^ y.i / m ] -1 /AJ f A f J IBP7*717771TTiTl Secretary of the Edward C. Aldridge, Jr.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Truman Spangrud

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise

Professional Staff

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Contributing Personnel Hugh Richardson, Associate Editor John A. Westcott, Art Director and Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the . It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on m ilitary doctrine, strategy, tactics, force struc- ture, readiness, and other national defense mat- ters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permis- sion. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal re- quests a courtesy line. Editorial— Blinders, Too, Are Made of Leather 2

The Essence of Leadership: Views of a Form er C om m ander Lt Gen Evan W. Rosencrans, USAF, Retired 6

Soviet “Tactical” Aviation in the Postwar Period: Technological Change, Organizational Innovation, and Doctrinal Continuity Dr Jacob W. Kipp 8

Soviet Maskirovka Charles L. Smith 28

Doctrinal Deficiencies in Prisoner of War Command Col John R. Brancato, USAF 40

Superm aneuverability: Fighter Technology of the Future Col William D. Siuru, Jr., USAF, Retired 50

The Human Element and Air Combat: Some Napoleonic Comparisons Maj Mark K. Wells, USAF 62

Ricochets 4 Letters Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 76 Notams Notices of Interest 94 Contributors 9 5 rated officers in these thoughts, we have ar EDITORIAL______rived at the crux of the problem. At issue is whether one will remain an aviator-special- ist or take on the broader responsibilities of Blinders, Too, Are Made of the professional senior officer. The argu- ment is with those who would remain in Leather service if only they did not need to learn anything beyond flying (crewing) an air- craft, if they could just be spared the drudg- HE Airpower Journal has followed with ery of staff assignments and the frustrations Tinterest and some concern the issue of of educational endeavor, and yet still be as- leather flying jackets, career irritants, flyers’ sured of promotion to higher rank. bonuses, and pilot retention. The depth and Herein lies a real threat to an effective breadth of concern can be discerned in the military force. One’s magnificently flown numerous letters from the field published in aircraft may win an engagement (perhaps periodicals and newspapers oriented to- more than one) yet be bested in the cam- ward the military services. paign; an aggressively led tactical unit may Much of what we hear and read tells us prevail in a battle but not necessarily win that additional duties, staff assignments, the war. An effective military force requires and educational requirements are driving leaders possessing highly developed strat- our flyers out of the service. Many letter egy and campaign-formulating talent. writers express the feeling that these “pe- Where are these leaders to come from? From ripheral requirements” are counterproduc- those whose long career experience has tive and that being the best possible aviator been that of a specialist in the cockpit and is what will win wars. Understandably, whose expertise is tactical at best? these officers want to remain at the “pointy Increased responsibility and higher mili- end of the spear." However, it is time to con- tary rank are secured by expanding beyond sider how we make effective use of that the narrow confines of a specialty to the spear and to understand that its use is de- broader requirements of a profession. Ac- pendent on more than how well we fly. ceptance of broad responsibility, mental Operations may be at the heart of military flexibility, and intellectual (as well as phys- success, but that is not the same thing as ical) preparation are the entry requirements flying an aircraft or even leading a of to that realm—and all that just for a chance them. Those who serve at the "pointy end” at achievement. Most will not make the suc- are unquestionably vital to military success, cessive cuts. for what good is a blunt spear? But there is If you seek high rank and broad opera- an equally vital requirement for those with tional responsibility, you must commit the broader knowledge of where and when yourself to additional duties, educational to point that spear and when to thrust and requirements, continuous study, and ex- when to parry. Those who currently spend pansion beyond the cockpit; if you do not so their time honing the edge of the blade must aspire, “dual-tracking” is another discus- also realize that attainments far beyond this sion. The nation relies on its well-seasoned, are required for comprehensive success in broadly educated (not trained), and holisti- war and that superior technical skill is not cally oriented military leaders to win its the only qualification for high or even nec- wars by adeptly orchestrating the efforts of essarily middle rank. all the specialties and specialists. The For those who can see no validity for decision about which road you take is yours. KWG CANT WAIT TO ORDER THE AIRPOWER JOURNAL???

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WRITE ON, COLONEL HALL ficer, I am keenly aware of many of the problems he cited. While I’m fortunate enough to work for After reading your Fall 1987 journal, I was de- a senior officer who has “taken me under his lighted to see that someone else is concerned ," I’ve had the opportunity to look back over about military customs, courtesies, and profes- the three years since my commissioning and ana- sional relations ("Shortchanging Our Young Of- lyze some of my training deficiencies. ficers: Military Traditions Denied,” by Lt Col To put it simply, it appears that the 12 weeks I Stephen C. Hall). spent in Officer Training School were devoted As a recruiter with the ANG, I also have an ad- mostly to the mechanics of management. And ditional duty as an NCO Preparatory Course in- having just completed Officer School structor. I too have noticed that our young by correspondence, I was amazed that the block airmen want more military in their lives and feel devoted to officership was one of the smaller that m ilitary traditions have lost some sections. importance. I must, however, confess a bit of confusion. In past classes, students seemed to take partic- What, exactly, is the difference between “officer- ular enjoyment in “USAF Customs and Courte- ship” and "leadership”? It’s not clear that they sies" and an incredible amount of interest in are separate subjects, yet we continually treat "The NCO Professional Relationships." Our them so. I once listed the traits that would be young airmen want to use terms of address and to necessary to be a good officer and the traits that be professional when dealing with superior en- would be necessary to be a good leader. The col- listed and officers. umns were identical. And looking at the enlisted “Shortchanging Our Young Officers” brought leaders I have known and followed (I’m prior en- to light the fact that officers don’t always know listed), I found that the traits I admired in them the correct response in professional military en- were listed in the “leadership” column. vironments. Our young enlisted are in the same Thus, I submit we are confusing the issue if we situation and feel that traditions should be continue to speak of “officership” and “leader- stressed more. ship” as two separate areas as if the traits of each I agree with Colonel Hall when he states that were separate and uniquely identifiable. In the fi- military members are bound by shared customs, nal analysis, people follow an individual, a hu- courtesies, traditions, and military discipline. I man being, not a rank. I realize this sounds a bit also feel that these areas should be expanded in like heresy. Please understand. I do not argue PME courses. against rank structures: they are obviously nec- More exposure to junior officers and airmen essary. I do. however, argue that attempting to about proper conduct, discipline, and profes- lead from rank alone is the most ineffective, and sional relatiops will add to and improve the the least desirable, situation. History is replete professional arena that we all work in. with examples of people attempting to lead by If personal development is as important as I the sole virtue of rank and failing miserably. have read, then I feel we owe young officers a bet- Rank does not automatically confer upon me the ter professional upbringing. How about a little ability of leadership. 1 must, as an officer, lend “Re-Bluing"? credence to my rank through competence, dig- nity, and trust. If your people don’t trust you, TSgt Roger M. Beardsley. Oregon ANG Portland, Oregon they won’t follow you; and this usually mani- fests itself during those times when you give or- ders that must be carried out on “trust" alone. This holds true for leaders at any level. I have just finished reading Colonel Hall’s excel- How then do we better prepare our company lent article “Shortchanging Our Young Officers” grade officers and officer trainees? Colonel Hall in the Fall 1987 issue and would like to comment is right in that the education process must be dy- on a couple of his ideas. As a company grade of- namic, occurring on a daily basis. But I believe

