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S-0865-0002-27-00001
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Title items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - Middle East 1967 (see list of items appendix No. 3)
Dafe Created 22/05/1967
Record Type Archival Item
Container s-0865-0002: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East
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End of Report United Nations - ARMS DatesefUNARMSDB -A,
Selected Confidential Papers on The Middle East 1967 1) Meeting - 14 March ^96s 7 - Present:!! Thant, Ambassador Goldberg, Ralph J. Bunche 2) Meeting - 15 March I - Present! U Thant, Ambassador Goldberg Ralph J. Bunche 3) Meeting - 22 March 1967 - Present- SG, Senator Clark, Pell, Mundt, Carlson, Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Gore, Cooper, •£ase, McCarthy, Marcy, Mr. Paul Hoffman, R. J. Bunche £ 1/..U--/V'-vO 4) 'Revised version of Carl Marcy's resume of meebing - 22 March 1967 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ( v
t< Selected Confidential Papers on The Middle East 1967 -continued- E. Note on Middle Eastern Situation - 4 August 1967 Note on Middle East Situation - 7 August 1967 Meeting - 10 August 1967 - Present: SG, Ambassador Rafael, Mr. Rosenne. Ralph Bunche Meeting - 14 August 1967 - Present: SG, Ambassador Rafael, Ambassador Rosenne, Ralph Bunche Meeting - 16 August 1967 - Present' SG, Ambassador Fakhreddine, Ambassador El-Farra, Ralph Bunche Meeting - 24 August 1967 - Present' SG, Ambassador Rafael, Ambassador Rosenne, Ralph Bunche Meeting - 25 August 1967 - Present SG, Ambassador El-Kony, Ralph Bunche Meeting - 30 August 19^7 - Present: SG, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Buffum, Ralph Bunche Meeting - 1 September 19&7 - Present: SG, Ambassador El-Farra Ralph Bunche Meeting - 22 September 1967 - Present- SG, PM S.A. Kyprianou, H.E. Mr. Z. Rossides, Mr. A. lakovides, Ralph Bunche, C^'ffi™**') J. Rolz-Bennett 37) Meeting - 26 September 1967 - Present- SG, Dean Rusk, Arthur goldberg, Ralph Bunche 38) Meeting - September 26, 1967 - Present- SG, H.E. Muhammad El-¥Aamiry, Foreign Minister of Jordan, Ambassador Taysir Toukan, Ralph Bunche 39) Meeting - 29 September 1967 - Present: SG, F.M Abba Eoan, Ambassador Rafael, Ambassador Rosenne, Ralph Bunche 40 Note for record - 2 October 1967 Ct.v.) Meeting - 11 October 1967 - Present: SG, H.E. Mr. Hamani Diori, H.E. Mr. Adamou Mayaki, Oumarou Youssoufou (interpreter) Jose Rolz-Bennett C^^a--^-^) 42) Meeting with Ambassador Fedorenko - 16 October 1967 43) Meeting - 17 October 1967 - Present: SG, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Sisco, Ambassador Pedersen, Ralph Bunche . Meeting - 19 October 1967 - Present: S. Kyprianou, *- cff~"-y Ambassador Z. Rossides, Mr. A. lakovides, SG, J. Rolz-Bennett 45) Meeting - 20 October 1967 - Present: SG, F.M. Rifai, Ambassador El-Parra, Ralph Bunche 46) Meeting - 20 October 1967 - Present: SG, Dr. Assad Khanji, Ambassador Daoudy, Ralph Bunche 47) Meeting - 30 October 1967 - Present: SG, F.M. Abba Eban, Ambassador Rafael, Ralph Bunche 1/48) Meeting - 22 November 1967 - Present: SG, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Pedersen, Ralph Bunche *- c-^v^-a) AS) Meeting - 23 November 1967 - Present: SG, Mr. Eban, Mr. Rafael, Bunche ./50 Meeting - 28 November 1967 - Present: SG, Lord Caradon, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Ignatieff, Ralph Bunche Notes on Meeting with Ambassador Goldberg in the Secretary-General's office at 4:45 p.m. on 22 May 1967
Present; The Secretary-General, Ambassador Goldberg, Ambassador Pedersen, RJB Mr. Goldberg said that in the light of the very grave situation, the United States is being called upon to reaffirm its commitments made to the Near East. These commitments were made individually by four Presidents - Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. They are commit- ments to protect any Near Eastern country against aggression. The basic principle in the commitment is that which was made in 1950 in the Tri- Partite Agreement involving France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The fundamental commitment is a desire to prevent and to counter aggression against any country in the Near East. The United States, although it has not said so publicly as yet, shall keep that commitment. This clearly has grave implications. Therefore the United States gives to the Secretary-General their complete support in the Secretary-General's forthcoming mission to Cairo. The Ambassador stressed that what he was saying had not been said publicly. Ambassador Goldberg then referred to a letter from him to the Secretary-General which he was handing to the Secretary-General. In this letter, it was emphasized that the United States has no designs on Syria or the UAR or any other country in the Near East, and the Secretary-General was informed that he could say this to Nasser in Cairo. In response to a question by RJB, Ambassador Goldberg stated that the United States commitment would extend to all countries in the Near East and therefore would be applicable in the event of an Israeli attack upon or invasion of Syria. The United States, he said, is against aggression in the area against any country in any form. Mr. Goldberg said that the United States seeks a solution to the -2- problems in the Near East through the United Nations. Justice Goldberg said, as he had previously expressed to the Secretary-General, that what has happened in the Near East recently was of very great concern to Washington and there was deep anxiety about the decision to withdraw UNEF. It may be recalled that the United States broke with its Allies at the time of the Suez crisis (Israel, France and the United Kingdom). Therefore, the United States has had a different view from that of the Secretary-General with regard to the withdrawal of UNEF. The United States position is that Nasser has a continuing obligation to protect the peace in the area and should not menace it by unilateral action. -3- Ambassador Goldberg said that the letter which he was handing to the Secretary-General is a reminder to President Nasser of the past record of the United States in this matter. Indeed, it could be said that Nasser would not be where he is now if it were not for the U.S. The letter, said Mr. Goldberg, is only for U Thant and Mr. Nasser to the extent to which U Thant may see fit to use it. It will not be made public. Mr. Goldberg said that the U.S. Government is under tremendous pressure on this question. He said the U.S. has differred with the Secretary-General on the matter, but respects his judgement and his motives. That, he said, is now past and we must look to the future. The main objective is to preserve an effective U.N. presence in the area. Some way must be found to meet the positions of both parties. We have said to the Israelis that we will keep our commitment and we wish them to cooperate. U Thant mentioned the mischievous Jordanian broadcast of yesterday. Ambassador Goldberg said that the U.S. had sent its Ambassador •to Jordan to protest about this and he was assured that such broadcasts will cease. Ambassador Goldberg thought there would be a great possibility for a U.N. presence of a new kind to be established at Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza, especially since the Strait of Tiran is regarded by many countries as an international waterway. He referred to the possibility of a new international instrumentality. Mr. Goldberg said that Ambassador El Kony had indicated to him that all that had to be done -4- now would be to observe the Armistice Agreement and to employ EIMA.C along the Line. But this was a one-sided approach as Israel did not agree with it. U Thant said that Ambassador Rafael had given a negative reaction this morning to paragraph 16 of the Secretary-General1s report to the Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg said that it is very important to get the forces of the two sides quickly disengaged by a, mutual withdrawal from the Line and, particularly, to get the FLA away from where it can make trouble. Mr. Goldberg said that with regard to the Soviets, President Johnson has written to Mr. Kosygin asking for his cooperation with UN efforts to £ind a solution to this crisis. Mr. Goldberg said that the U.S. position is firm on free passage through the Strait of Tiran. Ambassador Goldberg concluded that if no good results or commitments are obtained in Cairo the Secretary-General should at once bring the matter to the Security Council. The Ambassador referred to the possibility of the Secretary-General making an appeal for restraint and calm to all parties in the area prior to his departure for Cairo. The meeting adjourned at 5.25 p.m. 1 June 1967
NOTE FOR THE RECORD
Ambassador El Kony of the UAR came to see the Secretary-General on 51 May at 10.^5 a.m. He -wanted to make the position of his Government clear. In regard to the idea of a moratorium, his Government would not have any objection to a two week moratorium but wanted it to be made clear that this request would be without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the UAR. He was aware that the USSR attached great importance to this question and they regarded the Near East problem as their second most important international problem affecting the USSR, next only to the problem of Germany. He also mentioned that the draft resolution proposed by Ambassador Goldberg would not be acceptable to his Government. He repeated the highest esteem in which the Secretary- General was personally held in Cairo and hoped that the Secretary-General would not get personally involved in any explanation of paragraph 14 of his Security Council report. He also mentioned the possibility that King Feisal of Saudi Arabia might also visit Cairo as King Hussein of Jordan did recently, Morocco had decided to place forty percent of her armed forces at the disposal of the UAR. There was a new mood on the part of the Arabs and they were determined not to make any concession in regard to the Sinai Peninsula and the passage through the straiti of nieVKa-raT^ CVW/cc
UOTEJOR TBE RECORD
El Koay of the tlAR came to see the ea 51 May at 10. ^5 &•»• He "wanted to the position of his Government clear. In regard to the idea of a moratorittm, his Government would not have any objection to a two vaek aomtortuia Taut wanted it to be aaade elfl^s* that this request would be •without pre^uaiee t
r cc: Mr. Lemleux 1 V
Notes on the Secretary-General's Meeting with Foreign Minister Eban at 5-30 p.m. on 7 June 1967
Present: Secretary-General Mr. Abba Eban Ambassador Gideon Rafael Ambassador Shabtai Bosenne Mr. Ralph J. Bunche Mr. Constantin Stavropoulos Mr. Brian Urquhart
Ambassador Eban stated (a) that Israel would accept the Security Council cease-fire order; (b) that since Jordan had ordered a cease-fire the Israel Government had given a parallel order; (c) that the Israel Government was prepared to give cease- fire orders on all other fronts if they received reciprocal assurances from the Governments concerned. Mr. Eban said that the situation in Jordan was complicated by the entry of Iraqi forces in Jordan and by the fact that the military command of the Jordan army was in fact Egyptian. The Secretary-General raised the question of access of shipping to Gaza for the purpose of evacuating UMEP. It was explained that the Israel authorities in Gaza had said that facilities would be given for shipping to take troops out in a week's time, but that it was most desirable to evacuate the troops much earlier. Mr. Eban undertook to communicate at once with the Israel Government urging them to take the necessary action. The Secretary-General raised the question of Sharm el Sheikh and the Strait of Tiran and asked what would be the attitude of the Israelis to some future international machinery guaranteeing innocent passage through the Strait. Mr. Eban replied that while the Israel Government had not given sufficient thought to this problem as yet, any future agreement would have to have the UAR as a party to it, since the absence - 2 - of a guaranteed UAR agreement to UNEF presence at Sharm el Sheikh had proved to lie one of the great weaknesses of the UNEF arrangement. The Secretary-General raised the question of the safety of the records of UNTSO and UNEF, about which he had addressed a note to the Israel Government on 6 June. The Secretary-General also raised the question of the future of UNTSO and the Armistice Agreements. Mr. Eban said that these questions and others would have to "be part of a new structure of relationships in the Near East and the place of the United Nations in that structure. He believed that direct negotiations and contact between all parties was essential to that structure and the United Nations or some other third party might be useful in some of these contacts. The Secretary-General raised the possibility of a United Nations presence or representative of the Secretary-General for the whole area. Mr. Eban took note of this suggestion and said that the whole course of events of the past week had been so swift that Israel Government was intellectually unprepared for the situation but would be giving all of the questions brought up earnest study in the next few days. The Secretary-General described the reasons for the withdrawal of UNEF. 1»
f have the tumor to r$f«? to $wa& telegsasi of 196? which imj\i!FC3 whether the tt&tod States isi tSwr raqpaMt, set foztli 1® aoeaaaat jfeTiT of ssi SSzaargency Social Session of th®
telegram refers to •al* ^b of the Ealcs of of ths Aeaembl.y as cottisig for-th of the Secrets^ ^ene^al in <2eallng witb a Merger fo? an Ezaergeney Special EulQ 8b, which provides for the convenl^ of an Session within 24 hcu^-3 of tlis the Secretary Geaeral of & rscpQet for ©ueh a f reia a miajorlty of the members of the United for ...... _ . . Sb and 9b of tha S-en©i?al /iSSQmbls'"- o E\?lea of canstitute the only SOUFCS of ths feasls for the holding of an Essrgericy Special Session, 377 ^C^I P^>^i<5©s th&t Spacia.1 Session may be eall^S If tlio Security Council bectose of l&ck of unanimity of tils Femia-nent 5 falls to exei'eiSQ its primary resfonslfeiilt^ for of international geaco and sscurity in thei*e appears to fee a threat to breach of the peaee, or act of you laootfj the Security go&netl is @el2@$ of tlie
of the United nations of adoption bocaus© it «ii6 " ~ si resolutions are parking bcforo tb» other suggestions to
With respect to the States in Document 3 1 en t&at tfc® United 0 respect to t&© Smft rseolutlon eubmlttea by C^mia* its Sietingoislisd rsspresentatsiv^ i&sSicsted that rovieiais
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this letter of Excellency,, the j*@n@$r@3 t
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
13 July 196?
Dear Ambassador Goldberg, In my letter of 31 May 196? relating to the question of the withdrawal of UN3F from the territory"of the United Arab Republic, I informed you, as you will recall, that I had asked the Legal Counsel to prepare a memorandum on the strictly legal aspects of the matter. As 1 promised at that time, I am enclosing a copy of this memorandum which Mr. Stavropoulos has prepared. Sincerely yours,
U Thant
His Excellency Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations 799 United Nations Plaza New York, N. Y. 1001?
lc/tfe F The Secretary of State expressed regret at being late because of a traffic tie-up. He then asked the Secretary-General what he expected to come out of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. Did he think that the Middle East question will go back to the Security Council from the General Assembly? U Thant said that he did not anticipate that very much would come out of the Assembly in the light of all the circumstances. He referred to his recent talk with the Prime Minister of Poland and thought it significant that the Prime Minister had indicated that the existence of Israel must be accepted by all States. He said that this also had been implied by Mr. Kosygin. A majority of the Members favour withdrawal of Israel forces and a majority also are in favour of innocent passage for ships of all countries. U Thant referred to George Brown* s speech in which the latter had supported withdrawal with specific reference to the Old City of Jerusalem. Some question could be raised as to what significance could be attached to the fact that Mr. Brown mentioned only Jerusalem. Dean Rusk pointed out that Mr. Brown is a Catholic and may have been speaking indirectly for the Pope. U Thant referred to the speech made by Mr. Krag of Denmark. Mr. Krag had urged the appointment of a "UN" Representative to be selected by the Security Council. This, the Secretary-General pointed out, was -2- different from the concept set forth by Mr. Brown in his speech. Mr. Krag was speaking of a Representative of the Security Council. U Thant thought that there would be need for Security Council action on a Representative in any case. He thought it would be difficult to expect results from the General Assembly within two weeks as some had hoped. Dean Rusk asked about the Soviet attitude with regard to the arms race in the Middle East. U Thant said that he had no information. He expressed the view that one possible difficulty in the equation is Peking which is offerring unlimited arms aid to the UAR. U Thant thought that Peking might in time even give atomic warheads to the UAR. He added that both Israel and the UAR are manufacturing plutonium; • moreover, each of them has one reactor which is not subject to international inspection. The Secretary of State thought that it was not likely that this would happen but it could not be excluded. With regard to the Suez Canal Dean Rusk said that its closure basically is political. He said that their information is that one or two ships were in trouble in the Canal but not seriously. U Thant said that UAR representatives have never mentioned the Suez Canal in their talks with him. Dean Rusk observed that if the Canal is closed for very long the UAR will be in serious difficulty for revenue. He thought it would take quite some time to find solutions for the problems now before the General Assembly. Heither side, he remarked, will take -3- orders from anywhere on issues vital to them. When the question of a Special Representative was again mentioned, RJB pointed out that there would be some practical problems to be faced in connexion with the ability of a Special Representative to operate. He said that there would be need for the Special Representative to have his own aircraft, citing the experience of Count Bernadotte in May I9kti in having to make daily visits to several capitals for talks. U Thant asked if the US Government would look with favour on the idea of a Special Representative. s The Secretary of State said that he did not see why the US should not favour it. U Thant asked what prospects might be for a meeting of President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin. The Secretary of State said that there was some prospect but that nothing had yet been worked out for such a meeting. U Thant remarked that Mr. Kosygin had said at the lunch at the Soviet Mission today that he had planned to leave New York tonight (20 June) but was staying on instead because of 'the possibility of a meeting with the President which, however, could not be in Washington, B.C. U Thant then referred to the Hew York Times story of 20 June concerning his proposal in 196^ of a meeting of representatives of the United States and North Vietnam in Rangoon and the statement attributed to Dean Rusk about this proposal. U Thant recalled the talk with Dean in Rusk at the White House/June a year ago at the time of the reception for the United Nations and the role which Suslov had played. Suslov, -h- U Thant emphasized, had not initiated anything but had been used only as a channel of communication. Therefore, the Russians knew all about his proposal. The Secretary of State referred to the "seven talks" he had had with Gromyko about that time stressing that Gromyko had never mentioned anything about this proposal to him in the course of those talks. Dean Rusk also averred that when the Secretary-General talked with the senators who came to visit him no mention had been made to them of Rusk1s talks with Gromyko. U Thant expressed surprise at this because it was not for him to become involved in any way in the Secretary of State's talks with the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, which, in any case, he did not consider to be relevant to the particular point at issue. The Secretary-General stated that his position was that a willingness on the part of Ho Chi Minh to have a meeting between US and North Vietnamese Representatives in Rangoon had been conveyed to the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General had, in turn, conveyed this to the US Government through Adlai Stevenson. For a long time the Secretary-General got no response on the matter and it is only -* now that he hears for the first time of a completely new explanation. The Secretary of State,who, from the beginning of the meeting seemed preoccupied with something else and quite diffident, now began to show strong irritation and repeated several times that he must leave to keep an appointment with the Foreign Minister of the Ivory Coast for which he was already late and that 'a matter such as the Rangoon proposal could be discussed at some later meeting. -5- The meeting ended at 3.^5 p.m. with the Secretary of State saying rather curt goodbyes to the Secretary-General and RJB. Subsequently, Ambassador Goldberg asked RJB to inform the Secretary- General that the Secretary of State was upset before he came to the meeting with the Secretary-General because of an unpleasant luncheon meeting he had had with the French Ambassador about President De Gaulle* s statement of that morning linking the Vietnam war and the Middle East crisis. Ambassador Goldberg proposed that U /Chant and Dean Rusk have an early meeting alone under different conditions. 21 June 196? SECRET The Middle East Situation Mr. M. Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister of France, saw me today at 10:15 a.m. with Ambassador Seydoux and made the following observations. 1. Old Jerusalem must be internationalised. It will be a difficult process but the United Nations must devote its attention to that end. If Israel continues to occupy it, religious sentiments will be aroused. Nobody had thought of self determination for Old Jerusalem. Perhaps this idea should be explored. 2. The question of refugees must be tackled in right earnest. It is a difficult and delicate problem. The British idea of a United Nations political mission to the Middle East to deal with various problems including the problem of refugees should be supported. France will support the idea. 3. The question of innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba should not be raised in the General Assembly at this stage. A very careful study of all implications is needed. k. Regarding the question of withdrawal of Israeli forces to the Armistice lines it will be very difficult to implement it even if it is decided by the General Assembly. 5. In the view of the French Government the independence and territorial integrity of Israel must be recognised. He meant the territory of Israel as it was prior to June 5, 196?. 6. The United States proposal to ban shipment of arms to the Middle East is not fair in the present circumstances. If arms shipments are banned now Israel will be in a very strong position. 7. On the Middle East situation the French public opinion is influenced by two factors in factor of Israel: a) the long suffering plight of Jews throughout history; and b) the fact that a small country surrounded by big and hostile neighbours. Traditionally the French people have sympathy for the underdog. Many Frenchmen are also influenced by memories of Algeria and thus they have a kind of anti-Arab sentiment. But the French Government position - 2 - on the Middle East is supported by a large majority in France, 8. The French Government has made public statements to the effect that Vietnam and the Middle East are related issues and that the war in Vietnam has generated tensions and conflicts in the Middle East. The French Government feels that the Middle East conflict is the result of the pi.itical and psychological processes generated by the Vietnam war. Meeting of the Secretary-General with Foreign Minister Eban on 22 June 1967 at 7.30 p.m. in the Secretary-Generals Office Pr e sent: Seeretary-General Mr. Abba Eban Mr. Gideon Rafael Mr. Bunche Mr. Eban began by remarking that it appeared that the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly would be lasting longer than had been expected. U Thant indicated that the best guess was that it would go on for some three weeks. The Foreign Minister referred to talk that was taking place about a UN Representative in the Near East. He pointed out that there were differring versions, mentioning in particular the UK reference to a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and to the Danish version of a UN Representative appointed by the Security Council. U Thant said that he had had such an idea in mind before the recent hostilities and had taken up with President Nasser during his visit to Cairo the possibility of having a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the area, possibly with Headquarters in Gaza. President Nasser had favoured the notion but had expressed the view that the Headquarters should be in Cairo. On his return to New York the Secretary-General mentioned this possibility to the Permanent Representative of Israel and found that his reaction was not very favourable since he took the view that it was better for the Representatives of the countries to deal with the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters. U Thant expressed the opinion that such a —p — matter would require action by the Security Council, but that it could not be useful unless it was agreeable to both parties. Mr. Eban expressed the view that the attitude which Israel would take towards such a scheme would depend very much on what action would be taken here by the General Assembly. If the General Assembly would have acted before the appointment of the Representative and would require him to be bound by very specific terms of reference in one direction or another, this inevitably would affect the welcome which the Representative might expect to receive in the area. Mr. Eban thought that it would be best for such a Representative to have only very general terms of reference permitting him to seek solutions. Mr. Eban said for example that if the United States resolution were to be adopted by the General Assembly, it could be anticipated that the Special Representative charged with responsibility for the objective of that resolution would not be acceptable to the Arab Governments; on the other hand, if the Soviet resolution were to be adopted, the Representative would be unacceptable to Israel. U Thant expressed the view that this toucned upon uie crux of the problem and the basic issue. The Arabs, he said, want nothing to be done until after withdrawal of Israel troops. Mr. Eban stated that for Israel withdrawal must be related to settlements. Ambassador Rafael said that the Arabs want not a Special Representative but the appointment of a Withdrawal Commissioner. But, said the Ambassador, if no unconditional withdrawal resolution were to be adopted by the General Assembly, would the Arabs then accept a United Nations Representative? The Foreign Minister said that, in the absence of a specific General Assembly resolution, it is difficult for Israel to take a position on the -3- question of the UN Representative. Israel could accept such an arrangement with general terms of reference enabling the Representative to seek a solution. Ambassador Rafael said that Israel had favoured the Secretary-General going to the area before hostilities began - to Cairo, to Jerusalem and other capitals. Mr. Eban,' ->in response to a question from the Secretary-General, said that he expected now to stay in New York for most of the session. He thought that it was likely that there would be many resolutions introduced, most of which would be variants of the existing resolutions and there would be quite a "complex" of proposals. Mr. Eban thought there was no chance for either the US or the Soviet resolutions to be adopted in their present form. He thought that in the absence of anything else the delegates might fall back on the UN Representative idea. The Secretary-General, in response to a question from Ambassador Rafael as to how he assessed the situation as regards resolution possibilities, said that he had had no chance to talk at ahj" length with Mr. Kosygin about the question, and that he had learned nothing from Ambassador Fedorenko about it. He expressed the thought that most delegates would go along with the principle of innocent passage and also with the recognition of the existence of Israel. He had found that the Polish Prime Minister was talking along this line. The Secretary-General called to the attention of the Foreign Minister a report that had been received from General Bull about some recent difficulties at getting action from Israel authorities in granting visas -4- to incoming United Nations personnel. Ambassador Rafael stated that he would have this looked into and that there should be no difficulty. Just before leaving,the Foreign Minister referred to the problem of UNTSOTs return to Government House. He said that he hoped to bring to the Secretary-General an answer "in a day or two". The difficulty is the terms of the duties to be performed by the Observers. Israel, he said, is determined to get away from the Armistice Agreements regime and would be happy if UWTSO had a different title. Their emphasis would be that General Bull and his Observers would be carrying out their duties with regard to the current resolutions of the Security Council rather than with regard to the resolutions of the past. He thought that probably an exchange of letters making this clear would make possible the return of UKTSO to Government House. The meeting adjourned at 8.10 p.m. 4 » *" « 22 June 196? SECRET The Middle East Situation Ambassador Goldberg saw me at 3:15 p»m, today and made the following observations. 