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National Security Assistant: Three Role Conceptions and Their Implications INFORMATION TO USERS The most advanced technology has been used to photo­ graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 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Ml 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Order Number 1335125 The national security assistant: Three role conceptions and their implications Maslowski, Gerd, M.A. The American University, 1988 UMI 300 N. ZcebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106 THE NATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANT - Three Role Conceptions and Their Implications - by Gerd Maslowski submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service o-f The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts i n International Affairs Si'ematur es of Committee V ? c Chairman: ________ ________ jA li. Dean of the College O Date__.aAV-S.S- / / 1988 The American University / (7-2 O’ Washington, D.C. 20016 & JTHE MEBICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANT - Three Role Conceptions and Their Implications - by Gerd Maslowski ABSTRACT This thesis deals with the National Security Assistant as an actor in the national security decisionmaking process. The Assistant has performed many different roles since 1947. This leaves a confusing picture and raises several analytical questions: 1) What was the role of National Security Assistants in respective administrations? What factors determined their role performances? What are the implications of certain role patterns? Based on the analysis of the eight post-World War II administrations, three role conceptions are cristalized and made explicit: 1), the subordinate Assistant who is a policy-neutral process coordi nator/f aci .1 i tator , 2) the equal Assistant who manages the decisionmaking process and is also a substantive actor, and 3), the dominant Assistant who is the principal policymaker under the President and performes 'outside' functi ons. The three role conceptions have, respectively, advantages, but also shortcomings and limitations. Each of the three conceptions appears to be a viable organizational option an incoming President can choose. The chosen conception should be compatible with his executive style and interests. The Assistant must remain a flexible aide. Formalistic or legalistic statutes would be counterproductive. —i i i — Contents 1. Introduction p. 1 2. The National Security Assistant as Subordinate Actor in the State-centered National Security System p. 6 2.1. Souers and Lay under Truman p. 6 2.1.1. Preliminary Role Determinants p. 6 2.1.2. Roles and Functions p. 13 2.2. Cutler under Eisenhower p. 17 2.2.1. Preliminary Role Determinants p. 17 2.2.2. Roles and Functions p. 21 2.3. Implications o-f the National Security Assistant as Subordinate Actor in the State-centered National Security System p. 27 2.3.1. Role Conception I p. 27 2.3.2. What Factors Determine this Role Conception? p. 30 2.3.3. What is Wrong with this Role Conception? p. 33 2.3.4. What Can be Done About this Role Conception? p. 34 3. The National Security Assistant as Equal Actor in the Intermediate National Security System p. 37 3.1. Bundy under Kennedy p. 37 3.1.1. Preliminary Role Determinants p. 37 3.1.2. Roles and Functions p. 42 3.2. Bundy and Rostow under Johnson p. 48 3.2.1. Preliminary Role Determinants p. 48 3.2.2. Roles and Functions p. 50 3.3. Scowcroft under Ford p. 54 3.3.1. Preliminary Role Determinants p. 54 3.3.2. Role and Functions p. 56 3.4. Implications of the National Security Assistant as Equal Actor in the Intermediate National Security System p. 59 3.4.1. Role Conception II p. 59 3.4.2. What Factors Determine this Role Conception? p. 61 3.4.3. What is Wrong with this Role Conception? p. 64 3.4.4. What Can be Done About this Role Conception? p. 66 - i v — 4. The National Security Assistant as Dominant Actor in the White House-centered National Security System p. 68 4. 1. Kissinger under Nixon p. 68 4.1.1. Preliminary Role Determinants p. 68 4.1.2. Roles and Functions p. 72 Brzezinski under Carter p. 87 . 1. Preliminary Role Determinants p. 87 . 2. Roles and Functions p. 92 What Happened under Reagan? p. 103 4. 4. Implications of the National Security Assistant as Dominant Actor in the White House-centered System p. 112 4.4. 1. Role Conception III p. 112 4.4.2. What Factors Determine this Role Conception? p. 114 4.4.3. What is Wrong with this Role Conception? p. 117 4. 4.4. What Can be Done About this Role Conception? p. 119 Concluding Remarks p. 121 Bi bliography p. 128 - v - List o-f Illustrations Figure I: Role Conception I p. 122 Figure II: Role Conception II p. 123 Figure III: Role Conception III p. 124 1.________ Introducti on This thesis is about the National Security Assistant1 as an actor in the national security decision-making process. The Assistant's modus operandi has varied significantly during the last four decades. In the absence of any binding legal or formal prescriptions he has performed roles ranging from that of a mere 'paper-pusher' to that of an influential—even predominant— policymaker. Thus, the record of the eight post-World War II administrations gives a complex and confusing picture as to what the National Security Assistant 'is,' what determines his modus operandi, why he is used in different ways, and what his 'proper' role and function ought to be. What makes the position National Security Assistant particu­ larly interesting as a subject for examiniation is: a) its central location at the very focal point for the making of U.S. national security policy; and b) its disputed existence, as reflected in the heated profes­ sional controversy about it which is as old as the position i tself . Public and Scholarly attention especially began to turn to the National Security Assistant when Kissinger's role accumulation and gain in functional authority became apparent in the early 1970s. Breeninski's following of the precedent set by Kissinger led to a Congressional investigation about the 'role and account­ 1 The term 'National Security Assistant' is used synonymously throughout this study for the various formal and informal titles this official has been given since 1947. _ 2 - ability' o-f the Assistant in 1980. The recent Iran/contra Affair and the activities of President Reagan's Assistants has again shed light on the problem potential that is inherent in the posi­ tion. A systematic analysis of the position National Security Assistant appears to be urgent. Examining the National Security Assistant from the Truman through the Reagan Administration, I am guided by several ana­ lytical questions: 1) What has been the role of the National Security Assistant? The basic task of my study is to analyse what roles and functions the individual Assistants performed under their respective Pre­ sidents. On a case-by-case basis, the Assistants' activities are examined and his key roles and functions identified. The obtained information—which is predominantly descriptive in nature—is indispensable for my further research on the subject matter. 2) What determines the role of the National Security Assistant? The second analytical question goes hand-in--hand with the first one. While examining the roles of individual National Security Assistants, attention is also given to the factors that influence or determine the respective role performances. These role deter­ minants are certainly complex and different in each case. My focus is on four major factors (without excluding others): - presidential style - performance and responsiveness of the Secretary of State and the State Department - nature of the international demands challenging the U.S. at respective periods - abilities and ambitions o-f the National Security Assistants themselves Thus, the role performance of the individual Assistants is regarded in the context of major individual and situational determinants. 5) Can the role performances of the individual National Security Assistants be categorized into distinct role conceptions? The research effort under questions 1 and 2 produces a large amount of predominant1y descriptive information about 'many' idiosyncratic cases. Question number 3 addresses the consider­ ation whether some of these cases show such a similiarity as to allow a categorization into a 'few' distinct role conceptions.
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