4 RICOCHETS 5

some immediate changes in our formal training ship) is useful, but it would be far more useful to programs would go a long way toward providing put them into practice in leadership exercises the education we need. than to merely discuss their hypothetical effects More emphasis should be put on the study of from a "chalkboard” viewpoint. military history—all military history. It not only Obviously these changes are extensive and provides examples of how to be good at fighting would take time to implement. But we should a war but how to be a good leader too. Whether begin the changes now. If we do not begin to cor- you're hitting someone over the head with a rect these errors, we will move further away from rock, a sword, or an F-15, certain strategic and the professional dedicated force we must have. It tactical principles still apply. Whether you’re is a move we cannot afford. leading a rifle company or leading flightline lLt Michael K. Edgar, USAF maintenance, certain principles of human inter- Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota action are still the same. I was particularly sur- prised to see that works such as Sun Tzu's The Art of War and von Clausewitz's On War were TITANS AND THE ENLISTED FORCE not formally required reading until Air Com- mand and Staff College. I believe we should have Maj Michael A. Kirtland's “End of an Era” in the to read these before we even get lieutenant bars. Fall 1987 edition of Airpower Journal did not Formal training in leadership has always been mention one aspect of the deactivation of the Ti- difficult to define, much less achieve. But draw- tan II that will significantly alter the complexion ing again from my OTS experience, there are of the missile business. The Titan crew force was ways. Perhaps the most interesting and useful made up of both officers and enlisted crew mem- parts of OTS for me was the Leadership Reaction bers. There were two officers and two enlisted on Course (LRC). It gave us real, if somewhat con- every crew. The demise of Titan also ended en- trived, situations to deal with. Yet we spent a to- listed jobs on SAC’s missile operations tal of only one full day on it in a 12-week training crews. Ironically, the same issue of Airpower program. I believe a more extensive version of Journal contained the article “Shortchanging the LRC, used over the span of weeks on a regular Our Young Officers: Military Traditions De- basis, would be beneficial in two ways. First, it nied,” by Lt Col Stephen C. Hall, that expressed would allow instructors to better assess the po- concern about, among other things, our young of- tential of officer trainees. Second, it would allow ficers and their relationship with the enlisted our officers in training to better develop and re- corps. Titan crew duty was an excellent place to fine their skills under “field” conditions. develop and learn about officer-enlisted relation- Changes such as this would affect the amount ships. During my own Titan tours with both the of time being spent on communicative skills and 308th Strategic Missile Wing at Little Rock AFB, management training, but I believe it would be Arkansas, and with the 3901st Strategic Missile an equitable trade. Since our officers must have a Evaluation Squadron at Vandenberg AFB, Cali- college degree, they should have a reasonable fornia, I met and had the distinct pleasure of command of the English language. Four years of working with some of the very best enlisted mis- college English and the time spent at OTS on sile folks in the business. writing still didn't prepare me for the version of Now those professionals are doing other "Air Forcese" used on my installation. Every things. Many stayed as close as possible by commanding officer has likes and dislikes, and switching over to Minuteman or Peacekeeper attempting to second-guess them in a training missile maintenance jobs. Others are scattered course is ineffective and time-consuming. A around the world in a myriad of AFSCs. All have short course on effective writing would probably quit wearing their crew blues but their contri- fill the bill as effectively as the current time-con- butions to peace through deterrence will be suming requirements. Learning behavioral remembered. models for management (and nominally, leader- Maj Joseph J. M ulcahy, Jr., USAF Malmstrom AFB. Montana The Essence of Leadership Views o f a Former Commander

Lt G en Evan W. Rosencr ans, USAF, Retired THE ESSENCE OF LEADERSHIP 7

Following is an excerpt from an official US Air broken airplanes. Mess halls that don’t Force oral history interview with General Rosen- serve good meals don’t have problems; peo- crans that was conducted in July 1984 by Dr ple who work in those mess halls have prob- James C. Hasdorff of the USAF Historical Re- lems serving good meals. You get search Center. Maxwell AFB. Alabama.* everything done through people. This re- General Rosencrans's views on leadership and lates directly back to what I said about atti- command should be carefully considered by of- tude: get the attitude right, and the ficers aspiring to positions of high authority, as his commonsense approach points up the need problems will take care of themselves be- for serious thought about and commitment to cause the people are motivated. this important aspect of an effective combat Next, never lose control of yourself; never force. GeneraJ Rosencrans concluded his inter- raise your voice; never let the situation con- view with: trol you. Even though it appears to be out of hand, you must always be doing something to change the situation if you don’t like it. You must never resign yourself to “that is INALLY, let me address the qualities the situation” or "that is the system and that I think are necessary in order to be that’s how it works.” That attitude of resig- a good leader and a good commander. nation will defeat you and defeat your peo- The first and most important is ple. You must always be attempting to courage.F If you don’t have courage, you are influence the situation. never going to be a good commander what- Next, you must have a working knowl- ever your other qualifications are. The cour- edge of what your people are doing. You are age must extend down as well as up. not expected to be an expert welder or an Courage should not be mislabeled loyalty. expert aircraft mechanic or an expert sup- Although loyalty is a requirement, courage ply monitor or an expert cook or anything is even more of a requirement. else, but you have got to know something Second, you must be totally honest. Your about all those jobs so that you can discuss integrity must be beyond question at any them intelligently. You have to discuss time of the dav or night. Third, you have to have the ability to see them on a personal basis: “What are you beyond tomorrow. I have met so many colo- doing? Tell me what you are doing and how nels who stayed and retired as colonels be- you are doing it.” Let that individual speak cause they couldn’t see anything but what to you. When he is speaking to you, that’s they were looking for tomorrow. when you want to have the photographer Fourth, we hear a lot about motivation. present, and that photographer takes the It’s a buzz word. It's kind of like readiness. picture while that airman or junior officer is No one has ever really defined readiness; no speaking to you so that he can send copies one has ever really defined motivation ex- of those pictures to his girlfriend and his cept to say it’s the ability to get others to do family and pin it up in the barracks and say, as you wish them to do. What people forget "I told the general.” You have got to let him is. you must change the attitude before you know you are interested in what he is doing. motivate. It’s attitude that's the key; then You have got to let him know you know' a motivation will follow. little bit about it but you want to know more Next, you must realize that no inanimate because you are interested in it and it is con- object ever had a problem; people have tributing to the mission. And if possible, problems. Airplanes that are broken don’t learn something about him. If you have have problems: people have problems with worked with a of people for six months and you don’t know something per- sonal about each individual, you are no *USAF Oral History Interview No. K239.0512-1594 with Lt Gen Evan W. Rosencrans, USAF, Retired, 26-27 July 1984. San Antonio. Texas. 146-48. Continued on page 27 Soviet ‘Tactical” Aviation in the Postwar Period SOVIET "TACTICAL" AVIATION 9