1. The Secretary of State Dean Rusk was apologetic yesterday on his return to the United States Mission even before he (Goldberg) rang me yesterday. According to Goldberg Dean Rusk was under extreme pressure. Goldberg thinks that Washington is reconstructing the whole episode of the Vietnam situation of late 1964 and early 1965. I explained to him the circumstances leading to the rejection by Washington of Hanoi's acceptance of my proposal to send a representative to talk to President Johnson's representative. 2. Regarding the Johnson- Kosygin meeting being negotiated, Goldberg said that President Johnson was very upset that Kosygin did not even bother to use the hot line and inform Johnson about his proposed visit to New York. He just came without informing anybody in Washington. The President, being a proud man and a very sensitive man, was hurt at that slight. Goldberg said that there was a possibility of their meeting tomorrow morning. If the meeting does take place the scheduled meeting between me and Dean Rusk has to be postponed. 3. Goldberg had lunch with Africans today. They took a very independent line on the Middle East not at all like the French line. They would recognise Israel as a State and Goldberg said that General de Gaulle's statement yesterday on.the Middle East was widely critised in the French press. According to him Couve de Murville had to modify the French position in this morning's speech because of widespread French criticism. Goldberg also observed that it was ridiculous to link Vietnam and the Middle East. 4. (ffioldberg believes that Israel will withdraw but it will take some time. There is a possibility of United Nations supervision of the Syrian heights overlooking Israel. Israel has no interest in Sinai. Innocent passage in the Guld of Aqaba under international control will be acceptable to the vast majority of members. He believes that even the Soviet Union will agree to it. - 2 - Israel has no interest in retaining Gaza since there are too many refugees. In his view Jerusalem is the only hot spot. Goldberg believes that Israel will retain Old Jerusalem, although there is a possibility of international control of religious places. Goldberg also believes that Israel will retain the area on the West bank of Jordan and Israel wants to have direct negotiations and agreement with Jordan. He believes that Jordan made a mistake in rejecting the United States appeal not to ally itself with the UAR. He understands that General Odd Bull transmitted a similar appeal from Israel to Jordan. King Hussein now admist that the United States and the United Kingdom are not involved in the attack on the UAE. 5. President Podgorny of Russia is now on a visit to Cairo to prop up Nasser. Goldberg thinks that the Russians are afraid of a change of Government in Cairo. The United States thinks that any change will be better than Nasser. Russians are now sending vast quantities of arms to the UAR but they cannot send any food stuff. The Food situation in the UAR is very serious. He believes that the disruption of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Arab nations is only temporary; they will be restored very soon. Goldbeg also observed that the speeches in the General Assembly are getting milder and more restrained. He believes that some compromise resolutions will emerge. He also said that France does not want any General Assembly action. France is only for Security Council action. In his view India is going too far. India's position regarding the legal aspects of the Gulf of Aqaba is not shared by many Indians including the Indian Ambassador in Washington, B.K. Nehru. On this matter the official position is even stronger than Yugoslavia. 6. He thinks that the Secretary-General should now consider appointing a special representative to be sent to the Middle East to be involved in all aspects of the problem - withdrawal, peace-keeping, refugees, Gulf of Aqaba, Syria, etc. He believes that a statesman like Mr. Wahlen, of Switzerland, should be considered. He said he did not know him but he was reported to be a very able negotiator. (I did not comment on his suggestions. I just told him that I know Mr. Wahlen very well. Jose Rolz-Bennett told me on his return from Geneva that he had a long discussion with Mr. Wahlen about the Middle East crisis - 3 - and that Wahlen was very critical of the Arabs). 7. Goldberg thinks that the Government in Israel will be reshuffled very soon. Abba Eban is a candidate for the Prime Minister's post and therefore he has to be tough in his statements for domestic reasons. Still, Goldberg thinks that General Moshe Dayan has better chances than Eban. 8. Goldberg also said that according to United States intelligence reports there will be changes in the Government of the Soviet Union. The reason is reported to be a failure of Soviet policy in the Middle East. SECRET 27 June 1967 THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST Dean Rusk saw me today at 12 noon and made the following observations: 1. Middle East: Kosygin's press conference faithfully reflected his position at Glassboro. Regarding the Middle Eastern situation, the United States' position is very clear. Besides its desire for the withdrawal of Israel armed forces to the positions prior to 5 June, the following issues must be tackled: (a) existence of Israel must be recognized; (b) the Arab States must forgo belligerence; (c) innocent passage must be guaranteed in the Gulf of Aqaba. The Soviet Union is not prepared to excert sufficient pressure on the Arab States. In his view, mere adoption of the withdrawal resolution will not produce any result. Israel will not heed such a resolution and the United States is not in a position to persuade Israel to accept it. Therefore, withdrawal must be accompanied by other measures. He saw Dr. Fawzi this morning and discussed the Middle Eastern situation in detail. Regarding one of the main issues, that is, innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, Dr. Fawzi said his Government would agree to permit innocent passage just on the basis of understanding but not in writing nor in any official undertaking. Fawzi said the U.A.R. would agree to some sort of United Nations supervision on the Gulf to guarantee freedom of passage, but he did not want to commit it officially at this stage. Dean Rusk said that on this matter there is a big difference between Fawzi's position and Kosygin's position. Kosygin made it very clear that the freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba is no longer an issue. He observed that perhaps Kosygin was not well briefed on this subject. Dean Rusk said that the Soviet Union is pouring arms into Arab countries at a tremendous pace after the cease fire went into effect. He said it must be stopped. He said one great shortcoming of Nasser was that he was continuously threatening other Arab leaders who did not go along with him. He wanted all Arab States to keep in Dean Rusk - 2 - 27 June 1967 line with his policies. Even after the war, he is very suspicious of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Even now Libya is terribly afraid of him. But for understandable reasons, Libya cannot make public statements. He conceded that the problem of Old Jerusalem is very difficult and equally difficult is the problem of the area west of the Jordan River. He admitted that it will take a long time to solve the problem of additional refugees. Then he asked me about the UNEF stores in Gaza. I told him that unofficial estimates put the UMEF stores in Gaza at $15 million. They are now completely in the hands of Israel and that the Field Service has reported on several cases of pilferage and looting by the Israeli armed forces. I told him that for the purpose of record, if not for anything else, I had to report to the General Assembly. He asked me if he could take up the matter with Abba Eban. I told him that it would be better to await the final report from the Field Service, when the United Nations would have full facts. Then I took up the question of the Government House in Jerusalem and the progress or lack of progress in my negotiations with the Israeli Representative and Abba Eban here. I told him that both the House and the furniture and equipment were badly damaged and very serious looting had taken place. He said that he would take it up with Abba Eban. Dean Rusk is emphatic in saying that the Security Council must continue to be seized of the question of the Middle East and he said that the Soviet Union no longer wanted continued Security Council involvement. He said it is unrealistic for the Soviet Union to expect General Assembly action in this matter. 2. The question of Viet-Nam: I took up the question of Viet-Nam and explained to him once again the circumstances surrounding my efforts to bring about a private meeting of the representatives of Hanoi and Washington from September 1964 to January 1965- I told him that it was Stevenson who disclosed these facts to Eric Severeid who wrote an article in Look Magazine in October 19^5• Dean Rusk said that he did not believe that Eric Severeid faithfully wrote what Stevenson had told him because many facts in the article were at variance with Stevenson's own broadcast statement from the BBC just before his death. Dean Rusk - 3 - g7 June 1967 He repeated his old thesis that Hanoi had no intention to negotiate seriously even at that time. He then said that he met Gromyko several times during that period and he never once mentioned this fact to him. I told him that I used Suslov (Under-Secretary) to transmit my request to Hanoi and it was Suslov who got the message back from Hanoi in September 19$4-. Afterwards I checked with Federenko and again with Gromyko in October 1964 when he came here to attend the General Assembly. They both confirmed Hanoi's positive response. I told Dean Rusk that Gromyko did not mention this to him since he was not asked. If only he had asked Gromyko at that time, I believe Gromyko might have confirmed it. Dean Rusk said it was strange that Gromyko did not once mention this to him. I told him that Hanoi's message was to me personally from Ho Chi Minh, and obviously he did not even want Peking to know it. If Gromyko were involved in this and if the news leaked, Peking once again would blast at Moscow, accusing it of connivance with the United States in arranging such private meetings between Washington and Hanoi. Dean Rusk said that at that time he had many other contacts with Hanoi and he did not get the impression that Hanoi was seriously willing to negotiate with Washington. I told him that I knew his contacts, since Stevenson had told me at that time and that I had checked with the Canadian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, both of whom admitted to me that the Canadian representative on the ICC could contact only junior officials in the Foreign Office and that he had no means of contacting either Ho Chi Ming or Pham Van Dong. I told him that if he had doubts about the accuracy of my message, why not ask his own Ambassador Byr04e in Burma to contact the Burmese Foreign Office and ask for a meeting with Hanoi's representative there. It was as simple as that. If the Hanoi representative refused to see him, then my message would prove to be false. I told him that I was sure that Hanoi's response would be positive at that time. I told him that it was a mistake on his part not to have tested Hanoi's intentions by such a simple procedure. After that, in the course of my trips to Europe whenever I met Hanoi's representatives in Paris or Moscow, I expressed my thanks to Dean Rusk - k - 2? June 1967 Hanoi for the positive response to my suggestion and both Hanoi's representatives in Paris and Moscow knew about Hanoi's offer of negotiations at that time. I told him that when Stevenson told me in late January 1965 that Washington was not agreeable to the meeting, I had to convey that reply to Hanoi. Dean Rusk told me that Stevenson was never instructed to reject it but to keep the doors open. I asked him if there was any possibility of a bombing pause as I had been advocating for the last two years. He said that if there was a bombing pause, what about the North Vietnamese regulars in the demilitarized zone. Supposing there was a bombing pause. If these regulars moved into the South, the United States had to bomb again. He said there was no assurance that there would be no further infiltrations. He said that he was agreeable to the standstill truce proposed by me in March this year and he said that to have an effective standstill truce, there must be talks between Washington and Hanoi to agree on the modalities of the truce. I told him that Hanoi would not talk with Washington so long as bombing was going on. He said that last year during the thirty-seven-day bombing pause more reinforcements slipped into the South. I told him that my information was different. According to diplomatic sources, Ho Chi Minn had told some diplomats in Hanoi, including the U.A.R. Ambassador, that he had recalled many of the North Vietnamese regulars from the South during the United States bombing pause. Ho Chi Minh was reported to have told them that while he was recalling many of his men, the United States was reinforcing its troops in the South during the bombing pause. Dean Rusk replied that the United States was at war and that it had to reinforce its troops to support the Government of South Viet-Nam because of the commitments. 5. Non-proliferation: He said that there were some prospects of a non-proliferation treaty with the Soviet Union. Moscow is still suspicious of West Germany's getting nuclear weapons. He had an appointment with Gromyko tonight, and he would discuss this question with him. Dean Rusk - 5 - 27 June 1967 b. Anti-"ball!stic missiles: Dean Rusk said that he had discussed this question with Gromyko and the Soviet position was that they were only defensive weapons and so they were not a threat to the United States. But Washington had replied to Moscow that discussions should be both on offence and defensive weapons and that it would be most unrealistic to confine the discussions only to defensive weapons. The United States Government had considered this problem very intensively and found it too expensive. He said that to deploy effective anti-ballistic missiles in this country, the Government had to spend over $40 billion spread over seven years. His Government feels that these sums should profitably be diverted to more fruitful activities like economic aid, etc. 4 July 196? Meeting of the Secretary-General with Dr. Mahmoud Pawzi on \ July 196? at h p.m. in the Secretary-Generals Office behind the Assembly Present: Secretary-Geneia 1 Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi Mr. Mahmoud Riad RJB In response to a question from the Secretary-General, Dr. Fawzi indicated that if no resolution is adopted in the voting there would probably be a motion to adjourn the Assembly for one or two days in order to try to find a common ground. He said that the Arab Members would not ask for this but neither would they oppose itj they would not stand in the way. He said that up to this moment the chances seemed remote for any agreement on the text between the Arab States and the Latin Americans; they were too far apart. U Thant inquired of Dr. Fawzi as to what the UAR reaction would be to a suggestion from him that UN Observers might be stationed in the sector where there is now confrontation between the troops of the UAR and those of Israel. This would be to enable the Secretary- General to fulfill his reporting responsibility under the Security Council resolutions of June 6 and 7» The Observers would have to be stationed on both sides, of course. He pointed to the experience thus far in Syria where the arrangement is working well. Dr. Fawzi said that he would inform Cairo of this idea and seek their reactions to it. He understood that it would involve stationing Observers on both sides and this might be considered a temporary measure. He went on to say that at some later point, possibly after General Assembly action, it might be worthwhile considering the stationing on both sides of the line of some UNEF-type United Nations operation. e-il k July 1967 Meeting of the Secretary-General with Foreign Minister Eban on ^ July 1967 at 4.25 p.m. in the Secretary-General*s Office behind the Assembly Present: Secretary-General Mr. Abba Eban Arab. Gideon Bafael Arab. Shabtai Rosenne RJB The Secretary-General informed the Foreign Minister that he had no means of fulfilling the reporting responsibility given to him by the Security Council resolutions of 6 and 7 June in the Israel/UAR sector and that he wished to have Israel1 s reaction to the possibility of stationing UW Observers in the Suez area where Israel and UAR troops are now in confrontation. He advised the Foreign Minister that he had just mentioned this idea to Dr. Fawzi. The Foreign Minister stated that he would seek his Government* s reaction to this idea which he understood to be along the lines of * the arrangement in Syria. He was assured that this is the case. In response to a question from the Secretary-General, Mr. Eban said that he understood that if no resolution were adopted today there might be a move to have a vote on the appointment of a Special Representative with general terms of reference, such as there had been in the Danish draft and also in the original Latin American draft, from which it had been eliminated although he did not know why. Meeting of the Secretary-General with Ambassador Goldberg on 5 July 1967 at 11.35 a.m. Present: Ambassador Goldberg Se crfctary-General BJB Ambassador Goldberg said that Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin had called on him to discuss the possibility of working something out on a resolution for the General Assembly to break the present impasse between Israel withdrawal and the Arabs forgoing belligerence. Ambassador Dobrynin said the Russians were seeking a 48-hour adjournment of the Assembly. Mr. Goldberg said that he advised Dobrynin that it seemed to him useless to seek to close the wide gap between the non- aligned and Latin American resolutions. The most constructive suggestion in Mr. Goldberg* s view was for the Secretary-General to send someone out there as his representative. As to the question of the mandate for such a person, this could be in the form of a statement issued by the Secretary-General along the lines of a draft handed to the Secretary-General by the Ambassador (see attached). U Thant stated that he would prefer that a resolution by the General Assembly authorize him to send out a personal or special representative. Mr. Goldberg stated that he did not vote for the Jerusalem resolution in the Assembly because it should have read "no unilateral change" in the status of Jerusalem. The resolution should not exclude the possibility of voluntary agreement affecting Jerusalem between Jordan and Israel. But the Jordanian representative objected to the -2- US suggestion and, therefore, Shahi of Pakistan who was otherwise willing would not go along with it. Ambassador Goldberg said also that the Jordanian representative had voted for the Cuban resolution which alleged that the United States was the principal instigator of the war in the Near East. Ambassador Goldberg said that he could not then vote for the G.A. resolution for which Jordan was one of the sponsors. Mr. Goldberg said also that he was against a one-week report provision as he thinks that demands for reports on such short notice are unrealistic and unfair. He said that he had issued a statement explaining the US abstention on the Jerusalem resolution. Mr. Goldberg stated that Ambassador Dobrynin had said that the Soviet mission would like to make another effort to bridge the gap between the non-aligned and the Latin American resolutions but that bmbsrsnestehiyK he, Goldberg, had repeated that he did not think that this could be done. -* A t&t «f bvoed i®is% t ttet It Meeting of 7 July 1967 with Ambassador Tomeh of Syria at 2:U5 p.m. in the Secretary-General's office Ambassador Tomeh said that he wished to inform the Secretary-General of a difficulty with the Israelis in the Banias area where there is a famous site of ruins of particular significance to Christians. The Israelis, he said, have marked this place for archeological excavations and have already started work at it. They have sent archeological teams to the place. Ambassador Tomeh referred to the IMESCO Convention on the protection of historic places. The Secretary-General informed him that not long ago he had had a talk with Dr. Maheu about this Convention with regard to the current situation in the Hear East. Ambassador Tomeh asked the Secretary-General to use his good offices with the Israelis and with UMESCO on this matter. The Secretary-General said that he would send a cable to Dr. Mahefi about the matter. U Thant informed the Syrian Representative that he had taken up with the Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of Israel the question of the Syrian Vice Consul who was still being detained by Israel. He said that he had not been given assurance that the man would be immediately released. Meeting on 8 July 196? at 1.05 p.m. in the,Secretary-General's Conference Room Present: The Secretary-General, Arthur Goldberg, Mr. Pedersen and RJB Ambassador Goldberg referred to the "UAR story" about the UK being called upon to clear the Suez Canal. According to the story, the UAR have discussed with the Secretary-General the withdrawal of troops from both sides of the Canal in order that it could be cleared. U Thant denied the story and assured Ambassador Goldberg that it was entirely without foundation. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the US is for "disengagement" and would support a proposal calling on the Secretary-General to send a Special Representative to the area. He said the United States also will support the Secretary-General*s suggestion of United Nations Observers at the Suez Canal. Ambassador Goldberg thought that nothing will come out of the General Assembly as a result of the week*s adjournment. U Thant said that he was awaiting from Israel their report on the Jerusalem resolution. Arthur Goldberg said that he does not think that Pachachi's position that there can be no Special Representative without the acceptance of the principles of withdrawal is the last Arab word on the question. Mr. Goldberg said that he thought that a bit later on an emissary of the Secretary-General would have to be sent out to work out all of the arrangements for transition to peace, including the questions of withdrawal, security, etc. Ambassador Goldberg then said he regretted to have to bring up an administrative matter of some delicacy. He made reference to a high official in the Secretariat whom he described as "a very nice fellow". He said, however, that he would have to object to the projected appoint- ment of this man to a position of high responsibility and sensitivity. -2- He said there were two reasons for this: 1) the Congressional and public reaction when this would became known, and 2) all members of this particular nationality in the Secretariat have instructions to report regularly to their Government. U Thant stated that he was contemplating placing this member in a position which would "be vacated "by a staff member who would soon he retiring and that he was doing so on the basis of a Committee recommen- dation. He had full confidence in the staff member in question who had, in fact, long been engaged in this particular activity. U Thant said that he sometimes receives letters about United States agents in the Secretariat. U Thant said that one possibility is a rotation arrangement with perhaps an option of re-election. An alternative would be the appoint- ment «f someone else for a year. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the US had material to document what he had said but he said the policy of the US Mission was not to permit US intelligence agents to send their people to the UN. There are, he said, no US agents in the UN Secretariat. The meeting adjourned at 1:55 P.m. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS July 14, 1967 Dear Mr. Secretary-General: This will acknowledge with appreciation your letter of July 13th enclosing the memorandum prepared by Mr. Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary and Legal Counsel of the United Nations, relating to the question of the withdrawal of UNEP from the territory of the United Arab Republic. I shall read Mr. Stavropoulos' memorandum with close attention and interest, and appreciate your sending it to me. Arthur J. His Excellency U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS 799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017 ^ ^ YUlron 6-2424 ** June 29, 1967 His Excellency U Thant Secretary General United Nations New York Dear Mr. Secretary General: 1 have the honor to call to your attention the June 27 statement of President Johnson on emergency assistance for war victims in the Middle East. The text of the statement is as follows: "The recent hostilities in the Middle East took their inevitable toll in human suffering. While we are urgently searching for a lasting settlement of the Middle East problem, we must bear in mind that the first humanitarian task and the first task of recon- struction is to bind up the wounds of conflict—to begin to find homes for the homeless, food for the hungry and medical care for the sick and wounded. "The American people huvt: nlw/vy;; responded c.i'tierous.ly to human suffering anywhere in the world. In this humanitarian tradition, the United States will join with other nations in a special effort to provide emergency assistance in the Middle East now. I have directed the establishment of a reserve of $5.»000,000 from contingency funds, to meet urgent relief needs in the period immediately ahead. We will allocate these funds through a number of channels, in whatever ways best help the war victims and encourage contributions from others, including the countries within the area. "As a first ctep, I have directed that our Government part. In I.