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Models of Bicameral Parliaments. a Comparative Approach a Comparative Parliaments

Models of Bicameral Parliaments. a Comparative Approach a Comparative Parliaments

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES

------2014-07-03 13:45:37 . Apart from works by Andrzej An Andrzej by works from . Apart 5 The discussion about the sense of the the sense about discussion The structural properties of , only only bicameralism, structural of properties this of features general the most indicating system Jarosław and K. Sokołowski Jacek toszewski, em comprehensive no are there Szymanek, pirical studies. full optimisation and high standard of the of high standard and full optimisation to the reference a is This process. legislative whose Se Rome, the Republican of tradition become has elders) of council (literally natus model1. recognised role universally a nearly but is important, to tradition reference The polit all contemporary explain does not it of the domain which are ical phenomena, in the conducted political Studies science. 126 mid-1990s confirmed that the world of regions geographical in various bicameral2. while unicameral, 56 were were unicamer system, the bicameral initially In dominant. become clearly alism has from back coming keeps system bicameral bi of Critics also time, time in Poland3. to that trying are demonstrate to cameralism is the of structure the bicameral They reason. of not history and of product a of separation tripartite ’s ignore guarantees in which bicameralism powers4, the of a balance between the representation the high or the wealthy of that and people political sci Polish contemporary born. The the to attention much devoted not has ence “chambers of reflection” that were to ensure to ensure were that reflection” of “chambers ------13/2012 At the beginning of the estate monar the estate the beginning of At Regardless of any structural properties any of Regardless Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS chy, there emerged a custom whereby upper upper whereby a custom emerged there chy, of instances “second generis sui were houses or resistance” of “chambers born”, the better the observer. This type of analysis of the bi of the analysis of This type the observer. from separated model, parliament cameral by is specific systems, of political theentirety it though approach, erroneous an means no certainlyis incomplete. preferences. In analyses of bicameralism, bicameralism, of analyses In preferences. attribute in a tendency to this manifested is large federal or in the case of only rationality only methods all comparative Third, states. phe studied of the define partial identity establish to difficult it which makes nomena, on depends largely decision The boundaries. of simplifications, without which, howev which, without simplifications, of Second, impossible. is modelling formal er, easy with associated is comparisons making often This variables. some of manipulation prej own political scientists’ from stems when theyudice, try political examine to their own with in accordance phenomena ganisations and institutions in society are to to in society are institutions and ganisations much so articlenot is of the aim The operate. Each classify to bicameralism. but analyse to weakness and strengths its has classification used tools in most thein case as of First, es. a risk carries it with methods, it comparative Models of bicameral . A comparative approach A comparative parliaments. Models of bicameral vs. ( differences internal and defines the the parliament bicameralism), or whichother within framework formal Zbigniew MachelskiZbigniew WROCŁAWSKIE STUDIA POLITOLOGICZNE STUDIA POLITOLOGICZNE WROCŁAWSKIE machelski.indd 1 machelski.indd 2 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES 2 birth ofbirth aparty, or its whether foundation electoral played akey role inthe about aparliamentary whether group as an Duverger’s it system. is speaking, Generally sented was science Maurice in political entirein the space(space-bound). political versal nature of studied the phenomena with (system-specific) cases andcapture the uni nificance adopted the criteria aretypology of key sig sessment of relations. In eachclassification or clusions should stem from an empirical as arethey constantly Normativerevised. con generalisations, but we accept that fact the tangible We evidence. can of make sort this we should corroborate such statements with lations within parliamentary parties” interest groups and growth of anarchy inre tion, facilitates autonomisation political of system is conducive to [...]electoral corrup say, for example, that “a single-winner voting statement concerning what we “know”. If we determines our acceptance or rejection of a verificationpirical meansthat observation on or observation based experience meanswhich that pronounced opinions are marily dependent on empirical verification, ing characteristics, has several but is pri distributionthe of power” a tacit endorsement of its institutions and “simply analyzing apolity as it is amounts to makes it possible to avoid asituation, when scientists are forced critically. to think This and theories notfy to prove political them, only to invalidate interms of trying or falsi scholars sciences that should in social think standing and explaining athesis. Assuming change,tique and social and not only under proper the which of is cri science purpose ory, i.e. aschoolof thought according to susceptible to various forms of the critical contemporary has science become political “behaviouralof period Afterthe revolution”, Typology ofbicameralism © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

 The first typology of of Theparliaments first typology pre 9 . They . They helpevaluate us individual 6 . Critical think . Critical 7 8 . Em , then , then ------a typology of legislaturea typology models according group parliamentary domination of leadership party the over the groupmentary and leadership; party the c) b)relative parlia the party; balancebetween a) preponderance of representatives over the variants characterising of types parliaments: French scientist political considered three ganisation and parliamentary the group, the ferring to relations the or party the between ofparties extra-parliamentary origin parliamentary second origin, inthe –with In first the case we are withparties dealing of was primarily influenced bodies. by external manifestos. It becomes more “sophisticat in comparisonmodified withtheir election gramme is of substantially parties political parliamentin the often meansthat the pro of work parliament. inthe Winning seats of conflictstranslates these intothe quality atives, but express also conflicts. The nature net level organise of election the represent electoral level and parliamentary-cabi the Parties parties. political analysed on the are made up of people belonging to various as representative are and bodies, elected many operational concepts. Legislatures, third– inthe group. firstthe group, the while Britishparliament United States Congress is considered in to be mostthe frequently studied parliaments, the oppositionthe parliament inthe cumstances, prime the minister or of leader parliamentary group and, infavourable cir becoming of head leader the the party the structure by organisation, party the tary with replaced by apenetration of parliamen the means only theoretical; 3) interactions are effectivenessthe both of structures is by no characterised by astate of equilibrium and groupmentary and organisation party the is structure; 2)cooperation parlia the between leadership party the and party external the enjoy considerable autonomy with regard to to following the features: 1)representatives Duverger’s is source the of typology 11 . This is the basis. Thisthe is for 12 . Among 10 . Re 2014-07-03 13:45:37 ------POLITICALPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSINSTITUTIONS ANDAND ACTIVITIIESACTIVITIES ------3

