Newsletter of AFIO National Opinions, PERISCOPE Events, Plans & News
Association of Former Intelligence Officers Double Issue — Vol. XXVI, No 2; Vol. XXVII, No. 1, 2005
AFIO Celebrates Thirty Years of Service to the U.S. Intelligence Community
hirty years ago David Atlee Phillips, a CIA officer concerned over the Tstinging Pike and Church Committee hearings which condemned intelligence operations—operations AFIO 30th Anniversary Symposium/Convention conducted at the behest of U.S. Presidents—took at FBI Headquarters & Sheraton-Premiere Hotel early retirement and formed the Association 28–30 October 2005 of Retired Intelligence Officers. His mission: to explain to Congress, the ven before the issuance of reports seminating for the intelligence commu- Press, and the American by several post-9/11 Commissions, nity, law enforcement, and national and people, the important role cautiously FBI Director Robert Mueller was international government agencies. weighed and sourced intelligence col- E making major changes to fight the grow- With the creation by Congress of a lection and analysis plays in a nation’s ing worldwide terrorist threat. The Bureau Director of National Intelligence [DNI], security. Two years later, the Association shifted resources, promoted new counter- the realignment of duties and responsi- was renamed the Association of Former terrorism executives, moved to give them bilities between the various intelligence Intelligence Officers when its headquar- enhanced investigative powers through the agencies is in flux. A new National Security ters moved to Whittier Ave in McLean, VA USA PATRIOT Act and other procedural Service, to be housed at the Bureau but run where it remains today. streamlining, and created an entire new jointly with the DNI and FBI, has been One of the first goals of the Associa- division—the Office of Intelligence—to approved and is hiring staff and aligning tion was to educate Congress, and it did collect, analyze and disseminate intel- missions with existing Bureau compo- so through testimony at hearings and in ligence. nents. One thing is certain, the Federal personal visits with various committees. The Intelligence Directorate estab- Bureau of Investigation has a bigger and In 2005, however, much has changed. lished basic definitions and requirements crucial role—and new tools to detect the Congress and their staffs are knowl- for the Intelligence Program, and included subtle actions of an enemy – from abroad edgeable, but the American public, in an the ramping up of production and analysis and especially from within – seeking understandable mood to place blame for of new products the Bureau will be dis- to attack American institutions. Those
AFIO Early Years, continues on Page 14 FBI & Symposium continue on page 9 2005 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • page word “former” no longer fits as it did in years past. With these findings in mind, the Board periscope will start 2006 with exploration of a small Chairman’s proposed change in the name of the associa- ISSN 1044-3819 in 2005 tion. Mindful that the acronym AFIO has wide is published twice per year by the Message recognition [just try typing that, alone, in Association of Former Intelligence Officers your web browser] and is our “brand” of some 6723 Whittier Avenue, Suite 303A, McLean, VA 22101-4533 thirty years—we would keep the abbreviation Voice: 703-790-0320; Fax:703-991-1278; Peter Earnest but change its meaning to the Association For e-mail: [email protected] Chairman Intelligence Officers. Web: www.afio.com want to take this opportunity to thank all Please mail or email me [earnest@afio. Editors— Managing: Elizabeth Bancroft those Life Members for the large number com] your thoughts on this. I will take to the Mary Lynne McElroy of replies, donations, and thoughtful com- meeting a better sense of where our members Contributing: Dwayne Anderson Iments we received to my Life Member Appeal. stand. Should the Board then move that the Joseph Goulden While Life Membership is no longer offered in name change be adopted, it would go before the Susan Huck lieu of annual dues (to better enable the Asso- membership as part of a proposed amendment Hayden B. Peake Ward W. Warren ciation to grow), these members were the origi- to our bylaws, needing your vote. Copy: Janet E. Murphy nal seed that sustained the Association during Speaking of voting, I hope all of you will its early years, and continue to be a vital part of © 2005, AFIO, All Rights Reserved have voted for the new group of impressive can- its activities and historical underpinning. didates proposed for the 2006 Board. The ballot A F I O P u b l i c a t io n s As expressed in my note, your sustained appears on the back cover of this issue, but was WINs – Weekly Intelligence Notes—News, Issues, Commentar- commitment to the Association and its mission ies, Book Reviews, delivered by e-mail. also sent to all with email addresses. is valuable to us, and you showed it with that Website – www.afio.com – Fast-Breaking National and Foreign I look forward to greeting each of you at impressive response. We thank you! News, Events, Scholarships, Legislation, WINs, Careers, AFIO’s upcoming 30th Anniversary celebra- Store...and more. Updated daily. Like the Intelligence Community it tion, part of the October 28-30 Symposium at Periscope – AFIO Newsletter for National and Chapter news serves, the composition of AFIO membership and internal Association issues and policies of interest FBI Headquarters in downtown Washington, to members and donors. 2x/year. has greatly changed, as the chart on page and at the Sheraton-Premier Hotel in Tyson’s Intelligencer – Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies—AFIO’s 14 reveals. We now have the majority of our Corner, VA. While much needs to be done to flagship publication—substantive articles ranging from members currently working in active intelli- advance our mission, we have many reasons to historic surveys of intelligence practices, to current gence roles, either in their first career assign- celebrate our 30 years of activity. cutting-edge concerns and directions. Includes book ments, or back on long-term contracts. The reviews, essays, reprints and columnists. 2x/year.
C O N T E N T S painting of it as a well-planned withdrawal. Is that to be how the world sees us leave Baghdad? National FBI Intelligence Symposium 1 Thirtieth Year Celebration 1 How easy is it to predict, this late in the game, Message from the Chairman with so much at stake to depart gracefully? — Peter Earnest 2 In This What is certain while in the heat of the Message from the Executive Director — Elizabeth Bancroft 2 Issue moment, or even years later in recall, often can Intelligence Analysis Paralysis still be clouded by the “fog of war.” Much of — Gene Poteat 3 Share Missions, Not Just Information human experience faces this clouding, and his- — Frederick Harrison 7 Elizabeth Bancroft torical accounts vehemently differ as a result. Symposium Agenda 9 Executive Director After several important lead articles by Of This and That — Dwayne Anderson 10 AFIO National Events in 2005 12 Poteat, Harrison, Anderson, Wheeler and Le Composition of AFIO Membership 14 ur 2005 Symposium is being held, for Gallo, we present a collection of fascinating Members of the AFIO Board of Directors 14 the first time, at the FBI at the moment first-hand accounts on precisely those mo- Current AFIO Chapters 15 it undergoes significant transforma- ments in Saigon—thirty years ago on April Chapter Activities in Recent Months 17 O 29—when many of the same decisions had to tion. The tentative agenda [all agendas are “ten- Donors in 2004 20 tative” in this field of the unexpected] appears be made. CIA Chief of Station [Vietnam] Tom Lingering WWII Mystery: Leslie Howard Story — Douglas L. Wheeler 22 on page 9. If you have not sent in your forms Polgar tells of the increasing sense of doom and The Fall of Saigon — Tom Polgar 23 from the mailing that went out separately, we the inability by some to accept the situation, the The Fall of Saigon - Marine Perspective hope you will do so with the form with this urgency required and the difficulty conveying — Col. Steve Hasty 28 it to a government unwilling to embrace the A CIA Officer in Saigon — Richard W. Hale 30 issue. The Symposium will be a look at an “We were playing God, kicking back people” otherwise very closed Bureau that is normally facts until it was nearly too late to depart. An — Suzanne Goldenberg 34 hesitant to talk on these topics—so this is a account by U.S. Marines guarding the embassy, Covert Action — Andre Le Gallo 38 followed by a totally different recall of the situ- rare event not to miss. Profile: Derrin R. Smith, Ph.D. 40 ation by Henry Kissinger, shows how fear, em- Profile: Art Lindberg 42 This issue of Periscope touches on a barrassment and distance impacts the assess- Professional Reading - Intelligence Omnibus number of sensitive topics. The main one being — Joseph C. Goulden 45 ment of fast-breaking, emotionally charged A Job of Cutting — Sue Huck, Ph.D. 52 where we are heading in Iraq. How and when life-changing events. Richard Hale gives a Intelligence Bookshelf Candidates will we depart? How will we leave it—better — Hayden B. Peake 53 view from a different perch, followed by three off, or worse for our arrival? Often, these past haunting accounts presented in The Guardian Incoming — Ward Warren 60 months, I’ve heard people on all sides of the Forthcoming Books — Elizabeth Bancroft 63 [UK] from others who were present. issue cite our departure from Saigon as a wor- Ballot for Board of Directors 2006 68 Enjoy these articles and the large collec- risome moment in history when we appeared to tion of book reviews of professional titles. flee in haste—a highly public retreat despite the page • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • 2005 sis; so, they do what they can with what diplomatic code and revealed the contents they have—make