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30176. 6937 SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the Wth of JULY, 1917. The Gazette is registered at the General Post Office for transmission by Inland Post as a newspaper. The postage rate to places within the United Kingdom, for each copy, is one halfpenny for the first 6 ozs., and an additional halfpenny for each subsequent 6 ozs. or part thereof. For places abroad the rate is a halfpenny for every 2 ounces, except in the case of Canada, to which the Canadian Magazine Postage rate applies. TUESDAY, 10 JULY, 1917. Way Office, Briefly put, the enemy's plan appeared to be 10th July, 1917. to contain our main forces on the Tigris, whilst a vigorous canfpaign, which would directly The Secretary of State for War has received threaten India, was being developed in Persia. the following despatch addressed to the Chief There were indications, too, of an impending of the General Staff, India, by Lieut.-General move down the Euphrates towards Nasariyeh. Sir Stanley Maude, K.C.B., C'ommander-in- To disseminate our trpops in order to safeguard Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force: — the various conflicting interests involved GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, would have relegated us to a passive defensive everywhere, and it seemed clear from the out- MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. set that the true solution of the problem was a 10th April, 1917. resolute offensive, with concentrated forces, on SIR,— the Tigris, thus effectively threatening 1. I have the honour to submit herewith a Baghdad, the centre from which the enemy's report on the operations carried out by the columns were operating. Such a stroke pur- Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force for the sued with energy and success would, it was period extending from August 28th, 1916, the felt, automatically relieve the pressure in date upon which I assumed command of the Persia and on the Euphrates, and preserve Army, until March 31st, 1917, three weeks quiet in all districts with the security of which after the fall of Baghdad. we were charged. 2. The area over which the responsibilities This then was the principle which guided the of the Army extended was a wide one, em- subsequent operations, which may be con- bracing Falahiyeh, on the Tigris; Ispahan (ex- veniently grouped into phases as follows: — clusive), in Persia; 'Bushire, on the Persian First: Preliminary preparations, from Gulf; and Nasariyeh, on the Euphrates. August 28th to December 12th. 6938 SUPPLEMENT TO THE L O N D O N GAZETTE, 10 JULY, 1917. Second: The consolidation of our position on poses were provided. Establishments for all the Hai, from December 13th to units, whether on the various fronts or on the January 4th. L. of C., were fixed, whilst the provision of Third: The operations in the Khadairi Bend, mechanical transport and an increase in animals from January 5th to 19th. and vehicles enabled the land transport with the Force to be reconstituted. Fourth: The operations against the Hai salient, from January 20th to February 5. During the latter part of October the 5th. Army was fortunate in receiving a visit from the incoming Commander-in-Chief in India, Fifth: The operations in the Dahra Bend, General Sir Charles Monro, G.C.M.G., from February 6th to 16th. K.C.B. His Excellency made an extended tour Sixth: The capture of Sannaiyat and pas- of the theatre of operations, and his advice and sage of the Tigris, from February 17th comments on various matters were of the to 24th. greatest value to myself personally, whilst the- Seventh: The advance on Baghdad, from Army hailed his visit with the liveliest satis- February 25th to March llth. faction, feeling that he would assume his office Eighth: The operations subsequent to the with first-hand and sympathetic knowledge of fall of Baghdad, from March 12th to our needs and difficulties. 31st. 6. Matters had by this time developed so satisfactorily that during His Excellency's PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS : AUGUST 28TH TO visit General Headquarters were moved to the DECEMBER 12TH. front at Arab Village. Before joining there 3. It was of paramount importance, in view myself I carried out short tours of inspection of the approach of the rainy season, that no on the Karun front at Ahwaz, proceeding' as undue delay should take place in regard to the far as the Oilfields, so as to make further pro- resumption of active operations, but before vision for their local security, and on the these could be undertaken witlj .reasonable Euphrates front at Nasariyeh. At both places prospect of success it was necessary: — satisfactory conditions, prevailed. By the end of November preliminary pre- (a) To improve the health and training of parations were well advanced. A steady stream the