2014-07-03 13:45:37  ; 16 . The first case is about the ef the case is about first The . 18 , but it can be applied by using using by be can applied it , but . 19 17 Mezey’s typology based is the policy on Mezey’s 3) modified arenas: the classic example example classic the modifiedarenas: 3) completely parliaments e.g. 4) full arenas, divides parliaments into “moderate” (mod “moderate” into parliaments divides (sig “significant” and support) popular erate ex as well two as support), popular nificant popular enjoying parliaments models: treme such lacking parliaments and recognition in the two of A combination recognition. – owing to the position of the president in the president of the position to – owing the system) sup its and the of power making port society in in implement the legislatures of fectiveness their and legislative their own ing the government’s of the content on impact to distin it possible makes This proposals. A parliaments. “weak” and “strong” guish levels: on three effective is parliament strong re bills; b) of executive’s the a) modification (this carries bills the thejection executive’s of term); of the end before dissolution of risk instruments. legislative own its c) launching re not modify can but A weak parliament The legislation. draft ject the government’s some is power making decision of criterion what flawed approved of (number measures quantitative sup indicator, The second bills). vetoed or of basedmeasurement is a on portin society, just which is legitimacy, popular of the level support when This to difficult evaluate. as from a continuum, of in the form presented thereof, of lack to recognition of theextreme was the Parliament of the Fourth Republic in Republic the Fourth of the Parliament was the par also includes the group but France, Italy and in Germany liaments in which the ruling majority, by dominated there is confrontation for forum themain the and between theruling majority lation little having the opposition with opposition, var This process. on legislative the influence King United by the best is exemplified iant (in the France in Republic the Fifth and dom the of position the strong to owing former the in latter minister, the prime and cabinet ------. The parliament becomes, becomes, The parliament . 14 : 15 . Government proposals are modified are proposals . Government 13 2) modified transformative legislatures, legislatures, 2) modified transformative 1) highly transformative (the only exam (the only 1) highly transformative Two successive typologies of parliaments parliaments typologies of successive Two Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS which have a range of capabilities of modi of capabilities of a range which have proposals; fying the executive’s of legislatures of being the US Congress, view, in Polsby’s ple, mak of capability its determined by which is which decisions financial autonomous ing the president); on binding are tant in thisin case tant about debate public a for of forum all a first the executive. by forward put the initiatives legisla these Eachtypes of transformative – which variants, two – has arenas and tures types four distinguish to possible it makes and autonomous decision making. Arenas, making. Arenas, decision autonomous and be dispute of places are hand, theother on tween political their parties, which during their about think mainly confrontation of the quality The success. electoral future ef and the effectiveness process, legislative impor less become governance of ficiency vision of labour in the parliament. The final final The in the parliament. labour of vision political prefer determinedby is outcome of quality groups, parliamentary of ences of preparation professional and their work legislatures Transformative the members. policy of making structurally capable are ing power of legislatures can be presented be can presented legislatures of power ing on parliaments strong with a continuum, as the on weak parliaments and extreme, one “trans describedare as former The other. “are as – the latter legislatures, formative” nas” di the defining procedures of thein course – by Nelson W. Polsby and Michael L. Mezey L. Mezey Michael and Polsby W. Nelson – by parliaments that notes Polsby similar. – are of their policy terms making in powers differ the limiting of in their capability expressed The policymak the government. of power ed” in the sense and for the reason that it it that the reason for in the sense and ed” coali of possibility any hinder not should modifying The basic factor bargaining. tion the in parlia power of the distribution is election. an after ment machelski.indd 3 machelski.indd 4 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES ed capabilityed government’s the of modifying with two features basic incommon: limit “marginal” legislatures we have assemblies nition and risk of early elections. Among ment’s power, considerable popular recog modest capabilities of limiting govern the legislatures have three features incommon: andmodel procedural instruments. Reactive considerably interms of constitutional their functioning systems inpolitical differing of French the FifthRepublic, i.e. legislatures Bundestagthe and National the Assembly legislatures we have House the of Commons, Republic. other Onthe hand, among reactive Republic and parliament the of Italian the parliaments from Third the theand Fourth tions. Active legislatures include also French popular support and are at risk of early elec ernment’s bills, but donot they enjoy broad Republic) are capable gov the of modifying legislatures Reichstag (the Weimar inthe Congress is an example here). Vulnerable before end the of term(again their US the proval and are not at risk of dissolved being tives. enjoy They considerablepopular ap and launching owntheir legislative initia pable governmental of modifying proposals reactive (Table 1). (1) vulnerable, (2)active, (3)marginal, (4) legitimacy, gives us four of types legislatures: dicators: making power and policy popular 4 Source: M.Mezey, Table 1.Power of legislatures and popular support © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

POWER POLICY MAKING  In Mezey’s view, active legislatures are ca Comparative Legislatures weak strong Power , N.C.1979,p. 36. ------marginal Weimar Republic) 4th), (Italy, France (3rd and vulnerable Moderate support decisive role is played by four variables: a) ing. This depends on many factors, butthe ious possibilities of influencing mak policy considerable popular support and have var “modifiedtransformative” legislatures, enjoy tures inmost consolidated are extentlesser —Russia and . amples would include and —to Belarus a controlled by executive the can place there “manipulated” legislatures withoutleft any examples. thatseems It we bottom The port. left-hand field in Table 1 is draft legislation and moderatepopular sup are discipline also and loyalty. party Apart over state institutions. Ofgreat importance strength their ties, and ability to gain control able related to number the of par political significancerestrict the the legislature.of and minister government, inthe may which possibilitythe of combining offices the ofMP ments stemming from , the e.g. addition to areferendum, include instru procedural kinds of factors: constitutional, and political er of parliamentthe is determined by three ston-Bandeira and Philip Norton, pow the of legislature. the According to CristinaLe of legislature); the d)constitutional powers tem; c) number of factions (fragmentation nature of regime; political sys the b)party Andrzej Antoszewski notes The secondThe factor (political) the variis 22 . The constitutional factors, in (5th)) Germany, France (United Kingdom, reactive (United States) active Significant support 20 . In Europe ex 21 that legisla 2014-07-03 13:45:37 ------POLITICALPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSINSTITUTIONS ANDAND ACTIVITIIESACTIVITIES ------5

2014-07-03 13:45:37  . Both 28 . A solution has been has . A solution 27 . This means that the position the position that means . This 26 Another determinant limiting the scope limiting determinant Another has that a factor is chambers of Equality a crucial impact on the measure of strength strength of thea crucial measure on impact op an requires This system. a bicameral of of the notions abstract of erationalisation congruence and disproportionality the of the uniformity on depend primarily both chambers to in elections system voting used in a variety of forms and proportions. proportions. and forms usedof variety in a the of a restriction cases this most means In of way Another . legislative of right the deprive to is activity legislative limiting draft debating of a possibility of chamber prob main the , In first. legislation between the Sejm [lower lem in the relations legis to regard with the and house] the bound of the question is activity lative amendments of law, substantive under aries, the Senate by adopted amendments the scope of whereby adopted veryTheis Senate limited. legislation draft to legislation. draft debate does not be the may activity chambers’ the upper of a bill, debate to house the upper deadline for Finally, verywhich is by strictlylaw. defined the asymmet determines that element an a pos is system a bicameral of rical nature being chamber one of a position of sibility the fact and chamber the other revised by make to the right has chamber the other that of differences any should the final decision arise. opinion anced bicameralism, i.e. one that accords a accords that one i.e. bicameralism, anced the legislative of one to position dominant asymmetrical an as regarded is chambers, manifes extreme most its In bicameralism. in powers exclusive has chamber one tation, activi parliamentary of areas theimportant gov of the of control all, first including, ty, to political accountability its and ernment the chamber limited, significantly is house the upper of on is process the legislative of the burden and legislative greater which has house, the lower room the limit that instruments The powers. be can house the upper of manoeuvre for ------. This means means . This 25 – the disciplined UK parlia – the disciplined . The type of the distribution of of distribution type. The the 23 24 On the other hand, each bicameralism bicameralism each hand, On the other Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS to accomplish. accomplish. to bal of meet the assumptions does not that supervisory and creative function of the par function of supervisory creative and controlling to also comes whenit liament, the govern Consequently, the government. strong appropriately seek gain to must ment which in in both chambers, political support be difficult may system voting a proportional by a lack of constitutional differentiation of differentiation constitutional of a lack by the legislature partsthe two of thein de both chambers of the powers that evenly distributed are process making cision being subordi between neither them, with to the both applies This theother. to nated power defines a symmetrical (strong) bicam a symmetrical defines (strong) power asymmetricaleralism and (weak) bicameral are we a symmetrical In bicameralism ism. pow of equal distribution dealing an with very and similar er between the chambers both chambers. of competencies legislative characterised is bicameralism of This type Using algebraic terms, Arend Lijphart devel Lijphart Arend terms, algebraic Using taking into oped a typology parliaments, of pow of distribution variables: two account rep of level b) between ers the chambers; resentation (transformative to a greater degree) and and degree) a greater to (transformative in their effective (less legislatures “weaker” the executive). with relations and weak bicameralism Strong bicameralism United States, where party loyalty is often often is party loyalty where States, United (procedural) factor The third questioned. powers of structure the scope and concerns In . parliamentary of activity and this al view, Norton’s and Leston-Bandeira’s legislatures “stronger” distinguish to us lows from an exceptional situation – a coalition – a coalition situation exceptional an from government trans less is party, one by dominated ment, parliament the “multi-party” than formative inthe is different situation The in Italy. machelski.indd 5 machelski.indd 6 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES equal weightequal of votes. In Table 3sixbicam resented, however, which, guarantees them lation. As aresult, states small are overrep senators –regardless of sizeof the its popu is represented Senate inthe by two elected (0.01). In United the States (0.49)eachstate congruence offull representation is Belgium parliamentseral (Table one 2),the closest to on other.the Out of bicam ninethe selected one extreme and incongruent bicameralism tion congruent place fully bicameralism on either.body Different levels of representa Britishthe House of Lords is not an elected various states or representatives of governments the of the are not ingeneral elected elections, are only example, members of Bundesrat, the who byised an imbalanced representation. For resentation chambers. inboth to establish levelthe of congruence of rep onty congruencethe axis makes it possible quality (Table 2).Placing disproportionali complete equality, “1”complete while ine measure disproportionality, denote “0”will of legislature. the If we Gini the use Index to 6 Source: A.Lijphart, op. cit., p. 227. Table 2.Disproportionality of representation © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