the best possible esti- of the infamous Zimmermann Telegram to Opinions mate. Their institutional estimate for top the U.S., and then lured the U.S. into the officials is called a National Intelligence war on its side, the U.S. had no intelligence Estimate, or NIE, which is nothing more capabilities. President Woodrow Wilson than a thoughtful, cautiously delineated, said that if the U.S. needed intelligence, best judgment based on their intelligence we would simply get it from our allies, the tempered by their expertise. The word British and French. With the Armistice in INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS “Estimate” says it all. Yet, even the realm 1918, Wilson found himself ill-prepared to PARALYSIS of estimates contains pitfalls; the primary enter the Paris Peace negotiations. He had one is the trap of mirror-imaging…of no idea what the Europeans were likely to assessing situations from the particular want out of the peace negotiations. S. Eugene Poteat perspective of an American, far from the [email protected] One of Wilson’s advisors suggested values, views, beliefs, and objectives of the he create a group of experts who knew targets of interest. something about Europeans, their aspira- Self-flagellation: A practice that No other nation’s intelligence ser- tions, and especially their desires in nego- Shia Muslims and Americans have vices are so preoccupied with analysis tiations. The group, called the Inquiry, a in common; the Shia engage in it from internal sources and personal hastily assembled group of scholars and for religious reasons, affirming their assessments—other countries focus on investigative reporters, was this country’s faith and demonstrating their piety, collecting their adversary’s secrets directly. first attempt at providing strategic or the Americans engage in it for social Stalin, for example, didn’t bother with national intelligence to policy makers, in reasons, affirming their innocence and analysis. He told his intelligence people this case to support President Wilson and demonstrating their victimization. to just get the secrets in the Americans’ his entourage at the Paris Peace Confer- safes—no analysis was necessary. He ence. Although the Inquiry’s scholars, e now have U.S. media wringing valued raw, first-hand intelligence. There mostly historians, put together in short their hands over the personnel is no question that Soviet agents’ collection order a notable effort, it was ignored by Wshuffles at CIA in a manner was successful and Stalin’s conclusions Wilson’s policy makers from the State that caters to America’s appetite for the were correct. Department, who saw no need for an follies and foibles of actors, athletes and The Soviets stole America’s greatest independent intelligence assessment, i.e., other celebrities. No other nation dares secret of WWII—the atomic bomb—with research and analysis from anyone other push its intelligence services through the the result that Stalin knew of the bomb than the State Department, with the result public sieve as do we. before Truman did. Earlier, Soviet agents that Wilson was far out of his depth with One cannot appre- had completely infiltrated the Roosevelt the Europeans in the peace negotiations. ciate what is going administration. Their NKVD and GRU Although Wilson never understood the on at CIA without agents were in the White House, the Con- value intelligence had for policy making, some understanding gress, State Department, Treasury, Justice he finally came to realize that intelligence of how its present Department, OSS and the U.S.’s code- was needed not only to plan and win wars, intelligence analysis breaking operation; they had our secrets but also to insure peace. Nevertheless, came to be. in their pockets. By many estimates, their subsequent administrations continued The current intelligence collection successes in many to lack an understanding of the value of congressional and public outcry stems fields—economic, political, military, intelligence and to disdain its methods. from purported CIA and FBI intelligence technological—kept the flawed Soviet An egregious and notorious, later example failures to foresee the 9/11 terrorist attacks, system alive 30 years beyond what oth- of this naiveté was Congress’s passage of and the intelligence analysis that got right erwise would have been a swifter death the Communications Act of 1934, possibly Iraq’s know-how and capability to develop from the unreality and untenability of under the influence of the State Depart- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), but their economy. The CIA did not have a ment, which made it illegal to listen in then got wrong the conclusion—incountry single case officer inside the Soviet Union to others’ communications, including boasts to the contrary—that ergo propter hoc until well after Francis Gary Power’s U-2 those of the enemy. Notwithstanding this there must be large stockpiles of WMDs was downed in 1960. The reason for this legislative prohibition, the Office of Naval secretly stashed. This major intelligence negligence was that the U.S. ambassador Intelligence proceeded to break the law by failure, according to Silberman-Robb to the U.S.S.R., Llewellyn Thompson, was continuing to master the art of code break- WMD Commission, was due to the Intel- afraid that the “dirty business” of spying ing and to read the Japanese codes—just ligence Community’s inability to collect could jeopardize his sensitive diplomatic in time to save the day in WWII. Walter the hard evidence the analysts needed to mission. The paucity of collection contrib- Lippmann had been a member of the get it right. uted to the poverty of the analysis. Inquiry, and his later writings in the New Analysts are often in the position How did we get into this situation? York Times reflected these early concepts of having to make do without the hard The story begins during WWI. When of strategic intelligence analysis to support evidence (intelligence collection) which is British intelligence broke the German policy making. Wilson, Lippmann and the needed to turn out perfect, on-target analy- Inquiry were the beginning of the eastern 2005 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • page liberal establishment’s foothold in strate- To obtain that guidance, Kent advocated honest ones seeing through the sophistry gic intelligence. that, “Intelligence must be close enough of Communist ideology and the smoke of The idea of inde- to policy, plans, and operations to have the Soviet propaganda. This background led pendent intelligence greatest amount of guidance, and not so Kendall, who clearly understood the Soviet research was resusci- close that it loses its objectivity and integ- threat, to think in terms of America’s need tated during WWII in rity of judgment.” To resolve this difficulty, for intelligence on which to act—including the Office of Strategic Kent urged analysts to, “…keep trying every intelligence to sustain “the big job—the Services’s Research and known device to make the users familiar carving out of United States’ destiny in Analysis Branch. One of with the producers’ organizations, and the the world as a whole.” Kendall harshly producers with the user’s organization.” criticized Kent for a “crassly empirical con- Sherman Kent, 1903 - 1986 the analysts in the OSS was Sherman Kent, an He concluded his work with the admoni- ception of the research process.” Kendall, academic. Kent knew of America’s earliest tion to policy makers not to turn their in contrast, expressed the view that “an involvement in analysis at the end of WWI, backs “on the two instruments by which intelligence operation built upon a concep- and he was familiar with Lippmann’s Western man has, since Aristotle, steadily tion of the process in the social sciences thought and work. Kent, one of the found- enlarged his horizon of knowledge—the that assigns due weight to ‘theory’ as it is ing fathers of the CIA in 1947, carried instruments of reason and the scientific understood in economics and sociology, over Lippmann’s concept of intelligence method.” and increasingly one hopes, in politics…” analysis, institutionalizing it in the CIA’s K e n t ’ s would result therefore in a more accurate Office of National Estimates—eventu- tome remains and valuable intelligence picture. Here ally becoming its chief. Thus, America’s widely accepted we have the essence of Kendall’s views of overdependence on analysis goes back to as the “bible” of intelligence analysis, i.e., that intelligence the beginning of the CIA in 1947. By 1949, strategic intel- research should be steeped in knowledge Kent was the accepted national authority ligence analy- of the social sciences, the foundation for on intelligence research and analysis and sis by those in understanding the “otherness” of adver- Willmoore Kendall the guardian of its producers’ relationships the intelligence saries. Kendall, in essence, was simply with its consumers, i.e., the President and analysis business. But then, a small voice reminding Kent of Sun Tzu’s words 2500 the country’s other top policy and decision was heard that not only challenged the years ago, “know your enemy.” makers, such as those in the Department precepts of Kent’s bible, but turned out to of Defense. Kent codified his understand- be prophetic. Willmoore Kendall, writing ing of this esoteric subject in 1949 in his in World Politics in July 1949, challenged seminal book Strategic Intelligence for Kent’s shibboleths and charged that Kent American World Policy. had missed the boat—entirely. Kendall Depicting strategic intelligence as essentially cried out that the emperor had something produced independently by a no clothes. A Rhodes Scholar, Ph.D. in permanent bureaucratic group of scholars Political Science from the University of and experts, Kent proposed that they would Illinois, a tenured professor at Yale, and deliver volumes of encyclopedic expertise a life-long student of politics, Kendall