD OBRERA, POL.B,C. 26 DE ENERO No. UNABLE TO VERIFY 1Y 3, CIUDAD ARCE, LA LIBERTAD BASE G.T.A. DE LOURDES / BO. EL CENTRO, AVENIDA MAESTRO, COLON, L.L UNABLE TO VERIFY COLON CASETA DE PEAJE / CIUDAD CANTON SANTA LUCIA, CARRETERA CA1 , KM. 35, UNABLE TO VERIFY ARCE CIUDAD ARCE, L.L. DELEGACION DE COL. LAS CRUCITAS, C. PPAL. No.50 UNABLE TO VERIFY QUEZALTEPEQUE DELEGACION DE LA 2 da. CALLE ORIENTE POLIGONO 5, BARRIO EL UNABLE TO VERIFY LIBERTAD SUR CENTRO PUERTO LA LIBERTAD 83

DIVISION DE COMUNIDAD CONCHALIO, BOULEVARD UNABLE TO VERIFY INVESTIGACIONES LA CONCHALIO DEL PUERTO DE LA LIBERTAD A 100 LIBERTAD SUR METROS AL SUR DE UNIDAD MEDICA ISSS, DESPUES DE PUENTE COLIMA, LA LIBERTAD SUBDELEGACION DE LA KM. 59 CARRETERA DEL LITORAL, CASERIO EL UNABLE TO VERIFY LIBERTAD SUR JUTE PUESTO POLICIAL DE FINAL 7 AVE. SUR, CANCHA LA CHILAMA UNABLE TO VERIFY TURISMO DE LA LIBERTAD EXINDES, FTE. AL CEMENTERIO MUNICIPAL SUR PUERTO LA LIBERTAD. PUESTO DE CHIULTIUPAN C. PPAL. Bo. SANTO DOMINGO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE HUIZUCAR AV. EL MILAGRO Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE NUEVO 3a. C. PTE. CONTIGUO A TELECOM UNABLE TO VERIFY CUSCATLAN PUESTO DE SAN DIEGO C. PPAL. PLAYA SAN DIEGO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN JOSE C. PPAL. CTGO. ALCALDIA UNABLE TO VERIFY VILLANUEVA PUESTO DE SANTA CRUZ KM. 85 1/2 C. DEL LITORAL, CTON. MIZATA J. DE UNABLE TO VERIFY MIZATA LA LIBERTAD PUESTO DE TAMANIQUE 3 AVENIDA NORTE, COL. EL COCAL, POL. C, CASA UNABLE TO VERIFY No. 10, TAMANIQUE, LA LIBERTAD PUESTO DE TEOTEPEQUE C. A LA CUMBRE, FTE. CANCHA DE FOOT-BALL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE EL PALMARCITO CANTON EL PALMAR, C. EL LITORAL, Km. 49, UNABLE TO VERIFY TAMANIQUE SUBDELEGACION DE AV. OSCAR ARNULFO ROMERO, CASA NO. UNABLE TO VERIFY ZARAGOZA MUNICIPIO DE ZARAGOZA PUESTO CANGREJERA KILOMETRO 49 CARRETERA EL LITORAL, UNABLE TO VERIFY CANTON CANGREJERA, PUERTO LA LIBERTAD, LA LIBERTAD PUESTO MAJAHUAL KILOMETRO 40 CARRETERA EL LITORAL,CANTON UNABLE TO VERIFY EL MAJAHUAL, LA LIBERTAD PUESTO PNC EL TUNCO KILOMETRO 42, CARRETERA EL LITORAL, CALLE UNABLE TO VERIFY PPAL. PLAYA EL TUNCO, JURISDICCION DEL MUNICIPIO DE TAMANIQUE, LA LIBERTAD DELEGACION DE AVENIDA MORAZAN, FRENTE A COLONIA IVU UNABLE TO VERIFY AHUACHAPAN TALLER DE AHUACHAPAN CTON. ASHAPUCO, COL. SAN JUAN, No. 36 UNABLE TO VERIFY U.D.I.N. DE AHUACHAPAN Bo. EL CENTRO, 4a. AVENIDA NORTE UNABLE TO VERIFY ANTIEXTORCIONES Bo. EL CENTRO, 4a. AVENIDA NORTE UNABLE TO VERIFY AHUACHAPAN SUBDELEGACION DE CARA 6a. CALLE ORIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY SUCIA PUESTO DE SAN FRANCISCO Bo. EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY MENENDEZ SUBDELEGACION CENTRO Bo. EL CENTRO, 2a. CALLE ORIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE LAS CHINAMAS KM. 107, CARRETERA PANAMERICANA HACIA UNABLE TO VERIFY GUATEMALA FUERZA BINACIONAL/LAS KM. 107, CARRETERA PANAMERICANA UNABLE TO VERIFY CHINAMAS PUESTO DE LLANO DE DOÑA CTON. LLANO DE DOÑA MARIA, COL. SAN LUIS UNABLE TO VERIFY MARIA PUESTO DE LA LABOR PASAJE SUR Y 2 CALLE PONIENTE, BARRIO LA UNABLE TO VERIFY UNION TURIN, AHUACHAPAN SUBDELEGACION DE Bo. EL ANGEL, 4a. AV. SUR Y 3a. CALLE ORIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY ATIQUIZAYA PUESTO DE SAN LORENZO CALLE PRINCIPAL, CONT. A TELECOM UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE EL REFUGIO CALLE SALVADOR RODRIGUEZ PONIENTE Y 13°58'29.9"N 89°42'24.3"W AVENIDA CANALES PANAMA SUBDELEGACION DE ATACO 6 CALLE ORIENTE Y 4 AV. SUR , Bo. EL CALVARIO, UNABLE TO VERIFY CONCEPCION ATACO PUESTO DE APANECA Bo. SAN JOSE, AV. CENTRAL Y 3a. CALLE ORIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO TURIN C GERARDO PTE. FTE A JUZGADOS DE PAZ UNABLE TO VERIFY 84

PUESTO DE TACUBA 2 CALLE PONIENTE Y 1 Y 3 AV. SUR No. 9, UNABLE TO VERIFY BARRIOL EL CENTRO , TACUBA, AHUACHAPAN SUBDELEGACION DE JUJUTLA Bo. LAS FLORES, 1a. AV. NORTE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE GUAYMANGO Bo. EL CENTRO, FRENTE AL COSTADO NORTE DE UNABLE TO VERIFY LA IGLESIA PUESTO DE PLATANARES CTON. PLATANARES, FTE. A IGLESIA CATOLICA UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN PEDRO Bo. EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUXTLA PUESTO DE BARRA DE CTON. BARRA DE SANTIAGO, EN 2 AVENIDA SUR, UNABLE TO VERIFY SANTIAGO/POLITUR CONTIGUO A IGLESIA PRINCIPE DE PAZ, AHUACHAPAN SAN CRISTOBAL KM. 112, CARRETERA PANAMERICANA, SANTA UNABLE TO VERIFY CRUZ RESGUARDO FRONTERIZO DE CTON. EL JOCOTILLO, SAN FRANCISCO UNABLE TO VERIFY LA HACHADURA MENENDEZ RECINTO FISCAL DE LA CTON. EL JOCOTILLO, SAN FRANCISCO UNABLE TO VERIFY HACHADURA MENENDEZ UNIDAD ANTINARCOTICOS DE CTON. EL JOCOTILLO, SAN FRANCISCO UNABLE TO VERIFY LA HACHADURA MENENDEZ SUBDELEGACION ADUANA LAS CHINAMAS, PUENTE EL JOBO 14°01'04.4"N 89°54'20.1"W FRONTERIZA DE CONTROL MIGRATORIO LAS CHINAMAS D.A.N CONTROL DE ADUANA LAS CHINAMAS, PUENTE EL JOBO 14°01'04.4"N 89°54'20.1"W QUIMICOS/FRONTERAS LAS CHINAMAS DELEGACION DE SANTA ANA 14 Av. SUR Y 25 CALLE PONIENTE, EDIF. MARIO 13°59'02.8"N 89°33'55.8"W CALVO, SANTA ANA TRIBUNAL DISCIPLINARIO 14 Av. SUR Y 25 CALLE PONIENTE, EDIF. MARIO 13°59'02.8"N 89°33'55.8"W REGION OCCIDENTAL CALVO, SANTA ANA PUESTO MOVIL PARQUE Bo. COLON,CALLE JOSE MARIANO, ENTRE 14 AV. UNABLE TO VERIFY COLON SURY AV. JOSE MATIAS DELGADO,FTE A PLAZUELACOLON, PQUE COLON, SANTA ANA PUESTO MOVIL PARQUE Bo. EL CENTRO CALLE LIBERTAD ORIENTE ENTRE UNABLE TO VERIFY LIBERTAD 1 AV. Y AV. INDEPENDENCIA, PQUE LIBERTAD, STA, ANA PUESTO SANTA ANA NORTE Lot. Rocicler No. 10, Km 69, Carretera a Metapan, fte. UNABLE TO VERIFY ALBICASA; Santa Ana SUBDELEGACION CENTRO CALLE ALDEA SAN ANTONIO, EXLOCAL CARIBE UNABLE TO VERIFY MOTOR, SANTA ANA SUBDELEGACION DE 7 Calle Poniente y Final 12 Avenida Sur,No. 41, Barrio San 13°58'52.7"N 89°41'03.9"W CHALCHUAPA Sebastian,Chalchuapa SUBDELEGACION DE Kilometro 113, Barrio Pacheco, Carretera internacional de UNABLE TO VERIFY METAPAN Santa Ana a Metapan, solo lo con la diferencia que es Frente al Hospital General de Metapan, Santa Ana. SUBDELEGACION DE EL AV. 14 DE DIC. , Bo. SAN ANT. CONTIGUUO A UNABLE TO VERIFY CONGO LINEA FERREA SUBDELEGACION DE 2a. C. PTE. Y AV. FRAY FELIPE DE JESUS MORAGA UNABLE TO VERIFY FINANZAS / SANTA ANA NTE. EX - ADUANAS SUBDELEGACION AV. José DOMINGO PEÑATE SUR No. 7 UNABLE TO VERIFY CANDELARIA DE LA FRONTERA PUESTO DE COATEPEQUE 8a. C. PTE. Y 1a. AV. SUR, Bo. SAN José UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE MASAHUAT C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN SEBASTIAN C. PPAL. AV. GALDAMEZ, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY SALITRILLO SUBDELEGACION DE 4a. C. OTE. Y 2a. AV. SUR , Bo. EL CALVARIO UNABLE TO VERIFY TEXISTEPEQUE PUESTO DE EL COCO ENT. C. PPAL. CANTON EL COCO, JURISDIC. DE UNABLE TO VERIFY CHALCHUAPA PUESTO DE EL PORVENIR C. PPAL. CASA COMUNAL, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE LAGO DE CASERIO LA BENDICION, CANTON LA LAGUNA, J. UNABLE TO VERIFY COATEPEQUE DE COATEPEQUE PUESTO EL TINTERAL C. PPAL. CANTON EL TINTERAL, J. DE UNABLE TO VERIFY COATEPEQUE 85