Austria 0.05 India 0.10 Germany 0.32 Canada 0.34 Australia 0.36 Venezuela 0.40 Switzerland 0.46 United States 0.49 Gini Index of Inequality Belgium 0.01 Belgium  Incongruent bicameralism is character Lander (usually ministers); 39.7 10% Percentage of voters to seats won 10.8 11.9 15.4 24.0 33.4 28.7 31.6 38.4 55.0 20% 20.9 22.5 26.9 41.7 46.3 47.8 47.2 53.2 ------this functional “calque” functional this of legislative powers uties is, generally, acopy of Senate the and uties and Senate. the Chamber The Dep of “identical” powers of Chamber the of Dep resentation chambers, inboth but inthe also not only congruence political inthe of rep chambers. The modelspecificity this lies of strong congruence of representation inboth bicameralism inItaly is characterised by Riccardo Pelizzo, (strong) symmetrical the and congruence.of symmetry jphart’s criteria, are on placed different levels parliaments,eral classified basisthe on Li of the handsthe of lower the chamber, the while dom, where entire the legislative power is in example of such asystem is United the King of power parliament inthe from principle the of separation and balance cameralism we are with dealing adeparture samethe principles ning chambers inboth according to exactly two analogous legislative procedures run that within legislative the process there are as concordance ( from one chamber to other the is referred to According to Gianfranco Pasquino and 31.0 32.8 37.4 54.3 55.6 58.7 60.0 64.7 67.7 30% concordante 29 . In bi asymmetrical 30 ), which means), which 50.9 52.9 56.8 72.6 71.3 74.0 77.5 80.6 83.7 50% . An extreme 2014-07-03 13:45:37 ------POLITICALPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSINSTITUTIONS ANDAND ACTIVITIIESACTIVITIES . ------7

32 2014-07-03 13:45:38  government. government. Poland Asymmetrical Land United kingdomfrance United

. Only in this. Only case the Bundes is 33 Italy . The relations between the Senate and and between the Senate relations . The , Bologna 2006, p. 36. , Bologna 2006, p. Symmetrical 34 Länder Although the Senate was equipped with a with equipped was the Senate Although Poland’s asymmetrical and congruent asymmetrical congruent and Poland’s United statesgermany United bicameralism is determined by the specific determinedby is bicameralism after political transformation its of nature in the of the Senate restitution 1989. The a not was system constitutional country’s of the on the functioning reflection of result cre about not was It system. parliamentary the entire of structure fullya rational ating a tempo about but system, parliamentary rary solution. influence positively can it checks, of system de a limited policy to only making the state’s gree a confronta to down come the government situation is different in the parlia German different is situation the Federal of the participation where ment, limited is process Council in the legislative in of legislative has the right Bundesrat The the with together itiative ap require the by adopted Laws if they the concern the Bundesrat, of proval if insti or state a constituent of in participate states constituent of tutions concern if the laws i.e. their implementation, the body that equal to a legislative as status rat’s the Bundestag. of - - - - - DISTRIBUTION OF POWER POWER OF DISTRIBUTION Parlamenti democratici Parlamenti Congruent Incongruent .

31 TYPE OF REPRESENTATION OF TYPE In the symmetrical bicameralism group, the group, symmetricalIn bicameralism As a result, the model of incongruent bi incongruent the model of a result, As Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS chamber’s position. In the case of a diver the case of In position. chamber’s version compromise a opinion, of gence this version single and out be worked must The both chambers. by be to is accepted in the United States and Germany. Each bill Germany. and States in the United both win support must States in the United Repre of the in House and in the Senate virtually an play Both chambers sentatives. and process, part thein legislative identical reject the upper cannot chamber the lower level of congruence – the weak bicameral congruence of level means This Republic. the 5th French of ism take part in the both chambers although that decisions equal terms, on process legislative key. are Assembly the National by made parliaments to applies congruence low-level not become a factor enabling the penetration the penetration enabling a factor become not especially those preferences, additional of bicamer The the opposition. by forward put works Kingdom in the United al parliament The parliament. a unicameral to similarly a higher on – though includes group same upper chamber can only block or delay the delay or block only can chamber upper process legislative a model) reflects (Westminster cameralism does chamber in which the other situation Source: after: G. Pasquino, R. Pelizzo, Pelizzo, R. Pasquino, after: G. Source:

Table 3. Classification of bicameralism bicameralism of 3. Classification Table machelski.indd 7 machelski.indd 8 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES model of asymmetrical bicameralism. ofmodel asymmetrical bicameralismof symmetrical and not the making process characterise various forms chambers of policy the as well as symmetry or of similar scope legislative powers of both chambers,both sameness, political same the configurationbalanced of representation in have similar features very bicameralism of cases asymmetrical will all proportionality and congruence indicators), and representation of chambers both (dis of power, internal organisation, composition wewhen into take account distribution the version. Pasquino and Pelizzo assume that Poland is placed, is empty original inthe The topright-hand part of Tablewhere 3, moderately bicameralism) weak were used. jphart’s categories (moderately strong and Pelizzo’s classification (TableLi 3) not all markedly differentfrom model”. “ideal the The Sejm. bicameral in model Poland is congruentbeing with majority the inthe with majority the parties, ical of Senate the were by taken representatives of three polit out that out of 100seats the Senate inthe 96 nothingfact, of happened. sort the It turned upperthe free house from politics. In party of such a procedure claimed that it would principlethe of relative majority. Advocates voting system inelections to Senate the with introducedelectoral code asingle-winner governmentsexecutive of local bodies as well as legislative and Europeanthe Parliament, office the the of laws for national representative and bodies replacing code, a new previous the electoral firstthe time basisthe on the of provisions of in Poland on 2011took place for 9October chambers.both parliamentary The election executive, given congruence political the of initiatives, is which not task adifficult the for suading senators to support government’s the parliamentary practice, consists this inper Senate’s amendments to proposed bills. In tion of positions course inthe of work on the 8 © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

 It should noted be that inPasquino’s and 36 . In view, their a 35 . The - - - - are binding on citizens all makingthe of authoritative decisions, which manyments serve functions and in part take causative There link? is no doubtthat parlia system. Should we into take account another opinion, winning approval for political the adopted laws, ability to influence public inquiries are to on: focus quality the of the that category this is difficult to define. Our making power”. We have already noted making requires areference to “decision Legislatures making inpolicy ed thatpreparationed askilful of “game”, the players. In 1960s the it was demonstrat assessment of influence on decisions arethe rewardsbolic ing process and material seeking and sym game of actors influencing mak policy the ences work the of government. the only parliamentary player either that influ resultsthe are rarely positive erage, 20 and between 40%of proposals and are accepted itiated by government the and just as many matters dealt with by legislature the are in that around inastable 90%of decision process making), we assume (policy decision.final Whenpolitical the weighing stages, first the between idea theand diary important decisions political ininterme draft legislation,modifying the budget or more flexible, informalpolitical ways of of formalised nature, ahighly not replacing chambers and executive the are “veto points” but about obstacles political and checks. Two about veto legal-constitutional inthe sense, lower chamber and executive. the It is not important points: upperthe chamber, the of case the a bicameral system, we have three firstthe plans and final implementation. In change making process policy the between i.e. elements of system the that hinder or veto points, termof the uses so-called the ry The parliament’sThe capability policy of Assuming is a that parliamentary rivalry 38 . The opposition on rejects, av 40 , of key significance in an 37 . Political theo 39 . It is not the 2014-07-03 13:45:38 ------POLITICALPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSINSTITUTIONS ANDAND ACTIVITIIESACTIVITIES . ------9

