Napoleons Invasion of Russia

THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES

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F . N C . B . la te R . E . . MAUDE, , TH E R S SO - APA E SE WAR U J N . By

. F . R . W CK R . E . A. CAPT SEDG I ,

TH E WAR OF S E CE S S O 1 86 1 - I N, 1 862

B U L L RU N V N . B . W ( TO MAL ER HILL) y MAJ OR G . W R ED AY. H E L M CAMP ! I I . T U A G . B COL . F I N y . N.

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F. R . S W CK R . EDG I , M B ! . FRO O L OG E TO A S E RL Z VII U N U T IT . - \ B L l E U T . COL O I E L R . G B N ndia n rm y URTO , I A y . ! O L E OF MAR LB ’ VIII . UT IN ORO U GH S CAM

P A I GN S . B F W N . . O. YC K D . C S . . y CAPTAI MA O , O SPE CIA L CA MPA I G N SE RIE S N O 1 . . 9 NAPO L E O N ’ S INVASIO N O F RU SSIA

E - OL O EL R G B T N L T C . U R O I U . N . I n dia n A rwy ’ ” A U TH OR OF NAP OL E ON S C MPA GNS I N I T LY A I A , ” B GNE T A U E L Z E FROM OU LO O ST R IT , TC .

WITH SI ! MA PS A N D P LA N S

Les grand e s e ntreprises lo intaine s périsse nt par la ’ gra nde ur méme des prépara tifs qu o n fa it po ur en ” a ssurer la réussite . M N S O TE Q U IE U .

LONDON

E O R G E A L L E N C O MP A N L T D. G Y ,

R SK OU SE AND RA BO E PLACE U IN H , 44 45 TH N NEW YORK : TH E MACMI LLAN COMPANY 1 9 1 4

PREFACE

WHILE the great tragedy of 1812 must ever excite the

r r Of lik its inte est and wonde mankind , e all the deeds of

mi r r are its ghty actor , the lessons to be de ived f om it

most important if not its most attractive feature . We

ni Of r es may point to the va ty human g eatn s , here shown

in its mi r decline , and the li tations imposed by adve se circumstance on genius even in its most exalted mani

fes tio f li ta n . We may indicate the uti ty of undertaking

a r r r w a g eat ente p ise ith inadequ te means , without the power and perhaps even the will to carry it to a successful c onclusion ; and the limits that are ﬁxed to human a mbition a s much by the forces of nature as by the

o f in hostility of man . Napoleon , the embodiment tellectual force, the incarnation o f mental and physical e r he nergy , cont ived for a time to control the conditions

r r hi w b r o f created in Eu ope . He ode the w rl ind y vi tue

r o f r li characte , pe sona ty , of intelligence , and of imagina

hi um his r tion w ch made up the s of genius . But in cou se

r a r his of time he c e ted fo ces , not only in enemies but i f i r r . in h msel , wh ch ranged beyond the powe of cont ol

There arose in him an almost blasphe mous self- co nﬁdence a belief in his star that led him to neglect the elements vi P RE FA CE

r his necessa y to success , which may be illustrated by own saying It is a proof o f the weakness o f human ” nature that men imagine that they can oppose me . Well might Goethe say o f him : He lives entirely in ” the ideal but can never consciously grasp it . The military lessons of the Russian campaign a re

r In r o f numerous . In its general featu es , the grandeu

in its a s its conception , and some respects in execution ,

its wa s well as in abysmal end , this gigantic invasion

- un splendid and awe inspiring . Who can contemplate moved the sublime spectacle of that mighty human

E ﬁ its stream pouring across urope into Russia , ghting

its way to Moscow , and shattered remnants struggling

a r so b ck ac oss the Berezina , in whose icy ﬂood many thousand lives were quenched in circumstances Of tragic

The ﬁ r . r horror dramatic gu e of the Great Empero ,

standing in the snow during the retreat , dominating the

r r o f his i situation by the me e te ror personal ty , will stand

h f he out for ever on the page of history . T e ortitude in t N retreat of ey , that warrior of transcendent courage ,

who , asked where was the rearguard , replied in all truth , I am the rearguard and in response to a summons

rr A o f to su ender , Marshal France never surrenders f ﬁ urnishes one of the nest episodes of this dramatic epoch .

As regards the fundamental causes of failure , specula tion leads us to inquire into the personal attributes of the

T r greatest soldier of all history . he e appears to be no P R E FA CE vii

i N ’ t doubt that at th s time , although apoleon s intellec r a ll its his its etained sharpness and vision all clearness ,

r A his physical natu e had begun to decline . lready in his forty - third year he had lost in physical and mental

ur The vigo , and in decision and boldness of execution . — — ﬁrst failure of his plans the escape of Bagration would 1805 have been averted had Napoleon been the general of . But he contented himself with sitting in his study a t

V n ui i il a , and iss ng orders wh ch were sound in project but f ﬁn d him the aulty in execution . Nor do we dominating ﬁ a s li A z battle eld at Borodino he did at Rivo , at usterlit , and at Jena .

r ha s But in spite of failu e , when all been considered , the campaign of 1812 will remain for all time one o f the o fu hi most w nder l episodes in the story of the world , sufficient of itself to secure eternal fame to the Man of whom it ha s been said by Napier To have struggled with hope under such astoun ding difficulties wa s scarcely to be expected from the greatest minds . But like the emperor to calculate and combine the most stupendous efio rts with calmn ess and accuracy to Seize every favourable chance with unerring rapidity ; w to sustain every reverse ith undisturbed constancy , never urged to rashness by despair yet enterprising to the

utmost verge of daring consistent with reason , was a

i r d splay of intellectual g eatness so surpassing , that it is

no t has r without justice Napoleon been called , in refe ence viii P RE FA CE

a s as re the f r o f well to past ages to the p sent , o emost ” a m nkind . The author is greatly indebted to General Bo gdano ’ e r o f war P r r vi h s histo y the , published in St ete sbu g in ’ 185 9 The c r B o dano vich s arr t e . ac u acy of g n a ive has be n

th r f tested by reference to e co respondence O Napoleon . Among other works to which reference has been made ma o f De r ar a aum y be mentioned those Segu , M bot , L b e,

z J ni Buturlin and h i Chambray , Fe ensac , omi , Mik ailovsk

anilevski The r h h D . autho as also ad the advantage of traversing the route taken by the Grand Army in the a o dvance to Mosc w . TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE CAU SES OF WAR — PAGE Maritime Equilibrium The Ambition of Napoleon — — Sea Power The Berlin Decree Napoleon and Poland Policy of Annexation Controversy with Russia

CHAPTER II

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR Napoleon’ s Preparations—Formation of the Grand ’ Army Dav out s Corps Organisation Of Armies Supplies Transport Bridging

Mat erialsﬁ Further O - I — rganis—ation ntelligence Preparations of the Tzar Russian Plans ’ — Napoleon s Plan Napoleon at Dresden

CHAPTER III

THE OPPOSING FORCES

The Grand Army Character of the Army ’ — Dav out s Corps The French Leaders The Russian Armies Character of the Russian Army System of Enlistment Martial Q ualities Russian Cav alry Artillery The

— - — Cossacks Russian Ofﬁc ers Staff Administra tion Russian Commanders Po sitions of Opposing Armies

ix x CON TE N TS

CHAPTER IV PAGE THE THEATRE OF WAR

CHAPTER V

THE INVASION o r LITHU ANIA — — — General Distribution Russians French Napoleon — on the Niemenw Fo rwardMov ement Passage of — ’ — the Riv er Napoleon s Plan Further Advance — The Russians surprised General Russian — — ’ Retreat French Adv anc e Napoleon s Disposi Hons- Movements of the King of Westphalia ’ — B a gratio n s Retreat Pursuit of Bagration- m Weather Conditions Difﬁculties of Supply and Transport—Comments

CHAPTER VI

THE ADVANCE To THE DWINA ’ — — ’ Napoleon s Plan The Russians at Drissa Oudino t s — ’ — Adv ance Macdonald s Mov ements Napoleon — leav es Vilna The Mov ement towards Vitebsk — Action at Ostrovno Napoleon at Ostrovno — Operations at Vitebsk Forward Mov ement

O - Oudino perations —against Bagration t and Wittgenstein Movements of Schwarzenberg Comments

CHAPTER VII

FROM THE DWINA TO THE DNIEPER — Napoleon at Vitebsk Distribution of the Frenc h — — Forc es Russians assume the Offensive Skir ﬂ mish at Ink o v o French Dispositions- Russian — ’ Movements Napoleon s Advance- Passage Of — the Dnieper Cav alry Action at Kra sno i Russian Dispositions—Comments C ON TE N TS xi

CHAPTER VIII

THE BATTLE OF SMOLENSK PAGE — ’ — Smolensk Ra ev ski s defensiv e Measures Napoleon — arriv es before Smolensk French Dispositions ’ — Russian Pla nsﬁ B a gra tio n s Retreat Attack on Smolensk Russian Retirement Napoleon — ’ enters Smolensk Barclay s Retreat continued — — — Action at Lubino Comments The Decision to advance on Moscow

CHAPTER I!

THE ADVANCE TO BORODINO Russian Desire for Battle French Pursuit Napoleon leaves Smo lenskﬁ Mea sures in Re ar — Russian Retreat c ontinued Kutuzov assumes — — Command Action at Shiv a rdino Position of — — Borodino Oc cupation of the Position The Opposing Forces French Dispositions Napoleon’ s Orders

CHAPTER X THE BATTLE OF BORODINO

N o Shiva rdinO—A c Ru apole n—at tta k—on the ssian Left E ugene takes Borodino Renewed Attack — on Russian Left Ney assaults the Left ’ Ru R u —Po nia tov ski s ssians—retake the edo bts Advance The Battle at Semyo no vska ya — ’ French capture the Left Redoubts Mura t s C v C —C u Sem o no v ka a a alry harge ap—t re of y s y Po nia to v ski at U titz a The Battle in the Centre — — ’ Reinforcement of the Russian Left U v a ro v s — Cav alry Charge Renewed Attack on the Centre ’ —C ur Ra ev ski s — The a—pt e of —Battery Battle ends Russian Position Comments xii CONTENTS

CHAPTER ! I

THE OCCU PATION o r MOSCOW — P AGE Russian Retreat The Russians abandon Moscow N M c —The ap—oleon enters os ow Burning of the City Russian March to Podolsk- Pursuit by — French Adv anced Guard Frenc h Mov ements

- — Napoleon proposes Peace Measures for the — ’ Future Napoleon s Appreciation Of the Situa — — tion The Q uestion of Retreat Action at V v —Ev u M s —O n inko o a—c ation of o cow peratio s on the Dwina E vents in Vo lhynia CHAPTER ! II

FROM MOSCOW To MALOYAROSLAVE TZ — March of the Grand Army Kutuzov leav es Tarutino 2 Maloyaro sla ve tz - Advance or Retreat Retreat—Comments CHAPTER XIII THE RETREAT To SMOLENSK — The March to Vyazma Russian Mov ements Napoleon at Vyazma—News from the Wings ’ Napoleon s Measures Retreat c ontinued ’ — — Kutuz o v s Pursuit Battle of Vyazma Diﬁi — ’ — culties of the March Kutuz o v s Plans Retreat ’ S —N R u —The P to mole—nsk ey s earg ard assage of the Vo p Russian Operations CHAPTER ! IV

FROM SMOLENSK To Bo RIso v — Retreat from Smolensk Arrival at Krasnoi ’ — Napoleon s Resolution Battle of Kra sno i ’ — Ney s Rearguard From Kra sno i to Borisov ’ — — ha o v M v —Action at Borisov Chic g s o ements Disposition of Opposing Forces CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER ! V

THE PASSAGE o r THE BEREZINA — PAGE The Point of Passage Construction of Bridges — — 26th November 27th No v ember Capture of F D vi —P c — a rench i si—on assage ontinued Battle of the Berezina Repulse of Russians on both Banks—Comments—Napoleon on the Berezina

CHAPTER ! VI

FROM THE BEREZINA TO THE NIEMEN

R f —N v the etreat r—om the Berezina apoleo—n lea es Army The Army reaches Vilna Passage of the Niemen—Ney’ s Last Stand—Macdonald’ s — ’ Retreat Schwarzenberg s Retirement CHAPTER XVII

THE CAU SES OF FAILU RE 1 Ma T r . p of the heat e of Operations .

Ma O p to illustrate the perations round Smolensk.

P l E i lan of Smo ensk and its nv rons .

The BOro dino Battle of .

From Moscow to Smolensk.

P Berez ma assage . L EO N ’ S IN VA O F RU SSIA

AP I CH TER1,

THE CAUSES OF WAR — — Ma ritim e E ui i rium Th e Am itio n o f Na o leo n S e a P o we r — q l b — b p — Th e B e rli—n De c re e Na po le o n a n d P o lan d P o lic y o f An n e x a tio n Co n t ro v e rsy With R u ssia

MARITIME equilibrium is no less a part of the balance of Thi power than Continental equilibrium . s truth , recog

nised Maritime by Napoleon, but ignored by other E quilibrium Powers on the Continent during the struggles

‘ wa s of the Napoleonic epoch , at the base of the causes which led up to the invasion of Russia it was the funda mental reason Of the prolonge d contest between England

and France and it is the prime factor in world - politics

- to day .

T ma hus , although Napoleon had made himself ster

r S O in continental Eu ope , his power was insecure long

n as English ships could sail the seas u challenged , and

stand between him and the dominion of the world . And war with Russia arose in the ﬁrst instance from A I ’ 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

l the establishment of his continenta system , by which he hoped to destroy the maritime supremacy of England . While this and other factors contributed to annul the P eace of Tilsit , the immediate cause of hostilities lay in the ambition of the Man whose war eagles The Ambi tio n o f were carried from Madrid to Moscow, and who Na pd e o n occupied in turn the most important capitals o of Europe . In all pr bability he looked beyond Russia A E into sia , for even after his expedition to gypt the

- o i th E e glamour e ast had always attract d him , Since the days when he said My glory is already at an end ; there is not enough of it in this little Europe . I must t go to the Eas ; all great glory comes from there . This predilection for Orientalconquest cropped up co ntinually throughout his career . It was the motive of his treaty

o f P 180 wa s with the Shah ers ia in 7. It discussed at

T Tz A 0 An ilsit with the ar lexander in 18 8 . expedition

wa s e to Egypt to sail from Corfu , while the united armi s A of Russia , France and ustria were to march on India . In the same year he instructed his librarian to collect memoirs about the campaigns Which have taken place on

r P the Euph ates and against the arthians , beginning with that of Crassus down to the eighth century to mark A on maps the route which each army followed . gain in 1811 we ﬁndhim considering expeditions against Egypt d an . his Ireland If these succeeded , he would extend

’ 4 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

21st 1806 Berlin of November , instituted his continental ” wa s system , according to which not only England de

c lared The B erlin in a state of blockade , but all commerce De cr e e and all relations with Great Britain were forbidden in countries occupied by the French armies

them a s and llies , and all merchandi e and manufactures of Great Britain and her colonie s were declared con

ﬁscated . In addition , all Continental ports were to be closed to English Shipping .

RussIa , detached from England at the Treaty of Tilsit ,

e a which followed on the Fri dland Campaign , became subscriber to this system , while the Tzar succumbed to the genius and the personality of Napoleon . In the rearrangement of Europe which followed on the T Jena Campaign and the meeting at ilsit , the Grand

o f Na po le o n Duchy of Warsaw was created out the d P 0 13 “ a n P set Polish provinces torn from russia . To P ff up a kingdom of oland would be an o ence to the Tzar, and Napoleon agreed that he would never establish such t a kingdom , and would not fur her enlarge the duchy . wi Having settled th Russia , he turned to Spain and

wa s Portugal , from which his attention again diverted A T l by fresh hostilities with ustria . here fol owed the P s A eace of Vienna after the events of Rati bon , spern and Wagram . One of the clauses of the new treaty provided for the cession of half of Galicia to the Duchy of

Warsaw, which was thus elevated into the dimensions of THE CA USE S OF WAR 5

a . r small kingdom This measure , in di ect contravention

to the engagements made at Tilsit , alarmed the Tzar of e w Russia , who r monstrated in vain ith Caulaincourt , A the French mbassador . It was now clear that Napoleon aspired to universal

Empire . He espoused the daughter of the Austrian

P o licy of Emperor , after a union with the Russian Anne x a tiw Ann Grand Duchess e had been considered . 18 10 In the same year , , he issued decrees annexing Rome ,

Holland , and the German coast to Hamburg and Lubeck D on the Baltic , which involved the expulsion of the uke

ur - in - o f z ni of Oldenb g , brother law the T ar , whose dig ty

as ur w thus f ther offended .

A f acc o m long diplomatic correspondence ollowed ,

anied h p by mutual complaints and recriminations . T e

Co ntro vers y Tzar complained of the aggrandisement of Wit Russ a h i t he Duchy of Warsaw In contravention of the

A Of ur rticles of Tilsit , the treatment of the Duke Oldenb g and the ann exation of North Germany to the French

n Empire . Napoleo taxed him in return with failure to

observe the Continental system . But these negotiations hi only prolonged the period of preparation for war . W le the Tzar cannot be exonerated from all blame for the

ni rupture of peace , it was ma fest that Napoleon desired A war . He could count on the support of ustria . He

P e proposed , in order to gain over the oles , to r establish

Of P of had the kingdom oland at the expense Russia , who 6 NAP OLE ON ’ S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A a r r o f wa s a bso bed the g eater part her territory . He in

P co position to coerce russia . He hoped to obtain the

O o f wa s peration or at least the neutrality Sweden , which

a f and ruled by Bern dotte , a ormer marshal of France , thus secure the left flank o f his advance while on the right Russia wa s engaged on the Danube in war with

o f Turkey, the continuance which might be ensured by e wis diplomacy . CHAPTER II

PRE PARATIONS FOR WAR

’ — Na po leo n s P re pa ra tio n s Fo rm a tio n o f th e Gran d Army ’ Da v o ut s Co rps Orga n is a tio n o f Armie s Supplies Tra n spo rt B ridgin g Ma te ria ls Fu rthe r Orga nisa tio n

- — In te lligen c e - P re pa ra tio n s o f th e Tz a r R ussian P l ans ’ — Na po le o n s P la n Na po le o n a t Dre s den

’ NAPOLEON S preparations for war with Russia began with the calling out fo r service In December 1810 of the 1811 ’ conscripts of , to the number of Na po leon s ara f i gggg men . The Emperor next undertook the ort ﬁcatio n of Dantzig and the strengthening of At ’ its garrison . the end of June 1811 Davout s corps o f at observation on the Elbe , having headquarters

Hamburg , was strengthened to over men ; in July the cavalry was reorganised and a regiment of

wa s A Po lish lancers raised at Warsaw . By ugust Davout

had men ; the Saxon corps , and the troops of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw numbered In October the number of French troops in Northern

r r Germany, together with the ga risons of the fo tresses

on the Oder , reached nearly men . There were di U in ad tion men in camp at trecht , of whom 7 8 NAP OLE ON ’S I NVAS I ON OF RU SSI A

nf were sent to rei orce Davout , and the garrison of Dantzig numbered over This raised the strength of the French troops in North Germany to who could in a Short time be Fo rma tio n o f the Grand reinforced by over men from the Army nf Co ederation of the Rhine . By the end of 1811 Napoleon had available to deal with Russia

men , exclusive of the garrisons of Stettin and Glogau , In December a decree was issued fo r conscripts for the army and for the

ﬂeet . a n A The artillery p rks , which had bee at ugsburg and U lm w A 1809 Since the war ith ustria in , were transferred

s to Dantzig and the fortres es on the Oder , where there A 1811 were French garrisons . lready in the Spring of sma ll arms and a considerable number of guns had been despatched to Warsaw . The foundation of the Grand Army for the invasion ’ o f Russia was formed by Davout s corps , which was a

’ Da vo ut s model of organisation and administration . C °’ 5 P When Napoleon informed the Marshal that

he would have to operate in a desolate country , in all

probability laid waste by the enemy , and must be ready

to maintain his army corps , that experienced warrior

replied with an enumeration of all his preparations . His

men were provided with supplies fo r twenty - ﬁve

days . Each company included swimmers , masons , P RE P ARATI ONS FOR WAR 9

un a rtiﬁcers bakers , tailors , Shoemakers , g smiths , in fact t of every description . They carried every hing with them ; his army was like a colony Every want had been fore seen , and the means of supplying it prepared , even down

ha ndmills to for grinding corn .

ﬁn insuﬂic ient Napoleon , ding the annual conscription

ﬁll ur to the ranks of his armies , took meas es to collect the conscripts of previous years who had evaded service ,

mn f some in number . Movable colu s were ormed fo r this purpose and many thousands added to the army in a short time .

a wi While negoti tions th the Tzar were prolonged , the army of the Rhine was formed in rear of Davout’ s corps

v of obser ation , destined to be placed under Orgams a tio n 9 f mm co and of Ney , recalled from Spain , and Armies Oudino t The P . Viceroy , rince Eugene in

Pr Po niato vski Italy , ince in the Grand Duchy of

n x Warsaw, the Ki g of Sa ony and other princes Of the Confederation of the Rhine were directed to

r keep thei troops in readiness . Napoleon paid no less attention to the organisation of Supplies , which pre f sented great dif iculties . He intended to collect in ’ Dantzig a year s supply for or men . For this purpose General Rapp was ordered S upplies to see to the collection of wheat , and , as soon as war became inevitable , vast quantities of oats D a . and all the hay obtainable were purch sed antzig , ’ .I O NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

Magdeburg and Ma intz were chosen for the storage of these supplies . Thus Napoleon succeeded in collecting vast stores o f provisions and forage at a point near the prospective theatre Of operations but he had a still greater difﬁculty — to contend with the provision of means for the transport

a T of these supplies with the rmy . here were eight transport battalions of some 1500 biscuit T ranspo rt fo waggons , drawn by ur horses and requiring ’ s h two drivers each , carrying three day supplies for eac

- c rts kn wn ch rs la om . a o a a c battalion Light one horse , as p ’ toise ne , carrying o day s supply , and bullock waggons , were obtained and organised into four battalions o f one hOrse carts and ﬁv e battalions o f ox waggons the former é were formed in Franche Compt , the latter in Lombardy ,

P The - Germany and oland . advantage of the one horse carts consisted in their lightness and in their requiring only one driver for several horses , which were accustomed to follow one another ; while the ox waggons ~ could move over the worst roads and the oxen required little attention and would serve for food in case of scarcity . 5 000 6000 These seventeen battalions , with or carts , were sufﬁcient for the transport of two months’ supply

Of The food for men . Emperor calculated that

fﬁ fo r these supplies would su ce , the troops would subsist on the provisions collected at Dantzig and other places i as far as the Niemen . Having arrived on the N emen

’ 1 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

Oudinot In the meantime the French troops of Davout , and Ney, and the allied forces of the Confederation of the Rhine and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw were Furthe r Org a nis a organised and supplied with everything tio n necessary for their arduous march ; and Napoleon directed Prince Eugene with the Italian army A to prepare for the passage of the lps . Counting on the A friendship of ustria , he transferred to Lombardy almost all the troops remaining in Illyria and the kingdom o f e Naples . Three battalions w re chosen from each of the

wa s best regiments , and an army of French troops

d wa s thus forme , which , reinforced by Italians , de

s 4th tailed for the march to Ru sia . The remaining ( and 5th l ) battalions of regiments , together with some who e ’ Mura t s regiments and Neapolitan army, were left for

e o f a the d fence Italy . In addition a reserve army w s f f ormed rom some Italian and Illyrian regiments , to replace the Imperial Guard and Polish troops which were A to march to Russia . mong other war preparations wa s

’ the organisation of 214 c o mpanles of Custom s Coast

s guards , which were to replace the troop guarding the coasts of France .

P - reparing for an expedition to a little known country, Napoleon made every effort to obtain all possible informa di tion about Russia , and rected the printing I nte llig enc e of a map of a hundred sheets of the western regions of Russia , with a translation of the names of places P RE P ARATI ONS FOR WAR 1 3 into French this map was distributed to many of his

. P generals French agents in Russia , among them revost ,

S r e ecretary of the Embassy, were di ected to coll ct detailed sta tistical information regarding the Governments of

Lithua ma ur P Mohilev Estland , , Co land , skov, Vitebsk , ,

n Vl Bielo sto k Vo lh nla P Mi sk, i na , Grodno , , y , Kiev, odolsk a nd Kherson . His care in obtaining information about the theatre of operations is noteworthy and instructive Thus his private secretary writes to the librarian : I request

M . Barbier to send me for his Majesty a few good books ,

r most suitable for studying the natu e of the soil of Russia ,

ni and especially of Lithua a , with respect to its marshes ,

s . rivers , fore ts and roads His Majesty also desires to ’ O btain works that treat most minutely of Charles XII . S ” P And The campaign in oland and Russia . again , Em

eror u p requires a history of Co rland , as well as all that

O a can be bt ined as to the history , geography and topo ” ni graphy of Riga , Livo a , etc . T hese measures of preparation for war , presenting us with a spectacle o f the marvellous organising powers of i Napoleon , are scarcely less remarkable and nstructive than his strategical conceptions . ’ The Tzar Alexander s preparations began as soon a s

P re ara p the designs of Napoleon became apparent , tro ns o f the T z a r but lllS measures were delayed by the war

T . with urkey, which had been in progress several years ’ 1 4 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSS I A

These preparations included the reconnaissance of the

‘ prospective theatre o f war the strengthening of im portant points the completion o f the military establish ment , and organisation of the reserves the establish

‘ hOS itals and ment of depots , magazines , p parks on a war

r i r scale . Riga , Bob u sk and Kiev were to be st engthened ;

Dina bur S g and ebezh , where it was intended to collect

and ﬁ large supplies of provisions forage , were to be forti ed ; fortiﬁed camps were established on the Dv ina at Drissa

D - a and on the nieper at Kiev, and a bridge he d on the

Of Berezina at Borisov . The greater part these works , the fortiﬁcation of Mosta on the Niemen and the construction

‘ ” tete dc ant Seltz a Ya sio ld the of a p at on the , for improve ment of the communications between the different parts 18 2 1 . of the army , were still in progress in the spring of

But there was not time to complete all the proposed works . During the period under review considerable additions had been made to the strength of the Russian army .

F the resh units had been added to all arms , to number of

74 ns 11 3 battalio , Squadrons , companies of artillery ; this

! increase involved an augmentation of men . The strength of the army at the beginning of 1812 amounted

155 2 a s to men and guns , organised follows

Infantry 5 14 battalions Cavalry 4 10 squadro ns Artillery 15 9 companies Engineers 6 battalions P RE P ARA TI ONS FOR WAR 1 5

By J une 1812 the strength was inc reased to 1600 A men and guns . great part of the Russian army was scattered on the conﬁnes of the Empire when

a subse Napoleon w s ready for the invasion . But the quent conclus ion of peace with Turkey a nd Of a treaty of wi S alliance th weden , whereby considerable forces were set free to act against the invaders , must be counted ’ among the most important of the Tzar s measures Of preparation . It will be seen that the course of the operations rendered

R v many of the ussian magazines useless , and pro ed the futility of the selection of Drissa as a base for the Army

wa s of the West . Jomini tells us that there a great

v ni s T di ergence of opi on among the Ru sian generals . his ,

' ui hr the c a m a i n led contin ng t oughout p g , to disputes and recriminations whic h could not but react unfavourably f on the conduct O the operations . Bagration was in

O n Russ ia n favour of taking the ffensive , invadi g the P lans Duchy of Warsaw , and disputing the country between the Vistula and the Niemen . Barclay wished to await the enemy on the Niemen the Prussian Staff

ﬂic er O P fuhl , who had much inﬂuence in the Russian

n A cou cils , had persuaded the Tzar lexander to construct ﬁ D P a vast forti ed camp at rissa , on the road to St eters

W wa s w burg , to hich the main army to retire and a ait N ’ apoleon s decisive attack . With regard to this plan , we may quote Napoleon’ s dictum that an army ’ 1 6 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A which remains behind its entrenchments is already ” beaten . Even In those days the Press Showed indiscretion in

mIddle the publication of military details . Thus in the of June The Germa n Gaz ette at St Petersburg published in detail the situation of all the R ussian troops on the frontier from the Baltic to Slonim

N r apoleon , appa ently aware of these dispositions , resolved to pass the Niemen at the salient point of

’ i Na po lo e n s Kovno , which was conven ent for his project P la n iercm of p g the Russian centre , and then

In defeat their separated forces succession .

9th for On the May Napoleon left St Cloud Dresden , l6th where he arrived on the . Here he held court such

i A N a po le o n a t as had not been seen S nce the Middle ges , n Dre s de n i G attended by the ki gs and pr nces of ermany ,

his dwer A who were made to feel p and his superiority . suc c essIOn fétesi a nd of splendid , concerts , performances

t e elite P at the theatre , for which h of the actors of aris

i Dr 11 f relude t o had been brought to , ormed a p the

a s great tragedy on which n w about to rise . While at Dresden Napoleon heard of the Tzar ’ s arrival

ﬁ t o at Vilna , and sent an envoy to make nal overtures

r returiied 28th A . lexander His messenge on the May . His overtures were without result and on the 29th May

1812 Napoleon left Dresden for the front . CHAPTER III

THE OPPOSING FORCES

— — ’ Gran d Army Cha ra cte r Of th e A rm y Da v o ut s Co rps Th Fren L r — m i — a ra c te r o f e c h e a de s —Th e R ussia n A r es Ch th e R us sia n A rm y S yste m o f E nlistm en t Ma rt ia l — — — Q ua litie s R ussia n Ca v a lry A rtille ry Th e Co ss a c ks R u sian fﬁ c e rs — t a f —A m inist ratio n —R ussian Co m s —O S f d m an de rs P o sitio n o f Oppo sin g Fo rc e s

THE army of invasion was organised a s follows

THE G A A M THE E O N O EON The Grand R ND R Y . MPER R AP L Army Chief of the Staff—Berthier

THE G A U RDS . Old Guard Marshal Lefebvre 10 battalions Young Guard Marshal Mortier 3 2 battalions Legion of the Vistula 12 battalions Cavalry Marshal Bessieres 3 5 squadrons Reserve Artillery Count Corbier I . CORPS .

M s D v u 88 16 ar hal a o t, battalions, squadrons Morand 17 battalions Friand 17 Gudin 18 De ssaix 13 Compans 23 Girardin l 6 squadrons I 7 ’ 1 8 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

CO RPS .

M s Oudino t 5 1 i 20 d ar hal , battal ons, squa rons Legrand 17 battalions Verdier 15 Merle 19 Co rbino t 20 squadrons O C RPS .