troops, who had suffered severely from of reinforcements had been moving up the the intense heat during the summer months. Tigris for some weeks, and drafts were joining (b) To perfect our somewhat precarious their units, making good the wastage of the lines of communications. summer. The troops had shaken off the ill- (c) To develop our resources. effects of the hot weather, and their war train- (d) To amass reserves of supplies, ammu- ing had improved. Stores, ammunition, and nition and stores at the front. supplies were accumulating rapidly at the It was therefore considered desirable to re- front, our communications were assured, and tain General Headquarters at Basrah till the it seemed clear that it was only a matter of end of October, in order to systematise, co- days before offensive operations could be justi- ordinate and expand (b) and (c), whilst (a) fiably undertaken. Training camps which had and (d) continued concurrently and subse- been formed at Amarah were broken up, and quently. the general concentration upstream of Sheikh 4. Steady progress was made on the lines so Sa'ad was completed. carefully designed and developed by my 7. At the beginning of December the enemy predecessor, Lieut.-General Sir Percy still occupied the same positions on the Tigris Lake, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., to whom my front which he had occupied during the warm thanks are due for the firm foun- summer. On the left bank of the Tigris he dations which had been laid for the held the Sannaiyat position, flanked on one ensuing winter campaign. Th growth of side by the Suwaikieh Marsh and on the other Basrah as a military port and base continued, by the river. In this position he had with- and the laying of railways was«completed. The stood our attacks on three occasions during the subsidence of the floods and the organisation previous April. Since then he had of local and imported labour removed obstacles strengthened and elaborated this trench which had hitherto hindered development, system, and a series of successive positions ex- although conversely the lack of water in the tended back as far as Kut, fifteen miles in the rivers and consequent groundings of rivercraft rear. The river bank from Sannaiyat to Kut gave rise to anxiety from time to time. The was also entrenched. Directorate of Inland Water Transport was On the right bank of the Tigris the enemy created, and accessions of men and material held the line to which he had withdrawn in arrived from overseas, as well as additional May when he evacuated the Sinn position. rivercraft; whilst the influx of adequate and This line extended from a point on the Tigris experienced personnel for the Directorates of three miles north-east of Kut in a south- Port Administration and Conservancy, Works, westerly direction across the Khadairi Bend to Eailways, Supply and Transport and Ord- the River Hai, ,two miles below its exit from nance enabled these services to cope more the Tigris, and thence across the Hai to the adequately with their responsibilities in main- north-west. There was a pontoon bridge across taining the field Army. Hospital accomnao- the Hai near its junction with the Tigris which dstion was reviewed and still further expanded, was protected by the trench system in that whilst the B>emount and Veterinary Services vicinity. These defences also covered the ap- were overhauled and reconstituted. Changes proaches from the east and south to another were also made in the organisation of the pontoon bridge which the Turks had con- Army, the grouping of formations and units structed across the Tigris on the eastern side was readjusted, and alterations were made in of the Shumran peninsula. The enemy occu- the system of command. The line of communi- pied the line of the Hai for several miles below cation defences were recast and additional lines the bridgehead position with posts and m o u n t e d of communication u n i t s for administrative pur- Arab auxiliaries. SUPPLEMENT TO THE L O N D O N GAZETTE, 10 JUL?, 1917. 6939 On the left bank of the Tigris our trenches right (or western) bank, driving the enemy's were within 120 yards of the Turkish front line advanced troops back on to the Hai bridge- at Sannaiyat. On the right bank our troops head position, which was strongly held. Two were established some eleven miles upstream pontoon bridges were thrown across the Hai of Sannaiyat, with advanced posts about two at Atab, the right .flank of the force" under miles from those of the Turks opposite the Kha- Lieut.-General Marshall was secured by linking dairi Bend, and some five miles from his posi- up its old front line defences with its ne_w posi- tion on the Hai. tion on the Hai, and Lieut.-General Cobbe con- In the positions outlined above desultory tinued to demonstrate against Sannaiyat.

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