43 2014-07-03 13:45:38  . Legislatures . Legislatures 45 . An important important . An 46 . Of considerable significance here is here significance considerable . Of 44 that the quality of democracy of the also quality depends that revealed they are how on triedand are differences expressing of source between relations maintaining of ways tested a bicam In the executive. and the legislature tempers chamber thesecond eralsystem, participation in policy making, but, gener in policy making, but, participation to influence limited from the passage ally, external factors, of full a result is subjectivity the exerted by pressure of a result sometimes be sup may dissatisfaction Public electorate. the fuelled the academia by and ported by media We can of interest. theconflict of the structure link between the quali talk a permanent of democracy thety scale of differences and of democrat forces often conflicts, which and even changes, introduce to ic governments in favour personally not are when politicians parliaments that no doubt is them. There of diversi reflect institutions representative as by conflicts, though institutionalise tyand of society as a picture a are they definition in a democratic in addition, whole; of especially conflicts, some conflicts state be avoided should interests, though even compromises, out work often rooted they deeply reflect frequently more of the one is differences Showing differences. parliaments, and “representation” of tasks pow of institutions other any than more them, assuming express to obliged are er, legislatures which also have at theirdisposal at alsowhich have legislatures modifythem to and enable that instruments but legislation, draft reject the government’s formulat of capabilities have which do not original political initiatives their own ing categories two between the differences The of the nature by political culture, defined are the and system the electoral constitution, to the applies generally This party system. be of patterns approved and political system indeed operate all entities whereby haviour, or various entities: structurallyas separate a certain as whole. the state and ganisations their the scope of change may Legislatures ------status . Of cru .George 42 41 status quo , except for a situation when all players when all players a situation for , except Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS own. The second category is made up of of the up made is category The second own. which limit parliaments, of number biggest are These influence. exerting to themselves The first comprises parliaments that shape shape that parliaments comprises first The policythemselves limit making. Theynot do ap and modification consideration, to only the government’s to opposition or of proval at the legal instruments using but, proposals, their of actions their disposal, they initiate they are members of powerful organisations. powerful organisations. of members theyare the of the nature extent some to Simplifying between the chambers, power of distribution and between the legislature the relation and all divide can democratic we the executive, categories. general most two into legislatures strengths and weaknesses. The participants weaknesses. The participants and strengths organisation the benefit from may (actors) of the par structure field: the theplaying of the po of power the government, liament, Ordinary citi groups. litical parties, interest they take although part too can in thiszens, unless do so, in fact rarely political game, being measured by the size and efficiencythe size and by beingmeasured knowledge, to access theirorganisation, of which some to thanks features i.e. wealth, in any result a better will achieve to be able result The teams). (weaker others than issue the players’ determinedby is thegame of cial significance in this game is possession of of is possession cial in game this significance must player important Any “player”. a veto in the the change prevent to be able quo chang such that agreed unanimously have won is game The take place. not es should their strength with “teams”, the strongest by proposals at the same time, but by first com first by but time, the same at proposals being the them, better with of two paring then better one, the third with compared etc those one, thefourth with of game the parliamentary that notes Tsebelis in the a change about is which from the mathematical point of view of point the mathematical which from al almost is, the in parliament each vote involves Voting result. determined its ways the that means This sequences. majority all comparing by made not is best decision machelski.indd 9 machelski.indd 10 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES uniformity and homogeneous composition bicameralism.cal This meanspoliticalthe cameralism and incongruent asymmetri value, “3”, come congruent bi symmetrical Lower down but scale, the with an identical paigns and to influence MPs undecided portunities to conduct information cam opportunities for interest groups op to act, alongerbecause procedure creates more is incongruent bicameralism, symmetrical “policy structural the making” capability, of comparison.purpose cameral parliaments are included for the bicameralismin-between (1.5).Nine uni congruentcameralism, asymmetrical (2); incongruentasymmetrical bi (2.5);weak medium-strength and bicameralism, weak incongruentrical (3);bicameralism between medium-strength bicameralism, asymmet bicameralism, congruent symmetrical (3); powericy-making (4); medium-strength strong bicameralism with considerable pol legislative systems have distinguished: been of onis assessed 4toof ascale 1.Six types parliamentpolitical on decisions final the and bicameralism. weak The impact the of strong, moderately strong, moderately weak low. There are fourtypes of bicameralism: of logic the Lijphart’s division, box inthe be on decisions is presented, inaccordance with making and influence their (strong or weak) as an “independent controller”. serve also guardiana structural of law good and can second the inwhich chamberbers, becomes achieved thanks to asystembe of two cham ance with genuine “popular will”. This is to to a piece of legislation is which inaccord ciety, may this bring about an amendment concept a different policy and adifferent regulatory tion, is which associated with aproposal of islation as well as apossibility of modifica and for another discussion about draft leg passions, gives additional for time reflection 10 © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

 The highest-ranked variant, in terms of participationThe of legislatures policy in 47 . When there is a consensus inso 48 ------. from Table decision 3,the making process constitutionthe and to interpret it. has exclusive the Riksdag the right to amend tion here is unicameralism in Sweden, where ing powerthe of government.the The excep ism with regard making and to limit policy advantagehas astructural over unicameral The comparison showsthat bicameralism of incongruent bicameralism. asymmetrical proposals, is which confirmed thecase by ured by acapability to correct governmental influencetheir as making, meas policy on of representation chambers inthe weakens has very limited decision-makinghas very powers primethe minister leader, not does who necessarily become ests, or groups of supporters of a political groups, usually representing regional inter by government. the which do not submit to discipline expected comprising many factions ( party parliamentarycoalition-based majority in Italy, where after there an election is a ty ment, par iftheirs is ruling the especially support party’s their parlia inthe policy of Commons after who thewill election ofselection such candidates to House the ofelection MPs, comes which down to Kingdom determines to alarge extent the parliamentaryThe the in model United claims of many interest rival groups by senators, the have who with to deal issues in comparison to issues considered equivocal positions inanarrower range of representativesthe represent clear and un to Housethe of Representatives mean that mogeneous constituencies in electionsthe vent of nextthe The election. relatively ho at least for of part term,until the ad the senatorsthe to play role the of statesmen, Unitedthe States six-year the termenables bymined anumber of factors. specific In and influence making policy areon deter 50 In parliaments of case the sixselected Sometimes these areSometimes these “ideological” . We are with dealing adifferent effect 51 . In France, senate the correnti 2014-07-03 13:45:38 49 ), ), ------. POLITICALPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSINSTITUTIONS ANDAND ACTIVITIIESACTIVITIES . - - - 54 11