PUESTO DE PLANES DE LA LAGO DE COATEPEQUE,CANTON PLANES DE LA UNABLE TO VERIFY LAGUNA LAGUNA, CALLE PPAL. , EL CONGO. PUESTO DE SAN JACINTO NO ADDRESS UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE LAS CRUCES KM. 79 1/2 C. DE SANTA ANA A SONSON. UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE PEAJE A SANTA URBANIZACION EL TREBOL, AUTOPISTA SALIDA UNABLE TO VERIFY ANA A SAN SALVADOR PUESTO PNC CANTARHANA CARRETERA A SANTA ANA HACIA SONSONATE, UNABLE TO VERIFY ZONA FRANCA MATAZANO, MUNIPIO DE SANTA ANA PUESTO PNC CIUDAD REAL BOULEVARD PRADO, RESIDENCIAL SEVILLA No. UNABLE TO VERIFY 1, LOCAL 5 Y 6, POL. AA, FTE A REDONDEL PERIQUITO, CHALCHUAPA, CTON EL AMATE, SANTA ANA. SUBDELEGACION DE SAN ADUANA SAN CRISTOBAL 14°11'02.1"N 89°40'02.4"W CRISTOBAL(DIVISION FINANZAS) PUESTO SALAMO (EX-SAN MONTEBELLO/ EL CONGO, CASERIO UNABLE TO VERIFY BLAS) MONTEBELLO, C. PPAL. PUESTO DE SAN GERONIMO C. PPAL. CANTON SAN GERONIMO, J. DE METAPAN UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE GUARNECIA CASERIO GUARNECIA CANTON EL JUTE, UNABLE TO VERIFY JURISDIC. DE TEXISTEPEQUE DEPTO. DE SANTA ANA. PUESTO DE SANTA LEONOR KM. 62 1/2 C. ANT. A S.S., URB. BELLA VISTA PJE. A UNABLE TO VERIFY CASA N. 3, STA. ANA PUESTO DE SANTA ROSA C. LA GLORIA, Bo. EL CENTRO, SANTA ANA UNABLE TO VERIFY GUACHIPILIN PUESTO DE SANTIAGO DE LA C. GUZMAPA, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY FRONTERA PUESTO DE SAN ANTONIO Colonia España, Calle Principal Block “A” No. 6, San UNABLE TO VERIFY PAJONAL Antonio Pajonal, Departamento de Santa Ana. FRONTERA DE ANGUIATU FRONTERA ANGUIATU METAPAN, SANTA ANA 14°24'43.3"N 89°26'11.5"W FRONTERA DE SAN PARAJE GALAN, KM. 92, CANDELARIA LA 14°11'02.0"N 89°40'02.4"W CRISTOBAL FRONTERA, SANTA ANA REGUARDO DE ANGUIATU FRONTERA ANGUIATU METAPAN, SANTA ANA 14°24'43.3"N 89°26'11.5"W DIV. DE POLICIA TECNICA Y COL. EL PALMAR, 35 CALLE PONIENTE,SANTA 13°58'43.1"N 89°34'00.9"W CIENTIFICA / SANTA ANA ANA UNIDAD DE EMERGENCIAS Bo. NUEVO EDEN, 25 CALLE PONIENTE, SANTA 13°59'02.9"N 89°33'55.9"W 911-SANTA ANA ANA D.E.C.O. DE SANTA ANA 37 Calle Oriente y Avenida Las Amapolas, Lotificacion UNABLE TO VERIFY Los Santos, Canton La Loma, Santa Ana DIVISION DE PROTECCION A 2 CALLE PONIENTE ENTRE 10 AVENIDA NORTE Y UNABLE TO VERIFY VICTIMAS Y TESTIGOS / JOSE MATIAS DELGADO NORTE No.35, SANTA SANTA ANA ANA TALLERES DE SANTA ANA Bo. SANTA LUCIA, AV. FRAY FELIPE MORAGA UNABLE TO VERIFY NORTE, SANTA ANA DELEGACION DE SONSONATE 4 CALLE ORIENTE Y 2 AVENIDA SUR, EN HOTEL 13°43'07.1"N 89°43'40.8"W ORBE, MUNICIPIO DE SONSONATE, SONSONATE. D.I.N. DE SONSONATE 4 CALLE ORIENTE Y 2 AVENIDA SUR, EN HOTEL 13°43'07.1"N 89°43'40.8"W ORBE, MUNICIPIO DE SONSONATE, SONSONATE. SUB DELEGACION CENTRO DE 10 AV. SUR Y BOULEVARD OSCAR OSORIO, 13°42'52.2"N 89°43'31.6"W SONSONATE ANTIGUO LOCAL DEL MOP , SONSONATE. DELEGACION DE SONSONATE SAN ANTONIO DEL MONTE, BO. EL CALVARIO, 3 UNABLE TO VERIFY AV NORTE,SONSONATE SUBDELEGACION CENTRO NIDA FLAVIAN MUCCI No. 7 - 4, BARRIO UNABLE TO VERIFY Base Centroamerica/San Antonio MEJICANOS, SONSOna del Monte SUBDELEGACION DE CALLE PPAL. CASA 84, COL. RAZA II, ACAJUTLA UNABLE TO VERIFY ACAJUTLA SUBDELEGACION DE 1a. C. OTE. Y 4a. AV. NTE. No. 21, Bo. SAN UNABLE TO VERIFY ARMENIA SEBASTIAN,ARMENIA SUBDELEGACION DE IZALCO 1a. C.OTE. No. 6 y 7 , BARRIO SAN SEBASTIAN 13°44'49.6"N 89°40'27.1"W SUBDELEGACION DE JUAYUA 1 AV. NORTE No.1-5, JUAYUA UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CALUCO AV. 29 DE JUNIO Bo. EL CENTRO, FTE. UNIDAD DE UNABLE TO VERIFY SALUD 86

