A Classic Case of Deception (Antonio J. Mendez)

CIA Goes Hollywood A Classic Case of Deception Antonio J. Mendez Background: Exf""tltration and and disguise, cover legends and sup- 1 the CIA porung. d ata, " poe k et 1·ttter, " an d so forth is fuhdamental deception trade When briefing the CIA's Directorate craft in cl4ndestine operations. of Operations (DO) or other compo Personal documentation and disguise nents of the Intelligence Community specialists! graphic artists, and other (IC) about the Office ofTechnical graphics specialists spend hundreds of Services' (OTS) exfiltration capabil hours preparing the materials, tailor ity, I always made a point to remind ing the co;ver legends, and them that "readiness" is the key. coordinating the plan. This is one of the full-time concerns ' The operational of my former OTS office, the Graph Infiltratin'g and exfiltrating people ics and Authentication Division into and but of hostile areas are the involvement'' of GAD (GAD). most perilous applications of this officers in the tradecrafi. The mental attitude and In arranging for the escape of refu demeanof of the subject is as impor exf"tltration from Iran gees and other people of potential tant as th~ technical accuracy of the of six US Department intelligence value who are subject to tradecrafi items. Sometimes, techni political persecution and hostile pur cal operations officers actually lead of State personnel suit, prior planning is not always the escap~es through the checkpoints on 28January 1980 possible because they show up at odd to ensure/ that their confidence does hours in out-of-the-way places. Cur not falter~ at the crucial moment. I was a closely held rent surveys and collection of up-to secret until the CIA date intelligence regarding travel con trols and procedures are vital. OTS I Operation in Iran: Going decided to reveal it engages in this activity worldwide. as part of its 50th Public j anniversary The readiness to move clandestine agents out of harm's way using quasi The oper~tional involvement of GAD celebrations in 1997. legal methods is equally important. officers irl the exfilrration from Iran of six US Sfate Department personnel CIA's policy and practice are to bring I its valuable human assets in from the on 28 Japuary 1980 was a closely held cold when they can no longer remain secret until the CIA decided to reveal it in place. Sometimes this includes as part of the Agency's 50th anniver their families. Public Law 110 gives sary celebrations in 1997. '' I the IC the authority to resettle these ' I people in the United States as US David Martin, the CBS News corre- persons when the time comes and the sponden't covering national security quota allows. issues inJWashington, DC, had the story ear,ly on, as did Mike Ruane of OTS/GAD and its successor compo The Philadelphia Inquirer. The nents have serviced these kinds of Canadiah Broadcasting Company Antonio J. Mendez served in the operations since OSS days. The and Reaaer's Digest both have done Directorate of Operations and the "authentication" of operations offic serious ~ieces since the CIA opened Directorate of Science and Technology. ers and their agents by providing the files /on this important success them with personal documentation story. Deception A failed e:xitltration operation'' ... would embarrass the US, its Jean Pelletier's book, Canadian President, and the the US and Canadian administra Caper, published in 1980, mentions tions. The stakes were high. A failed that Canada-whose diplomats in CIA, and probably exfiltration operation would receive Tehran had hidden and cared for the would make life even immediate worldwide attenrion and six American "houseguests" after Ira would seriously embarrass the US, its more difficult for President, and the CIA. It would nian militants seized the US American hostages probably make life even more diffi Embassy-had received CIA help in cult for all American hostages in Iran. the form of forged entries in Cana in Iran. The Canadians also had a lot to lose; dian passports to enable Canadian the safety 9f their people in Iran and Ambassador to Iran Kenneth Taylor security of their Embassy there would to engineer the escape of the six from be at risk. Iran. A brief passage in Hamilton Jordan's book, Crisis, alludes to CIA New Job, New'' Challenge Bur we had maintained a very officers on the scene in Tehran. Mter impressive record of success with On 11 December 1979, about a he left office, former President operations of this type over many month after the takeover of our years. Carter, in statements to the media, Embassy in Tehran, I moved from gave hints of even more credit due my job as Chief, OTS, Disguise Sec his administration for the only true tion, to Chief, OTS, Authenrication Collecting Basic Data operational success