2014-07-03 13:45:38  . 53 It is usually assumed that a parliament parliament a that assumed usually is It When we describe the relations between describewe therelations When Parliamentary committees committees Parliamentary its of when the structure “stronger” is mediation procedure fails, the bill is not not the is bill fails, procedure mediation adopted we in Poland, chambers the parliamentary of the inequality bear that to in mind have ac of both their sphere concerns their roles on policy making.The influence and tivity first in 1989 was the Senate of establishing in symbol important an to allreference a of the tra to – a return consciousness national impor More Poland. independent of dition quite emerged in Poland the Senate tantly, the veryunexpectedly from beginning and institution a temporary as treated was own its analysedof casesthe has each Thus, specific determinants. • Finland [1] [1] • Finland [1] • Greece [1] • Israel [1] • Luxembourg [1] • Malta [1] • Portugal Weak bicameralism (asymmetrical, Weak [2] congruent) • Austria • Ireland • Poland bicameralismIn-between [1.5] • Norway 1991 [1.4] before • Iceland Unicameralism [2] • Sweden [1.3] • Denmark Zealand [1.1] • New - - - laws, laws, Länder ) comes into play play into ) comes ) or suspensive veto veto suspensive ) or . In Germany, Germany, . In 52 ). The Bundesrat’s veto may be be may veto Bundesrat’s ). The Zustimmung Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS Einspruch Vermittlungsausschuss • France • France • Spain Bicameralism between medium-strength weakand (asymmetrical, [2.5] incongruent) Kingdom • United • Japan • Japan • Italy Netherlands • The bicameralism Medium-strength (asymmetrical, [3] incongruent) • Canada • Australia • Australia • Germany • Switzerland States • United bicameralism Medium-strength (symmetrical, [3] congruent) • Belgium Bicameralism with decision-making considerable power (symmetrical, [4] incongruent) prime minister prime which the Bundesrat of in the adoption the federal of expression an takes part, are the Bundestag by will. adopted A bill state’s its give which may the Bundesrat, to sent is ( consent and is an advisory body. Legislative initi Legislative advisory an is body. and the domain within entirely almost is ative the presi and ministers of the council of to a complex to conform Theyhave dent. draft which requires procedure, legislative the Council of by be to approved legislation the to subordinated formally which is State, and usually works out a compromise that that a compromise out works usually and the If the Bundestag. to then presented is ( the same by in the Bundestag overridden in the Bun the veto for voted that majority serious disputes, more the case of In desrat. the right Councilwhen invokes the Federal Committee the Mediation veto, absolute of ( Legislatures and the decision-making process process the decision-making and Legislatures machelski.indd 11 machelski.indd 12 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES have right the to get independent access to pendent chair, and, finally,when committees a long time under leadershipthe of an inde stronger, deputies the when sit on for them pline. other Onthe hand, committees grow of committees level isof ahigh disci party reasons alack behind of any significant role that should into taken be account. One of the ment itself. There is one more consideration notcurrentthe reflect majorityparliathe in stronger,be composition their when does assume, that parliamentary committees will cilitates reaching acompromise. We can also effect the exchangeon thoughts,of and fa know eachother better, has which apositive Membersof expertise. of committees small committees is conducive to development the one big committee. Specialisation insmaller scrutiny on of part the government the than committeesmentary are less susceptible to why it should so. be Many parlia small executivethe and it is not difficult to note liamentary committees and strength the of number the areverse between be link of par are they when less numerous thereeffectivewhen are more them of and out that committees the are at most their erlands parliamentsthe inItaly, France or Neth the out less to “strong” be making than inpolicy turnedcan into be one committee –turns in great detail, entirethe House of Commons ings, inorder when, to consider agiven issue committees buttype of meet aspecific also UK parliament – with its complex system of committees.the It is no coincidence that the governmentthe officials and members of committees facilitates cooperation between ernmental departments and parliamentary work. communication Close gov between as efficiency and effectivenesslegislative of to representatives’ the involvement as well committeesthe between and is conducive of conflicts likelihood jurisdictional es the of cabinet inthe ministries committees corresponds to structure the 12 © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

 56 . Jean Blondel has rightly pointed 55 57 . This reduc . There might ------mittees of USCongress the Bundestagthe and Investigating the Com Thisthecase the is defenceof committee of committees into investigative committees. a possibility of transforming permanent procedure of some legislatures provide for entirethe public administration. Rules of ment, but interest their infact includes also on scrutinytheir govern the is focused ment of parliamentary scrutiny. Formally, vestigative apparatus. have at awell-developed in disposal their bureaucracythe as welland as other experts, may permanently function or on an version. Joint parliamentary committees mittee must negotiate a “third” compromise of same the bill differso muchthat the com third chamber. This happenswhen variants States ajoint committee almost becomes a right of legislative initiative Spain and Italy dojoint committees have the there is asingle uniform model. Only in chambers.both not This does thatmean composition composition political the of representationequal and theirreflecting in mittees, on principle the based of parity or chambers, mediation or conciliation com accomplished during joint sessions of both procedures and mechanisms. This beis to areis needed appropriate decision-making quirement for astrong bicameralism. What nisms for reaching acompromise is are casualties. Creating appropriate mecha Bundeswehr’s attack and numerous civilian ernment had known about effects the theof and other members of Angela Merkel’s gov mer minister of defence, Franz Josef Jung, committee what was to ascertain for the tember near Kunduz inAfghanistan. The hijackedtanks by Talibanthe in early Sep commanderthe of Bundeswehr, the on two cumstances of arocket attack, ordered by committee inorder to investigate cir the tee was transformed into an investigative Bundestag’s2009, the defence commit Committees are an important instru 59 58 . In United the . In December ad hoc ad 2014-07-03 13:45:38 ------POLITICALPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSINSTITUTIONS ANDAND ACTIVITIIESACTIVITIES ------13

2014-07-03 13:45:38  The advocates of unicameralism disa of unicameralism advocates The Taking into account the principle of of theprinciple account into Taking gree. They claim that the legislative process process legislative the claim that They gree. two require doesin unitary not systems them, the For in the parliament. chambers system electoral a proportional of terms more to be representation for sufficient are in par matters legislative urgent In varied. A bicameral system better reflects various various reflects better system A bicameral demands, social economic and interests, The second political as preferences. well as their co for place additional an is chamber po common a out working and ordination to a confrontation is conducive This sition. the of stability view and of points various of it possi makes system The political system. regard with disputes settle procedural to ble by the represented positions thedifferent to the increases Bicameralism chambers. two and partymajorities various of influence A process. the legislative on groups interest bicameralism of in favour argument strong region account taking into of a possibility is ethnic, lin of especiallyal causes, problems sociallyin varied groups cultural and guistic chambers, the upper of Members countries. particularly when they perform their func the the term of than periods for longer tions develop time for more have houses, lower expertise ing of selectedin The scope fields. usual is committees chamber in upper work carried out work the scope of that broader ly committees. legislature in unicameral Final remarks remarks Final between the relations balances, and checks as well as the legislature and the executive bicamer the legislature, within the relations rulealism a key becomes in liberal constitu which is system a bicameral is It tionalism. mutu balance, institutional by characterised pow of division appropriate and al scrutiny a system Such between ers the chambers. provid be prepared, to better bills for allows negotiation, this through takes place ed that compromise. a for search and cooperation