O STEAL a title from Von Hardesty’s At the same time, it is critical tor our pur- recent fine volume on the Soviet Air poses to make quite clear the inadequacy of Forces in the Great Patriotic War our conventional terms of reference in deal- (1941-45), the development of Soviet ing with the Soviet Air Forces and Soviet T“tactical” aviation in the postwar period military doctrine, which is not a cognate for might well be titled "Red Phoenix Revis- what we mean when we use the term mili- ited." In this case, however, Marx’s famous tary doctrine. Crucial to our understanding injunction that great historical events re- of the postwar military doctrine is to recog- peat themselves as farce seems hardly to ap- nize the unique and special role that oper- ply. The resurgence of Soviet “tactical” ational art plays in linking together tactics aviation in all its forms represents a formi- and strategy within the context of modern1 dable military capability that has enhanced war. For the purpose of this study, Soviet the Soviet military’s ability to conduct thea- Air Forces will be addressed within both ter-strategic operations relying on conven- the operational and tactical contexts, with tional combined arms. The path to these much greater emphasis on the former be- capabilities has not been a direct one and cause it is the level of war where aviation can best be understood within the context of has its most decisive impact on ground the development of Soviet military art in the combat and where the Soviets recognize the postwar period. need to develop mutual support and inter- 10 AJR POWER JOURNAL

action among combat arms and branches of such control has traditionally identified the the armed forces. air combat unit’s operational and tactical subordination. Thus, strategic air reserves have been referred to as reserves of the Su- The Great Patriotic War preme High Command (Stavka), which in wartime has meant direct subordination to When we speak of Soviet Air Forces, we Stavka control. During the Great Patriotic have in mind a number of units that are War, Stavka kept control of Soviet long- structured functionally and that exist in a range aviation but employed it to support form of dual subordination to their branch, deeper strikes (up to 400 kilometers from which provides training, supply and logis- the line of contact in multifront operations) tical support, and a command authority to rather than using it for strategic bombard- control the combat employment of the ment of what the Soviets then referred to as units. The command authority exercising the “state rear.” In December 1944, Stavka long-range aviation was reorganized into the 18th Air Army and subordinated di- rectly to the command of the air forces. Un- Soviet technological problems and an emphasis on der this new arrangement, the 18th Air missile and artillery development for air defense kept Army took part in the Vistula-Oder, East propeller-driven aircraft in the Soviet Air Forces well Prussian, and Berlin operations, where it after World War II. These captured Yak fighters, bear­ ing North Korean markings, are shown shortly before carried out strikes in the enemy’s opera- shipment to the United States in late 1950. tional rear.

C SOV/BT “TACTICAL" AVIATION 11

“Frontal aviation” refers to air assets di- to carry out missions at operational-tactical rectly under the authority of a front com- depths in cooperation with combined arms mander that are earmarked to strike at the formations. These missions included air enemy at operational depths. Since the support, tactical air reconnaissance, tactical 1930s. Soviet theorists had postulated the airborne landings, and logistical support of need for each front commander to have his mobile groups that were the spearhead of own air army dedicated to strikes at opera- the combined arms formation’s advance. tional depths (out to roughly 200 to 300 kil- Air assets assigned directly to the tactical ometers from the line of contact). In some battle under corps and divisional command operations during the final phase of the war, constituted “troop aviation.” In the 1930s, fronts were assigned two air armies, de- Soviet corps and divisions had their own pending upon the nature of the theater, the light planes for artillery spotting and utility depth and nature of the enemy defenses, the missions. However, during the Great Pa- importance of the front’s strategic axis triotic War both army aviation and troop (axes), and the need to achieve simultane- aviation were abolished and their assets as- ous suppression of enemy operational signed to the air armies of the fronts. During reserves. the war. the Soviet High Command central- At the outset of the Great Patriotic War. ized all air assets under the air armies as- air assets assigned to close-support mis- signed to front commanders. This allowed sions had been directly subordinated to an the front commander, or Stavka representa- army commander, hence the designation tive in the case of multifront operations, to “army aviation.” Such assets were assigned dedicate his air assets to the various mis-

616

The air defense of the Soviet homeland was consid- ered so important that Ihe/irsl MiG-15s were given lo air defense units. The MiG-15 shown here carries US Air Force markings. It was flown for test purposes after its capture in 1953. 12 AJR POWER JOURNAL