about the external world that could be wrote that Kent’s doctrine of strategic drawn upon by the policy makers when intelligence was born out of wartime needed. In his Strategic Intelligence, he expediency and was absolutely unsuited characterized the relationship between for a peacetime world wherein the United “producers and consumers of intelligence” States found itself in competition with the as “one of utmost delicacy” and “wished Soviet Union. “Since it is American policy above all else to have its findings prove on which the future of the free world seems Willmoore Kendall useful in making of decisions.” Kent often to depend, it is high time for the public Kendall was a difficult person, a used the words “objective scholarship” debate to commence.” Kendall said that man who had little tolerance for mortals regarding his analysis unit to emphasize— Kent’s approach to strategic intelligence of lesser intelligence and for bureaucra- and also to remind practitioners of analy- was wrongly preoccupied—as appealing as cies—obviously, not one to fit into the sis—that getting too close to the consumer airy conjecture might be—with predicting CIA establishment. When Kent’s NIEs, in of intelligence might cause the analysts the future, rather than being responsive to 1962 on Soviet intentions to place offensive to slant or color their analyses to accom- urgent, present needs. missiles in Cuba, in 1975 on Soviet strategic modate the consumer’s wishes—avoidable Although Kendall had early leftist missile forces, and in 1979 on the fall of the only by keeping a wide gap between the leanings and might have been a Trotsky- Shah of Iran, seriously missed the mark two—a practice that supposedly continues ite, he became staunchly anti-Communist again and again, it became clear that the to this day. To insure the analysts’ products after a stint in Spain during the Spanish Kent model for strategic intelligence was had value to their consumers, Kent argued Civil War. He turned conservative in the not up to the job—as seemed to have been that analysts should “bend every effort to 1940s. This was a common conversion predicted by Kendall. Much has been said obtain guidance from their customer.” among many intellectuals of that era—the and written about the Kent-Kendall debate, page • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • 2005 but the poor showing after the debate by assets—and open sources—the analysis that implicated the Agency in the Kennedy the Office of National Estimates seemed to can be based on rock solid evidence. Intel- assassination. Later, the KGB circulated a have tipped the scales in favor of Kendall. ligence analysis is, perforce, based on the falsehood that the CIA was in cahoots with Though Kendall often shot from the hip, he inputs it receives from various sources, the kidnappers of babies in South America displayed a deadly accuracy. The past and including the secrets the DO is able to pilfer to obtain their organs for transplants to current failures of analysis underscore the from reliable and clean-hands sources, and people in the U.S. For good measure, the validity of Kendall’s model for intelligence the additional research and judgments of KGB propagandists threw in additional analysis, a methodology based on knowing the analysts. Every computer geek knows piffle that CIA was pushing drugs in Watts, one’s enemy, how he thinks and what he GIGO (garbage in, garbage out)—good Los Angeles. One has to hand it to the wants, a model that is even still applicable intelligence operates under the same law: Soviet writers—stirring the pot with all in today’s war against terrorists. good collection in, good analysis out. the right ingredients for a naïve U.S. audi- The fundamental problem is the ence was their specialty. U.S. newspapers DO’s inability to collect urgently needed were filled with outrage, which spilled into …intelligence research should be intelligence from a new type of enemy, Congress, demanding that all CIA activities be investigated and reined in. steeped in knowledge transnational and ubiquitous, but one whose whereabouts are unknown and The constraints on the DO began of the social sciences, whose communications are undetectable. further limiting its ability to provide the foundation for understanding Mission impossible? Seemingly so. This analysts with needed data. The DO’s the “otherness” of adversaries. vacuum of raw material has hampered inputs to the analysts declined further intelligence analysts, leaving them (and when Jimmy Carter—the first President to the nation) open to policy mistakes and politicize the DCI’s position—displayed But Kendall’s admonition to get misstatements. How and why did the his discomfiture with CIA and the “dirty under the skin and into the mind of one’s Directorate of Operations get into a posi- business of spying,” with a number of adversaries was not adopted. The Kent tion where in its reduced size and capabili- appointments that echoed the view that model of intelligence analysis prevailed ties do not and can not produce the needed “gentlemen don’t read other gentlemen’s and underpinned other critical errors of intelligence? Start with waves of Executive mail.” Carter bought into the idea that the analytical judgment, e.g., the 1950s bomber branch investigations and Congressional unpleasant necessities of human spying and missile gap, a contention dispelled by attacks beginning four decades ago.. The could be avoided …that technology could the U-2’s flights which showed that there Church and Pike Committees led to con- do it all, and leave one with clean hands: was no gap. While analysts, in 1973, were straints on what the DO could do, whom no more recruitment of and disreputable struggling at their desks with the technical it could recruit, and how quickly it could intercourse with shady, unsavory, disaf- issues of whether the Soviets could covertly respond to national threats, and shackled fected, and disloyal foreigners—diplo- convert their SA-5 anti-aircraft missile the slightest initiative. mats, scientists, soldiers, and unspeak- into an anti-ballistic missile to skirt the The CIA was not the only organi- able spies—to supply stacks of stolen and ABM Treaty or whether they would simply zation attacked by the Church and Pike cheat on the treaty, the CIA’s technologists Committees. The FBI’s counterintelligence went into the field and intercepted the budget was cut by twenty-five percent and GIGO—garbage in, garbage SA-5’s radar signals that confirmed that their CI agents were transferred to pursue out—good intelligence operates the Soviets were cheating on the treaty by crimes that had already been committed under the same law: good testing their SA-5 in an ABM mode. Better rather than remaining assigned to prevent collection in, good analysis out. collection—not better analysis—solved espionage and terrorism, thereby leaving the problem. When Henry Kissinger during Soviet spies more operating room. The treaty negotiations confronted the Soviets Defense Department’s human intelligence suspect secrets. Carter appointed Admiral over their behavior, they ceased their cheat- collectors suffered the same fate. These Stansfield Turner Director of Central Intel- ing. Unfortunately, the analytical failures two committees seemed to make the work ligence with the specific charge to turn the continue, the most recent and notorious of of the KGB and the GRU easier. The Soviet Agency away from the dirty “agent” side which are the failure to anticipate 9/11 and KGB exacerbated the self-inflicted damage of the business and to focus on technical the assertion that the Iraqis had stockpiled to U.S. intelligence by waging a deception means of collection. Turner’s belief in weapons of mass destruction. campaign that helped to poison the minds techno-wizardry was rock solid. Although What is not so well known, and does of Americans and friendly foreigners he knew that it was no panacea for intel- not get into the news, is that intelligence against the CIA and its DO by planting false ligence collection, yet he went along with analysts have many successes to their stories about it around the globe. Carter’s view since collection by technical credit. There is a clear correlation between Buying into one of these old propa- means could, and did, have some positive good intelligence collection and good ganda lies, Oliver Stone’s movie JFK, using benefits. The problem with technical col- intelligence analysis. When analysts have Jim Garrison’s absurd interpretation of lection, by such means as satellites, is that good information provided by the CIA’s the New Orleans trial of Clay Shaw, were their capabilities are not a secret, and so clandestine collectors in its Directorate both based on an oft-cited KGB false story they are vulnerable to countermeasures of Operations and technical collection planted in an Italian Communist magazine and deception. Carter’s anti-HUMINT