PUESTO DE METALIO Km. 90 Carretera hacia la Hachadura, Col. San José , UNABLE TO VERIFY Canton Metalio,Sonsonate PUESTO DE NAHUILINGO 2 C. Pte. , Bo. Santiago, Fte. Alcaldia Nahuilingo UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE FINAL 3 AV. NORTE No.12, LA TRINIDAD UNABLE TO VERIFY NAHUIZALCO NAHUIZALCO DIHO NAHUIZALCO 5 Av. Sur y 2 Calle Poniente, Nahuizalco, Sonsonate 13°46'45.2"N 89°44'21.3"W PUESTO DE LAS HIGUERAS C. PPAL. , CANTON LAS HIGUERAS J. DE IZALCO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN ANTONIO DEL C. A CANTON LAS HOJAS Y 3a. AV. SUR UNABLE TO VERIFY MONTE PUESTO DE SAN JULIAN COL. SIMON BOLIVAR FINAL , SAN JULIAN UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SANTA CATARINA C. PPAL. No. 9, Bo. EL ROSARIO UNABLE TO VERIFY MASAHUAT PUESTO DE SAN JOSE LA AV. PPAL. CTON PPAL. CTON . SAN JOSE LA UNABLE TO VERIFY MAJADA MAJADA,JUAYUA PUESTO DE CUISNAHUAT BO. EL CALVARIO Y CALLE 15 DE SEPTIEMBRE, UNABLE TO VERIFY MUNICIPIO DE GUISNAHUAT, FTE. A LOS JUZGADOS,SONSONATE PUESTO DE APANCOYO KM. 95 CARRET. DEL LITORAL , CASERIO UNABLE TO VERIFY APANCOYO, CANTON APANCOYO JURID. DE ACAJUTLA DEPTO. DE SONSONATE. PUESTO DE SALINITAS Canton Punta Remedios,Contiguo a Residencial UNABLE TO VERIFY Salinitas,Jurisdiccion de Acajutla, Sonsonate. PUESTO DE SANTA ISABEL CALLE PPAL., SANTA ISABEL ISHUATAN UNABLE TO VERIFY ISHUATAN PUESTO DE LOS NARANJOS LOTIFICACION ALTOS DE LOS NARANJOS, UNABLE TO VERIFY JURISDICCION JUYUA,CARRETERA A SONSONATE PUESTO DE SALCOATITAN CALLE PPAL., ESQUINA OPUESTA DEL PAQUE. UNABLE TO VERIFY CENTRAL PUESTO DE SANTO DOMINGO Bo. EL ROSARIO, AVENIDA CENTRAL NORTE, STO. UNABLE TO VERIFY DE GUZMAN DOMINGO GUZMAN SUBDELEGACION SONZACATE 2 AVENIDA NORTE Y 2Y 3 CALLE ORIENTE, UNABLE TO VERIFY SONZACATE PUESTO MOVIL SONSONATE BARRIO EL CENTRO 1 CALLE ORIENTE ENTRE AV. UNABLE TO VERIFY MORAZAN Y AV. CLAUDIA LARS, PARQUE CENTRAL,SONSONATE ODAC 14 DE SEPTIEMBRE Col. 14 de Diciembre, Av. Morazan, contiguo Estadio UNABLE TO VERIFY Municipal, Interior del Circulo Estundiantil, Sonsonate ODAC EL SAUCE URBANIZACION EL SAUCE EN 4 AVENIDA NORTE, UNABLE TO VERIFY BLOCK H, CASA No. 49, SONZACATE, DEPARTAMENTO DE SONSONATE. ODAC BELEN COLONIA BELEN EN 7 CALLE ORIENTE EN LA UNABLE TO VERIFY INTERSECCION DE LA 24 AVENIDA NORTE , CASETA POLICIAL, FRENTE A CANCHA EL CEBOLLAL, DEPARTAMENTO DE SONSONATE. ODAC SAN GENARO COLONIA SAN GENARO, EN 6 CALLE Y FINAL 1 UNABLE TO VERIFY AVENIDA NORTE, LOTE No. 670 Y No. 671, DEPARTAMENTO DE SONSONATE ODAC ASTILLERO ACAJUTLA C PPAL. A LA PLAYA, COSTADO OTE. DE HOTEL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUERTO VIEJO, ACAJUTLA ODAC SANTA EGUENIA Calle Ppal. Blk 13 casa No. 6 , punto de buses col. Santa UNABLE TO VERIFY Eugenia, Sonzocate. ODAC LA PONDEROSA Colonia la Ponderosa , Poligono No. 3, final del pasaje 06, UNABLE TO VERIFY Lote No. 60, Municipio de Sonzacate Sonsonate. ODAC SENSUNAPAN COLONIA SENSUNAPAN, 6 Avenida Sur, y Calle UNABLE TO VERIFY principal de la Colonia SENSUNAPAN, Sonsonate. ODAC LA TERMINAL NUEVA Calle a Nahuilingo , Local de Terminal SEDAS , costado UNABLE TO VERIFY "SEDAS" Nor- Oriente , Entrada a La Terminal Nueva de Buses SEDAS, Sonsonate ODAC LOS COBANOS Calle a los Cobanos y Desvio a Club Royal de Decameron UNABLE TO VERIFY Salinitas, Sonsonate. CASETA PNC MERCADITO EL 1 Calle Oriente y 8 Avenida Norte, Barrio El Angel, UNABLE TO VERIFY ANGEL Mercadito El Angel, mercadito El Angel, Costado Poniente, Sonsonate PARQUEO DE CHATARRA / CALLE PPAL. ,COL. ENTRE RIOS, AL COSTADO SUR UNABLE TO VERIFY NAHUILINGO ORIENTE DEL PUNTO DE BUSES DE LA RUTA 53C, 87

JURISDICCION DE NAHUILINGO, DEPTO. SONSONATE PUESTO DE CONTROL DAN / ZONA INDUSTRIAL ACAJUTLA, CALLE AL UNABLE TO VERIFY ACAJUTLA MUELLE, ACAJUTLA, SONSONATE PUESTO DE CONTROL DAN / COL. OBRERA II, BLVD. OSCAR OSORIO, UNABLE TO VERIFY ACAJUTLA ACAJUTLA PUESTO DE CONTROL DAN / ZONA INDUSTRIAL ACAJUTLA, CALLE AL UNABLE TO VERIFY ACAJUTLA MUELLE, ACAJUTLA, SONSONATE SUBDELEGACION DE ZONA INDUSTRIAL ACAJUTLA, BLVD. OSCAR UNABLE TO VERIFY FINANZAS / ACAJUTLA OSORIO, ACAJUTLA DIIVISION DE FRONTERAS / ZONA INDUSTRIAL ACAJUTLA, BLVD. OSCAR UNABLE TO VERIFY ACAJUTLA OSORIO, ACAJUTLA CASETA DE FINANZAS / ZONA INDUSTRIAL ACAJUTLA, BLVD. OSCAR UNABLE TO VERIFY ACAJUTLA OSORIO, ACAJUTLA DIVISION DE PUERTOS Y ZONA INDUSTRIAL ACAJUTLA, CALLE AL 13°34'30.6"N 89°50'01.2"W AEROPUERTOS / ACAJUTLA MUELLE, ACAJUTLA, SONSONATE DEPARTAMENTO DE LOTIFICACION INCLAN, LOTE No. 2, CARRETERA UNABLE TO VERIFY INTELIGENCIA POLICIAL- HACIA ACAJUTLA, MUNICIPIO SONSONATE, SONSONATE DEPARTAMENTO DE SONSONATE UNIDAD DEPTAL. INV. FISCAL- LOTIFICACION INCLAN, LOTE No. 2, CARRETERA UNABLE TO VERIFY UDIF SONSONATE HACIA ACAJUTLA, MUNICIPIO SONSONATE, DEPARTAMENTO DE SONSONATE DEPARTAMENTO DE LOCAL LOTIFICACION INCLAN, LOTE No. 2, CARRETERA UNABLE TO VERIFY ANTIEXTORCIONES- HACIA ACAJUTLA, MUNICIPIO SONSONATE, SONSONATE /(ELA) DEPARTAMENTO DE SONSONATE DELEGACION DE CABAÑAS Final Avenida Libertad, Barrio Los Remedios 13°52'40.6"N 88°37'37.8"W Sensuntepeque, Departamento de Cabañas. SUBDELEGACION CENTRO 6 AV. NORTE No.10, BARRIO LOS REMEDIOS, UNABLE TO VERIFY SENSUNTEPEQUE SUBDELEGACION DE 4a. AV. NTE. Y 9a. C. OTE. No. 35, Bo. SAN MIGUEL 13°50'42.5"N 88°50'56.2"W ILOBASCO PUESTO DE SAN ISIDRO C. BOANERGES CHAVEZ PTE., Bo. EL CALVARIO 13°49'57.1"N 88°43'10.5"W PUESTO DE GUACOTECTI C. ANTIGUA A SENSUNTEPEQUE UNABLE TO VERIFY (AGUAS ZARCAS) PUESTO DE JUTIAPA 4a. AV. NTE. CONTIGUO A TELECOM UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE TEJUTEPEQUE CALLE AL CEMENTERIO, BARRIO EL CENTRO No. UNABLE TO VERIFY 14 PUESTO DE CIUDAD DOLORES AV. DOLORES No. 4, Bo. SAN ANTONIO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CINQUERA C. BLANCO, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SANTA MARTA CANTON SANTA MARTHA, JURISD. DE CIUDAD UNABLE TO VERIFY VICTORIA DEPTO. DE CABAÑAS. PUESTO DE CIUDAD VICTORIA AV. José MATIAS DELGADO Y C. NUEVA, Bo. EL UNABLE TO VERIFY CENTRO PUESTO DE SAN NICOLAS CASERIO SAN NICOLAS, CALLE PRINCIPAL, UNABLE TO VERIFY SENSUNTEPEQUE DELEGACION DE CUSCATLAN 2a. C. PTE. CASA S/N, Bo. SAN NICOLAS UNABLE TO VERIFY COJUTEPEQUE TRANSITO TERRESTRE Final 8 Calle Oriente, Casa No. 21, Barrio San Juan UNABLE TO VERIFY CUSCATLAN Cojutepeque, Frente a Subdelegación Centro de Cojutepeque, Departamento de Cuscatlán. BASE OPERATIVA 911 3 Calle Oriente, Barrio Santa lucia casa No. 35, UNABLE TO VERIFY CUSCATLAN Departamento de Cuscatlan. SUBDELEGACION DE 7 AV. SUR, Bo. SAN NICOLAS, COJUTEPEQUE UNABLE TO VERIFY CUSCATLAN SUBDELEGACION CENTRO 8 CALLE ORIENTE. No.21, BARRIO SAN JUAN, UNABLE TO VERIFY COJUTEPEQUE SUBDELEGACION DE 4a. C. OTE. Y AV. 15 DE SEPT., Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY SUCHITOTO SUBDELEGACION DE SAN C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PEDRO PERULAPAN SUBDELEGACION DE SAN Bo. EL CENTRO, 1a. AV. SUR, FTE. AL MERCADO UNABLE TO VERIFY RAFAEL CEDROS MPAL. PUESTO DE SAN RAMON C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SANTA CRUZ C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY ANALQUITO 88