M 48 li 24 u arshal Ney, batta ons, sq adrons Ledra 17 battalions Ra z o ut 17 Marchand 14 Volvart 24 squadrons I V O S C . . RP P c n V I 5 7 rin e E gene, iceroy of taly, battalions, 24 squadrons

Lechchi 5 t 8 ba talions, squadrons Delz o ns 19

Bro usSier 18 Pino 15 Guion 16 squadrons V O . C RPS .

P P o nia to vski 44 20 r rince , battalions, squad ons Zaio nchek 16 battalions Do mbro vski 16

Knia z evich 12 Kaminski 20 squadro ns O C RPS .

M r St C r 28 16 d s a shal y , battalions, squa ron Deroy 15 battalions Wrede 13 Light Cavalry 16 squadrons

’ s o NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R USSI A

The invading army was composed of troops of various nations and unequal quality . Marbot says that the

un Cha ra c ter army which crossed the Niemen amo ted °f the Army to men actually present , of whom ” were French . He considered that the tone o f the French troops was lowered by mingling foreign

T ﬁr regiments with them . hus the st corps commanded

D 1st o f by Marshal avout reckoned on June men ,

o f whom were French , the balance consisting ’ P s udino t s . O Germans , Spaniards and ole In corps 1600 P 1800 with French there were ortuguese , ’ C 7000 o roats and Swiss . In Ney s corps the prop rtion o f French was even smaller , while in the fourth and Sixth

auh corps , united under Eugene Be arnais , the French

one composed less than half , the remainder being Croats ,

ni o f Bavarians , Spa ards , Dalmatians and Italians and the cavalry under Murat only were French

Of the foreigners all served very badly , and ten ” paralysed the efforts of the French troops . According to another authority twenty nations were represented in the ranks of the Grand Army . Thus out

605 n 299 of battalio s of infantry , , comprising 306 men , were French , and battalions , or men, belonged to other nations . This admixture , however ex c ellent the elements composing it may have been , did not

ﬂi n . make for e cie cy in discipline or facility in command

Of the cavalry , were French and foreigners . THE OP P OSI NG F ORCE S 21

The French veteran tr0 0 ps had taken part in many

ns hi campaig , had attained a gh state of discipline and were possessed of most warlike qualities . Their cavalry contained a great many recruits and young horses un ﬁtted to bear the vicissitudes of a distant campaign involving many hardships .

4 - n wa s The artillery, largely armed with pou ders , inferior to that of the Russians . Many batteries were

dl wa s ba y horsed , and in the Russian territory that occupied scarcely any remoun ts were obtain able to replace the great number of animals lost from the very

nni begi ng of the campaign , involving the abandonment of guns .

vic1ssitudes The French troops , mured to war by the o f in many campaigns , well trained , well equipped , and

r spi ed by the greatest soldier the world has ever seen ,

ﬁ e . At s were the nest in Europ the same time, the uperior the ﬁ . of cers were in some cases tired of war , and possibly mora l of the troops was not at this time quite as high a s

ur A it had been , for example, d ing the usterlitz Campaign . The French were still recruited on the general system established after the Revolution but they were far better i u trained , eq pped and organised than when Napoleon ﬁrst commanded an army in the campaign of Italy Sixteen

The t - o f years before . establishmen the Empire eight years previously had enhanced the power and prestige

N his of apoleon , whose troops were inspired by presence . ’ 22 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A — They possessed that which is half the battle co nﬁdence

r in themselves and thei commanders , and in the certainty

Of ur w victory . They end ed fatigue and privation ith remarkable constancy . They were active and enter

r Of prising , wonde ful marchers , superior intelligence , and

r o f most susceptible to appeals to thei love glory . They knew well how to adapt themselves to groun d and take a The i Oﬂicers dvantage of its natural features . reg mental r h we e excellent , and constantly wit their men , to whose training and well - being they devoted all their time and interest . The cavalry consisted o f heavy and light horse cui ra ssICrs , dragoons , hussars and mounted chasseurs .

r s They were armed with sab e and pistol , and in ome cases

n ni with carbines . Regime ts were orga sed in four

r Squadrons . Brigades were variable in st ength . The dragoons were principally employed in reconnoitring and in outpost duties .

was its ﬁre c o noc The artillery generally massed , being n trated Co - on points of attack . operation betweenthethree arms was thoroughly underst ood ; the artillery especi ally had learned to give close support to t he infantry . The gunners were armed with musket and bayonet .

Troops were well clothed and shod , and , as will be seen , close attention was given to the commissariat , although

hi diﬂiculties t s broke down owing to the of the campaign .

r a a The infant y was rmed with ﬂint gun , effective from THE OP P OSI NG FORCE S 23

un dr a h dred to two hun ed yards , but ranging double di that stance . In action the light troops advanced Skirmishing in extended order and taking advantage Of all cover behind them followed the infantry in formed b di r o es in two or th ee lines , the attack being made

o generally in column. In these man euvres , in deploy ments , and in Skirmishing and attack in column with

s ﬁ the bayonet , the troop had acquired great pro ciency . De Segur gives an interesting account of the interior ’ e economy of the divisions of Davout s corps , which wer

’ Da vo ut s a model for the rest of the army, the result o w l’s being that on the march to Moscow, they reta ined the fullest complement of men their detach

s n di u ment , being u der better scipline , bro ght back larger

ur supplies , and at the same time inﬂicted less inj y upon

a ur the inhabit nts . Those who stayed with the colo s k lived upon the contents of their napsacks , the clean and well- husbanded stores of which afforded relief and re freshment to the eye which was absolutely harassed by

a s the view of the general disorder each of these kn psack , limited to what was strictly necessary in the articles of

hi a r e wi clot ng , cont ined two Shirts , two pai s of Sho s , th

r a nails and soles to repai them , a pair of canvas pant loons

Of n ni and also gaiters , some ute sils for clea ng , a strip of t linen for dressing wounds , some lint , and six y cartridges . hi In the two sides were placed four biscuits , weig ng at the sixteen ounces each ; beneath , and bottom , a ’ 24 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A long and narrow canvas bag was filled with ten pounds fi of flour . The whole knapsack thus constituted and lled ,

- e together with the straps and oil case covering , weigh d

hi - un t rty three po ds twelve ounces .

Each soldier carried besides , attached to a belt , a canvas bag containing two loaves weighing three pounds wi r each . Thus th his sabre, his loaded cartridge box , th ee

flints - fift - , turn screw , belt and musket , he carried y eight ’ f pounds weight , and had bread for our days , biscuit for four days , flour for seven days and Sixty musket

C harges . In his rear there were carriages containing provisions fo r Six days but little dependence could be placed on

r ffe these vehicles , which we e taken up in the di rent places which the army came to in the state in which they were f ound , and would have been extremely convenient in a

f n a nd dif erent cou try , with a smaller army a more Slow and regular system of warfare .

ﬂo ur- ﬁ When the bag was empty , it was lled again

r r with any grain that could be procu ed , which was g ound

' ﬁ ro a d o r - at the rst mill found on the , by hand mills , which followed in the train of every regiment , or were to be met wi th in the villages , for these people in fact scarcely have At any others . one of these mills the labour of Sixteen men was required for twelve hours to grind one day ’ s supply of corn for a hundred and thirty men .

In a n this country , every house being provided with THE OPP OSI NG FORCE S 25

i v . o en , the army felt but l ttle want in that respect Bakers abounded the regiments of the ﬁrst corps com prised artisans of every description , so that victuals , clothes , everything , in Short , could be prepared or mended

ur T among themselves in the co se of the march . hey , in fact , constituted colonies combining civilised with

’ The pastoral life . original suggestion was the Emperor s , D and avout acted upon it . Opportunities , situations , and men had been eminently fav ourable to him for accomplishing the object but the other chiefs had these di elements of success less at their sposal . Besides which , their more impetuous and less methodical characters would probably have prevented their acting on the same plan with anything like the same advantage . With a

i ni gen us less orga sing and systematic they had , therefore ,

r The E greater obstacles to su mount . mperor had not

suﬂic ient paid attention to these distinctions , and the ” consequences of this neglect were highly injurious . Most of the French generals had already borne a

s di tinguished part in many campaigns . Jerome , the N Th e F re nc h brother whom apoleon had made King of Lea ders Westphalia , was no soldier his appointment

mi - ff was a stake which had far reaching e ects , although he did not remain long with the army . Nepotism was ’ A contrary to the Emperor s practice , and prior to uster l T itz he had said In the army there are no princes . here

o ﬂic ers s are men , , colonels , general , and there is a ’ 26 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R US SI A

Commander - in - Chief who must be more capable than ” v all others and stand far abo e them .

Eugene de Beauharnais , Viceroy of Italy , was a brave and capable commander .

r di k- Mu at , King of Naples , was a Splen d leader of cava y ,

ur i — possessing unsurpassed co age , activ ty and dash but was no general . Ever at the head of the advanced guard ,

ﬁr n ﬁre Of and st u der , his appearance in front the troops served as a signal for battle . In a green tunic heavily

sur faced with gold and a cap with a tall red feather , roun ded by a brilliant staff including anArab dressed as hi a mameluke , t s fearless warrior aroused the enthusiasm

Of his troops and the wonder of the Cossacks , who often

e him greet d with cheers . Davout was cold and methodical although animated

r ff by the spi it of the o ensive in battle , he left nothing to

His Auersta dt l . ed chance victory at , on the day of Jena , Napoleon to refer to him in his bulletin as of distin

uished v a ﬁrmn g bra ery , and gre t ess of character , the

Of ﬁrst quality a warrior . His services were scarcely E less distinguished at Ratisbon, ylau and Wagram . His wisdom was equally remarkable in the administration of ﬁ his command and on the eld of battle .

The h a s times were favourable for , as been truly said , only in great political cataclysms are men of character and talent likely to ﬁnd a fair Opportunity Of rising pro fessio na ll y above the general dead level . Such times

’ 28 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

hi energy and capacity for work , t s system proved

ff s e ective . But later it led to a neglect of nece sary details .

T he Russian The Russian forces were disposed in three Armies armies as follows

FIRST WESTE RN ARMY U NDER GENERAL BARCLAY DE TOLLY — lst Corp s Lieutenant- General Count Wittgenstein : 28 16 u 3 C c i battalions, sq adrons, ossa k reg ments, 9 m a i i 1 c m 2 co p n es art llery, o pany pioneers, pontoon m anl co es . p — 2nd Cor s L - G Ba vo t 24 p . ieutenant eneral gge o : bat i 8 d 7 m i s i tal ons, squa rons, co pan e art llery . 3 rd Cor sQ—L u —G Tuc v 24 i p ie tenant eneral hko battal ons, 4 1 C s c i 7 m squadrons, o sa k reg ment, co panies

artillery . — l 4i Cor - h p s. Lieutenant General Count Shuvalo v z 23 n 8 u 6 c m n battalio s, sq adrons, o pa ies artillery . 5 ih Reserve Cor s —HI E G Du C i p . the rand ke onstant ne P v vi : 26 i 20 s d 6 c m ie a lo ch battal ons, qua rons, o pan s i 1 m art llery, co pany pioneers . — 6ih Cor s G Dokhturo v : 24 n 8 p eneral battalio s, u 7 m i sq adrons, co pan es artillery . — 13 25 Cava lry Corp s Lieutenant- General U varov : 20 uad 1 m ti sq rons, co pany horse ar llery .

2nd Cava br Cor s —M - y p . aj or General Baron Korf : 24 s u d 1 m s i q a rons, co pany hor e art llery .

3rd Cava lr Cor s —M - G P 24 y p . aj or eneral Count alen : 1 c m il squadrons, o pany horse art lery . 1 Suc c e e de d in J uly by Lie ute nan t - Ge ne ral Co unt Oste rma n o s o i T l t . THE OP P OSI NG FORCE S 29

Li ht Troo s —G A m P v : 14 u g p eneral ta an lato sq adrons , 4 m i co panies art llery .

T n 5 5 otal : me and 8 guns .

SECOND WESTERN ARMY UNDER GENERAL PRINCE BAGRATION — 7th Cov Li u - Ra v ki 24 s s. G e s : p e tenant eneral battalion , 8 d i s 7 m i . qua rons, co pan es art llery — 8th Cor s Li ut - G Bo rOz din : 22 p . e enant eneral battalions, 20 u 5 m i i sq adrons, co pan es art llery . — 4th Ca va lry Coma Maj or- General Coun t Siv ers : 24 u 1 m i 1 i sq adrons, co pany art llery, company p oneers, 1 pontoon company . Reserve A rtiller —4 m y co panies .

Li ht Tr00 —M r- G Il a iski 9 g p3 . ajo eneral o v : Cossack regi 1 i ments, company art llery .

T : 216 u otal men and g ns .

THIRD RESERVE ARMY OF OB SERVATION GENERAL COU NT TORMASSOV

Cor s —G C u K m i : 18 8 p eneral o nt a ensk battalions, u 4 m i e sq adrons, co panies art ll ry .

Cov s - Lieu - G M v 12 . : p tenant eneral arko battalions, d i 8 u 7 m i . sq a rons, co pan es art llery — Cov s Li u - G S c 12 i p . e tenant eneral Baron a ken battal ons, 24 s u dr 2 c m i i q a o—ns, o pan es art llery . Cava lry Corp s Maj or- General Count Lambert : 3 6 d squa rons . ' Ia ht Troo s —9 ss c g p Co a k regiments . Resevve Artiller —l i c m 1 y art llery o pany , pioneer c m 1 c m o pany, pontoon o pany .

t m n 164 To al : e and guns . ’ 30 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

Grand total of Russian armies men and 1038 guns . Reinforcements joined later , including the army A h of Moldavia under dmiral C ichagov, set free by the

r treaty with Turkey, and the army of Finland unde

n Ge eral Steinheil .

m Sir Of the character of the Russian ar y , Robert

Wilson , who knew it well at this period , wrote The infantry is generally composed of athletic Chara cter o f l us s ia n i h o men between the ages of e g teen and f rty , gim§ w endowed ith great bodily strength , but wi generally of Short stature , th martial countenance and complexion ; inured to the extremes o f weather and hardships ; to the worst and scantiest f ood ; to ’ marches for days and nights , of four hours repose and Six hours ’ progress accustomed to laborious toils and

Of f the carriage heavy burthens erocious , but disciplined ; obstinately brave , and susceptible of enthusiastic excite ments devoted to their sovereign , their chief , and their

em country . Religious without b g weakened by super stitio n ; patient , docile , and obedient ; possessing all the energetic characteristics of a barbarian people , with ” v the ad antages grafted by civilisation . A system of compulsory service ensured the enlistment

The of the best men . magistrates selected the most

eﬂicient di S yste m o f young men accor ng to the required E nlis tment number . The Russian soldier was thus selected from a numerous population, with the greatest THE OP P OSI NG F ORCE S 3 1

attention to his physical powers ; no man even with

e nl bad t eth was e isted .

d Suva ro v In accordance with the tra itions of , the

nf bayonet was the principal weapon of the Russian i antry .

The Ma rtia l French had already experienced their Q ua lities ﬁ A ghting powers in the campaign of usterlitz , 180 and at Friedland and Eylau in 7. The regiments of fa G light in ntry , and especially the chasseurs of the uard , f composed largely of men rom Siberia , were hardy ,

t a nd excellently rained , good marksmen . The footguards , 7000 é numbering some men , were the lite of the army, of

Whom Sir R . Wilson wrote there cannot be a nobler ” corps , or one of more warlike description . The Russian cav alry was said by the same authority to be the best mounted on the Continent , and as

n Russ ia n E glish horses can never serve abroad in Ca va lry 1 English condition , it is the best mounted

ur Af Of in E ope . ter the battle Eylau , when the Imperial cavalry of the guards were ordered from St Petersburg to P join the army in oland , the men were sent in waggons

n as far as Riga , and the horses accompa ied at the rate ﬁ of fty miles each day . From thence they were ridden

- ﬁve 700 mi thirty miles a day for les , and arrived in di good con tion .

he d T cavalry sol iers were brave and intelligent , and 1 At le a st a s lo n g a s th e E n glish c a v —a lry a re n urtured t o re uire w a rm s t a e s ux u ria n t e s e t c . so o n a s e fﬁc ie n c q bl , l b d , —l g y ir R . S N . a bro a d is s a c riﬁ ce d t o a ppe a ra n c e a t ho m e . S WIL O ’ 3 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A had especially distingui shed thems elves at the battles o f

a Eylau and Friedland , where they covered the retre t of the infantry .

u r The R ssians we e strong in artillery , and their guns were well equipped and well served . Four horses drew

the light ﬁeld- pieces and eight and twelve Artillery pounders . The drivers were of high quality, and the artillery was remarkably mobile , and , although they did not attach too much reputation or disgrace to the possession or loss of a gun , few guns were lost in the c a m a1 n in P p g oland .

The o f Cossacks , natives the Don and Volga , merit some notice in an account of a ca mpa1gn in which they i The bore a conspicuous part . Liv ng in semi C °s s a °k s d o wn indepen ence , under their laws , and exempt from taxes , the Cossacks were under an obliga

ﬁve T tion to serve for years with the Russian army . hey were born soldiers who with their ﬁrst a ccents learn to lisp of war . From eight years of age the boys rode fear

- - lessly over the steppe on half wild , bare backed horses . ﬁ On holidays they red at marks , cut posts , and indulged

r in various warlike games , while the long evenings we e passed in listening to tales of raids and adventures with

ﬁr A which the veterans ed the spirits of their sons . rmed

with long lances , guns sabres and pistols , they rode

small but hardy horses lightly equipped , a snafﬂe ,

halter , the tree of a saddle , on which was bound a cushion THE OP P OSI NG FORCE S 33

ff ’ stu ed with the Cossack s property , on which he rode , formed the whole of his baggage . wi Count Benkendorf , who was employed th Cossacks , wrote in 18 16 The Cossack is born with that degree of activity , intelligence , and enterprise that up to the rank of non- commissioned ofﬁcer he is unrivalled but h e degenerates immediately when he is pushed beyond

The - m his place into a higher grade . non com issioned fi of cers are the soul of a regiment of the Don , because they almost always obtain that advancement owing to their ” own merit . No troops were better adapted for night T fi marches than the Cossacks . heir sabres were rmly ' fixed in their girdles they had no spurs and no metal

The to clash against their arms . stars served them as guides and they would get supplies and forage for their horses where other troops would starve . Cossack move ments were very simple , and they had their own peculiar

T e . . tactics . h y generally marched in sections of threes ' The squadron (sotm a ) st andards were united at the head of the column the squadron leaders in front and the other ofﬁcers on the ﬂank . In deploying they formed up A n in single rank . close colum was rapidly reformed on

T r o the centre . hei principal tactical man euvre was the

lava T Ghen iz celebrated , learnt from the artar hordes of g T Khan and aimur , and from the bitter experience of many ﬁ T ﬁ a bloody ght . his consisted in ghting in a loose for mation , tiring out their foes , and drawing them into ’ 34 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

W r 1812 ambuscades . riting in this yea of , the French M Marshal orand said We (the French cavalry) deploy , ir and boldly advance to the attack , and already reach the line but they disappear like a dream and we see only

An the bare pines and birch trees . hour later , when we

o ur a have begun to feed horses , the d rk line of Cossacks e again appears on the horizon , and we are again threat ned

o with an onslaught . We repeat the same man euvre , and , f s as be ore , our operation are not attended with success . Thus one of the best and bravest cavalry forces the world has e ver seen was tired out and disorganised by those

whom it considered unworthy foes , but who were the real

A B ronz evski saviours of their country . gain , wrote In the day of trial the Don Cossacks stood in the ﬁrst t rank of the defenders of their country . The grea deeds performed by them in the war of the fatherland form the

golden epoch of their history , and surpass all the glory

and renown won by them in former campaigns .

T no t hey do appear , however , to have been much more

ﬁ a nd . than ef cient skirmishers , in the attack they dis

played little enterprise and no high order of courage .

But their elusive tactics wore out their opponents .

With the exception of those of the Guards and cavalry , the ofﬁcers of the Russian army had generally little

Rus sian education , a circumstance which reacted Ofﬁce rs especially on the efﬁciency of the infantry of

un the line . But their courage was impeachable, and

’ 36 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

ffi ff The better , for want of an e cient sta . wounded were for the first time dressed on the field of battle at Friedland . In every respect the Russians had gained valuable w was experience in the wars ith Napoleon , and the army now the most formidable with which the great conqueror had had to contend .

The Russians had experienced and capable generals , many of whom had previously met the French at Auster

P . litz and in oland Barclay de Tolly , Minister

o f War , who commanded the First Western

Ar rw my , was cool , straightfo ard and stead

l in f . ast He had exerted himse f army reform , and ﬁ made enemies in the process . His want of con dence in others led him to the performance of many duties which might have been carried out by subordinates .

Like so many distinguished Russians , he was of foreign extraction ; he was regarded with some distrus t a s a f had fﬁ oreigner , and not su cient command of the language to converse with the Russian soldiers . P A rince Bagration , Commander of the Second rmy ,

o Suvaro v was a born warri r who had served under , and f Tur P A a ought in the Caucasus , in key , oland , Italy , ustri and Finland , where he had distinguished himself in every A r action . lways with the advanced gua d or the rear guard , Bagration was tireless in war . Considerate to

hi Suva ro v others , strict towards mself , he knew, like , the

o f his l ur value those under command . Al who s rounded THE OP P OSI NG FORCE S 37 him as as were devoted in his service . He w not well

a s educated Barclay in theory and in administration , but he was more able to inspire his troops .

To rma sso v his , before appointment to the command

T Ar f a d of the hird my , was known as a skil ul military

ni mi strator , with a gift for diplomacy , exhibited a short w P time before in war ith the Turks , and ersians , when he

was Commander - in - Chief of the troops in Gruz ia and o n U the line of the Caucasus . nable to beat his enemy in ﬁ ni s P the eld , he had cun ngly kept the Turk and ersians

a s i apart . He w strict in his relations w th his subordinates , a reg rding zealous service as a duty, and not as entailing

a dis right to tinction or reward .

Count Lambert , who throughout the war generally

ﬁr To rma sso v commanded the advanced guard , st with

and afterwards with Chichagov, was a Frenchman who had left his native country in his youth and entered the

ui a s Russian service . He had disting shed himself and w 1799 severely wounded in the war of , and in the campaign of 1807 he had gained renown as a cavalry general and

advanced guard commander .

- was a Count Wittgenstein , then forty four years old , hi w bold and active warrior , not ghly educated , but ith capacity for command and ability to inspire his troops h his ff by his example , w ile the devotion of sta helped to

render him a formidable opponent . 20th A 1812 Kutuzov, who was on the ugust appointed ’ 38 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

mi wa s to the command of all the Russian ar es , sixty seven years of age , and had scarcely the energy of body and mind requisite for the task before him . The Napoleonic wars had already shown the value of youth in the commanders of armies the failure of Napoleon’ s a dv ersan es hi , and the signs of decline in mself , point to the essential truth of his own dictum that no general ” - ﬁfth has any enterprise after his forty year . Kutuzov was inferior to Barclay de Tolly in a dmini

trati e a s v . w s ability , and to Bagration in activity He experienced and cunning but somewhat dilatory and ﬁ unenterprising . He had , however, the con dence of the

wa s whole army and nation , which lost by Barclay owing

o f to his prolonged retreat , and was thus an asset value .

Milo rado vich i , possess ng many of the qualities of a

ﬁne advanced guard commander , tireless , cool and f cheer ul in the midst of danger , was , however , neglectful of the proper disposition of his troops , and some of his l orders were scarcely intel igible . But he was always to be found at the post of danger . There were many other good commanders among

— s P the Russians O terman , rince Eugene of Wurtemburg ,

Ko no vnitz in Ba ev o o t P A , gg , latov, taman of Cossacks, and the brothers Tuchkov . When the campaign Opened on the 23rd P o sitio ns o f Oppo s ing; June 1812 the o ppo smg armies were posted Am nes as follows THE OP P OSI NG FORCE S 39

RUSSIANS

F A M — d T m n . e e IRST R Y Barclay olly, and 5 5 8 H guns . eadquarters at Vilna

lst Cor s —Wi i K i d m p ttgenste n, at edan etach ent at s i n u ur Ro s a a ; advanced g ard at Yurbo g . 2nd Co a —Ba evo ot Orz hishki dv u m gg , at a anced g ard

at Yanovo . 3rd Co a —T v N v T k v c d m uchko , at o ia ro i ; ad an ed guar at

Visoki Dvor . 4ih Cor s —S v v O i v p hu alo , at lken ki ad anced guard at

Orani. 5 th Cor s —G D C P v v p rand uke onstantine a lo ich, at S e ntz ia ni v .

6th Co a —Dokhturo v L v m m , at ida 5 ad anced guard for ed by the 3 rd Cavalry Reserve Corps under Palen at L ebiuda . — l st Re erv Cava lr Cor s U v V m . s e . y p varo , at ilko ir — 2na Reserve Cava lr Co a K Smo r oni. y m Baron orf, at g

The last two cavalry corps formed the second line of ’ e l t s wa s th First Army . P a o v ﬂying detachment at

Grodno .

A M — n 216 s S O . EC ND R Y Bagratio , men and gun , tw Ni m B u i u t be een the e en and the g, w th headq ar ers i at Vo lko v sk .

— Dv 7th or s Ra evski N v . C p . , at o i or — 8 th or s Bo ro z din Vo lk o visk . C . p , at — ’ Re rv or s Si v Z v . ih ava lr se e . 4 C y C p e ers, at el a

- Detac / nt Ilo vaiski Bielo stok . Fl in hme . y g , at ’ 40 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF RU SSI A

TH M —T r s V lh nl R AR o ma sov o a . I D Y . , in y Headquarters at Lutz k

FRENCH

AP L - H Vilk i hki N O EON. eadquarters at ov s

Guar —A Vilk is hki d t ov . — Cor s D v Pilviski. p — a out, forest of 2na Co a Oudino t . m , in rear 3rd o —Ne in d Ma ri n l C a v e o . m y , a ance at p —E k 4ih Cor u a t O . ps gene, letz o th or s —G St r Tz im h C o n. 6 C . v c e p ou ion y , at lst ava lr e r —Nanso ut C y R serve Co ps. l Between Kovno 2na Montbruii F and reni . 3rd Grouchy

— i J Au usto vo R W . K H d IGHT ING ng erome . ea quarters at g — 5 th Cor s Po nia to vski Au usto vo . p , at g 7th ar —R i Ostr l nk C a o e o . p eyn er, at

8th - V d mm Au ust vo Cor s. o . p an a e, at g

These corps arrived at their destmatio n on the h 25t June .

ih a lr or —L Ma nb ur Au u 4 C va C s. o stovo . y p atour g, at g — L Ma. n d T t W . . EFT ING cdo al , ilsi CHAPTER IV

THE THE ATRE OF WAR

THE western regions of Rus sia and the strip of country from the U pper Dnieper to Moscow formed the theatre 1812 of the war of . Generally the whole western portion

r of the Russian empi e , bounded on the north by the

the Baltic Sea , on west by the Niemen and Bug , on the south by the Dniester and on the east by the Dnieper and

r N thern 1 . or Dwina may be divided into th ee parts The , 1 l to i 2 The Centra l from the Ba tic the forest reg on . . , di lu ng the forest region, together with the marshes

ielo vez h 3 of the Berezina and the B plain . . The

S outhern f , from the orest region to the Dniester and the A n ustria frontier .

is n The northern portion undulati g , intersected by rivers which do no t present formidable obstacles to the

a p ssage of troops , in parts covered with forests , lakes and inextensive marshes the borderland of the Baltic Sea

is has a surface soil of clay , sand and black earth , and fairly productive the part nearest the forest region is fo r the greater part sandy . The region on the right bank

1 I n o l —fo r t r io n Russian p y es iyé es e g . ’ 42 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R US SI A

o f a is the Lower Dwin covered by innumerable lakes , marshes , forests , small hills and streams , which fall into the Dwina of these streams the most important is the

Drissa , which by its direction , parallel to the course of the

Dwina , and owing to the left bank commanding the right , presents an advantageous defens1ve line against an enemy c rossing the Dwina between the town of Drissa and the

U la The i mouth of the River . reg on from Smolensk to ’ Moscow, forming the theatre of operations of Napoleon s

Ar be Grand my , as it approaches the ancient capital , comes more and more open the country is fertile

and well cultivated , and abounds in wheat and other

supplies necessary for an army .

o f The forest region , the country lying in the form a

- triangle between Brest Litovsk , Rogachev and the mouth

P - un of the ripet, presents a strip of low lying , marshy gro d

w s covered ith dense forests , in the mid t of which small

open spaces are met with , characterised by sandy hills ,

and valleys suited for cultivation , in which are a few All hi villages . the rivers of t s region ﬂow between low,

marshy banks , and in spring and autumn overﬂow for a

considerable distance , when they become impassable , or

ﬂat - can be crossed only slowly by means of bottomed

boats and rafts . It will be understood then that , in the ﬁ rst place , the forest region divides the northern and southern parts of the western borderland of the Empire

and in the second place , that that country is Specially

’ 44 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A of P wa s wi St etersburg the Western D na , and towards — Moscow the Berezina and the U pper Dnieper . The Western Dwina presents a highly advantageous defensive line , strengthened at its lower end by the fortress of Riga

ﬁ Dina bur “ s (the forti cations of g had carcely been begun) .

Dinabur Moreover , a hundred versts above g, on the left ﬁ bank of the Dwina , a forti ed camp was established at

Drissa , in which it was proposed to concentrate the main

A Dina bur strength of the Russian army . bove g the t Dwina does not present any considerable obs acle , for the banks are low and the depth is not great , and during a dr y summer fords appear . From Vitebsk to Drissa , and for some distance below the latter point , the left bank f r commands the right arther on , to Riga itself , the ight bank is higher than the left . The width of the river

Dina bur f 180 230 between Vitebsk and g in rom to paces ,

800 e and at Riga , paces . There were bridges at V lizh ,

Dinabur Surazh , Vitebsk , g and Riga ; and ferries at

Budilo va Bieshenko vich U la Po lo tz k a , y , , , Disna , Driss ,

J a c o stadt b . Leonpol , Druya , and Friedrichstadt The River Berezina might serve as a defensive line to wi cover the front between the D na and the Dnieper . 60 That region extends from Vitebsk to Orsha , versts and in width presents a marshy and wooded strip ,

o extending on one side to Syenno , and on the ther to

Po r echi e y y and Smolensk . The region between the Berezina and the Dnieper is still more enclosed and THE THE ATRE OF WAR 45

s The re embles the forest region . supporting points of the defensive line o n the Berezina in 1812 were furnished by

r ﬁ the fortresses of Bob uisk and Borisov, but the rst of

la these y to one side of the main roads to the interior , and could therefore no t exercise a decisive inﬂuence on t the operations the stronghold of Borisov , for wan of time , could not be brought into use , for the engineering

- works were conﬁn ed to the arming of the bridge head . The width of the Berezina from the canal to its junction 0 with the Dnieper varied from 60 to 12 paces . The right bank commands the left , except at Veselovo ,

Studianka i ni- , Borisov and N j Berezina , where the left

bank is higher than the right . Fords are to be found

mn n in summer and sometimes in autu , but ge erally the passage is rendered difﬁcult by marshes extending on

the both banks of river . There were bridges at Borisov

- and Bobruisk ferries at Veselovo , Nijni Berezina , and

other places .