[Vito :!n the nppropr I.ulr HnlLc-d N.-i t,i UN/2599/598 >„ - 2 - "The Secretary of State will keep emergency needs under constant review and will cooperate fully with the intergovernmental and private organizations now at work. "I must emphasize that this is an emergency relief program. Even while we are joining in thin effort to meet urgent needs, we must look toward a permanent and equitable solution for those who have been displaced by this and previous wars. It will not be enough simply to fall back on the relief arrangements of the past. There will be no peace for any party in the Middle East unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and certainly, primarily, by those who are immediately concerned." You will note that the President has stated that funds will be allocated through a number of channels, in whatever ways best help the war victims and encourage contributions from others, including the countries within the area. The United States has been the major contributor to UNRWA since its establishment seventeen years ago. I am pleased to inform you now that, in accordance with the President's announcement that a reserve of ;l>>5,000,000 has been established to meet urgent relief needs in the Middle Ivist, the Government of the United States is maklnc; available n :;p<.v in] <:> iritribub.i.on of 1(52,000,000 to UNKWA to help meet these urgent needs in the period Immediately ahead. We are undertaking immediate consultation;; with the Commissioner-General of UMRWA with a view to ascertaining how best and in what form this contribution could be made so as to be of maximum utility in meeting these urgent relief needs in the area. I would appreciate it if this letter could be distributed as a Document of the cm-rent emergency session of the General A'.scmbly. . Arthur J. Goldb 17 July 1967 Hotes on Meeting of Secretary-General with Ambassador El-Kony in Secretary-General's Office, at 11. gO a.m. on 10 July 1967 Present: Ambassador El-Kony Secretary-General RJB U Thant enquired whether the UAR had accepted the stationing of UN Observers in the Suez Sector as envisaged in the Security Council consensus, Ambassador El-Kony stated that he had instructions to say officially that the UAR does accept, U Thant pointed out that the first seven Observers constituting the advance party which General Bull would be sending out would be drawn from the Observers already in UNTSO. But the question of nationality would arise in connexion with the twenty-five new Observers to be • recruited. Ambassador El-Kony indicated that the attitude of the UAR would be influenced by the way Governments voted on the non-aligned and Latin American resolutions in the General Assembly. Thus he was negative on any Latin Americans, on Ethiopians, Irish, Nepalese, Danes and Norwegians, but was affirmative on Burma, Finland, Sweden and, finally, France. He himself mentioned India and Yugoslavia as desirable and said that Spain would be acceptable. It was agreed that General Bull would need to go to Cairo to discuss arrangements. Hotes on meeting in the Secretary-General1s office on 10 July 1967 at 11:35 a.m. Present: Secretary-General, Ambassador Rafael and RJB Ambassador Rafael said, referring to the situation in the Security Council the night "before that may be the UAR did not want UN Observers stationed in the Suez sector. U Thant said that he would wish an official reply from Israel on Israel acceptance of the stationing of UN Observers in the Suez sector. Ambassador Rafael said that before the Council has concluded its discussion his Government wanted to know just what was intended by the idea of stationing Observers. Now this is clear and he could communicate this to his Government. U Thant pointed out that he must first have an acceptance from the two Governments before he can give instructions to the Chief of Staff, General Bull, to begin consultations with the parties on the arrange- ments for stationing the Observers. U Thant pointed out also that he was expecting a reply from the Government of Israel to his letter on the General Assembly1s resolution on Jerusalem. Ambassador Rafael said that he expected to have his Government*s reply on the Jerusalem matter late in the day. U Thant asked that he receive the reply as early as possible. The Secretary-General then raised the question of nationalities of Observers. Ambassador Rafael said that his country had no objection to any of tbs nationality s now represented amongst the Observers and that, in general, they would find Observers acceptable from any country having diplomatic relations with Israel. As to Ethiopia, the Ambassador said he would enquire of his Government. He was negative on Spain, with whom Israel has no relations. As to Austria, he was reluctant because of the German- speaking aspect. He was affirmative on Finland. SECRET 19 July 1967 THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST Ambassador Seydoux told me today that the United States has been excerting utmost pressure in all capitals regarding the matter before the General Assembly. He disclosed that before the voting on the two draft resolutions tabled by non-align and Latin-American group, Joe Sisco (State Department) telephoned the French Ambassador in Washington, who was on vacation at that time, that Dean Rusk had asked him to inform the French Ambassador regarding the activities of Ambassador Seydoux at the United Nations. He said that Ambassador Seydoux was campaigning very vigorously with the French Africans to vote for the non-align resolution. Many French Africans complained to the United States against Seydoux' pressures. Therefore, Dean Rusk wanted the French Ambassador to know that if Ambassador Seydoux continued to put undue pressure on some delegations who had decided originally to support the Latin- American draft "it could have serious consequences regarding United States-French relations". The French Ambassador conveyed this to Ambassador Seydoux the same day and Seydoux reported this to Paris. On the next morning Ambassador Goldberg telephoned Seydoux to seek an appointment. Seydoux received him at his residence. Before Goldberg started the talk, Seydoux recounted to him what transpired the previous day and told him that such complaints by the State Department would not be accepted and were unacceptable. Seydoux also told him that he had never experienced such communications in his diplomatic career and expressed the hope that it would be the last. Goldberg apologized to him and said that it was not the intention of Dean Rusk to bring up the matter in such strong terms and perhaps the French Ambassador (Lucet) must have misunderstood Joe Sisco. The same day Seydoux met Joe Sisco at Pakistani lunch and he repeated the same objection to him. Joe Sisco was also apologetic and he explained that he had to carry out the instructions of the Secretary of State, although the language alleged to have been used by him was far stronger than he actually used. Middle East - 2 - 19 July 1967 Seydoux also made further additional points: 1. In the view of the French Government, there will be no solution of the Middle Eastern problem until after the United States Presidential elections at the end of 1968. 2. The French Government does not consider that the latest Latin-American draft resolution handed over by Goldberg to Dobrynin yesterday (l8 July) is a suitable one. 3. The French Government understands that Kuwait is thinking of withdrawing huge deposits in the British banks. Although there are differences of views between France and the United Kingdom, France does not favour such a step, since it will result in the devaluation of the British pound and have undesirable repercussions in the total European economic situation. 4. The French Government considers that the question of Jerusalem should be considered in the Security Council as soon as the Secretary-General has reported on Israel's reply to the second resolution on Jerusalem adopted by the General Assembly. 5. The French Government does not consider that Israeli boats should be permitted to ply in the Suez Canal. SECRET 19 July 1967 THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST Lord Caradon saw me today and brought up the following points: 1. According to his information both Israel and the U.A.R. have agreed to accept a Secretary-General's Special Representative for the area as proposed by several delegations in the course of the General Assembly debate. I told him that I have checked with both Governments and that Israel will accept a Special Representative without explicit terms of reference and the U.A.R. will accept one only on condition that his mandate is related to a specific General Assembly or Security Council resolution. He promised to pursue the matter further. 2. He asked me if Mr. Gussing could take up other political matters besides his prescribed functions in the context of the Security Council resolution. I told him that it would be very risky to enlarge his mandate on my own without any reference to the Security Council or the General Assembly. 3- He said that in the opinion of his Government, 25 observers for the Suez Canal sector would be inadequate. He wanted me to consider enlarging the number. I told him that on the advice of General Odd Bull I had already stated my intention to the Security Council and that I did not consider it advisable to enlarge the number at this stage. U. He asked me if any Security Council action on Jerusalem would be advisable. I told him that the repetition of the same resolution which was adopted in the General Assembly would be meaningless. If the Security Council is to take up the matter, some action should be contemplated. If the Security Council were to call upon Israel to implement the resolution, it could be a very positive step. He said that he would bring this up with his Government in London, since he is leaving New York on Saturday. 5- He told me that his Government has been in contact with FLOSY regarding the question of Aden, and he said that he was looking forward to seeing Mackawee who is now in New York. In his view, the Middle East - 2 - 19 July 1967 (Lord Caradon) prospects for the settlement are brighter than before, since FLOSY is agreeable to participate in the projected National Government. He told me that some members of Parliament in London are publicly proposing some sort of arrangement for the United Nations presence with some specific functions on Perim Island which is on the south of Aden. Perim is now part of the South Arabian Federation, but some kind of United Nations presence there after the independence of the South Arabian Federation will have a stabilizing influence in the area. His Foreign Secretary is interested in this matter and he will definitely raise this question in London. I told him that I could not comment on this problem, since the matter has to be taken up by the Committee of 2k and then by the General Assembly if there is any proposal by the British Government. 6. He asked me about my decision on the future of Sir Alexander MacFarquhar. I told him that I have decided not to extend his contract beyond the end of this year and I suggested to him to nominate one or two names to succeed him for the Chief Administrator's post. I explained to him that the new man will be in charge of both Personnel and Budget and he should be well versed in administration and treasury matters. I would prefer that the nominee should be not older than 55, since his contract would be five years. He said that he would take it up in London. He asked me if there is any possibility of another British nominee for one of the Under-Secretary posts in the contemplated lower echelon. I told him that there is a possibility, although the nominee would not necessarily succeed Martin Hill. I suggested somebody with a sound political judgment or a good economic background. 7- He told me that the two British pilots detained at present in Algeria are long overdue for release, since they were forced to fly Tshombe's plane from Spain to Algeria at gunpoint. They were not at all involved in Tshombe's kidnap, and he had talked with Ambassador Bouattoura with a view to the release of these two pilots. He was not taking up this matter officially, since he knew that this was not within the competence of the Secretary-General, but his Government wanted him to mention this case to me with the request to use my good offices purely on a personal basis with the Algerian Government. I assured him that I would do all I could- SECRET 20 July 1967 The Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika saw me today accompanied "by Ambassador Bouattoura and Mr. Yazid. He brought up the following points: 1. He was very disappointed with the stalemate in the General Assembly and the manoeuvres of the Big Powers. In his view, the Big Powers are trying to impose an agreed formula on the General Assembly. As far as his Government is concerned, there can be no concession on the question of Israeli withdrawal, and other matters cannot be taken up before the question of withdrawal is decided upon. He is critical of both the United States and the Soviet Union for trying to impose a solution which is not auitahle. * to the Arabs. He is seeing Mr. Gromyko at 5-30 p.m. today, and he looks forward to having a frank exchange of views. I asked him if he had contacts with Mr. Gromyko or the Soviet Representative in the last few days regarding private negotiations. He told me that the last time he saw Mr. Gromyko was about ten days ago and after that he had no contact with him. 2. Regarding the question of Moroccan/Algerian relations, he is aware of the fact that the Secretary-General is obliged to answer the letter of the King of Morocco, but before answering it in writing, he wanted to explain the situation orally. Morocco has been receiving vast quantities of arms and equipment from the United States, and, therefore, Algeria has to procure arms and equipment from the Soviet Union. It is far from the intention of the Algerian Government to launch any aggression against any country, particularly a brother Arab state, but in these days of political tensions and border problems, Algeria feels that she must be prepared for defence. After the visit of the Moroccan King to Washington, things happened quickly. The Moroccan Ambassador in Washington was recalled and made Foreign Minister. The King's brother-in-law was sent to Washington as Ambassador and arms started to flow in. Governor Harriman visited Algiers with a personal letter from President Johnson addressed F.M. Bouteflika - 2 - 20 July 1967 to President Boumediene. The substance of the letter and even the language were identical with those of the letter addressed to the Secretary-General "by the King of Morocco. For the past few weeks almost all the Algerian armed forces were dispatched to the U.A.R. and at present there is not one single military plane in Algeria. Prom this it is clear that Algeria has no ulterior motives for aggression against any country. (When I asked him when any written reply is expected, he said that he would bring up this matter with his President when he goes back to Algeria.) 5. I brought up the question of the two British pilots raised by Lord Caradon yesterday. He said that the Swiss Ambassador in Algiers is deputizing for the British Government and he has seen the two British pilots who are treated very well, and the Swiss Ambassador has already reported this to London. Lord Caradon had also seen Ambassador Bouattoura, but these two pilots have to be kept in Algeria for some time while the case of Tshombe is pending. They are very important material witnesses in the case and before judgment is arrived at, the Algerian Government considers that these two pilots have to be kept in Algiers. k. I brought up the question of the estranged relations between Ivory Coast and Guinea and explained to him my efforts to bring about an amicable settlement of the question of detainees by both Governments. He said that the clue to the settlement lies essentially with the French Government, since France has excellent relations with Ivory Coast. At present the President and Foreign Minister of Ivory Coast are in Paris and the French Government can influence their decision. I told him that I sent Mr. Rolz-Bennett to Paris, and he had long discussions both with the President and Foreign Minister of Ivory Coast, but their position was still very rigid. I told him that I am sending Mr. Rolz-Bennett and Mr. Djermakoye tonight to Paris for further consultations. They are taking a personal message from me to the President of Ivory Coast. I asked him if Algeria would be prepared or willing to contribute towards the settlement of this problem. He said that Algeria would not be in a good position to render any service in this matter. Meeting in the Secretary-General's office on 20 July 1967 at 12:40 p.m. Present; Secretary-General, Ambassador El-Kony, RJB The Secretary-General mentioned that General Bull was now in Cairo taking up the question of boats on the Suez Canal. The Secretary-General also referred to the question of the continuing difference with the Government of the UAR on the use of code messages by the Suez observer operation. Ambassador El-Kony said that he had been on the phone with Cairo that morning and had been told that the question of the use of code "will be OK when things quiet down". He said just now the atmosphere in Cairo was bad and there was very great suspicion of everything. U Thant stated that he sought the advice of Ambassador El-Kony as to whether a personal appeal to the President or to the Foreign Minister on the outstanding questions would be advisable. Ambassador El-Kony said definitely that it would not be advisable and helpful now to make such an appeal. U Thant referred to the problem of communications by UN Observers from one side of the sector to the other. Ambassador El-Kony said that he had no report on that matter. r ', ' * Meeting of the Secretary-General with the Representatives of Iraq, and Jordan, 20 July 1967, 3.30 p.m. Present: Representative of Iraq Representative of Jordan Secretary-General HJB The Representative of Iraq stated that he was speaking on behalf of the Arab group who wished him to approach the Secretary-General on the question of his reporting responsibilities with regard to the last resolution of the General Assembly on Jerusalem. This resolution asked the Secretary-General to report to both the General Assembly and the Security Council, not only on the implementation of the resolution but on the "situation" in Jerusalem as well. He wished to know what steps had been taken or would be taken by the Secretary-General with regard to implementation and what did the Secretary-General have in mind with regard to reporting about the situation in Jerusalem. The Arab group hoped that the Secretary-General in his next report would do more than merely include the reply of Israel to his note, but that he would use his authority and prerogative not only toward achieving an implementation by Israel of the resolution, but of providing some helpful information as regards the actual situation in Jerusalem. U Thant stated that both resolutions were identical in their language. As regards implementation, the most he could do would be to seek an early reply from Israel. As to reporting on the situation in Jerusalem, he could try to obtain the cooperation of Israel in accepting a personal representative of the Secretary-General to visit Jerusalem, observe the situation there and after two or three weeks report to the Secretary- General on it. He did not know what the reaction of Israel might be to this "but thought it possible that they would reject the idea. It would be necessary for such a representative to have full freedom of movement and observation in Jerusalem so that he could do more than merely pass on to the Secretary-General whatever information Israel authorities would give to him. He would not want to present a report on the situation which would reflect only the Israel point of view. The Secretary-General said that he had already asked the Government of Israel to reply on the second G.A. resolution on Jerusalem. The Secretary-General also said that he intends to include in his next report on this question that it has not been possible for him to get information on the situation in Jerusalem since he has no one there for that purpose. If the Israelis agreed, of course, he could send someone. But since the Secretary-General has no means now to ascertain the situation and since he could send someone out only with the concurrence of Israel, the Secretary-General would think it better and provide a stronger basis if the Security Council could take action authorizing the Secretary-General to send someone to Jerusalem for the purpose of providing the necessary information. Ambassador El-Farra stated that the next report of the Secretary- General might include statements made by responsible Israel officials in the Knesset where they had said very much about changing the status of Jerusalem. It was explained that we do not receive the official records of the Knesset and therefore would have to rely upon press accounts to follow Mr. El-Farra* s suggestion. -3- Airibassador El-Farra raised the question of the return of the civilians from Jordan to the West Bank of the Jordan River. He stated that the Israelis were imposing all kinds of conditions and restrictions on the return of such people. Their definition of "hardship" cases, for example, was such a limitation. Thus 160 went back out of 300 who had gone out in one place. The Ambassador wished to know whether there was anything the Secretary-General could do since there are now over 150,000 such displaced persons in Jordan. stated The Secretary-General/that this would be called to the attention of Mr. Gussing. It was agreed at the end that the Secretary-General would take up with Israel the proposal to send a personal representative to Jerusalem to gain information with the understanding that this individual would have full freedom of movement and observation and that the Secretary- General would hope to submit a report wi thin two to three weeks. Meeting in the Secretary-General's office on 21 July 1967 at 11:00 a.m. Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Rafael Ambassador Rosenne RJB U Thant referred to his responsibility for reporting to the Security Council on both the "implementation" of the second General Assembly resolution on Jerusalem and on the "situation in Jerusalem" under that resolution. With regard to "implementation", the Secretary- General pointed out that he relies entirely on the reply which he will receive from the Government of Israel which will "be incorporated in his report. With regard to reporting on the "situation in Jerusalem", the Secretary-General said that he would wish the advice of the Repre- sentative of Israel. As to the possibility of the Secretary-General sending a representative of his for the specific purpose of observing and reporting to the Secretary-General on the situation in Jerusalem he would have to be free to move about and observe without limitation. The Representative of Israel stated that the resolution does not specify any such report, adding that Israel could inform the Secretary- General on the situation as well as on the question of implementation. He said that in the reply which his Government would make to the Secretary-General's letter about implementation of the resolution reference would be made to the situation in Jerusalem as had been done in their reply about the first resolution. The Ambassador said that at this time he could only refer the Secretary-General*s proposal to his Government. U Thant repeated the proposal: Would the Government of Israel agree to an arrangement under which the Secretary-General would send to Jerusalem a representative appointed by him on an ad hoc basis with the -2- assignment of observing the situation in Jerusalem and reporting on it to the Secretary-General. This would be a short mission of a few weeks only and possibly only two weeks with the sole function of reporting to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General stated that if the principle of such a step is agreeable to the Government of Israel he would consult with the Representative of Israel on possible nominees for the position. The Secretary-General stressed that such a representative must be able to observe freely. It would be a one-time mission for a one-time purpose. Meeting of the Secretary-General with Amb. Rosenne of Israel on 25 July 1967 at 12 noon Present: Amb. Rosenne Se cretary-General RJB Mr. Rosenne said that he had word from his Government about the Secretary-General*s proposal of a personal representative to Jerusalem to collect information on the situation in Jerusalem. Mr. Rosenne said that Foreign Minister Eban had enquired whether it would not be possible for Mr. Gussing to also undertake this assignment. The Secretary-General said that it would not and explained that first of all Mr. Gussing was fully occupied with the task he had undertaken under the Security Council humanitarian resolution and that secondly he had been seconded by the U.N. Hj.;gh Commissioner for Refugees to work on the refugee problem only. Mr. Rosenne said he would inform his Government to this effect. He then raised the question of Government House saying that Mr. Eban was disturbed because of the discussion Mr. Rosenne had had yesterday with Mr. Sloan on this question because in this discussion questions of principle had been raised which promised much difficulty. Mr. Rosenne said there were two points to be resolved, one was the area to be returned and this was of prime importance in Israel's view. The question of the two antennas, he assured, would present no difficulties. Both antennas could be fenced, full access to them could be assured and also protection of the cables leading from them. The second point was the question of the protocol and the wording of this was of less importance -2- to Israel than the question of the area. In response to a question from Mr. Bunche, Mr. Rosenne said that he thought there could be agreement on a protocol such as that originally suggested by Ambassador Rafael, namely, a sentence or two stating that the basis for return of the premises would be the letters exchanged on 4 July. Thus, the draft protocol that they had previously presented along with the document of the Land Registry would be withdrawn, but Mr. Eosenne stressed that the question of the area uould present a very great problem for his Government which, as the Secretary-General knew, is already divided on the question of the return. U Thant stated that he understood this but that he did not wish to put himself in a position of being criticized by some Members of the IM for having surrendered part of the area of the Government House compound and he wished Mr. Rosenne to convey this to Mr. Eban. His problem would be how he could possibly explain in the report that he must make to the Security Council on Government House his acceptance of a reduced area. Mr. Rosenne stated that the answer to such questions is that the operation has new functions and that these could be adequately served by the area returned. Mr. Bunche pointed out that, obviously, the Secretary-General could not take any such position in the Security Council which would in effect be accepting an Israel position which is not at all accepted by some other Members of the Organization. Thus, if any such question were to be raised the Secretary-General would have to reply to it and -3- at least reserve his position about it. Mr. Rosenne repeated that the area to "be returned is a big issue with his Government. U Thant replied that he would wish that Mr. Rosenne would convey to his Government that this is a difficult question also from his point of view. '^ -i SECRET 27 July 1967 THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST Ambassador El Kony saw me today and "brought up the following two points: 1. Security Council meeting; 2. The question of observers on the Suez Canal sector. Regarding the Security Council, he said that the Arab Foreign Ministers are scheduled to meet in Khartum on 1 August and the meeting might take about three days. He thinks that among other recommendations there will be one on the Arab summit meeting. It is likely that the Arab summit meeting may take place on or about 6 August. In his view, the Security Council should not meet before that date, since there may be some important decisions arrived at at the Arab summit meeting to be taken up at the Security Council meetings. In his view, the Security Council should not meet earlier than 10 or 11 August. He wanted to know my own views. I told him that I agree with his assessment and that I think there is an additional factor. If there is going to be a Security Council meeting, it should be clear what the Council can usefully decide. I suggested to him that even while the Foreign Ministers' meeting is taking place, there should be some attempt at drafting a suitable substantive resolution for private discussions and consultations before the actual meetings of the Security Council. Ambassador El Kony told me that his own information is that the United States and the Soviet Union have some understanding regarding the nature of the resolution to be discussed at the Security Council meeting. He could not substantiate these rumours, but according to a reliable source, some understanding between the two super Powers was reached between Ambassador Goldberg and Ambassador Dobrynin. He further said that the Arabs would not accept any formulation which is against their interests, such as, linking the question of withdrawal with the termination of the state of belligerence and opening the international waters to innocent passage. Ambassador El Kony - 2 - 27 July 1967 On the question of United Nations observers, he said that he had received my letter sent on last Saturday and that he had transmitted this to Cairo. He requested me to be patient, since in due course his Government would be agreeable to my proposals. But just right*it will be very difficult for Cairo to permit the transmission o^f^ code messages between Ismailia, Cairo and Jerusalem, since the intelligence operations of the United States, United Kingdom and Israel are very active everywhere. I explained to him that it will be very difficult for me to justify my acceptance of this new procedure in regard to the transmission of messages, since the established practice with all United Nations observation missions in Kashmir or UNEF or UNTSO or even the present arrangement between b* Syria and Israel ara contact to A only in code. If an exception is to be made, I must have some justification to convince the Security Council and I wanted him to do his best to explain this aspect to his Government. I also told him that even in the case of the International Control Commission which is still operating in Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, code messages are permitted by all Governments concerned. For instance, the Canadian representative on the ICC can send code messages even from Hanoi to Saigon and the Polish representative on the ICC can send code messages from Saigon to Hanoi. This practice has been universally recognized by every Government and I will find it very difficult to agree to Cairo's proposal to use only open messages. He promised to transmit this information to his Government. Notes on meeting in the Secretary-General* s Office on 28 July 1967, at 12.25 P.m. Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Rafael Ambassador Rosenne Mr. Bunche Ambassador Rafael raised the question of the Secretary- General' s proposal for a Personal Representative to Jerusalem. He said that the answer is "positive" but he advised that this question should not be played up and should be handled informally and orally. He referred to the speech of his Foreign Minister on 14 July. If the Secretary-General wishes to obtain information on Jerusalem facilities can be made available to his Representative and he can have discussions with the Government. U Thant pointed out that this could not be done secretly, it was bound to leak out and could not be kept from public knowledge. Ambassador Rafael stated that it would be difficult for Israel because of Israel1 s attitude toward the General Assembly resolution on Jerusalem, pointing out that Israel did not participate in it. The Secretary-General observed that he had to make a report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation in Jerusalem and would need to have independent sources of information for this report. The person gathering this information would have to be free to inform himself of conditions in Jerusalem, to talk to religious leaders, public officials, Arabs and Jews, etc. Mr. Rafael agreed to this and asked if the Secretary-General had any particular name in mind. -2- U Thant stated that he had been thinking of the possibility of a Swede and had in mind two possible names. He had been thinking first of Agda Rossel for this mission. Ambassador Rafael stated he had nothing against Swedes but would not be favourably inclined toward Agda Rossel because he recalled she took some positions which were not at all liked by Israel. On enquiry by Mr. Bunche, the Ambassador said these were positions having nothing to do with the Middle East question but rather with Africa. This was when she was the Representative of Sweden at the United Nations. Ambassador Rafael then turned to the question of Government House. He said that his Government wished to settle this issue. The Legal people, he observed, make difficulties. He thought it could be worked out by means of a short protocol note to which a map would be attached. He referred to the fact that there had been a demonstration in Jerusalem against return of Government House to the UN and he said his Government itself was divided on the issue. He took from his breast pocket a note which he described as a "personal draft" from which he read but which he did not hand over and this referred to the letters exchanged on 14 July and had some wording something like "in which the area was defined," and a reference to the talks on this subject with Mr. Bunche. He explained that he was bound by a Government decree that Government House can be handed over only by a protocol. The Secretary-General indicated that he would like to see the proposal in writing. -3- The Representative of Israel then raised the question of compliance •with the Security Council cease-fire and that there had been either no replies or circulation of replies from some of the countries concerned. This was being raised and desired not for propaganda purposes but because of cthe forthcoming meeting of the Arab Governments. He suggested that the Secretary-General present a note to the Security Council on compliance with the Security Council cease-fire resolution relating to the corres- pondence referring specifically to Kuwait which said that it would not comply and pointing out that from the others there had been no replies. The Secretary-General made no commitment about this. SECRET 4 August 1967 Note on Middle-Eastern Situation I sent for Ambassador Pedersen of the United States Mission today and explained to him the situation regarding the Government House in Jerusalem. I told him that the Israeli Government has agreed to return the Government House to General Bull but a very reduced area. Ralph Bunche considers that the area of the land proposed to be returned to the United Nations would be approximately one third the size of the original area and I told him that I had asked the Israeli representative to clarify two points: a) the actual size of the land proposed to be returned to General Bull; and b) the purpose of the Israel Government in retaining the rest of the plot. I told him that I am still awaiting the reply of the Israel Government. I explained to Pedersen that it will be very difficult for me to accept the Israeli proposal since I will not be able to justify it in my report to the Security Council. According to my information Israel Government has already fenced in the area and I feel that it is the intention of the Israel Government to insist on returning the reduced area. Although General Bull considers that he and his staff can function .in the Government House without necessarily getting back the original plot of land, I told him that on principle I cannot accept it. I made it clear to him that I am informing him just for the sake of information and not for any action since the Israeli representative had promised to transmit my request to hi Government for clarification. Pedersen told me that he had discussed that question with Ambassador Raphael of Israel and according to him I did not raise these points when he last met me and that it was Ralph Bunche who raised these points on the telephone just before he left for Jerusalem. I told him that during my meeting with Amb. Raphael I had told him that it will be very difficult for me to justify my acceptance of the Israeli proposal in the Security Council. After Raphael left the office I discussed the matter with Ralph Bunche and I asked him to seek the clarification of the above two points from Ambassador Raphael. I asked him about the propsects of a Security Council meeting or a General Assembly meeting. He said he did not know although there seems to be a difference of opinion between the Arabs about the meeting. He said that Pachachi is in favour of a General Assembly meeting while El Khony is in favour of a Security Council meeting. Personally he does not think that the Security Council can meet before the proposed Arab summit meeting which, according to his information, will definitely take place. He then asked me about the reported agreement on the Suez Canal. I told him that the New York Times story this morning is essentially correct and that I am expecting a full report from General Bull either today or tomorrow and then it is my intention to transmit this to the Security Council for infomtion. Pedersen told me that Ambassador Goldberqis coming to New York on Monday and going to Washington on Tuesday to see the President. He said that*I am free to receive Ambassador Goldberg he will be very glad to call on me on Monday. I told him that I will be glad to see him at his convenience either in the morning or in the afternoon. (The appointment is now set for 11:30 a.m. on Monday.) SECRET 4 August 196? Note on Middle-Eastern Situation I sent for Ambassador El Khony of UAR today and explained to him Mr. Gussing's dilemma regarding the question of Jews residing in UAR. According to Gussing's information several hundred Jews residing in UAR were detained by the Government of UAR and Gussing wanted to know whether he should take up this question during his next visit to Cairo since the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 14 June 196? recommends to the governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949. I told Amb. El Khony that I had advised Mr. Gussing to await my instruction after an informal and private discussion with him (El Khony). I asked Amb. El Khony what his views would be. Ambassador El Khony considered that the status of Jews in the UAR does not come under the provisions of the Security Council resolution since it was meant only for Arab refugees in Israel occupied territories. I explained to him that it was my considered opinion that the question of Jews in UAR comes under the Security Council resolution since it recommends all governments to take some action in regard to the civilian population. After some discussion he agreed that I might be right but he advised very strongly against the bringing up of this question by Mr. Gussing in Cairo since it would upset his Government and for the fact that the temporary detention of Jews in UAR was motivated purely by security reasons and not for political reasons. He also observed that the Security Council members were not conscious of such implications when they adopted that resolution, though perhaps, in his view, two of the sponsors, Argentina and Brazil, might have some motives in drafting that particular paragraph. I then asked him about the chances of a Security Council or a General Assembly meeting. He did not think that an early meeting either of the Security Council or of the General Assembly was possible but he personally feels that the Security Council will be more appropriate to take up the question of the Middle East since the General Assembly had decided to transfer that matter to the Security Council. He said that the Arab Foreigh Ministers meeting is likely to finish either on Saturday - 2 - night or Sunday morning and he believes that the Arab summit meeting will take place later in the month. He does not think that the Security Council meeting should be contingent on the Arab summit meeting. SECRET Notes on the Middle East Situation 7 August 196? The Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vratusa, saw me today and brought up the following points. President Tito will visit Cairo on Wednesday with certain concrete proposals to be made to President Nasser. Among the most important points in the proposals will be the following: a) the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories; b) the undertaking to be given by UAR and other arab states not to threaten the State of Israel and to give guarantees against any act of war (without using the word belligerence); c) during the process of withdrawal the Gulf of Aqaba will permit innocent passage; d) during the process of withdrawal the Suez Canal will be opened to all innocent passage except in regard to ships flying the Israel flag; e) once the withdrawal is completed the Suez Canal will permit the passage of all ships including those flying the Israel flag; f) firm agreements by Israel and her supporters to solve the problem of arab refugees; . . "r~ g) the question of United Nations presence along the frontiers &ie*g Israel and arab states. He also said that President Tito might visit Baghdad and Damascus after his visit to Cairo. Then a general discussion followed on the proposals to be made by Marshall Tito. Ambassador Goldberg saw me today and brought up the following points. Since he had to leave New York as soon as the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly was adjourned, he wished to bring me up to date on the question of the Middle East. On 19 July 1967 Ambassador Dobrynin called on him and discussed the draft resolution in the presence of three representatives of Latin America. On 20 July 1967 Amb. Goldberg called and Mr. Gromyko. Dobrynin also was present. They discussed the draft resolution again and both Dobrynin and Gromyko expressed their satisfaction with the draft with some minor alterations. From these discussions two draft resolutions emerged (version one and version two attached). He got the impression that Mr. Gromyko preferred version one and told hion that although he would go along with it-?he had to get the views of the arab delegations. Goldberg understood that Gromyko had a long meeting with the Algerian Foreign Minister, Bouteflika, on the same night and that Bouteflika had rejected it. The arab rejection of the draft resolutions was confirmed at a meeting of the Arab Group on 21 July 1967 just before the start of the last meeting of the General Assembly on the same day. Although the arabs rejected it Goldberg feels that the draft will still be a very useful basis for further talks. He asked me if the question of the Secretary-General's representative for the area could be mentioned in the draft. I told him that it was my original idea and that if all parties agreed it would be a useful step. Then Goldberg suggested that the draft should very well state only the principles and leave the implementation of those principles to the Secretary-General's representative who will be in contact with all governments concerned. Amb. Goldberg also confided to me that the head of the African Division in the State Department is shortly proceeding to Cairo to contact the authorities there in order to conduct very private negotiations. The fact that Cairo had accepted to receive him is a good sign. On his return to Washington he will report to the United States Government and the United States will formulate its policy on the basis of his report. Amb. Goldberg then told me that President Tito is going to Cairo on Wednesday and according to his information Tito has nothing/coXcrete to propose to Nasser although Washington is confident that Tito will exert some calming effect on Nasser since the Emperor of Ethiopia and Marshall Tito had very useful talks in Yugoslavia afew days ago. The Emperor of Ethiopia also asked Tito to try toiee his good offices to contribute towards a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem. I told him that according to my information Marshall Tito's visit to Nasser could produce some positive results since he is reportedfe*i—p-mins nt o raise some important proposals. Arab. Goldberg then asked about the status of my negotiations with Israel on the Government House in Jerusalem. I explained to him the present status of negotiations and he said that he appreciated my position. 8 August 1967 Ambassador Morozov saw me today and asked me about the prospects of a Security Council meeting. We exchanged views and agreed that there are no prospects s- of a Security Council meeting during this month. Morozov also told me that according to his information the United States is trying to contact and negotiate with the arab states individually. He heard that the United States is now engaged in serious negotiations separately with the UAR and Jordan. He ask me if I had heard anything about these developments. I told him that I had no information. He then explained to me the status of negotiations between Goldberg on the one hand and Gromyko and Dobrynin on the other on 19, 20 and 21 July 196? and told me that itwwas not true that the Soviet Union had agreed to the two draft resolutions drafted by Goldberg. The Soviet position was and still is that before it gave approval to any draft resolution one condition is that the arabs must agree W? it. Since the arabs did not agree to it the Soviet Union cannot go along \ with the United States draft resolution. In reply to my question Morozov said that in his personal opinion the two draft resolutions were sensible and should be pursued. I asked him if his government is still in contact with the arab governments regarding the draft resolutions for the purpose of consideration in the Security Council. He said that he did not have any official information but he believed that his government was in contact with the capitals. 8 August 1967 Ambassador Tarabanov of Bulgaria saw me today and explained to me the status of the negotiations between the United States and the USSR before the adjournment of the General Assembly session. He confirmed Morozov's statement that the Soviet Union's agreement on the United States draft resolution was conditionston the ...A - 4 - agreement. Since the ||rab agreement was withdrawn the Soviet Union was not pursuing the matter. In his personal opinion both draft resolutions were very sensible and Eastern European countries had unanimously endorsed it until it was rejected by the arabs on 21 July 196?. He still consideres that it will be useful to discuss the two draft resolutions privately among the members of the Security Council. In reply to my question he said that he prefers version one. He also repeated what Morozov told me earlier that the United States was conducting bilateral talks with the UAR and Jordan. He said that once the withdrawal is completed the Suez Canal should be opened to all traffic including that of Israel ships. He also considered that United Nations presence would be necessary for the Gulf of Aqaba as well as the Israel/Syria frontier and perhaps Gaza. Then we discussed the prospects of a Security Council meeting and agreed that there would be no meeting this month. Then he brought up the question of a possible trip by me to Bulgaria in September. 12 August 1967 Meeting with Ambassador Rafael, 10 August 1967 at 10:50 am in the Secretary-Generalrs Office Present: Secretary-General, Ambassador Rafael, Mr. Rosenne, and RIB U-Thant stated that with regard to the representative he would be sending to Jerusalem, in connection with the General Assembly resolution on Jerusalem, he understood that Ambassador Agda Rossel would not be acceptable. Ambassador Rafael affirmed this and added that Foreign Minister Eban of Israel had pointed out also that a woman could not be fully effective in the Jerusalem area in dealing with the religious leader- ship who were not accustomed to accepting women on a basis of equality. U-Thant said that he now had it in mind to appoint Ambassador Ernest Thalmann of Switzerland to this post, pointing out that Ambassador Thalmann is a former Swiss Observer to the United Nations. U-Thant stated that he had made inquiries and had ascertained that the Swiss Government would agree to Ambassador Thalmann taking the assign- ment which would consist of about two weeks in Jerusalem after which he would return to New York to prepare his report for submission to the Secretary-General. Ambassador Rafael stated that he would submit Mr. ThalmannTs name to his Government adding that he did not anticipate any hitch and that he himself could see no objection. He pointed out, however, that there had been a little problem on the question of the Secretary-General sending a representative to Jerusalem in connexion with the General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem. There were elements in his Government, he said, who have "misgivings" about the United Nation's actions on Jerusalem and were therefore concerned about anyone coming out there in connexion with them. "When the matter of a representative for Jerusalem was raised in the government, there were criticisms about - 2 - it but Foreign Minister Eban was able to meet them. Mr. Rafael mentioned that there had been a stride of Arab shopkeepers in Jerusalem just two days ago when Mir. Gussing arrived, owing to the fact that the Arabs mistakenly thought that Mr. Gussing was the Jerusalem Representative and was staging a demonstration for his benefit. There is fear in his Government said Ambassador Rafael, that the arrival of the Secretary- General's Representative d»n Jerusalem might stir up more trouble. Ambassador Rafael stated that he was saying this for the Secretary- General 's information but that there was no question of Israel's withdrawing of its acceptance of the Secretary-General'sproposal to send a representative to Jerusalem for the purpose of securing information for the Secretary-General's report. The Secretary-General expressed the hope that the reply of the Government of Israel on the designation of Ambassador Thalmann would be received by the next day, i.e. Friday 11 August. He said that it was his intention to write to Mr. Thalmann on Saturday at the latest, proposing that he proceed to Jerusalem next Tuesday. In this letter he would advise that he should plan to stay in Jerusalem not more than two weeks at the maximum and return here to prepare and submit his report to the Secretary-General. This letter would also incorporate the general terms of reference for Mr. Thalmann1s mission. Ambassador Rafael expressed the hope that in announcing Mr. Thalmann's mission, stress would be put on the "technical nature" of the mission, i,e, that its.'purpose is to facilitate the Secretary-General's reporting to the Council on the situation in Jerusalem and making it clear that the mission has nothing to do with the implementation of the General Assembly resolution and does not involve any negotiations. U-Thant stated that the terms of reference and the announcement would make this clear and that the whole operation should not exceed one month. He said that he was proposing to make the appointment for one month only. He asked the Government of Israel, of course to afford his Representative all facilities necessary for his work. Ambassador Rafael stated that his Government would certainly do so in accepting the person as the Secretary-General's representative. i U-Thant said that he supposed that General Bull could provide the Jerusalem Representative with the necessary secretarial assistance and transportation* Ambassador Rafael said that his Government would b e glad to give such help if it were to be needed. U-Thant said that he wished merely to mention two other points. He said that he was proposing to issue a report to the Security Council later in the day stating that he was proposing to authorize General Bull to return to Government House. Ambassador Rafael expressed appreciation of this. U-Thant stated that the other point was that there would be coming out this morning a. report on the situation in the Suez sector covering:, the stationing of observers and General Bull's negotiations with regard to military activity in the Canal, Notes on Meeting in the Secretary-General* s Office on 14 August 1967 at 11.40 a.m. Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Rafael (Israel) Ambassador Rosenne (Israel) Mr. Bunche Ambassador Rafael raised the question of Government House and expressed surprise at the Secretary-General's interim report on that question. He stated that he had expected to receive from the Secretary- General a letter along the lines of what he had suggested at their earlier meeting. He again read the statement in question, but did not hand any paper over to the Secretary-General. U Thant said that this did not correspond to his understanding. He definitely had not "accepted" any proposal or suggestion and, in fact, had not had a copy of what Ambassador Rafael had in mind. Moreover, he wished to make it clear that he had not accepted a reduced area as the basis for the return. He pointed out that he had asked for a justification by the Government of Israel for not returning all of the area involved in the Government House compound. Ambassador Rafael explained that Israel could not accept the UN claim and therefore sought to keep the question of claims, titles, etc., out of the discussion. He said that the objective was to take a "first tentative step". He referred to the opposition in his Government against returning Government House to the UN and mentioned that it would only strengthen the opposition to the return if the UN were too demanding. He repeated that he had expected to receive -2- a letter from the Secretary-General. He said that he is now afraid that on the basis of this report he might get a "niet" from his Government on the whole matter. He went on to say, however, that he was sure the Government would honour its previous commitment. U Thant stated that the legal position is important because he felt that the Secretary-General is not competent to accept a reduced area of Government House on his own . That is why he used the expression "tentative" in his report to the Council. His intention: is that if the Security Council or some Members of it do not challenge him on what he indicated in the report he would intend to do, then he could go ahead on the basis indicated in the report. U Thant said that in a recent discussion with Ambassador Goldberg on the Government House issue he had found that the US Representative was in full agreement with the Secretary-General1 s approach and intentions on the matter. Ambassador Rafael stated that Israel's desire is to give General Bull all of the facilities he needs. He suggested that Israel authorities could now send a letter to General Bull. U Thant pointed out that this would not be very helpful since General Bull would immediately send the letter to UN Headquarters for guidance on what to do. There was then a discussion about a proposed draft of a letter which Ambassador Rafael found OK except for the use of the words "released" and "rights". U Thant suggested this be considered a tentative draft and Ambassador Rafael agreed. Ambassador Rafael informed the Secretary-General that his Government was agreeable to the designation of Ambassador Thalmann as his Personal Representative in Jerusalem, for the purpose of gathering information -3- for the Secretary-General' s report. He stated that his Government has some fear about the mission and the tensions it would aggravate if the Jerusalem Representative were to come to Jerusalem at this time. He said that there had been a strike when the Jerusalem Arabs mistook the arrival of Mr. Gussing for the arrival of the Jerusalem Representative and it was feared that this would be repeated when Ambassador Thalmann did arrive. He said the situation was complicated by the present return of Arabs to the West Bank of the Jordan and the tensions in connexion with this were not helpful. Therefore Foreign Minister Eban hoped that Ambassador Thalmann would defer his imminent departure and come to Jerusalem at a later date. Ambassador Rafael said that he realized, of course, that the Secretary-General had a deadline to meet on his report. He understood this to be September 15. He said that if the Secretary-General understands Israel1 s predicament could agreement be arrived at for a date for the arrival of Ambassador Thalmann. U Thant enquired when did he have in mind. Ambassador Rafael replied the end of August. He said it would be possible to announce Ambassador Thalmann1s appointment now and to say that he would be arriving in Jerusalem later. U Thant indicated that the end of August would be too late for his schedule, whereupon Ambassador Rafael said that it could be announced that Ambassador Thalmann would be arriving in Jerusalem on 21 or 22 August. U Thant agreed, stating that Ambassador Thalmann would leave for Jerusalem on the 21st of August. Ambassador Rafael referred to the Gussing mission. He said that -k- Mr. Gussing was a very objective man and a "fine gentleman". Israel authorities, he said, had raised with him the question of the treatment of Jews in the Arab countries, but Mr. Gussing was not sure that this would be within his terms of reference. U Thant interposed to say that he had taken this question up with the Permanent Representative of the UAE. He had been told that there were 2, UOO Jews still in the UAR today, whereas there had been 70,000 twenty years ago. He said that only a few of the Jewish men had been taken into custody and these solely for reason of their own security. Ambassador El-Kony had said also that if Mr. Gussing were to take up the question of the treatment of Jews in the Arab countries he should also be entitled to bring up the question of the treatment of Arabs in Israel. Ambassador Rafael said 'why not?'