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a? s •X& m pjasitvcixxTA • &w* ^fffj President White Library , Cornell University Cornell University Library DC 235.B97 Napolean's invasion of Russia 3 1924 024 323 382 The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024323382 SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. No. 19 NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA ) "SPECIAL CAMPAIGN" SERIES With NUMEROUS MAPS and PLANS. Crown 8vo. Cloth. SI- net each (1) FROM SAARBRUCK TO PARIS (Franco-German War, 1870) By Lieut-Colonel SISSON PRATT, late R.A. (2) THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877 By Major F. MAURICE, p.s.c. (3) FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN, 1862 By Major Q. W. REDWAY (4) THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 By Colonel HAROLD WYLLY, C.B. (5) THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN By Lieut-Colonel SISSON PRATT, late R.A. (6) THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866 By Lieut-Colonel GLUNICKE (7) THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN, 1813 By Colonel F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (8) GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA (The Wilderness Campaign) By Captain VAUGHAN-SAWYER (9) THE JENA CAMPAIGN, 1806 By Colonel F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (10) THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Part I By Captain F. R. SEDGWICK (11) THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1861=2 (Bull Run to Malvern Hill By Major G. W. REDWAY (12) THE ULM CAMPAIGN, 1805 By Colonel F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (13) CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG, 1863 By Colonel P. H. DALBIAC, C.B. (14) THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1863 (Cedar Run. Manassas and Sharpsburg)' By E. W. SHEPPARD (15) NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY, 1796-7 and 1800 By Colonel R. G. BURTON (16) THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. Part 2. Dble Vol. 10/- net (The Campaign in Manchuria, 1 904-1 90s) By Captain F. R. SEDGWICK (17) FROM BOULOGNE TO AUSTERLITZ By Colonel R. G. BURTON (18) MARLBOROUGH'S CAMPAIGNS By Captain F. W. O. MAYCOCK, D.S.O. (19) NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA By Colonel R. G. BURTON (20) THE FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY By Captain H. M. JOHNSTONE, R.E. Ret (21) THE INVASION OF FRANCE, 1814 By Captain F. W. O. MAYCOCK, D.S.O. LONDON: QBORGE ALLIEN & UNWIN, LIMITED SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. No. 19 NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA By COLONEL R. G. BURTON Indian Army AUTHOR OF " NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY," " FROM BOULOGNE TO AUSTERLITZ," ETC. WITH SIX MAPS AND PLANS " Les grandes entreprises lointaines perissent par la grandeur mgme des preparatifs qu'on fait pour en assurer la reussite." Montesquieu. LONDON GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. 40 MUSEUM STREET NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 2^c J5^7 <^-Ur4*^ A.vnisi First Published in 1914 PEEFACB While the great tragedy of 1812 must ever excite the interest and wonder of mankind, like all the deeds of its mighty actor, the lessons to be derived from it are its most important if not its most attractive feature. We may point to the vanity of human greatness, here shown in its decline, and the limitations imposed by adverse circumstance on genius even in its most exalted mani- festation. We may indicate the futility of undertaking a great enterprise with inadequate means, without the power and perhaps even the will to carry it to a successful conclusion ; and the limits that are fixed to human ambition as much by the forces of nature as by the hostility of man. Napoleon, the embodiment of in- tellectual force, the incarnation of mental and physical energy, contrived for a time to control the conditions he created in Europe. He rode the whirlwind by virtue of character, of personality, of intelligence, and of imagina- tion which made up the sum of his genius. But in course of time he created forces, not only in his enemies but in himself, which ranged beyond the power of control. There arose in him an almost blasphemous self- confidence a belief in his " star " that led him to neglect the elements VI PREFACE necessary to success, which may be illustrated by his " own saying : It is a proof of the weakness of human nature that men imagine that they can oppose me." " Well might Goethe say of him : He lives entirely in the ideal but can never consciously grasp it." The military lessons of the Russian campaign are numerous. In its general features, in the grandeur of its conception, and in some respects in its execution, as well as in its abysmal end, this gigantic invasion was splendid and awe-inspiring. Who can contemplate un- moved the sublime spectacle of that mighty human stream pouring across Europe into Russia, fighting its way to Moscow, and its shattered remnants struggling back across the Berezina, in whose icy flood so many thousand lives were quenched in circumstances of tragic horror. The dramatic figure of the Great Emperor, standing in the snow during the