The w River Dnieper , ﬂo ing from Dorogobuzh to Orsha , D almost parallel with the Western wina , and beyond

n Orsha sharply tur ing to the south , although navigable throughout its whole course from Dorogobuzh to its

n mouth , cannot be said to fur ish a favourable defensive

ns line agai t an enemy advancing on Moscow, not only because at many points the right bank commands the f left , but because during summer ords are to be found

o Mohilev Vo rko ab ve Smolensk , at Lyada , Khomino , , ’ 46 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

- The i v Bikho v . labov , No i , and other places w dth of the 90 river at Dorogobuzh is paces , from Smolensk to Stari

Bikho v 100 150 Bikho v to paces , and below to its junction with the Pripet gradually 1ncreases to 500

T Mohilev paces . here were bridges at Smolensk , and

om ts The ﬁ Kiev ; ferries at many p . forti ed town of

Smolensk , lying at the junction of the roads from

P o r echi e y y , Vitebsk , Orsha , Mstislavl , Roslavl , Dorogo ff buzh and Dukhovshchina , a ords means for a stubborn defence . The ﬁrst line of defence against the irruption of an enemy into the so uthern region is formed by the Western

The U 40 Bug . width of this river at stilug is about paces , 120 and at Drogichin , paces . In summer many fords are

v . to be found between Vloda a and Brest Generally , the

n U left ba k commands the right , except at points at stilug ,

Dro lchin Opalin , Brest , Nemirov and g , where the right bank is the higher . Much better lines of defence are furnished by the Rivers Styr and Gorin . Generally in the districts to the north and south of the forest region there were a great many roads , mutually intersecting one another in every direction ; but their condition varied with the weather and the time of year . wi On these roads it was impossible to employ, th con stant success , the transport used in the Napoleonic armies in Germany and Italy and light transport required a

multitude of horses to carry supplies for the troops , which THE THE A TRE OF WAR 47

ff in their turn were with di iculty supplied with forage , of which there was not always sufﬁc ient even for the troop horses of the immense army of invasion . In the forest region the number of roads was strictly

un fﬁ limited , and generally comm ications were di cult , mn especially in spring and autu . The climate of Russia is characterised by extreme cold

r in winte , which comes on very rapidly , and considerable D ﬁ heat in summer . uring the rst part of the campaign the invading armies suffered much from sultry weather as well as from heav y rain while during the retreat they

The were destroyed by the cold . effect of climate is thus

expressed by Napier , who wrote What vast prepara

v tions , what astonishing combinations were invol ed in

ex ec u the plan , what vigour and ability displayed in the tion of Napoleon’ s march to Moscow Yet when winter ’ came , only four days sooner than he expected , the giant s scheme became a theme for children ’ s laughter ! In

ur fact , the forces of Nat e with which the invaders had to contend were more terrible and imposing than the

hostility of man . CHAPTER V

THE INVASION OF LITHUANIA — — — Gen e ra l Dis tributio n R ussia n s F ren c h Na po leo n o n the — Nie m en - F o rw a rd Mo v e m e n t P a ss a ge o f th e Riv e r ’ — — Na po le o n s P la n Furthe r Adv a n c e Th e R ussia n s s ur — — pris e d Gen e ra l R u ssia n R e t re a t F re n c h Adv an c e ’ — ! Na po le o n s Dis po sitio n s Mo v e m e n t s o f th e Kin g o f We st ’ — pha lia - B a gra tio n s —R et re a t P ursu it o f B a gra tio n We a the r Co n ditio n s Difﬁ c ultie s o f Supply a n d Tran spo rt —Co m m e n t s

WHEN the French Emperor left Dresden on the 28th May

n Ge nera l the Russia armies were distributed on a DiS t’ ibutim wide front , with a view to meeting the enemy wherever his attack developed . The First Army—Barclay de Tolly men and 5 5 8 guns , with headquarters at Vilna , and Russia ns Ro ssiana ﬂanks at and Lida . A —B and 216 Second rmy agration men guns ,

Vo lko visk with headquarters at , lay between that place

ielo sto and B k near the Bug .

A —To rma sso v 164 Third rmy men and guns ,

lh nia Lutz k Vo . was in y , with headquarters at On that date Napoleon’ s army was standing on the

Vistula , so disposed that an advance could be French f f made rom either wing with equal acility . 48 THE I NVASI ON OF LI TH UANI A 49

Napoleon’ s plan was to pierce the too extended Russian ln i e by a movement on Vilna , and then defeat the enemy in detail . It was in accord with the principle he had

a S wa s c rried out with success in Italy and in pain , and yet to adopt in the Waterloo campaign . He would ” concentrate men on one point . On the morning of the 23rd Jun e 1812 a travelling

a r se c rriage , d awn by six hor s and accompanied by an

e sc o rt un ur Na po le o n o n of mo ted chasse s of the Guard , the Nieme n drew up near a regiment of Polish Lancers on the outposts near the bank of the Niemen opposite

Kovno . Napoleon alighted from the carriage , and questioned the ofﬁcers who approached as to the

s routes to the Niemen . He expres ed a desire to put on ’ a P f o o s i s , P v l olish uni orm , and donned Colonel g k c oak

A e b e and forage cap . ccompani d y B rthier and one of

P o ﬂicers s the olish he rode to the advanced po ts , to the

Alex o ten wi village of , opposite Kovno afterwards , th

rm his E mm i General Ha , ngineer Co ander , hav ng care

e the‘ le calit hi fully observ d y, he rode gher up the Niemen

e of Po n emun Ha x o to the villag y , where found a very r convenient point of passage , where a bend in the rive would facilitate the concentration of the ﬁre of batteries posted on the left bank . Napoleon reconnoitred the place , without being observed some Cossack patrols were the

l s on y troop visible on the farther bank of the Niemen . At one point his horse stumbled and threw him on the D ’ 5 0 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R USSI A

or A sand , as he one of his suite remarked bad omen ” n A Roman would have turned back . Returni g from this reconnaissance , the Emperor was very gay , and during the day frequently hummed the old air Marl ’ a - - en brouk s en v t guerre . Af i “ P terwards , hav ng discarded the olish garments ,

No arishki he proceeded to g , a village lying six versts f a f rom Kovno , somewhat to the right of the ro d rom i h i Vilko v s k to that place . ’ On this day Napoleon s main army, consisting of the

Oudino t Na nso ut corps of Davout , , Ney , y , Montbrun d m F o rw a rd and the Guar , to the nu ber of men , M°Ve ment approached the Niemen in the neighbourhood of Kovno and Macdonald reached Tilsit with At the same time the Viceroy Eugene , St Cyr , and

reni Grouchy moved on Kalvaria and P King Jerome ,

Po niato vski with the corps of , Reynier , Vandamme and

r- Maubo ur Latou g, also numbering some marched on Bielo stok and Grodno while Schwarzenberg marched towards Drogichin on the Bug with men . ’ Napoleon s headquarters were established at Nogar

h rd r f r is ki. Ar o e s o rived there , he issued the passage of the 75 Niemen , for which three pontoon bridges of pontoons

Po n emun each were to be constructed at y , at intervals 150 of not less than paces . In addition a fourth bridge

Alex o ten was to be thrown across at , where the pontoons were to remain until the French troops had occupied

’ 5 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON f OF RUSSI A f rom the main line of advance . Should the enemy assume ff the o ensive in the direction of Warsaw, Jerome would sﬂtand on the defensive , while Eugene attacked them in ank , and the Emperor , descending from Vilna , would

The sever them from their base . main attacking army thus advanced across the Niemen between Grodno and t Kovno . The two extreme ﬂanks of this grea army — of invasion were covered the left by Macdonald , who

v T Ro ssiana would ad ance from ilsit on , the right by

Schwarzenberg , towards Lublin . Napoleon established his headquarters at Kovno on

th i d the 24 June . Learn ng that Prince Eugene woul not 26th Further arrive at Kalvaria until the , and dreading Adva nc e to expose Ney alone to the attacks of the at T Russian forces which he supposed to be roki , the ’ t o At Emperor decided bring Ney s corps to Kovno . the same time , in order to secure both banks of the Vilia ,

udino t he directed O to throw a bridge across that river , and send over a division and some cavalry and Macdonald was ordered to enter into communicationwith ’ Oudino t a h Grand ean s , which was est blis ed by j division

at Georgenburg . These dispositions were made in case of a Russian

o f the offensive movement against the left ﬂank army ,

“ the corps of Ney and Oudino t being disposed to ward o ff

The this danger . right wing under King Jerome was

r di ected on Grodno , where it would pass the Niemen on THE I NVASI ON OF LI TH UANI A 5 3

29th n S the Ju e . chwarzenberg was to unite with Reynier towards Slonim . The news that the French army had crossed the Niemen

24th The reached Vilna on the night of the June . celerity of the movement in passing The Rus s ia ns men across the river in the course of a few summ ed hours was a surprise to the Russians , although they had alrea dy taken the precaution to move their A a rchives and treasure . The Emperor lexander left

n 26th Vilna on the morni g of the , when Barclay de Tolly

3rd 4th concentrated the and Corps at that place . But

i his as the enemy advanced , and came in contact w th

0 0 advanced tr ps , Barclay was obliged to retire and

Sventz iani 28th withdrew to on the , directing Bagge

t hirvinti vo o to delay the enemy at S . He had already

G D v sent directions to eneral orokho , who was at Orani ,

‘ to retire on Mikhalishki ; and Platov wa s Genera l Rus s ia n ordered to retreat from Grodno through Lida Re treat Smo r o ni Sventz iani n and g towards , opposi g the enemy wherev er possible and laying waste the country At nf mi on his route . the same time , i or ng Bagration of

wi 3rd 4th Sventz ia ni his retreat th the and Corps on , he

hi v instructed him to conform to t s mo ement , taking care that the enemy did not cut his communications via ” ns Mi k with Borisov and to guard his right ﬂank , and

o rma sso keep up communication with Platov and T v . All stores that could not be carried away from Vilna ’ 54 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R US SI A

were burnt , and the bridges over the Vilia were destroyed . Simultaneously Wittgenstein retired with the lst Corps ’ on Vilkomir ; Ko rf s cav alry retreated from Smo rgo ni on Mikhalishki ; and Dokhturo v with the 6th Corps on

mo r o ni A wa s S g . The whole of the First Russian rmy

u Vo lko visk th s in full retreat but Bagration was still at . 28th Napoleon reached Vilna on the June , making a state entry , when he was received with acclamation by P the olish populace .

Oudino t r reached Vilkomi the same day , driving ’ out Wittgenstein s rearguard Ney was adv ancing

F renc h along the right bank of the Vilia , and

Adva nc e ~ Ro ssia na Macdonald advanced through .

Preni Eugene was at , on the left bank of the Niemen, and received orders to advance on Vilna and Jerome , who

Au usto v o was at g , was directed to move at once on

- Ma ubbur Grodno , where Latour g had already arrived

Schwa rz enber a s iedlitz . w S with his cavalry g at . The movement on Vilna had thus pierced the Russian c S Arm entre , and separated their First and econd ies .

’ wi e Na po le o n s Revie ng the situation at Vilna Napol on , DiS P°S iti°ns though not clear as to Bagration s position , now perceived the opportunity of cutting o ff and ’ destroying that general s army . He despatched Murat T in pursuit of the main body of Barclay de olly, toward ’ Sv entz ia ni D , with the cavalry and two of avout s

Nanso ut divisions . y , with his cavalry and one of THE I NVAS I ON OF LI TH UANI A 5 5

’ v Da out s divisions , was sent towards Mikhalishki to deal

Do khturo v D v u his ma ni with ; and a o t , with two re i ng ’ i n G P div sio s , rouchy s cavalry, and a olish division , moved on Volozhin to cut inon the line of retreat of the A K Second Russian rmy . ing Jerome , with the right

wing of the army , was supposed to be follow ,1 c 55$212?t ing up Bagration , in order that , in onjunction ’s “ D v gang with a out , he might destroy his army . J his v But erome was dilatory in mo ements . His cav alry patrols had been before Grodno since the

23rd J une , but he himself did not enter that place

30th v until the , when he arri ed with a division of the

5th He Corps . spent some days in concentrating and in attending to his commissariat . Instead of making ff every e ort to gain contact with Bagration , he remained

v inacti e , apparently awaiting orders from Vilna , and ’ nf sending no i ormation to the Emperor s headquarters .

to He allowed Bagration retreat unmolested , and as

tb 4th r mi Napoleon wrote him on the July , comp o sed

rl ht all the success of the campaign on the g . It is ” impossible to wage war thus .

Vo lko visk 28th Meanwhile Bagration left on the June , 30th collected his corps at Zelva by the , and next day

’ ni B a g ra tio n s continued his march to Slo m . Continuing Retrea t his retreat in accordance with Barclay’ s

o v o rudo k instructions , Bagration reached N g on the 3 k 4t rd July, and passed the Niemen at Ni olaev on the h ’ 5 6 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

th 5 . and , with the intention of marching on Vileika But

' hearing from Platov that Davout was a t Vishnev with an

r vi nf army said to be st ong , and ha ng i ormation ’ of the enemy s appearance at Zelva in his rear and in the direction of Grodno on his ﬂank , he recrossed the

- river , intending to march by Novi Sverzhen on Minsk ,

a rlichi and assembled his forces at K . Hearing from P t latov that he had communication wi h Dorokhov, who had reached Kamen , he directed him and that general to occupy Volozhin and effect a junctio n with him (Bagra

o M . ti n) at insk But on arriving next day at Mir , Bagra tion heard from Dorokhov that the French were in great f k orce at Mins , and , wishing to avoid a general action , t according to his ins ructions , he again changed his route,

b N esviz h Slutz k taking the road y y and to Bobruisk . On the 8th July the whole of his army wa s concentrated

es iz h P at Ny v . latov with his Cossack ﬂying column 9th reached Mir on the , and there made a stand against ’ f the enemy s advanced cavalry , a terwards continuing to ’ cover the retreat of Ba gratio n s army through Slutz k I 13th on , and Bobruisk . King Jerome ha d not sent his cavalry on under Latour

Maubour G o 4th g from r dno until July , and this was at 8th p urs uit o f Novogrudok on the , the same day that B a g ra tim‘ Davout reached Minsk , for the enemy whom Bagration had heard of at that place were only advanced troops . THE I NVASI ON OF LI TH UANI A 57

Jerome reached Novogrudok with two corps on the

11th N esviz h 14 o , and y on the th , his ther two corps

hi h To r following and watc ng t eir right ﬂank , exposed to ma sso v o lh nia B V . in y But agration , although he had f n A not yet e fected a ju ction with the First rmy , had escaped the danger of being surrounded by Davout

rushani and Jerome . Schwarzenberg was now at P and

ni r ni Smor o ni Rey er app oaching Slo m . Eugene , nearing g ,

v was in a position to join either Jerome or Da out . During this period the troops had suﬁered much from the extraordinary heat which set in in the early days of

l o ﬂicers u W ea ther J y many and men succumbed , hil hims f w e the Emperor el was prostrated . hi wa s T s weather , and the heavy rain that preceded it , ’ among the causes of the slowness of Jerome s move di ﬁ ments , while at every point f culties of supply and transpo rt were met with . Owing to the state of the roads from rain towards the end of Jun e the baggage could not keep up with the troops , and not only supplies ,

had but transport to enable them to follow the army , to

The be pro vided at Grodno . troops had to subsist 10th on meat alone . It was not until the July

his re that Jerome was able to assemble main army , duc ed N esviz h to a strength of men, at y , distant 0 2 0 versts from Grodno , and he considered it necessary

his to keep troops concentrated , as Bagration was falsely reported to be have men . ’ 5 8 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R USS I A

Want of provisions and forage was experienced im T mediately after the crossing of the Niemen . housands

of horses died from being fed on green corn . l s The ggﬁggg army , ill supplied with provisions , lived f a n' on the scanty resources of the country, and gggrg

the men took to plunder and insubordination , which undermined discipline and res ulted in large numbers of stragglers . Immense convoys of bullocks had followed the army, the greater number in droves , others harn essed to the provision waggons ; but while many

a n reached Viln and Mi sk , few got so far as Smolensk ; s D they could not keep up with the armie . While antzig contained enough grain to supply the army, the rivers had been depended upon for transporting it . But the Vilna was so dried up as to be unnavigable for the

An lighters . attempt was made to organise a transport

500 e corps of Lithuanian carriages at Vilna , where wer collected , but they proved useless . By the time the provisions which had been stopped at Kovno reached

Vilna , the army had left that place . ’ Napoleon s ﬁrst great man oeuvre n - the piercing of the Russian line and the consequent separation of their — forces was successfully completed when his C o mments centre crossed the Niemen and advanced to ’ wi B a ratio n s a Vilna . But th g escape from combined i attack by the armies of Davout and Jerome , wh ch must

have crushed him out of existence . the second part of the

’ 60 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A would not have stopped a capable and energetic com ’ mander . We may call to mind Napoleon s own saying

b ut . It rains , that does not stop the march of the Grand ” find Army . It is not surprising then that we Napoleon writing on the 5th July All my manoeuvres have mis carried and the finest opportunity ever offered in war has been missed by this extraordinary disregard of first A 11th military principles . gain on the July , to Jerome As you had no information of the forces Bagration had

’ Vo lh nia left in y , as you were ignorant how many divi wi did sions he had th him , as you not even take up the

o ne pursuit , and he was able to retreat as quietly as if no were behind him ; all this being contrary to the usual practice of war , it is not extraordinary that things ” should be as they are . Too late the Emperor placed Davout in command of ’ Jerome s army , and the latter left for his kingdom of e Westphalia . But while he rightly blamed incomp tent

re subordinates , Napoleon himself was in a measure i a Sponsible for this failure . Wh le his vast prepar tions , and astonishing combinations revealed a brain and a

ni ge us in no way impaired , a certain lethargy both mental and physical appears to have affected him in some degree . He was more inclined than of old to leave

His the execution of his plans to his subordinates .

- physical nature , at forty three years of age , already

his showed signs of decline , and he no longer possessed THE I NVASI ON OF LI TH UANI A 61 former capacity for resisting fatigue and the effects of u exertion . But while he had ndoubtedly lost much of the ﬁery energy of youth which had made him so ubiquitous ﬁ on the battle elds of Italy, while he was no longer A the general of Marengo , of usterlitz , and of Jena , and lacked the energy to execute the wonderful conceptions

his v of brain , that brain had lost nothing of its mar ellous

his a reciat power , and mind was as capable as ever of pp

nl ing the circumstances that beset him . O y, where the general of ten years before would have hastened to the

ure decisive point and ins d success by his restless energy , the Emperor of 1812 remained quietly at Vilna and con tented himself with issuing orders to incapable subo rdi

his nates and leaving to them the execution of plans .

For their incapacity his system of centralisation, hi di w ch destroyed all initiative in subor nates , was largely to blame . Nor can he be exonerated for having appointed Jerome

An d v to command an army . it may be obser ed that failure and disaster should be visited not only upon those directly and immediately responsible but upon those responsible for appointing men to positions for

unﬁtted which they are . The preliminary disposition of the Rus sian armies was made on a too extensive front they were not strong at ’ To ll s ﬁr any point . Barclay de y intention from the st h was to retreat into the Drissa camp , and it would ave ’ 62 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R US SI A

and been better merely to have watched the frontier , have kept the armies more concentrated . By their wide dispersal the Russians laid themselves open to pene tration f and de eat in detail . It is scarcely necessary to observe that the Russians were bound to retreat . ’ wa s f o f The direction of Barclay s retreat aulty , but was course dictated by the position of the fortiﬁed camp at

n s w Drissa . This fur i hes an example of the rong use

ﬁ ns of forti catio , which should be disposed to assist

a o f the mobile rmy, and not made a primary factor defence so as to immobilise troops or draw them o ff in

strate lca l A ir a wrong g direction . retreat d ect by the

u n Smolensk road , which wo ld have draw him more towards Bagration and enabled him to c o - Operate with that general , would have been better . CHAPTER VI

THE ADVANCE TO THE DWINA

’ — ’ Na po le o ns P la n Th e R ussian s a t Driss a - Ou dino t s Adv an c e ’ — — Ma c do n a ld s Mo v e m e n t s Na po le o n le a v e s Viln a Th e — — Mo v e m en t t o w a rds Vite bsk Ac tio n a t Ost ro v n o Na po le o n — — at Ost ro vn o Ope ra tio n s a t Vite bs k F o rwa rd Mo v e m e n t — Ope ra tio n s a ga in st B a gra tio n Oudin o t a n d Witt gen st e in — Mo v e m e n ts o f S c hw a rzen be rg Co m m en t s

WHEN he realised that Bagration had escaped , Napoleon planned to follow Barclay de Tolly with the corps o f

’ Oudino t Na po leo n s Murat, Ney and , whilst Eugene and P a n l D o f avout , the latter now in command ’ Po lo tz k Jerome s army , advanced on and Vitebsk , to threaten the Russian line of communications with

St Petersburg and Moscow . The First Russian Army had retreated to the Dwina and occupied the fortiﬁed camp of Drissa between

th th wa s the 9 and 11 July . But that camp The Rus s ia ns a t untenable . Its strategical situation , to one Dris s a side of all the main roads leading into the interior , rendered it useless , while it was faulty also

r f om a tactical point of view, being situated in a bend wi on the west side of the River D na , and in close 63 ’ 64 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

proximity to an extensive forest , under cover of which an enemy could mass his forces .

The T wi Po lo tz k zar had been th Barclay at , where he P left the army in order to go to St etersburg and Moscow,

a m to excite the nation to a general r ament and resistance , m li and to organise a i tia .

n Co sidering the Drissa camp untenable , Barclay de

v e 14th Tolly e acuat d it , crossed the Dwina on the July , and took up a position on the right bank of the river , while his cavalry later engaged that of the advancing

French .

s This day Napoleon was till at Vilna . Murat , with

Ar the head of the Centre my , had advanced by Vidzy

i to Zamosha , his cavalry be ng pushed forward towards f Drissa and Druya . Ney , ollowing in support , reached

Dris iati Oudino t Dina bur v . reconnoitred g, decided

’ Oudino t s that the loss that would be entailed in attack Adva nc e ing it would be too great , and turned up the

a His left bank of the Dwina in the direction of Druy . advance on Dinaburg elicited a reproof from Napoleon The Emperor has viewed with astonishment and regret

Dinabur your movement on g without orders . If you supposed the Russian army to be there , you exposed w R your corps ithout reason . If you knew the ussian a rmy was not there, your march is still more blameable

ur The you exposed yo right to attack from Drissa . E ” mperor ordered you to go to Solok . THE ADVANCE TO THE DWI NA 65

Macdonald , in accordance with instructions issued on

9th a c o bsta dt F the July , was to march on J and riedrich

’ Ma c do na ld s stadt , and threaten to pass the Dwina there . M°Vements o n e e h He had reached P y vi z . He was told that the ﬁrst object of his corps was to protect the navi — ga tion of the Niemen his second to contain the garri ’ son o f Riga consisting of thirty battalions of this year s — recruits and unworthy of consideration his third to

D Dina bur pass the rissa between Riga and g, to disturb — the enemy ; his fourth to occupy Courland , and pre serve that province intact since it held so many supplies ﬁ for the army ; nally , as soon as the right moment D arrived , to pass the wina , blockade Riga , to call up the siege train and begin the siege of that place , which was important to secure winter quarters and to give a point of support on this great river . These were not posi tive orders but only general instructions , because the ” distance is very great and will become greater .

14th J N esviz h Jerome was this day , uly , at y ; he

D v received orders placing him under a out , and he

his The - Ma ubo ur resigned command . cavalry of Latour g

Ruz hani S . was in advance . chwarzenburg was at

Slutz k Bagration , retreating before this advance , had left

Mohile for Bobruisk Dav out was approaching v .

To rma sso v Lutz k was at , and Reynier was ordered back from Nyesviz h to cover Poland . The general effect of all these movements will be

E 66 NAP OLE ON ’ S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

— observ ed to be a concentration of the Russian armies towards Vitebsk and Smolensk, to cover Moscow ; and F a general advance of the rench in pursuit , clearing the country as they proceeded , and providing for the protection of ﬂanks and rear . ’ Napoleon s plan was to operate with his right, avoiding

Dina bur D any attack on g and rissa , and by this move

all fo rtiﬁca Na po le o n ment to render untenable the lea v es Vilna tions established by the enemy during the past three months . He knew that this movement

v alone would bring about the e acuation of Drissa ,

t he and he hoped to attack them on march . He 16th left Vilna on the evening of the , and reached

Sv entz ia ni next morning . Hearing from Murat that D r the enemy had countered across the wina , and conside ing that this might indicate a general offensiv e movement F A on the part of the Russian irst rmy , he ordered the advance to stop ; but later information pointing to ’ Barclay s continued retreat , he directed the advance to proceed . Continuing his journey , Napoleon reached

G d 18th v lubokoye at mi day on the , and ga e orders for the continued movement of his centre on Vitebsk . Eugene was to move on Kamen in the same direction .

’ T Ko rf s D Barclay de olly , leaving corps at rissa and ’ Pa len s D o lo tz k 17th P . at isna , reached on the On the

20th mn he marched on in two colu s , which joined at

23rd The f n Vitebsk on the . corps le t behi d at Drissa

68 NAP OLE ON ’ S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

4th Infantry Corps and some cavalry to Ostrovno , to hold back the enemy and gain time . Seven versts from ’ anso ut s Vitebsk , Osterman met N y advanced troops , which were driven back by his cavalry and pursued a s

dri , v far as Ostrovno Next morning Murat advanced, ’ Ost erman s ing back cavalry , and found the Russians in position astride the main road behind Ostrovno , their f t ﬂanks protected by ores and marsh . The Russian cavalry were quickly overthrown by a charge of Polish lancers and hussars but their infantry held their own a n d stopped the French advance until evening , when

3 rd they fell back on the Infantry Division , posted in

Kakuviac hin support at the village of , eight versts from Ostrovno . ’ Murat advanced next morning with Nansouty s ' ’ Delz o ns corps and division, and came up with the ’ The Actio n a t Russians at eight o clock . Russian 0 5 tf °vn° front was covered by a deep ravin e ; their right ﬂank rested on the Dwina , which was , however , f fordable their left was on a thick and marshy orest . The French skirmishers advanced to the edge of the

Delz o ns ravine , and engaged the Russians while made dispositions to attack both their ﬂanks and centre ;

’ some of Murat s cavalry crossed the Dwina to turn their

The . he right wing attack was rapidly carried out . T Russians repulsed the French o n their left ﬂank ; but were driven back on the right . The Russian General THE ADVANCE TO THE DWI NA 69

Ko no vnitz in reinforced his right with the whole of his ’ reserve , which pressed the enemy s left and drove them

The across the ravine . battle had , on the whole , f avoured the Russians , when Murat charged a Russian

column which had pursued the French across the ravine , while a further advance of French infantry against the

o f N left their position forced them to retreat . apoleon,

Who had arrived on the scene , directed the attack to

Ko no vnitz in continue , and fell back in good order from

w a position to position until evening , when he ith Osterm n

Lucho sa A rejoined the main army behind the River . new Russian advanced guard was pushed forward across

that stream . Napoleon bivouacked at Ka kuvia chin Of the effect of his presence in action Segur says : The Emperor

ms T M Na po le on a t hi elf arrived . hey ( urat and Eugene) OSt ‘m hastened to receive him , and informed him

n in a few words of what had just been do e , and what still remained undone . Napoleon instantly went to the highest point of ground and nearest to the enemy and from that spot his comprehensive and ardent genius , levelling all the obstacles in its way, soon pierced both the shades of the forests and the depths of the mountains

his he gave orders without the slightest hesitation , and these same woods which had arrested the audacity of the two impetuous princes were traversed from one extremity

In to the other . short , on that very evening , from the ’ 70 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R US SI A

riﬂemen top of her double hill , Vitebsk might see our ” debouch into the plain by which it is surrounded .