2005 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • page bias resulted in the emasculation of agent system that increasingly produces feckless, WMD Commissions, other than signaling recruitment by the Agency’s DO. flawed, or flimsy analyses. Few appreciate the public that attention has been drawn to This over-reliance on technology and what Goss is doing since he isn’t perform- the problem, are unlikely to result in better the inability to understand the need for the ing in public and has chosen not to appear collection and analysis. Nor will the Con- patient development of human sources, on the TV news talk shows to explain why gressional and administration mandated including unsavory and infamous per- he seems to be focusing on changes in the changes in management superstructure, sons, gained further unfortunate footing Directorate of Operations. The close and reshuffled budget authorities, and who with Clinton’s selection of John Deutch as essential connection between collectors briefs the President address the problem. DCI. Deutch, responding to the demands and analysts seems to be too arcane for Not only are these changes—that are at of Congress, the White House, and the pundits and the public to comprehend. best marginally related to the problem— public, wiped out the DO’s ability to col- After all, if analysts got it wrong, why are unlikely to improve intelligence collection lect the secrets that the analysts needed, collectors the ones being asked to take and analysis, they have the potential for restricting its clandestine collectors from retirement? Many claim that this is throw- making matters worse. For example, fur- dealing with “unsavory” characters— ing out the baby with the bathwater, but ther restricting the dialogue between the sending out new requirements that only there is historical precedence. President President and the DCI—the only one in the “nice people” who had secrets to sell be Roosevelt did the same after Pearl Harbor, chain of command with first-hand, inside recruited. When valuable raw intelligence skipping over top generals and admirals to knowledge of clandestine operations and vanished because there were not enough put younger ones in charge. And he won the responsibility for improving intel- “nice” people who were unhappy with the war. ligence collection and analysis—could unstable and or dangerous countries, had The intelligence analysis process deny the President the benefits that access to these countries’ secrets, and demands the best of raw intelligence come only from face-to-face exchanges were willing to take the risks of passing inputs from both technical and human between policy and intelligence. While their information to the U.S., American sources. The orders for the cutbacks in the resolution of who in the Intelligence intelligence analysts were left to their own human sources that are essential to good Community will do what in information local resources, mostly open sources, in analysis came from the same Congressio- sharing, analysis, and reporting is needed, composing critical NIE’s. No wonder they nal panels and policy makers who now are only better intelligence collection from missed the boat on 9/11, or as others have demanding that the intelligence problem reinvigorated clandestine sources and put it, didn’t have enough dots to connect. be fixed by doing better, more objective technical services can provide the basis for One of the old-line DO operatives from analysis. To rescue American intelligence, improved analysis. How successful Goss the days before the Congress tied CIA’s the DO—the very foundation of the intel- will be in restoring collection inputs into hands put it another way, “Estimating is ligence structure—needs to be rebuilt; intelligence analysis depends on whether what you do when you don’t know and hence, the need for a number of replace- the Congress, White House, and especially can’t find out.” ments. Goss, with his wealth of experience the public—all informed and understand- The complex diffi- as a DO clandestine case officer and as ing—demand that changes be made that culty of fixing the collec- Chairman of the House Permanent Select support rather than destroy the possibility tion-analysis problem is Committee on Intelligence, knows what of improvement. Indeed no intelligence, apparent daily as newspa- has to be done, and he has moved quickly counterintelligence, counterterrorism or pers report with surprise to reinvigorate the DO. He expects to see law enforcement organization will ever at the departures of some the pay-off in terms of better analysis from be effective at eliminating the threats to senior CIA officials. Are the Directorate of Intelligence; analysis our way of life without the trust and sup- Goss we making things worse that lives up to the standards that Will- port from a well informed and educated with these rapid and sweeping changes? moore Kendall urged decades ago—solid, public—which is AFIO’s mission The loyalty of insiders clouds the issue. reliable assessments based on the knowl- Many unhappy voices are merely stating edge, understanding, and interpretation of the foreign targets’ interests, not on solidarity with colleagues whose careers © 2 0 0 5 , S . E u g e n e P o t ea t are cut short by the sweeping changes. Anx- the mindset of desk-bound Americans believing that their open-source material The writer is a retired CIA intelligence offi- iety over their own security compounds the cer, and serves as President of the Associa- din. Many are wary of the forced Congres- and personal view points have it right. tion of Former Intelligence Officers. sional solution to reorganize intelligence, Certainly, there are those within the DO particularly because reorganization as the ranks who know terrorism and know how sole solution was sold to the public with to work against terrorists. Goss’s challenge great fanfare through an impressive public is to articulate and communicate his mis- relations campaign before its content was sion and objectives to these mid-ranking released and without being subjected to officers, to remove restrictions on their “Nations get on with one another, any study and debate. work, and to increase their reliance on not by telling the truth, but by lying deep, non-official cover rather than rely Others recognize that the current gracefully.” —H.L. Mencken DirCIA, Porter Goss, may be making on liaison services. necessary, yet painful, changes to fix a The recommendations of the 9/11 and page • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • 2005 What makes effective intelligence analysis and support so difficult is that available hard data is rarely sufficient to permit high con- fidence determination as to what’s going to happen (if anything), who’s going to do it, where and when. In Share Missions, the good old Cold War days, we could watch the massive Not Just Information Soviet military establishment with our national techni- Frederick Harrison cal means, and know when [email protected] something might be afoot. In the current era, we are dealing with single or small numbers of individuals skulk- he danger in today’s intense focus ing around the world using on improving information sharing the weave of our social and in homeland security protection is economic fabric for cover. T The upshot is that it is much that the term will be taken too literally. The number of organizations engaged and harder to tell whether or not a the volume of information generated is so piece of information obtained great that providing more data to more by one or another intelligence people, in the interest of better “informa- or enforcement organization tion sharing,” will not resolve underlying is significant enough to war- sharing issues, and is likely to make them rant sharing and with whom worse. Compounding the volume problem to share it. Automatic sharing is the largely vertical orientation of home- of everything with everybody land security components, each guided by is clearly not the answer; that its own chain-of-command, established would simply make the hay- missions, and interest-driven imperatives. stack much larger, without The seams between them are the prover- making the needles more bial cracks into which observed anomalies apparent, particularly when can fall enroute to becoming intelligence there is often no universal failures. They are also barriers to the agreement as to what the constant and focused interaction needed needles look like. to prevent those cracks from defining the The combination of intelligence process. fragmentary, ambiguous It is much too simplistic to ascribe information and the noise our information sharing weaknesses to introduced by an enormous failures of dissemination: that if only a intelligence-enforcement report available to Person or Organiza- infrastructure that processes tion A had gotten in time to Person or and reacts to it creates a per- Organization B action could have been fect storm. Unfortunately, it taken to avoid catastrophe. Often, perhaps is unrealistic to believe that more often, the indicative information was we will one day be able to available to key people who were not able completely eliminate either to recognize its portent, chose to discount of these problems. Homeland it, or simply never got to it. To a significant security will always involve extent, their lapses reflect the limitations large numbers of diverse imposed, often unconsciously, by the organizations generating and operational contexts in which they work, sifting enormous volumes where competing priorities, objectives, of data, very little of which and expectations will unavoidably color of is of agreed significance evaluation of information received and the and indisputably actionable. situation at hand. What we can do, however, is to mitigate the storm’s 2005 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • page centrifugal forces that make cooperation foster active working relationships local agencies. In fact, however, security more difficult. among analysts, law enforcement protection features incorporated in the A mission-centric approach to struc- officers, and management deci- proposed virtual community architecture turing the operating relationships among sionmakers across organizational would be at least equal to those currently intelligence support and law enforcement boundaries. operative in comparable DoD, Intelligence components offers a promising way to Pooling analytical resources across Community, and Homeland Security net- transcend organizational stovepipes. organizational boundaries should yield worked systems. They would provide for Implementation would occur in the virtual important synergistic benefits. No orga- centralized administration of internet- environment of secure digital networks nization disseminates all of the informa- work accesses, personal authentication of and state-of-the-art information technol- tion it collects, partly because of time individual users, monitoring and record- ogy that now exist or are already under