. This would create no difficulty for his Government. If Mr. Gussing wishes to obtain information on Arabs in Israel, the Government will cooperate with him. Ambassador Rafael asked if Mr. Gussing could be informed accordingly. U Thant said that he would wish to think about the matter. Ambassador Rafael stated that the question is most serious and acute in Iraq, Syria and the UAR. Wotes on Meeting in Secretary-General's office on l6 August at 3.00 p.m. Present: Secretary-General Amb. Fakhreddine (Sudan) Amb. El-Farra (Jorda.n) Ralph J. Bunche Amb. Fakhreddine said that he and Amb. El-Farra had two matters to take up with the Secretary-General. First, they had been requested by the Arab Group to convey to the Secretary-General the support of that Group for the Secretary-General*s efforts on "behalf of the Foreign Minister of Guinea and Arab. Marof. The Arab Group felt that the confinement of these two officials was a violation of the recognized law governing relations between states. U Thant stated that President Sekou Tour£ had asked him to inscribe this item on the agenda of the Security Council but only the Security Council itself can inscribe items on its agenda. U Thant said that he considered this to be a very important question for the United Nations. He observed that the President of the Ivory Coast would be coming to the UN in a few days en route from Montreal and the Secretary-General would be discussing this problem with him. Amb. El-Farra said that he wished to raise the question of the personal representative of the Secretary-General in Jerusalem, for this was a question of particular importance to Jordan. He said that his Government would appreciate having more information on the following points: The extent to which the personal representative will have freedom of movement and freedom of contact. Amb. El-Farra recalled that the representative of Dag Hammarskjold who had been sent to Khan Yunis at one period was always accompanied by an Israeli soldier and therefore could not act freely. Mr. El-Farra expressed the view that the personal representative of the Secretary-General should be able to contact the Arab leaders such as the Governor of -2- Jerusalem, who is now in Safad, the religious leaders who are still in Jerusalem, lawyers, etc. He asked if the personal representative would be in touch with people from Jerusalem who are now in Jordan. The Secretary-General said that the resolution is concerned with Jerusalem and the personal representative of the Secretary-General is to visit Jerusalem only. There would "be unnecessary problems if he were to go out of Jerusalem to see people but he may ask to see anyone and could arrange to have those not present brought to Jerusalem. He will, of course, be entitled to talk with people without having an Israeli official present. Amb. El-Farra asked about the implementation of the resolution and action on it. U Thant said that the implementation aspect of his report will depend on the reply which he is to receive from Israel. It is, he said, for the Government of Israel to respond to his approach. The Secretary-General said Amb. Thalmann may ask to see the Arab Mayor of Jerusalem and other Arab officials of the Old City who are still there, although no longer functioning in their official capacities. r I' Notes on meeting held in the Secretary-General*s Office on 2k August 1967, at 4.30 p.m. Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Bafael Ambassador Rosenne Mr. Bunche Ambassador Rafael referred to a situation of grave concern to Israel, namely the plight of Jews in the Arab countries. He said that Israel had hoped that the Red Cross and the Swiss Government would be able to do something concrete about this but this had not been the case. They are now, he said, in a new state of gravity and physical threat and so he was appealing to the Secretary-General to use his good offices with the Arab Governments on this matter. He said that the Arab treatment of the Jews in their countries was considered by Israel to be only an expression of their vindictiveness. He mentioned specifically Iraq, Syria and the UAR. In Egypt, he said, all male Jews were arrested at the outbreak of hostilities in June. U Thant stated that he had taken this matter up with the UAR Ambassador, Mr. El-Kony, who had said that only a few Jews had been confined and this was for their own safety. He also may have said that these Jews were free to leave Egypt, though it is not certain that this referred to all categories. Ambassador Rafael referred to information they had received from non-Jewish sources to the effect that as of 5 June all of the male Jews in Egypt, that is approximately 500, were jailed and remained jailed. Their families, he said, live in a state of constant -2- terror from night visits by the police, confiscation of property, etc. The Swiss Government and the Red Cross, he said, tried to do something but found the Government of the UAR negative and even hostile on the matter. He observed that these men are being held as hostages. In Iraq, he said, many Jews were arrested, the Government saying that they are Iraqi citizens and therefore will accept no outside interference on the matter. In Syria, he said, most Jews were arrested at the beginning of the war but most have now been released, although they are not permitted to leave the country. U CPhant asked what the numbers of Jews involved in these countries were. Were there about 2,000 in the UAR? Ambassador Rafael replied that there were about 2,500 in the UAR. He said that the Jewish prisoners were kept incommunicado; he added that most Jews have now been able to leave Libya. He said also that there are about 2,500 Jews in Iraq and another 2,500 in Syria. U Thant asked if there was any possibility that Israel would accept these Jews if they were released by the UAR or by Iraq and Syria. He asked this particularly since Ambassador El-Kony had indicated that at least some were free to leave. Would Israel take them if the UAR, Syria and Iraq, would let them go? Ambassador Rafael said emphatically yes, Israel would take them. U Thant asked if he could communicate this answer to those three Governments and Ambassador Rafael agreed that he could. U Thant urged that no publicity be given at this time to this particular matter as this would not be helpful. Ambassador Rafael agreed with this. -3- U Thant stated that he had two other points to raise. The first had to do with the return of refugees to the West Bank of Jordan. There were only five or six days Left until 31 August. Mr. Michelmore, Mr. Gussing and the Representative of Jordan on behalf of his Government were all asking for the Secretary-General* s support in obtaining an extension of this deadline since over 100,000 displaced persons were still awaiting return. Ambassador Rafael said that Israel has been prepared to accept these returnees at the rate of 3>000 a day, but they have not been coming. There has been only a trickle. Israel's explanation for this, he said, is that the people signed up originally to establish their right to return and that also they had listed many more members of their families than they actually had, doing this in order to get additional rations. Thus the number listed is much greater than those actually seeking return. He added that during the remaining period they should be ready to speed up the rate of return. At this point U Thant handed to Ambassador Rafael an aide-me'moire asking for an extension of the deadline. U Thant said that the second point had to do with Ambassador Thalmannts mission to Jerusalem. He said that assurances had been given by the Government of Israel regarding Ambassador Thalmann* s freedom of movement and action in Jerusalem. He added that Mr. Bunche had informed Mr. Rosenne that we had taken it for granted that this assurance meant that Ambassador Thalmann would not have to conduct his interviews in the presence of an. Israeli official. However, said the Secretary-General, Ambassador Thalmann had reported to him by -k- cable that soon after his arrival he had "been handed a programme by an Israeli official which covered almost every waking moment of his two weeks' stay in Jerusalem and this programme had been formulated without benefit of any consultation with Ambassador Thalmann about who he might wish to see and when. Moreover, Ambassador Thalmann had been informed that it was the intention of Israel to have an Israeli Liaison Officer attached to him who would be with him in all of his meetings. Ambassador Thalmann had objected to this and the Secretary-General had supported him in this objection. Ambassador Rafael said that Mr. Gussing had accepted this without question and had found no difficulty and no unwillingness on the part of people to talk with him under these circumstances. The difficulty which Ambassador Thalmann had, said Ambassador Rafael, was due to his desire to see a number of Arabs who were considered by the Government of Israel to be close to the Jordanian Government. Ambassador Thalmann had also used the expression "the parties", when referring to the people he wished to see, although it developed he did not mean this but it did create an initial difficulty. Ambassador Rafael said they had supposed that Ambassador Thalmann had received these names from the Government of Jordan. U Thant replied that no doubt he had got the names from the Security Council documents since the Representative of Jordan had mentioned a number of Jerusalem Arabs in his communications to the Council. U Thant averred that his Personal Representative in Jerusalem should be free to meet people whenever he wishes without being in the presence of an Israeli official. Ambassador Rafael stated that his Government wished only that -5- Ambassador Thalmannts choice of contacts should not create disturbances. The Secretary-General handed to Ambassador Rafael an aide-memoire on the subject of Ambassador Thalmann's difficulty. Notes on meeting in the Secretary-General1s Office on 2g August 1967, at 3.gO p.m. Present: Secretary-General Ambassador El-Kony (UAE) Mr. Bunche The Secretary-General raised the question of the status and treatment of Jews in the UAR. He said that the Ambassador of Israel had visited him yesterday and had made a statement to the press later with regard to the request which he made to the Secretary- General on behalf of his Government for the Secretary-General to take appropriate action to alleviate this situation. The Secretary- General said that he had explained to the Representative of Israel his earlier talk with the Representative of the UAR on this subject. He had said that the Representative of the UAR had explained that the UAR had confined some Jews in the interest of their own security and that some were free to leave. The Secretary-General said that he had asked the Representative of Israel if his Government would be ready to accept Jews, should they be permitted by the UAR to leave the country and the Representative had promptly said yes. He had also said about 2,500 Jews were still in Egypt. The Representative of the UAR stated that those Jews who are not UAR citizens are free to leave at any time but those who are citizens are not free to leave since this would be harmful to the UAR in the sense that it would be used by the Israelis and their supporters as propaganda against the UAR. Ambassador El-Kony stated that he did not know the proportion of those who are citizens and those who are -2- not citizens, but thought that most of those now remaining would be citizens. He said there had been 40,000 Jews in the UAR ten years ago, but there are only 2,500 now, indicating how very many had been free to leave. He repeated that the foreign Jews are free to leave the UAR at any time but not those who are citizens. Jews in the UAR, he averred, are treated on the same basis as other citizens. He reiterated that most of the foreign Jews had already left Egypt. Those who are citizens, he emphasized, have nothing to worry about; only a few had been limited in their freedom for their own protection. At any other time, the Ambassador said, if Jewish citizens had wanted to leave the country the UAR would have let them go, but now there is the harmful propaganda aspect of the matter to be taken into account. U Thant referred to the projected Arab summit meeting and asked if it would actually take place. Ambassador El-Kony said yes. U Thant asked if the Ambassador of the UAR expected United Nations action after the summit meeting. Ambassador El-Kony said yes, but there is a question as to whether the action will be brought up in the emergency special session of the General Assembly or in the regular session, but, he said, it will be brought up and it will be the dominant issue. The Security Council, he said, cannot offer helpful means of action unless the Members could be sure of the action to be taken beforehand. He expressed the view that the main item for concentration in the General Assembly should be that of withdrawal. Notes on Meeting in Secretary-General*s Conference Room on 30 August 1967 at 11,50 a.m. Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Goldberg Ambassador Buffum ME. Bunche Ambassador Goldberg said his purpose was to have a "roundup" on developments on several questions during his absence. Mr. Bunche reported on the phone call he had just received from Ambassador Gideon Bafael of Israel regarding the Secretary-General1s request for an extension of the 31 August deadline for the return of displaced .persons to the West Bank. Mr. Rafael had said that his Government's answer would not be forthcoming until Sunday after a Cabinet meeting and that he could not say at this time whether the extension would cover only those already registered and approved or would be broader. He said that the indications are that the reply will be "favourable". Ambassador Goldberg advised the Secretary-General to have a look at the Congressional Record of 28 August which carries a number of speeches in the Senate on the question of taking up the Vietnam question in the UN. This was in support of the Mansfield position and Senator Mansfield has sought to get speeches from all Senators who at one time or another had been at the UN on US delegations to the General Assembly. He had succeeded in lining up all but one or two. The general attitude reflected in these speeches is that the UN should take hold of the Vietnam question, .even if this brings about a Soviet veto. Ambassador Goldberg said that he thought there had been some intimation that the Soviet bloc States may now not be so negative as before about a "Security Council go on Vietnam". -2- U Thant stated that he knew of no such intimation. He said that he had had a talk with Ambassador Fedorenko before the Ambassador left for Moscow and that when the question of Vietnam in the Security Council came up he shrugged and said "what can the Security Council do?". Ambassador Goldberg asked whether the Secretary-General had talked with the Polish Representative on this subject and U Thant replied that he had not. Ambassador Goldberg stated that Ambassador Tarabanov of Bulgaria had said to him that on the Middle East question "we are not as rigid as the record seems to show us to be". U Thant stated that the Ambassador had expressed to him his irritation about the Arab attitude. U Thant expressed the view that Ambassador Tarabanov is the most liberal of the Eastern bloc representatives while the Hungarian Ambassador is the most rigid. Ambassador Goldberg interposed that the Hungarian Ambassador is an old-line Stalinist. U Thant stated that the Yugoslav Ambassador had just been in to see him this morning. U Thant revealed that he had been in touch with Tito and had been kept informed on Tito's moves on the Middle East question. He had not as yet been given a copy of the current Tito plan but he understood it to consist of the following main points: 1) withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory; 2) the Security Council to underwrite guarantees of the security of Israel1s borders (by which is meant the Big Powers); 3) the Strait of Tiran to be open to all traffic; 4) the Suez Canal to be open to all traffic except Israeli flag ships and to be opened to these ships when withdrawal takes place. U Thant spoke of TitoTs recent visit to the Near East. He went to -3- Cairo first "but got no commitment there from President Hasser. Then he went to Damascus and received a negative response there. Thence to Baghdad and there President Arif told Tito that Nasser is the key man and that Hasser must take any initiative. Tito then returned to Cairo and U Thant said that it is his impression that President Nasser will bring up the Tito plan in a private meeting at the current Arab summit session. He added that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister will deliver Tito's plan to the US tonight (Wednesday, 50 August). He is coming to see the Secretary-General on Friday morning, when the Secretary-General will expect to have the exact text for the first time. U Thant understands that the main Yugoslav intention is to get the Security Council involved in the Middle East question. Ambassador Goldberg said that the Yugoslav Ambassador had also come to see him and had made an appointment with him for the Yugoslav Foreign Minister after his talks in Washington. U Thant said that he had been informed that President Tito was most pleasantly surprised with the cordial letter he had received from President Johnson. Ambassador Goldberg said that a lot of people had been surprised by the cordial, almost effusive, tone of LBJ* s letter. He added that \ Foreign Minister Eban had said that Titors effort was not welcome. Ambassador Goldberg advised that the Israelis are being "very rigid". They are, of course, in a strong position now. Mr. Goldberg added that the US had had no word from the Soviet Union either here or in Moscow about the Middle East situation. He said all of the important Soviet officials have been on vacation all through August and can be found only at the Black Sea. The US has had talks, however, with the British who are having their problems over the closure of the Suez Canal. He said that the Israelis this time are demanding real assurances. They do not think a Security Council resolution will be enough. Ambassador Goldberg added that he doubted that this time anyone could "impose a solution on the Israelis" as was done in 1956. Mr. Bunche asked if Ambassador Goldberg really felt that a solution was imposed on the Israelis in 1956. Ambassador Goldberg answered"perhaps not imposed, but the pressure from Eisenhower and elsewhere was very great and therefore it could be said that the Israelis bowed to this pressure." Mr. Goldberg thought that a solution today might be "manoeuvered" in the sense that the Israelis might be persuaded to accept something reasonable. He repeated that the 1956 solution was one which the Israelis concurred in under great pressure. U Thant said that the Tito plan does not specify how much withdrawal must take place before free passage will be possible. In the Tito plan he said there are three alternatives: a guarantee by the Security Council, by the Big Four or by the Big Three. Ambassador Goldberg spoke of the need for formal arrangements which can take various forms. For example, he said, the Dardanelles is open because of an international convention. He said that it can be easier at times to do something under an international convention than by means of a bilateral agreement. He indicated that a UH convention, such as that on Outer Space, could have advantages, in dealing with a question such as innocent passage. Ambassador Goldberg reiterated that there was no "give1* by the Israelis today. -5- Ambassador Buffom said that the Egyptians seem to be thinking in terms of instituting again a UNEF-type arrangement. U Thant said that Dr. Fawzi had mentioned this to him when he came here- for the special session of the Assembly, particularly with application to Aqaba. Ambassador Goldberg stated that he did not think the Israelis would look with favor upon the idea of a new UNEF-type operation in the Wear East. U Thant referred to the possibility of having a dinner meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four. Arthur Goldberg said that Dean Rusk will be coming to the General Assembly only on 26 September since he has to attend a Latin American Conference before then. Justice Goldberg said that President Johnson is very much interested in arms limitation in the Near East; he thinks the availability of arms really sparks the conflicts in that area - the UAR reliance on the USSR for arms, Israel's reliance on the US, etc. Ambassador Goldberg said that there were indications that despite De Gaulle's decree the French also were somehow still supplying arms to Israel. He said that the President was making a request to the Secretary-General to pursue privately this question of arms limitation. He thought that perhaps the attitude of the USSR on this subject may change. They already have replenished much of the arms which Egypt lost in the June war. Mr. Goldberg suggested £hat the Secretary-General could make some private explorations on this, beginning with the Big Four. -6- U Thant pointed out that both Israel and UAR now have reactors. Israel, he said, has two of them, one at the Weissmann Institute is open to international inspection by the IAEA.. But the other one which is near Beersheba is not open to inspection and has never been inspected according to information given to the Secretary-General by Sigvard Eklund. In both the Israeli and UAR reactors plutonium is being manufactured, thereby opening the way to the development of nuclear weapons. The Secretary- General expressed great concern about this. Ambassador Goldberg said that the US fully shares the Secretary- General* s concern over this situation. U Thant said "I am very scared about this development in the Hear East" and Ambassador Goldberg said "we are too". U Thant stated that he has been informed that some of the Arabs have been talking about approaches to Peking to obtain atomic weapons and this, of course, would be extremely dangerous. Ambassador Goldberg replied "we agree". The Secretary-General said that he would do his best to take some soundings on the question of arms limitation in the Wear East. Ambassador Goldberg said that the Secretary-General might start on this with the Big Powers who are the suppliers. Mr. Buffura enquired about the Secretary-General1s plans with regard to the African summit meeting in Kinshasa. U Thant said that he understood Sekou Toure definitely was not going and Houphouet-Boigny had indicated to him that he does not wish to go. The Secretary-General said that he had given an acceptance in principle -7- to President Mobutu, but that his present intention is not to attend. The Africans, he said, are so divided and he understood that not more than ten of the Heads of States-will attend. There are also questions of security and the factor that Africa generally is in a mess which are factors which must be weighed. From the standpoint of the Secretary- General the timing of the meeting is very bad. Both Mr. Gussing and Ambassador Thalmann will be coming here early in September to prepare and present their reports to the Secretary-General who, in turn, will have to submit reports to the General Assembly and the Security Council and his presence, therefore, will be needed here. Moreover, there is the question of winding up the special session of the General Assembly at about the same time. Consequently, the Secretary-General said that he is making bookings for the flight to the Congo but undoubtedly will have to cancel his acceptance. He expressed the hope that he could submit the report on Jerusalem by 11 September. He thought the emergency special session of the General Assembly might meet on or about 13 September and he was going to suggest this to Ambassador Pashwak. The emergency special session would only meet to take note of the reports submitted to it by the Secretary-General and then transfer the item to the agenda of the regular session of the General Assembly. Ambassador Goldberg expressed agreement with this proposed procedure and commented that "the shorter the emergency session the better". Ambassador Goldberg stated that he would wish the General Assembly could abandon the practice of taking up some items in plenary meetings as was done on the question of South West Africa. He thought this was not good and it was much better for the general debate to proceed -8- without interruption so that the Foreign Ministers could make their speeches and. let all items go to the appropriate committees in the first instances U Thant referred to Mr. Van Tien of the HLF who is their representative in Hanoi and who is very outspoken. U Thant suggested that the US could usefully establish contact with this man who is in the Polit Bureau. In this way the US could get a clearer view of the thinking of the National Liberation Front. The meeting adjourned at 12.