Barclay de Tolly , in pursuance of his intention to give

Lucho sa battle , had taken up a position behind the River

V . Opera tio ns before itebsk He had men , and he a t Vite bsk hoped that Bagration would join him from

Mo hile the v by way of Orsha . But on night of the

26th July an aide - de - camp arrived with information from Bagration that he had been unable to get through

Mo hilev by , where Davout was concentrating his forces , and was doubtful of his ability to join the First Army even at Smolensk . Barclay de Tolly called a council of war it was decided

wa s no w ﬁ a s that there no object in ghting at Vitebsk , even a successful action would be useless should Davout occupy Smolensk in the meantime . Further retreat was therefore imperative , although that operation would be diﬂicult A in the presence of the enemy . ccordingly Count

P 3 rd t alen with the Cavalry Corps , reinforced to a streng h 14 32 2 of battalions , squadrons , and regiments of 40 Cossacks with guns , was directed to hold the enemy on the road to Vitebsk . With this object in view Count Palen occupied a position eight versts from Vitebsk , the front covered by a stream which fell into the Dwina , and the right ﬂank on the

The t e o f Dwina . left ﬂank was quite open and h extent

fo r the position was too great the strength available , the THE ADVANCE TO THE DWI NA 71

4000 whole fourteen battalions only numbering men . T hese were disposed in two lines , with no reserve , and

The considerable intervals between battalions . cavalry

dr w was a n up on a small plain , where the stream fell into w the Dwina , chequer ise in three or four lines , which led

ﬁre to considerable loss from the hostile artillery . At dawn on the 27th July Napoleon sent his troops f orward on the road to Vitebsk , the light cavalry in front ’ Bro ussier s The followed by division . French soon came c in conta t with the Russian rearguard , and a sharp action ensued , during which the Emperor himself arrived on the ’ Nanso ut s scene . But it was not until y cavalry and ’ Delz ons infantry were all engaged that the Russians ’ At ﬁve were forced to give way . o clock in the afternoon

ucho sa Palen retired behind the L . The loss on either ’ side dur1ng the three days ﬁghting amounted to some 00 37 men . Barclay de Tolly had in the ﬁrst instance intended to

Lucho sa remain on the only until noon this day, but the resistance offered by his rearguard encouraged him in the hope of holding the enemy on that line until evening .

c c - P n Wishing to operate with alen in delayi g the French , he reinforced him from the main body and advanced his ’ left wing to threaten the enemy s right ﬂank . Napoleon hoped to draw Barclay de Tolly into a

r decisive engagement . The French troops , ti ed with their long march , almost without bread and having for ’ 72 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R US SI A

the most part nothing to eat but meat without salt , wished for a battle , hoping for something better . But the Russian general was already preparing to continue At ’ his retreat . four o clock in the morning the Russian army marched o ff in three columns towards Smolensk

P o r echi e by way of Velizh , y y and Rudnya respectively . ’ Count Pa len s rearguard remained On the Lucho sa until

th ﬁr dawn on the 28 July . Large bivouac es burning on the site of the encampment convinced Napoleon that his

‘ expectation o f engaging the main Russlan army would be realised . the But next day the French cavalry , taking up pursuit , ’ sustained a reverse from Palen e rearguard at Agapo no v

china o F o rw a rd s . The French tro ps being worn out M°Ve ment for want of provisions and exhausted with the heat , and Napoleon no longer seeing the possibility of keeping the Russian armies separated , he decided to halt and rest his troops . ’ A wa s Napoleon s Central rmy , acting against Barclay , disposed as follows —Headquarters and the Guard at

The Vitebsk . Viceroy Eugene at Surazh , on the Dwina , ’ f w Murat s ormed the left ing of the army cavalry, with ’ e N y in rear , was fronting Rudnya ; three of Davout s divisions were behind Ney between Ba bino vichy and h . C r Bieshenko ic ﬁ e Vitebsk St y was at v y . In the v weeks which had elapsed since the passage of the Niemen, Napoleon had succeeded only in occupying some useless THE ADVANCE To THE DWI NA 73

o f territory , exhausted supplies . The want of provisions ﬁl caused widespread disorder , and the country was led

a with b nds of marauders who had left the army . There had been a vast loss of transport animals and of cavalry

i o horses . The corps under the immediate leadersh p f

Napoleon , detailed above , which had crossed the Niemen

strong , now numbered no more than

men of the casualties not more than one - tenth had been

w . killed , ounded , or made prisoners in action While he was at Vitebsk Napoleon heard of the Russian u peace with T rkey , and of the treaty between Russia and Sweden .

his Barclay de Tolly continued retreat on Smolensk , where he concentrated his forces and encamped on the

1st A right bank of the Dnieper on the ugust , on the roads

Po r echi e leading to y y and Rudnya , at each of which

a fear uard nf places / g was posted . His army was rei orced there by the reserve batta lions and artillery companies

Winz in ero de under g .

It is now time to direct attention to the operations A against the Second Russian rmy under Bagration , whom

ut th The we left at Sl z k on the 13 July . Ope ra tio ns a g t French cavalry had kept in touch With the B a a tio n i i in Russ ans , and several act ons took place A P consequence , notably one in which the taman latov

met and repulsed the French cavalry at Romanovo . ’ 74 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R US SI A

o f vi The troops under the King Westphalia were mo ng,

Vandamme from Nyesviz h on the line Minsk - Orsha ; Po nia to vski through Igumen on Mohilev ; and Latour

Maubo ur f g, having reached Glusk , ollowed towards ’ Mohilev 26th Re nier s on the July . y corps , as already related , had been sent back to Slonim to operate against

rma o To ss v .

his Davout continued advance towards the Dnieper . He left Minsk on the 13th and reached Igumen on the

th hile 0th 15 Mo v 2 . July , and entered on the In the meantime Bagration had assembled his whole 18th army at Bobruisk on the July , and next day received orders to effect a j unction with the First Army by way of

Mo hilev in and Orsha . But at the same time he had ’ f o Mohilev ormation of Davout s m vement on . Hoping ’ to interrupt the enemy s concentration at that place , Bagration sent on a detachment under Raevski and i fo llowed next day w th the remainder of his army . ’ Ra evski s cavalry fought an action with the French advanced troops between Stari Bikho v and Mohilev on

21st 200 the July , in which French were taken prisoners .

Mohilev un Davout , determined to cover , which was favourable for defence , took up an advanced position on

22nd the with men at Saltanovka , where Bagration determined to attack him with a view to forcing a route

o fMohilev by way and Orsha in accordance with his orders . The Russians attacked at eight o’ clock in the morning on

’ 76 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R USSI A

While the events that have been narrated were taking ’ O Oudino t s place , perations had been in progress between

who corps and that of Wittgenstein , , on the 0 udmo t a nd ’ W ittg e n retreat of Barclay de To lly s main army from S tem Po lo tz k Drissa to , had been ordered to remain in the neighbourhood o f Drissa to protect Riga and the country between Novgorod and the Dwina . In case of retreat being necessary he was to retire through Sebezh P h to skov, where magazines were establis ed for the

had supply of his corps . Wittgenstein men and 100 guns . ’ Oudino t s When Napoleon advanced on Vitebsk , corps ,

wa s to supported later by St Cyr , left oppose Wittgenstein St P and threaten etersburg . He had some men . He was on his left supported by Macdonald with

a c o bsta dt 21st men , who occupied J on the July , and

Dina bur At established a garrison at g a few days later . the same time Oudino t moved up the Dwina towards

P o lo tz k Disna and , which he had been directed to make “ if ” his headquarters circumstances permitted . On the

26th s Po lo tz k he cros ed the Dwina at , with a view to f taking the of ensive against Wittgenstein , his instructions being to advance towards Sebezh and so cause the

Russians to evacuate Drissa and Druya . Wittgenstein had advanced towards Druya with the intention of crossing the Dwina at that place , when he heard of the advance of Macdonald and Oudino t on both THE ADVANCE TO THE DWI NA 77

. T his ﬂanks his determined him to fall back on Sebezh . On the 30th July his advanced guard came in contact wi Oudin o t th that of at Yakubovo , where an indecisive n actio took place , at the end of which the French main ta ined r W thei position . ittgenstein renewed the attack ’ - at three o clock the next morning , and after a hard fought

udino t Klia stitz i action drove O back two versts on .

There the French took up a second position , but they

f v were de eated , their rear turned by the Russian ca alry and forced back to Boya rshchino behind the Drissa stream . Wittgenstein pursued , but his vanguard came into collision with the French in a strong position between two lakes in front of Boyarshchino and was driven back with heavy loss . Oudino t again advanced as far as Go lo v shchitz i there

Wittgenstein , having heard of the action at Boyarshchino , had ta ken up a position with his right on the River

v Nishcha . He defeated the advancing French , and dro e them back across the Drissa Oudino t re - entered Po lo tz k

rd A nf on the 3 ugust . Being rei orced by St Cyr on the 7th A ugust, the French marshal again advanced but was met and defeated by Wittgenstein at Svo ln a on the

11th A P o lo tz k ugust , and once more fell back on , where 16 he arrived on the th . In the meantime Macdonald had continued at Yakob

Dina bur P stadt and g, while the russian contingent of his corps laid siege to Riga . ’ 78 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

On the extreme right Reynier and Schwarzenberg had

been operating against To rma sso v, and were at Slonim

3rd A on the ugust . Napoleon directed Mo v e me nts o f S e w a r h Schwarzenberg , who commanded the whole z enb erg To r forces of this ﬂank , to march against

ma sso v w and Kamenski , and to follo them until they 12th A were destroyed . On the ugust Schwarzenberg

R in attacked the ussians at Gorodechna , and after an

’ ’ decisive action in which Reynier s attack on the enemy s

' To rmasso v left ﬂank failed , retreated to Kobrin . It is clear that the Russian retirement to the Drissa

o f camp was in contravention all strategical principles . The two Russian armies which had been C o mments ’ separated byNapoleon s advance were retlrmg on div ergent lin es instead of drawing nearer in order to effect a junction while Drissa was on the ﬂank of the E main roads leading to the interior of the mpire . For

T entirel to this false move Barclayde olly was not y blame , as l ﬁ has a ready been explained , and he recti ed the error by moving to Vitebsk as soon as he found Drissa both

n strategically and tactically u tenable . Had he lingered

ul v there , Napoleon wo d undoubtedly ha e closed in on him by his advance on Po lo tz k and cut o ff and destroyed his

Who army . could suppose that a position that had taken months to prepare would be so soon evacuated ; or in stead o f ordering his movement on P o lo tz k in order to ’ destroy Barclay s army , Napoleon might otherwise have THE ADVANCE TO THE DWI NA 79

adopted a more central line of advance and occupied

Vitebsk before the Russians reached that place . But the Emperor wrote on the 15th J uly that he does not intend to attack the enemy either in their intrenched camp at Dina burg or in their intrenched camp at Drissa

ur n he intends to t n their positions , render them u tenable , ” and attack the enemy on the march . A T rrived at Vitebsk , Barclay de olly intended to give

c c - O battle , expecting the peration of Bagration , who had It been ordered to march on Orsha . was fortunate that the former heard that Bagration had been obliged to change the direction of his march in time to extricate his army and retire on Smolensk . ’ Ba ra tio n s ff g retreat was boldly executed , and his o en sive movement against Davout was not without effect in t D keeping tha general on the right bank of the nieper . CHAPTER VII

FROM THE DWINA TO THE DNIEPER

‘ — Na po le o n a t Vit e bs k Dist ributio n o f th e F re n c h Fo rc e s — R u s sia n s a ssum e th e Offen siv e m Sk irm ish a t I n ko v o F re n c h — — ’ Dis po sitio n s R uss ia n Mo v em en t s Na po leo n s Adv an c e — P a ss a ge o f th e Dn ie pe r Ca v a lry A c tio n a t Kra sn o i — R ussia n Dis po sitio n s Co mm e n t s

O O 13th A NAP LE N remained at Vitebsk until the ugust .

But in the meantime the Russians assumed the initiative . T Na po leo n a t hey were now concentrated at Smolensk Vite s k b The to the number of men . French on the front P o lo tz k - Vitebsk -Mohilev were reduced to

On the 6th August Barclay de Tolly called a council of T war . The zar , the nation and the army were all de manding a cessation of the retreat which had already

The abandoned so much territory to the invaders . ‘ insuﬂicient Russian general knew that his forces were for

v ff . decisi e action . But it was decided to adopt the o ensive hi W le Barclay had been retreating to Smolensk , Napoleon had been employed in resting his army and seeing to supply . Many stragglers rejoined the artillery

wa o ns which parks and gg , had been left far in rear , arrived 8 0 FROM THE DWI NA TO THE DNI E PE R 8 1 at Vitebsk the corps commanders collected seven days ’

The provisions in the country . Russian magazines seized in Surazh and Velizh served for the 4th Corps and the Dni Guard . For the passage of the eper and preservation ’ ni of commu cations with Davout s troops , Napoleon

Ra sa sna ordered the construction of four bridges at .

When the Russian armies retreated on Smolensk , the — French were disposed as follows The Guard and one

’ D v of avout s di isions stood at Vitebsk , Dis tributio n his o f the where Napoleon had headquarters in the ’ v - di 53222 Go ernor General s house . Two visions of Pa vlo vich the same corps were at y , between ’ V Ba bino v ich 4th itebsk and y the Corps , Eugene s , was ’ Sur Mura t s v at Velizh and azh cavalry reser e , Mont brun ’ s and Grouchy’ s corps (with the exception of Dou ’ merc s cuirassier div ision which was with Oudinot) at ’ Seba stiani s Rudnya , with division as advanced guard at ’ io z na Inkovo Ney s corps in rear of the cavalry at L . Davout s remaining two divisions were on the Dnieper between Ba bino vic hy and Dubrovna ; the 8th (West phalian) Corps un der Jun ot was at Orsha ; the 5th (Polish) ’ Corps of Po niato vski at Mohilev ; Latour - Ma ubo urg s ’ Cavalry Corps and Do mbro vski s Polish division were detached from Mo hilev to observe Bobruisk and the

’ s rt l s G E e . Rus ian eneral corps , which was at Mozyr

T 3rd A um hese troops , on the ugust , n bered

nf v i antry and ca alry , altogether men , or ’ 8 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

’ ’ excluding Latour - Ma ubo urg s and Do mbro vski s troops acting separately , the main strength of the French army for operations towards Smolensk was men .

Napoleon intended , covered by the forests and marshes between the opposing forces , to execute a ﬂank move

Ra sa sna ment to his right , cross the Dnieper at , seize

S n f out molensk , and thus tur ing the Russian le t , their line of retreat to Moscow and destroy them . The Russian armies left Smolensk for their offensive 7th A movement in three columns on the ugust, leaving

n The only one regime t to garrison the city . Rus s ia ns S te he A Second rmy , strong , passing through Béggivg D Smolensk on the right bank of the nieper , formed the left column along the bank of the river A 7 to the village of Katan , and the First rmy , ma r Do khturo v ched in two columns , the left, under ,

b Prika z moving y the Rudnya road on Vidra ; the right ,

T Po r echi e under uchkov, by the y y road to Zhukovo , and

hche o l eva afterwards to the left by S g y on Kovalevskoye . u Each column furnished its own advanced g ard . A detachment of a division of infantry with some

v ca alry and fourteen guns , under General Olenin , had

r been posted at K a sno i to observe the road from Orsha . On the right ﬂank of the adv ancing army a detachment

P Sha kho vski under rince marched on Kasplya , and ’ r A K a sno v s Cossacks on Kholm . nother detachment furnished from both armies , under Baron Rosen , pre

’ 84 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A w Dwina and Dnieper will be covered , and supplies ill be secured by the facility o f transporting them from Velikia ” r t Bie lo i To o e z . Luki , and p and y By the occupation of the road to P o ryechiye he would be able to strike the ’ r enemy s left ﬂank with superio forces , to open com municatio ns with the U pper Dwina and cover Wittgen ’ s m S tein s left w g . uch a position has undoubted adv antages and gives complete freedom of action ” according to circumstances . The abandonment of the offensive by Barclay de Tolly pleased neither his staff nor the army in general . Bagra tion considered that there was more danger to be a ppre hended on the left than on the right ﬂank of the Russian D army . ispleasure manifested itself throughout the

1t i army , where was thought that the ndecision of the

Commander - in - Chief deprived the army of the prospect

The of victory ; some even accused him of treachery . small successes which the Russian advanced troops had obtained in desultory actions had raised their spirits ﬁ and inspired them with con dence . On the 8th August the Ataman Platov attacked the French at Molevo Boloto near Inkovo with his Cossacks

S kirmish a t and some cavalry and infantry supports , Ink °V° ’ taking 300 prisoners and seizing Sebastiani s papers , from which it was found that the French were aware of the Russian concentration towards Rudnya . A gain treachery was suspected , but it was discovered FROM THE DWI NA TO THE DNI E P E R 85 that the information had been obtained through the letter

ﬁ his of a Russian of cer to mother , in whose house near

Rudnya Murat was quartered . On the 9th August the Russians continued their ﬂank

Do khturo v Mo shchinki movement ; moved to , where headquarters were established Platov retreated to

A Prika z its Gavriki the Second rmy moved to Vidra ,

or- advanced guard , under Maj General Vasilchikov, stand ’ n o lo ko a Plato v s i g at V v on left .

irmi Napoleon , hearing of the sk sh at Molevo Boloto , took immediate measures to concentrate in order to

F renc h oppose the expected Russian advance . He DiS P°5 iti°ns directed Ney and Murat to hold the enemy back on the Rudnya road three divisions of Davout’ s from Vitebsk and the 4th (Eugene ’ s) Corps were sent to

Lio z na join Murat and Ney at Davout , Junot (West phalians) and Po nia to vski with his Poles and Latour ’ Maubo urg s cavalry were to concentrate between Ra sasna

iuba ich T and L v y . hus men could be collected — — in two days or by the l0th August o n a front of thirty

Lio z na Liuba vich versts between and y , or between

in o ich D r Do mbro vski 6000 Bab v y and ub ovna . with

m Mohile re ained in v . While the Russian First Army remained on the

Po r e chi e A Prika z y y road , the Second rmy marched from ’ Vidra to Smolensk on the 12th August on B a gratio n s t ini iative , the excuse given being the want of good water , 86 NAP OLE ON ’ S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A which wa s a difﬁculty with both opposing armies owing

e to the prolong d summer heat . Bagration wished to hi f Rus sia n protect s le t ﬂank being turned by the M°Vemeﬁ ts occupation of Smolensk . His advanced

un remamed Vo lo ko va guard , der Vasilchikov, at ; with a support of a grenadier division and eight squadro ns o f P at ~ De ritz a lancers under rince Gorchakov b . This movement took place just when Barclay wa s preparing to renew his advance on Rudnya . On the 14th August his army wa s disposed between Vo loko va and Lake Kasplya , with headquarters at Gavriki ; he

the t o 15 th A expected French attack on the ugust, ’ ’ r Ba ra tio n s Napoleon s birthday . Two co ps of g army

a ag in left Smolensk and marched to Katan . Napoleon now saw that the Russian advance had

Vo lo ko va ceased with the occupation of the position , and

’ o ff f the Na po leo n s in order to cut them rom Moscow by Adva nc e occupation of Smolensk he executed a ﬂank movement to the passages of the Dnieper at Ra sasna and

his d Khomino with the army under imme iate leadership , while the corps under Davout moved from Orsha and

ohile Ra sa sna M v towards and Romanovo . Napoleon left Vitebsk before daybreak on the 13th August and stopped for a time at a house in Ba bino vichy

Ra sa sna resuming his journey on horseback , he arrived at

n - i in the eveni g . Eye w tnesses described him as distin guished by the plainness of his attire in the midst of

8 8 NAP OLE ON ’ S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

r ff a ur French caval y, but su ering he vy losses d ing the retirement . Barclay de Tolly heard of this action on the night th A of the 14 ugust . But he still did not know that

Napoleon had made a change of front , had crossed the

Dnieper and was turning his left ﬂank , which he had thought secured by that river . The only movement

Ra evksi Russ ian made was to send with his corps back DiS P°S iti°ns to Smolensk , with orders to march to the

evero v ski Kra sno i support of N on the road . But he decided in consultation with Bagration that the latter should cross the Dnieper at Katan to oppose the A enemy on the left bank , the First rmy supporting him , following the French army and protecting the country D between the Dnieper and wina . He wrote to the Tzar on the 15 th Although the enemy ’ s movement to the

Dnieper and on the left bank of the river , by which he abandons almost the whole region between the Dwina D and the nieper , gives cause for astonishment as soon

as I satisfy myself as to his real intentions , I shall not neglect to arrange Operations according to actual circum

stances , and I shall so dispose the army that it will A always , while in a position to support the Second rmy , at the same time hold the country between the Dwina and ” the Dnieper . But he was soon obliged to change his

0 0 plan of operations , and to hurry all the tr ps back to

Smolensk . FROM THE DWI NA TO THE DNI E P E R 89

Raevski 15 A reached Smolensk at dawn on the th ugust,

Krasno i Nev ero vski left by the road , and joined at two ’ o clock in the afternoon in front of the city . Before night in fall the Cossacks were driven by the advancing French , and soon the hostile masses were seen to occupy a position fo r Ra ev ski the night on the Russian front . , seeing that he would be surrounded , decided to retire and take up a position to defend Smolensk itself . In the phase of the operations between Vitebsk and Smolensk there were two movements of special interest

- ff the Russian o ensive advance , and C o mments Napoleon’ s great ﬂank movement across

Dn the ieper to the south of Smolensk . The Russian offensive was well conceived but badly executed . Vacillation and irresolution were evident in the Russian counsels the ablest conceived plans will not command success unless carried through with

resolution .

In advancing on Smolensk , Napoleon hoped to master

un the Russian comm ications with Moscow, as he had 1800 done in the case of the Austrians at Marengo in .

wa s He , in fact , carrying out a favourite strategical

oe di man uvre , which was splen d in conception and might ul have been decisive in res t . He knew that the Russians

had advanced from Smolensk , and he arrived before that

- T place twenty four hours ahead of them . hey had ,

however , thrown a small force behind the strong walls of ’ 0 AP LE S I VASI OF R S SI A 9 . N O ON N ON U

and was f of the city , it not due to any ault either con ’ c e tio n The p or execution that Napoleon s plan failed . was fﬁ as place su ciently strong , will be seen in the next f chapter , to enable a small orce to hold it until the main a Russi n army arrived .

’ 92 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSS I A

The di a wet ditch , crossed by a bridge . tch surrounding the town wall was not deep , and had been dug only to obtain the earth required for the glacis . Some emplace n ments had been made for gu s behind the walls , and there — ﬁ was a covered way . Smolensk has three gates the rst ,

Kra sno i at the junction of the roads from , Mstislavl and

! is Roslavl , called the Malakhov ; to its west lies the Mstislavl suburb ; and to the east of this gate and of the Mstisla vlro a dextend theRoslavl andNikolskoye suburbs ; the last communicates with the city through the Nikol sko e - y gate farther , on the north eastern side of the town

r1ver Ra chenka by the , lies the suburb , through which

S Pru ishche vo passes the road through hein Ostrog to d . Near these two villages are fords of the Dnieper—the one

ur The fo and the other eight versts from Smolensk . third entrance—the Dnieper gate—is turned towards

r the river . Besides these gates the e are two passages

u thro gh the walls one to the left of the Dnieper gate , known as the Dnieper passage the other , at the north

Ra chenka eastern corner near the river , the passage . These were constructed on the occasion of the visit of the

Empress Catherine II . , for whose carriage the Dnieper

An and Malakhov gates were too narrow . earthwork , P constructed by the order of eter the Great , covered the wooden bridge which communicated from the town to

T ﬁre the right bank of the Dnieper . his work was under from the right bank of the river . THE B ATTLE OF S MOLE NS K 93

On the east and west the defence o f Smolensk is

ur strengthened by the Rachevka and Ch ilovka streams , ﬂowing through deep ravines into the Dnieper near the

achenka ra sno i R and K suburbs . In the town itself three small streams run in similar deep ravines . ’ Ra ev ski In expectation of the enemy s appearance , had — disposed his troops as follows for the defence z three regiments in the Kra sno i suburb and cov ered Ra evs k xs ’ e ens ive i D f way to the right of the K ng s Bastion , with M ures eas m two guns com anding the approach . Three

’ regiments and eight guns occupied the King s Bastion .

Four regiments and twenty - four guns held the Mstislavl

ur Two - sub b . regiments and twenty four guns were in the Roslavl suburb and in the cemetery in front . One

o Two regiment and four guns in the Nikolsk ye suburb . u regiments in reserve . Two regiments and fo r guns at D F the bridge over the nieper . inally , twelve squadrons of cavalry were posted for observ ation on the left ﬂank . At eight o ’ clock in the morning of 16th August Ney’ s ’ corps and Murat s cavalry arrived within cannon - shot N ’ of Smolensk . ey s corps deployed against the Kra sno i and Mstislav l suburbs with their left ﬂank on the Dnieper and their right on ’ G u the Mstislavl road , while ro chy s cavalry

r drove the Russian cav alry into the Nikolskoye subu b . ’ ’ v D Napoleon himself arri ed at nine o clock , when avout s

his corps began to approach . Ney moved a body of ’ 94 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF RUS SI A

o hi tro ps to attack, and mself led an assault on the ’ wa s King s Bastion . But the position a strong one ;

nf rei orcements were hurrying into Smolensk , and the

Russians held their own , Bagration arriving by midday , the f while Barclay de Tolly reached place be ore nightfall , and took up a position on the high ground on the right

The bank of the Dnieper . French during the day limited themselves to a cannonade of the suburbs and ni to feeble attacks , and at ght encamped in a semi circle round the town . Napoleon had hoped that the Russians would come out and give battle in front of the town , and consequently the attack was not 16 A pressed . On the evening of the th ugust the — French troops were disposed as follows Ou the

Kra sno i e F rench left wing , opposite the suburb , thre

DE -f it“ns W f e divisions o N y ; in the centre , opposite ’ iko lsko e ﬁve the Mstislavl and N y suburbs , of Davout s ’ Rachenka Po niato vski s divisions on the right , opposite ,

r two divisions and farther to the ight , near the Dnieper , ’ Murat s The three cavalry corps . Guard stood in reserve ’ 111 Kra sno i the centre . Eugene s corps was still between ’ Ko ritni a unot s and y , and J had lost the way and did not arrive until evening . The Russians generally considered that the time had now arrived to put an end to the adv ance of the w French . But Barclay de Tolly ith more reason saw the danger of opposing at this point a superior enemy

’ 96 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

U and drove out the enemy . ntil three in the afternoon the action was limited to cannonade and musketry , and

ﬁre the French was not directed on the town . Napoleon

o f still hoped that the Russians , having possession Smolensk and being able to pass the Dnieper freely under cover of its strong walls , would cross over and give battle to protect the town .

nf f Napoleon , about midday, receiving i ormation rom the right ﬂank of his position of the movement of consider

i rea d able Russ an forces on the Moscow , went to the village of Shein - ostrog and personally conv inced himself ’ o f Ba ratio n s g retreat . He then proposed to cross the

Dnieper above Smolensk and envelop the Russian left . But in order to carry out this project the whole army

would have to ford the river , for if any attempts were made to construct bridges the Russians would oppose

them at the selected points , or , passing through Smolensk , would assail the ﬂank and rear of the French army in any case the construction of bridges would take so much time that the Russians would be able to decline battle

and retreat by the Moscow road . Napoleon , after con

siderin g these circumstances , sent some scouts to look

n for fords , but none were found . The only alter ative

was to take Smolensk . ’ The attack began at three o clock in the afternoon , when the French cavalry overthrew the Russian dragoons and drove them headlong into the town through the THE B ATTLE OF S MOLE NSK , 97

P Malakhov gate , killing their general , Skalon . onia to vski then attacked the Niko lsko ye suburb and the

Ra chenka Atta ck o n , with his right ﬂank on the Dnieper, s m°le n5 k and established a battery of sixty guns on

ur ﬁr the bank of the river . The sub bs were ed in l P severa places , and the oles reached the wall of the

w e r n to n , att mpted to storm , but were d ive back with

a v e he y loss . N y in the meantime got possession of

Kra sno i D the suburb . avout attacked and gamed the

v ﬁ Mstislavl and Rosla l suburbs after a stubborn ght , but the walls of the city proved an insuperable obstacle . Fierce assaults were concentrated against the Malakhov gate , but time after time the French were driven back .

ni Finally towards eve ng the attacks ceased , and the assailants contented themselves with a cannonade which did much damage and ﬁred the town in many places . A ’ nother assault at seven o clock failed, and by nine the

The 6000 battle ceased . French had lost some and the 0 Russians 4 00 men . The A fearful night succeeded the day . Russians could no longer hold out amid the burning ruins which surrounded them , and Barclay de Tolly ordered the

Dokhturo v evacuation of the town . marched two hours

his before dawn , taking artillery , after burning the bridges across the Dnieper . Barclay’ s army assembled in position on both sides

Po r echi e wi of the y y road , th the left ﬂank on the village G ’ 98 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

Kra kho tkina P of , leaving a rearguard in the St eters burg suburb to cover the retreat of the last defenders

Rus s ia n of Smolensk . The town , which was nearly Retireme nt all burnt , was evacuated not only by the

so troops but by the inhabitants , that when Napoleon entered it next morning by the Nikolskoye gate he found little besides a blackened heap o f

e Wurtember ruins . Ney sent som g and Portuguese battalions across the river to St P occupy the etersburg suburb , but the Russian rear guard , being reinforced , drove them back , and held A the suburb throughout the day on the 18th ugust . That morning Bagration continued his retreat by the P S Moscow road to neva loboda , near Solovyova , leaving a detachment under Prince Gorchakov to remain near A Lubino until relieved by troops of the First rmy .