PUESTO DE SAN BARTOLOME 1a. C. PTE. Y AV. FELIPE DE PAZ, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PERULAPIA PUESTO DE SAN JOSE 2a. AV. SUR, Bo. LA VIRGEN 13°50'09.0"N 89°05'43.1"W GUAYABAL PUESTO DE TENANCINGO 2a. C. PTE. Y AV. CENTRAL, Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE EL CARMEN BARRIO EL CENTRO, C. PPAL. CONTIGUO UNABLE TO VERIFY ALCALDIA MUNICIPAL. PUESTO DE SANTA CRUZ Bo. EL CENTRO, C. LA EXESTACION UNABLE TO VERIFY MICHAPA FERROCARRIL, STA. CRUZ MICHAPA PUESTO DE ORATORIO DE C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY CONCEPCION PUESTO DE CANDELARIA 1a. C. OTE. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY DELEGACION DE LA PAZ 3 AV. SUR, No. 12B, SAN JOSE ZACATECOLUCA, LA 13°30'22.9"N 88°52'05.5"W PAZ 911 SAN JUAN NONUALCO CALLE PPAL. Y 4 CALLE PONIENTE Bo. UNABLE TO VERIFY CONCEPCION, MUNICIPIO DE SAN JUAN NONUALCO, LA PAZ SUBDELEGACION Bo. EL CENTRO, AV. JOSE MATIAS DELGADO UNABLE TO VERIFY CENTRO{ZACATECOLUCA} No.21-A SUBDELEGACION DE C. MORAZAN , Bo. EL CENTRO. CONTG. ALCALDIA UNABLE TO VERIFY OLOCUILTA MUNICIPAL SUBDELEGACION DE F. AV. PROGRESO Bo. EL ANGEL UNABLE TO VERIFY SANTIAGO NONUALCO SUBDELEGACION DE SAN AV. ALEJANDRO MERLOS Bo. EL CENT. UNABLE TO VERIFY PEDRO MASAHUAT ODAC MOVIL EL CARMEN, LOTIFICACION MIRAFLORES No. 1 EN 14 AVENIDA UNABLE TO VERIFY SAN PEDRO MASAHUAT LOS GERANIOS, CANTON EL CARMEN, SAN PEDRO MASAHUAT, DEPARTAMENTO DE LA PAZ( FURGON MOVIL). SUBDELEGACION DE EL KM. 46 1/2 C. ZACATECOLUCA , DESVIO ROSARIO UNABLE TO VERIFY PEDREGAL DE LA PAZ PUESTO DE PARAISO DE BO. EL CENTRO C. DIONISIO VELASQUEZ, . UNABLE TO VERIFY OSORIO PUESTO DE CUYULTITAN C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE ROSARIO DE LA VARRET. LITORAL Bo. EL ANGEL UNABLE TO VERIFY PAZ PUESTO DE SAN LUIS TALPA AV. LUIS RIVAS VIDES Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN MIGUEL C. PPAL. ALFREDO ESPINO Bo. EL CENT. UNABLE TO VERIFY TEPEZONTES PUESTO DE SAN PEDRO 4 AV. NORTE Y C. PPAL. Bo. EL CALV. UNABLE TO VERIFY NONUALCO PUESTO DE SAN RAFAEL 3a. AV. NTE. No. 10 Bo. EL CALVARIO 13°30'11.7"N 88°55'27.5"W OBRAJUELO PUESTO DE SAN FRANCISCO C. LA RONDA Bo. SAN FCO. UNABLE TO VERIFY CHINAMECA PUESTO DE SAN JUAN 2a. AV. SUR PJE. COSME DE SOTO Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY NONUALCO PUESTO DE SAN JUAN TALPA C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO, FTE. ALCALDIA MUNIC. UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN JUAN CALLE PPAL. Bo. EL CALVARIO CASA S/N, ATRÁS UNABLE TO VERIFY TEPEZONTES IGLESIA EL CALVARIO DE SAN JUAN TEPEZONTES, LA PAZ PUESTO DE SAN LUIS LA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL, FRENTE A UNABLE TO VERIFY HERRADURA LA IGLESIA CATOLICA, SAN LUIS LA HERRADURA PUESTO DE LA ZUNGANERA PLAYA LA ZUNGANERA UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE COSTA DEL SOL TURICENTRO COSTA DEL SOL, A LADO DEL UNABLE TO VERIFY ESTERO, KM. 67 1/2, LA PAZ PUESTO DE MERCEDES LA C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY CEIBA PUESTO DE MONTELIMAR ENTRADA COL. MONTELIMAR CARRET. A UNABLE TO VERIFY COMALAPA JURISDICCION DE OLOCUILTA. PUESTO DE SAN JOSE LAS Carretera a la Costa del Sol, kilometro 54 1⁄2 , Lotificacion UNABLE TO VERIFY ISLETAS las Hojas, Entrada a Caserio los Ranchos , Canton San Jose Las Isletas, Municipio de San Pedro Masahuat. CASETA DE OLOCUILTA KM. 27 CARRET. A COMALAPA EX - PEAJ. UNABLE TO VERIFY 89

PATRULLEROS DE CAMINOS / KM. 40 CARRETERA A COMALAPA , SAN LUIS UNABLE TO VERIFY COMALAPA TALPA, LA PAZ PUESTO PALESTINA AV. NABLUES, No.66, COL.. VILLA PALESTINA, UNABLE TO VERIFY CTON. LAS FLORES, SAN PEDRO MASAHUAT, LA PAZ PUESTO DE SANTA MARIA Calle ppal. Barrio Las Delicias, No. 250, contiguo a Pasaje UNABLE TO VERIFY OSTUMA Las Marias, fte. A Igleis a Evangelica, Municipio de Santamaria Ostuma, la paz U.D.I.N. DE ZACATECOLUCA Final Calle Rafael Osorio , Edificio Ex/ Hotel Vista UNABLE TO VERIFY Hermosa, Colonia La Esperanza, Zacatecoluca, Departamento de La Paz. DELEGACION DE SAN 1 Calle Oriente No. 16, Bo. El Santuario, Costado Sur de la UNABLE TO VERIFY VICENTE Iglesia Catedral de San Vicente DELEGACION SAN VICENTE 8 CALLE PONIENTE No. 22, BO. SAN JUAN DE DIOS , UNABLE TO VERIFY (BARTOLINAS) SAN VICENTE SUBDELEGACION CENTRO 2 CALLE ORIENTE NO.52, BO. SAN FRANCISCO UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE 3a. C. PTE. Y AV. 25 DE JULIO UNABLE TO VERIFY APASTEPEQUE SUBDELEGACION DE SAN 2a. AV. SUR Bo. EL TRANSITO UNABLE TO VERIFY SEBASTIAN PUESTO DE SAN CARLOS DESVIO SAN NICOLAS LEMPA, KM 8, C. A LA PITA UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN JACINTO C. PANAMERICANA, KM. 68, CTON. SAN JACINTO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO POLICIAL PUENTE CARRETERA PANAMERICANA, KILOMETRO 90, UNABLE TO VERIFY CUSCATLAN CANTON SAN LORENZO, MUNICIPIO DE SAN IDELFONSO, SAN VICENTE PUESTO DE SAN NICOLAS CASERIO SAN NICOLAS LEMPA, KM 79, C. UNABLE TO VERIFY LEMPA LITORAL PUESTO DE SANTA CRUZ C. EL LITORAL KM. 73 1/2, A 50 MTS. FTE. FABRICA UNABLE TO VERIFY PORRILLO DE QUESO PETACONES SUBDELEGACION DE FINAL C. MORAZAN, SOBRE C. A ZACATE. UNABLE TO VERIFY TECOLUCA PUESTO DE GUADALUPE AV. SALVADOR PLATERO No. 63 UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN CAYETANO BO. SAN CAYETANO, DETRÁS DE LA UNIDAD DE UNABLE TO VERIFY ISTEPEQUE SALUD PUESTO DE TEPETITAN CALLE LA RONDA, Y ANTIGUA CALLE TEPETITAN UNABLE TO VERIFY NO. 7 PUESTO DE SAN ESTEBAN 6a. AV. NTE., Bo. CONCEPCION UNABLE TO VERIFY CATARINA PUESTO DE SAN ILDEFONSO Bo. EL CENTRO COSTADO NTE. IGLESIA SAN UNABLE TO VERIFY IDELFONSO,SAN VICENTE PUESTO DE SAN LORENZO AV. 10 DE AGOSTO, FTE. PARQUE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SANTA CLARA 4 CALLE. PTE. LOCAL ALCALDIA SANTA CLARA UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SANTO DOMINGO AV. 5 DE NOV., BARRIO EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE VERAPAZ 1a. C. PTE., Bo. MERCEDES CONT. A JUZGADOS UNABLE TO VERIFY TRIBUNAL DISCIPLINARIO BLVD. JACINTO CASTELLANOS No. 35, SAN 13°38'25.6"N 88°47'35.5"W REGION PARACENTRAL VICENTE DELEGACION DE SAN MIGUEL ENTRE 10 Y 8 AVENIDA SUR CENTRO DE 13°28'15.4"N 88°11'01.8"W GOBIERNO, SAN MIGUEL DIV. DE VICTIMAS Y TESTIGOS BARRIO SN FCO AV. GERARDO BARRIOS 607, SAN UNABLE TO VERIFY REGION ORIENTAL MIGUEL SOLVENCIAS SAN MIGUEL 10 AVENIDA SUR Y 9 CALLE ORIENTE, CENTRO DE UNABLE TO VERIFY GOBIERNO SAN MIGUEL, EXOFICINAS DE MIGRACION, SAN MIGUEL SUBDELEGACION DE Bo. DOLORES, AVENIDA 15 DE SEPTIEMBRE UNABLE TO VERIFY CHINAMECA SUBDELEGACION DE AV. LA JUVENTUD CASA S/N, Bo. EL CALVARIO UNABLE TO VERIFY ULUAZAPA SUBDELEGACION DE EL 2a. AV. NTE. No. 15 Y C. 14 DE DIC. UNABLE TO VERIFY TRANSITO PUESTO DE SESORI 1a. AV. SUR, FTE. A PARQUE MUNIC. UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE NUEVA Calle Ppal. Nueva Guadalupe, Frente a la Alacaldia, San UNABLE TO VERIFY GUADALUPE Miguel 90