^7 p.m. j * Notes of meeting in the Secretary-General's office on 1 September 1967 at 10.30 a.m. Present: Secretary-General Arab. Sl-Farra Ralph J. Bunche Ambassador T*!l-Farra referred to the need for a positive point of view on the Middle TCast situation and intimated that the Secretary- General might take it, particularly in the forthcoming introduction to the Secretary-General*s annual report. The Secretary-General replied that if there is no resolution by an organ what is the UN point of view? Amb. El Farra had just returned from California and said that students with whom he had held discussions out there had been much impressed by the reports of U Thant*s speech before the Quakers in Worth Carolina and his strong position on the Viet Nam war and against the use of force. He said there can be unanimity on the Charter provisions against the use of force. U Thant added against the use of force and the threat of the use of force. He said that the Secretary-General cannot cite one important principle and ignore others. In the North Carolina speech he cited the refugee problem as the most basic but did not discuss other Middle East questions such as withdrawal. Amb. El Farra said that the Security Council has rejected the use of force on the grounds of provocation because of a threat of use of force and that this was a well known position. He added that the Secretary-General is himself an independent organ of the United Nations and he can help the UN when other of its organs become ineffective by himself taking a position. The Secretary-General said he doubted this. He said the Secretary- -2- General can raise his voice whenever he wishes to but this will not change the positions or the results in the General *ssembly or in the Security Council on a problem such as the Middle 3ast. All that he could do "by raising his voice would "be to alienate some groups of members. He said that RJB had told him of the talk he had had with the Ambassador the day "before and of the Ambassador's opinion that the Secretary-General should play a "stronger role" in the Middle East. The Secretary-General said that he would wish to play such a role hut that as Secretary-General he is bound by the Charter and "by the resolutions of the organs and must think always of the possible good or bad effects of such aciions by him. He pointed out that as a result of statements already made by him on controversial issues there was increasing criticism of him. He said that there were some who had been urging him to invoke Article 99 of the Charter on the Middle East question and have been critical of him because he did not do so. But he was convinced that it would have been wrong to do so and that he would merely have won the hostility of the Soviet bloc states, the *rab states and accomplished nothing. Indeed, he observed, in the entire history of the UW, Article 99 had been invoked only once by the Secretary-General and that was by Dag Hammarskjold in July 1960. Mr. Hammarskjold took this step only after he was assured of full support in it by the African bloc of states, by the USSR and the United States and many others. He stated that he could be sure that had he invoked Article 99 on the issue of the blockade of the Strait of Tiran he would have ended his usefulness and the result would have been nil because the Security Council would have done nothing in any case. The Secretary-General agreed that there must be a liquidation of the results of military occupation. This, he said, is just and necessary. Such occupation is illegal and contrary to the Charter but it is not for the Secretary-General to act alone on such a matter. This is not the time for such bold action by the Secretary-General. He added that if he were to take such a position and initiative in the introduction to his report it would only alienate almost half of the Members of the Organization and with no positive results. Arab. El Farra observed that he was speaking as a friend and therefore -3- could speak frankly. He said that he loves his country and he loves the United Nations. He pointed out that with regard to Viet Warn the Secretary-General took a strong stand which has had a very great impact on world public opinion. This has very much helpdd the image and prestige of the.United Nations. A similar attitude by the Secretary- General on the question of occupation would produce similar results. U Thant said that if the Viet Nam issue were before the United Nations and being discussed in the Security Council or if the Security Council had adopted a resolution on it he would keep his "mouth shut" on that issue, but he had been free to speak out on Viet Nam precisely because this issue has not been considered and acted upon by the United Nations. He pointed out that this is why he keeps silent on issues such as Kashmir on which he has personal views. U Thant said that he had once explained this to Adlai Stevenson when he raised the question about the Secretary-General speaking out on Viet Nam. The Secretary-General added that he would, of course, say something on the Middle East question in the introduction to his report but this is not the time for him to take a controversial position on the question. To do so would only alienate the support of much of the membership without any positive and helpful contribution. The Secretary-General pointed out that in the terms of public opinion the Middle East crisis is more deep-rooted than that of Viet Nam. Amb. El Farra said that he had been informed by his Government that Mr. Michelmore was contemplating paying UNRWA employees in Jerusalem in Israeli currency. He said that his Government was not insisting that they be paid in Jordanian currency but would object to the use of Israeli currency. They could, he said, be paid in dollars or some other currency. He said that he was leaving tonight for Jordan for consultations with his Government and would return in ten days. Note for the record Meeting held between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and the Secretary-General on 22 September 196? Present: IM S.A. Kyprianou The Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Z. Rossides Mr. R.J. Bunche Mr. A. lakovides Mr. J. Rolz-Bennett 1. Mr. Kyprianou said that he first wished to refer to the matter of the Council of Europe in his capacity as President in pur- suance of the discussion he had had with the Secretary-General at Strasbourg, particularly with regard to co-operation and co-ordination between the two organizations. He said that Mr. Smithers of the Council would be arriving here about 1 October for the purpose of conversations on these matters. Mr. Kyprianou announced that he brought greetings to the Secretary-General from the King of Greece. He then alluded to the subject of the Greek-Turkish dialogue and the recent meeting of the Prime Ministers in Thrace. He said that the Prime Minister of Greece had given him a full account of the recent talks. He added that for the Government of Cyprus there was no surprise that the talks had ended in failure. Turkey, he stated, has always had two objectives in pursuing these talks: to indulge in a dialogue purely for the sake of dialogue, and secondly it suited their purpose that while the dialogue would be going on no one else, including the United Nations, would try to do anything about the Cyprus question. According to Mr. Kyprianou, the meeting of Prime Ministers registered complete disagreement and no progress whatsoever was made on the question of Cyprus. 2. It would have been normal to suppose that the Prime Ministers' meeting had been carefully prepared and that the Prime Ministers would convene to put their signatures to an accord previously worked out. Apparently this was not the case. The official explanation given to Mr. Kyprianou in Athens was that after one and a half years of Greco- Turkish dialogue, questions were being constantly referred back to the - 2 - respective Prime Ministers and as a result it was decided that the time had come for the Prime Ministers to attempt to solve the outstanding issues. 3. The Greek side had proposed centering the discussion on enosis. This, however, was categorically rejected by Turkey. Turkey, on its side, made three alternative proposals: a) a federal independent Cyprus, dividing Cyprus geographically in two parts (not necessarily equal), each enjoying autonomy and self- government; there would be federal subjects such as foreign relations and others. A "more substantive military presence of Turkey in Cyprus would be envisaged"; b) an independent Cyprus with autonomous cantons, also envisaging a more substantive Turkish military presence; c) condominium of Cyprus by Turkey and Greece. The three above-mentioned proposals by Turkey were rejected by Greece. k. Since the gap revealed itself to be so great at the Prime Ministers' level in regard to their approach to the Cyprus question, the Government of Cyprus believes that there is no point in the dialogue being pursued. Cyprus cannot simply sit and wait, thus playing the game of Turkey. The Government of Cyprus is aware, however, that if the dialogue is interrupted a vacuum will be produced which would have to be filled. Cyprus feels that the Cyprus question should be brought again within the United Nations framework and therefore it is important to decide on what the next step should be. The Secretary-General's views would weigh heavily in the decision of the Government of Cyprus. 5. The Secretary-General said he had given some thought to the further steps that could be taken in trying to find a solution to the Cyprus question, as called for in the relevant resolution of the Security Council, and while he had not arrived at definite conclusions, he felt strongly that it would be wrong to let the matter drift. Delicate international problems, such as the question of Cyprus, should not be left dormant since they could erupt at any given time. He was thinking at the present time of submitting certain proposals in his Report to the Security Council on Cyprus due in December 1967 and he - 3 - would, of course, exchange views with the delegations concerned on his proposals beforehand. 6. Mr. Kyprianou said that the Government of Cyprus had no suggestions to offer but perhaps a useful step would be for the Secretary- General to extend his good offices in search for a solution. It would be difficult for Cyprus to consider favourably the appointment of a new mediator since Cyprus had accepted Mr. Galo Plaza's report as a basis for a solution; furthermore, it was Turkey and not Cyprus which had rejected both the report and the person of Mr. Plaza as mediator. If a new mediator were appointed and he were to make proposals similar to those of Mr. Plaza, Turkey would reject them; if they were different from those of Mr. Plaza, probably Cyprus would ^ect them. Therefore, there would be little to be gained from having a new mediator. The Secretary-General, on the other hand, could well offer his good offices to the parties, thus serving a two-fold purpose of bringing the matter back to the United Nations framework and of filling the vacuum created by the discontinuance of the dialogue. Meeting in the Secretary-General*s Conference Room on 26 September 1967 at 10 a.m. Present: The Secretary-General Dean Rusk Arthur Goldberg Ralph J. Bunche The Secretary of State referred to his dinner meeting with Grorayko last night and said that Gromyko was relaxed and pleasant tut that the discussion they had was no real test of his mood and attitude since they did not try to go deeply into any question and did not discuss Viet Nam at all. With regard to the so-called "agreed text" of a resolution on the Middle East question which had been accepted in principle by Gromyko and Goldberg on 20 July, Dean Rusk said that in fairness it could not be called an agreement since it was clearly understood that the Soviet position on the text was conditional upon its accepta- bility to the Arabs. Arthur Goldberg pointed out that with regard to this text there had to be some "precise understandings" as to the meaning of certain clauses as for example the opening of the Suez Canal. Dean Rusk said that it appeared to him that the USSR was now leaning strongly toward the Yugoslav position. U Thant referred to his meeting of the evening before with Foreign Minister Riad of the United Arab Republic. Mr. Riad had confided in the Secretary-General that he had told Gromyko that the UAR would now go along with the 2Oth of July USSR text. But it was Riad's view that the question should be taken up in the Security Council rather than the General Assembly since it would be possible for the Arabs to avoid getting involved and making speeches in the Security Council which they could not do in the General Assembly. Ambassador Goldberg described this as "a trick" because the Arabs - 2 - have to be involved otherwise the resolution would have no meaning and it would never "be possible to induce Israel to go along unless the Arabs were involved. The US/USSR agreement, said Justice Goldberg, requires involvement of the Arabs, first and foremost with regard to the opening of the Suez Canal and forgoing belligerence. U Thant said that he learned from his talk with Mr. Riad that the question of a special representative of the Secretary-General in the Near East would be more palatable to the Arabs if it were to be in the context of a Security Council resolution and if the special representative would have a well defined mandate. U Thant referred to the question of a resumption of diplomatic relations between the United States and the UAR. He said that he had the impression from talking with Mr. Riad that the UAR wishes a resumption of such relationships but feels that the US should take the initiative. Dean Rusk pointed out that the US was not likely to take such an initiative and that the US was in fact maintaining a fair-sized diplo- matic staff in Cairo of a dozen or so people and they were having regular relations with the UAR Government. Dean Rusk said that in the course of his talk with Gmnyko the question came up of the possibility of clearing out the southern exit of the Canal and releasing the Ik stranded ships from Great Bitter Lake by taking them out through the s'outhern exit. U Thant said that he had in fact taken this matter up with Riad on the day before. U Thant1s position was that he would be willing to use his good offices on this question if there was a collective approach to him by representatives of the countries owning the stranded ships, including the Eastern European countries. He said that Ambassador Astrom of Sweden had first raised the question with Bunche who had informed the Secretary-General and that George Brown - 3 - had brought it up in the course of their talk. The Secretary-General informed Brown that the exercise of good offices "by him would depend upon a collective approach to him by the ship-owning countries, including the Eastern Europeans. U Thant said that when he raised this question with Riad yesterday, the Foreign Minister had not been negative bud had stated that there would be difficulties about it. He seemed to fear that Israel might try to make capital out of it by presenting demands with regard to dredging the Canal, tolls, etc. Nevertheless, Mr. Riad said that he would refer the question to Cairo and inform the Secretary- General later of his Government's views. Ambassador Goldberg said that forgoing belligerency by the Arabs would have to mean opening of the Suez Canal. U Thant stated that he had mentioned to Mr. Gromyko his idea of private meetings of the Security Council at the Foreign Ministers' level and had found Gromyko not opposed if the meetings were held on an agreed agenda. Mr. Gronyko emphasized that he would not be willing to discuss the Viet Nam issue even in such a private meeting of the Security Council. U Thant mentioned that Gromyko had also said that he would not engage in any discussions on Viet Nam at the dinner which U Thant is giving to the four Foreign Ministers on the night of 26 September. The meeting adjourned at 11.30 a.m. £-* Notes of meeting held in the Secretary-General's office on September 26, 1967, at 5:30 p.m. Present: The Secretary-General H.E. Muhammad El-*Aamiry, Foreign Minister of Jordan Ambassador Taysir Toukan Mr. Ralph J. Bunche U Thant, referring to the talk he had had with Mr. Bourghlba of Tunisia, said that he had been informed by Bourghiba that the Arab representatives were now inclining toward consideration of the Middle East question in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly. The Security Council was considered to be a preferable recourse if there was prospect of agreement among the principals and the Big Powers. A resolution by the Security Council would carry more authority and the Arabs might feel that there was less need for them to participate in the discussion and become directly involved than would be the case in the General Assembly. U Thant mentioned the matter of the special representative in the Near East and, in response to a question from the Foreign Minister, conveyed his conception of what the special representative would do. The Foreign Minister said that he now was leaning also to Security Council consideration of the Middle East question. U Thant expressed the view that the situation had deteriorated as a result of the Israeli announcement with regard to its intention to settle Israelis in some of the militarily occupied Arab areas. U Thant referred to the lack of unity amongst the Arabs, mentioning the positions taken by Algeria and Syria. He said that the UAR and Jordan, for example, were agreed on the Tito proposal but Syria and the Sudan were against it. He expressed thepersonal view that it is much better for the Arabs to have a united position. The Foreign Minister replied by referring to the Khartoum summit - 2 - meeting and said that the agreement there referred to no "peace treaty" with Israel but did not say "no peace" with Israel. The Foreign Minister mentioned the question of guarantees by the Security Council as a possible approach after there had been an unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops. The Foreign Minister said it would be very dangerous for the Arabs as regards Arab public opinion to appear to be paying a price for Israeli withdrawal. U Thant expressed the view that the idea of guarantees was really not practical. The United States and Israel, he said, are opposed to it and he felt that it would have little or no chance of adoption. He pointed out that Tito had incorporated in his plan the idea of a guarantee. U Thant stated that in his view the US/USSR draft of July 20th might now have a chance if those two Governments were still agreed upon it. The Foreign Minister expressed the desire for the extension of Stanaway, the Chairman of the HJK-I-MAC. Notes of meeting held in the Secretary-General*s office on 29 September 1967 at 3:^0 p.m. Present: The Secretary-General Foreign Minister Abba Eban Ambassador Rafael Ambassador Rosenne Mr. Ralph J. Bunche The Secretary-General asked the Foreign Minister what he thought could happen in the General Assembly on the Middle East question. Mr. Eban replied that he thought not much had been indicated in the general debate as likely to happen. He pointed out that there was a question as to whether the matter would be taken up in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. The Foreign Minister expressed the view that the only concrete point in the discussions thus far is that made in the Secretary-General's introduction to his Annual Report on the designation of a Special Representative to the Middle East. Mr. Eban said on this idea most Members seem to agree. But, he said, the deadlock of June-July with regard to simple withdrawal and Israel's identity and security continues. There could be a change in the situation only if there had been some movement in decisive places, that is if the USSR or the Arab States had moved. The Arab States, he thought, have not reached the point of being able publicly to accept the necessary conditions for withdrawal. Any resolution likely to have Soviet and Arab support would be so worded as to fail to get enough support for acceptance, that is, said Mr. Eban, it would be a "bad resolution". If it would have "balance" it could not pass; if it could get a majority vote, it would not be balanced. As to the question of whether the item should be considered in the General Assembly or the Security Council, Mr. Eban pointed out that in the Security Council the weight of the USSR is much greater than in the General Assembly since the USSR has the veto in the Security Council. U Thant said that with regard to the Special Representative the -2- Arab position continues to insist on a specific and properly defined mandate for such a Representative. (Israel vould accept a mandate expressed in general terms). U Thant said that in Cairo, President Nasser had expressed willingness to accept such a Representative as a "go-between" without any precise definition of the mandate. However, when he returned to New York the Secretary-General "broached the matter to Amb. Rafael who stated that he saw no need for such a Representative and that it would "be better for the Secretary-General to deal with the Governments through their Representatives at the United Nations. U Thant said that therefore he did not include his proposal in his Report. U Thant explained also that he did not go to Israel at that time for the reason that the issue which prompted his trip to Cairo was one between the UN and the Government of the UAR, namely the UAR request for withdrawal of UNEF. There was no issue between the UN and Israel and therefore there was no special reason for U Thant to include Israel in that visit. With regard to the Special Representative, U Thant pointed out that the basic difference between the Arab States and Israel relates to the question of the definition to be given to the mandate for the Represen- tative. U Thant stated that in his long talk with Foreign Minister Riad, he had indicated UAR willingness to accept the USSR/USA July 20th draft, although some Arab Representatives do not accept it. Mr. Riad had also made this statement to Foreign Minister Brown of the UK. Mr. Bunche pointed out, however, that there were sharp differences now becoming apparent between the USSR and the US and the interpretation to be given to some of the provisions in the July 20th draft, one of which was the vital one of the opening of the Suez Canal. U Thant said that Mr. Gromyko had indicated to him that the opening of the Suez Canal is linked to the solution of the question of the Pale- stine refugees. U Thant expressed the belief that something could be worked out on the basis of the US/USSR draft. Mr. Eban, however, said that he did not think so because the question of access to the Suez Canal is a touch-stone for Israel. He -3- said "we cannot withdraw from the Canal without having definite assurance of the passage of our ships through the Canal". For Israel the crucial question is "withdrawal to what?" There must "be a prior decision on frontiers and then withdrawal will take place to those frontiers. Mr. Eban pointed out that just as under the Armistice Agreements they had moved from the cease-fire lines to the armistice lines, now the movement must "be from the armistice lines to firm and secure frontiers. Mr. Eban, in referring to the July 20 US/USSR draft, said that "inter- nationsl waterways" in that draft have to mean free passage for Israeli ships. Amb. Rafael pointed out that-Mr. Riad in his speech did not mention that the Armistice Agreement was only to "be a "step toward peace" and he also made no mention of the Suez Canal. U Thant asked Mr. Eban whether, if it had come to a vote,Israel would have voted for or against the July 20 US/USSR draft. Mr.Eban said that in the form it was at that time Israel would have voted against it unless it was amended so as to renounce war, establish frontiers and open Suez to Israel. Mr. Eban stated the view that much work is needed to define policies "before withdrawal could take place. U Thant questioned whether this meant that then there would "be no Israel acceptance of the idea of tying solution of the refugee problem to the opening of the Suez Canal. Mr. Eban said no, since that question was decided "back in 1951 that these two problems for many reasons could not be linked. He added that what Mr. Riad had said in his speech of this day would have been an excellent position to take "if the UAR had occupied Tel Aviv and had won the war". The Foreign Minister asserted that Israel is not prepared to return to the k June situation but will discuss frontiers with each Arab State. For example, Israel would be prepared to evacuate Sinai but only on the basis of clear agreement on what will happen to the Sinai after that evacuation. Israel would not raise the question of UAR sovereignty over Sinai but would be very much concerned with the problem of security. -k- Israel would demand the demilitarization of Sinai. Israel would have a similar concern with security on the West "bank. Mr. Eban asked what does Mr. Riad mean when he says that he cannot state his position publicly. Israel, said Mr. Eban, must know what the political-juridical position will "be when Israel withdrawal occurs. With regard to the Syrian heights, Israel's position need not mean an adjustment of the frontier; there could "be a demilitarized area arrangement, although in some places some frontier adjustment might "be indicated. U Thant referred to Mr. Eban*s recent speech at Strasbourg and the plan for collaboration between Israel and some of the Arab States which he mentioned. Mr. Eban says that Jordan is aware of what he had in mind and that Jordanian authorities know, for example that under such an arrangement with peace Jordan would have full access to and use of the port of Elath. Arab. Rafael expressed the view that "clever wording" cannot be a substitute for "policy". U Thant asked whether, if agreement could be reached on basic principles, would Israel prefer consideration of the question in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly. Mr. Eban said yes, they would, "if there is clear agreement on principles". He pointed out that President Tito in his p^in puts the question of guarantee as a substitute for Arab involvement. The Arabs would not have to do anything under the Tito plan. Mr. Eban expressed doubt that it would be possible to get the US to give a guarantee without agreement of the parties concerned. Mr. Eban thought that the other three big powers would not like to get involved to the extent required by a guarantee. The meeting ended at 4:30 p.m. 2 October 1967 NOTE FOR THE RECORD The Secretary-General invited the Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives of France, USSR, UK and USA. to dinner on Tuesday 26 September 1967 at 7«50 pm. All invitees accepted the invitation and were present. The whole atmosphere of the dinner was very cordial and there was a very frank exchange of views. In regard to the Middle East, M. Couve de Murville stated that consideration of the question by the General Assembly was inevitable and that, while it would be useful to have a meeting of the Security Council on the question, this would be productive only if prior consultation showed that there was some hope of agreement. There was an exchange of views on this aspect of the matter and, after discussion of the pros and cons of Security Council consideration versus General Assembly consideration, the final consensus seemed to be that, if the Security Council could reach an agreement on a draft resolution which the parties could accept, this would be the best solution. The Secretary-General asked for the views of the Foreign Ministers on his proposal that the Foreign Ministers of the countries represented on the Security Council might have closed door meetings at the time that the General Assembly was conducting its general debate and while the Ministers were still here. Mr. Brown reacted favourably to this proposal, though he said his own staff had advised against it. Mr. Gromyko said that he was not against the idea in principle but he stressed the need for prior consultations and agreement on the items to be discussed and the substance of these items. Mr. Rusk thought there would be considerable advantage in closed door discussion amongst Security Council members provided that there was some pri or understanding as to the items to be discussed. He felt that it would be useless to have a meeting which would only have the effect of exaggerating the differences. Mr. Brown added that it was essential that at these meetings there should be no effort at propaganda. Ambassador Goldberg, whose opinion was sought by Mr. Rusk, pointed out that it would be unwise to ignore the existence of the eleven other members of the Security Council. -2- The Secretary-General agreed