T i the Barclay de olly , hav ng rested his troops during day , marched in the evening , taking the route by Sushchovo and Prudishchiye with a view to j o lmng the Moscow road at Solovyova , where it crossed the

Dnieper . Napoleon remained in inaction at Smolensk on the 18th

A He ugust . had no information as to the position of the

o f enemy , and the fords the Dnieper were unknown , in

i n the absence of sp es and of guides . With k owledge on these points he might yet be in a position to keep separate the armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration by an

’ I OO NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

19th A P m the ugust . rince Gorchakov, co manding the t de achment left by Bagration , had marched on to Solov yova without waiting to be relieved by troops of the First

A o f s rmy, leaving only three regiments Co sacks to observe

m 3rd no t the S olensk road . Tuchkov could , therefore , march on , or he would leave open the point by which the

n colum would debouch on to the Moscow road . He accordingly moved a short distance towards Smolensk , ’ and at ten o c lock took up a position with his 3000 men ’ behind the Kolodnya stream , with Karpov s Cossacks covering his left to the Dnieper . He had information that Junot was constructing bridges with a view to

Prudishchev o crossing the river at , and that French troops were moving out from Smolensk to the Moscow road . ’ In the meantime a portion o f one of Barclay de To lly s corps had lost its way in the forest , and emerged at

v in Gedeono o the morning when Ney, who had crossed

wa s the Dnieper by bridges constructed during the night ,

his f P forming up corps in ront of the etersburg suburb , nl 5 o y 1 00 yards distant . T Barclay de olly happened to appear at this point , and made arrangements for the troops to occupy the defensive position , to cover the retreat of the remaining corps which had lost their way to Gorbunovo . Thus , while the f Russians had not yet ef ected their retreat , and had had to post detachments at two points to cover the movement, THE B ATTLE OF S MOLE NS K I OI

Ney was in a position to attack and Junot was in a situa

Ar tion to advance and appear on the rear of the First my . ’ But Ney delayed his advance until after eight o clock in

nin v P the mor g , gi ing the Russians (commanded by rince Eugene of Wurt emberg) time to prepare the Gedeonovo At F position for defence . length the rench advanced , cut off a battalion , and forced back the Russians , who were only saved from destruction by timely reinforcements of

v cavalry , which covered their retreat to Gorbuno o .

nf wi Napoleon , i ormed that Ney had met th the enemy , D di ordered avout to follow, and rected Junot to cross

Prudishchev o P the Dnieper at . The Guard and rince ’ P o niato vski s Eugene remained in Smolensk , and corps on the left side of the Dnieper , above Smolensk .

ms Napoleon hi elf proceeded to the front , ordered Ney to advance along the Moscow road , and , although the cannonade was becoming more sustained , returned to ’ s ﬁve v Smolen k at above o clock , after gi ing orders to ’ Murat and Junot to c c - operate in the advance on Ney s right . He considered that the action was only an i ’ ord nary rearguard one , and , unaware that Barclay s army was retreating by a circuitous route and not by the

Moscow road , had been unable to grasp the importance ’ of Tuchkov 3rd s position behind the Kolodnya . ’ The action there began with Ney s attack soon after T 3rd nf 2000 midday . But uchkov was rei orced by some f lst and men rom the corps of Tuchkov , it was not ’ 1 0 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A until three o ’ clock that he was forced back behind the

Stra an 8000 g stream , where he had collected men by ’ A c tio n a t four o clock , and the command devolved on “ him Ermo lo T General v . his position was of great ’ T 1st s importance , covering the retreat of uchkov columns when they debouched on to the Moscow road . The Russians offered a stubborn resistance but at ’ nine o clock in the evening they were forced to retire , wi T 3rd wa s th the loss of their brave leader , uchkov , who wounded and captured when leading a ﬁnal bayonet

un charge to cover the withdrawal of his wounded . J ot D had crossed the nieper early in the action , but he remained immovable in a retired position , and failed

’ c c - Mura t s to operate in the attack , notwithstanding to personal and repeated requests . Had he marched

’ Lubino on the Moscow road in rear of Tuchkov 3rd s position he would have cut the line of retreat of the First Army and so attained the object for which he had been

D Prudishche o his despatched across the nieper at v . T

wi r action was attended th considerable loss on eithe side , 5000 the Russian casualties numbering . Since Napoleon crossed the Dnieper at Ra sa sna he had lost some men , and his army now numbered under com pared with the with which he had passed the

Niemen between Kovno and Grodno . On the 20th August the troops of Tuchkov 1st’ s column

e Do khturo v r ached Solovyova , where they joined and

’ 1 0 4 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

Drissa and the constant urging of the Tzar that the retreat s suﬂicient hould cease are alone to p rove that such a

plan had not entered the heads of responsible authorities . ’ It has already been remarked that Napoleon s change

of front , which took him across the Dnieper and turned ﬁ t the Russian left , was one of the nest movements tha

t The he had execu ed . causes of failure have also been

ur generally indicated . Tactical fail e appears to have been due in the ﬁrst instance to a want of vigour in press

ﬁn d ing home the attack on the city , and to inability to

Prudishchev o the fords over the Dnieper at in good time . ’ uno t s Subsequently , J inaction after crossing the river at that place admitted of the escape of Barclay when he mi o ght have been cut ff on the Moscow road . It appears to be worth considering whether Napoleon would have done better to turn the Russian right instead of their left in the advance on Smolensk . By marching by way o f Po rye chiye he would have avoided the double

Ra sa sna passage of the Dnieper at and Smolensk , and on arrival before that place he would have been in possession of the higher part of the city on the right bank of the river . But such a movement in a direction where the enemy was awaiting him would have eliminated the element of secrecy essential to the success of his plan and it would have involved the separation of his forces as he would have been manoeuvring away from instead o f Mohile v . towards Davout , who was approaching from THE BATTLE OF S MOLENSK 1 0 5

Napoleon had now to decide whether to advance

un e farther or remain in Smolensk til the next y ar . He

had already considered the matter at Vilna , T he dec is io n to a vance ﬁ d but had arrived at no de nite conclusion , o n MOS COW although he had told Jomini that his intention S was to advance as far as molensk , form winter quarters there for the army , and return to Vilna to establish his o n w headquarters . But this was on the under standing that he would have defeated the Russians in

r a good battle . For political pu poses he had estab lished his Foreign Minister , Maret , at Vilna . Several new factors had appeared subsequent to the opening of the campaign , which had so far not come up

The to his expectations . conclusion of peace between T Russia and urkey , setting free the army of Moldavia , wi S and the treaty th weden , as has already been mentioned , imperilled the safety of the wings of his army . He had expected the Russian forces on either ﬂank to

nf co orm to the movements of their main army , but they remained facing Schwarzenberg on one ﬂank and St Cyr T on the other . his unexpected obstinacy on the part of To rma sso v had hindered the general rising of the Poles

Vo lh nia that had been anticipated in y , while Wittgenstein held his o wn on the other ﬂank . ﬁ hi Dif culties of supply and transport , w ch , in view of

un ex the vast preparations that had been made , were

ected w p , had been met ith from the very beginning of ’ 1 0 6 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A the campaign and if the troops had suffered so much in friendly Lithuania what was to be expected on the hostile soil of ancient Russia This had resulted in great s f losses to the army , both from sickne s and rom straggling , which must be expected to increase . ” Strategical consumption , to use the expressive term of Clausewitz , had reduced the strength of the army , so that the vast preponderance with which Napoleon had

o opened the campaign no longer c ntinued , and the wasting disease would become more evident as the army advanced into the interior . The Emperor had been b disappointed in the expected attle , and the time and opportunity for strategical manoeuvring had passed

away . w Finally , the events of Smolensk , hich left to the conqueror nothing but the smoking ruins of a deserted

city , proved that Napoleon was now engaged in a national war against a people whose religious and patriotic senti

ments were aroused to the point of fanaticism .

The time had arrived when these matters had - to be considered in forming a decision whether to advance on

Moscow in pursuit of the retreating enemy , or to be satisﬁed with the position on the Dnieper and establish

himself at Smolensk for the coming winter . The advance into the interior would draw out his communications in m an attenuated line , while the Russians could base the

selves o n the whole extent of their vast Empire . It

CHAPTER IX

THE ADVANCE TO B ORODINO — — R ussia n Desire fo r B a ttle Fren c h P u rsuit Na po le o n le a v e s — — Sm o len s k Me a s ure s in R e a r R ussia n Re tre a t c o n tin ue d — — Ku t u zo v a ssum e s Co m m a n d A ctio n a t Shiv a rdin o — — P o sitio n o f B o ro din o Oc c upa tio n o f th e P o sitio n Th e — — ’ Oppo sin g Fo rc e s Fren c h Dispo sitio n s Na po leo n s Orde rs

THE Russians were now more anxious than ever to fight t f a decisive bat le , and on the retreat rom Smolensk their object was to fin d a position favourable for Rus smn e s ire fo r ff D a defensive action . For this purpose sta Ba ttle officers were despatched on the road to

U sv ati e Moscow, and two positions were found , one at y y , U behind the zha stream , and another at Tzarevo

Zaimishchi e - u . y , about half way to the R ssian capital The position at the former place being considered u most favourable was taken p for defence . But

when the French advance developed , weaknesses were discovered on both ﬂanks , and the Russians withdrew

23rd- 24th A to Dorogobuzh on the night of the ugust .

Meanwhile Murat , followed byDavout and Ney , reached P S 22nd neva loboda on the , and crossed the Dnieper , f the cavalry fording the river , the in antry by two 1 0 8 THE ADVANCE To B ORODI NO 1 0 9

The o pontoon bridges ; Junot followed . heat was p pressive ; troops , carts and ﬂocks which followed the ’ mo vedin thick French army clouds of dust . Eugene s P urs uit corps marched by P o mo ga ilo v o and thence by

- 25th the Dukhovshchina Dorogobuzh road , and on the

c Za seli e n ff rea hed y , where a ju ction was e ected with G D P i rouchy who had marched by ukhovshchina . on a tov ski B elkino marched by y , following the course of the D r niepe at a distance of some versts from the main road .

Latour - Maubo urg marched on Mstislav l and thence to 28th Yelnya where he was to arrive on the . N R apoleon , hearing that the ussians had taken up D a position before orogobuzh , and hoping for a general G engagement , sent his uard forward on the N l , 2 th A ni 4 . ugust , and left Smolensk that ght s mo lens k

He had now about men , exclusive of

a 4500 a g rrison of left in Smolensk , where there were

0 un S also some 600 wo ded . uch supplies as were found were despatched after the troops . In the course of a few weeks considerable magazines of ﬂour and other provisions were established . Meanwhile Napoleon had not neglected the ﬂanks and

his n rear of army , to which he paid special atte tion now

Mea s ures in that he had advanced so far into hostile Rear territory and , as he hoped , was about to complete the subjugation of the enemy by a decisive

the victory and the occupation of ancient capital . ’ 1 1 0 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

P wi 9th Marshal Victor , who was in russia th the

Corps , was directed to march by Kovno and Vilna to

c o mmunica Smolensk . The detachments on the line of

Mo hilev tions at those places and at Minsk , and Vitebsk were placed under him . The Emperor wrote to Schwarzenberg You will try to reach Kiev while we ” C r had Oudino t go to Moscow . St y , who succeeded , was directed to hold back Wittgenstein , and Macdonald to lay siege to Riga . The siege park was ordered up from T Af ilsit to the Dwina . ter obtaining possession of Riga ’ Macdonald s corps was to take part in the general St operations , and then Macdonald and Cyr can threaten P C r St etersburg while we are in Moscow . Should St y e be def ated , Victor will move to the assistance of the

o f troops operating on the Dwina . But the chief object

fo r his army is to form a reserve the Moscow army . In case of interruption of the communications between

Smolensk and my headquarters , they must at once be reopened it may be necessary for the Duke of Belluno

P ﬁnd (Victor) to march towards us . erhaps I shall not peace where I am going to seek it . But in that case ,

r having behind me a strong eserve , I shall be in no danger ” ’ Au ereau s and I need not accelerate my retreat . g corps was to occupy the country between the Vistula and the Niemen . Some of the Cohorts of the National Guard

The were moved to the Rhine and the Elbe . conscription for 1813 was ordered . Thus the great Emperor made

’ 1 I 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

z wi ff Kutu ov, an event which was not thout e ect on the A nation and the army . lthough Barclay was the more

able commander of the two , the continual

retreats and the abandonment of Smolensk , the holy city on the conﬁnes of Old Russia had lost him the conﬁdence of the troops and of the

u people . Kut zov, a Russian of the Russians , a lieutenant

Suv aro v A . of , had indeed been defeated at usterlitz But he was ready to give battle to the invaders , and he

v arri ed at the psychological moment . Conditions were more favourable to him than they had been at any period of the campaign . The long marches , the bloody combats , fﬁ the di culty of obtaining provisions and forage , the extension of the line of communications had sapped the ’ The enemy s strength . news of the battle of Salamanca

ff ora l The had perhaps a ected their m . conclusion of a treaty with Sweden had strengthened the Russian posi tion ; peace with Turkey had set free the Danubian army under Chichagov to c c - operate against the French line

. As of communications they retreated , the Russians

ur gained in strength , and exhausted the reso ces of the country on the track that must be followed by the invaders . These causes tended to the equalisation of

o f the forces in point numbers .

nn hi f- o f- Kutuzov, accompanied by Be igsen , his C e the

f - Zaimishchi e Staf , reached the army at Tzarevo y on the

29th A - in - f ugust . The new Commander Chie decided to THE ADVANCE TO B ORODI NO 1 1 3

ﬁ continue the retreat , in order to give time for lling up

s the rank of the army now reduced to men , but

nf un Milo rado vich shortly rei orced by over der , and by a considerable militia in the shape of untrained

ho peasants w joined the army with cries of , It is the will of God

r in But although Kutuzov ret eated , he had determ ed to give battle in accordance with the demand of the

mo a l nation and the army . His arrival raised the r of the troops in the highest degree , and they prepared for ﬁ the coming struggle with full con dence in themselves ,

us in their leader , and in the justice of their ca e . ’ One of the new Commander - in - Chief s ﬁrst acts was to inform To rma sso v and Admiral Chichagov of his intention ﬁ i to ght a battle , and to tell them that , in v ew of the enemy having penetrated to the heart of Russia , their rOle no longer lay in the defence of remote Polish pro di vinces , but in the straction of the hostile forces massed di agains t the main Russian army . He accordingly rected ’ To rmasso v to act against the right wing of Napoleon s

G Ar wi rand my , while Chichagov, th the troops coming from Moldavia , would carry out the duties hitherto

o rmasso v perf rmed by To . On the 3 1st August the Russian army left the position

T - Za imishchi e G at zarevo y , passed through zhatsk and

r Milo ra do vich wi his reached Ivashkovo , whe e joined th

T r Ko no vnitz in men . hei rearguard under made

H ’ 1 1 4 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF RUS SI A

was a stand at Gzhatsk , but driven out by Murat and

Napoleon reached Gzhatsk on the lst September and there heard of the arrival of the new Russian Commander

in - Chief , and of his intention to give battle . He accord ingly stopped the advance in order to rest and organise

0 0 his tr ps for the approaching conﬂict . Murat halted

a short distance beyond the town . Ney and Davout

s a were dispo ed round Gzhatsk , where the Gu rd was P quartered . Eugene was at avlovo on the left and

Po niato v ski at Budayevo on the right front . Junot 4th was coming on in rear . On the September Murat w and Davout were ordered for ard to Gridnevo , the army

nf co orming to their movements . There the Russian

rearguard was met with , but not forced to retire until

Ko lo tz ko i nightfall , when they fell back to Monastir .

This position was attacked next day , and the Russians forced to retire by the advance of Eugene ’ s corps on their

. T right ﬂank hey retreated to their mam army , which had taken up a position about Borodino .

The advanced guard under Murat , followed by the

A ob Grand rmy , crossed the Kalo a at Fomkino and

Va lueva Shiv a rdino , and turned to the right to , where a Russian detachment under Prince Gorchakov stood on the heights in front of their main position , protected by a strong redoubt .

’ ’ Napoleon sent three of Davout s div isions and Murat s

’ 1 1 6 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A with a lofty hillock at the village of Gorki above Boro dino the Voina , ﬂowing sluggishly through a marshy

Kalo cha valley , joins the on the left bank ; Borodino stands on the height which lies between the streams . Higher still—the Semyonovka ﬂows out of the forest on the old Smolensk road to join the Kalo cha on its right bank its banks are almost level in the upper part , but S steep in the lower reaches . Between the emyonovka ,

ob Stonetz the Kalo a , and the the high ground commands

oun the the surr ding country . On the summit is situated ’ Ra e ski s o f spot known as v battery . From the village Semyo no vska ya to its mouth the right bank of the Semyonovka commands the left above Semyo no vska ya the left bank is the higher . Owing to the heat of the summer of 1812these streams were all practically dry, and there was little water in the

al cha Sem o no v ska a K o . To the left of y y as far as the

U tit a - ﬁelds of the village of z extended a bush grown plain . ﬁ The elds were surrounded on three sides by deep forests , T is e traversed by the old Smolensk road . here a consid r able eminence close to the road in the forest behind

titz a U .

From the Kamenka stream , a dry tributary of the Semyonovka marking the prolongation of the Russian

un o f front , the gro d rises gradually in the direction T Fomkino , and of the line of the French advance . here

Shivardino are three knolls near . THE ADVANCE TO B ORODI NO 1 1 7

The Kalooba covered the right win g of the position only a s far as Gorki ; from that point the Rus sian line

r Sem o no vs a a U titz a passed th ough y k y and .

It will be understood , then , that the right ﬂank and right wing of the Russian position was rendered strong

ur The by natural feat es . centre and especially the left were weak , that ﬂank resting on no natural obstacle and being liable to envelopment by a turning movement along the old Smolensk road .

The position was strengthened by earthworks . Two un batteries , of three and nine g s respectively, were con — k structed the one on the noll just in front of Gorki , the 200 w other yards farther do n the road towards Borodino . The wooden bridge over the Kalooba wa s left standing and Borodino was prepared for defence . In the centre a large earthwork was made , with embrasures for ten gun s ; but the works generally were not as complete a s mi ﬁ they ght have been , through a de ciency of entrench ﬁ ing tools , while the ground was dif cult , being covered

Sem ono . v with stones Farther to the left , in front of y ska a y were three batteries , known as the Bagration redoubts . m Besides the works that have been enu erated , the wood on the left ﬂank of the position was prepared fo r defence . The Moscow and Smolensk militia , numbering

men , being badly armed and trained , was employed

n and - i carrying the wounded on baggage guard . ’ 1 1 8 NAP OLEON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

The right and centre of the position were occupied by A the First rmy under Barclay de Tolly the left , by the A un P Second rmy der rince Bagration . The 0 c c upa tio n o f the 2nd and 4th Infantry Corps under Milo ra P o s mo n

dovich formed the right wing , covered by

ob 800 the Kalo a , extending from a point yards from

Stonetz the Moskva River to the stream behind Gorki . The 2nd Cavalry Corps stood in rear of the left of this wing the 1st Cavalry Corps was considerably U thrown back on the right rear , towards spenskoye , ’ Plat o v s and Cossacks were formed upon its left . The

6th 3rd Infantry Corps , supported by the Cavalry Corps ,

Dokhturo v under , occupied the high ground across ’ Stonetz Ra evski s the , south of Gorki , extending to battery . A 7th Of the Second rmy the Infantry Corps , with the 4th Cavalry Corps in rear , occupied the space between ’ Ra evski s battery and Semyo no vska ya and Count ’ ro ntz o v s — Vo division the Bagration redoubts . The riﬂe regiments were distributed along the front with the exception of four regiments which occupied the bushes on the Kamenka stream and to the left in the direction of the S old molensk road , and two which stood in a grove behind the right wing between the 2nd Infantry and 1st Cavalry

Corps . Five Cossack regiments observed the lower

Ka lo cha to its junction with the Moskva , and six, the ’ U titz a Tuchko v s f was left about , where in antry corps

’ 1 20 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

f o f suffered rom want provisions . The cavalry horses c hi were mostly worn out and in bad ondition , w le the French guns were greatly inferior in calibre to those of the Russians . The Russian army comprised ill mi trained recruits , and litia , many of whom were armed only with pikes . It will be seen that as the right flank of the position was well protected by natural features , it might have been more lightly occupied , and it would perhaps have been sufficient to have observed that flank or held it

so f lightly , and set ree a larger number for the general

wa s reserve , and for the exposed ﬂank on the left, which insufﬁciently held . During the 6th Napoleon reconnoitred the Russian

hi wa s position . T s was quite clear until their left

v Frenc h reached , where its limit could not be percei ed DiS °S iti°ns P U titz a as it was hidden by the forests about .

In the evening he issued his orders for the battle , after posting P oniato v ski in the forest on the right ﬂank

s t of the army near the Yelnya road . It is aid hat Davout urged a wide turning movement roun d the

Russian left , to avoid a direct attack on the redoubts on that ﬂank but the Emperor considered this too danger i f ous , as it would div de his orces in the presence of the enemy . Davout was in position to the right front of Shiva rdino

Dessaix with the divisions of Friant , and Compans THE ADVANCE TO B ORODI NO 1 21

c Nanso ut u - Maubo ur the avalryof y , Montbr n and Latour g

his hi ardino were in rear . Ney stood between S v and

Alexinki him ; Junot behind , and the Young and Old Guards in rear of him again Morand was on Ney’ s left

Ka lo cha front , his left on the , behind which stood ’ Grouchy s cavalry ; Morand and Grouchy were under

P un G Broussier rince Eugene , whose divisions der erard , and Delz o ns stood in that order from right to left behind

Kalo cha the and the Voina stream , with the Italian V Guard in the rear . The extreme left , beyond the oina ’ Ornano s e was watched by cavalry , b tween Bezzubovo and Loginovo . The orders issued directed two new batteries of twenty f our guns , constructed during the night on the plain

’ ﬁre Na po le o n s occupied by Davout , to open on the two Orders At opposing hostile batteries . the same time the chief of artillery of the lst Corps with thirty guns of ’ ’ Compans and all the howitzers of Dessa ix s and Friand s ’ divisions , was to move forward and shell the enemy s

Sem ono v ska a ﬁre right battery at y y , against which the

- F of sixty two guns would be concentrated . orty guns

3rd ﬁ of the Corps were to open on the left forti cation , and the howitzers of the Guard were to be in readiness to act

accordin g to circumstances . During this artillery ﬁre Po niato v ski was to advance

U titz a by the old Smolensk road , attack , and turn the

’ enemy s position . ’ 1 22 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

Compans wa s to move through the forest and attack

o the l ft redoubt . Subsequent orders would be issued according to the ’ s e e enemy mov m nts . The c annonade on the left ﬂank would begin as soon as ’ as s e a that on the right w heard . The skirmi h rs of Mor nd s

’ d s P c s s n to ivi ion , and of rin e Eugene divi io s were open a heavy ﬁre when they saw the beginning of the right

c The P c wa s s atta k . rin e to occupy Borodino , cro s the Kalo cha by three bridges which he had been ordered to

n c the and c m co stru t during night , onform to the move ent

’ ’ n and e s s c e of Mora d s G rard divi ions , whi h w re to attack

th e e n n r u r e ntr chme t of Gorki , and we e placed nde his

o s rder . These orders were to be carried out with order and

e e s s . m thod , k eping troops in re erve as far as po sible

In instructions issued to Davout by the Chief- o l- the S taff we read

The Emperor wishes that to - morrow the 7th at ﬁve

’ ’ o c lo ck in the morning Compans division be drawn up

r a es Shiva rdino e o by b ig d in front of the r d ubt , having

’ s in t Dessa ix s d thirty gun fron of it . ivision will be disp o se d in the same manner between the redoubt and ’ the re s f its e Frie nd s fo t with its ourteen guns on l ft .

e division will be drawn up in lin with the redoubt . “ Ney is directed to take the 8th Corps under his

mma He h 3 rd co nd . will place t ree divisions of the Corps

CHAPTER !

THE B ATTLE OF B ORODINO — — Na po le o n a t Shiv a rdin o Att a c k o n th e R ussia n L e ft E ugen e — — t a ke s B o ro din o R en e w e d Att a c k o n R ussia n L e ft N e y — a ss a ults t h e L e ft R u ss ia n s re t a ke th e R e do ubt s ’ — P o n ia to v sk i s Adv a n c e Th e B a ttle a t S e m y o n o v sk a y a — ’ F re n c h Ca pt ure th e L e ft R e do u bt s Mu ra t s Ca v a lry Cha rge — — Ca pt u re o f S e m y o n o v sk a y a P o n ia t o v sk i a t U tit z a — Th e B a ttle in th e Cen t re R e in fo rc e m en t o f th e R ussia n — ’ — L e ft U v a ro v s Ca v a lry Cha rge R e n e w e d Att a c k o n th e — ’ — Cen t re Ca pture o f R a e v sk i s B a tt e ry Th e B a ttle en ds R ussia n P o sitio n —Co m m e n ts

NAP OLE ON mounted his horse at half - past ﬁv e in the m 7th Shiva rdino orning of the September , and rode to the

Na po le o n a t redoubt . He had slept little during the night , S hiv a rdim o wmg to the excitement of the impending ff battle , while his health was not good and he was su ering from a severe cold which almost deprived him of his

rema med u voice . He nearly all day on the high gro nd in front of the redoubt , about a mile from the Russian

ﬁr st line the Guard were drawn up round him . Here he paced up and down , stopping at times to issue orders . Kutuzov had at the same time taken up his position at Gorki , where he remained until the end of the battle , f at a considerable distance rom the decisive ﬂank . 1 24 THE BATTLE OF BORODI NO 1 25

The French batteries opened fire with 102 guns at ’ fin six o clock, but ding the range too great , they were 1600 moved forward , and reopened at about Atta c k o n the Russ ian paces . This was followed by the opening of L eft artillery fire in the centre and by Prince ’ The u Eugene s guns against Borodino . R ssians replied

U o f from their batteries and redoubts . nder cover ’ the artillery ﬁre Davout s two divisions moved to the — attack Compans on the right and Dessa ix on the left . On emerging from the forest , the former came under ﬁre from the redoubts and were driven back into cover, but at length they rushed to assault the left At earthwork . this moment Compans fell severely

n his oo n wou ded , and tr ps wavered , but Davout , seei g

r thei hesitation , rode forward , led the attack and the

nf redoubt was taken . Bagration had sent up rei orce ments from the second line ; these drov e the French

r disco mﬁture out again , and thei was completed by a charge of two regiments of Russian hussars and dragoons , who captured twelve guns , but were forced to abandon t them and retire by wo brigades of French light cavalry .

Dessaix During this struggle was severely wounded , and Marshal Davout had his horse killed and received a

severe contusion , but remained at his post . ﬁ P E While this ght was in progress , rince ugene had ’ wi Delz o ns attacked and occupied Borodino th division ,

hi s ur w ch drove out the Ru sians , who were p sued across ’ 1 26 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

ob F the bridge over the Kalo a by a rench regiment , T which followed them to the vicinity of Gorki . here the French were in turn atta cked by superior

forces in front and ﬂank , and forced back to i Borodino w th heavy loss . The Russians then

ob P destroyed the bridge over the Kalo a , while rince Eugene contented himself at that point with holding ’ Delz o ns Borodino . division and the Bavarian cavalry stood behind the village to the left was a strong battery ’ ﬁring on the Gorki heights and Ra ev ski s battery and farther to the left , in front of the village of Bezzubovo , m ’ t e ’ Orna o s light cavalry stoo d upon h plain . Eugene s

’ ’ Bro ussier s remaining troops (Gerard s and divisions , the Italian Guard and Grouchy’ s cavalry) moved to the right towards the bridges which had been constructed across

ob the Kalo a above Borodino , and crossed under cover of ’ riﬂm n e e Morand s , who were engaged with the Russian ’ a e ski skirmishers at the foot of R v s hill . fﬁ Napoleon , hearing of the loss of general o cers in the right attack , had sent Rapp to succeed Compans but

Rapp was soon wounded . The Emperor now, Re new e d ’ Atta c o n c c - 0 k at seven o clock , directed Ney to perate Russ mn L e t f ’ ’ uno t s in Davout s attack , while J corps was ’ Shivardino Mura t s moved up to the left of , and cavalry advanced to support . ’ n r Bagratio , observing Ney s advance , took measu es to oppose the enemy with reinforcements o f both infantry

’ 1 28 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

these were overthrown by a charge of Russian cuirassiers , the which pursued them , entered entrenchments , and drove out the French infantry . Murat himself only escaped being taken prisoner by dismounting and taking

Wurtember refuge in the left redoubt , occupied by a g

1 i i battalion . The Russ an cu rass ers were at length driven back by a regiment of Polish lancers . A ’ bout ten o clock , after a renewed and desperate

P Nevero vski struggle , in which rince Gorchakov and ’ were wounded , Ney s troops again obtained possession of the redoubts . But at this moment the reinforcements sent by Barclay de Tolly to reinforce the left wing were

a Sem o no v ska a T appro ching the y y heights . hey charged wi th the bayonet , and once more drove the French out ﬁ of the eld works . Meanwhile Po nia to vski had advanced along the old

Smolensk road , and had gained possession of U titz a ; his corps numbered only

men , and he could advance no farther against the Russian ﬂank in the face of superior forces . A ’ lready at nine o clock Napoleon , being informed that ’ Sem o no v ska a Ney s troops had captured the y y works , and thinking that he did not require the c c T he B a ttle a t S e m o y operation of the Westphalian corps , ordered “o YS k a a y Junot to move into the interval between

Poniato v ski . Davout and , to combine the two attacks ’ News then came of Ney s repulse , but it was some THE B ATTLE OF B ORODI NO 1 29

time before Napoleon decided what to do , and at ’ length he sent Friand s division to reinforce him ; it ’ was eleven o clock before Friand moved forward . The French had now some men attackin g the

Sem o no vska a y y entrenchments , where Russians T opposed them . here were numerous batteries on either

ﬁre ur hi side , whose was incessant . It was d ing t s period

Do khturo that Bagration fell mortally wounded . v

Ar succeeded to the command of the Second my , while

o no nitz in m K v com anded the troops at the redoubts . At about eleven o ’ clock the French again assaulted the earthworks , once more obtained possession of them , and

un the g s . But they did not hold them long , for they were soon driven out and forced back into the forest by a ’ B o ro z din s di desperate bayonet charge of grena ers .

At eleven - thirty a renewed attack drove the Russians ﬁ out again , and the French now nally gained

Sem o no vska a the possession of the y y redoubts , 1 r the Russians reti ing behind the watercourse , 15232111) ts where Ko no vnitz in reorganised the remainder of the troops under cover of strong batteries .

Ney now attacked the village , but was repulsed ; nf rr whereupon Murat , having co e ed with him , decided

’ to intervene in the battle with a great mass of Mara t s r l di v1ded i C a v a l y cava ry . These were nto two parts , C har e g to attack the Russians on either side of

hi a em o no ska a . S y v y To cover t s attack, Ney and D vout ’ 1 3 0 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF R US S I A

established batteries along the margin of the watercourse . ’ a nso ut wi G N y , crossing th St ermain s cuirassiers and ’ Sem o no v ska a Bruyere s light cavalry division , above y y

l Wa s ﬁre vi lage , met bya heavy from the Russian batteries . At the same time two regiments of Russian guards on the n left wi g formed six squares , and repelled the attack with their ﬁre two more charges met with the same

i result , and then one of the guards reg ments charged in R their turn with the bayonet , while the ussian guns played upon the cuira ss1ers until their ﬁre was masked

’ and Na nsouty s cavalry was driven back with heavy loss .

Latour - Ma ubo urg had crossed the watercourse below

v the illage with his two cavalry divisions , but the difﬁculty of the passage delayed him and he came into

a nso ut action later than N y . Charging on the right

nf and rear of the Russian i antry , this cavalry met with

c t . more su cess , but hey also were forced to retire During this cavalry action Friand renewed the attack

on the ruins of Semyo no v skaya, of which he obtained

possession , and his troops maintained them C a pture o f m o i S a y selves on the r ght bank of the watercourse , nOVOS k a y a obliging the Russians to retire a cannon - shot

from the ravine .

Sem o no vska a On occupying y y , Ney established strong batteries which Opened ﬁre from the front against the Russian left wing and on the ﬂank of their troops in the

’ 1 3 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

beyond the village on being confronted by the First

D vi . Russian Grenadier i sion , supported by artillery The Rus sians took up a strong position about a knoll

Po nia to v ski on which some guns were posted , and , not knowing that Ko no vnitz in had been driven from the

Sem o no vska a y y heights , did not advance farther , fearing

o un to be cut ff from the French army . It was not til

- half past ten , when Junot had appeared and engaged the

( Po nia t o v ski Russians on his left , that drove Tuchkov back and took possession of the knoll In the meant ime Prince Eugene had attacked the battery in the Russian centre , which was defended by

Ra evski T he g a me , the whole of whose second line in the C entre had been sent to reinforce the defenders

Sem o no vska a of the y y heights by order of Bagration . ’ Ra ev ski s troops , some dozen battalions in all , were

so disposed along the ravine in rear of the battery , that from the right a ﬂanking ﬁre could be brought to

O bear on the attack . From the pening of the battle a sharp action had proceeded between the Russian ~ skir mishers across the Semyonovka stream ahead of the ’ ’ Broussier s v battery , and Morand s troops . di ision ,

ob crossing the Kalo a , also took part in the action and the French batteries soon forced the Russian skirmishers

Bro ussier to retire from the stream to the hill . and ’ re Morand followed up the attack , Gerard s division maining in reserve while Montbrun was ordered to cross THE BATTLE OF B ORODI NO 1 33

’ At ’ and support Morand s attack . about ten o clock Bro us sier made an unsuccessful attempt to assault the

battery , but was driven back . The French now prepared a fresh attack by opening a

’ ﬁre heavy artillery , and at eleven o clock the assault was ’ renewed by Morand s troops , whose leading brigade under B o na my drov e the Russians out and captured their

guns and earthwork , thus gaining a most important point

’ in the centre of the enemy s position .