PUESTO DE COLONIA 15 DE 8a. C. PTE. Y 1a. AV. SUR, Bo. SAN José SAN MIGUEL UNABLE TO VERIFY SEPTIEMBRE SUBDELEGACION CIUDAD 4 AVENIDA SUR, CASA No. 3, BARRIO UNABLE TO VERIFY BARRIOS CONCEPCION , CIUDAD BARRIOS PUESTO DE CHAPELTIQUE C. PPAL. Bo. SAN PEDRO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CAROLINA El Centro, 2 Calle Pte casa No3, Ciudad de Carolina, UNABLE TO VERIFY Depto. de San PUESTO DE CHIRILAGUA C. PPAL. Bo. EL CENTRO, Local de Alcaldia UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE LOLOTIQUE Barrio el Centro Avenida Roosevelt casa No. 17 Lolotique UNABLE TO VERIFY San miguel PUESTO DE MONCAGUA BARRIO SAN PEDRO,COLONIA MATAMOROS, UNABLE TO VERIFY CALLE HACIA CHAPELTIQUE, CONTIGUO A TALLER VARGAS, MUNICIPIO DE MONCAGUA, SAN MIGUEL. PUESTO DE COMACARAN 2a Avenida Sur. Barrio El Transisto, Comacaran, San UNABLE TO VERIFY Miguel PUESTO DE QUELEPA 3 AV. Norte Barrio El centro, Quelepa, San Miguel UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE SAN LUIS 2 CALLE PONIENTE CASA No. 1, BARRIO EL UNABLE TO VERIFY DE LA REINA CENTRO PUESTO NUEVO EDEN DE SAN BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL ORIENTE , UNABLE TO VERIFY JUAN S/N, COSTADO NORTE DEL PARQUE CENTRAL, SAN JUAN PUESTO DE EL CUCO ENT. PPAL. , 50 METROS AL NTE. DE TELECOM UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN GERARDO 2a. AV. SUR, Bo. EL CENTRO, SAN GERARDO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN ANTONIO DEL 1a. C. PTE. Bo. EL CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY MOZCO PUESTO DE SAN JORGE C. PPAL. Y 1a. AV. SUR UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN RAFAEL 4 Calle Oriente y 5 Av. Wilmer Jimenez, Calle Morazan, UNABLE TO VERIFY ORIENTE San Rafael Oriente, San Miguel PUESTO DE LA PRESITA PJE. CHIRILAGUA, LA PRESITA, SAN MIGUEL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO CIUDAD PACIFICA EL JALACATAL, BLVD. LOS HEROES, LOTE 22-2, UNABLE TO VERIFY POL. D 34, SAN MIGUEL PUESTO NUEVO BELEN URB. NUEVO BELEN , BLK 25, CASA No. 2, UNABLE TO VERIFY DEPARTAMENTO DE SAN MIGUEL D.E.C.O. DE SAN MIGUEL RES. EL SITIO II ETAPA, CALLE EL CENICERO OTE. UNABLE TO VERIFY LOTE 34 Y 3 BODEGA DE REGION BO. CONCEPCION, 8 AV. SUR, CENTRO DE UNABLE TO VERIFY ORIENTAL GOBIERNO FTA REGION RES. EL SITIO, I ETAPA, CALLE MAQUILISHUAT, UNABLE TO VERIFY ORIENTAL(ANTIEXTORCIONE No.10, SAN MIGUEL S) UNIDAD DE INVESTIGACION RESIDENCIAL EL SITIO No. 1 CALLE AMATE, UNABLE TO VERIFY DE HOMICIDIOS SAN MIGUEL BLOCK F, CASA No.3, SAN MIGUEL PUESTO MOVIL EL DELIRIO CANTON EL DELIRIO, KM 143 CARRETERA EL UNABLE TO VERIFY SAN MIGUEL LITORAL, MUNICIPIO DE SAN MIGUEL, DEPTO. DE SAN MIGUEL PUESTO MOVIL CENTRO BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE SIRAMA, CONTIGUO UNABLE TO VERIFY MILAGRO LA PAZ PQUEO MUNICIPAL, DEPTO. DE SAN MIGUEL PUESTO MOVIL INIM SAN Entre 6 Calle Oriente y 10 Avenida Sur, Barrio La Cruz, en UNABLE TO VERIFY MIGUEL el interior de la Terminal de Buses , Departamento de San Miguel DESTACAMENTO DE LA KM 137 CARRETERA PANAMERICANA, FRENTE A UNABLE TO VERIFY TERCERA BRIGADA DE DIDEA , SAN MIGUEL INFANTERIA SAN MIGUEL DIV. DE DISPOSICIONES ENTRE 10 Y 8 AVENIDA SUR CENTRO DE UNABLE TO VERIFY JUDICIALES/REG. ORIENTAL GOBIERNO, SAN MIGUEL DELEGACION DE USULUTAN BARRIO EL CALVARIO, CENTRO DE GOBIERNO, 13°20'25.4"N 88°26'16.5"W EDIFICIO PNC UNIDAD DE EMERGENCIAS 911 BARRIO EL CALVARIO, CENTRO DE GOBIERNO, 13°20'25.4"N 88°26'16.5"W EDIFICIO PNC ODAC USULUTAN BARRIO EL CALVARIO, CENTRO DE GOBIERNO, 13°20'25.4"N 88°26'16.5"W EDIFICIO PNC UTO/GCAC/DAE LOTIFICACION TROPICANA S/N 16 AVENIDA UNABLE TO VERIFY NORTE ,USULUTAN 91

PUESTO DE SANTA MARIA 1a. AVENIDA SUR Y 4a. CALLE ORIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN DIONISIO C. PPAL., Bo. EL CALVARIO UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE OZATLAN BARRIO EL CALVARIO, AVENIDA PPAL., No. 26 UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE BERLIN BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE GUANDIQUE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE ALEGRIA BARRIO EL CENTRO, 4a. AVENIDA SUR UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE MERCEDES BARRIO DEL CALVARIO, CALLE GERARDO UNABLE TO VERIFY UMAÑA BARRIOS PUESTO DE ESTANZUELAS BARRIO EL CALVARIO, AVENIDA PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE 1a. AVENIDA NORTE Y 1a. CALLE PONIENTE, CASA UNABLE TO VERIFY JIQUILISCO S/N SUR PONIENTE DEL PARQUE CENTRAL, JIQUILISCO, DEPARTAMENTO DE USULUTAN CENTRO DE INTELIGENCIA 1 AV. NORTE Y 1 CALLE PONIENTE, CASA S/N SUR UNABLE TO VERIFY POLICIAL USULUTAN PONIENTE DEL PARQUE CENTRAL, JIQUILISCO,USULUTAN SUBDELEGACION DE SANTA 5a. AVENIDA NORTE Y 3a. CALLE PONIENTE 13°22'50.1"N 88°24'50.6"W ELENA PUESTO DE EREGUAYQUIN 5a. AVENIDA NORTE Y CALLE JOSE BRAN UNABLE TO VERIFY

PUESTO DE CONCEPCION BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY BATRES PUESTO DE JUCUARAN BARRIO EL CALVARIO, CALLE BARAHONA, No. 16 UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE ARCOS DEL CASERIO ARCOS DEL ESPINO, CANTON EL ESPINO UNABLE TO VERIFY ESPINO SUBDELEGACION DE BARRIO EL CENTRO, 2a. CALLE ORIENTE, No. 2 UNABLE TO VERIFY SANTIAGO DE MARIA PUESTO DE CALIFORNIA BARRIO LA PARROQUIA, AVENIDA AMBROSIO UNABLE TO VERIFY CANESSA PUESTO DE TECAPAN 2a. AVENIDA NORTE Y 3a. CALLE ORIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE JUCUAPA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE JOSE SIMEON CAÑAS UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CIUDAD EL BARRIO EL CALVARIO, 3a. CALLE ORIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY TRIUNFO PUESTO DE NUEVA GRANADA BARRIO SAN ANTONIO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN BARRIO EL CENTRO, 1a. AV. NORTE Y 2a. CALLE UNABLE TO VERIFY BUENAVENTURA OTE. PUESTO DE PUERTO EL BARRIO EL CALVARIO, 3a. CALLE ORIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY TRIUNFO PUESTO DE SAN AGUSTIN BARRIO EL CENTRO, AVENIDA. BELEN UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE EL ZAMORAN CASERIO ZAMORAN, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN FRANCISCO BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL, 25 UNABLE TO VERIFY JAVIER METROS AL ORIENTE DE TELECOM U.D.I.N. DE USULUTAN BARRIO LA PARROQUIA, 10a. CALLE OTE., No. UNABLE TO VERIFY 5/NVA DIRECCION 8 CALLE PONIENTE Y AVENIDA GUANDIQUE No. 29, DEPATO. DE USULUTAN. C.I.P USULUTAN BARRIO LA PARROQUIA, 4 CALLE ORIENTE No. 4, UNABLE TO VERIFY USULUTAN TALLERES DE USULUTAN BARRIO EL CALVARIO, 4a. AVENIDA SUR, CENTRO UNABLE TO VERIFY DE GOBIERNO PUESTO MOVIL SAN MARCOS CALLE EL LITORAL KM. 87, CANTON SAN MARCOS UNABLE TO VERIFY LEMPA LEMPA, PUENTE DE ORO, USULUTAN DELEGACION DE MORAZAN BARRIO EL CENTRO, 3a. AV. NORTE Y 1a. CALLE UNABLE TO VERIFY PTE. SUBDELEGACION DE OSICALA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE NATIVIDAD MAJANO, UNABLE TO VERIFY No. 1 PUESTO DE DELICIAS DE BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY CONCEPCION PUESTO DE SAN SIMON BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE TOROLA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE MELENDEZ UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE JOATECA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY 92