------pro navette procedure, navette navette mode or in the parity in the parity mode or . Such activity undoubt activity Such . 60 navette . A good example of the of . A good example 61 One of the most wide-spread methods methods wide-spread the most of One Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS committee may be rejected by the govern be rejected by may committee the final deci the of making with ment, chamber. the first to being entrusted sion unanimity because mechanism, the Swiss is procedure the work with connected inextricably is it hand, On the other committee. the joint of ar decisions procedures, the French under in the at rived tecting their absolute equality. In the Ital In equality. tecting their absolute the basicis instrument it parliament ian House ifthe often, and balance finding for decide cannot the Senate and Deputies of in ends it committee, a joint forming on of a lack the being rejected bill because of one version. Under the Under version. one several between pass chambers may a bill eliminat are alltimes until discrepancies as the regarded is system shuttle This ed. the legislative spectacularmost of division between competition function,increasing pro time, the same at and, the chambers between the chambers, is the is between the chambers, the “shut as to referred sometimes cedure denotes name French This tle procedure”. free trans of procedure a parliamentary to chamber one from bill a debated of fer on agree both chambers until the other concern for the quality of legislation and and legislation of the quality for concern makes This being sought. the compromise with positions, reject extreme to possible it and paralysis parliamentary of a risk out obstruction. dialogue facilitate to which is mediation, of cess, which, as many opponents of bicam of opponents many which, as cess, in argument a sufficient eralism is believe, ad For parliament. a unicameral of favour committee a joint bicameralism, of vocates that indicating a goodis counterargument be by characterised should work legislative basis, as necessary. Their overriding goal goal overriding Their necessary. as basis, to acceptable agreement an out work to is during then which “ratified” is both houses, plenarya session pro the legislative delays and edly prolongs machelski.indd 13 machelski.indd 14 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES as a “collective king” and a guardian of a conservative of times the Roman the Empire highest –the legislative body. Jan that believes it Baszkiewicz was regarded ment’s work. on perceptionthe of valuethe of parliathe governance, which has a negative impact regulations that diminish qualitythe of judged solutions. This results in defective for effective lobbyingthat counteractsill- of problems. all There is not enoughtime for making voters aware of complexity the happens quickly too and there is no time in aunicameral system, but sometimes this ism agree that laws are more quickly passed authorities.the The advocates of bicameral greater responsibility and accountability of that aunicameral system is conducive to The advocates of unicameralismalso argue siderably prolong legislative the process. damage legislation, the undoubtedly con concessions donot they evenwhen which, chamber’s support, government the makes upperposite the may Seeking true. evenbe not demonstrated be scientifically. The op to supportevidence it or, in any it case, can bicameral procedure is wrong. There is no of better legislation under a passed being demonstrated inany that case argument the the bytected other institutions. According to law when prolegislative is also services, ing governmental the and parliamentary results achieved by could be strengthen ian of law, arguing that same the or better rolesial of upper the chamber as aguard it ifnecessary”.point They the controverto ing that “the second chamber improve will to correctness the of draft legislation, hop means that deputies the pay less attention ticular, existence the of asecond chamber 14 1995, no. 1(9),pp. 10,17.Jerzy aconstitutional Ciemniewski, and law in1992–1993 deputy expert chair 2004,pp. 34-35. trojów państwowych © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

 1 2 coeteris paribus coeteris

3

During the times of times the During republic the senate the was legislative the and executive the body, during while G. Tsebelis, J. Money, See Z. See Jarosz, “Problem dwuizbowości parliamentu w przyszłej Konstytucji RP”, , Gdańsk 2002,p. 29;T. Maciejewski, principle Bicameralism 62 it could be , Cambridge 1997,p. 45. ------mos maiorum. mos ers. Bicameralism increases number the of ofmodel representation and of scope pow broader of scope issues within chosen the participation inconflict. It covers a much upperthe chamber is not limited only to ever, inademocratic system activity of the ences of opinion. More importantly, how not to linked “political will” or just differ bringsalism with it apossibility of conflict, and congruence. bicamer Each symmetry oftance is decision the scale the to choose For astrong bicameralism of key impor conforms to its own interests and priorities. it maintains and can overcome. butbers, adegree of also controversy which guaranteeing of cham both symmetry the bicameralism that is potentially balanced, procedure. An effective bicameralism is a could not inaconsultation determined be termine fate the of controversial bills, ifit by voters, the who, during elections, de chambers the between is eventually settled a semblance of unicameralism. Any dispute facilitate sometimes which dialogue, create There are various mechanismsthat are to tioning of abicameral system is impossible. lative process, without efficient which func concerning binding decisions legis inthe ation and arriving at common positions system. They should provide for cooper comparison inaunicameral used to those systemeral must more be sophisticated in for democracy. Measures inabicam used istence of such “veto points” is healthier cess. It is commonly that believed ex the points that change making pro policy the Historia powszechna ustroju i prawa i ustroju powszechna Historia Each stateEach must on choose its own what J. Baszkiewicz, Powszechna historia us historia Powszechna Przegląd Sejmowy , 2nd edition, 2014-07-03 13:45:38 ------

POLITICALPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSINSTITUTIONS ANDAND ACTIVITIIESACTIVITIES

, , - - - - 15

2014-07-03 13:45:38  , Bologna, Modelli di Parlament Parties and 2010, no. 5 (100), 5 (100), 2010, no. Continuity and Change and Continuity

, ed. L. Bardi, Bologna 2006, L. Bardi, , ed. , Gdańsk 2001, p. 259. 2001, p. , Gdańsk Elementi di teoria politica teoria di Elementi e oltre , ed. T. Mołdawa, J. Zaleśny, Warsaw Warsaw Zaleśny, J. Mołdawa, T. ed. , Annales UMCS Sectio K: Politologia Sectio UMCS Annales , Polish translation by A. Kłoskows by translation , Polish , ed. F.I. Greenstein, N.W. Polsby, vol. vol. Polsby, N.W. Greenstein, F.I. , ed. Przegląd Sejmowy Sejmowy Przegląd 20, 2008. cartel party , Homewood 1985, p. 106. 1985, p. , Homewood Western European Party Systems. Party European Western Handbook of Political Science Political of Handbook , Cambridge 1976, p. 125; idem, 125; p. 1976, Cambridge , , Comunité, Milano 1961, p. 227. 1961, p. Milano , Comunité, Systemy polityczne współczesnego świata współczesnego polityczne Systemy Political SciencePolitical Methods Research Athenaeum. Political Science Political Athenaeum. Partiti e sistemi di partito. Il Il partito. di e sistemi Partiti I partiti politici Scope and Methods of Political ScienceScope of Political Methods and , Bologna 2007, p. 71 and further. 71 and , Bologna 2007, p. It is worth mentioning the classification formulated by Max Weber, who divided parliaments into into divided who parliaments Weber, Max by formulated the classification mentioning worth is It N.W. Polsby, “Legislatures”, [in:] “Legislatures”, Polsby, N.W. M. Duverger, M. Duverger, Parliaments, Beyme typologyvon his in Klaus used “Government, (idem, by were criteria Duverger’s Duverger writes about “interior” parties and “exterior” parties, which emerged when politics became when politics parties, which emerged “exterior” parties and “interior” about writes Duverger J. Ciemniewski, op. cit., p. 56. p. cit., Ciemniewski, op. J. of on the basis features of a set organising in consists classification that Sartori Giovanni with I agree J. Buttolph Johnson et al., al., et Johnson Buttolph J. A.C. Isaak, There are many studies by constitutional law specialists, but these are analyses of the state system. system. state of the analyses are thesespecialists, but law by constitutional studies many are There Scholars have formulated the term “Montesquieu’s tripartite separation of powers”. However, the However, powers”. of separation tripartite the term “Montesquieu’s formulated have Scholars A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, R. Herbut, A. Antoszewski,