and expense, but mostly because the ing of member online activity. The services development in the national homeland information’s significance (if any) and facility that supported these functions security infrastructure. operational value are not apparent or would also provide for the maintenance Information sharing communities cannot be determined. Much of it, there- of data bases relevant to a community’s would be structured to reflect operational fore, is known only to people within the interests and serve as a secure portal for targets or missions rather than participat- organization that acquired it. Providing its interaction with outside entities and ing organizations. The targets/missions, convenient and secure facilities for those sources of new information. large and small, permanent and transitory, individuals to share insights and infor- Mission-centric virtual communi- would mirror the operational responsibili- mation, as well as to collectively address ties are not new, either in concept or ties and concerns of the homeland security observed anomalies, can yield more useful implementation. The National Counter community. One community might focus, analysis of situational ambiguities and Terrorist Center, itself a mission-centric for example, on security of the Mexican potential developments. Including in the community, has created an on-line adjunct. border, another on container shipments community both intelligence analysts and The Department of Defense, in prosecut- into East Coast ports, a third on narcotics operational managers should provide the ing and supporting military operations trafficking into the Detroit area. latter better support in determining the in Afghanistan and Iraq, makes remark- nature and timing of action to be taken. able use of such communities in tactical • A mission-centric information shar- command and control, surveillance and ing community would comprise There are two concerns likely to be intelligence operations. Several years ago, those people, across the spectrum of raised in connection with mission-centric two junior Army officers created civilian participating organizations, whose information sharing communities. The Internet websites called Companycom- expertise, duties, and insights could first has to do with the potential for man- mand.com and Platoonleader.org. They are contribute to effective performance agement failure, improper actions, or plain successful, mission-centric communities, of the designated mission. Relation- confusion caused by the apparent blurring their mission being to provide a forum in ships would extend beyond the Fed- of organizational boundaries and chains- which young officers can help one another eral arena to encompass appropriate of-command, particularly where operating be better company commanders and pla- state and local organizations. authorities and intelligence support per- sonnel are interacting in the same context. toon leaders. • Each active community would be An obvious deterrent to such occurrences These examples reflect operating coordinated by the organization(s) would be a strict regulation precluding models that differ in specifics from one bearing statutory or operational use of an information sharing medium for another, and from the concept discussed responsibility for the target or mis- transmission, by anybody, of operational in this article, because their missions and sion it covers. Participating orga- taskings or assignments. In endorsing underlying contexts vary. What they have in nizations would assign to it their the concept, the leaders of the Homeland common is that they make their users and sub-elements and personnel most Security and Intelligence Communities participants more effective by enabling appropriate to that coverage and would have to decide that the benefits them to work together in an environment to its own responsibilities. Every of mission-centric information sharing driven by common missions and objec- community would have direct par- substantially outweighs its potential pit- tives rather than by a rigid organizational ticipation by both enforcement and falls. Their continuing support would be system. intelligence support agencies. needed to prevent the gradual imposition • Mission-centric communities would of restrictions that could ultimately render FREDERICK HARRISON has had an be realized as distinct virtual entities the communities useless. extensive Intelligence Community career, devoted principally to multi- supported by an array of collaborative The second major area of concern agency information sharing initia- interaction tools that would enable will be security: the protection of ongo- tives. He holds ONI’s Neilsen Award, members to exchange information ing investigative and enforcement opera- NSA’s Rowlett Trophy, CIA’s Career and views, in a variety of media, on tions and of intelligence sources and Medal, the Vice President’s Hammer a one-to-one or one-to-many basis. Award, and the National Intelligence methods. The communities’ transverse Medal of Achievement. Participating individuals, identified membership structure and information by name, would be assigned to their flow patterns will raise flags, particularly communities on a long term basis to given the proposed inclusion of state and page • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • 2005 Symposium—continued from page 1 cells already within our borders, hidden or using the cloak of religious tolerance and freedom, are counting on America’s openness and diversity to blind us to their intentions to seek the annihiliation of all “infidels” or nonbelievers, while publicly downplaying these ideas to the trusting American public, hesitant to speak ill of religious-appearing groups with political agendas.
A F I O N A T IO N A L I n t E l l I G E n c E s y MPO S I U M A n d C O N VE n t IO N 2 0 0 5 1100 -1135 - Gary M. Bald, Direc- 0930-1015 - “Steps to Defeat Global The NEW Federal Bureau of Investiga- tor, National Security Service, Terror” - Panelists: Jennifer Sims, tion—Its new National Security Service, Office of the DNI/FBI - “Coun- Burton Gerber, James Gosler, Intelligence Directorate and Counterter- terterrorism, Intelligence, and others [confirmed] rorism Division the National Security Service.” Break Buffet Stand-up/Courtyard 1035-1140 - “Trust But Identify: Lunch Biometrics Identification Sys- F r i d a y , O c t o b e r 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 1315 -1415 - Willie Hulon, Assis- tems” - John D. Woodward, Jr., tant Director, Counterter- Rand Corp., former Director of Hosted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation - rorism Division, “Interna- US DoD Biometrics Management Headquarters—Robert S. Mueller, III, Director tional Terrorism, Human Office. Washington, DC Intelligence, and National SPEAKER LUNCHEON and on... Security” 1145-1300 - Luncheon with Paul Sperry, Saturday and Sunday, October 29 and 30 at the 1420 - 1520 - “Islamic Extremists, ‘Muslim Ter- Sheraton Premiere Hotel, 8661 Leesburg Pike David W. Szady, Assistant Direc- rorists’ and Political Correctness in Vienna, VA 22182 tor, Counterintelligence Division, America” [invited] FBI - “New Counterintelligence Techniques for the Expanded 1300 -1450 - Intelligence Books Panel - Convention/Symposium Co-Chairmen: Bureau Roles” Hayden Peake, Judith Pearson, Stephen Budian- Peter Earnest, AFIO Chairman sky, Ann Blackman, Nigel West [confirmed] Break S. Eugene Poteat, AFIO President Break 1540 -1610 - John Pistole, Deputy Director, FBI 1510 - 1700 - Intelligence Panel on Intelligence, - “In Summary - Counterter- Internal Security, and America’s Own MI5. T h u r s d a y , 2 7 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 5 rorism / Counterintelligence at Stephen Marrin the FBI - Overview of Many New Reception and Awards Banquet The Sheraton Premiere Hotel, Vienna, VA Directions” 1900 - 2000 - Chairman’s Reception - (1) Registration from 1600 to 2000 hours All Day- FBI Recreation Association 2000 - 2200 - AFIO Annual Awards Banquet [dark (2) Hospitality Suite - informal get-together in Main Store will have satellite outlet at the meeting business attire] Lobby. Appetizers. All Day - World Trade Center Private Exhibit - just General Richard Stilwell Chairman’s Award opened; unavailable to the general public David Atlee Phillips Founder’s Award Optional Evening Reception.... Keynote Speaker: [TBD] Departure for International Spy Museum - Zola F r i d a y , 2 8 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 5 Restaurant [For those who have selected the Lifetime Achievement Award Spy Museum Reception] FBI HQ, Charles J. Bonaparte Auditorium 1645 - 1930 - Chairman’s Reception at the Inter- national Spy Museum. AFIO Chairman [Spy 0700 - 0800 - Buses depart Sheraton-Premiere Museum Executive Director] Peter Earnest S u n d a y , 3 0 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 5 Hotel host. Conference Center, Sheraton-Premiere Hotel 0815 - 0900 - FBI Security/Registration - Bonaparte Auditorium, FBI HQ International Spy Museum Reception 0830 - 1000 General Membership Meeting - Presi- dent, Sr. VP & Executive Director 0905 - 0915 - FBI Security Briefing includes hors d’oeuvres in private recep- tion room of Zola’s Restaurant. Museum’s Break 0915 - 0925 - Introductions - AFIO President Eugene large gift shop will remain open the first Poteat, AFIO Chairman Peter Earnest 1015 - 1200 - Chapter Workshop – restricted to cur- hour. Will NOT include tour of Museum. rent and prospective Chapter representatives, 0925-1005 - Robert S. Mueller III - FBI Director; “FBI: conducted by AFIO VP for Chapters Emerson Intelligence, Terrorism, and the New Bureau.” Cooper. No cost, but must register. Break S a t u r d a y , 2 9 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 5 END OF SYMPOSIUM and CONVENTION 1020-1100 - Arthur Cummings, Special Agent/Deputy Conference Hall, Sheraton-Premiere Hotel Director, National Counterterrorism Center - “Countering International Terrorism Opera- 0845-0930 - Registration at Conference Hall - Main tions” Lobby 2005 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • page Church Committee. It climbed back gradu- ally and then with a rush in the 1990s as it endorsed openness and had good roles in TV series and movies. Subsequently, NATIONAL LEADERSHIP FORUM it dropped a few points with the Ames Upcoming Conference case but was helped by the popularity of cigar smoking, good guy, Director Tenet, soared to new heights during the Afghan Of This and That campaign, and maintained a good level