sions throughout the depth of the enemy’s rope and Manchuria.5 Air doctrine incor- defenses according to his operational porated the basic assumptions outlined in design.' A. N. Lapchinsky's Vozdushnaia Armiia This centralization facilitated the massed (The Air Army) of 1939, but it stressed the employment of aviation assets on the most centralized control of air assets to ensure decisive axes in any operation throughout the optimal application of air power during the depth of the defense. Developed in the- the air operation throughout the depths of ory before the war and put into practice dur- the enemy’s operational defenses. The air ing the second period of the Great Patriotic instruments of that combined arms team War. this “air offensive” reached full ma- were fighter, ground-attack, and medium- turity in the third and final period of the war aircraft. These aircraft reflected a when it was employed with great effect dur- maturity of design and an optimization of ing the Belorussian, Jassy-Kishinev, Vis- existing technology adapted to the East Eu- tula-Oder. East Prussian, Berlin, and ropean theater of operations. The emphasis Manchurian operations.2 Only in the 1960s was upon ruggedness, dependability, and did army and troop aviation reappear, this sustainability. time in conjunction with the development On the other hand, the pace of technolog- of rotary aviation.3 ical changes and the emergence of the cold Roughly speaking, there have been four war forced the Soviet leadership into a ma- distinct periods of doctrinal development jor reconsideration of the composition and since 1945, during which the composition, structure of its air forces. Although Soviet organization, and structure of Soviet Air aeronautical specialists had foreseen the Forces underwent considerable changes. By development of jet propulsion in the prewar the 1980s, aviation in all its manifestations period, the Soviet aircraft industry was in a had recast operational art. Then Chief of the difficult situation when jet-propelled air- General Staff N. V. Ogarkov wrote in 1982 craft made their combat appearance with that “the air sphere in combat actions and the Luftwaffe. operations has acquired an ever-growing The development of Soviet jet aircraft in role, which gives to modern operations a the postwar period followed a three-stage three-dimensional, deep character.”4 process. The Soviets initially relied on cap- The path to this present situation con- tured German engines to power first-gener- tained its own share of twists and ironies. ation jet aircraft that were hardly more than That same path also offers some clues relat- the of propeller aircraft adapted to ing to the further development of Soviet Air the new engines. Then came the production Forces and their roles in operational art and of British Nene jet engines under license. Fi- tactics. nally. the engine design bureaus of Klimov, Mikulin, and Liul'ka began to produce So- viet engines for a generation of fighters, The Immediate fighter-, medium bombers, and Postwar Period, 1945-54 strategic bombers.6 Hand in hand with the development of jet This period found the in a technology went a structural reorganization most difficult situation regarding the devel- of Soviet Air Forces in the immediate post- opment of tactical aviation. On the one hand, Soviet frontal aviation in the form of its air armies had proven to be a most effec- tive instrument in the final period of the

Great Patriotic War when it was applied as Soviet emphasis on ground support during World War part of a combined arms force to multifront, II is clearly seen on I his map by the number of sorties successive deep operations in Eastern Eu- flown in support of the army during June 1944. Leningrad Total Sorties Flown Soviet Air Forces, Reval 1-30 June 1944

Oorpat • Bologoye

3400 sorties

Ostrov

Opochka# Moscow £

Dvinsk

• Kaluoa

Kovno

Minsk • Bryansk 35,400 sorties

Pinsk

Konotop

Kovel • Priluki

Kiev

Zhitomir

Lvov 8800 sorties

'Chernovtsy

13 14 AIR POWER JOURNAL

war years. The appearance of atomic weap- ons and the emerging geostrategic competition with the United States brought with it renewed interest in long-range avia- tion. Soviet Air Forces were again divided into frontal aviation and long-range avia- tion. The former was by far the numerically larger force, organized into formations and units reflecting functional specialization— bomber, attack, and fighter aviation—as well as a general category of “aviation of special designation’’ that embraced recon- naissance, transport, medical, and utility aviation.7 Although Soviet interest in long-range aviation remained a feature of aviation de- velopment over the next four decades, the Soviets never developed an enthusiasm for strategic bombing as the most effective The Su-17 Fitter (right) represents about half of the means for the delivery of deep strikes Soviet fixed-wing ground-attack aircraft and has been in service for some time. The newest generation of against the enemy’s state rear. In part, this ground-attack aircraft is the Su-25 Frogfoot, which was a result of the geostrategic situation has been used with gunships for coordi­ confronting the USSR, which made forward nated ground attacks in Afghanistan. basing to support such strikes impossible. The low priority for avia- tion also had its roots in several other fac- fronts (the Western, Southwestern, Central, tors. First, serious consideration of strategic and Transcaucasian) and six armies. In bombardment only came at a time when a 1946 these were reorganized into air de- competing delivery system (the ballistic fense districts. At the same time, a com- missile) had already appeared and was un- mander of Soviet National Air Defense der development. Second, given the com- Forces (PVO Strany) was appointed. He was manding authority of the Soviet General immediately subordinated to the com- Staff in formulating military art and sci- mander of artillery of the armed forces of ence, there was no independent institu- the Soviet Union. This relationship re- tional voice to promote or to champion flected the fact that tubed artillery still rep- strategic bombardment as a definitive ele- resented the dominant weapon of air ment of national military posture. Finally, defense. In 1948, however, PVO Strany be- we should note that the Soviet acquisition came an independent branch of the Soviet of atomic and then nuclear weapons did not armed forces. United under its command lend itself to nuclear “fetishism” in the late were interceptor aviation; antiaircraft artil- 1940s or early 1950s. Atomic bombs, while lery (AAA); and the Ground Observation weapons of mass destruction, could not be Service, which included radar units, mass produced. Even keen American ob- ground observers, searchlight units, barrage servers believed that the military impact of balloon units, and other specialized forces. these weapons would be limited to strategic The entire country was divided into border bombardment for an indefinite period.H and interior regions. In this period, the con- The Soviets responded to the US atomic duct of air defense actions in particular re- threat by reorganizing their air defenses. gions came under the direction of the During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet air commanders of the various military dis- defense forces had been organized into four tricts.” The importance of air defense of SOVIET "TACTICAL" AVIATION 15 16 AIR POWER JOURNAL deep targets was reflected in the decision to lations and air assets with the objective of turn the first production MiG-15s over to air paralyzing the defense and gaining com- defense units and in the shift from point de- mand of the air. Just prior to the start of the fense toward an integrated national system ground operation, the focus of the air prep- that was designed to inflict heavy losses on aration would shift to cjirect attacks on en invading bombers through integrated and emy defensive positions timed to coincide sustained attacks. General Lieutenant M. M. with the friendly artillery preparation, the Kir’ian has referred to this effort as “the or- objective being to disrupt and destroy the ganization of the air defense operation.”10 enemy’s system of fire throughout the depth While this did not mean that the air defense qf the defense. Once the breakthrough had of ground forces disappeared from Soviet been achieved, air units were to be redi- military art, it did mean that top priority in rected to provide support for the advancing the development of combat means and forces." methods went to the defense of the state rear Thus, the immediate postwar period saw from the US strategic bomber threat. Devel- the Soviets try to fit a technologically ad- opment of surface-to-air missile (SAM) vancing aviation into their basic design for weaponry received a high priority owing to successive deep operations. The Soviets this particular threat. did, however, acknowledge new missions All of these developments in the field of for aviation in strategic bombardment em- aviation took place at a time when the So- ploying atomic and later nuclear weapons viet General Staff was reformulating its no- and in the development of an integrated sys- tions of strategic operations conducted by tem of national air defense. As a result of the multiple fronts in a theater of military ac- condition of the national economy, the need tions. The most crucial element to this pro- for immediate demobilization, and the ap- cess of working out the means of conducting pearance of other competing needs for re- strategic offensives was the digestion of the search and development funding, frontal lessons learned during the Great Patriotic aviation was modernized at a much slower War itself. The emphasis was on mutual pace than existing doctrine and military art support and cooperation among all required. This period came to an end in branches of the armed forces in the achieve- 1953 with the death of Joseph Stalin and the ment of decisive results. The most impor- appearance of the first generation of nuclear tant changes in operational art in the weapons, which made possible the produc- immediate postwar period were a determi- tion of weapons of truly mass destruction nation of the need for deeper strikes into the and set off a search for means and methods enemy defense and an accelerated pace of of employing such weapons.12 advance, which was to be achieved by the total mechanization of all ground combat arms and the further development of air- The Scientific-Technical borne forces. In the initial phase of a future war, frontal Revolution in aviation was expected to win the battle for Military Affairs command of the air over the most decisive offensive axes and to set the stage for a The death of Stalin and the emergence of breakthrough and exploitation on the nuclear weapons inaugurated within the ground, which would end with the encircle- Soviet military the second period of post- ment and destruction of the opposing war doctrinal development and a profound forces. The air offensive was divided into ferment over the implications of the new two parts: preparation and support. The for- technologies of strategic destruction and mer consisted of preliminary air strikes delivery. For roughly a decade, Soviet mil- against the enemy’s most powerful instal- itary theorists associated with the General Tear Out and Remove □ □ Detach one of cards, fillthese it out,and mail it along with a check, ordered ($11.90 for internationalmail). 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Staff viewed this nuclear-rocket revolution 1954 the air defense forces were upgraded as a negation of past military experience, to an independent service with their own making the latter irrelevant to the develop- commander in chief, who also served as a ment of military art. From 1955 they were deputy minister of defense.13 guided by the Communist party’s decision At the height of the Khrushchev era, So- to treat science as an independent element viet military theorists recast Soviet military and to accelerate the pace of scientific-tech- strategy along lines that emphasized the nical progress. Operating from a position of employment of the new weapons of mass absolute strategic inferiority at the start of destruction. In 1959 a new service, the Stra- this period, the Soviet military sought by tegic Rocket Forces, was created.14 And in various means to negate the US advantage the same year, a group of authors at the Vo- while working out means and methods of roshilov General Staff Academy authored using the new weapons of destruction. In the first study of military strategy by Soviet authors since A. A. Svechin’s Strategy had appeared in 1926. In 1962 a new edition of The Mi-24 Hind has proven to be a highly successful this work was published under the title Mil- and lethal ground-attack helicopter. Its four-barrel itary Strategy and under the editorship of Gatling gun under the nose is capable of destroying both soft and armored targets. It is generally consid­ Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, who had been ered to be one of the finest attack in the chief of the General Staff when the work world. was composed. This work summed up the 18 AIR POWER JOURNAL