7 8 9 5 6 4 15 13 14 11 12 10

Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland. Zur politischen Kritik des Beamtentums und Parteiwesens und Beamtentums des Kritik politischen Zur Deutschland. neugeordneten im Regierung und 1918. München-Leipzig 5, Mass. 1975, p. 277. 1975, p. 5, Mass. policy negative a pursue former The Parlament). (arbeitende “working” and Parlament) (redende “talking” development and work to legislative conducive conditions create latter The administration. to regard with Pols Thus, willto cooperate. theyclass’ reflect the addition, political In qualities. leadership authentic of Weber’s to reference no makes he article “Legislatures...” in his but new, nothing discovers by p. 56. p. [in:] Parties”, Political in Power of the Structure and did the German scholar further). and 341 However, p. 1983, Beverly Hills-London Mair, P. Daalder, H. ed. typology enrich Duverger’s not He did methodology. scholar’s French by the use offered all not possibilities reasoning. statistical observation and empirical with Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis for A Framework Systems. Party 229. 1995, p. mass of political rivalry in the style the led adaptation of to subsequently A change phenomenon. a “mass” Peter and Katz S. those describedspecial A parties Richard model. are modelof by parties the catch-all to e democrazia di partito. modelli nei organizzativi “Cambiamenti Mair, P. parties. cartel as R.S. Katz, Mair [in:] La party”, cartel del nascita ka-Dudzińska, Warsaw 2010, p. 67. 2010, p. Warsaw ka-Dudzińska, encompasses that criterion a applying typology hand, involves the On other variable. one and principle one G. Sartori, description. organising complex a more is It compounds. attribute two than more of the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly, then a member of the Constitutional Com the Constitutional of then a member Assembly, the National of Committee the Constitutional of justification no a unitary with finds structure states in system bicameral “a that claims consistently mittee, (idem, based” is modern states democratic of which the organisation on principles in the fundamental “Dwuizbowość w systemie konstytucyjnym III Rzeczypospolitej”, sovereignty of the people, concepts that had a great influence on Montesquieu’s views. D. Held, Held, D. views. Montesquieu’s on influence a great had that concepts the people, of sovereignty democrazia See political systems. into studies part as of conducted are parliamentarism into political science studies In a rzeczywistością ideą Między współczesnym. w świecie Parlamentaryzm i w porównawczym pojęcia w konstytucyjnym poznawcze “Kluczowe i prawie Jaskiernia, 2011; kategorie J. politycznych”, o systemach nauce dy ilościowe we współczesnych badaniach nad parlamentaryzmem”, dy ilościowe we współczesnych badaniach nad parlamentaryzmem”, 2. 16, 2009, no. of separation a tripartite of the concept of the author not was era the Enlightenment thinker of French the times since least at powers of the separation of the problem studied have Philosophers state. in a powers to power papal subordinate to who wanted Padua, of Marsilius also is mentioning worth It Aristotle. of and government) (mixed system a mixed of concepts created Marsilus in the Church. council the general p. 54). However, there is no hard evidence substantiating such a strong thesis. See J.K. Sokołowski, “Meto Sokołowski, See thesis. J.K. a strong such evidence substantiating hard no is there However, p. 54). machelski.indd 15 machelski.indd 16 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES nel Parlamento italiano Parlamento nel system.political may this plane. mean In that not of “is rivalry case the aparty party compatible” with terms the of the proach, “incongruent”the refers model to field a wider politicalrivalry, of i.e. not only theparliamentary to 2006, p. interpreted is also 80).Congruence as afeature of consensus the model. In ap democracy this ments of Democracy. Majoritarian and Proportional Visions Idem, tries a “muffled” bipartite system. A. R.Antoszewski, Herbut, nant and party an exception form inthe of cabinet coalitions. It to seems Ryszard Herbut that UKhas the coalition. The British bipartite system is not“ideal”. there systemparty with a can a We predomiobserve Warsaw 2001, pp.Democrats 95-96). AfterConservatiststhe 2010 theelectionsLiberal the and formed a Opozycja wsystemie demokracji parlamentarnej. Wielka Brytania, Niemcy, Włochy, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Party of acoalition and 1931–1945 was of a period Conservatists. the “national unity” (I write about it in: Asquith as primethe minister, heading a coalition government comprising his supporters from Liberal the had amajority House inthe of Commons. In 1916David Lloyd December George replaced Herbert H. don-New York 2005,p. 177. of Southern Europe”, [in:] oftype research experiment is to some extent defective, mentioned as has been above. are an independent variable, result the while of legislative the process is adependent variable. However, this byied means of a statistical analysis of government’sthe bills amended by parliament.the Two chambers bicameral procedure is better prepared. The quality of legislation in a passed bicameral systemcanbe stud op. cit., The advocates p.138and further). 80andof further; bicameralism claimthat legislation ina passed systemparty or other outside events political occurring parliamentary the system (J. Buttolph Johnson etal., real influence making. policy on Poland (’s cabinet), main the because opposition (Law and party Justice) was deprived of any powersthe of executive. the It seams that “full the arenas” group includes also termparliament 6th the in and government supported by parliamentary the majority and to then cooperate and share with him/her ortion (aparty coalition of to president. the parties) The presidentthen is forced to appoint a ministerprime duringwhen apresident’s terminoffice a parliament a iswith elected majorityseats of won the by opposi executivein the government the and president the from opposing camps. political This situation occurs PoliticaScienza of Polsby’s G.DiPalma, method. “Parlamentoarena oparlamento ditransformazione?”, Giuseppe Di Palma, in hiswho assessment of parliamentthe of Italianthe Republic accepted results the e partiti”, system of Italian the tary Republic First during so-called Republic the (A.Panebianco, “Parlamento-arena 16 © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

 29 28 26 27 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 , New Haven 1984.In his later works Dutch the scholar terms the uses of strong and bicameralism. weak

Le democrazieLe contemporanee The level of congruence is distorted theby lawelectoral (G. Bingham Powell, Jr., J. op. Ciemniewski, cit., p. 61. A. Lijphart, J. Szymanek, A. Lijphart, The firstcoalition government the in United Kingdom was informed Maythough 1915, the liberals C. Leston-Bandeira, P. Norton, “Conclusion: The Impact Democraticof the Practice on Parliaments Ibidem, p. 240. A. Antoszewski, Herbut, R. It is about –difficult to likelihood – the assess of any disturbing factorsimpact ofexternal such the as M. Mezey, The French variant requirestaking into account cohabitation, a situationwhichthere in with coexist In Angelo Panebianco’s view, Polsby’s is of little classification inthe typology use parliamenthe of The as Italian bicameralism is described usually “full” or “perfect” (F.Cazzola, Rivista Italiana di Politica Scienza 17,1987,August, p. 186. Comparative Legislatures Le democrazie...Le Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty One Coun Izby parlamentu drugie procesie w ustawodawczym , Milano 1974; Z. Witkowski,Z. 1974; Milano , Southern European Parliaments in Democracy Systemy polityczne współczesnej Europy , p. 225. , Bologna 2001,pp., Bologna 219–234. , Durham, N.C.1979,pp. 21-44. 17,1987,August, p. 204).Adifferent approach was adopted by Ustrój konstytucyjny współczesnych Włoch waktualnej Systemy polityczne współczesnej Europy… , Polish translation by M. Czekański, Warsaw , Warsaw 1999,p. 79. , Warsaw 2006,p. 239. , ed. C.Leston-Bandeira, Lon Governo eopposizione Elections asInstru Rivista Italiana di Rivista , p. 184. 2014-07-03 13:45:38 ------

POLITICALPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSINSTITUTIONS ANDAND ACTIVITIIESACTIVITIES - - - 17 39,

2014-07-03 13:45:39 Racja Racja  2011, , Polish , Polish IlMulino , ed. M. Gallagher, ed. Divided Government Government Divided Przegląd Sejmowy Przegląd , Polish translation by J.S. Kugler, Kugler, J.S. by translation Polish , Demokracje zachodnioeuropejskie. zachodnioeuropejskie. Demokracje 25, 1995, p. 302. 25, 1995, p. , New York 1996. York , New , Boston 1979, p. 267. 1979, p. , Boston The German Polity German The Sur la télévision (suivi de L’Emprise du journalisme) du L’Emprise de (suivi télévision la Sur Representative Government in Modern Europe Modern in Government Representative , ed. M. Zubik, Warsaw 2003. Warsaw M. Zubik, , ed. , p. 226). However, according to many other political scientists, political scientists, other many to according 226). However, , p. British Journal of Political Science Political of Journal British , Polish translation by J. M. Zaremba, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warsaw Warsaw Sejmowe, Wydawnictwo Zaremba, M. J. by translation Polish , Comparing Legislatures , Roma-Bari 1995, p. 22. 1995, p. , Roma-Bari , ed. J. Goldthorpe, Oxford 1984, pp. 179–208. 1984, pp. Oxford Goldthorpe, J. , ed. , Toruń 2004, p. 133), which, however, has little in common with “excellence” “excellence” with in common little has 133), which, however, 2004, p. , Toruń Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Econo Political the in Studies Capitalism: in Contemporary Conflict and Order , ed. R. Elgie, Oxford 2001, pp. 167–181. 2001, pp. R., ed. Elgie, Oxford , ed. A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, Wrocław 1997, p. 28. 1997, p. Wrocław R. Herbut, A. Antoszewski, , ed. L’opposizione Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View A Comparative Institutions: Legislative Democratic How Parliament Works Parliament How Le democrazie contemporanee... Le democrazie D.M. Olson, Olson, D.M. G. Tsebelis, Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work, New York 2002, p. 28. 2002, p. York New Work, Institutions Political How Players. Veto G. Tsebelis, to the points world the influencing of possibility and subjectivity of vision characteristic Journalists’ could be interests private intheir which situations avoid should officials public this principle, Under Applying the game theory, the Italian professor Alessandro Pluchino has demonstrated that bringing bringing that demonstrated has Pluchino Alessandro professor the Italian theory, the game Applying Parliamentarism, in Presidentialism, Players Veto Systems: in Political Making “Decision G. Tsebelis, G. Pasquino, R. Pelizzo, op. cit., p. 35. p. cit., op. R. Pelizzo, G. Pasquino, 7. p. cit., op. M. Mezey, G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson, G. Pasquino, Scandinavia, Capitalism: in Postwar Class Politics as “Social Policy Korpi, W. G. Esping-Andersen, R. Sturm, “Divided Government in Germania: The Case of the Bundesrat”, [in:] Bundesrat”, in Germania: of The the Case Government “Divided R. Sturm, 58. p. cit., Ciemniewski, op. J. district and council and municipal to elections in the Electoral law 2011 changing 5 January of Act P. Silk, P. sym among German parliaments who placedand theUS Lijphart, with agree Pelizzo and Pasquino A. Antoszewski, “Modele demokracji przedstawicielskiej”, [in:] demokracji przedstawicielskiej”, “Modele A. Antoszewski,

, Poznań 2011, pp. 349-350). In Poland of particular importance to any analysis of the policy of making analysis any to particular of importance Poland In 349-350). pp. 2011, Poznań , 36 37 38 39 40 33 34 35 32 30 31 46 44 45 41 42 43 Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 13, 2012 © for this edition by CNS fazie jego przemian 1989–2004 przemian jego fazie imperfetto”, bicameralismo “Il in fact, is, true.Pasquino, G. the opposite view, in Pasquin’s and Zapobieganie konfliktowi interesów w III RP interesów konfliktowi Zapobieganie 16. 1998, p. Warsaw in conflict or even only be perceived as being in conflict with an impartial discharge of their public duties public oftheir impartialdischarge an with as in conflict being only be or perceived even in conflict and public interest (A. Zybertowicz, “Strukturalny konflikt interesów jako fundament [in:] III RP”, stanu coun of the nature definedthe which specific of interest, the structural of conflict a recognition is process of the political The peacefulchange political transition. and revolution negotiated bloodless, top-down try’s bodies. state important most in the old system in formed the staff most leaving with associated was system p. 363; see Ibidem, of interests. the conflict tackle of this structural dimension rarely researchers However, fact that the most influential media co-shape the framework of the functioning of other organisations and and organisations other of of the functioning the mediaframework co-shape influential the most fact that They alsothe define others. mentioning rules, not informal and and formal some activating institutions, Bourdieu, P. social of problems. “visibility” public further. 44 and pp. 2009, Warsaw A. Ziółkowska, and K. Sztandar-Sztanderska by translation Austria, and Germany”, [in:] Germany”, and Austria, Nations European Western of my A. Pluchino, this institution. of work of the quality improve would the parliament to selected MPs randomly 2011). 1 May (access: http://www.pluchino.it ad agenti, di simulazioni alla programmazione Introduzione Multipartyism”, and , no. 34. See M. Jarentowski, “Zmiana systemu wyborczego do Senatu RP z 2011 r.”, 34. no. See“Zmiana wyborczego systemu do M. Senatu Jarentowski, RP z 2011 r.”, 4 (105). no. et al., McGraw-Hill, New York 1995; D.P. Conradt, Conradt, 1995; D.P. York New McGraw-Hill, et al., Perspective Comparative in the of the Senate and Poland of the Sejm the Republic to in elections of Electoral law assemblies, regional to 2011, of Laws of Journal Parliament, the European to in elections the Electoral law and Poland, of Republic 1994, p. 138 and further; 223 and further. further; 138 and further. 223 and 1994, p. the is Germany in bicameralism of the strength determines what view, Lijphart’s In metrical bicameralisms. (A. bothchambers of powers scopesimilar of and the in politicalsystem theBundesrat of position strong Lijphart, asymmetrical. is SeeGerman bicameralism July-August 1990, p. 597. 1990, p. July-August porównawcza Analiza machelski.indd 17 machelski.indd 18 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES system becomes useless inscience, ifit not does into take account of many aseries different circumstances. unlikelyis highly to that apply. cease soon it will Thus, comparing a bicameral systemwith aunicameral for statement the about governing for of ifsomething rules true inertia the along has been reality: time, it maintain many variables unchanged, except for one variable, for selected experiment. the basis Thisthe is agreeing on aconsolidated text of abill or bill definitely inthe being Z. rejected. Witkowski, op. cit., p. 185. or backrunning and forth in order to a matter. settle This results in eitherbothparliamentary chambers 5 (64),p. 51. Roma–Bari 2006,p. 99. Bundes ed. H.Döring, Frankfurt-New York 1995,pp. 406-447. “Ile PRL wIIIRP?Toksyczne elity iułomna demokracja”, [in:] variant dominated by a cartel of elites and conciliatory-deliberative procedures. B. Fedyszak-Radziejowska, makesthis it possible to assume that it is possible to have, in addition to rivalry-competition democracy, a (A.Lijphart, parties political tween several ismodel that of consensus democracy, works which through separation the of powers and be links close a coherent and significant majoritythe in HouseCommons. of theIn continental Europethe predominant with adomination of executive. the Thisallows theusually government to controlparliamentthe through ning, on depends of model the democracy. Amajoritarian model, e.g. Westminster the model, is associated 18 © forthis editionbyCNS Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne13,2012

 52 51 50 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 49 48 47 The The

The passingThe of constantly the between chambersbills modified is referred toinItalian as J. Szymanek, “Postępowanie w parlamencie mediacyjne dwuizbowym”, Ibidem. A. Barbera, J. Blondel, A. Mastropaolo, L.Verzichelli, C. Leston-Bandeira, P. Norton, op. cit., pp. 177-185. J. Szymanek, “Sejm iSenat wporządku konstytucyjnym”, [in:] Herzog,R. “Stellung desBundesrates imdemokratischen Bundesstaat”, [in:] W. Skrzydło, M. Clark, P. op. Silk, cit., p. 249. Davidson,R.H. W.J. U. “Parliamentary Liebert, Lobby Regimes”, [in:] Arriving at one version of abill inabicameral parliament, there when was no agreement at begin the , Polish translation by B. Banaszak, Warsaw 1995,p. 185. coeteris paribus Modern Italy 1871–2006 Comparative Legislatures I parlamenti. Un’analisi parlamenti. I comparativa Ustrój polityczny Francji principle state reflects acertain of affairs, scholarwhen a in anexperiment can Congress and Its Members Il parlamento. assemblee Le legislative nelle democrazie contemporanee , Polish translation by T. Wituch, Warsaw 2009,p. 513. , Englewood Cliffs 1973. Cliffs , Englewood Le democrazieLe , Warsaw 1992,pp. 190-221. , translation by C.O`Neill, Warsaw 1994,pp. 445. , Roma–Bari 2007,p. 58. Parliaments and in Western Europe ..., p. According 27and further). to many analysts, Racja stanu... Parlamentaryzm wświecie... , p. 87. Przegląd Sejmowy Die Staatsorgane des far spola la , p. 182. 2004, no. 2014-07-03 13:45:39 - - , , ,

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