Register Early until deep into the Iraq operations when th and Save $200! Annual See inside for 4 details… Dwayne S. Anderson it slowly became apparently the Saddam China Forum [email protected] did not have big stocks of nerve agents, biological weapons, or any kind of a viable relude: These are interesting times nuclear weapons program. for those that follow the twists and Although the Iraq estimate was an turns of our intelligence policies. P IC judgement, CIA took the image hits for Every day brings new developments. Yester- the unhappy estimate. It more lost ground Learn the Secrets of Doing Business in Today’s China day, for example the Negropointe/Hayden Risk Assessments from American Intelligence Professionals when Tenet’s “Slam Dunk” statement nominations were approved, with Hayden • Learn about the newest trends and was widely publicized, and drooped more October 14, 2005 opportunities…and potential pitfalls giving some insights on what went wrong AMA Executive Conference Center • Discover how to cultivate contacts and Chicago, Illinois partnerships points with the publication of the Septem- • Find out about the requirements, on the Iraq estimate. Also yesterday, the restrictions and risks ber 11 Committee report. At the moment, • Get the inside story from intelligence President’s Commission on Intelligence experts and world affairs specialists it doesn’t look like a good investment as • Share knowledge and ideas with colleagues and speakers criticized the CIA and FBI plans to retool various newspaper columnists point out Co-sponsored by and improve their organizations. What National Leadership Forum on Global Challenges the morale is low, and that Director Goss will tomorrow bring? Interesting but hard has politicized the Agency by bringing REGISTER TODAY! on the poor columnist, like myself, who 1-800-262-9699 www.amanet.org/events over a batch of politically oriented per- finds that anything he writes, becomes sonnel from Congress and putting them quickly dated unless it is written five min- October 14, 2005 - in senior positions while ousting many of utes before publication. AMA Executive Conference Center the old time professionals. Also, the new One question that occurs to me is: if Director of National Intelligence is said Chicago, IL all current and projected changes to the Fourth Annual China Update Program to be eating CIA lunch by taking over the intelligence community had been in place and Registration daily briefing of the President, taking over before the Iraq Estimate, would that esti- Current Issues Full-day Forum. estimates, and reportedly, is about to hire mate have been more accurate? Unlikely, a couple thousand analysts. With Defense in my view. Creating more superstructure apparently getting into clandestine opera- Learn the Secrets of Doing doesn’t necessarily create better analysis tions in a bigger way, and the FBI moving and new sounder information. Business in Today’s China into overseas operations. CIA may be at a IC Market Report: Just read an item market low. Expert speakers from U.S. diplomatic called “Cold Cases,” by Dennis Drabele But not all the news is bad for the and intelligence communities offer in the book review section of the Sunday Agency, and it may hold it market value insights and perspectives on establishing 6 March 2005, Washington Post in which at a steady though lower level. It is doing he wrote or expanding well budget wise and has been ordered The reputation of polar explorers is so business relationships in China. to hire more analysts and operations variable that it may help to think of them officers. Only time will tell how it works http://www.amanet.org/events/china as stocks. Judging by a pair of new books, Scott is up, Peary has fallen to a new out, and it may do quite well as Director Event co-sponsored by the low, and Cook, once thought of as all but Goss, an experienced intelligence hand, National Leadership Forum on Global Challenges. worthless, is rallying. AMA Executive Conference Center. now relieved of many of the onerous daily It struck me that may be a good way AMA Members $995, Nonmembers $1,195. duties, can concentrate, especially, on to look at the US intelligence community Call 1-800-262-9699 to register. strengthening clandestine operations. (IC). One might say that it is a bull market Market Advice: Reduce holdings. Online registration at for the agencies, especially for growth, The Bureau: FBI (until recently, pri- and we have two major mergers afoot. http://www.amanet.org/events/ marily a law enforcement agency) has cer- CIA, DIA, FBI and NSA might equate to tainly had its ups and downs too. Glorified big board stocks (NYSE) and the others to Meeting #3890-00005 in its early years by bringing down famous NASDAQ equities. gangsters (and by adroit public affairs) its The Agency: CIA had a good, though stock set a new high right from the start. much shrouded public image in its early Recent years were less kind as the Hanson years, then reached a low point later, case, the failure of a costly computer perhaps bottoming out at the time of the page 10 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • 2005 system, and the failure to prevent the 11 I’ll leave the NASDAQ agencies for warming trend, glaciers in Iceland are September attacks have lowered the stock another time although they all appear growing). value. It too has expanded its asset base and capable of some upward movement. Classification: I note that DCI Porter has diversified. Market Advice: Hold. New Offering: One IPO is coming Goss once voiced his concern over clas- Defense Intelligence: DIA has, wisely upthe Office of the Director for National sification, namely (I don’t remember his in my view, largely managed to stay out of Intelligence. This organization will face exact words) that it was badly done, and the limelight from its inception, a policy enormous turf battles, budget battles, and over done. I believe that almost everyone in inaugurated by its first Director, LTG infighting. It will need strong White House the intelligence community has long ago Carroll. It had to tread lightly at first as it and Congressional support to function come to the same conclusion. I mention was created over objections and resistance well. Despite these problems, there is a “almost” everyone because I recall one from the Services. Avoiding criticism and strong possibility of upward movement guardian of compartment documents who building it asset base with its large, fairly here. This looks like a solid investment as firmly believed that no one, even cleared new headquarters, improved communi- a growth stock. Market Advice: Buy! personnel should have access to this mate- cations and computerization, and better Disclaimer: This market analysis was rial. If no one saw, it read it, handled it, it training it has shown, up until now, a written on 23 March. Stocks might rise or was secure. The fact that it was then use- solid, steady growtha good dividend fall further depending on developments less, despite having been gathered at great issue. Gradually, however, the Office of that transpire between now and the pub- cost, made no impression on him. Security the Secretary of Defense increasingly got lication date. was the first, foremost and sole objective. into the intelligence business, moving Predicting: The Intelligence reorga- Doubtless there were or are others of the sideways into the game through C3 (Com- nization bill requires CIA to build several same persuasion. mand, Control, Communication) and then checks into its analysis proceduresto Otherwise, it is generally agreed that more directly as it established intelligence avoid forecasts such as the one on weap- too much is classified and too much is clas- offices and currently ending up with an ons of mass destruction in Iraq. Now sified at higher levels than is warranted. Undersecretary for Intelligence with, of (mid-December 2004) there are some During my years in the Office of the Sec- course, a substantial staff. Moreover, it Congressional pressures to extend these retary of Defense, there were many times was announced yesterday that the Penta- requirements to the entire Intelligence I and my colleagues did not use compart- gon wants to consolidate all eight of its Community. Several of these measures mented intelligence because an answer intelligence agencies under one four star may be useful, however, some of the pro- was needed “now” and getting the special generala Super Defense Intelligence cedures were already established since documents with, perhaps, useful data, Organization (this was sort of what was 9-11, such as Red Team analyses. Others, would take far too long. It would arrive far intended for DIA in the first place). What such as a quality control office, might be too late. Time and inconvenience greatly with the new DNI, a Defense Undersecre- superfluous or even a step backward. Too limited its use. To a lesser degree, this was tary for Intelligence, plus a Deputy Under- many checks, balances, and rechecks, also true of all classified information. On secretary, and possibly a four star Chief of could slow down the process of evaluating occasion, under time pressure, I added Defense Intelligence, DIA’s stock appears intelligence, refining it, and getting it out sections to the Secretary’s briefing books to be slipping. Market Advice: Sell! to consumers. from open sources, even though Secret