retreat, dominating the situation by the mere terror of his personality, will stand out for ever on the page of history. The fortitude in the retreat of Ney, that warrior of transcendent courage, who, asked where was the rearguard, replied in all truth, " I the " am rearguard ; and in response to a summons to surrender, " Marshal " A of Prance never surrenders ! furnishes one of the finest episodes of this dramatic epoch. As regards the fundamental causes of failure, specula- tion leads us to inquire into the personal attributes of the greatest soldier of all history. There appears to be no ;; PREFACE vii doubt that at this time, although Napoleon's intellect retained all its sharpness and his vision all its clearness, his physical nature had begun to decline. Already in his forty-third year he had lost in physical and mental vigour, and in decision and boldness of execution. The first failure of his plans—the escape of Bagration—would have been averted had Napoleon been the general of 1805. But he contented himself with sitting in his study at Vilna, and issuing orders which were sound in project but faulty in execution. Nor do we find him dominating the battlefield at Borodino as he did at Rivoli, at Austerlitz, and at Jena. But in spite of failure, when all has been considered, the campaign of 1812 will remain for all time one of the most wonderful episodes in the history of the world, sufficient of itself to secure eternal fame to the Man of whom it has been said by Napier : " To have struggled with hope under such astounding difficulties was scarcely to be expected from the greatest minds. But like the emperor to calculate and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness and accuracy to seize every favourable chance with unerring rapidity to sustain every reverse with undisturbed constancy, never urged to rashness by despair yet enterprising to the utmost verge of daring consistent with reason, was a display of intellectual greatness so surpassing, that it is not without justice Napoleon has been called, in reference viii PREFACE as well to past ages as to the present, the foremost of mankind." The author is greatly indebted to General Bogdano- vich's history of the war, published in St Petersburg in 1859. The accuracy of Bogdanovich's narrative has been tested by reference to the correspondence of Napoleon. Among other works to which reference has been made may be mentioned those of De Segur, Marbot, Labaume, Ghambray, Fezensac, Jomini, Buturlin and Mikhailovski- Danilevski. The author has also had the advantage of traversing the route taken by the Grand Army in the advance to Moscow. —— TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I The Causes of War PAGE Maritime Equilibrium—The Ambition of Napoleon Sea Power—The Berlin Decree—Napoleon and Poland — Policy of Annexation — Controversy with Russia ..... 1 CHAPTER II Preparations for War Napoleon's Preparations—Formation of the Grand Army — Davout's Corps — Organisation of Armies — Supplies — Transport — Bridging Materials—Further Organisation—Intelligence —Preparations of the Tzar—Russian Plans Napoleon's Plan—Napoleon at Dresden . 7 CHAPTER III The Opposing Forces The Grand Army — Character of the Army — Davout's Corps — The French Leaders — The Russian Armies — Character of the Russian Army — System of Enlistment — Martial Qualities — Russian Cavalry — Artillery — The Cossacks—Russian Officers—Staff—^Administra- tion — Russian Commanders — Positions of Opposing Armies . .17 ix ——— CONTENTS CHAPTEE IV PAGB The Theatee of War 41 CHAPTEE V The Invasion of Lithuania General Distribution—Eussians—French—Napoleon on the Niemen—Forward Movement—Passage of the Eiver—Napoleon's Plan—Further Advance The Eussians surprised—General Eussian Eetreat—French Advance—Napoleon's Disposi- tions—Movements of the King of Westphalia Bagration's Eetreat—Pursuit of Bagration Weather Conditions — Difficulties of Supply and Transport—Comments . .48 CHAPTEE VI The Advance to the Dwina Napoleon's Plan—The Eussians at Drissa—Oudinot's Advance—Macdonald's Movements—Napoleon leaves Vilna—The Movement towards Vitebsk Action at Ostrovno—Napoleon at Ostrovno Operations at Vitebsk—Forward Movement Operations against Bagration—Oudinot and Wittgenstein—Movements of Schwarzenberg Comments . .63 CHAPTEE VII From the Dwina to the Dnieper Napoleon at Vitebsk—Distribution of the French Forces—Eussians assume the Offensive—Skir- mish at Inkovo—French Dispositions—Eussian Movements—Napoleon's Advance—Passage of the Dnieper—Cavalry Action at Krasnoi Eussian Dispositions —Comments . 80 —— CONTENTS xi CHAPTER VIII The Battle of Smolensk PAGE Smolensk—Raevski's defensive Measures—Napoleon arrives before Smolensk—French' Dispositions Russian Plans—Bagration's Retreat—Attack on Smolensk — Russian Retirement — Napoleon enters Smolensk—Barclay's Retreat continued —Action at Lubino—Comments—The Decision to advance on Moscow . .91 CHAPTER IX The Advance to Borodino Russian Desire for Battle — French Pursuit — Napoleon leaves Smolensk—Measures in Rear Russian Retreat continued—Kutuzov assumes Command—Action at Shivardino—Position of Borodino—Occupation of the Position—The Opposing Forces — French Dispositions Napoleon's Orders ...

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