THE SEJM REVIEW PRZEGLĄD SEJMOWY FIFTH SPECIAL EDITION 2014 2 the Sejm Review Fifth Special Edition / 2014 EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
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1 THE SEJM REVIEW PRZEGLĄD SEJMOWY FIFTH SPECIAL EDITION 2014 2 The Sejm Review Fifth special edition / 2014 EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Editor-in-Chief Prof. PIOTR TULEJA Jagiellonian University, Cracow Deputy Editor-in-Chief Prof. JERZY CIEMNIEWSKI Institute of Law Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences Dr ZBIGNIEW WRONA Director, Bureau of Research, Chancellery of the Sejm Scientifi c Secretary Prof. ANDRZEJ SZMYT University of Gdańsk Editorial Board Prof. LESZEK GARLICKI University of Warsaw Prof. MIROSŁAW GRANAT Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw Dr WOJCIECH KULISIEWICZ Director, Sejm Library, Chancellery of the Sejm Prof. PAWEŁ SARNECKI Jagiellonian University, Cracow Prof. ZBIGNIEW WITKOWSKI University of Nicolaus Copernicus, Toruń Prof. KRZYSZTOF WÓJTOWICZ University of Wrocław Prof. JERZY ZAJADŁO University of Gdańsk Prof. MAREK ZUBIK University of Warsaw © Copyright by Kancelaria Sejmu Warszawa 2014 ISSN 1230-5502 Adress: “Przegląd Sejmowy”, ul. Zagórna 3, 00-441 Warszawa, phone (4822) 6941300 e-mail: [email protected] http://www.sejm.gov.pl/publikacje/przeglad sejmowy TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 Bogusław Banaszak, Professor Doctor Habil., University of Wrocław The Judicial Activism of the Constitutional Tribunal . 5 Anna Łabno, Professor Doctor Habil., University of Silesia The Sejm of the Republic of Poland and the Representation of Interests . 25 Piotr Tuleja, Professor Doctor Habil., Jagiellonian University, Cracow Proceedings Before the Constitutional Court in Relation to Hierarchical Review of Norms . 47 Jerzy Ciemniewski, Professor Doctor Habil., Institute of Law Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences Bicameralism under the Constitutional System of the Third Republic of Poland 65 Dorota Lis-Staranowicz, Doctor Habil., University of Warmia and Masuria in Olsztyn Jan Galster, Professor Doctor Habil., The Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń Europeanization of Polish Constitutional Law . 85 Paweł Sarnecki, Professor Doctor Habil., Jagiellonian University, Cracow The Sejm of the Republic of Poland in the Period of Transformation . 111 Andrzej Szmyt, Professor Doctor Habil., University of Gdańsk The Sejm and the Senate Under the Proposals for Amendment of Poland’s Constitution of 1997 . 129 Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Doctor Habil., Jagiellonian University, Cracow The Impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on Poland’s System of Government . 149 Marek Zubik, Professor Doctor Habil., University of Warsaw When the Marshal of the Sejm is the Most Important Person in the State or the Polish Interregnum . 167 Anna Rakowska, Doctor, University of Łódź Krzysztof Skotnicki, Professor Doctor Habil., University of Łódź Changes in Electoral Law Introduced by the Election Code . 189 Martin Bożek, Doctor, Kazimierz Pułaski Technical Uniwersity of Radom Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Secret Services in Poland . 215 Iwona Wróblewska, Doctor, The Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń Public Hearing in Poland. An Analysis of Normative Solutions and the Practice of Their Application . 233 Annex. Alphabetical list (by author’s name) of English summaries of articles contained in Sejm Review (Przegląd Sejmowy) from No. 6(101)2010 until No. 5(118)2013 . 255 4 The Sejm Review Fifth specialTable edition of Contents / 2014 5 BOGUSŁAW BANASZAK THE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL* ABSTRACT In the recent decades, there has been growing discussion in the democratic counties on the prob- lem of judicial activism within the supreme and constitutional courts. The above-mentioned notion is generally recognized as a departure by the court beyond adjudicating individual cases and as an involve- ment in a broadly understood resolution of social problems or in shaping the concept of the state. Judicial activism of the Constitutional Tribunal within such a meaning existed in the fi rst phase of Poland’s transformation, which lasted from June 1989 to the adoption of the current Polish Con- stitution in 1997. During that period, the norms of the previous constitution, successively amended after 1989, were given — within the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal (and within juris- prudence of other courts and activities of supreme state authorities) — a new meaning which made it possible to apply solutions adjusted to the changing social circumstances. Therefore, necessary re- forms could be implemented relatively quickly without a time-consuming work on modifi cation of the constitution. Judicial activism of the Constitutional Tribunal has not yet been thoroughly examined in the Polish literature of constitutional law. The problems related