At Yermo lo v this moment the Russian General , Chief ' o f- - f o f A the Staf the First rmy , was passing along the rear of the captured battery with two batteries of horse artillery which he was leading to reinforce the left of the

Sem o no vska a y y position . He saw what had happened ,

r c and at once tu ned his guns on the aptured battery , ﬁ ﬁnd and taking the rst fresh battalion he could , led it

against the French , taking with him also the Russian troops that were streaming back from the captured

ﬁr position . Morand had not had time to con m the success gained by his leading brigade when this attack

At Kre tz took place . the same time General y with

ﬁre three regiments of dragoons , supported by artillery , ’ M The charged the remainder of orand s troops . French

r were d iven out of the battery , forced back , and pursued i for some distance Montbrun was k lled , and the di Pa o l visional generals , Morand , j and Defrance, were

B o na m un wounded , and y wo ded and taken prisoner , the ’ 1 34 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

French losing altogether in this attack on the Raevski 3000 battery some men .

o f It was now midday . On the left the position the f At ’ Russians had ormed a new front . nine o clock General B a ggev o o t had received orders to R emfo rc e me nt o f the proceed to that flank , and had started with ‘ Rus s ’a n L e ft leav m his two divisions , g only his rifle reglments on the right flank in the grove and the bed

a lo cha K . of the On the way the corps was divided , one d1v1s10 n being taken by B a ggevo o t to the left while the other under Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg

ﬁ Ra evski was rst directed against the captured battery ,

but on the battery being taken as above described, the Prince moved on to form a new line between that and

Sem o no vska a o med y y , where he was J by Barclay de F Tolly . Here they formed squares to repulse the rench

e cavalry , whos attacks have already been described , and having suffered heavily from the subsequent P i f cannonade , the rince moved his divis on to the le t

to the old Smolensk road .

M B a evo o t was eanwhile gg had reached the left , and ’ supporting S ha kho v skiagainst Juno t s Westphalianswith

four regiments , while the remainder of the division joined

niat vski h Tuchkov in an attack on P o o . T is was success ful and the Poles were driven back on U titz a after a ﬁerce struggle in which the gallant Tuchkov was mortally

wounded .

’ 1 3 6 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A the Russians breathing- space in which to establish them in selves their new positions . ’ Ar It was two o clock . rangements were now made to ’ Ra ev ski s renew the attack on battery , while the French right was to press forward beyond Semyo Re ne w e d a tta o n the ck novskaya . The Russians , seeing that the C e ntre hostile forces were gathering for the attack , ’ exchanged the shattered corps of Ra evskifor Osterma n s

ﬁr corps , which moved into the st line with its right on

m o no ska a the main road and its left towards Se y v y . It appeared to their enemies as though they were about to

Off make an ensive movement , and a mass of artillery was brought to bear upon them . But the Russian troops

i ﬁrm rema ned under this devastating cannonade , while

r their guns replied , and a general duel of artille y raged 800 along the entire front , where on either side guns

mi O vo ted forth death upon their pponents . The attack on the Ra evski battery was led by Ca ulain

o f court with some cavalry, followed by the divisions

Bro ussier Morand , Gerard and . On the Russian side Osterman was sustained by the 2ud and 3rd Cavalry

Corps . Caulaincourt charged the battery with strength and

courage , overthrew some of the Russian C ’ t‘ f Riév éfrﬁ infantry, and forced an entrance at the B a tte ry r f head of his cui assiers , but was himsel

r ff killed , while his ho semen su ered severely and would THE BATTLE OF BORODI NO 1 37

’ r have been enti ely destroyed . But the ViceroyEugene s columns were swarming in the redoubt was captured ; its defenders being slain , and the Russian line was driven ﬁ back behind the ravine in rear , after a nal charge by

Grouchy, who was forced to retire by the cavalry of the

Russian guard . ’ hr It was now t ee o clock . The French were at length ﬁ in possession of the eld of battle , but the Russians ,

ﬁr n driven back from their st position at all poi ts , still showed a front behind the Semyonovka to the high

road about Gorki . Only the troops on both sides

and were exhausted, the battle now became merely a cannonade .

Po niato vski , when he saw that Ney and Davout were ul successf , had in the meantime attacked the mamelon

U titz a behind ; and the Russians at that point , now

Ba ev o o t wi under command of gg , fell back into line th ’ the broken remn ants of Bagratio n s troops at the source

of the Semyonovka . The cannonade continued until

T he B attle nightfall , but the battle was practically at an e nds end . Napoleon had still in hand the

men of his Guard , but did not employ them . He himself ’ Sem o novska a f rode forward to y y at our o clock , and “ returned to his camp at seven , when, contrary to his

usual demeanour , his face was heated , his hair in dis f ” his . order , and whole air one of atigue ’ At six o clock in the evening the Russians occupied ’ 1 3 8 N AP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A — positions as follows the 6th Infantry Corps was on the right ﬂank at the battery near Gorki , from whence the

ﬁ Sem o Rus s ia n rst line extended in the direction of y P °S iti°n novskaya ; the 4th Infantry Corps was on the left ﬂank of the 6th ; the remains of the Second Army were farther to the left ; the 3rd and the greater part of

2nd B a evo o t the Infantry Corps under gg stood apart , on both sides of the old Smolensk road , in prolongation of the

The line occupied by the troops of the Second Army . 5 Cavalry Corps were in the second line , and the th Corps

The was in reserve . position had no advantages for it defence ; behind , at a distance of about two thousand yards , the route of retreat to Moscow lay parallel to it .

An attack by the Guard must have had a decisive effect . The sun was still high when Murat sent General Belliard

c o - Of to Napoleon to ask for the operation the Guard . Napoleon rode to the Semyo no vskaya heights and thence ’ Ra evski s to battery . Everywhere he saw the Russians standing in expectation of a renewal of the battle . But the Emperor said I will not have my Guard destroyed . At a distance of eight hundred leagues from France one ’ ” does not destroy one s last reserve . The Russian loss amounted to some men the

French had not less than casualties .

s difﬁ Knowing the disposition of both armie , it is not cult to criticise the actions of the combatants at the battle

The of Borodino . faulty occupation of the position by

NAP OLE ON ’ S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

moment for Wellington was when Blucher and his

P At wa s russians approached . Borodino Napoleon in vastly superior force on his right when the battle opened that was the decisive moment when the concentration o f strength against the Russian left would have decided the battle but the somewhat desultory nature of the attack and its distribution gave time fo r the weak Russian left to hold out until they were reinforced by men who had been erroneously posted on their right . The troops of Ney and Davout mlght well have been employed intheir full strength in the ﬁrst attack on the e Russian left , while Eugene held the centre . Wh n

e Eugene did attack , his attack should hav been carried ’ di a s wa s out , not with Morand s vision only , it at ten ’ wa s o clock , but with his entire strength , as it between ’ two O and three clock . Eventually , but too late , the ’ whole Russ1an line was forced from the centre at Ra evski s

Sem o no vska a U titz a redoubt , from y y and from beyond . This was done against the entire strength of the Russian

e army . How much more easily , then , it might hav been accomplished by a decisive attack before the enemy had

n been able to correct the faulty dispositio of his troops . di The columns of attack were sposed in great depth . A wider distribution would have facilitated the turning

Of the Russian left . Napoleon has been blamed for not employing the ﬁ men of his Guard to con rm the victory . Certainly he THE B ATTLE OF B ORODI NO 1 41 would seem to have acted in this against his own maxim Generals who save troops for the next day are always ” did beaten , as he in the general conduct of the battle contrary to his other maxim “ Never make a frontal ” attack upon a position which you can circumvent . r T But the ci cumstances have to be considered . here were still in view behind the enemy’ s left men in T reserve . hat these consisted of the Moscow militia w E armed with pikes was not kno n to the French mperor .

un The strategical situation has to be taken into acco t . At a distance of 800 leagues from France in a hostile country , short of transport and supplies , the position of the French a rmy in case of reverse would have been one of supreme danger . But it may be doubted

o whether the old Nap leon , the General of Italy , of A J Marengo , of usterlitz , and of ena would have been so cautious . He would surely have used his reserves up to the last man to secure a decisive victory . When all has been considered it certainly appears that Napoleon did not in this battle display the greatness of conception and vigour in execution that marked his

H e previous victories . He showed unwonted caution . hi did not dominate the issue as was his former habit . T s has by some been ascribed to the state of his health .

suﬁerin v But , although g from indisposition , he preser ed

his — all faculties . The problem was a simple one to

a ff destroy the Russi n left , and every e ort should have ’ 1 42 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A been directed to the attainment of that Object at the beginning of the day . At the same time we must remember what Napoleon himself said in Italy in 1797 Health is indispensable T in war and , a few years later here is but one season ﬁt for war I shall be for it six years longer , and then I ” shall myself be obliged to stop . He had passed the limit set by hims elf when the highest efﬁciency could be expected .

’ 1 44 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

Mozhaisk until Napoleon’ s army returned thither from

Moscow . On the 8th Napoleon remained in his camp at Shivardino he seemed overwhelmed by fatigue ; from time to time he clasped his ha nds violently over his crossed knees , and was frequently heard to repeat with ’ a kind of conv ulsive movement Moscow 1 Moscow !

That day the Russian army retreated to Zemlino , while the rearguard rema ined at Mozhaisk until driven out next day by Murat . They left behind wounded , who were turned into the streets by the French to make room

r l0th fo their own sick and wounded . On the September

Krutitz i i the Russians retreated to , and the r rearguard,

Milora do vich now commanded by , made a stand at

rimsko e ur K y . The rearguard held their own when M at m did ff attacked the , and not retire until theyhad su ered s 2000 a los of men . The French casualties were no less in T number . his day Kutuzov enrolled men of the

Moscow militia to form third ranks in his regiments . On the 11th he reached Bolshaya Via z yo ma and next day

ni Mamonova . He had been engaged in reorga sing his

nf army during the retreat from Borodino . Those i antry regiments which had less than 300 men under arms were formed into battalions the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry f Corps were ormed into one corps under Baron Korf . Ko no vnitz in was appointed to command the 3rd Infantry

o f Corps in place Tuchkov, killed in the battle . THE OCCUP ATI ON OF MOS COW 1 45

On the 13th September the Rus sian army bivouacked

Dra o milo v . outside Moscow, two versts from the g gate In view of the slow pursuit Kutuzov feared that the Viceroy Eugene might turn his right and occupy Moscow

’ inz in ero de s nf . W in his rear g detachment , rei orced by di a regiment of hussars and two of Cossacks , was rected

Winz in ero de to guard against such a movement . g had

O F R been perating in rear of the rench , and was at uza , 8th north of Mozhaisk , on the September . Finding hi ’ mself close to the Viceroy Eugene s encampment , he

ni made a ght march , got ahead of him on the Moscow mi road , and was then posted on the Vladi r road . Kutuzov in the ﬁrst instance intended to give battle A again under the walls of Moscow . position was taken up and partly entrenched , the right in front of the village

the Vo ro b o via G — of Fili , left on the y ori the Sparrow

Hills . But it was represented to the Russian Commander m - Chief that in a position so unfavourable defeat was certain . He decided to abandon Moscow and continue his retreat but as he did not desire to take the entire responsibility of abandoning the ancient capital , he called

The n a council of war . cou cil , however , were mostly in ﬁ T favour of ghting , though Barclay de olly indicated the

r futility of cou ting certain defeat , when Moscow must be R lost in any case , and the ussian army would in addition

be rendered us eless for further operations . Kutuzov

The gave orders for the retreat . army was to retire by K ’ 1 46 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

the Riazan road and then cross over to the Kaluga road . had Supplies been collected at Serpukhov, from whence they could be distributed with equal facility on either

a Ra stO chin e s ro d . Count p , the Gov rnor of Mo cow, reported that most of the inhabitants had already left

e the city . Those who remain d were ordered by Kutuzov

Ra sto chin to be sent to Riazan . p reported to the Emperor that all the c o mmisa riat and arsenal had been 100 removed . But this was not the fact, for over guns ,

rm small a s , powder , and other supplies were left to the enemy .

1s U - Moscow the heart of Russia . pon its time worn walls broods the spirit of a thousand years of veneration .

T he Within rise a thousand spires of varied colour 1 Of 53513t and Oriental aspect . In its hundreds MO C — S OW sacred ediﬁces are sheltered the icons the

—“ sacred images before which a primitive people bent in reverential homage . But the Russians decided to

The the abandon their ancient capital . remainder of 13 14 e population left on the th and th Septemb r , and before dawn on the latter date the Russian army began u the march thro gh the city . Their baggage had been

The despatched during the night . troops followed by wa Dra o milo v y of the g gate , preceded by the cavalry , the whole army marching in one long column to the exit

Ko lo men T by the gate . hey continued their march to

v P The the illage of anki , seventeen versts distant .

’ 1 48 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

Emperor ! Long live Napoleon ! the French soldiers R entered the ussian capital . Napoleon awaited in vain

ra o milo the expected deputation at the D g v gate . “ ” “ M ! What , he exclaimed , oscow empty What an unheard of thing go and bring me the boya rs But

- there remained only some gaol birds , let loose from the

fo rel ners No v prisons , and a few g . one else recei ed the ’ The conqueror . mighty actor on the world s stage appeared before an empty house Not thus had he been

n M A r received at Milan , Vienna , Berli and adrid l eady

mn The B urning ominous colu s of smoke were to be seen ° f the C it y The c di rising from the houses . in en aries were at work . Napoleon took up his residence in the

ml He Kre in . was driven forth by ﬂames , and moved to the Petrovski Palace . In a few days the greater At ﬁr part of Moscow was reduced to ashes . st the

s Ru sians accused the inv aders of this act of vandalism . Afterwards it was claimed as a patriotic deed on the

G Ra sto chin in part of the overnor , Count p , and the habitants . It was more probably the work of marauders .

Of Moscow , mainly built wood , was lighted easily and burnt quickly . If the burning of Moscow was a pre meditated act , it is not easy to see what was to be gained by it . If it was designed to show the invaders that their

v enemy was implacable and would ne er come to terms , it might , had they so taken it , have warned them in time to h effect a safe retreat . Or it mig t have caused them to THE O CCUP ATI ON OF MOS COW 1 49

K To u advance at once on aluga . b rn Moscow in the

i v m ddle of September could ser e but little purpose .

There were supplies more ample than could be destroyed . To have arranged for in cendiary ﬁres at the end of October would have been to deprive the French of quarters on the approach of winter , or forced them to retreat when the climatic conditions were most severe . It is a curious circumstance that a Belgian named Smidt proposed to assist in the destruction of the invading wi army th a balloon or ﬂying machine , from which bombs and rockets were to be discharged . His project wa s seriously considered by the Government , but came to

Nl ni nothing . He and his balloon were removed to j G A Novgorod when the rand rmy approached Moscow . It is a question whether the French were wise in not harassing the Russians during their evacuation of the city . For Napoleon to refuse battle must have increased G the steadfastness of the Russian overnment , as it pointed

NO to the exhaustion of their enemies . doubt he did not wish to lose more men , while he counted on peace following on the occupation of the capital . On the day of the French occupation of Moscow the Russian army marched ﬁfteen versts on the Riazan road to the village of Panki the rearguard R us sia n Ma rc h to under Milo ra do vich halted less than half that P o do lsk iaz o ka A distance at V v . halt was made to h cover the escape of the inhabitants of Moscow . T e ’ 1 5 0 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

l6th march was resumed on the September , and next day after the passage of the Moskva River at Borovski Most , where the rearguard , now composed of fresh troops under

Ra evski z , was left , Kutu ov executed a ﬂank movement d P 19th by force marches and reached odolsk on the . During this movement the right ﬂank was covered by P the akhra River . The rearguard, having destroyed the

e E hrimo v bridge at Borovski , marched by night , l aving p with two Cossack regiments on the Riazan road .

21st P On the the army reached Krasnaya akhra , where

Milo ra do vich it was covered by a detachment under , posted at Desna . It was at this time that the Russians began those partisan operations with detachments o f Cossacks that contributed to the destruction o f the in s vading army , by acting on their line of communication , ﬁ attacking convoys , and nally by harassing the retreating

mn colu s . The French vanguard under Sebastiani had meanwhile

u in been sent on by M rat , who remained Moscow, and had followed the Russians down the ‘ by ’ E rimo v s flgfigfi Riazan road . Sebastiani mistook ph E c ed a égzig Cossacks for the Russian reargu rd , and Bro nn itz i marched as far as , whilst Murat , completely deceived , informed Napoleon that the

Russian army had dispersed , leaving only Cossacks .

Bro nnitz i But on reaching , Sebastiani became convinced that he had been led astray .

’ 1 5 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

At Murat moved to that place with all his cavalry . the same time Bessieres approached Desna . These move ments forced back the Russian detachments , which drew the French cavalry away from the main Russian army . T here are three roads leading from Moscow to Kaluga , the shortest of which passes through Krasnaya - Pakhra and Tarutino . Kutuzov decided to take up and strengthen a position at the latter place , there awaiting reinforcements and the development of events before

O undertaking any further perations with the mam army . Napoleon had hoped that the occupation of the capital would lead the enemy to sue for peace . He lingered in

Moscow in this expectation , sent Lauriston , Na po le o n ro o s e s P s p p formerly ambassador in St eter burg , to P ea c e negotiate an armistice with Kutuz ov and make overtures to the Tzar . Kutuzov temporised ; de spatched an envoy to the Tzar with the French pro

o sa ls ﬁ p , which were , however , inde nite , and at the same A time urged lexander to make no terms . Napoleon ’ had mistaken the Tzar s character . That monarch dis

ﬁrmn played unexpected ess and decision , and adhered to his previous resolution , that he would not consider terms of peace so long as a French soldier remained on

Russian soil , nor would he communicate with the French

Emperor . The long halt in Moscow after the hardships and THE OCCUP ATI ON OF MOS COW 1 53

v r pri ations th ough which the soliders had passed , the ﬁ evacuation of the city by its inhabitants , and the res by which the place was devastated reacted on the dis ci line p of the troops . The men abandoned themselves

dis E m to order , and marauding did not cease until the pero r took stringent measures to restore discipline when P P ml he returned from the etrovski alace to the Kre in .

T i 9 c o nﬂa ratio n h s was on the 1 th September after the g

e ceas d . In the meantime Napoleon was obliged to consider his measures for the future . He had several alternatives . The possibility of remaining in the Moscow for the winter had to be immediately dis i m ssed . He might move northwards at once ,

r P in and th eaten St etersburg , the hope of thus forcing

u 1a n the R ss s to conclude peace . Or he could march

- D in north west to the Lower wina , where he would be a

St P ur position to menace etersb g , and at the same time ul avoid the appearance of a retreat , which wo d demoralise his army and have a dangerous effect in Prussia and E ul throughout urope generally . Or he co d retreat by Kaluga towards Warsaw and Grodno through a region that had not yet been ravaged by war . Situated as he was , with a hostile army of constantly increasing strength in the neighbourhood , it would have been foolhardy to

dir P Off march ect on St etersburg , and risk being cut f his rom base . But a movement towards the Lower ’ 1 54 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

Dwina , supported by Victor , who could march with

P o lo tz k men from to Velikiya Luki , whilst the

r Empe or advanced on Velizh , would open the way for

ur f ther operations . He could then have moved on wi Novgorod th men , or at the worst could have

Po lo tz k retreated towards and Vitebsk , where he would have been supported by Oudino t and Macdonald on the

D As Lower wina . for the southern project , Kutuzov

K The F already barred the way to aluga . rench army wa s scarcely in a condition to ﬁght another battle with an enemy whose strength was being c ontinuously augmented . ’ The Emperor s appreciation of the situation is recorded in the following undated notes , probably dictated by him during the ﬁrst days Of October (1) Since the enemy is moving to the

Kiev road , their intention is evident they expect re inforcements from the Moldavian

oe army . To march against them would mean to man uvre in the direction of the reinforcements and winter in ’ o int d a w} cantonments without any p pp , with our ﬂanks ’ exposed , while the enemy s ﬂanks and rear would be

nh secure . Moscow, abandoned by its i abitants and burnt, is no longer of any use to us the city can no longer harbour our sick and wounded if the supplies there are

n us once exhausted , it can fur ish no fresh ones , nor assist in establishing order in the country .

’ 1 56 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF RUSSI A

” can march as rapidly as we like and meet our supplies

- wa . half y from Smolensk However , the army could ’ easily carry a fortnight s ﬂour , and we could reach

Smolensk without being obliged to forage . We could

v e en stop at Vyazma as long as we wished , and procure supplies by extending right and left .

i We are conquerors , our organ sation is perfect , and fi if we had to ght and carry our wounded , we should be in the same position as during the advance , when the ffi advanced guard had some wounded . It is true di culties w may arise ith regard to fodder , but we could procure ffi that within two or three leagues , and the di culty would not be serious .

1 ( ) There can be no doubt but that , if Smolensk and

Vitebsk were districts like Koenigsberg and Elbing , the

ﬁr st would be the most sensible plan , namely, to march to a favourable country , go into winter quarters , and recruit the army .

2 c o nc eal fro m ( ) In such case, however , we cannot ourselves that the war would be greatly protracted , but it would still be more protracted if we chose inhospitable

V O districts such as Smolensk and itebsk , which ffer scanty resources and are little suited for eight months in winter quarters . What ought to be done

I a ( . ) What results are to be attained 2 (i) To qu rter THE OCC UP ATI ON OF MOS COW 1 57

E the mperor as near France as possible , and satisfy the country that he would be in the midst of a friendly

o population in winter quarters . (ii) T admit of the army being cantoned in a friendly country, near its supplies of clothing and equipment .

To St P (iii) occupy a position threatening etersburg , E and so support the mperor in his negotiations for peace . (iv) To maintain o ur military reputation at the height to which it has been raised by this victorious campaign . A (II . ) manoeuvre combining thes e four conditions ul wo d undoubtedly be perfect . This manoeuvre would be as follows The Duke of Belluno (Victor) with his corps reinforced by four battalions of Saxons , two battalions of West

halians p , two or three battalions of Illyrians , and two

Of 129 nf battalions the th I antry Regiment , bringing it up

v S to a force of nearly men , would lea e molensk the

ﬁr Velik a st day of the operation , and march to Velizh and y

Luki , where it would arrive on the eighth or ninth day from Velikya Luki the Duke of Belluno would take his

o lo t line of operations on P z k and Vitebsk . Marshal St

P o lo tz k nf Cyr , leaving his position at , would rei orce him in six days .

he T M T Duke of arentum ( acdonald) would send him , f nf f Dina bur O . rom the environs of g, a brigade i antry

“ Of The Duke Belluno , as the senior , would command

Velik a all these troops united at y Luki , where , on the ’ 1 58 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

tenth day from the commencement of the movement , an

7 At Velik a army of men would be concentrated . y Luki the army would draw supplies from Po lotz k and

Vitebsk . On the day when the Duke of Belluno began his wi movement , the Emperor would leave Moscow th the army and march on Velizh by Voskresensk , so that the head of the army would reach Velizh on the tenth day , and At its rear on the thirteenth or fourteenth day . Velizh the army would draw supplies equally from Vitebsk and

o lo tz T D P k . hus , while the uke of Belluno menaced St

P Velik a the etersburg from his position at y Luki , army would be behind him on the Dwina the 3rd Corps and D A the corps of the uke of brantes (Junot) , numbering at least men , would march from Moscow and

Mozhaisk on Smolensk by way of Vyazma . All the cavalry and infantry regiments on the march to join the army would be directed on Vitebsk and Velizh , to meet the army and incorporate themselves with it on

The m arrival . E peror , with the Cavalry of the Guard , the Old Guard and the Young Guard , would be at the

be head of the army , in order to in a position to support D the uke of Belluno in case of necessity . Finally , on the

O twelfth day of the peration , that is to say , of the move ment of the army, the position would be as follows The Duke of Belluno with Marshal St Cyr and one ’ Tarentum s o f of the Duke of brigades , forming a corps

’ 1 60 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

ul r that the enemy wo d make peace , and if the ci cum stances o f the movements of the enemy did not tend to

elik a V . advance , we could remain at y Luki

As these projects did not fructify it is unnecessary to

he comment on them , but it may remarked that the whole scheme bears an appearance of unreality , of a desire to mould circumstances in accordance with Napoleon’ s wishes , and that it makes several unwarrantable assumptions .

Napoleon still remained in Moscow, awaiting a reply to his proposals from St Petersburg . Twenty days had elapsed since his entry into the ancient capital The Q ues tio n o f 1 1m erat1v e i of Russ a . It was p to cons der the Re tre a t

question of retreat . He has been blamed for

e h sitating so long , for winter was approaching . But in criticising the Emperor , factors of the widest range have to be taken into consideration . It was not to be supposed that Napoleon would be willing to retreat except as a last resort . Much as his army had suffered in strength di ff and scipline during the advance , he knew it would su er fﬁ still more in a retreat . He had scarcely su cient horses to mount half his cavalry , and to draw those guns the greater number of which may to - day be seen in the

Kremlin , where they were taken when abandoned on E u the march . rope might rise in his rear , and he had

—A s P unfriendly elements in his army u trians , russians THE OCCUP ATI ON OF MOS COW 1 61 and Westphalians -“ who would be ready to abandon a

. c lost cause Events in Spain aused him anxiety, for Wellington had entered Madrid after the battle o f

Salamanca . ‘ m s In addition he feared for his line of com unication .

The main Russian army was in a position to threaten it . The army of Moldavia under Chichagov had advanced S against chwarzenberg , and forced that general to retire i beh nd the Bug . Warsaw and Vilna were threatened . Steinheil ’ s corps from Finland had reinforced the enemy in Livonia , where they were now superior to Macdonald .

To S meet the situation , Victor had reached molensk , ’ Bara ue d Hilliers i followed by g y w th men .

A nf ustria was requested to rei orce Schwarzenberg , and di Prussia asked to send a v ision to Macdonald . But it was out of the question to remain much longer

To in Moscow . winter there , a course which had been A d considered , was impossible . part from the istance F ni from rance , the commu cations were insecure , although

t O n ff hitherto par isan peratio s had had little e ect on them . But even if sufﬁcient provisions could be Obtained in ul Moscow for the men , forage wo d not be available for cav alry and artillery horses and cattle during the long and severe winter . Meanwhile Murat was with the adv anced guard about

Chernishna s Vinkovo on the River , sixty verst from

Moscow . His isolated position led Kutuzov to attack ’ 1 62 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF RUS S I A M him . urat had not more than men , including 8000 187 cavalry , with guns . His troops were reduced

Ac tio n a t by hardship and privation , and he occupied Vih k I ° ° nf The a position u avourable for defence . negotiations he had engaged in with Kutuzov led him to hope for early peace . It is said that he had been lulled

an into security by understanding , amounting to an mi ar stice , which had been concluded with the Russian i commander . The existence of this arm stice is denied by Russian authorities , who aver that it referred only At to outposts . any rate Kutuzov was quite capable of undertaking hostilities in any circumstances , should a di good chance of success present itself, notwithstan ng his A inherent unwillingness to enter on active operations . disposition to remain always on the defensive appears to be a constant characteristic of the Russian race . ’ Kutuzov wa s at length induced to attack Murat e army . Reconnaissances had revealed that the French , a either through laxness or trusting to the rmistice , were

v fﬁ A not keeping up their protective ser ices e ciently . forest on the left Of the French encampment was not 18 R watched or patrolled . On the th October the ussians advanced , the main army to make a frontal attack , while a strong corps under Bennigsen traversed the forest on the French left by a night march with a v iew to attacking

. o r that ﬂank The man euv e was badly executed , though well conceived , the ﬂank attack arriving too late , and

’ 1 64 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

Colonel B erthemy was sent to renew negotiations with

wa s Kutuzov, with a letter from Berthier in which it proposed to take measures to give the war a character in accordance with accepted measures , and to stop the w laying aste of the country , which was as harmful to ” Russia as it was distasteful to the Emperor Napoleon .

Kutuzov , as usual temporising , wrote that there had not yet been time to receive - a reply to the despatch sent to

o lko nski the Tzar by Prince V . While the events that have been narrated were taking

place , there was considerable activity in the Opera tio ns o n th e theatre of war where the w1ngs of the Grand Dw ma A rmy were engaged , both on the Dwina

Vo lh nia and in y . ’ Af ﬁr Po lo tz k r ter the st battle of , Wittgenstein s t oops were disposed from the 23rd August to the l6th October with headquarters at Sivoshin on the right bank of the

Drissa stream , and the reserve and cavalry corps at

Soko lishchi O - Of . With the bject holding the French on the Drissa , Wittgenstein strengthened the defences of

a Sebezh , where his depots were stationed and det ch

O ments were posted at Kamenetz , to bserve Macdonald, and on the Sv o lna and the road from Po lotz k to Nevel

Of to cover the front the corps . He thus protected St Petersburg by covering the roads leading from the Dwina P to Novgorod and skov .

Marshal St Cyr did not venture to attack Wittgenstein, THE OCCUP ATI ON OF MOS COW 1 65

in hav g an exaggerated idea of his strength , while his e r ni fo r nergies were largely di ected to obtai ng supplies ,

v ff ns want of which , howe er , his troops su ered co iderably . In September Wittgenstein received considerable rein f orcements , mostly militia , amounting in all to

un men . During the period der review the only hostilities

ns ns on the Dwina co isted of partisan operatio . Later in October Wittgenstein receiv ed orders to attack the

Po lo tz k Sventz ia ni French at , and drive them towards ’ v S s he was then to lea e the pursuit to teinheil s corp , and to c o - operate with Chichagov in cutting Oﬁ the retreat of ’ The O Napoleon s army . result of these perations will be seen in the chapter dealing with the passage of the

Berezina . ’ inh On conclusion of the treaty with Sweden , Ste eil s corps of men , which had been posted in Finland , 22nd was ordered to Riga , where it arrived on the

September . Macdonald had remained inactive at Dina burg with ’ Gra nd ean s di the men of j vision , while the Prussian troops un der York were in observation before i Riga , the garr son of which , under General Essen , made A several sorties in July and ugust .