General Staff’s assumptions regarding the were the basic and most reliable means [of revolutionary impact of the nuclear-rocket delivery].”16 Long-range aviation was revolution upon military affairs: rearmed with air-to-surface missiles; fighter Military strategy under conditions of modern aviation was equipped with a first genera- war has become the strategy of deep nuclear tion of guided air-to-air missiles; and sur- rocket strikes in conjunction with the opera- face-to-air missiles emerged as a central tions of all services of the armed forces in order element of PVO Strany, whose first note- to effect the simultaneous defeat and destruc- worthy success with the new technology tion of the economic potential and armed came in May 1960, when an SA-2 shot forces throughout the entire depth of the op- down a US U-2 reconnaissance aircraft near ponent’s territory in order to accomplish the Sverdlovsk. A wrecked summit conference aims of war in a short period of time.14 and political embarrassment for the Eisen- The organizational, technological, and hower administration brought the new era doctrinal implications of this emphasis on into focus for the non-Soviet world. deep nuclear strikes were profound for all For the Soviet Air Forces, this incorpora- the services. In the early 1960s, when tion of missile technology brought a radical Khrushchev's enthusiasm for rocket weap- reorganization of air assets and a reformu- ons was most influential, it appeared that all lation of operational art. “Under these new other services would assume an auxiliary conditions the air offensive as a form of em- role in support of the Strategic Rocket ployment of aviation, which was character- Forces. Ground combat and airborne forces istic for the Great Patriotic War, lost its were seen as instruments to be employed significance.”20 With the integration of the after nuclear strikes had disabled the enemy nuclear weapons and missile technology, forces. Then tank-heavy ground forces air tactics underwent a radical shift in would complete the destruction and oc- which massing of forces gave way to mass- cupy important military, economic, and po- ing of fire. The very concept of command of litical-administrative regions. The reduced the air lost its significance under the impact role of ground combat forces in this nuclear- of nuclear-rocket weapons. There appeared dominated military art was made manifest in place of the struggle for command of the by the decision in 1964 to abolish the post of air the task of eliminating the enemy’s commander in chief of Ground Forces, a de- means of nuclear attack by destroying his cision that was reversed in 1967 with the rocket and air groupings of forces.21 appointment of Marshal I. G. Pavlovsky to One key indicator of this shift was the re- the resurrected post.16 organization of Soviet naval aviation in the Primary emphasis in Soviet aviation dur- late 1950s, when it was stripped of all ing this second period was on those arms fighter and attack aircraft and given two key that contributed directly to strategic attack missions: destruction of US aircraft carriers and defense. Long-range aviation was using long-range, missile-armed aircraft, rearmed to carry air-to-surface missiles and and antisubmarine warfare using fixed- so became truly intercontinental for the first wing and helicopter assets. This decision time.17 Frontal aviation was reconfigured went hand in hand with decisions to arm for the delivery of nuclear weapons in the Soviet submarines with ballistic missiles, to execution of strategic-operational tasks and equip surface combatants with surface-to- found itself challenged by ballistic and air- surface missiles, and to rely on SAMs and to-surface missiles of all types. Among the antiaircraft artillery to provide air defense most important targets for Soviet air strikes, for surface combatants now forced to oper- top priority went to the destruction of en- ate farther from Soviet home waters in their emy nuclear-delivery systems.1B In the late struggle with US nuclear-delivery 1950s “Soviet military science concluded platforms.22 that rockets of various types and missions For frontal aviation, the new nuclear- SOVIET “TACTICAL" AVIATION 19