PUESTO DE JOCOAITIQUE BARRIO EL CENTRO, AVENIDA PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE MEANGUERA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE PERQUIN BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE JOCORO BARRIO SAN SEBASTIAN, 4a. AVENIDA NORTE Y UNABLE TO VERIFY 1a. CALLE ORIENtal PUESTO DE EL DIVISADERO BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE SAN JOSE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CORINTO BARRIO LA CRUZ, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SOCIEDAD BARRIO EL COCO, SALIDA A SAN FRANCISCO UNABLE TO VERIFY GOTERA SUBDELEGACION CENTRO AVENIDA JOSE SIMEON CAÑAS Y 1 AVENIDA SUR, UNABLE TO VERIFY SAN FRANCISCO GOTERA, MORAZAN PUESTO DE CACAOPERA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE GUATAJIAGUA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CHILANGA BARRIO CONCEPCION, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN CARLOS BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY DELEGACION DE LA UNION 7 Avenida Norte y 3 Calle Oriente, CENTRO DE UNABLE TO VERIFY GOBIERNO, CONTIGUO A ISSS PUESTO DE MEANGUERA DEL BARRIO SAN FRANCISCO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY GOLFO SUBDELEGACION DE EL Km. 164, barrio El Centro, atrás de la Iglesia El Carmen, UNABLE TO VERIFY CARMEN La Union. PUESTO MOVIL LAS TUNAS LA CASERIO LA PINERA, CALLE PRINCIPAL, CANTON UNABLE TO VERIFY UNION TAMARINDO, EN CENTRO OBRERO, 100 METROS ANTES DEL INSTITUTO NACIONAL EL TAMARINDO, MUNICIPIO DE CONCHAGUA, DEPARTAMENTO DE LA UNION. PUESTO DE INTIPUCA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE SAN ALEJO Bo. GUADALUPE, 2 AV. SUR Y 4 CALLE PTE. No. 9, UNABLE TO VERIFY SAN ALEJO PUESTO DE PAVANA BARRIO EL CENTRO, SAN ALEJO UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION DE SANTA CARRETERA RUTA MILITAR UNA CUADRA AL UNABLE TO VERIFY ROSA DE LIMA ORIENTE DEL ESTADIO MUNICIPAL DE LA COLONIA ALTOS DEL ESTADIO, SANTA ROSA DE LIMA, LA UINON PUESTO DE PASAQUINA BARRIO EL CENTRO, 1a. CALLE PONIENTE UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE BOLIVAR BARRIO EL CENTRO, 2a. AVENIDA NORTE UNABLE TO VERIFY PREDIO DE VEHICULOS COLONIA ALTOS DEL ESTADIO, CARRETERA 13°38'02.8"N 87°53'21.9"W DECOMISADOS EN SANTA PANAMERICANA ROSA DE LIMA SUBDELEGACION DE BARRIO EL ZAPOTE, 4a. AVENIDA NORTE 13°44'31.2"N 87°52'13.1"W ANAMOROS PUESTO DE EL SAUCE BARRIO EL CENTRO, 2a AVENIDA SUR UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CONCEPCION DE BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY ORIENTE PUESTO DE NUEVA ESPARTA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE POLOROS BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE PRINCIPAL UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE LISLIQUE CANTON JUAGENIQUIL, CALLE COELIS UNABLE TO VERIFY SUBDELEGACION CENTRO LA Final 8 Avenida Norte y 7 Calle Poniente No. 5-3 UNABLE TO VERIFY UNION. PUESTO DE CONCHAGUA BARRIO EL CENTRO, FRENTE A ALCALDIA UNABLE TO VERIFY PUESTO DE CUTUCO CARRETERA A CUTUCO, FRENTE A DISAGRO UNABLE TO VERIFY RECINTO FISCAL DE EL CANTON SANTA CLARA, CASERIO EL AMATILLO UNABLE TO VERIFY AMATILLO PUESTO MOVIL ODAC CARRETERA PANAMERICANA KM 179, DESVIO UNABLE TO VERIFY GUISQUIL LA UNION CANTON GUISQUIL MUNICIPIO DE CONCHAGUA, LA UNION 93

SUBDELEGACION DE EL CANTON EL TAMARINDO, MUNICIPIO DE UNABLE TO VERIFY TAMARINDO CONCHAGUA, CARRETERA QUE CONDUCE AL DESVIO PLAYAS LAS TUNAS, LA UNION U.D.I.N. DE LA UNION CORSAIN CALLE LAS PLAYITAS, PUNTA GORDA, KM. 186, UNABLE TO VERIFY DEPARTAMENto CASETA CENTRAL SANTA BARRIO EL CENTRO, CALLE GENERAL LARIOS, 13°37'32.5"N 87°53'29.9"W ROSA DE LIMA FTE. ALCALDIA, IMA SANTA ROSA DE LIMA, LA UNION

Guatemala Public Hospitals Addresses Coordinates DIRECCIÓN DE ÁREA DE 7a Calle 6-24 Zona 11, Coban, Alta Verapaz (15.4779884, -90.3718194) SALUD DE ALTA VERAPAZ HOSPITAL DISTRITAL FRAY Barrio Magisterio, Fray Bartolome de las Casas (15.8014103, -89.8698039) BARTOLOME DE LAS CASAS HOSPITAL DISTRITAL SANTA BARRIO EL HOSPITAL ZONA 11, SANTA CATALINA (15.3171349, -89.8760819) CATALINA LA TINTA LA TINTA, ALTA VERAPAZ. HOSPITAL NACIONAL DE 8a. Calle 1-24, zona 11 (15.4788537, -90.3725803) COBÁN ESCUELA NACIONAL DE 3a. Calle 5-18 zona 3 coban A.v. (15.4691586, -90.3692230) ENFERMERÍA DE COBAN E INSTITUTO DE ADIESTRAMIENTO PARA PERSONAL DE SALUD DE LAS VERAPACES MINISTERIO DE SALUD 6a Avenida 3-45 zona 11 (14.6229279, -90.5236738) PÚBLICA Y ASISTENCIA SOCIAL HOSPITAL SAN JUAN DE DIOS 1a Avenida 10-50, zona 1 (14.6395137, -90.5208706) HOSPITAL ROOSEVELT Calzada Roosevelt Zona 11, Guatemala, C.A. (14.6124104, -90.5426032) HOSPITAL INFANTIL DE 9a. Avenida 7-01 zona 11, Guatemala (14.6169771, -90.5422592) INFECTOLOGÍA Y REHABILITACIÓN HOSPITAL NACIONAL DE 13 calle 0-18 zona 1 (14.6369465, -90.5215388) ORTOPEDIA Y REHABILITACIÓN DR. JORGE VON AHN DE LEÓN HOSPITAL 11 Avenida "A" 12-30 zona 7, Colonia La Verbena (14.6299537, -90.5404681) ANTITUBERCULOSO SAN VICENTE HOSPITAL NACIONAL DE Avenida de Presidios Final Zona 18 Colonia Atlantida (14.6642666, -90.4782211) SALUD MENTAL FEDERICO MORA HOSPITAL NACIONAL DE 7ma. calle y 10 avenida Canton Hospital, Amatitlan. (14.4814914, -90.6265982) AMATITLAN HOSPITAL NACIONAL 55av. 12-20 zona 10 Parcelamiento Plan Grande, Villa (14.5092430, -90.6192510) ESPECIALIZADO DE VILLA Nueva. NUEVA DIRECCIÓN DE REGULACIÓN, Avenida Bolivar 28-07 zona 8 (14.6229198, -90.5236852) VIGILANCIA Y CONTROL DE LA SALUD / DGRVCS DEPARTAMENTO DE 5a. Avenida 11-40 colonia El Progreso zona 11 (14.6076581, -90.5445518) REGULACIÓN DE LOS PROGRAMAS DE ATENCIÓN A LAS PERSONAS / DRPAP DEPARTAMENTO DE 2a. Avenida 0-61 zona 10 UNABLE TO VERIFY REGULACIÓN DE LOS PROGRAMAS DE LA SALUD Y AMBIENTE /DRPSA LABORATORIO NACIONAL DE Km. 22 Carretera al Pacico, Bárcenas Villa Nueva (14.5197369, -90.6191182) SALUD /LNS SISTEMA INTEGRAL DE 9a Avenida 14-65 Zona 1 (14.6333733, -90.5114782) ATENCIÓN EN SALUD -SIAS DEPARTAMENTO DE 2a. Avenida 0-61 zona 10 UNABLE TO VERIFY REGULACIÓN Y CONTROL DE 94