to it are seldom recognized and dis- cussed only in the context of other issues or in glosses to judgments. Judicial activism existing after the adoption of the 1997 Constitution is diversely appraised. Negative appraisals appeared rarely in the beginning of that period and, over time, became more frequent. Excessive judicial activism of the Tribunal may lead to a situation in which the Tribunal will decide not only of the vision of the law-governed state, but rather of its particular solutions. It should be noted that judicial decisions made by the Tribunal are no more subject to institutionalized legal review. Therefore, it is diffi cult * This article was published in “Przegląd Sejmowy”, 2009, No. 4. Research work fi nanced out the funds for science in 2009–2011 as own research project No. N N110 058236. 6 The Sejm Review Fifth special edition / 2014 to understand why these decisions, and not the decisions of the legislative power, would have prior- ity and be more consistent with the expectations of the public. On the contrary, its parliament itself, chosen in democratic way that is — on its nature — better fi t to articulate these expectations. Other- wise, it would be shown that the constitutional court occupies a central position within the system of government (as some authors imply on the basis of experiences of an increased judicial activism in some modern democracies). In Poland, the scope of judicial activism of the Constitutional Tribunal is not large enough to enable us to say that the above-mentioned threat is real. I. THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF THE SUPREME COURT OR CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES udicial activism of the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court is generally rec- Jognized as their going beyond the adjudication of individual cases, and as in- volvement in a broadly understood resolution of social problems or in shaping the con- cept of the state. It is among the factors infl uencing the frequency of constitutional amendments. The more active the court becomes in interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, the easier it is to avoid the need to change the constitution, since the meaning ascribed to it can be simply modifi ed. Convincing evidence in support of this thesis is provided by the United States. In addition to the U.S.A., judicial activism can be seen in both Germany and Switzerland. The initial period of judicial activism of the Constitutional Tribunal, within the above-mentioned meaning, occurred during the fi rst phase of Poland’s transforma- tion that lasted from June 1989 to the adoption of the current Polish Constitution in 1997. During this period, in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal (but also in the case law of other courts and the decisions of supreme State authorities), the norms of the former Constitution were frequently amended after 1989 and the Con- stitution was often given a new meaning in order to introduce solutions consistent with the changing realities of social life. “This activist role derives, primarily, from the fact that in some circumstances judges are compelled to make law. In such law- making decisions, the court may refer to arguments based on general principles con- tained in the Constitution or on arguments driven by policy-making requirements”1. In this period, the advantage of the Constitutional Tribunal’s activism was that the Constitution was not an obstacle to democratic reforms, even if its structure dated back to the times of real socialism. Thus, socially desirable reforms could be imple- mented relatively quickly, without working on the revision of the Constitution. It should be noted that such work would have been time-consuming; not only for pro- cedural reasons, but mainly because of the need to develop a consensus between emerging political formations. In general, this type of activism of the Supreme Court or constitutional court has been evaluated positively. One of the German constitutional law theorists even 1 P. Tuleja, Stosowanie konstytucji w świetle zasady nadrzędności (wybrane problemy), Kraków 2003, p. 27. Bogusław Banaszak: The Judicial Activism of the Constitutional Tribunal 7 claims that the reluctance to amend the constitution, which he described as constitu- tional and political immobility, may imply the creation of a new function for the Fed- eral Constitutional Court, consisting in adapting the constitution to various challeng- es that may arise2. This makes it possible to solve many social problems in a way that ensures social peace in those countries where the system of political forces is a rela- tively stable, and also in those countries where there is a great diversity of views on political topics accompanied by instability of the political system entailing lack of consensus needed to adopt a Constitution. This does not mean, however, that the ac- tivism of the supreme court or constitutional court totally eliminates the need for con- stitutional amendments.