rockets seemed to provide more effective Colonel General M. A. Gareev, a deputy means of executing the most crucial mis- chief of the Soviet General Staff since late sions in a modern war dominated by nu- 1984, has recently argued that the critics clear weapons. On the other hand, the were right. He contends that in evaluating development of aviation technology, espe- the impact of nuclear weapons, Soviet mil- cially supersonic bombers, meant that such itary theorists who supported Khrushchev’s aircraft were less effective in the role of sup- one-sided emphasis upon nuclear-rocket port over or near the battlefield. At the same weapons went too far in dismissing the rel- time, attack aviation could not meet these evance of existing military theory and new requirements. Thus, attack aviation praxis, especially that of the Great Patriotic (shturmovaia aviatsiia) gave way to a new War.26 type of aircraft, the fighter-bomber, which first appeared in 1958. The first aircraft of this type. P. O. Sukhoi’s Su-7b, entered pro- The Reemergence of duction as a fighter but was quickly adapted Frontal Aviation to the new role.23 Development of the US strategic air threat The third period of postwar doctrinal de- in the form of SAC’s manned aircraft, un- velopment followed this singled-minded manned air-breathing missiles, and ballistic emphasis on nuclear warfighting capabili- missiles did lead to greater assets being in- ties, which did not go without challenge. vested in PVO Strany. During the late 1950s Military Strategy, the major Soviet work on and early 1960s, Soviet SAM weaponry ap- military practice, went through three revi- peared in ever-larger numbers and became sions in the six years between 1962 and an integrated part of a national system of air 1968. In response to the US formulation of defense. In addition to the application of “flexible response" in the first years of the operations research techniques to the mod- Kennedy administration. Soviet authors be- eling and management of the air defense op- gan to address the possibility that a major eration, Soviet PVO Strany emphasized a war between capitalism and socialism combined arms approach that linked to- might involve an initial conventional pe- gether a new generation of interceptors and riod of undetermined length. By 1968 the fixed-site SAM systems. Gradually the So- certitude about the immediate and decisive viets began exploring SAM systems opti- role of nuclear-rocket strikes in such a war mized for long-, mid-, and short-range gave way to a question: interception at high and low altitudes. They But in essence, the argument is about the basic developed more advanced fixed, semimo- method of conducting a future war: will it be a bile, and mobile systems and added anti- land war with the use of nuclear weapons as a missile and antispace defense to PVO means of supporting the operations of ground Strany’s missions. Radio-electronic warfare troops, or a war that is essentially new, where and centralized troop control figured prom- the main means of solving strategic tasks will inently in its solutions to the existing air be the nuclear-rocket weapon? The theory of threat.24 military art must give an answer to such im- The Soviet fixation on a single, nuclear portant questions as: what types of strategic warfighting posture lasted from roughly actions will be used in a nuclear war, and what form must military operations take?” 1955 to 1964. Khrushchev, although by no means a military expert, exercised a pro- Even prior to this admission of doubt, found influence in pressing such views in some Soviet authors had reasserted the the face of powerful institutional interests need to address these issues within the con- within the Soviet armed forces and against text of prior military experience, especially the doubts and criticisms of Soviet military that of the Great Patriotic War. These au- theorists associated with the General Staff.25 thors, who included Marshal M. V. Zak- 20 AIR POWER JOURNAL harov, chief of the General Staff for much of rear services from enemy air strikes; the strug- the 1960s, reasserted the relevance of the gle with the enemy’s deep reserves, and other. theory of deep operations as developed in The second mission (group of missions) are the 1930s and 1940s and applied during the fulfilled by Frontal Aviation in operational or Great Patriotic War. Numerous works on tactical cooperation with the ground forces for these subjects began to appear in the mid- their support in the course of battles against an 1960s.28 enemy with which they have direct contact. This marked the beginning of frontal avia- This includes: the destruction of nuclear- tion’s recovery. While some Soviet theorists rocket weapons at tactical or near-operational had seen rocket forces replacing frontal depths; the destruction or suppression of the enemy's means of electronic warfare and com- aviation. Major General of Aviation S. L. So- mand and control points on the axis of the of- kolov addressed the role of frontal aviation fensive of a given operational or tactical in support of ground forces by calling for an grouping of forces, the illumination of a locale “alliance" between the rocket forces and or the placement of marker lights for support frontal aviation in which the two would of the combat actions of the ground forces at provide mutual support for each other. So- night, and occasionally individual sorties with kolov envisioned a division of labor in the objective of aerial reconnaissance. This which each branch would be used under mission is fulfilled, as a role, in accordance conditions favorable to it. Frontal aviation's with the plan of the all-arms strategic forma- primary advantage lay in its ability to ma- tion (operational formation).30 neuver, while the rocket forces could de- liver strikes over great distances in very Taken together, these two sets of missions short periods of time. Sokolov reminded his represented a reformulation of the concept readers of the utility of frontal aviation dur- of the air offensive but with a crucial differ- ing the Great Patriotic War, when its aircraft ence. Whereas during the Great Patriotic won air superiority and delivered telling War the air offensive had been executed by blows against enemy ground and air an air army according to the plan of the front forces.29 commander, the new circumstances de- In the new situation brought about by the manded strict centralized control of all air presence of nuclear weapons on the battle- assets to coordinate the air operation field, Sokolov acknowledged that the top- throughout an entire theater.31 At the same priority target was the destruction or time, Sokolov flatly stated that the new suppression of enemy nuclear-delivery sys- fighter-bombers could not provide the di- tems. Here he saw a role for frontal aviation rect close air support for ground units in because ballistic missiles were not very ef- their advance. He left this role to the new fective against mobile targets. Thus, frontal rocket weapons and assigned the fighter- aviation, equipped with air-to-surface mis- bombers to “free-hunting” missions in the siles, could strike such targets with greater enemy rear, where they would work closely chance of success. He did not, however, with air reconnaissance assets. The nuclear- confine frontal aviation to that mission. In tipped missile had replaced the ground-at- more general terms, he identified two tack plane, but it could not provide effective groups of missions for frontal aviation: fire support during an initial conventional phase.32 This situation became all the more press- The first are general-frontal missions. They in- ing when Soviet military theorists began to clude: aerial reconnaissance over the entire depth of the enemy’s operational dispositions; address the problem of the initial phase of the struggle with enemy aviation on the air- war and the experience gleaned from mod- fields and with their rockets at their launchers ern air combat in local wars. While nuclear to operational depth: the destruction of enemy weapons still dominated the structure and nuclear-rocket weapons: cover of troops and organization of the various services, Soviet SOVIET "TACTICAL" AVIATION 21 military theorists began to explore a dual- The 1960s had been a decade devoted to track option that would permit forces to securing an invulnerable strategic capabil- fight conventionally and to shift to nuclear ity that would provide the Soviet Union employment if the need arose. These doc- with strategic parity, thus negating US stra- trinal requirements radically exceeded tegic superiority at the outset of the decade. what Soviet force planners could deliver in This situation undermined the symmetrical the 1960s, but they provided an agenda to logic of "flexible response" and “forward guide the modernization of Soviet combat defense” in NATO by undercutting the ra- arms and support services into the next tionality of the conventional/theater-nu- decade. clear/strategic linkage, which was the One of the first indications of this new keystone of NATO doctrine and the foun- agenda for the Soviet Air Forces was the dation of its force structure. For the Soviets, Domodedovo Air Show of 9 July 1967, this was the military context of the era of de- when the Soviets unveiled a new generation tente between East and West. According to of aircraft that reflected a renewed commit- Soviet authors, NATO acknowledged this ment to frontal aviation and combined arms situation officially in 1978, although US doctrine. On that Day of the Air Fleet, the pressure on its allies in 1977 to increase de- Soviets displayed a new generation of fight- fense spending was a clear indication of the ers with variable geometry wings, vertical dilemma.35 NATO sought a solution to the takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL), and problem of Soviet/Warsaw' Treaty Organi- short takeoff and landing aircraft (STOL).33 zation conventional superiority in the con- The new models of even conventional air- text of superpower strategic parity through craft, including the Su-17 (Fitter-C/D), rep- modernization of its own theater-nuclear resented a substantial improvement over forces. The Soviets, while modernizing the earlier generation of fighter-bombers be- both their strategic and theater-nuclear ar- cause of increased weapons load, more senals, looked to enhanced conventional powerful engines, and the addition of an capabilities as a viable path to keeping the electronic countermeasures (ECM) pod to military instrument as a rational extension increase their ability to penetrate enemy ra- of politics. dar and strike deeper targets. Foreign ob- servers noted the increased combat capabilities of these aircraft in nonnuclear Frontal Aviation wars. In 1968 Colonel N. Semenov reintro- duced the term command of the air to the and the Conventional Soviet military lexicon and flatly stated ex- Theater-Strategic Option actly the same point: The fourth period of postwar doctrinal It is becoming quite obvious from the above [a discussion of the increased capabilities of development can be seen in the Soviet ap- modem aircraft] that the necessity of gaining proach to a conventional solution to the air supremacy in conducting military opera- problem of using military power in the con- tions without the use of nuclear weapons in text of strategic nuclear parity. The ap- modern conditions is becoming even more proach implied a commitment to use acute than in the past. However, it is clear that conventional means to shift the theater-nu- it will be considerably more difficult to resolve clear correlation of forces in favor of the this problem. It will require a reevaluation of USSR and its allies while seeking military many factors and a different approach to the decision through the operational applica- use of forces and means.54 tion of a new generation of conventional By the late 1960s, the Soviet Union stood in weapons technology.37 As recent writings a position to explore whether such a con- on tactics suggest, Soviet military theorists ventional option was militarily feasible.35 have not ignored the presence of nuclear 22 AIR POWER JOURNAL