that the ground should be prepared in advance. There was even some suggestion that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four, similar to the meeting at dinner, at the invitation of the Secretary- General, could be a useful fore-runner of such a closed door meeting of the Security Council at the Foreign Minister level. The Secretary-General riased the question of Cyprus, Mr. Brown observed that the bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey could not be said to have been a real failure. The Cyprus question could not be solved except by such a dialogue between Greece and Turkey. The fact that the dialogue had taken place was itself an important step forward. It was essential that this dialogue should be continued so that some acceptable solution might be found. Meanwhile it was essential to continue UNFICYP. The Secretary-General referred tothe bad financial situation of UHFICYP and also stressed the undesirability of having a semi- permanent continuance of a peace force since it tended to relieve the parties directly involved of the sense of urgency that was necessary if meaningful solutions were to be sought. Mr. Gromydo stated that his Government was for the independence of Cyprus and against the principle of MOSIS. So far as military bases were concerned their continuance could be subject to negotiation, although the existence of foreign military bases was against the basic principles of the USSR. The Secretary-General stated that when he submitted his report on UNFICYP in December he would inevitably have to refer to the difficult financial situation of the Force. He was also thinking of drawing attention to the main recommendations of Mr. Galo Plaza and of endorsing these recommendations. Both Lord Caradon and Dean Rusk stressed the value of bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey and the need for the continuance of UKFICYP. At this point Mr. Brown said that it would be easy for the deficit of UNFICYP to be taken up by the four Permanent Members of the Security Council. Mr. Fedorenko said that the USSR would never pay for UKFICYP; a remark which was not taken kindly by Mr. Brown. -3- Substantive discussion ceased at this point. There was a further discussion as to what the Foreign Ministers might say. It was agreed that the Secretary-General might make a statement, through a spokesman, drawing attention to the fact that this was essentially a social occasion at which questions of primary interest to all concerned, including the Middle East and Cyprus, were discussed, but the question of Viet-Kam was not specifically discussed. It was also agreed that the Foreign Ministers would simply decline to comment on the discussions at the dinner, and state that only the Secretary- General was authorized to make a statement on what was discussed at the dinner. C. V. Warasimhan Chef de Cabinet Note for the Record Meeting held "by His Excellency Mr. Hamani Diori. President of Niger, with the Secretary-General on 11 October 1967 Present at the meeting were; His Excellency Mr. Hamani Diori Secretary-<}eneral President of Niger His Excellency Mr. Adamou Mayaki Jose1 Rolz—Bennett .ambassador of Niger to the United States Mr. Oumarou Youssoufou Interpreter 1. President Diori stated that, among the many problems facing the world organization, he would like to raise with the Secretary-General the following: a) In the first place, he wished to refer to the dispute between the Ivory Coast and Guinea. As he had occasion to tell the Secretary-General during their conversation a few days ago, the presence of the Secretary- General at the recent OAU meeting in Kinshasa had contributed very signifi- cantly to the efforts that many African Chiefs of State were making in order to bring about greater harmony and friendly relations between the African States. To conserve and even to strengthen the atmosphere created in Kinshasa, he was very keenly interested in avoiding an acrimonious debate between the Ivory Coast and Guinea at the United Nations and, to this end, he would like to request a delay of 15 days in the inscription of the item proposed by the Secretary-General. During this delay, he would undertake to contact Presidents Houphouet-Boigny, Tubman and Sekou Tour£, for the purpose of requesting them to write to the Secretary-General suggesting that the latter should either reserve the item for next year's regular session of the General Assembly or, if the Secretary-General did not find it possible to do so, at least to enlarge the title of the item so as to avoid a bitter debate between the two African countries which could only hurt the cause of African unity. b) Concerning the Middle East, President Diori. thought that the question should be approached from a human point of view. T/Jhat was important was to solve the human problems involved. As far as he saw it, the question of withdrawal should be dealt with from a perspective leading to permanent peace and co-operation between the countries of the area. The withdrawal of Israeli troops should be linked with a guarantee of the frontiers of Israel by the Great Powers, if necessary by the stationing of troops of the Big Powers at the frontiers. If the countries of the Middle East would not agree to the stationing in their territories of Great Power forces, they may agree on a force formed by troops of Asian, African and Latin American countries. If the international community awaited for the agreement of all Arab countries to any peace formula, such as the one he suggested, this may lead nowhere, but if one were to seek the agreement of the UAR and Jordan with the United States and USSR such a procedure might lead to some results. He felt that negotiations through a third party were essential since the Arabs had been defeated and humiliated and therefore were naturally reluctant to sit across the table with Israel. Either the Secretary-General or the Security Council should appoint a Mediator who would be entrusted with the task of negotiating on behalf of the international community. One important point was that the Arabs should understand that no state could accept to negotiate except on the basis of the recognition of its own territorial integrity. Freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba should be tackled in connexion with the refugee problem. As regards the Suez Canal, he supported the Yugoslav solution that Israeli ships should pass through the canal at first without its flag, this situation being regularized some time later on. He felt strongly that the frontiers of the States of the area should be formally guaranteed and incursions of terrorists from one country into another should be prevented. c) Vietnam was also a situation which gave rise to great concern. President Diori felt that, if the United States was left alone, the bombing of North Vietnam would continue. Also, if North Vietnam was left alone, it would have no choice but to remain in its adamant position. For this reason, he thought that Asian countries - Burma, for example - were in the best posi- tion to contact the parties and propose a truce which could serve to attempt the beginning of negotiations (he said in passing that the Americans under- stood that it was very hard to stop the infiltration of guerrillas from Worth to South Vietnam but that they objected strongly to the interference in the South of regular North Vietnam troops). All those involved in the Vietnamese conflict should be made to understand that they were not the only ones interested in peace but that peace in Southeast Asia was the concern of the international community. d) Concerning the fight against under-development, President Diori felt that African and Asian countries could help considerably in raising the agricultural output which was required to meet the growing food deficit in the world. Africa could certainly increase its food output, - if given the means - in order to help countries like India which faced an acute food shortage. 2. The Secretary-General thanked President Diori for his helpful and positive comments. Regarding the first point raised by President Diori, the Secretary-General felt it was not necessary for him to go into the'background of the problem between the Ivory Coast and Guinea inasmuch as President Diori was fully aware of it. He merely wished to recall that he had made every effort to solve the problem of the detained persons and to this end had sent two Under-Secretaries to confer with Presidents HouphSuet-Boigny and Toure" and had presented several proposals which were not accepted by the parties. In the circumstances, and bearing in mind that an important question of principle relating to the immunities of Representatives to meetings of the United Nations was involved, he had had no choice but to request the in- scription of the item. It was only after the request for inscription that the problem had been solved. - 5 - In view of President Diori's request, however, the Secretary-General felt that if during the next meeting of the General Committee - which he understood would be held next Monday, 16 October - a member of the Committee, such as the Sudan or Jordan, were to request that consideration of the in~ scription of the item should be postponed for another ten days, the Secretary- General would have no objection. This would afford the fifteen days which President Diori required to contact Presidents HouphSuet-Boigny, Tubman and Toure. 3. President Diori thanked the Secretary-General for his understanding and stated that he would try to do his best to solve the matter. k. The Secretary-General said that, before turning to another subject, he wished to recall that the Guinean officials had been detained while on the way back from United Nations meetings and that this fact made it the direct concern of the United Nations under the relevant provisions of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. On the Middle East question, the Secretary-General said that the basic point was that Israel insisted on direct talks with the Arabs. The UAR was not prepared to accept direct talks. However, it would appear that the UAR was now prepared to accept the US-USSR resolution. It was the Secretary- General's understanding that Minister Riad had the intention to contact soon Secretary of State Rusk to discuss this question. Contacts, therefore, were continuing. Concerning guarantees by the Big Powers, while many countries were in favour of the proposals advanced by President Tito, Israel was of the view that such guarantees were not sufficient. Only directly negotiated arrangements would provide the security of its borders. The Secretary-General believed that the United Nations should be involved and that a solution may be found on the basis of the Big Powers and/or the Security Council guaran- teeing the frontiers of the States of the area. Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal was a key issue. The Secretary-General felt that the Yugoslav proposal linking the withdrawal of Israeli troops with the opening of the canal was a very sensible one. The UAR had accepted this proposal but Israel had not indicated its acceptance. The question of Jerusalem, according to Israel, was a non-negotiable issue. It should also be noted in connexion with the Suez Canal proposal that if withdrawal of Israeli troops meant with- drawal from Jerusalem, this may be a reason for Israel's reluctance to accept the Yugoslav proposal. As regards the appointment of a Representative of the Secretary-General for the Middle East, there was general agreement on the idea but differences of opinion concerning the mandate. The Arabs wanted a specific mandate, whereas Israel was in favour of a mandate of a general nature that should not mention withdrawal of troops. The UK and the US were working on this issue. 5. In regard to the President's pertinent remarks on Vietnam, the Secretary- General wished to tell President Diori how glad he was that the President had mentioned his ideas in Washington. As the President was well aware, the Secretary-General had maintained all along that stopping the bombing of North Vietnam was a prerequisite for negotiation. The US insisted that there should be a reciprocal gesture on the part of North Vietnam and this was unac- ceptable to the North Vietnamese Government. According to American estimates, the South Vietnamese Government troops amounted to 285,000; the Vietcong guerrillas were estimated at more than 200,000 and the regular North Vietnamese troops in the South at 50,000. The US troops, on the other hand, reached already 500,000. Taking these figures into account, it was unrealistic to demand that North Vietnam should show reciprocity by way of stopping its supplies to the South since it could be easily assumed that the US and South Vietnam would be in a position to strengthen and resupply its own troops while the bombing was stopped. President Diori was right in stating that Vietnam was a human problem. It was estimated that three to eight times more civilians were killed than military; uprooting of peoples and destruction of villages caused deep suffering. As President Diori was no doubt aware, people in Asia were very attached to their land and their birthplaces by strong ancestral ties and their uprooting caused a deep psychological trauma. The Secretary-General did not believe that communism could be fought with arms; communism was an idea which had to be combated with another idea, that of democracy. However, it seemed that South Vietnamese troops were not imbued with democratic ideals. The Geneva agreements called for a neutral and non-aligned Vietnam. This objective was difficult to achieve but the Secretary-General would continue his personal efforts in the search for a peaceful solution to the Vietnamese war. Drawing from his experience during Burma's fight for inde- pendence, he feared that the longer the fight the greater was the danger of the extremists coming out on top. 6. Since his last meeting with President Diori, the Secretary-General had occasion to discuss the problems of economic development with UNDP officials. The Secretary-General felt that during the meetings next month in the Second Committee of the General Assembly, questions concerning the developing countries, including ways of increasing aid for agricultural production would be discussed. The forthcoming UNCTAD Conference in New Delhi was of great importance and, in this connexion, the Meeting of the 77 in Algiers was endeavoring to prepare the views and a common strategy for the developing countries. 7. In concluding, the Secretary-General wished to thank President Diori for his support and for having made available Mr. Djermakoye to serve as an Under-Secretary. Mr Djermakoye had made a positive contribution and the Secretary-General was very pleased to have him as one of his collaborators. 8. In parting President Diori said to the Secretary-General: "May God help you in your noble mission". 13 October 1967 Jos& SECRET MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR FEDOREMKO, l6 OCTOBER 1967 Fedorenko saw me today and brought up the following points: 1. Situation in the Middle East - He told me that he had been instructed by his Government to bring the following facts to my attention. On 9 October Mr. Gromyko sent for United States Ambassador Mr. Thompson and explained to him that the Soviet Government would like to revive discussions with the United States Government on the draft resolution discussed between him (Gromyko) and Mr. Goldberg on 19 and 20 July in New York. Gromyko also told Ambassador Thompson that it was his Government's understanding that the Arab delegations now would go along with the draft resolution on one condition that the question of free passage of the Suez Canal could be taken up only when agreement is reached on the settlement of the Arab refugee problem. Gromyko reminded Thompson that in the course of his discussions with Mr. Goldberg in New York, Suez Canal was never mentioned and it was never the understanding of the Soviet Government that freedom of passage did apply to Suez Canal. On 10 October Ambassador Thompson saw Mr. Gromyko again and informed him that the United States' understanding was that Suez Canal was included in the discussions in New York when the question of freedom of passage in international waterways was raised. Thompson did not believe that any progress could be made in discussions without this point being cleared up. Fedorenko told me that in the view of his Government, the United States was in no hurry to have a meeting of the Security Council or the General Assembly to adopt a substantive resolution. I thanked him for the information. 2. Reorganization of the Secretariat - Fedorenko also brought up the following observations of his Government regarding the projected reorganization of the Secretariat. He said that it was his Government's understanding that the Secretary-General is very shortly presenting to the General Assembly a document outlining the reorganization of the Secretariat, and he wanted to make the following observations: Ambassador Fedorenko - 2 - l6 October 1967 (a) The post of Chef de Cabinet and the Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs should be separated, since both posts are sufficiently important to be taken care of by two officers; (b) The number of two Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs should be reduced to one, as there is no justification for two posts; (c) The Under-Secretary in Charge of DPI should be from Eastern European countries, as East Europe is under-represented; (d) In the proposed eleven posts in the upper echelon, there should be two Eastern Europeans; (e) In the lower echelon of Under-Secretaries, there should be at least two or three Eastern Europeans; (f) There should be regular meetings between the Secretary- General and Under-Secretaries where business can be transacted much more satisfactorily; (g) In the proposed appointment of four or five experts to examine and report to the Secretary-General the administrative set-up in the Secretariat, the Soviet Union should be asked to provide one expert. I replied to him on the following lines: (a) I will study the proposal very carefully, but I did not see any possibility of an early separation of the two posts; (b) It will be very difficult to reduce the posts of Under- secretaries for Special Political Affairs to one, since the activities of a political nature are expanding. I foresee a long time in which two posts will continue to be not only necessary but essential; (c) I will consider the proposal regarding the Under-Secretary for OPI, but at present I had made the request to a Government regarding the availability of a person to be in charge of OPI. If my request is complied with, there is no possibility of my considering any other candidate; Ambassador Fedorenko - 3 - l6 October (d) Out of the proposed eleven Under-Secretaries in the upper echelon, Mr. Nesterenko and Mr. Wosek will be included; (e) I have not given sufficient consideration to the composition of the lower echelon, "but it is probable that the Executive Secretary of the ECE, that is, Economic Commission for Europe, will be from Eastern Europe. There is a possibility that another Eastern European will be appointed in the lower echelon; (f ) I had been planning to have regular working meetings with the Under-Secretaries, but these will take place only after the reorganization of the upper echelon is in force. In the meantime, periodic working luncheons are being organized, but I admit that they are not sufficiently effective; (g) I promise to ask the Soviet Union to provide one expert out of the proposed four or five experts to examine and report to me regarding the reorganization of the Secretariat. 3. I asked him if there were any new developments regarding Viet-Wam. He told me that there were no new developments and his Government's views were well known. 4. He told me that Mr. Kuznetsov, Deputy Foreign Minister, is arriving tonight to participate in the General Assembly, I asked him how long Mr. Kuznetsov is going to be in New York. He told me that he had no idea and added that two members of his Mission are leaving for Moscow and Mr. Kuznetsov *s arrival is just to reinforce the Mission. I asked him if Mr. Morozov is also leaving. He said that Morozov will stay here . Notes on meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on IT October 1967 at 11.30 a.m. Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Goldberg Ambassador Sisco Ambassador Federsen Mr* Bunche Mr. Goldberg stated that the United States intends to deposit with the United Nations the Outer Space Treaty. The United States, he said, will also follow this up with a subsequent documentation showing some United States activity under the new Treaty. Mr. Goldberg said that the United States wo&ld follow the practice of reporting through the Secretary-General. With regard to the Middle East, Justice Goldberg said that he could only report that there had been many discussions but that problems have arisen which relate mainly to the failure of the USSR to confirm the understanding reached with the United States in the July 20th resolution. Ambassador Goldberg went on to say that the US does not charge the Soviet Union with "bad faith" in this matter but apparently the Russians did not show everything in connexion with the draft to the Arabs last summer. There were,he explained, "different versions" in circulation. One of these versions had no date. The Russians, he said, used the words "without delay" from one version and dates from the second version which they were not entitled to do. Mr. Goldberg said that he had made it very clear to the Russians that acceptance of their version would require an affirmative action on the -2- part of both sides, Arabs as well as Israelis, and particularly with regard to withdrawal, foregoing belligerency and opening and free passage through the Canal. Ambassador Goldberg said that there had been in these discussions no linkage of the passage through the Canal with the issue of Palestine refugees. Justice Goldberg reported that in his talk of the day before with Foreign Minister Mad of the UAR it had appeared to the United States that Riad was supporting the idea of an effort which would not call on the Arabs to do anything on the grounds that it was impossible for the Arabs to join in or acquiesce in a resolution calling for action. Therefore, Mr. Riad apparently concluded that it was better to have a Security Council resolution in general terms. Riad had asked if the United States would have any objection to the non-permanent Members trying their hand at working out such a resolution. Mr. Goldberg said that he had no objection and observed that the non-permanent Members were, in fact, meeting on this very day for this purpose. The Secretary- General pointed out that there is also the question of a Special Repre sentative. Ambassador Goldberg said that there had been no agreement as yet on this question but that the atmosphere was more favorable to the notion now than previously. He said that Foreign Minister Eban was returning to Israel on this day and might come back with some further points of view on the subject, although at times he seemed to come back with rather harder positions than before he had left. Mr. Goldberg said that Mr. Riad had referred to "States directly -3- concerned", "by which he apparently meant to exclude such interested States as Algeria and the Sudan. Mr. Goldberg expressed the view that there had been "some slight progress". In Ambassador Goldberg1s view the question now is one of the interpretation to be made of the July 20th draft. This, he said, must be understood. The UAR, he said, would now prefer a fresh approach. The Secretary-General enquired whether Mr. Riad had referred to George Brown's proposals. The Secretary-General remarked that Mr. Riad had informed him that the UAR might be willing to go along with the Brown formulations. Ambassador Goldberg said that Mr. Riad had not mentioned the Brown proposals in the course of their talk but that the British had spoken to him about them. Mr. Sisco stated that the Egyptians had said nothing definite about this. Ambassador Goldberg noted that the UAR prefers action in the Security Council. He added that he sees "a little light" but that he could know whether there was real progress only when something specific is put on paper. The Secretary-General asked if there had been any paper put in as yet and Ambassador Goldberg replied negatively. The Secretary-General enquired whether the Brazilian draft was being discussed. Mr. Goldberg said that the Brazilians had said that the Arabs had -It- rejected their draft and therefore the Brazilians are no longer pursuing it, and he repeated that the non-permanent Members would "be meeting on the matter on this day. That, he said, is about all that there was to report on the Middle East situation. Ambassador Goldberg added that he did not exclude the possibility that the Secretary-General might be authorized to send a Special Representative to the Middle East with the UN Charter as guidelines. Mr. Goldberg added that he had had no call as yet from Mr. Kuznetsov for a meeting. The Secretary-General stated that he had seen Mr. Kuznetsov this morning. U Thant observed that he had the impression that Mr. Kuznetsov had come over here because Ambassador Fedorenko's contacts are so unsatisfactory. Mr. Kuznetsov made it clear that he wishes a substantive resolution adopted; he also indicated that the UAR had gone just about as far as they could be expected to go. The Secretary-General understood that Mr. Kuznetsov would be seeing Mr. Riad today. U Thant added that Ambassador Pedorenko will never volunteer an opinion on his own. Ambassador Goldberg said that the United States had had the same experience with him. They had found also that he always aaid exactly what is reported by Tass in the Russian press. The Secretary-General said that Mr. Kuznetsov is quite a different personality. The Secretary-General asked Ambassador Goldberg for his assessment of the prospects for agreement on non-proliferation. -5-. Ambassador Goldberg stated that the situation was "very rough". He said the United States would like to bring a non-proliferation agreement to the UN by mid-November but to do this only on the basis of a prior agreement. He said there are two major issues as obstacles to this: safeguards and inspection. The US, he said, is against an adjournment of the Geneva talks on the basis that to bring an incomplete treaty direct to the UN would only be abortive. The US people in Geneva, he observed, still believe that the job can be done and a treaty text can be formulated, agreed upon and brought to the UN in November. But the reports from Geneva are not very encouraging in this regard. In the US view, he said, the USSR does -Kant a treaty and certainly the US does. The Indians, however, are a big obstacle as are some of the direct allies of the US, particularly on the issue of inspection and on their insistence that this responsibility should be given to Euratom. Justice Goldberg said that he was afraid that if the proliferation agreement could not be acted upon at this time there will be no such treaty at all. The Secretary-General shared this view. Mr. Goldberg said that with regard to Vietnam the US was not aware of any further developments. The Secretary-General asked Mr. Goldberg if he had seen the Reuters report appearing in the press of today regarding a Vietcong committee for relations with the American people. Ambassador Goldberg said that he had not seen the press report but that since LBJ's speech and his own statement at the UN on Vietnam there has been no response of any kind from the other side. -6- The Secretary-General referred to David Schoeribrun's reports which confirmed his view that the Vietcong are entirely independent of Hanoi. Mr. Goldberg said that there was "nothing stirring governmentallyn at this time. The meeting ended at 12.32 p.m. DECLASSIFIED Authority Note for the Record Meeting held between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and the Secretary-General on 19 October 1967 Present; Mr. S. Kyprianou Secretary-General Amb. Z. Rossides Mr. J. Rolz-Bennett Mr. A. lakovides 1. Mr Kyprianou said he had "been in "Washington where he held discussions at the State Department on the Cyprus question. Present at the meeting from the State Department side were: Assistant Secretary Mr. Battle and Messrs. Rockwell, Horner and Belcher (US Ambassador to Cyprus). Prior to going to Washington, Mr. Kyprianou had received private information to the effect that some officials in the State Department favoured some new initiative, perhaps by the United Nations, even on the substance of the matter. However, during the meeting at the State Department, nothing of this was said by the United States officials, who indicated they wanted to know what the present thinking of the Cyprus Government was. They also commented that it would be unwise to say that the dialogue between Greece and Turkey had failed forever because conceivably it could be reactivated some time in the future. 