Marshal Victor , with the corps constituting the reserve T 9th A A . of the Grand rmy , reached ilsit on the ugust T He had men . his corps set out from Tilsit at A o f the end of ugust , and , marching by way Kovno and ’ 1 66 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

28th e Vilna , arrived at Smolensk on the Sept mber , after suffering considerable loss both in men and horses from At want of provisions , and from disease . Smolensk

nf matters were not much better , as supplies were of i erior quality . The arrival of reinforcements for Wittgenstein obliged

r Victor to take measures to support St Cy . With this

’ Object Da endels div ision left Smolensk for Ba bino v ichy ’ lth At Parto un eaux s on the 1 October . the same time

v division was posted at Mstisla l , for convenience of ’ v supply , and Gerard s di ision remained in Smolensk .

Victor now had about men . After the indecisive action at Gorodechno related in

To rma sso v Chapter VI . , retreated behind the Styr on the

29th A His E v e nts in ugust . main forces were posted at V°lh h ie y Lutz k , with advanced detachments under

un Cha litz ﬁr A Co t Lambert and p , the st from the ustrian

t utz k Lu z k L . frontier to , the second from to Kolki Schwarzenberg and Reynier stood between the Styr

To rchin ~ a nd and the Turya , with advanced posts at

haruko C v .

he T Russians were in a safe position , the Styr being unfordable from the point where it crosses the Austrian P frontier until its junction with the ripet , while all the bridges had been destroyed and their movements behind the river were concealed by the forest . On their side , in open and marshy country, Schwarzenberg and

’ 1 68 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

L esna ﬁr y and retreated st to Volchin , and then , being Me D hi pursued, crossed the Bug between lnik and rogic n th T 12 . on the . Chichagov occupied Brest Litovsk hus the allied corps were driven into the Grand Duchy of

Warsaw, and the road to the Berezina was laid open to the Russian advance . f Chichagov remained inactive at Brest for a ortnight , to collect supplies , but sent detachments into the Grand

Duchy to seize the magazines and to harass the enemy . G Schwarzenberg , after the action at orodechno , might perhaps have followed up his success and tried to deal To rma sso v another blow before his junction with

Chichagov . But this would in all probability have been

ff v ine ective , for the Russian would merely ha e retired before him until the junction was completed . His retire ment on Warsaw instead of towards Minsk , a direction that would have brought him into communication with ’ O i Napoleon s army , is perhaps more pen to critic sm ; he appears to have considered ﬁrst the retention of the wi A shortest line of communication th ustria , on which

c o - wi there were ample supplies , in place of operating th ﬁ the main army of invasion . He thus did not ful l

rOle his , which was to protect , on the right ﬂank, the

Of communications the army . The curtain was now about to rise on the last act of

hi dr t s great ama , than which the history of the world can scarcely show a greater human tragedy . CHAPTER ! II

FROM MOSCOW TO MALOYAROSLAVE TZ — Ma rc h o f t h e Gra n d A rm y- Kutu zo v le a v e s Ta rutin o Ma lo — ‘ — — y a ro sla v e t z Adv a n c e o r R e tre a t Z R e t re a t Co m m en t s

ON the evacuation of Moscow the French army numbered 5 69 over men and guns . Of these there were

nf The h a d nearly i antry . sick and wounded been despatched as far as possible by the Ma rc h o f the Grand direct road to Mozhaisk , which was occupied Army M by Junot . Mortier was left in oscow

rema ln ln un 23rd he had orders to occupation til the , when he was to blow up the Kremlin and public build ings and march to Vereya , where he would be in a position to maintain communication between the main

un army and J ot . 9 P Napoleon left Moscow on the 1 th October . rince ’ Ne Eugene s corps formed the advanced guard , with y

n G immediately behi d then followed the Old uard , two ’ v D v di isions of a out s corps , a division of the Young G uard accompanying headquarters , the treasure , and ’ waggons laden with trophies ﬁn ally Morand s division of Davout’ s corps and Colbert’ s brigade of cavalry of the 1 69 ’ 1 70 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

The Of Guard . light cavalry marched on either ﬂank

n T the colum . hese ﬂanking troops and the rearguard

en route had orders to burn the villages . Napoleon ’ himself arrived at Tro itz ko ye at four o clock in the after noon and the advanced guard reached Viyatutinka at the same time . The march of the French army from Moscow had the appearance of the migration of a people ; the T impedimenta occupying a length of many miles . here 00 were 20 artillery carriages . Each company had an equipment Of two or three carts for the transport T of provisions . here was a confused assemblage of carriages , waggons and carts of every description , and T even wheelbarrows , laden with booty . here were T P trophies of Russian , urkish and ersian ﬂags . There

n was a motley crowd of followers , including many wome a nd children . Such were the encumbrances with which this army set out on a march that was to be perhaps the most difﬁcult and terrible that has ever been attempted .

20th a Tro itz ko e On the October Napoleon rem ined at y , while the advanced guard , having reached Krasnaya

- n Pakhra , took a cross country track to Fomi skoye on the ’ u The new Kal ga road . same day Ney s corps effected a

wi M Po nia to vski junction th Murat on the ocha , while fell in in rear of the advanced guard under Eugene , and was afterwards directed on Vereya .

’ 1 72 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

’ after expelling Eugene s advanced guard . Kutuzov had

622 un men and g s . The town of Ma lo ya ro sla vetz stands upon a height hi overlooking the River Luzha on the north , from w ch di Ma lo y a ro s rection the French were approaching . le v etz Beyond the town is a lofty plain surrounded T by forest , traversed by roads from Kaluga and arutino . ’ Delz o ns P , who commanded rince Eugene s advanced

“ 23rd guard , had occupied the town on the evening of the wi th two battalions only , fearing to push his whole force beyond the river and deﬁle on the edge of a precipice At down which he might be driven by a night attack . daybreak Do khturo v attacked and drove the French out

v P of the town and back on to the di ision below . rince Eugene was some six miles distant when the sound of the

guns warned him of the action . He hurried forward

Delz ons wa s with his remaining forces to support , who diﬂicult with y maintaining his hold on the bank of the

ﬁre Luzha , in a position exposed to the of the Russians

The P on the heights above . rince ordered an attack , and the French pressed over the bridge across the river , drove back the masses of Russians who ﬁlled the ra v me which led up to the town , and soon their bayonets glittered on

Delz o ns the heights above . But here was killed , and his troops , disheartened , hesitated and fell back .

nf Rei orcements were now coming up on both sides .

The battle continued throughout the day , the town being FROM MOS COW TO MAL OYAROSLA VE TZ 1 73

taken and retaken again and again . But the Russians T were more numerous and continued to arrive . hey

occupied a strong and commanding position , and it was only after the exhaustion of all his troops that Eugene ﬁ nally held the town , while the enemy assembled their

Ma lo a ro sla v etz forces on the road to Kaluga , between y F and the forest . Towards evening the whole rench army D ’ arrived near the scene of action , and two of avout s E divisions were moved forward to support ugene .

The two armies were now facing each other , Kutuzov barring the road to Kaluga , by which Napoleon had

r ln Advanc e o r intended to retreat th ough Ye ya on Re h ea t ? S molensk . His expressed intention had been to ﬁght a battle should the enemy think of covering

Kaluga . The Emperor had his headquarters at

Gorodnya , some miles in rear . Napoleon now showed an indecision and a want of resolution that were new to him . He summoned the marshals , and asked their Opmlon as to whether it was to the advantage of the ” he army to ﬁght or to avoid battle . T generals advised a retreat either direct on Smolensk or through Mozhaisk . 25th It was the morning of the , and the Emperor rode ’ S forward to reconnoitre the enemy s position . oon after ’ Plato v s he started , some thousands of Cossacks rode close up to Napoleon , who was only saved by the presence of mind of his staff and the timely arrival of the cavalry of the Guard; who extricated him when he and his suite ’ 1 74 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

were surroun ded and had drawn their swords to defend

themselves . The Emperor spent the day in reconnoitring R the ussian position , and returned to Gorodnya without

having come to a decision . He certainly had reason 600 to hesitate . Kutuzov had men and guns

drawn up to bar his passage . Napoleon had 7 men 300 and guns , and his soldiers were no longer possessed of the spirit which inspired them when they crossed the At Niemen . this distance from France he had every reason to preserve the strength of his army as far a s

possible . The enemy was in a position two and a half versts

Ma lo a ro sla v etz The beyond y . French forces were ’ Da distributed between that place and Mozhaisk . vout s corps and two cavalry corps stood in front of Ma lo yaro s la v etz the Viceroy Eugene occupied the town and the valley of the Luzha the Guard and two cavalry corps were between that place and Gorodnya Ney with two divisions was between Gorodnya and Borovsk ; ’ Marchand s division behind that town ; Po nia to v ski in Vereya Mortier on the road from Kubinskoye to Vereya ; Junot in Mozhaisk ; the artillery park and baggage at Borovsk , Gorodnya , and between that place

a lo a ro sla vetz and M y . On the morning of the 26th October Napoleon again rode towards Ma lo ya ro sla v etz with the Guard and two

ﬁre cavalry corps . He stopped at a bivouac short of the

’ 1 76 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

no oe i f was to be more man uvr ng , but merely an ef ort to save the army .

v Napoleon , ha ing determined to march to Kaluga him mi f . rom Moscow, had two courses open to He ght have attacked the Russians in their fortiﬁed C o mments

position at Tarutino , and so cleared the way . U ndoubtedly he chose the right course in retreating , rather than ﬁght a doubtful battle . But when his plan had almost succeeded his irresolution led to failure . He still had it in his power to avoid a conﬂict and march by

ﬁnd r Medyn . But in the result we him etreating by a route which he had better , as circumstances turned out ,

ﬁr u and have taken in the st instance , th s saving time , what was almost as important , the consumption of

o n provisions . But it is not clear why he did not march Medyn and Yelnya instead of taking his army by the

s His exhausted and longer route through Mozhai k . troops were perhaps too scattered to follow the Russians 2 th t immediately on the 6 . But he was ed the whole of th the 25 when he might have been collecting his forces . Kutuzov showed the usual tactics of the Russian in retiring unnecessarily from a strong position . He had advanced with timidity he retreated with precipitation

nf and in such co usion that Sir Robert Wilson , the British general attached to the Russian army , declared that the retreat resembled a rout . CHAPTER XIII

THE RETREAT TO SMOLENSK — — Ma rc h to Vya zm a R ussian Mo v em en ts Na po le o n a t — — ’ Vya zm a Ne w s fro m th e Win gs Na po le o n s Me a sure s — ’ — R e t re a t c o n tin u e d Kutu z o v s P u rs u it B a tt e o f ya m a ' l V z — — ’ — Difﬁc ultie s o f th e Ma rc h Kut u z o v s P la n s R e t re a t t o ’ - — Sm o len s k Ne y s R e a rgua rd The P a ss a ge o f th e Vo p R us s ia n Ope ra tio n s

O O V 2 th NAP LE N reached ereya on the 7 October . There

un Ponia to vski 23rd he fo d , who had arrived on the , and

T he Ma rc h Mortier , who had marched from Moscow t° Vy a z ma wi ml after blo ng up the Kre in , happily some ff z what ine ectually . Mo haisk was passed next day , and

ﬁ 29th The ﬁ the battle eld of Borodino on the . eld of

a fri htful wi battle still presented g scene , strewn th corpses ,

ms r s fragments of uniform , ar , helmets and broken d um .

Ko lo tz ki ur Farther on was the monastery , t ned into a 500 hospital , where there were some wounded , most of wi whom were taken on on carriages th the army , the

Emperor even giving up his own vehicles for this purpose . Information had been given by a captured Russian ﬁ of cer that Kutuzov was marching direct on Smolensk , and the fact that the rearguard was followed only by

Cossacks appeared to conﬁrm this statement . Napoleon M 1 77 ’ 1 78 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A n accordingly hurried on his march , feari g that the Russians would reach Vyazma or Smolensk by a shorter route .

Winter was now approaching , and although the nights

ﬁne v . were cold , the weather was and fa ourable No snow had as yet fallen . Napoleon reached Vyazma on the

3 1st October , travelling in his carriage . On this day the French troops were disposed as follows —the Old Guard ’ and Murat s cavalry eight versts beyond Vyazma Mortier and Junot—approaching Vyazma the Viceroy

P onia to vski G and near Gzhatsk ; Davout at ridnevo , f orming the rearguard , with orders to burn all villages and buildings as he passed .

During the march the cold gradually increased , and

The de there were several degrees of frost at night . moralisation of the troops continued the sick were constantly augmented men cast Off the burthen of their arms , and at every step were to be seen infantry soldiers w P r ithout weapons and troopers without horses . a ties wa ndered o ff the road to seek for food and numbers found D f death . iscipline declined ; amine conquered feelings of honour and subordination soldiers no longer obeyed fﬁ nor even respected their o cers . Between Mozhaisk 400 5 700 and Gzhatsk out of Westphalians left the ranks .

The baggage trains of various corps became mixed , and were plundered and bloody strife took place between

French soldiers and their allies .

’ 1 80 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

n zud remaining u til midday of the . Here he received news from St Cyr of his evacuation of Po lo tz k ; from

Na po leo n a t Victor of his movement from Smolensk to Vya z ma the Dwina and from the Duke of Bassano (Maret) from Vilna reporting theretirement of Schwarzen berg before Chichagov . From these reports he gathered that the Russians intended to cut his line of communi

’ cations . Wittgenstein had resumed the offensive and marched

St Po lo tz k against Cyr , who was in position before , on

1 he 5 . T New s fro m the th October Russian general the s n 18 r attacked on the th , d iving the French S into the town , and as teinheil was advancing D along the left bank of the wina from Disna , St Cyr

Po lo tz k i D evacuated and w thdrew across the wina , at ’ the same time defeating Steinheil s advanced guard , and f orcing that general to retreat to Disna . Wittgenstein

ni then crossed the Dwina , and St Cyr retired on Chash ki ,

Ula ff on the River , where Victor e ected a junction with 29th S h him on the October . Thus molensk , w ere Victor was to have formed a general reserve , and from whence he was to have advanced to meet the Grand Army or to support St Cyr or Schwarzenberg as occasion arose , was wi left th only a garrison .

- In the meantime , in the south western theatre of opera ’ tions Schwarzenberg had retreated before Chichago v s advance , and crossed the Bug at Drogichin , thus exposing THE RE TRE A T TO S MOLE NSK 1 81

the French line of retreat towards the Berezina .

Chichagov remained near Brest - Litovsk un til the 30th

October , when he advanced towards Slonim , from whence , as will be seen , his march was continued to the Berezina . Napoleon still hoped that he would be able to avoid the enemies closing in on every side . Victor and St Cyr

’ Na po le o n s should hold Wittgenstein in check , and Mea s ure s ifﬁ Chichagov, marching by d cult roads through the Lithuanian forests , should be detained ’ h by Schwarzenberg s pursuit . C arpentier , governor of

nf V G Smolensk , was directed to i orm ictor that the rand

Ar D 3rd my would be at orogobuzh on the November , and that the Emperor expected to receive there all in

v formation regarding the mo ements of the wings , and of

wa s the supplies and artillery available in Smolensk . He to write to the Commandant at Vitebsk and the governor of Mohilev to prepare as much ﬂour as possible for the

nf v the army , and to i orm them that the mo ement of

v l vr army is o untary, that it is a manoeu e to approach a hundred leagues nearer to the armies forming the wings

v v M that , since lea ing the en irons of oscow, we have no ” news of the enemy , with the exception of some Cossacks .

’ Ba ra ua d Hilliers S g y , who was advancing from molensk by the Kaluga road to meet the Grand Army was directed

v An d V in to conform to the new mo ement . ictor was formed that the object of the march was to brin g the

O ﬂa the troops perating on the nks into closer touch with ’ 1 82 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF RUSSI A

A Grand rmy and that in all probability the main forces , taking up a position between the Dwina and the Dnieper ,

O his would btain touch with . the corps under command .

The French army , weakened by hunger , moved almost without a halt , with the exception of the troops that had

V . D v Retre a t reached yazma a out passed through °°h h h h ed G 1st N zhatsk on the ovember , and continued his march to get through the deﬁle of Tzarevo - Za imish chiye , harassed on the way by the Cossacks , and abandon ing guns and waggons . He was followed immediately ’ by Pa skev ich s division ; and to the left of the main

Milo ra do v ich road marched the advanced guard of . Milo ra do vich could not hope to cut o ff the whole French army from its advanced guard ; there would be ’ men to oppose his and Pla to v s But he intended to intercept the rearguard at Tzarevo Za imishchiye his advanced troops came into touch wi 1st th the French on the November , but arrived too

o ff late to cut them , as they passed through by night . On the 2md the French army was situated as follows

’ the Westphalians beyond Semlev o ; Napoleon s head G l quarters and the uard , with part of the reserve cava ry at Semlevo Ney , who had orders to allow all the other troops to pass to form the new rearguard , at Vyazma ;

Po nia to vski the Viceroy and , having passed some six

F o dero v sko e versts beyond y y , had halted to support

Davout , who was close to that place . For want of cavalry

’ 1 84 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

attack was badly conducted , and although they inﬂicted

- ff heavy loss on their worn out enemies , they su ered T ﬁ severely themselves . his running ght continued until w D ’ ’ evening , hen , avout s and Eugene s troops having passed through , Ney formed the rearguard and evacuated

Vyazma , leaving the place in ﬂames . c While both sides claimed the vi tory at Vyazma , the

v n ad antage remained with the French , who attai ed their T object . hose terrible soldiers showed that their spirit and their martial qualities still held out , notwithstanding the privations they had undergone and the enemies who

The e assailed them on every side . r sult proved the soundness of Napoleon’ s dispositions in arranging for the

The F relief of the rearguard at Vyazma . rench would probably have gained a considerable success had there been one officer in command to c o - ordinate the disposi tion of the troops . But what is to be thought of the

- in - Russian Commander Chief who , almost within the

un v so d of the guns at Vyazma , where the in aders stood at

v 2 d bay , remained in inaction at Biko a It may be sai that he knew the climate and the vicissitudes of the march would do the work without the expenditure of “ more troops , and that he left a golden bridge for his

‘ ” enemies . But the theory of the golden bridge , so

’ b tfa s frequently and erroneously advanced , e y a counsel midi un of ti ty , and Kutuzov here lost the opport ity of

, Ar annihilating a great part of the Grand my . THE RE TRE AT TO S MOLE NS K 1 85

v S Next day, when he arri ed at lavkovo , Napoleon heard of the action of Vyazma , which led him to halt until t 5 h . mi Difﬁc ulties the He even had an idea of for ng °f th e Me t eh an ambush between Slav kov o and Dorogo

r buzh , to fall on the pu suers with all his troops , but hi t s was soon abandoned . It had been getting colder ,

ﬁr 4th mi and the st snow fell on the , adding to the series

is and the d organisation of the army . On the 5th headquarters and the Old Guard reached G Dorogobuzh the Westphalians , the Young uard and

zud 4th r the remains of the and Caval y Corps , passing through the town , were posted on the road to Smolensk

Po niato v ski V D v v , the iceroy and a out between Sla kovo and Dorogobuzh and Ney with the rearguard

S v v S approached la ko o . now continued to fall , and A frost increased . large portion of the cavalry was lost and many carts and some guns were abandoned . When a horse fell , it was seized , cut to pieces and devoured .

Having no food and no proper clothing and boots , the

F ff c rench su ered terribly from cold , and mar hed with ult T diﬂic . y here was an enormous number of stragglers ,

wr 4th mostly unarmed . Ney ote to Berthier on the that the roads were without exaggeration crowded by 4000 u men of vario s regiments , who could not be induced to ” march together . Physical suffering produced decline in mo ra l discipline vanished everything gave way to the instinct of self ’ 1 86 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF RUSSI A

At preserv ation . night the sick and wounded wandered

v ﬁ about the bi ouacs , trying to secure a place at the res . The mornings rev ealed the campin g sites strewn with

ﬁ The corpses , like elds of battle . Russian bivouacs were F constantly surrounded by crowds of unarmed rench , to did whom their enemies showed hospitality . They not

unf trouble to make these ortunates prisoners , and many ,

u nf r e were sla ghtered by the i u iat d peasants . The sur

viv o rs S looked to molensk as towards a promised land .

T ﬁn d t i here they hoped to every hing they requ red , and

to go into winter quarters . Meanwhile Kutuz ov continued his march by the parallel road to Yeln ya Milo ra do vich and Platov pursued the

’ Kutuz o v s enemy from the rear and left ﬂank . In order P an s l Off to cut the French from the south , the

G v T o o ernors of Kaluga , ula and other pr vinces were

v v v directed to send the militia le ies to Rosla l , Mstisla l , G Yelnya and other places . eneral Ertel was ordered It with his detachment from Mozyr on Bobruisk . was proposed to Chichagov to leave a corps of observation S to watch chwarzenberg , and to march to Minsk and D Borisov ; and to Wittgenstein to approach the nieper ,

St C r leaving Steinheil to follow y , or to try and prevent the latter from joining Napoleon , should he make the

attempt . On the 6th November Napoleon’ s headquarters reached

M v ikhale ka , where he heard that Victor had fought an

’ 1 88 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

rags and scarcely human in appearance , who seized what

Ou ever provisions they could lay hands . On the night of the 9th the soldiers slaughtered two hundred horses for food , as there were no supplies of meat . Napoleon ordered the Guard to be furnished with supplies for four teen days and the remainder of the army for six days . D uring the retreat from Vyazma , Ney fought heroically At D with his rearguard . orogobuzh he made a stand

Milo rado vich Ne w and drove back , who was in R e e f h e f d g ﬁre close pursuit , and set to the town before leaving it , but the snow prevented the ﬂames from

i Spreading , and the Russians halted there for the n ght .

Ne d y pressed on through a blin ing snowstorm , and

the 13th F reached Smolensk on the ev ening of . rom

Milo ra do v ich Dorogobuzh the pursuit relaxed , for turned

- n off to the south west to join the main army , and o ly light detachments followed the retreat . But still the ﬁ S rearguard had to ght in order to gain time at molensk , and when his disheartened soldiers threw down their

Ne e arms y seized a musket and , hims lf setting the example , inspired them to renewed exertions . It has already been related how the Viceroy Eugene had taken the road from Dorogobuzh to Vitebsk by way G of Dukhovshchina . Napoleon had sent eneral Sanson with a party of ofﬁcers and a small escort to survey the road and especially the River Vop . But this party was

P . A. capturedbythe advanced guard of General Kutuzov, THE RE TRE AT TO S MOLE NSK 1 89 which had marched by a parallel route north of the main road and had reached Dukhovshchina . Prince Eugene advanced from Dorogobuzh and crossed the Dnieper on the 7th November the passage wa s di ﬁ ul , T he f c t and from twelve to sixteen horses l a s a g e o f had to be employed to drag each gun up the the flo p As bank . the march continued , men and

un horses died of h ger and cold , baggage was abandoned , and the corps was becoming disorganised when the bank ' Vo th 9 . of the p was reached on the Here a bridge , con S structed the day before , was wept away by a ﬂood , and

- The the troops had to ford the riv er breast high . greater part of the artillery and baggage had to be abandoned ,

’ Pla to v s and , to make matters worse , Cossacks , who had f ollowed from Dorogobuzh , attacked the rear . But ’ Bro ussier s division , forming the rearguard , kept the

v Cossacks at bay , and co ered the remainder of the force , which effected the passage by nightfall . The night was ’ Broussier s passed in open bivouac in the snow . division

w - crossed at da n , leaving behind sixty four guns , and the greater part of the baggage . There remained under

6000 The arms not more than men . march was continued

n P hi to Dukhovshchi a , followed by latov, w le from the ’ ’ a i A Kutuz o v s town issued Ilo v ski s advanced guard of P . . A detachment . ttacked in front and rear , the valiant ’ remnant of the Viceroy s troops held their own , drove

Ilo vaiski from Dukhovshchina , and took possession of the ’ 1 90 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

w . to n , which had been abandoned by its inhabitants S Here shelter and some food were found . till pursued by

o ff Cossacks who cut stragglers , but generally kept at a di w stance , the Viceroy entered Smolensk ith the remains 13th N of his corps on the ovember . During this period Kutuzov had continued his march

- from Bikovo by Byeli Kholm to Yelnya , where he 8 R us s ia n arrived on the th November , and halted on 0 e f e ti°h s P 9th A l mn z ha ro ski . O v the ﬂying co u under ,

Of u 8th moving ahead the army , passed Balt tino on the , ’ while Da vido v s partisans were between Alex yeiev o and T the Yelnya road . hese Cossacks , in conjunction with

- v a detachment under Count Orlov Deniso , next day attacked and eventually surrounded a brigade under

’ ’ Au erea u B a ra ua d Hilliers a d General g , forming g y v a nced guard , posted between Lyakhovo and Yazvino .

Af in ter an obstinate resistance , which many were killed

Au ereau and wounded , g was obliged to surrender with 00 over 17 ofﬁcers and men .

Kutuzov, meanwhile , had passed through Yelnya and

La bko v o l1th reached , on the Roslavl road on the . On the 13th he crossed over to Shchelkanovo on the Mstis la v l Milo ra do vich road . proceeded towards Chervonnoye

- with the advanced guard , where Orlov Denisov, who was

P z ha ro ski . O v ahead , drove out a detachment of oles

r n i v K a s o P A . mo ed his detachment direct on ; and . C D . Kutuzov marched to ukhovshchina hichagov, having

CHAPTER XIV

FROM SMOLENSK TO B ORIS OV

— — ’ R e t re a t fro m Sm o len s k A rri v a l a t K ra sn o i Na po le o n s R e — ’ — s o lutio n B a ttle o f K ra sn o i - Ne y s R e a rgua rd F ro m ’ Kra sn o i t o B o ris o v —Ac tio n a t B o riso v —Chic h a o v s Mo v e — g m en t s Dispo sitio n o f Oppo sin g Fo rc e s

NAPOLE ON left Smolensk with the Guards by the Kra sno i

14 N mn road on the th ovember . Junot and the re ant of

’ Po niato v ski s corps had marched on the 12th . Eugene was to start next day , and

Davout and Ney , whose corps still formed

15 . the rearguard , on the th

The army was reduced to some men , calculated as follows

Gu rd i c v r 2000 : . a nfantry, a al y, I — 1st C D v u . nfantry orps, a o t

3 r I f t r s 6000- Ne d C . n an y orp , y h I s 5 000—P i c Eu 4t C . nfantry orp , r n e gene — 5 th I f C r 800 P o nia t o vski. n antry o ps,

I a t - J u 8 C s 700 . th nf n ry orp , not i m u e d lr 5 D C v 00. s o nt a a y, 00 C v 3 0. a alry,

E i r A i r 7000. ng nee s and rt lle y, FROM S MOLE NSK To B ORI S O V 1 93

It is difﬁcult to understand why Napoleon marched

his mn Pro with colu s separated by such long intervals . bably the want of good maps and of a knowledge of the roads prevented him from adopting a formation of parallel

mns He colu . might , moreover , have marched along the i north bank of the Dn eper to Orsha , thus having the v ri er to protect his left ﬂank . The leading French column reached Kra sno i on the ’ 14 Oz haro vski s th , driving back detachment , which had ’ The E Arriva l at expelled the French garrison . mperor s Kt e S h °i headquarters with the guard remained that

Ko ritn a night at y .

On the Russian side , Kutuzov was at Volkovo , a

Milo rado vich detachment under at Knyaginino , and a detachment under Osterman attacked a French force (not speciﬁed but said to be Poles) near Ko biz ev o and

6000 n 40 took priso ers . This day there were degrees o f frost . On the 15th the leading column passed Krasno i and

Lia di reached , while Napoleon caught up the West

halians ra no i i Milo ra do vich p and entered K s w th them . and Osterman reached the vicinity of the highroad near t avka N G while apoleon and the uards were passing , but did no more than open a cannonade some of the balls falling near the Emperor caused him to rema rk with indifference Bah ! the bullets and shot have been ﬂying about o ur legs these twenty years ’ 1 94 NAP OLE ON S I NVAS I ON OF RUS SI A

Here , as ever , he displayed that cool disregard of personal danger which was one of his chief and most

valuable characteristics . His courage was no less evident

Kra sno i Ar 17 at than on the bridge of cola in 97. On arrival at Kra sno i in the evening Napoleon heard of the ’ presence of Oz ha ro vski s detachment of six regiments

n with six gu s at Kutkovo , and had them driven out with heavy loss by a night attack by a divisi on of the Young

Guard . Hearing from prisoners that Kutuzov with the main

Krasno i Russian army was a short march distant from ,

’ E a Na po le o n s the mperor resolved to wait the arrival Re 5 °h1ti°h S mn from molensk of the other colu s , in order

o to save them from being cut ff. It was a great resolu

tion , worthy of a great commander , to take such a risk in the immediate presence of an army strong , with other armies of equal strength hurrying up on either

o ff ﬂank to cut him . He could have marched on to

v - Orsha , lea ing two thirds of his army to almost certain

destruction . On the l6th November Eugene was waylaid on the road

r i Milo ra do v ich M K a sno . to by , who stood at erlino R ejecting a summons to surrender , the Viceroy fought his waybravely through these superior forces , and reached

Kra sno i 3000 with the remains of his corps , amounting to

men . The situation of the Emperor now appeared sufﬁciently

’ 1 96 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RU SSI A

P o f r he stood on the frozen road , in his olish cap ma ten

- fur t fur , and green velvet lined coa with gold braid, lean

out f - ing on a stick rom a birch tree , holding at bay Russians more by the terror of his presence than by force of the feeble remains o f the Grand Army that still held together under his command .