weapons but have sought to adjust their Soviet interest in helicopters dates back force-structuring to reflect a search for op- to the pre-World War II period, when they timal conventional impact and the ability to pursued both autogiro and helicopter tech- shift swiftly to nuclear combat if the situa- nology. In the postwar period, the machines tion demanded it.38 designed by in the United This posture involved a sweeping inves- States served as an inspiration for the first tigation of military praxis in theater-scale generation of Soviet machines, and by the operations. Soviet theorists focused on 1950s the Soviets were giving substantial at- three sources of experience: their own tention to the military applications of heli- World War 11 experience, the experience of copter technology, including heavy-lift recent local wars, and the lessons from So- vehicles such as the Yak-24 and Mi-6.4' viet field exercises and wargames. Vietnam and the earlier French employ- The Great Patriotic War provided the ment of armed helicopters in Algeria closest approximation of the scale and in- opened up the possibility of creating armed tensity of combat that they envisioned. This versions. The initial Soviet response was to brought with it a very close examination of add weapon pods to the Mi-8T (Hip-E) the problem of troop control and a consid- which went into production in 1966.44 This eration of automated systems to aid opera- short-term solution was followed by the de- tional commanders in conducting modern velopment of a strictly military helicopter deep operations. It culminated in the designed for air assault and fire-support emergence of the concept of the theater-stra- missions—the Mi-24 Hind, which first flew tegic operation with a TVD (theater of mili- in the early 1970s and went into series pro- tary operations) commander and his duction in 1972. The Mi-24 has since under- headquarters to direct it.39 In operational gone numerous modifications to make it terms, the Soviet theorists began to empha- more effective as a close-fire-support sys- size the decisive nature of the initial period tem against enemy armor and infantry. of war as a means of successfully shifting With the Hind’s appearance, the Soviet the correlation of forces. And they sought aircraft industry provided the armed forces means of applying combat power to pre- with its first true close-air-support tool clude enemy recourse to nuclear weapons since the 1950s. This air assault-attack air- within the theater and to force a decision craft (desantno-shturmovik) has continued upon the opponent without either side re- in production for over a decade with more sorting to weapons of mass destruction. So- than 2,300 in military service by mid-1983 viet writings began to emphasize surprise, and many more being exported around the deception (maskirovka), the tempo of the world.45 Hinds and Hips are organized into advance, and the employment of mobile squadrons (18 machines) and provide direct groups—operational maneuver groups close-air-support assets to division and (OMG)—at operational depths.40 The Sovi- army commanders. Each division has a sin- ets employed such an operational maneu- gle squadron of such aircraft, while each ver group for the first time during the army has an assault helicopter regiment (40 Zapad-81 field exercise.41 Hinds and 20 Hips).46 In exercises a flight of The second source of military praxis that attack helicopters has been assigned to sup- Soviet theorists examined in their search for port a motorized rifle battalion acting as a a conventional option was the experience of forward detachment. Forward air control- the local wars of the last two decades. The lers with the battalion provide communi- Soviets observed the US problems with cations with a flight of attack helicopters.4 close air support and the search for solu- Army and front commanders also have tions in Vietnam. In part, this involved the available to them air assault units, which emergence of the helicopter as a combat range from air assault and airmobile assault weapon.42 and an airborne division at front SOVIET "TACTICAL" AVIATION 23