or No Such Agency: NSA managed to Determining the current situation Top Secret material on these sections were get by with virtually no public image at all is difficult enough, given a secretive and availablesomewhere if one had the time until recent years. Now we have Glavnost big security-minded target, but predicting the to find itand likely were more extensive or time at the Agency. Deep into retooling to future, as estimates must do, will always more detailed. I’ve had to do this even with cope with burgeoning communications be chancy business and 100 percent accu- such items as a foreign country’s order traffic, one might consider it a growth racies can rarely be achieved. Consider of battle (on two occasions for the Vice stock, but there some questions. First off, that, in the 1970s, climatologists who had President’s books). One of the issues here its CEO is leaving after doing a credible job, enormous quantities of solid data available was that, even though action officers in and moving to become number two at the to them, were worried about global cool- OSD were cleared for the special material, Office of National Intelligence (or whatever ing. For thirty years, these data showed our safes were not and thus the material it will be called). Having an expert on NSA that world temperatures had slowly but had to be picked up each day and returned matters at the right hand of the DNI might steadily dropped and scientists were saying each evening. Not handy at all when one be good, but perhaps, not so good for that something must be done or we would was gyrating at top speed. NSA’s in house ability to make and carry enter another ice age. Their predictions, One basic problem affecting over out its own decisions. More critical, is the according to many and perhaps most pres- classification is a system whereby an extremely difficult job of trying to monitor ent climatologists, were 180 degrees off analyst, case officer, or desk officer is the worlds communication without get- course and global warming, not cooling, never reprimanded for over classifying ting buried under by the massive increases is the dire threat (On 23 December 2004, a report but could be in hot water from in trafficnot to mention all the wide band shortly after I wrote the above, George Will under classifying one. So, when even the fibre optic cables, which to this writer, discussed those global cooling predic- slightest doubt exists, use the higher clas- appear to pose formidable problems. tions at some length. He also mentioned sification. Market Advice: Limited buy. that, contrary to the other evidence of a The over classification problem can
2005 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • page 11 never be completely resolved, but there are some measures that can be taken to reduce it. First and foremost, security officers should to be charged with, not just oversee- ing the security of various information but also briefed on, charged with, and graded on fitness reports on ensuring that unclas- sified information is not uncritically and automatically stamped with various clas- sifications, and if stamped, it is not done at AFIO National 2005 a higher level than necessary. After all, the The behemoth .50 Beowulf dwarfs the .223 cartridge shown for less classified matter there is in circulation, comparison. It’s hard to believe these cartridges function in guns Special Events and the better it is likely to be protected. that are not all that different in design. Note the rebated rim of the .50 Beowulf cartridge. Speaker Programs The second measure is that new compartments of classified data should course). So the Special Forces have a wide in brief be extremely limited and previously com- selection. The last two, I understand, are parted information put into regular chan- powerful (334-grain bullets for the .50), nels whenever feasible. Thus, Top Secret shorter range cartridges primarily for use Codeword would become Top Secret and in carbines. Needless to say, there are many more available to users. new optical and other attachments that A F I O a t T a n g l e w oo d 1 3 A u g u s t 0 5 Special Forces and the AR: First off, I make the AR even more effective. There are had best establish that I really don’t know two articles in the March 05 Guns&Ammo In the beautiful Berkshire Hills of whether Special Forces should be consid- magazine for those interested in learning Western Massachusetts, the Boston Sym- ered part of the intelligence framework. In more about AR developments. phony Orches- fact I stopped trying to define intelligence While on the subject of weapons, tra held their long ago. I do know that some fifteen agen- here’s one more note for our many read- well-known cies make up the formal intelligence com- ers who are interested in arming the case annual con- munity and various and sundry mavens in officer. Kahr Arms, a firm that has spe- c er t wh ich this field name up to twenty-one agencies included an that belong under this rubric. Maybe the A l l-Mo z a r t Library of Congress should be number Program and an evening of All That Jazz twenty two. Anyhow, US Special Forces conducted by Keith Lockhart. Family, do carry out many activities that are best friends and AFIO colleagues of Boston- defined as covert action. Because of the based AFIO Board Director Albano Ponte nature of these actions, the rifle/carbine arrived from New England and New York to has become a more important part of their celebrate this purely social engagement. armament than it generally is with regular forces where artillery, mortars, missiles, and rockets, cause many enemy casualties. P45, Black polymer frame, matte stainless slide S u mme r L u n c h eo n - 2 8 J u l y 0 5 In any case, the venerable M-16/AR-15 has cialized in small lightweight, concealed M i k e S c h e u e r a n d S t eve C o l l greatly improved over the years (remem- carry pistol, is producing a new polymer ber when we heard of how it broke down, .45 (the KP4543) that weighs 17 oz. and “Between Iraq and a Hard Place — the misfired, jammed and other horror stories has a match grade barrel and a six round CIA, Islamic Militants, and the problematic during the Vietnam War, and how some magazine. Sounds like a good weapon for Middle East” was the theme of the well-sub- of our troops preferred to use captured anyone desiring a lightweight weapon in a scribed summer luncheon. The turnout, AK-47s) becoming heavy caliber. One caution, because of the in fact, was so large—almost 300—that it a highly reliable low weight, it might be a tad difficult to required the hotel to move another group weapon. Recently is control when loosing off several rounds. to other quarters, to allow us to have three has been improved I have looked at other Kahr models (never contiguous large rooms – and even those even more and now fired one) and they seem to me to be well were crowded. comes in a variety of made. Speaking first, in a spirited ‘take-no- calibers including prisoners’ presentation, was former CIA heavier 5.56 cali- officer and now un-”anonymous” Michael 334 grain FMJ Rainier bullet ber bullets and the A tyrant…is always stirring up F. Scheuer, former head of CIA’s Osama newer 6.5 Grendal, 6.8 SPC, .448 SOCOM, some war or other, in order that bin Laden unit until 1999 and author of and .50 Beowulf (someone in the ammuni- the people may require a leader. IMPERIAL HUBRIS: Why the West Is tion business must have been impressed — Plato Losing the War on Terror. He provided a by their freshman English Literature needed eye-opening examination of what page 12 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • 2005 Charles S. Robb’s talk. Robb, Co-Chair- man, WMD Commission [Silberman-Robb Commission] also explained why the report devotes little time on what intelli- gence did right, and focused on 9/11 as an “intelligence failure” rather than a failure of policy to accept and act on numerous warnings given to it by several agencies. I. C. Smith, former Special-Agent-In-Charge, FBI, discussed material from his new book: Spies, Lies, and Bureaucratic Bungling Inside Al Ponte and Gary Wass celebrate the successful event the FBI. Thaddeus Holt, lawyer and former Deputy Undersecretary of the Army, spoke Ponte, and teammate Gary on Military Deception in WWII. His book, Wass arranged and hosted The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the the event for local Boston Second World War, received unusually strong and New England members able to attend praise by U.K. and U.S. reviewers. this upbeat, spirited outing. Thank you Al and Gary!