Kutuzov now extended his left , and ordered the greater part of his troops to turn Kra sno i by way

N nf o f of Sorokino on Dobroye . apoleon , i ormed this movement , decided to retreat , although this obliged him to abandon Ney with the rearguard . Kutuzov, becoming aware that the Emperor wa s present in

n e perso , stopped his movement , and the French retreat d

Liadi to .

a bando nm Napoleon has been blamed for thus g Ney , a course that has been falsely attributed to his desire for

ur l personal safety . But what useful p pose wou d have

hi ﬁn been served by s ding there like the Emperor Julian , a glorious death To remain in Kra sno i would have ’ v been the end of all things . Not only Ney s ad anced

guard , but the whole army must have been destroyed . A M 6000 . 1 . 7 Ney left Smolensk at two on the th , with men and twelv e guns ; arriving near Kra sno i next

’ N e y s afternoon , he found the road blocked by the Re e t g h a t d A whole Russian army . lesser man would

v ha e surrendered . But this brave warrior had not come

o f to the end either his courage or resources . To a FROM S MOLE NSK TO B ORI S O V 1 97

A summons to lay down his arms , he replied marshal of France does not surrender

’ His troops even captured some of the enemy s guns , w although these ere retaken . But it was impossible to

e mak headway against the numbers which assailed him . The brave marshal now undertook one of the most wonderful marches recorded in history . With his forces

ur greatly reduced he t ned towards the Dnieper . Guided w by an inaccurate map in an unkno n country , he struck

r Siro koko reni e wi no th to y , follo ng a rivulet which he knew must ﬂow into the river . He decided to pass the

ni The D eper and march along the right bank to Orsha .

ur ui had his p s t fortunately relaxed , the snow covered up

a . tr cks , and a thaw followed on the frost His only fear was that the melting of the ice would preclude the

o f possibility passage . The remnant of the rearguard A came to the river near Gusinoye . place was found di where the ice would bear , and the sol ers crossed ,

ni un Ar a bando ng g s and carts . rived on the far bank

rn c they tu ed towards Orsha , following a track s arcely And discernible in the forest . now a new danger pre ’ Plato v s sented itself . Cossacks had come from Smolensk and were taking the same route . They harassed the rearguard whenever they emerged into the open . Ney formed his men into a square , and marched on . The

ﬁre P Cossacks opened with artillery , and latov, thinking

o f r e his to complete the destruction the enemy, di ect d ’ 1 98 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

men to charge with the lance . But , inspired by their

r f b ave leader , the French kept their ranks , and ought their way to Yakubovo , where food and shelter were

ni 19 n o f found on the ght of the th . In the early morni g

20th P o ﬂicer the a olish was sent to Orsha with news of the desperate situation of the rearguard . Napoleon had already left , thinking Ney lost , but Davout and the

Viceroy Eugene were in the town . The latter at once

’ marched out to Ney s assistance , met him on the road , and conducted him in safety to Orsha . Well might Napoleon exclaim when hearing that evening of his ” safety He is the bravest of the brave . His rear 900 guard was reduced to men . The events roun d Kra sno i reduced the strength of the A Grand rmy by some men . But that any had escaped is remarkable , and to be ascribed , apart from the

ur in bold meas es of the Emperor , to the timidity and

o f - in - action the Russian Commander Chief . But it has Sir been recorded that Kutuzov said to Robert Wilson , who was in his camp I do not consider that the de struction of Napoleon’ s power would be advantageous to Europe ; it would lead to the supremacy of England ” T instead of the supremacy of France . hat aspect of wi the question , however , had nothing to do th the ﬁ duties of the general commanding in the eld .

Af Kra sno i ter evacuating , Napoleon passed the night at

Liadi f , and took the road to Orsha be ore dawn on the

’ 20 0 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

Borisov, Vilna and Orsha , so that when the army was e U stablished at Minsk he could move to the pperBerezina ,

C r - cover the Vilna road and join St y , then retiring on

Lithuania . Next day Napoleon reached Orsha and took up his quarters in the Jesuit monastery . Orders were sent to Victor to be prepared to be at Borisov on the 2 th 26th 5 or to form the rearguard of the army . At Orsha Napoleon reorganised the remains of his a ﬁ - rmy , nding there some small arms , thirty six guns , and other supplies . Still in the hope o f forestalling Chichagov on the

t Ko khano v Berezina , the march was continued nex day to 2 ud and on the z to Tolochin . The previous day

hi Do mbro v ski a d C chagov had forced out of Borisov, n P occupied that place with his men , the ole falling back to Bobr , which was reached the same day by

udino t i 8000 O w th men . Victor was at Chereya with

— On the Russian side Kutuzov, after detaching a

f Yermo lo v strong orce under in pursuit of Napoleon , was

Lanniki 21st at on the , awaiting the crossing of the Dnieper by his advanced guard un der Milo ra do vich at

Kopis . Wittgenstein was at Chashniki with men

Sheresho v o Sacken , with had retreated to before

Ra detz k o Schwarzenberg , who had advanced to with

P B a bino vich A. men . . Kutuzov had reached y .

f for 20th Rain ell some days from the , making the FROM S MOLE NSK TO B ORI S O V 20 1

iffi At hi marching still more d cult . Toloc n Napoleon hi heard of the capture of Borisov by C chagov, and realised that the only course now remaining was to force the passage of the Berezina in the face of a Russian army . The possibility of taking a direct route north of Borisov

n on Molodechno , crossing the Berezi a where fordable ,

ni proposed by Jomi , was rejected on account of the strong position of Wittgenstein at Chashniki while other

s n mi Ru sia forces , moving by shorter routes , ght forestall him at Vilna . Napoleon’ s initial plans for the passage of the Berezina — were as follows z Oudino t was to occupy the ford at

Veselovo , construct bridges there , and cover them by fortiﬁcations Victor—to hold the Lepel road in order

udin t At - to cover O o from Wittgenstein . four thirty in the morning of the 24th orders were given to the chief o f Eblé G pioneers , General , and of engineers , eneral Chasse

Oudino t loup , to join at Borisov, and proceed with the u P o constr ction of the bridges over the Berezina . ntoons , The sappers and miners were ordered to Borisov . order

urn was given for half the carts and waggons to be b t . ’ Meanwhile Oudino t met with and defeated Chichago v s

Lo shnitz i advanced guard at , and on the French advance

A ctio n a t being continued the Russian commander B ed s ” n withdrew to the other ba k of the river , occupied the bridge - head and destroyed the bridge at

Oudino t w Borisov . occupied the to n and reconnoitred ’ 20 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R US SI A

24th T the river for a point of passage on the . his was found at Studyanka ; a feint was to be made at Mali

Stakhov . In driving the Russians out of Borisov , Oudino t took a great part of their baggage and killed o r captured a thousand men , exclusive of the sick and wounded who were all abandoned in the town .

i r Wh le these events we e taking place , Wittgenstein

ur The was p suing Victor on his retreat from Chereya . ﬁ French marshal retired ghting on Bobr , where he arrived

24th O on the , thus leaving pen to Wittgenstein the direct

Lo shnitz a route to Studyanka . Victor reached on the 25th , the day on which Napoleon had assembled all his other forces at Borisov .

hi - C chagov, posted at the bridge head opposite Borisov , was misled by movements of French parties to believe

’ Chicha g o v s that the passage of the Berezina was to be me ve h ‘eh ts A attempted below that place . ccordingly,

- leaving a part of his force at the bridge head , he marched

Sha ba shev ich 25 th down the river to y , on the , the day

udin ot on which O moved up to Studyanka . Chichagov

Cha litz had posted a detachment under p at Brili , opposite

Ofﬁ Studyanka , but that cer received orders to withdraw

- to the bridge head , which he did , although he observed and had information o f the preparations on the opposite bank of the river . He , however , left some Cossack posts

along the bank . On this day also Napoleon entered

o f Borisov , riding part the way , but at times being

’ 29 4 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A a few days before wa s now pouring in an ice - laden ﬂood between its banks . Now it was necessary to construct fﬁ bridges , a di cult work in such a stream . The forces brought from Moscow did not exceed men the

Oudino t corps of Victor and amounted to as many . These were encumbered by some unarmed men and

’ Chicha o v s followers . To these were opposed g on the right Wittgenstein and Steinheil’ s and ’ Kutuz o v s were approaching from the left and rear . CHAP TER ! V

THE PASSAGE OF THE B EREZINA — — Th e P o in t o f P a ssa ge Co n st ru c tio n o f B ridge s 26th No v em be r

- — — 27th No v e m be r Ca pt u re o f a F ren c h Div isio n P a ss a ge

- — c o n t in ue d B a ttle o f th e B e re zin a R e pulse o f R ussian s o n — — bo t h B a n ks Co mm en ts Na po leo n o n th e B e re zin a

NAPOLEON left B OI‘ lSOV on the 25th November and f established his headquarters at Stari Borisov, rom

v whence he rode o er to Studyanka at dawn next day . The village of Studyanka stands on the slope of the left ﬁf bank of the Berezina , a hundred and ty paces from the

The The p o int river . heights on that side dominate °f P as sa ge the right bank , where marshes , frozen since

24th v the , favoured the movement of troops under co er

o f at The batteries established Studyanka . crest of the high ground extending along the left bank of the Berezina

r cove s the road leading from the town of Borisov, in f ront of Stari Borisov, and farther through the village of

Bitchi to Studyanka . On the right bank of the river runs

the main country road leading from Bobruisk , in front of

- the Borisov bridge head , and farther to Bolshoi Stakhov and the Stakhov forest ; after passing through the forest

r and leaving Brili on the right, the road tu ns almost at 205 ’ 20 6 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

right angles at a distance of four versts from that village , and passes through great forests and difﬁcult deﬁles d formed by the River Gaina to Zembin and Molo echno ,

n where it joins the main road to Vil a .

When Napoleon arrived at Studyanka , the hard frost had frozen the broad marshes lying along the Berezina , but the river was not yet frozen , and was covered with large blocks of ice which rendered diﬁicult the construo At ’ tion of the bridges . eight o clock in the morning

Co rbino t General was sent across with a squadron , and when materials had been collected some rafts to carry ten men each were constructed and 400 of Dom

’ r i s ri n At b o vsk ﬂeme . followed the same time all ’ Oudino t s 40 artillery, guns , was posted on the heights at Studyanka . The detachment that had crossed over soon drove back

Cha litz into the forest the posts left by p at Brili , and the

n a s co struction of two bridges w begun , one

about a hundred yards distant from the other ,

' that on the right being intended for the passage of troops , and the one on the left for artillery

The and waggons . wood for the bridges was taken from the houses in Studyanka , the iron parts were brought Eblé from Orsha by General , who undertook the con

diﬁiculties struction of the bridges . Great were met

The v with . ri er had risen until it was a hundred yards in width , and it was six feet deep in some places .

’ 20 8 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF R USSI A

the remains of the corps of the Viceroy, Davout and

Junot were approaching Borisov . During the 26th Chichagov had remained at Sha ba she

“ vichy , and it was not until late in the day that one of his a cth detachments discovered that Napoleon had Nevemhe t gone to Studyanka and was there passing the

T . river . his information was sent to Kutuzov at Kopis

Zhisko v o Ko stritz a Wittgensteinwas nowmovingfrom on ,

P Lo shnitz a Yermo lo v and the same day latov approached ,

i r o ic a l v a Mlo a d v h M a k . reached Krupki , and was at y During the night the bridge intended for wheeled

vehicles broke down twice , becoming useless from eight ’ ’ ’ o clock until eleven o clock, and from two o clock until

mo rnm 2 th T ns v six in the g of the 7 . his led to exte i e

crowding on the left bank of the Berezina . In order to

maintain order as far as possible and hasten the crossing , Napoleon himself passed the night of the 26th in a hut ' bI‘ id es near the g when he rested , his place was taken by ’ Murat , Berthier or Lauriston . Ney s troops and the

ur Young Guard crossed d ing the night . Every effort

was made to get the unarmed men and followers across , but most of these preferred to wander round Boriso v in

search of food . 27th ’ On the morning of the Victor s corps came up , ’ with the exception of Pa rto un ea ux s division left as rear

a t v The guard Boriso . arrival of Victor ensured the

f o ne crossing being covered rom Wittgenstein , so at THE P AS S AGE OF THE BE RE ZI NA 20 9 o’ clock in the afternoon Napoleon sent the Old Guard

The over and rode across himself . Baden brigade and ’ Daendels a7th the artillery of division followed ; N°Vemhet then the remains of the corps of the Viceroy , T Davout and Junot . hus there remained at Studyanka ’ ’ G Da endels only irard s division and one of brigades , ’ Fournier s cavalry division and the reserve artillery of ’ ’ the 9th Corps ; Pa rtouneaux s division and Dela itre s l cava ry were holding Borisov . As f the troops crossed to the other bank , they ormed

v front in order of battle towards the Stakho forest . R But the ussians feared to attack , and throughout the day the opposingforces stood face to face within musket

A i Cha litz shot . re nforcement reached p in the evening , but the Russia ns appeared to be paralysed by the presence

t r of Napoleon . Had they at acked with vigou , they must F have rendered the position of the rench most desperate . ’ The larger bridge broke down again at four o clock , and

The was not repaired before six . sick , the wounded and

s the stragglers crowded the entrance to the bridge , and together with horses and carts ﬁlled the whole space be tween Studyanka and the bank of the river . Victor alone , 6000 e with men , held the heights above on the l ft bank

Partouneaux of the Berezina , while was still in Borisov, to draw o ff the attention of Wittgenstein and to hold back hi C chagov at the broken bridge , whither the latter had returned from U sha . o ’ 2 1 0 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSS I A

Pa rto unea ux repelled at Borisov an attempt by ’ hicha o v s - C g troops to cross from the bridge head . He

then started for Studyanka , but at three C a pture o f ’ a F renc h o clock ln the afternoon of the 27th he was Dm sw n ’ o ff cut by Wittgenstein s advanced guard , which had reached Stari Borisov , his march being impeded by baggage carts and thousands of unarmed

Pa r stragglers who crowded round his columns .

n his to neaux bravely attempted to cut way through , but

too the odds were great , and he was forced to retire to

v Borisov , where he was soon surrounded by the ad ancing

v Russians . Still this bra e Frenchman would not sur At render . night he broke out again , and attacked ’ Wittgenstein s army, obtaining some success near Stari

Borisov, but at length , surrounded on every side , he was

Dela itre forced to surrender . Next morning , who had retreated again to Borisov with his cavalry , was also

The 5 obliged to surrender . captured included general 120 ﬁ 7000 3 . of cers , men and guns One battalion , strong , managed to escape along the bank of the Berezina and T joined Victor . his was the only signal success obtained

by the Russian arms during the entire campaign . Meanwhile Chichagov had thrown a pontoon bridge

c o mmunica over the river at Borisov, and entered into P tion with Wittgenstein and latov , who had arrived there . Chichagov informed Wittgenstein that he would attack 28th the enemy next day , the November , and asked for

’ 21 2 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

’ round to turn Victor s left , whilst at the same time guns opened on his right and on the bridges and masses collected on the left bank near the point of crossing . T — hese people the sick , the wounded , the followers ,

un including women and children , and the thousands of armed stragglers who had been wandering from camp fire to camp fire like gaunt spectres during the retreat rushed in tumultuous masses towards the bridges , mixed Se up with horses and vehicles . gur describes the scene that ensued “ About midday the first shot from the

’ T a s enemy s batteries fell amid this chaotic mass . hen , ’ a in all extreme circumstances , men s he rts were laid bare , and acts of the lowest infamy and of the sublimest heroism were exhibited . Some , with relentless fury , cut them

a . selves dreadful passage , sword in hand Others forced T a still more cruel way with their carriages . hey drove them mercilessly over the crowd of wretched beings t whom they crushed in heir course . With atrocious avarice they sacriﬁced their c o mpanlons in mrsfo rtune to ” the preservation of their baggage . Hundreds were crushed on the bridges , and thousands perished in the

- ice laden torrent that ﬂowed below . To complete the confusion and horror the bridge for the artillery cracked and broke . The column which was in the act of crossing this narrow passage tried in vain to

The un retreat . crowd which pressed on from behind ,

o f di o f e conscious the saster , and deaf to the cries thos THE P ASSAGE OF THE BE RE ZI NA 2 1 3 b f e ore them , pushed forward and precipitated them into the chasm into which they were soon thrown in their ” ur t n . The whole stream was at length diverted to the other A bridge . number of large caissons , heavy carriages , and

ﬁeld- U pieces ﬂocked to it from all parts . rged on by their drivers and carried rapidly down a frozen and rugged u i declivity, through the thick of this mass of h man be ngs , they crushed the unfortunate wretches who happened to be caught between them then , meeting with a heavy

m v v shock , most of the were o erturned with iolence and

wn W knocked do all around them in their fall . hole ranks of men driven in desperate terror by these con

ﬂictin a wn g obst cles got entangled with them , were thro down and crushed by other ranks who rushed on to the ” same fate in frightful and ceaseless succession .

The same horrible struggle ensued at the other bridge . Amid the fearful din made by the roar of a furious

rr hi hu icane , the thunder of artillery , the w stling of the t empestuous wind , the hissing of bullets , the bursting of shells , the shouts , groans , and frightful imprecations ﬁ hi m of erce and despairing men , t s tu ultuous mass heard not the wailings of the victims over whom it ” rolled . hi During the progress of t s scene , the battle for the protection of the passage had waged ﬁercely on the heights

The a a bove . French cavalry beat back the ttack on ’ 21 4 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

’ f ﬁ c ounterm a ttack Victor s le t , and a erce on the Russian

ﬁ The e centre con rmed this success . Russian reserv s came up and arrested the advance of the French who had

his broken through their centre , while a fresh attack on left obliged Victor to throw back that wing to cover

Studyanka and the approaches to the bridges . Still the French fought un til dark against the great odds brought against them . The combat ceased after dark , and during the night Victor withdrew across the Berezina , leaving a small rearguard to cover the retreat of the remaining stragglers and baggage . He had lost half his force , but a had inﬂicted gre t losses on the enemy , and had held his own throughout the day with remarkable skill and

ur valo . Meanwhile on the right bank o f the Berezina Chichagov had advanced from Stakhov at dawn to attack the French

udinot who had crossed over . There Ney and O with 8000 1500 men , including cavalry, stood with their right towards the thick forest traversed by the Borisov road .

Oudin o t the occupied the right and centre , and Ney left wing of the position , which was about two versts in extent .

4000 t e In reserve stood the guard , s rong , und r the personal leadership of Napoleon .

wa s The Russian attack was badly carried out , and ff preceded by the assumption of the o ensive by Ney , who ’ udinot drove back the enemy s advanced guard . O was wounded early in the engagement , and Ney then assumed

’ 2 1 6 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

number that had reached the river under arms and in addition not less than unarmed stragglers were

captured or perished . Kutuzov with the main Russian army had crossed 26th the Dnieper at Kopis on the November . On 29th the he halted short of the Berezina , which he

Zhuko vetz intended to cross at , and some forty versts

- south east of Borisov . Thus he found himself far from the decisive point at the decisive moment .

was O It not nly the absence of his army , but the want o f unity o f command which it entailed that led to the

ur T e Russian fail e on the Berezina . here wer C o mments in the neighbourhood ample troops to have A completed the destruction of the Grand rmy, had their movements been methodically c O- ordinated from the ’ e innm As fo r Parto uneaux s b . g g it was , but the loss of division , the French operations were wonderfully success ful , and the passage of the Berezina again proved the

o f r f r o f genius the g eat commander , the skill and o titude

o f his marshals and the valour his troops . f It is , however , only air to the Russians to point out that they were not aware of the disorganised and famished

di o f con tion of their opponents , while the presence some un armed men increased the appearance of strength T of the army when viewed from a distance . hus Chichagov supposed that Napoleon was still at the head of a z men when he rrived on the Bere ina , and the THE P ASS AGE OF THE BE RE ZI NA 21 7

’ moral effect of the Emperor s presence was equivalent to another

’ mi Kutuz o v Jo ni points out that , with regard to s circumspection , it was most important for him to pre serve the precious nucleus of his army, as the ulterior situation must in the event be inﬂuenced by political considerations and it was essential to Russia to be in a position to decide Prussia and Austria to detach them S f if elves rom the French alliance , or to resist them they hf ” remained fait ul to it .

It may be said , on the other hand , that the destruction o f the remainder of the Grand Army and the capture o f the person of the French Emperor would have placed Russia in the strongest position both with regard to power di and prestige to ctate terms to Europe , and a considera

ul f ni mi tion of this factor seems to n li y the opi on of Jo ni . Surely both political and military considerations should have dictated the advisability of terminating at one stroke

eﬁo rt by concentration of and resolution in execution , the existe nce o f the Grand Army and the power of

Napoleon . z Se The passage of the Bere ina where , says gur ,

Napoleon s ucceeded in saving out of men , was accomplished mainly by the p esence Na po l eo n r n i s f o n the and the d1 spo s1t10 s of the Emperor h m el . . B ere z m a “ He stayed up to the last moment on these

o f wi dismal banks , near the ruins Brili , thout shelter , ’ 21 8 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUS SI A

his and at the head of Guard , a third part of whom had been destroyed by the storm at night they

n hi ur bivouacked in a square arou d their c ef . D ing these three days and nights , Napoleon , whose eye and whose thoughts appeared to wander from the midst of f hf the ait ul band in three directions at once , supported the second corps by his presence and by his orders , de fended the ninth and the passage across the river by e his artillery , and united his exertions to those of Ebl

as a s f in saving much possible rom the general wreck .

mn Lastly he directed the march of the re ant of his army , P in person , towards Zembin , whither rince Eugene had ” preceded him .

’ 220 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

respectively . Kutuzov himself moved slowly, and had 9th not reached the Berezina on the 2 . He intended to direct his further advance across the Berezina at Zhu ko vetz Smo levich , and thence through y and Volozhin on

o vi a T N y roki . Other detachments were to conform to the general movement .

fo r Napoleon , still hoping to halt his troops a time on the road to Vilna , for reorganisation and rest, had

r Do kshitz i s di ected Wrede , who was at with the remain o of the Bavarian corps , to move to Vileika to c ver the

o f crossing the Vilia , collect supplies for the army , and

o Smo r oni open communicati n with the commandant of g , who had been directed to pro v1s10 n the magazines in

mo r o ni shmiani S g and O . Supplies were to be sent to meet the retreating army , and the remaining cattle despatched to Vilna so that they should not fall into the

o f hands the Cossacks . But in a few days the army had practically ceased to exist . Few men remained in the ranks but on the 4th December Ney ma de a ﬁne stand with the rearguard at

re the entrance to Molodechno , and , with the aid of the ’ ’ o f o ff hicha o v s mains Victor s corps , drove C g advanced guard .

The Emperor now decided to leave the army , where his presence could no longer be of any use , but might

o f 4th even be a source embarrassment . On the

December Victor wrote to the Chief- o i- the - Staff : The FROM THE BE RE ZI NA TO THE NI E ME N 221 action which the rearguard has fought is the last effort that it can make against our enemies ; the troops which compose it are tod ay so reduced and the few Na po le o n es th e mi that remain so serable , that I am obliged lifrhy v r The to avoid e e y species of engagement . ’ enemy s vedettes and ours are in sight of one another ; I shall in all probability be followed to - day as persistently as yesterday , and I think it would be convenient for his ” Majesty to keep at a greater distance from us .

N Smo r o ni 5th D apoleon set out from g on the ecember,

v after handing o er the command to Murat , and drove

As straight through to Vilna . he himself said to Maret di The army no longer exists a sorganised crowd , wandering in search of food and shelter , cannot be called an army . At dawn on the 8th December the Emperor crossed

v the Russian frontier at Kovno , where he had arri ed less

Two than six months earlier at the head of men . 19th days later he reached Warsaw, and on the December P he arrived in aris , two days after the appearance there o f 29th the famous Bulletin , in which he announced the disastrous conclusion of his invasion of Russia .

Napoleon has been blamed for leaving his army . But of what use was it for him to remain with the shattered remnant of his troops , to share their fate , to pass with them beneath the Caudine Forks 2 Had he been

a e diff . only a general , the matter would h v been erent ’ 222 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

But he was the ruler of a great Empire , at the western end of which the army of his most persistent enemies was contending for the mastery of the Peninsula . In Paris his presence was necessary to strengthen and even to secure his Government . Between him and France stretched 600 leagues of territory inhabited by peoples and ruled by monarchs whom he had humbled , ready on the ﬁrst opportunity to rise against the Emperor

o of the West . Wh but he would be able to gather to gether in four months a new army of men and 600 guns with which to appear , once more terrible in ﬁ n 2 battle , on the elds of Lutzen , Bautze and Leipzig Meanwhile the debris of the Grand Army continued

he T . on its woeful way . frost increased in intensity In the three marches between Smo rgo ni and

Vilna more than men succumbed . The

remainder , half dead with cold and hunger , f mi n 9th a a shed crowd , burst into Vil a on the December . P d rovisions were ample , but the disor er was so great that they could not be distributed and the magazines had to h be given up to pillage . Wittgenstein and C ichagov followed close upon their heels , but with greatly reduced

The n forces . former had only men remaini g .

o ff Ney , a rearguard in himself , held the enemy where possible with incomparable valour .

At vn length the Niemen was reached at Ko o , and , i 700 covered by Ney w th a rearguard of men , the

’ 224 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

plished presents nothing that is of military interest . e a Murat r ached Konigsberg with a thous nd men , followed by a few thousand stragglers . ’ Macdonald s operations roun d Riga had come to a l 18 standstill , and it was not unti the th December that

’ Ma c do na ld s he received news of the events that had taken Retre a t T place , and orders to retire on ilsit , where he th T arrived on the 28 . here he was deserted by the

P s 30th ru sians under Yorck , who on the December con cluded a convention with the Russians under the terms

fo r of which he agreed to remain neutral two months . T 9000 hus with his corps reduced to men , Macdonald continued his march to Konigsberg . It has been related that Schwarzenberg had advanced

14th r towards Minsk . On the Decembe he withdrew

from Slonim to Byelostok , and a week later S c hw a rz en ’ ' e r s c o nc luded a n n b g armistice , taki g up a position Ret’rement

to cover Warsaw, from which he did not

o f r retire until the end Janua y 1813 . CHAPTER XVII

THE CAUSES OF FAILURE

’ THE failure of Napoleon s campaign Of 18 12 has been frequently and indeed generally ascribed to the early

v T v and excessi e cold of the climate . hus e en the historian of the Peninsular War says that when winter

’ came only four days sooner than he expected , the giant s ’ scheme became a theme for children s laughter ! It is , however , a fact that the cold was neither earlier nor more severe than usual . Hard frosts did not set in until the 5th November there was a thaw for some days prior did to the passage of the Berezina , and the cold not

v The become extreme un til after that e ent . rigours of the climate were no greater than in the campaign of

E v ylau , but in the latter there was no want of pro isions ,

s of tran port , and of shelter , and the army did not become

di ni sorga sed . ’ The primary cause of failure is expressed in Montaigne s maxim Great and distant enterprises perish from the v ery magnitude of the preparations made to ensure their ” The o f success . vastness the distances , the numbers of the army bringing in its train difﬁculties of supply and p 225 ’ 226 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

n e - transport requisite for its mai tenanc , the long drawn — out line of communications these combined to render im success unattainable . Napoleon undertook the possible not even his genius could overcome the difﬁ culties ﬁnd fo r encountered , or a remedy the strategic consumption of his army ins eparable from the ever lengthening line of commun ications from the Vistula to

Moscow . wi a s e ﬁn d Vie ng Europe a whol , we the French

Emperor engaged in war in two directions , both e n ff ast and west , which rendered co centration of e ort impossible . Many causes of failure have already been indicated in these pages . They may conveniently be recapitulated .

U nf oreseen factors , the Turkish peace and the Swedish i alliance , inﬂuenced the situation after the open ng of the

P mi t e us campaign . olitical errors and o ssions were h ca e di of these sadvantages , and if they were not expected and provided for, as appears to have been the case , the cam pa ign should not have been undertaken without measures f to meet them . They resulted in the reedom of two i arm es to operate on the ﬂanks of the advance . The Grand Army was half composed o f foreigners ; and as a consequence neither a high standard of discipline

- nor whole hearted devotion could be expected . Disorder manifested itself as soon as Russian territory was entered . People of twenty nations might gain victory under such

’ 228 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

A swift advance might have thrown Barclay back upon

the Baltic . The ﬁne turning movement that brought the Grand Army to Smolensk failed to produce the results expected

for reasons that have been detailed . Napoleon might have contented himself with the occupation of the line 1812 of the Dnieper in , and deferred a further advance i hi until the follow ng spring . He had considered t s plan but it was impossible to subsist the army in a depopulated

a r and devast ted country . He had eithe to advance or retrace his steps his prestige throughout Europe and the necessity of its maintenance rendered it impossible

for him to ackn owledge failure by a retrograde movement . f Lithuania af orded no resources , all supplies having

already been requisitioned by the Russians . There was no general rising of the Poles such as had ﬁ been anticipated , as Napoleon did not ful l their expecta

re - tions . But he had to consider that the establishment of a kingdom of Poland would in all probability have

’

A c o - alienated ustria , whose operation , or at least

n neutrality , was indispensable to him during this campaig .

The Oudin o t V troops of Macdonald , , St Cyr and ictor on the line of communications should have been un der T i one commander . hey m ght then have crushed Witt

enstein g and have been of more assistance in the retreat . Napoleon had hoped for a decisive battle west of the

Dwina . In this hope he was disappointed by the con THE CA USE S OF FAI L URE 229 tinued ﬁn retreat of the Russians . But when ally they stood for battle at Borodino , his tactics were not of the type that had gained him the victory at Austerlitz and

f ur Jena . Nor was the battle followed up by a swi t p suit of the exhausted enemy, who was allowed to retire on

Moscow, and pass through that capital without molesta tion and place himself in an adv antageous position to

mm ni s threaten the extended line of co u cation . The character of the Russian Tzar and the resistance offered by his people deceived the expectations of the

n invader , who remained in Moscow vainly hopi g for the Opening of negotiations which could not be expected in view of the strategic situation of the opposing forces .

un When the retreat from Moscow was dertaken , the project of retiring by the Kaluga road was not pushed ’ through with the Emperor s customary resolution ; a week was thus lost and the selection of the eventual line of retreat to Smolensk led the army through an already

n exhausted cou try . The retirement of Schwarzenberg towards Warsaw

instead of Minsk exposed the ﬂank of the retreating army . When retreat had been decided upon a concentration of

all M S troops , including those of acdonald and chwarzen

v . berg , towards the Berezina should ha e been arranged for

As it was , the separate parts of the army were all exposed

to defeat in detail . Many writers have tried to ascribe the failure of ’ 23 0 NAP OLE ON S I NVASI ON OF RUSSI A

l Napo eon entirely to bad fortune , and have belittled the Operations of the Russians to the extent of denying that they had any inﬂuence whatever on the destruction of the

Ar As h Grand my . Jomini says , to suc writers only the manna of the desert and the waves of the Red Sea were wanting to make the God of battles work miracles in

his favour of enemies . But to belittle his enemies is

the not way to exalt the genius of the great captain .

The Nor is such a course just in this instance . Grand Army was opposed by brave troops un der able and devoted leaders . In this campaign the genius of Napoleon is no less

un in evidence than in his previous dertakings , although we may see faulty execution in the details of the opera T tions . here was no blind plunge into the depths of a

- half barbarous and inhospitable country . But the vast ness of the distances , of his masses of troops , of his pre parations rendered the task impossible of human attain ment . In their conception and initiation the grandeur of his projects is comparable with his most successful undertakings . Nor were the operations of the Russians in their wider aspects wanting in skill both in conception and execution . Their initial dispositions as well as their retirement on

v di ergent lines were faulty , but the concentration at Smolensk of their separated wings was a masterly move T ment . heir avoidance of battle until the invaders had