of the hostage Branch. I had operational responsi CfiSIS. bility worldwide for disguise, false documentation, and forensic moni We had recently moved one agent toring of questioned documents for out oflran through Tehran's Mehra My recollections of the long national counterterrorism or counrerintelli bad Airport. As a result of this emergency-which began on 4 Nov gence purposes. operation, we had a body of techni ember 1979 with the US Embassy take cal data on the airport conrrols and of the over and ended with the release of the I had already spent the first days of the competence and efficiency 52 hostages 1 on Inauguration Day in the crisis creating a deception opera-· people operating them. The task of January 1981-encompass several tion designed to defuse the crisis. collecting and analyzing current doc ument inrelligence thus would be a major plans and operational actions President Carter decided not to use matter of verifYing fairly recent infor focused on Iran that were supported this plan, however. He has since lamented that decision. mation and ensuring that it was up to by OTS. These included intelli date, rather than having to start from gence-gathering, deception options, scratch. The requirement for dealing with the the hostage rescue effort, secret nego six State Department employees hid tiations with the Iranian Govern ing under the care of the Canadian We also were conrinuing to support ment; and exfiltrations of agents and Embassy in Iran was one of many the infiltration and exfiltration of a the "Canadian six." challenges I had to address on my few inrelligence officers and agents first day on the new job. I immedi who were traveling in and out of Iran on intelligence-gathering and hos In those days, the atmosphere in CIA ately formed a small team to work on this problem. tage-rescue planning operations. We was one of full alert. OTS, like many could use these people as collection Agency components, was buzzing sources. The complexities were evidenr. We with intense activity. There are needed to find a way to rescue six numerous stories about technical and Americans with no intelligence back operational innovations resulting ground, and we would have to Major Potential Obstacles from the emergency-like environ coordinate a sensitive plan of action ment; the rescue of the six is one of with another US Government depart We were most concerned about the many such stories. ment and with senior policymakers in exit controls at the airport. Long 2 Deception before the revolution, Iranian The Passport Question We decided to push for this option, authorities had adopted a two-sheet but to ~oncentrate first on devising embarkation/ disembarkation form. The debate over passports began with cover f~r the six before making final This form was printed on carbonless the question of whether to use ordi recomciendations on the type of paper and filled out by the traveler nary US passports, Canadian passpor:t to be used. upon entry. The authorities retained passports, or other foreign passports a white sheet, and the traveler at our disposal. CIA managers were retained a yellow copy to present at not comfortable with the idea of : the exit control point when depart using foreign passports. They were Quest; for Infonnation ing. The clerk was supposed to concerned that persons who were not match the two forms to verify that intelligence professionals could well We began an all-source quest for the traveler left before his visa prove unable to sustain a foreign inform,ation on the types of groups cover story. expired. Many countries in the world rravelirig in and out of Mehrabad Air have similar systems; few complete pore. ~n the meantime, the DO's the verification process on the spot, if The Iranians, moreover, had embar Near ~ast (NE) Division was devel ever. rassed the US by finding a pair of oping information on overland OTS-produced foreign passports in the US Embassy that had been issued "black:' exfiltration qptions, hoping We hoped to determine whether the to two CIA officers posted in Tehran. to 1'd et:J.tlI 'fy a smugger1 ' s route or a militants operating at Mehrabad were One of these officers was among the "rat liAe" into Turkey. Texas billion completing this kind of positive hostages being held in the Embassy. aire H, Ross Perot had used such a check before travelers cleared the air The discovery of the passports was plan t6 exfiltrate two of his employ pore. Earlier in 1979, the control the topic of extensive media coverage ees eahy in the Iranian revolution. I personnel were unprofessional and in Iran and other countries. He haa already offered support to the did not collect the forms unless the I Agency for hostage rescue efforts. departing traveler volunteered them.

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