– W i n t e r L u n c h eo n – 1 4 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 5 Mike Scheuer, top photo, signs books. Journalist Steve Coll, bottom, – S p r i n g L u n c h eo n – answers questions as AFIO Chairman Peter Earnest looks on.. P h i l ip Z e l i k o w 2 9 A p r i l 2 0 0 5 a n d G eo r g e F r ie d ma n is wrong in the way we are approaching H o n . C h a r l e s S . R o b b , the al Qaeda/Taliban issues–and how the I. C . S mi t h , “ T h e funding and tasking was–and might still a n d T h a d d e u s H o l t Political Tug- be done–in the community. of-War over “Inside the new WMD Report - And What Money and Following lunch, Steve Coll - Pulitzer Isn’t In It, and Why” was the topic of the Hon. prize winning author, associate editor of Power - The the Washington Post - spoke on his years Intelligence of tours, activities and research for his Communit y prize-winning book: GHOST WARS: The Re s t r uc t ure Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, Battle” was and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion t he t heme to September 10, 2001 which won a 2005 of Philip D. Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction. The Z e l i k o w ’s book used numerous interviews with Mike [Execut ive Scheuer, Gary Schroen, and other Agency Director, 9/11 officers who worked on Afghanistan and/ Commission or Iraq operations. Top: Senator - National Robb speaks Philip D. Zelikow, top photo. Commission For the first time, AFIO released with Peter Dr. George Friedman, bottom photo. streaming audio of the program online Earnest. on Terrorist for all members to enjoy. It can be found Middle: FBI Attacks Upon the United States] talk to a at: http://www.afio.com/sections/event_sched- CI expert I.C. standing-room-only crowd. He laid out the Smith speaks myriad problems the Commission faces ule/05_july_28_luncheon_audio.htm on his years in the Bureau. Bottom: AFIO President with adoption of its findings and what he Gene Poteat with author foresees in a restructuring of the intel- Thaddeus Holt ligence community. Earlier that morning, A F I O A T t h E P O P S Dr. George Friedman, Founder/Chairman 1 1 J u n e 2 0 0 5 - T h i r d A n n u a l of Stratfor, Strategic Forecasting, Inc., AFIO/ B o s t o n P op s E ve n i n g author of the riveting America’s Secret War: “ R e d , W h i t e a n d B l u e ” The Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between the United States and Its Enemies discussed On Saturday June 11th Boston-area “Islamic Terrorist Extremism - Abroad AFIO members and friends gathered again and Within - Europe’s Late Awakening.” at Boston’s Symphony Hall to hear the He displayed an unusual clarity in picking Boston Pops Orchestra perform a medley out the salient sources that have given his of patriotic songs under the direction of reports uncanny accuracy and coinage in Keith Lockhart. AFIO Board Member Al Washington circles. 2005 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • page 13 9/11, has joined the chant that this was give hope that some of these policies will career advice, internships, and referrals, an “intelligence failure.” A mantra many be reversed to counter growing dangers the Association continues its role where repeat with conviction but little under- we face. AFIO’s role remains the advising the needs are greatest…as a beacon and standing of its falsehood. and encouragement of young students conduit for the intelligence officers of As Dave Phillips said of similar anticipating careers in this field, and in tomorrow, meeting the career officials of claims in 1975, and as AFIO says today, the explaining of current and historical today. We welcome those who join to learn, it was not an “intelligence failure.” 9/11 intelligence issues told from the rare to educate, and to encourage others who was a failure of intelligence “policy”–a viewpoint of the actual intelligence prac- wish to serve the country in this crucial but policy set by Congress, by courts, and titioner. Through publications, seminars, frequently misunderstood field. various Administrations. The decades of 8/14/2005 such policies brought layer upon layer of The Composition of Current AFIO Membership as of 1 August 2005 legislative restrictions, hand-tying limita- Intelligence Affiliations - Full Members, Only tions, inappropriate political or economic Army CIA 18.0% correctness, and odd skittishness over 24.7% offending those blatantly intending to do us harm. Examples of this came out in NRO 0.1% Unspecified post-9/11 hearings—from the protection 9.7% of Saudi co-conspirators, letting them slip OSS - Historic quietly out of the country, to the inability to 0.1% cut through legal restrictions to examine NGIA the laptop of terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui, 0.0% Media 0.2% Air Force to the insistence that Iraq was linked to al 9.7% Congress Qaeda despite no evidence. These policies 0.1% effectively suffocate risk-taking, creativity, DOE and imagination…traits that became risky 0.5% Navy career breakers in the 1980s and ‘90s, yet Academic 8.0% 0.6% expected by the post-9/11 committees. State Dept Marine Corps The USA PATRIOT Act and new Visa 0.9% 6.6% Homeland Security / Law Corporate Intel DOJ & FBI Enforcement and Passport requirements, and – let’s 3.5% NSA DIA 4.6% 6.0% hope – serious protection of our borders, 3.2% 3.2%
c u r r E n t M E M B E r s of t h e A F I O B oa r d of D i r e c t o r s a n d S pe c ia l A d vi s o r s
HONORARY BOARD Mr. Brian Latell Membership Administration Co-Chairmen ConfidentialJohn Lenczowski, Ph.D. Ms. Mary Lynne McElroy AFIO Membership Office Hon. George H. W. Bush Mr. David G. Major Ms. Janet A. Murphy Hon. Gerald R. Ford John L. Martin, Esq. RADM Don H. McDowell, USN (Ret) Legal Counsel Hon. Shirley Temple Black Valerie J. McNevin, Esq. William Benteen Bailey, Esq Hon. Frank C. Carlucci Mr. C. Carson Morris Dr. Ruth M. Davis Mr. James L. Pavitt Financial Counsel Adm. Bobby R. Inman, USN (Ret) Mr. Albano F. Ponte John W. Balch, CPA Professor Ernest R. May Mr. S. Eugene Poteat Special Committees Mr. John Anson Smith C. Emerson Cooper - National-Chapter Liaison Hon. William H. Webster EMERITI RADM Don H. McDowell, USN (Ret) - Speaker Programs Hon. R. James Woolsey Mr. Charles A. Briggs Albano F. Ponte, Endowment Funds and Fund Raising RADM Donald P. Harvey, USN (Ret) Editors and Managers of Special Assignments BOARD OF DIRECTORS Maj. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, USAF (Ret) Dwayne Anderson - Founding Co-Editor, Intelligencer; Mr. E. Peter Earnest, Chairman Contributing Editor / Intelligencer & Periscope Lt. Gen. Edward J. Heinz, USAF(Ret), Vice Chairman OFFICERS Richard Gay - Special Historical Projects Mr. Ralph W. Adams President Joseph C. Goulden - Contributing Editor / Intelligencer James H. Babcock, Ph.D. Mr. S. Eugene Poteat & Periscope Ms. Elizabeth Bancroft, ex officio Sr. Vice President Dr. Susan Huck - Contributing Editor / Intelligencer & Periscope Mr. C. Emerson Cooper Mr. André Kesteloot Hayden Peake - Contributing Editor / Intelligencer & Mr. Jack G. Downing Executive Director / Secretary-Treasurer Periscope Mr. Martin C. Faga Ms. Elizabeth Bancroft Ward W. Warren - Contributing Editor / Intelligencer & Mr. Robert F. Grealy Periscope Mr. H. Frederick Hutchinson page 14 • association of former intelligence officers’ periscope newsletter • 2005 C U R R E N T A F I O Florida—Miami Nevada—Las Vegas Ted Shackley Miami Chapter Las Vegas Chapter CHAPTERS James Angleton Jr., President Richard Cohn, President 305.937.4476 702.295.0911 [email protected] [email protected] AFIO chapters are autonomous local groups granted permission to use the AFIO Georgia—Atlanta New Mexico—Santa Fe name, who form and thrive often based Shirley Bodie Findley Chapter New Mexico Tim Smith Chapter on the efforts and enthusiasms of a few Joel “Pat” Patterson, President Dick Callaghan, President dedicated, energetic local members. While 770.521.1006 505.992.1338 all members of chapters must be current [email protected] [email protected] members of the National association in Virginia, the local chapters set their own Hawaii—Honolulu New York—All NY Boroughs, E New Jersey, S Connecticut, SE NY dues and conduct their own programs. To Hawaii Chapter New York Metro Chapter remain certified, chapters must hold three or more meetings a year, elect officers C. Emerson Cooper, Acting under Reorg Jerry Goodwin, President annually, and every January supply to the 702.457.2530 212.308.1450 National Headquarters a list of current [email protected] [email protected] chapter officers and members. If no chapter is listed below for your area, Illinois—Elgin New York—Eastern Long Island, New York and you possess the drive to start one, Midwest Chapter Derek Lee Chapter our Vice President for National Chapters, Col. Angelo DiLiberti, President Don Milton, President Emerson Cooper, can guide you through 847.931.4184 516.621.5252 the assessment and formation process. [email protected] [email protected] He can be reached at [email protected]. net. Chapters need 15 to 20 seed members Maine—Portland/Kennebunk Ohio—Cleveland to begin the process. Many areas have that number or more [the National Office Maine Chapter Northern Ohio Chapter will search membership records by zip- Barbara Storer, President Capt. John Lengel, USA(Ret)/CIC, Contact Person codes], but lack that individual willing to 207.985.2392 440.826.0294 undertake the formation and maintenance [email protected] [email protected] duties. Those who have done so, however, will tell you that it is satisfying to see a Massachusetts/Connecticut/Rhode Island/Vermont/New Hampshire Pennsylvania—Erie chapter grow, and witness the favorable New England Chapter Presque Isle Chapter educational impact it can have on the Art Lindberg, President Robert J. Heibel, FBI(Ret), President local community curious to learn more about intelligence, counterterrorism, and 732.255.8021 814.824.2117 homeland security. [email protected] [email protected] Montana—Bozeman Texas—San Antonio California—San Francisco Dick Grant Chapter Texas Alamo Chapter California Jim Quesada Chapter Gary Wanberg, President Henry Bussey, II, President Andre LeGallo, President 406.542.1484 210.490.5408 415.456.9255 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Nevada—Reno; Sierra Nevada Crest, in California: From Fresno, Washington—Seattle California—San Diego CA north to the Oregon border; East of Interstate 5 (I-5). Pacific Northwest Chapter San Diego Chapter In Nevada: From 38 Degrees north Latitude, north to the Oregon & George N. Knudtzon, President Darryl Thibault, President Idaho borders; West of the Nevada-Utah border. 360.698.1403 619.297.9959 Northern Sierra Chapter [email protected] [email protected] Gary Hipple, President [email protected] Colorado—Denver/Boulder Rocky Mountain Chapter David McMichael, Acting President AFIO Chapters Across the U.S. 303.697.8745 [email protected]
Florida—Jacksonville North Florida Chapter Capt. Ken Meyer, USAF(Ret), President 904.868.8339 [email protected]
Florida—Palm Beach Palm Beach Chapter F. W. Rustmann, Jr., President 561.655.3111 [email protected]
Florida—Cape Canaveral Satellite Chapter Barbara E. Keith, President 321.777.5561 [email protected]
Florida—St. Petersburg Florida Suncoast Chapter H. Patrick Wheeler, President 727.934.8748 [email protected]
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