PRODUCTOS FARMACEUTICOS Y AFINES ESCUELA DE ENFERMERAS DE 6AV 3-55 ZONA 11 (14.6140686, -90.5408648) GUATEMALA DIRECCIÓN DE ÁREA DE 11 Av. A 12-19 Z.7 Colonia la Verbena (14.6295297, -90.5412527) SALUD GUATEMALA CENTRAL DIRECCIÓN DE ÁREA DE Km. 17 Carretera a San Juan Sacatepéquez 32-45 Col. San (14.6548527, -90.6043218) SALUD GUATEMALA José Los Pinos zona 6 de Mixco NOROCCIDENTE DIRECCIÓN DE ÁREA DE 2 avenida 6-40 zona 2, Guatemala (14.6548689, -90.6042987) SALUD GUATEMALA NORORIENTE DIRECCIÓN DE ÁREA DE 5ta. Avenida 0-84 Cantón la Cruz, Amatitlan UNABLE TO VERIFY SALUD GUATEMALA SUR Hospital Naciónal de Escuintla Km 59.5 carretera a Taxisco, Escuintla (14.2868551, -90.7722740) Hospita Naciónal Ramiro De León Km 143.5 Finca San Judas Tiquisate, Escuintla UNABLE TO VERIFY Carpio Dirección Área de Salud, de 2da. Calle 1-70 Zona 4, Colonia Itzcuintlan, Escuintla, (14.3017730, -90.7887790) Escuíntla Guatemala, C. A. Dirección Área de Salud, de El Barrio El Golfo, cabecera municipal Guastatoya, del (14.8534757, -90.0681080) Progreso departamento de El Progreso Hospital Naciónal El Progreso Barrio Minerva, Camino a Santa Rita, Guastatoya, El (14.8551793, -90.0630195) Progreso Dirección Área de Salud, de 8a. Ave. 1-66 zona 1 Chiquimula (14.8020972, -89.5444969) Chiquimula Hospital Nacional de Chiquimula 2da. Calle 14-71 Zona1. Chiquimula (14.8021264, -89.5366769) Dirección Área de Salud de 6 AVENIDA 9-26 ZONA 1, LA ALAMEDA, UNABLE TO VERIFY Chimaltenango CHIMALTENANGO Hospital Nacional de 8a calle 1-15 zona 5, La Alameda, Chimaltenango (14.6520602, -90.8135207) Chimaltenango Dirección Área de Salud, de Baja 8va. Avenida 7-87 Zona 1, Salamá, Baja Verapaz (14.6294671, -90.5413090) Verapaz Hospital Nacional De Salamá Carretera 5, Salamá, Guatemala (15.0996263, -90.3274853) Dirección Área de Salud Jutiapa Final Calle Principal Colonia "El Paraíso", Barrio Latino, (14.2865636, -89.8876956) Jutiapa Hospital Naciónal "Ernestina Barrio Latino, Jutiapa Zona 1 (14.2876033, -89.8886706) Garcia Vda de Recinos" Jutiapa Escuela Para Auxiliares De Calle 15 de Septiembre Final, contiguo al Hospital UNABLE TO VERIFY Enfermería De Oriente Nacional Dirección Área de Salud Barrio El Centro, Sayaxché, Petén UNABLE TO VERIFY Suroccidental-Sayaxché Dirección Área de Salud, Petén 8 avenida 14 calle zona 1 Barrio Playa Blanca, San Benito, (16.9237897, -89.9064496) Norte Petén Dirección Área de Salud, Petén Sur Avenida 15 de Septiembre 4-05 Zona 1. Poptún, Petén (16.3335004, -89.4182869) Oriental Hospital de San Benito, Petèn 9a Calle entre Av. Francisco Archila y 6a Av. "A" Zona 3, (16.9138746, -89.9131132) San Benito, Petèn Hospital de Melchor de Mencos Barrio Fallabón, Melchor de Mencos, Petén (17.0592879, -89.1528209) Hospital Distrital Sayaxché, Petén Barrio la Esperanza Zona 4, Sayaxché, Petén (16.5202499, -90.1806927) Hospital Integrado de Poptún, 10a Avenida y 9a Calle Zona 4. (16.3490500, -89.4264364) Petén Dirección Área de Salud de 14 avenida 0-26 Zona 1 Quetzaltenango (14.8396684, -91.5182373) Quetzaltenango Hospital Naciónal de Occidente 0 Calle 36-40 Zona 8 Colonia San Isidro, Quetzaltenango (14.8580139, -91.5402441) Hospital Naciónal de Coatepeque 5ta. Calle 9na. Avenida Zona 4, Barrio Colombita, (14.6991712, -91.8692955) "Juan José Ortega" Coatepeque, Quetzaltenango Hospital Naciónal Rodolfo Robles Diagonal 11 Zona 1, Quetzaltenango, Quetzaltenango (14.8324588, -91.5294127) de Quetzaltenango Escuela Nacional de Auxiliares de 12 Avenida 0-26 zona 1 Quetzaltenango (14.8392286, -91.5168506) Enfermería Quetzaltenango Escuela Nacional de Radiología 0 Calle 36-40 Zona 8 Quetzaltenango (Dentro del Hospital UNABLE TO VERIFY Diagnóstica Regional de Occidente) Dirección Área de Salud de Quiché 1a. Av. 12 Calle Zona 5, Santa Cruz del Quiché (15.0251191, -91.1470876) 95

Dirección Área de Salud de Ixcán 6ta. Av 3-15 zona 11 UNABLE TO VERIFY Dirección Área de Salud de Ixil Cantón Ilóm, Chajul, Quiché (15.4830451, -91.0375173) Hospital Nacional De Nebaj Cantón Vicotz Nebaj, Quiché (15.4003115, -91.1420460) Hospital Nacional De Joyabaj Barrio la Libertad, Joyabaj , Quiché UNABLE TO VERIFY Hospital Regional De Quiché Salida a San Antonio Ilotenango, zona 3 (15.0307686, -91.1572391) Hospital Distrital De Uspantan Avenida Centenario1-12 zona 2, Uspantán Quiché UNABLE TO VERIFY Dirección Área de Salud de 3a Av. 5-39 zona 1, Retalhuleu "Antiguo Hospital (14.5385905, -91.6796372) Retalhuleu Naciónal" Hospital Nacional De Retalhuleu Boulevar Centenario Zona 2 Retalhuleu (14.5469152, -91.6763320) Dirección Área de Salud de 7a Calle Poniente No. 31, La Antigua Guatemala UNABLE TO VERIFY Sacatépequez Hospital Nacional Pedro de Aldea San Felipe de Jesus, Antigua Guatemala, (14.5704828, -90.7317847) Bethancourt Sacatepéquez Hogar de Ancianos "Fray Rodrigo 4a. Avenida Sur No. 6, Antigua Guatemala, Sacatepéquez (14.5822306, -90.7445655) de la Cruz" Dirección Área de Salud de San 1a. Calle 13-40 Zona 4, San Marcos (14.9647491, -91.7878221) Marcos Hospital Nacional de San Marcos 5 calle 19-22 zona 5, San Marcos, San Marcos (14.9536913, -91.8070391) "Dr. Moises Villagran Mazariegos" Hospital Naciónal Malacatán Comunidad Agraria la Montañita, Malacatán, San Marcos (14.8941906, -92.0905110) Profesor Eberto José Velasco Dirección Área de Salud de Santa 4a. Calle 1-51, zona 4, Cuilapa. Santa Rosa (14.2803148, -90.3001955) Rosa Dirección Área de Salud, Sololá Final Calzada Venancio Barrios, Zona 2, Final Calzada (14.7644317, -91.1766968) Venancio Barrios, anexo al Hospital Nacional de Sololá, Zona 2, Sololá, Sololá Dirección De Área De Salud De 4ta. Avenida 4-71 zona 1 Mazatenango, UNABLE TO VERIFY Suchitepéquez Suchitepéquez Hospital De Mazatenango 1a. Ave. Norte y tercera calle zona 1 (14.5370441, -91.5066430) Escuela Nacional De Auxiliares De 1ra. Ave. 2-50 zona 1 Mazatenango Suchitepéquez (14.5375760, -91.5061204) Enfermería De Sur Occidente Dirección Área de Salud 1 Avenida Calle A-38 zona 1 Totonicapán (14.9164196, -91.3566160) deTotonicapán Hospital Nacional de Totonicapán Km 198. Cantón Poxlajuj, Totonicapán UNABLE TO VERIFY Dirección Área de Salud de Zacapa 16 Av. Final Barrio Cementerio Nuevo, Zacapa (14.9677416, -89.5243753) Hospital Regional de Zacapa 8a. Av. Final Barrio Cementerio Nuevo, Zacapa (14.9677422, -89.5244507) Dirección Área de Salud de Izabal 15 Calle 14 y 15 Avenida, Puerto Barrios, Izabal UNABLE TO VERIFY Hospital de La Amistad Japón- Colonia San Manuel, Santo Tomas de Castilla, Puerto (15.6951169, -88.5823245) Guatemala Barrios Hospital Naciónal Infantil Elisa 14 calle entre 14 y 15 ave. Puerto Barrios, Izabal (15.7260124, -88.5911010) Martinez, Puerto Barrios Instituto de Adiestramiento de Barrio Toltac, Quiriguá, Los Amates, Izabal UNABLE TO VERIFY Personal en Salud "Doctor Alberto Viau Dávila" -INDAPS Dirección Área de Salud de Complejo Institucional las Lagunas zona 10, (15.3149961, -91.5157633) Huehuetenango Huehuetenango Area De Salud Huehuetenango Zona 1, Huehuetenango - Anexo Hospital Nacional De Barillas 5ta calle 6-68 zona 6 barrillas Huehuetenango - Hospital Regional De Complejo Institucional las Lagunas zona 10, (15.3155824, -91.5143849) Huehuetenango Huehuetenango Hospital Nacional De San Pedro Municipio de San Pedro Necta, Huehuetenang (15.4907301, -91.7656583) Necta

Guatemala Police Stations Addresses Coordinates Comisarías Distrito 1 Central - 16 Avenida 14-00 Zona 6, Colonia Cipresales, Guatemala (14.6550217, -90.4925867) Todas las zonas - Interior Subdirección General de Finanzas y Logística 96

