The Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Anglo-American
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DIVIDED WE STAND: THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 'ALLIANCE' W. Scott Lucas Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in accordance with the requirements of the London School Economics and Political Science UMI Number: U048352 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U048352 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Library British Library of Political and Economic Saence \Vb<o SS3 ABSTRACT The aim of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, using recently-released American, British, and Israeli documents, private papers, and oral evidence in addition to published work, it re-evaluates the causes and development of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Secondly, it examines the operation of the Anglo-American 'alliance' in the Middle East, if one existed, in the 1950s by considering not only the policymaking structures and personalities involved in 'alliance' but also external factors, notably the actions of other countries, affecting relations between the American and British Governments. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to the staffs of the British Public Record Office, the U.S. National Archives, the Truman and Eisenhower Presidential Libraries, and the University of Birmingham Library for their help in the research of this thesis. I am indebted to the London School of Economics and the University of London for financial assistance. I am indebted to the tolerance and guidance of my supervisor, Professor D.C. Watt of the London School of Economics. I have been fortunate to benefit from collaboration with many colleagues, especially C.J. Morris and Anthony Gorst. I am grateful to Orna Almog for her assistance with Israeli documents and to the Institute of Contemporary British History for its support and the use of its facilities. I have relied upon the strength of many friends during the course of my research. Above all, I am grateful to my family, especially my mother and father, who have accepted my 'permanent vacation' with forebearance above and beyond the call of parental duty. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION i MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1954 V MAP OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL vi CHAPTER 1 1945-1952: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO- 1 AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CHAPTER 2 1953-1954: DIVISION AND RECONCILIATION 24 CHAPTER 3 FEBRUARY-SEPTEMBER 1955: SEEDS OF CONFLICT 51 CHAPTER 4 SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1955: THE SEARCH FOR A 74 COMMON POLICY CHAPTER 5 JANUARY-MARCH 1956: PREPARING FOR A 109 SHOWDOWN CHAPTER 6 MARCH 1956: THE TURNING POINT 122 CHAPTER 7 APRIL-JULY 1956: THE OMEGA DISCUSSIONS 156 CHAPTER 8 19 JULY-26 JULY 1956: WESTERN ATTACK, 187 EGYPTIAN COUNTERATTACK CHAPTER 9 26 JULY-14 AUGUST 1956: BRITAIN'S QUEST 196 TO 'HIT, HIT NOW, AND HIT HARD' CHAPTER 10 15 AUGUST-3 SEPTEMBER 1956: WASHINGTON'S 234 LEASH UPON LONDON CHAPTER 11 4 SEPTEMBER-18 SEPTEMBER 1956: NEW PLANS, 256 NEW FAILURES CHAPTER 12 19 SEPTEMBER-4 OCTOBER 1956: THE ILLUSION 283 OF SCUA CHAPTER 13 5 OCTOBER-14 OCTOBER 1956: FORCE DISMISSED 303 CHAPTER 14 14 OCTOBER-29 OCTOBER 1956: FORCE 313 RESURRECTED CHAPTER 15 29 OCTOBER-6 NOVEMBER 1956: WAR 354 CHAPTER 16 7 NOVEMBER 1956-10 JANUARY 1957: AFTERMATH 404 CONCLUSIONS I: SUEZ AND BRITISH POLICY 439 CONCLUSIONS II: SUEZ AND ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 447 BIBLIOGRAPHY 454 INTRODUCTION In October 1956, Britain, France, and Israel, all of whom desired the overthrow of the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, agreed to attack Egypt. The Israelis invaded the Sinai Peninsula on 29 October, and the British and French, intervening as 'peacekeepers,' began bombing on 31 October, dropping paratroopers on the Suez Canal Zone on 5 November, and landing the main assault force 24 hours later. Almost immediately, Britain, under pressure from the U.S., was forced to cease fire. The Anglo-French force occupied only one-third of the Canal Zone and failed to topple Nasser. British and French troops left Egypt in December, and the Israelis departed in March 1957. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was replaced by Harold Macmillan in January, as the Americans, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, replaced Britain as the dominant Western power in the Levant* This chronology of the Suez War is well-known, but it fails to answer questions surrounding the conflict. Why did Britain, traditionally allied with Arab States, risk her Middle Eastern position by conspiring with Israel? Why did Ministers ignore the warnings of their officials against war and then circumvent them to carry out the invasion? Why did the United States, who privately shared Britain's aim of curbing Nasser's prestige and discussed covert plans against Egypt with Britain, cooperate with the Soviet Union in the United Nations, as the Soviets were crushing the Hungarian Revolution, and force two of her NATO allies to cease fire? Why did an operation which ii was a military success end in political failure? Past accounts of Suez have often tried to answer these questions by placing the responsibility for 'failure' upon individuals or portraying the crisis in terms of a 'moral,' rather than political or legal, conflict. Some authors ascribe the failure of Anglo- American 'alliance' to the hypocrisy and deceit of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles; some blame the 'irrational' behaviour of Prime Minister Eden. Some portray Suez as a Cold War episode with Britain and France confronting the Communist menace in the Middle East; others describe it as Egyptian resistance to imperialist oppression. Recently-released documents and private papers from Britain, the U.S., and Israel do not contain portentous revelations about the chronology of Suez. No 'smoking gun' identifies the culprit who destroyed Anglo-American cooperation or orchestrated collusion between Britain, France, and Israel. Yet this approach to the crisis, which assumes that a few pieces of 'evidence' will solve all mysteries, is flawed in itself. By focussing merely on a talisman like the intrigue of collusion or American betrayal of her allies, we fail to recognise that those talismen are products of a number of variables within and outside the control of policymakers on either side of the Atlantic. The first task of this thesis is to reconstruct those policies, actions, and circumstances which led to the Suez crisis and determined its course. British and American policies were not only influenced by France, Israel, and iii Egypt. The cast of actors must be extended to include the Soviets, the Iraqis, the Jordanians, the Saudis, the Syrians, and the Turks, among others. The loci of action not only included 10 Downing Street and the White House, the State Department and the Foreign Office but also the Treasuries of both the U.S. and Britain, the CIA, MI6, and military staffs in both countries. 'Chance' occurrences such as Foster Dulles' departure for hospital during the Suez War must also be considered. Through reconstruction, 'irrationality' becomes, if not 'rational,' at least comprehensible. The immediate 'causes' of the Suez War can be perceived as products of wider issues. Collusion becomes a strand of a web including Britain's Middle Eastern foundation of an Israeli-Jordanian axis, the Israeli-Jordanian border conflict, and the developing Franco-Israeli 'alliance.' Eden's apparent obsession with Nasser is appreciated in the context of a Chancellor of the Exchequer, Macmillan, who believed Britain could not survive as a global power without a victory over Egypt, a press which criticised the Prime Minister for being weak and indecisive, and an intelligence service, MI6, which insisted that Nasser was Britain's enemy and a Soviet puppet. Re-evaluation of Suez leads to re-evaluation of the Anglo-American 'alliance.' The 'alliance' is not a fixed entity, subjectively defined by language, culture, and tradition or objectively defined by institutions and operating procedures. By autumn 1956, relations between Washington and London were so complex that, while the U.S. was refusing to join Anglo-French military planning iv against Nasser, it was cooperating with Britain in a comprehensive program of political, economic, and psychological action to overthrow the Egyptian Government. Some American agencies and officials continued to work with the British, even during the Suez War, while others advocated sanctions against London. Some aspects of Suez are still shrouded in secrecy. For example, a detailed account of the Franco-Israeli planning which pushed Britain towards collusion may never be available. However, as the legends of Suez are verified or refuted, so the myths surrounding the Anglo-American 'alliance' can be replaced with an understanding of the complexities of relations between Washington and London. The 'specialness' of the 'special relationship,' if it exists, can only be defined through such an examination. qm6d jYoL>jf^Hd ^n - n 6 c p s *7 1 Y 'v r'v'vJ1' • Sjvpj ipwsfqvy CRETf KHfin* Alexandria Aden tm.sowv IINVAI! Karachi MAf OF THE WibtsLE EAST «N 1454- «N EAST WibtsLE THE OF MAf OF e^MfT ISeAEL Area occupied in Six Day War Cease-fire line 1967 Armistice line 1949 M E D IT E R R A N E A N SEA El Arish, Snapir ( J - j m A d a : 14 84 0 , p • 214-. 1 CHAPTER 1 1945-1952: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST By 1939, Britain's dominant position in the Middle East was firmly established.