2. Mr. Kyprianou had occasion to bring the State Department officials up to date regarding the thinking of the Cyprus Government, along the lines he had indicated to the Secretary-General at their meeting on 9 October 196?. The State Department's officials raised no objection to the possibility of a new U.N. initiative. After the meeting, Ambassador Belcher told Mr. Kyprianou that the State Department had been doing some thinking as to what might be done to promote a peaceful solution in the light of the inconclusive summit meeting between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. "While the State Department had not arrived at firm conclusions, it was anxious, however, not to create the impression that the U.S. was coming out with any proposals. 3. Since his last meeting with the Secretary-General, Mr. Kyprianou had endeavoured to obtain further clarification concerning the position of the United Kingdom Government. His contacts - particularly with Lord Caradon - had made it clear that the United Kingdom might go along with a new initiative after "some two months", "not now". He also had the feeling that the United Kingdom felt that, when the Security Council meets in December, something more should be included in the resolution than the mere extension of UNFICYP for another period. Concerning the remark which Foreign Secretary Brown had made at the Four Big Power dinner given by the Secretary-General that "one should not talk of failure of the dialogue ...", a clarification had come from London to the effect that while Mr. Brown did not wish the impression to be created that the dialogue had failed, this did not mean that other initiatives should be excluded. - 2 - k. The Secretary-General reiterated to Mr. Kyprianou that he was giving thought as to what he could and should do, in the present circumstances, to promote a peace- ful solution to the Cyprus issue. The question of timing was important and, as Mr. Kyprianou knew, the Secretary-General had commented to the Foreign Ministers of the Four Big Powers that he was thinking of taking some initiative in his next report to the Security Council in December. Tentatively, he was thinking of holding some pre- liminary consultations in November with the Permanent Bepresentatives of the countries particularly concerned including, of course, the Permanent Representative of Cyprus. 5. Turning to another question related to Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou requested the Secretary-General to consider the advisability of reiterating to UNFICYP the directives he had spelled out in a Secco document in April 196^, concerning the implementation by UNFICYP of that part of its mandate referring to the "return to normal conditions". He recognized that there were differences between the views of the Government of Cyprus and the Secretary-General as to the interpretation to be given to the phrase "return to normal conditions", but he wished to refer to the fact that in some instances UNFICYP seemed to take a position at variance with the interpretation given by the Secretary-XSeneral. 6. Mr. Eolz«Bennett commented that the interpretations given by the Secretary- General in various documents to the Security Council continued to be valid. While the Secretary-general would therefore have no difficulty in re-stating his position, he was certain that UNFICYP officials had these interpretations very much in mind. Since Mr. Kyprianou had raised the question of return to normal conditions, Mr. Rolz- Bennett said he wanted to draw the Foreign Minister's attention to the general lack of co-operation with UNFICYP shown by the National Guard and General Grivas. It was particularly disturbing that the National Guard should find it necessary to erect new fences forward of their defence positions in Kyrenia and other parts of the island at the time when the Government of Cyprus was engaged in carrying out its "pacification measures", thus compromising the efforts of the Government. 7. Mr. Kyprianou said he would look into this question upon his return to Nicosia and would also take advantage of his stop-over in Athens to discuss the matter with the Greek authorities. He recommended that General Grivas should be approached by General Martola as one soldier to another and deal with all these differences from a purely military point of view without mixing it with political considerations. If necessary, meetings between Martola and Grivas could also be arranged under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and in this way Mr. Kyprianou himself would help to resolve any outstanding differences. 8. In reply to a question by the Secretary-General, Mr. Kyprianou said it was his intention to go to London for two or three days, then to Athens also for two or three days and thereafter to Nicosia. In conclusion, Mr. Kyprianou said he wished to re- iterate his Government's appreciation for the continued interest and efforts of the Secretary-General in regard to Cyprus. A fr> J. Bolz—Bennett 20 October 1967 Notes of Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on 20 October 196? at if-:00 p.m. Present; The Secretary-General Foreign Minister Rifai (Jordan) Amb. El-Farra Ralph J. Bunche Mr. Rifai advised the Secretary-General that he was bringing greetings from King Hussein. He said that the King willprobably arrive in the United States about 5 November. His sole purpose is to visit Washington but no doubt he will wish to see the Secretary-General. It is left open as to whether he will wish officially to visit the United Nations on this trip. Mr. Rifai said that the King has received invi- tations to speak at two universities and will probably accept them. Mr. Riad expressed the hope that the United Nations will be seriously dealing with the question of the Middle East by the time the King comes to this country. The Foreign Minister sought the Secretary-General's assessment of the situation as regards action here on the Middle East question. The Secretary-General said that it would be very damaging to the United Nations if no action on this question were to be taken. He emphasized that there must be some action and expressed the view that this action should be preferably in the Security Council, but if it is not possible to achieve action in the Security Council the question should then be taken up again in the General Assembly. He observed that the non- permanent Members were meeting on the question and he said that he had seen a draft formulation that they had prepared and in his opinion it is well done and objective, but the Secretary-General foresaw that there will be two main difficulties in gaining acceptance for this formulation: In connection with the withdrawal it specifies the date of 5 June and with regard to the Special Representative is seeks to -2- have him implement the principles including, of course, the principle of withdrawal. The United States, as the Secretary-General understands their position, would "be against "both of these provisions, as would Israel. The Secretary-General went on to say that if there should "be serious objection "by the latin American Members to the specifying of the June 5 date with regard to withdrawal, he would think that the date could be eliminated. As regards the implementation provision, if the United States should object too strongly, a compromise could possibly be found. Foreign Minister Rifai expressed the high regard which he and all the Arabs have for the Secretary-General and agreed with the Secretary- General on the preference for action in the Security Council. With regard to matters of substance, on the question of the inclusion of the date of June 5th, he said that the Arabs are sensitive, not about a word but about the principle involved. Deletion of the date would be, he thought, a departure from the principle and would compromise the issue of with- drawal and thus the basic principle of no acquisition of territory by military aggression. Mr. Riad said that in a talk he had had with Ambassador Goldberg, the latter had raised the question of territorial integrity. Mr. Riad said that he was happy that the draft paper had retained the date. With regard to the Special Representative, if he should go out without specific mandate, he cannot accomplish very much. He must have guidance and support. U Thant remarked that the UN must do something. U Thant repeated that there are two major factors in the draft from the standpoint of possible US negative reaction: The date relating to the withdrawal line and the implementation provision relating to the Special Repre- sentative. The meeting ended at 4:25 p.m. Notes of Meeting held in the Secretary-General's Office on 20 October 1967 at 4:30 p.m. Present; The Secretary-General Dr. Assad Khanji, Secretary-General, Syrian Foreign Ministry Anib. Daoudy Ralph J. Bunche Dr. Khanji stated that these are very important days at the United Nations and that everyone is following the efforts that are "being made and the consultations that are taking place. As regards the Security Council, he said that Syria hopes and would be very happy if a solution for the Middle East problem can be found in the Council. Otherwise, of course, the issue will have to go back to the General Assembly and be considered there. He said that Syria is a small country and it has faith in the United Nations and it counts on the assistance of the United Nations and of the Secretary-General. Syria very much hopes that the United Nations will not fail as the League of Nations failed. U Thant stated that the non-permanent Members are now meeting and hoped to be able to consult the Big Powers on Monday. The Secretary- General stated that he had seen the draft that had been formulated and he thought it was a very good draft. The UN, he said, must do something on this issue in the interest of the Middle East and of the United Nations in order to avoid the fate of the League of Nations. The Secretary-General stated as his view that it would be much preferable to have action in the Security Council since such action would be more effective and more binding than General Assembly action. He said that he was in complete agreement with the substance of the draft by the non-permanent Members which he had seen, but he realized that there would be difficulty in gaining acceptance for it. He foresaw two main difficulties which would involve objections by the US and Israel: The reference to the date of 5 June in connection with the withdrawal provision and the provision that -2- the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have terms of reference providing for implementation of the principles, including withdrawal. The Secretary-General gave assurance of the continuation of his efforts to achieve a peaceful solution. If such a solution cannot "be reached in the Security Council then clearly the issue must go back to the General Assembly. Mr. Daoudy observed that if the date of June 5th is deleted then the question must be to where would the Israeli troops withdraw? Dr. Khanji pointed out that there have been Security Council resolutions of the past which have not been observed by Israel and asked why this is condoned by the United Nations and by the US. This question, he said, is closely linked to the existence of the United Nations. He said that as a final point he wished to call attention to the plight of the Syrian displaced persons - 117,000 Syrians who had been expelled from their homes and who will experience severe hardship in the coming winter if something urgent is not done. The Secretary-General stated that he was fully aware of this situation and intended to do all that he could in behalf of these suffering people. He hoped to be able to be more definite about this soon. The meeting ended at 4:55 p.m. Hotes of meeting held in the Secretary-General* s Office on 30 October 1967 at 3:30 p.m. Present; The Secretary-General Foreign Minister Abba Eban Ambassador Rafael Mr. Ralph J. Bunche Foreign Minister Eban presented to the Secretary-General a note in which Israel announced that it was making a special contribution of Israeli £ 1 million to UNRWA for the relief of persons suffering dislocation as a result of the recent hostilities. Mr. Eban then referred to the consultations that are going on in connection with a draft resolution on the Middle East situation and particularly the consultations of the six non-permanent Members. He stated that the six had now been reduced to five because of the withdrawal of Brazil and might soon be reduced to four since it was likely that Argentina would also back out. Mr. Eban remarked that the texts of the drafts that are being considered are too specific. The Indian draft, for example, he said, makes reference to the k- June positions or the positions before the recent hostilities. This is unacceptable to Israel. Israel will consider withdrawal only to fixed, permanent frontiers and not to the old armistice lines. These frontiers have to be negotiated and Israel will seek in such negotiations some territorial adjustments, particularly on the Syrian front and in Gaza where, apparently, the Egyptians themselves do not wish to be. The Indian text, he said, prejudices this territorial position of Israel and it runs the risk, should it be adopted, that Israel could not deal with the Special Representative provided for in the resolution. The Danish-Canadian text does not prejudice the position of Israel in this regard. Mr. Eban said that withdrawal is an irrevocable act but a declaration of non-belligerency is not irrevocable. It can be made at one moment and revoked the next. Mr. Eban said that the Indian draft is very specific about things which are favourable to the Arabs but never -2- specific about matters favourable to Israel. He added that Israel had seen the Indian text for the first time on the previous Saturday. Mr. Eban expressedthe view that the "game" revolving around the Indian draft is to try to create a conflict "between Israel and the Security Council. But Mr. Eban said that Israel thinks it is possible to work out a new formulation on which agreement could be found, though he doubted that it would be possible to successfully marry the Indian and Danish texts. Anib. Rafael said that the text should be formulated in general terms and that all "contentious clauses" should be removed. The Secretary-General enquired whether, if the present consultations should be unproductive, would Mr. Eban think that the US and the" USSR would meet. Mr. Eban said that this very likely would be the case. He added that Mr. Kusnetzov apparently has come over here not for propaganda purposes but to achieve "action". If, said Mr. Eban, the US and the USSR could agree, that agreement would likely solve the problem. The Secretary-General asked whether Amb. Jarring would be acceptable to Israel as the Special Representative, pointing out that he had gone so far as to approach the Swedish Government informally about the possible availability of $mb. Jarring and had been told that he would be available if there was agreement on him amongst all the necessary parties. Foreign Minister Eban said ttat Jarring would be acceptable and that Israel thought well of him. The Secretary-General asked Mr. Eban what he thought about the proposed provision in the draft that the Special Representative would be asked to report in 30 days. Mr. Eban said that this should be left to the discretion of the Special Representative and no specific period should be stipulated. The Secretary-General made reference to the statement attributed -3- to Prime Minister Eshkol about the "Greater Israel". Arab. Rafael explained that this had a different meaning and connotation when rendered in Hebrew and really meant "Great". Mr. Eban commented "it is better if Prime Ministers wauld let Foreign Ministers write their speeches". Arab. Rafael stated that Israel is not "enthusiastic" about the designation of a Special Representative. —oOo— Notes on meeting in the Secretary-General's Office at twelve noon on 22 November 1967 /•• OM/h/tA^i) Present: Secretary-General Ambassador Goldberg Ambassador Pedersen Mr. Bunche Ambassador Goldberg had phoned the Secretary-General1s office shortly before asking most urgently for an immediate appointment. Ambassador Goldberg informed the Secretary-General that he had come at the urgent request of Dean Rusk to convey to the Secretary-General from Dean Rusk the disturbing fact that the U.S. Government had "hard intelligence1* that the Turks would be "moving on Cyprus" "tomorrow morning", that is 23 November. It was the view of the U.S. Government that the situation was extremely dangerous and required emergency action both by the United Nations and by Governments desiring to avoid a clash. Ambassador Goldberg felt that the Secretary-General could be helpful in the situation by sending immediately a "Special Representative of the Secretary-General" to Cyprus. Ambassador Goldberg stated that in his view this person should be Mr. Bunche, whereupon Mr. Bunche demurred. Mr. Bunche interjected to say that the Secretary-General already had a high-level Special Representative in Cyprus in the person of Mr. Osorio- Tafall and that to send another one of the same Under-Secretary rank to Cyprus would not be likely to make much impact and might, indeed, offend Mr. Osorio-Tafall. Mr. Bunche expressed the view that a more effective and certainly a quicker approach, especially important in view of the little time available, would be for the Secretary-General to make immediately and to release a strong appeal for utmost restraint to the three Governments, -2- that is Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, and to include in that appeal his intention to send a high-level Personal Representative to the three capitals (preferably first to Ankara) to convey directly to the Governments the Secretary-General's great concern. Ambassador Goldberg stated that he thought this -would be an excellent approach and again expressed the view that Mr. Bunche should be sent, because he is an "American" and this would underline the deep concern and interest of the U.S. about this situation. Mr. Bunche explained to Mr. Goldberg that this would not be a wise step, that in his view it would be much wiser for the Secretary-General to assign Mr. Jose" Rolz-Bennett to the mission since Mr. Rolz-Bennett had, on a previous occasion, visited and been warmly welcomed at the three capitals and was thoroughly familiar with the problems of Cyprus. Mr. Pedersen said that he had understood that Mr. Rolz-Bennett had once not been acceptable to Turkey. Mr. Bunche pointed out that this was not the case. Turkey had had no objection to Mr. Rolz-Bennett personally when his name had been mentioned as possible Cyprus Mediator, but had not wished to have a member of the Secretariat named to that position on the grounds that a non-Secretariat person could be more "free". Subsequent to this, Mr. Rolz-Bennett had, in fact, been warmly welcomed in Ankara on a mission relating to Cyprus. U Thant indicated a willingness to make an appeal and to include in the appeal a reference to his intention to send a Personal Representative to the three capitals, as a means of underlining the appeal. He was not, however, prepared to say what precise form the appeal would take. He said also that he would not wish to send Mr. Bunche on this mission because -3- he was needed at Headquarters on the Middle East question. Moreover, he would wish to ascertain from the three parties that his Personal Representative would be welcome. The Secretary-General asked whether in view of the imminent danger there would be a call for a Security Council meeting. Ambassador Goldberg stated that it would be difficult to request a meeting on the basis of U.S. intelligence reports. The Secretary-General agreed. The meeting adjourned at 12.20 p.m. Notes on Meeting in the Secretary-General*s Office on 23 November 1967 at k p.m. Present: Secretary-General Mr. Eban Mr. Rafael Mr. Bunche Mr. Eban said that he would be leaving for Israel on the 24th. He was particularly interested in eliciting information about Mr. Jarring, such as when he was expected to arrive here, whether he would see the Permanent Representatives here, whether he would be still connected with the Swedish Government or on contract to the United Nations, where his Headquarters would be, what his staff plans would be, etc. The Secretary-General informed Mr. Eban that Ambassador Jarring would be arriving in Hew York on the weekend, that he had la d formal acceptance of the assignment by Mr. Jarring, that he would be staying here about three days for consultation with the Secretary-General and briefing, that he would undoubtedly wish to meet and talk with the Permanent Representatives of the countries concerned, that we would consult with him about his Headquarters in the area and the staff he would need and that he would be taking leave of service from the Swedish Government and be under contract to the United Nations and subject, therefore, only to UN instructions. Mr. Rafael indicated a wish to talk with Ambassador Jarring on next Tuesday since Mr. Rafael was planning to leave for his new assignment in Jerusalem Tuesday afternoon. Mr. Eban called attention to the extreme statements made by Mr. Nasser in a bellicose speech just reported by the wire services. He considered -2- this not very encouraging. Mr. Eban expressed the opinion that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would need to be in the area for quite some time, would have to listen patiently to the parties and should try to bring them together in some three-party discussion arrangement such as took place at Rhodes during the armistice negotiations. Notes on meeting held in the Secretary-General's office on 28 November 196? at 5*50 P»m* Present: Secretary-General Lord Caradon (UK) Ambassador Goldberg (US) Ambassador Ignatieff (Canada) Mr. Bunche Ambassador Goldberg reported some improvement in the Cyprus prospects and that Mr. Vance would be leaving for Nicosia in the early hours of the morning on 29 November. The main problem in the text agreed to by Turkey and Greece appears to be their insistence on a "new and enlarged mandate for UNFICYP". The United States had attempted to explain both that this was not necessary and that it would probably create severe problems in the Security Council. If the text was agreeable to the three Governments an appeal by the Secretary-General could be directed to them dealing with withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops, restoration of calm, etc. Lord Caradon thought that Archbishop Makarios would be particularly disturbed that the text contained no mention of the inviolability of Cyprus sovereignty. Cyprus would not call for a Security Council meeting until all hope of progress in negotiations had been lost. He felt that the United Nations actions both by the Secretary-General and the Security Council so far had been exactly right. The Secretary-General said there would be technical problems for the Security Council as regard the basis of any discussion of the present situation. Such a basis could be the replies to his appeal. Greece and Cyprus had already replied but had asked for their replies to be held until Turkey1 s reply came in. Another important substantive basis for the -2- Council would be the negotiations carried on by Mr. Vance and he asked if it would be possible for the United States to submit a report to the Security Council on Mr. Vance's efforts. Ambassador Ignatieff raised the problem of reciprocity of action and the question of balance. He felt that neither the Greeks nor the Turks fully relied on UHFICYP. The role of the National Guard would be crucial and an understanding would have to be reached on the reciprocal relations of the Greek and Turkish contingents, the police, the National Guard and UNFICYP. Mr. Goldberg felt it was essential to avoid running into Soviet opposition by allowing the United States to carry the ball too much. He would therefore prefer as a basis for Security Council discussion additional reports from Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. The basis would then be the appeal by the Secretary-General and the responses of the three countries. Dr. Bunche, after talking to Ambassador Eralp on the phone, said that the Turkish reply to the Secretary-General's appeal was constructive but ended with the statement that "time is short". Ambassador Goldberg reiterated that if Mr. Vance was successful the Secretary-General would issue an appeal and the three Governments would indicate their acceptance. This would be the basis for Security Council action. The appeal would be to cut back forces in Cyprus to the 1963 level as expeditiously as possible. The parties would have a private understanding on the timing (^5 days) and initial moves. The first appeal would be to Greece and Turkey and the next phase would be the working out of arrangements between the National Guard and UNFICYP. The National Guard would be cut back -3- to 1963 level. Ambassador Ignatieff agreed with Lord Caradon that the first thing was to separate out the action to be taken by Greece and Turkey and get it going. President Makarios was unlikely to accept the arrangements on the Rational Guard or detailed proposals as to how Cyprus was to be run. The Secretary-General said the first step was to get a response from Turkey; he wauld then issue a third appeal outlining specific steps, but if the mandate had to be enlarged there would be problems. It was very important to impress on the Governments that everything they wanted could be done under the existing mandate. At all events he would have to ask General Martola what could be done and whether he needed reinforcementsj there would then be a financial problem. Ambassador Goldberg gave assurances of US financial cooperation. If the appeal could be cast within the existing UKFICYP mandate, it might even be unnecessary for the Security Council to meet. He felt that Mr. Rolz-Bennett could be helpful in making clear to Ankara that the existing mandate was adequate. He hoped they could go ahead on the first two steps and, if necessary, wrestle with President Makarios later. Mr. Bunche returned from speaking to Mr. Rolz-Bennett who had said that the Greeks had accepted the text, subject to small clarifications and to the condition that the Greek Government could not commit itself on matters which were within the authority of the Cyprus Government. The situation was definitely better but it would be very difficult to get President Makarios* agreement, particularly on the omission from the final text of the assurance on territorial integrity and on the enlargement of the UNFICYP mandate. Mr. Rolz-Bennett planned to return to New York on 29 November. -k- Ambassador Goldberg, Lord Caradon and Ambassador Ignatieff thought Mr. Rolz-Bennett should not return so soon as he might wery usefully follow up with Archbishop Makarios who would find it easier to accept pressure from the Secretary-General's Representative than from others. He might also help in Ankara and Athens on the question of the UWFICYP mandate. Lord Caradon pointed out from his own experience that the greatest difficulty might be with President Makarios and Mr. Rolz-Bennett might be very helpful in this regard.