Comisaría Modelo de Villa Nueva 12 Avenida 7-51 A, Colonia Tabloncito Zone 1, Villa UNABLE TO VERIFY Nueva Comisarías Distrito Sur 13 Avenida y 4a. street, section "D" 13'1 Zone 5, Colonia UNABLE TO VERIFY Hunapú, Escuintla Comisaría 31 4a. Avenida y 9a. Calle Zona 1 , Escuintla (14.3000995, -90.7854802) Comisaría 32 3a. Avenida y 4a. Calle Zona 3, Barrio La Parroquia, (-32.9640301, -60.7236376) Cuilapa Comisaría 33 Kilómetro 157.5 Colonia El Compromiso Zona 3, (-34.5601589, -58.4561016) Mazatenango Comisaría 34 5a. Calle y 6a. Avenida esquina Zona 1 (14.5396874, -91.6796621) Comisaría 11 11 avenida 4-01 zona 1 (14.6435312, -90.5077530) Comisaría 12 16 avenida 14-00 colonia Cipresales zona 6 (14.6543029, -90.4901412) Comisaría 13 29 calle 13-36 zona 5, San Pedrito (14.6198663, -90.5088225) Comisaría 14 31 avenida y 4 calle colonia Centroamérica zone 7 (14.6303027, -90.5554446) Comisaría 15 12 avenida 7-51 zona 1 colonia El Tabloncito Villa Nueva (14.5266750, -90.6206300) Comisaría 16 Calzada San Juan 1-67 Zona 7 Colonia Belen, Mixco (14.6490263, -90.5828146) Sub estación Guarda Viejo Avenida Bolivar 40-34 zona 3 (14.6354864, -89.9813633) Comisaría 22 6a. calle Barrio La Democracia, Zona 6, Jalapa (14.6354864, -89.9813633) Comisaría 51 1a. calle 5-12 Zona 2, Alta Verapaz (15.4703920, -90.3763352) Comisaría 52 7a. avenida 6-36 Zona 1, Salamá, Baja Verapaz (-34.6833427, -58.4691337) Comisaría 53 Barrio Las Joyas a un costado del Parque Central de (-34.5811075, -58.4137125) Guastatoya, El Progreso Comisaría 31 4a. avenida entre 8a y 9a. Calles Zona 1, Escuintla (-34.5825456, -58.4201522) Comisaría 32 3a. avenida y 4a. Calle Barrio La Parroquia Cuilapa, Santa (-32.9640301, -60.7236376) Rosa Comisaría 34 6a. avenida y 5a. Calle Zona 1, Retalhuleu (14.5396810, -91.6796690) Comisaría 33 Kilómetro 157.5 Ruta al Pacifico, frente a Plaza América, (-34.5601663, -58.4561008) Colonia El Compromiso, Suchitepéquez Comisaría 21 1a. Avenida 5-030 Zona 1, Jutiapa frente parque Rosendo (-34.5877794, -58.4160605) Santa Cruz Comisaría 23 8a. Y 6a. Calle A final Zona 1, frente al Estadio, (-34.5825456, -58.4201522) Chiquimula Comisaría 24 8a. Calle 3-05 Zona 2, Barrio La Reforma, Zacapa (-34.6340391, -58.3605954) Comisaría 61 6a. avenida entre 5a. y 6a. calles, Puerto Barrios, Izabal (15.7366441, -88.5992888) Comisaría 41 13 Avenida "A" Zona 1, Quetzaltenango (14.8386686, -91.5179536) Comisaría 42 9a. Calle 8-66 Zona 1, San Marcos (14.9596786, -91.8055836) Comisaría 43 3a. Calle entre 4a. Y 5a. Avenida Zona 1, Huehuetenango (15.5094783, -91.6044857) Comisaría 44 4a. Calle 4-63 Zona 1, atrás del Teatro, Totonicapan (14.9122088, -91.3587161) Comisaría 71 3a. Avenida 1-40 Zona 5, Santa Cruz de Quiché (15.0359727, -91.1487016) Comisaría 72 6a. Avenida 1-100 Barrio El Calvario, Sololá (14.7706988, -91.1835036) Comisaría 73 1a. y 1a. Avenida Zona 1, Chimaltenango (14.6607091, -90.8188851) Comisaría 74 Colonia San Pedro El Panorama Lote 11 y 12 Sección "S" UNABLE TO VERIFY A.G Sacatepéquez Comisaría 62 2a. avenida entre 8a. y 9a. calle Zona 1, Barrio La Ermita, (16.9086674, -89.8871179) San Benito, Petén

Guatemala Prisons Addresses Coordinates Dirección General 7 calle 10-54, Edificio El Imparcial, Zona 1, Ciudad de 14°38'28.4"N 90°30'31.4"W Guatemala Centro De Detención Preventiva Colonia Atlántida Zona 18, Ciudad de Guatemala 14°39'57.4"N 90°28'36.3"W Para Hombres Zona, 18 97

Anexo “B” Del Centro De Detención Final Colonia Atlántida Zona 18, Ciudad de Guatemala 14°40'04.6"N 90°28'40.8"W Preventiva Para Hombres Zona 18, Cárcel De Delitos Menores Centro De Detención Preventiva Final Colonia Atlántida Zona 18, Ciudad de Guatemala 14°40'04.6"N 90°28'40.8"W Para Mujeres Santa Teresa, Zona 18 Granja Modelo De Rehabilitación Kilómetro 17 Carretera a El Salvador, Granja Pavón, 14°30'42.8"N 90°26'25.2"W Pavón, Fraijanes Municipio de Fraijanes, Departamento de Guatemala Centro De Detención Preventiva De Kilómetro 17.5 Carretera a El Salvador, Granja Pavón, 14°30'18.6"N 90°26'19.8"W Reinstauración Constitucional Municipio de Fraijanes, Departamento de Guatemala Pavoncito, Fraijanes Centro De Orientación Femenino Kilómetro16.5 Carretera a El Salvador, Granja Pavón, 14°31'10.6"N 90°26'39.4"W C.O.F., Fraijanes Municipio de Fraijanes, Departamento de Guatemala Centro De Detención Preventiva Kilómetro 17.5 Carretera a El Salvador, Granja Pavón, 14°30'28.9"N 90°26'22.6"W Para Hombres, Fraijanes I Municipio de Fraijanes, Departamento de Guatemala Centro De Detención Preventiva Kilómetro 17 Carretera a El Salvador, Granja Pavón, 14°30'53.7"N 90°26'33.3"W Para Hombres, Fraijanes II Municipio de Fraijanes, Departamento de Guatemala Granja Modelo De Rehabilitación Kilómetro 68.5 Carretera a Taxisco, Municipio de 14°12'58.5"N 90°44'10.2"W Canadá, Escuintla Chiquimulilla, Departamento de Santa Rosa Centro De Alta Seguridad, Kilómetro 68.5 Carretera a Taxisco, Municipio de 14°13'17.5"N 90°43'53.6"W Escuintla Chiquimulilla, Departamento de Santa Rosa Granja Modelo De Rehabilitación Kilómetro 196 Carretera Interamericana, Departamento de 14°50'43.0"N 91°28'14.5"W Cantel, Quetzaltenango Quetzaltenango Centro De Detención Preventiva Aldea Los Jocotes, Departamento de Zacapa 14°57'53.9"N 89°30'15.5"W Para Hombres Y Mujeres De Los Jocotes, Zacapa Centro De Detención Preventiva Colonia Socabal Zona 4 camino viejo al Municipio de San 14°38'37.7"N 90°49'16.3"W Para Hombres Y Mujeres De Andrés Itzapa, Departamento de Chimaltenango Chimaltenango Centro De Detención Preventiva 10 Avenida 1-25 Zona 3, Departamento Cobán , Alta 15°28'14.7"N 90°21'54.1"W Para Hombres Y Mujeres De Verapaz Cobán, Alta Verapaz Centro De Rehabilitación De Puerto 23 Calle Colonia El Progreso, Municipio Puerto Barrios, 15°42'55.9"N 88°35'26.4"W Barrios, Izabal Departamento de Izabal Centro De Detención Preventiva Calle Limite, Municipio Santa Elena, Departamento Flores 16°53'59.9"N 89°54'23.0"W Para Hombres Y Mujeres De Santa Peten Elena, Peten Centro De Detencion Preventiva Final Avenida Dolores, Departamento e Mazatenango, a la 14°33'32.7"N 91°30'03.5"W Para Hombres Y Mujeres De Altura del Kilómetro 160 Mazatenango, Suchitepéquez Centro De Detención Preventiva El Kilómetro 65 Carretera a El Salvador 14°15'40.3"N 90°17'06.4"W Boquerón, Santa Rosa Centro De Detención Preventiva De 1 calle y 1 avenida Zona 1 Santa Cruz del Quiche 15°01'54.3"N 91°08'55.3"W Santa Cruz, El Quiche Centro De Detención Preventiva Kilómetro 5.5 de la ruta al Atlántico Zona 17 14°38'14.9"N 90°28'42.4"W Para Hombres, Zona 17 Centro De Detención Preventiva 5 Calle Final 18-00 Zona 1, Castillo San Rafael de UNABLE TO VERIFY Para Hombres, Zona 1 Matamoros, Interior de la Guardia Presidencial Centro De Detención Preventiva 2 Calle Final Barrio Las Joyas, Municipio de Guastatoya, 14°51'03.8"N 90°04'13.1"W Para Hombres Y Mujeres De Departamento de El Progreso. Guastatoya, El Progreso

Honduras Public Hospitals Addresses Coordinates

Hospital Militar Luis Alonso Discua Carretera al Batallón Comayagüela 14°03'44.9"N 87°15'55.2"W Hospital Escuela Carretera Suyapa Tegucigalpa 14°05'21.0"N 87°11'50.2"W Hospital Mario Catarino Rivas Frente Al Pedregal San Pedro Sula 15°31'27.2"N 88°02'30.1"W Hospital Atlántida Integrado La Ceiba, Atlántida 15°46'09.4"N 86°48'32.4"W Hospital de Area Roatán Roatán 16°19'04.4"N 86°32'21.2"W

98

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