level to an air assault battalion with tank ployment of modern air defense systems. and combined arms armies. These air as- The Soviets were in an obvious position to sault/airmobile forces have been widely recast their air defense concepts on the basis used in Afghanistan in conjunction with of the experience of Vietnam, the Arab-Is- Hind attack helicopter squadrons and have raeli wars of 1967 and 1973, and the Israeli proven a deadly foe for the mujahidin. invasion of Lebanon in 1982. All these con- There is even some evidence that the Sovi- flicts underscored the need for a combined ets have sought to adapt the Mi-24 to anti- arms approach to air defense by forging helicopter operations.48 SAMs, AAA, and interceptors into an inte- At the present time, the Soviets have un- grated air defense system with increased der development a successor generation of maneuver capabilities so that forces can be helicopters, with improved close-air-sup- regrouped to perform new tasks in the port and antihelicopter capabilities. These course of an operation or during a subse- include the Mi-28 Havoc and Kamov’s new quent operation.58 Hokum, which some Western observers In the same context, local wars provided have identified as helicopters optimized for a stimulus for a fresh look at the air defense air-to-air combat. This development goes of ground forces employing both active and hand in hand with a radical improvement in supporting means.54 This problem, in con- the lift capability of Soviet transport heli- junction with the appearance of a new gen- copters, especially the Mi-26 Halo, which eration of cruise missiles with enhanced can carry 20 tons at a cruising speed of 158 flight and target-acquisition capabilities, miles per hour.49 led to a reorganization of Soviet air defense In addition to pointing out the applica- forces. This reorganization has involved a tion of rotary-wing aircraft to close air sup- shift in assets away from those dedicated to port, local wars in Vietnam and the Middle the strategic mission of homeland defense East raised four other crucial questions or toward combined arms employment with issues with which Soviet frontal aviation frontal aviation in support of deep opera- and air defense forces had to deal. First tions.55 There has been a decline in the came the recognition that the decision to go number of heavy interceptors over the past with fighter-bomber aircraft as a universal 15 years and an increase in the number of type had created platforms unsuited to fighters suited for forward air defense and either role.50 This recognition led to a shift the struggle for air superiority. The appear- back toward aircraft optimized for fighter, ance of the MiG-29 Fulcrum with STOL ca- interdiction, and close-air-support pability and advanced avionics and missions. weapons seems to fit in with this shift as The second issue concerned the transfor- well.56 mation of modern, high-performance air- The fourth issue highlighted by the ex- craft into effective close-support and inter- perience of local wars was the question of diction systems against enhanced air defense air combat tactics. The improvement of forces. This led to an investigation of pre- standoff weapons for middle-distance com- cision-guided munitions, which reduced bat, the development of increasingly so- air losses and radically increased the prob- phisticated means of electronic warfare, ability of destroying ground targets.51 The and the performance characteristics of Soviets developed their own first-genera- third-generation jet aircraft in close combat tion, smart weapons and acquired a fourth forced the Soviets to reexamine the problem generation of jet aircraft to deliver them, in- of air-to-air combat and the superiority of cluding a fixed-wing, ground-attack plane, the two-plane “flight” as the optimal tacti- the Su-25 (Frogfoot-A).57 cal formation.57 The third issue raised by air combat in lo- In all these areas, the local wars of the last cal wars related to the development and em- three decades have provided the Soviets 24 AIR POWER JOURNAL with valuable data on tactical problems re- stressed the fact that winning the electronii lating to the new technologies that have battle is indispensable to the success oi been developed for air combat, and they such air operations. This was one of the cen- have allowed Soviet theorists to address the tral lessons they drew from both the Israeli critical problems that such changes create invasion of Lebanon and the Falklands for mutual support and cooperation at the War.63 The Soviet approach to the theater- tactical and operational levels of war. Af- strategic operation as a conventional option ghanistan since 1979 has provided valuable remains true to the classic terms of Soviet practical experience in the application of deep-operation theory in its emphasis on a frontal and army aviation in tactical combined arms approach and the integra- situations. tion of new means of striking the enemy’s The third and final focus of Soviet efforts operational rear. The partnership that de- to develop the concepts and force structures veloped between frontal aviation and So- for the execution of theater-strategic opera- viet rocket forces has not been abandoned tions has been their own exercises and war- under this new situation. Instead, the rocket games.58 They have tried to use such forces have been equipped with a new gen- exercises and maneuvers for the training of eration of conventional warheads that will troops as well as for adapting arms and co- allow them to attack stationary targets with operation on the modern battlefield.50 Dur- an effect similar to that of small tactical nu- ing Zapad-81, the Soviets employed an clear weapons of a generation ago.6* operational maneuver group with helicop- ter air assault and fire support to test the concept’s effectiveness as part of their thea- ter-strategic operation.60 Conclusion Soviet authors have been quite explicit Some authors have compared this Soviet about the critical role of the air operation in approach to the adaptation of modern com- their conception of such theater-strategic bat means with blitzkrieg warfare.65 Others, operations. Command of the air over the most notably the late Richard Simpkin, main axes of advance has been directly as- have seen these developments as a “search sociated with the need to blast air corridors for simultaneity throughout the depth of the through enemy air defense assets. Soviet au- defense" in which the Soviets are banking thors have linked this process to the strug- heavily upon airmobile, mechanized forces gle for air superiority and the antiair to support their mobile groups in high- operation. One source notes that “questions speed, offensive operations. Simpkin ex- of the preparation and conduct of the air op- pressly linked this approach to new poten- eration for gaining command of the air, con- tialities that were emerging as a result of ducted with, the purpose of destroying the development in helicopter aviation, which enemy aviation grouping on specific axes, he termed as nothing less than a rotary rev- have been worked out.”61 The basis of the olution as profound in its implications as antiair portion of this operation was the as- that associated with the mechanization of sumption that the best means of air defense warfare in the 1930s. Simpkin saw this was the destruction of enemy air assets on search for simultaneity as ongoing and un- the ground.62 Such an operational concep- realized but thoroughly in keeping with So- tion places a high premium on surprise and viet operational art as it was developed in preemption during the initial period of war. the 1920s and 1930s bv Marshal M. N. Tuk- At the same time, it requires that air units hachevsky and his colleagues.66 Frontal and their logistical support network be both aviation has a critical role to play in such rugged and flexible in order to survive and operations in cooperation with other arms sustain combat operations. and services. For all the technological At the same time, Soviet authors have changes and developments, its role still fits SOVIET "TACTICAL" AVIATION 25

within that outlined by A. N. Lapchinsky in "command of the air" over the theater of Vozdushnaia Armiia on the eve of World military operations or on the axis of the War II when he said, "In order to conduct a main blow. Command of the air is achieved maneuver war, one must win the air-land by a combination of blows aimed at destroy- battles which begin in the air and culminate ing the enemy’s basic aviation groupings, in victory on the ground and this requires defeating his air defense forces, and dis- the concentration of all air forces at a given rupting his system of command and con- time on a given front.”67 At the present time, trol.66 For all the technological changes and such operations begin with the seizure of organizational innovations, a core element of doctrinal continuity remains.69 □

Notes 1. M. N. Kozhevnikov, Komandovanie i Shtab VVS v Velikoi 23. Vaclav Nemecek, Sow/et-Flugzeuge (Steineback-Woer- Otechestvennoi Voine. 1941-1945 gg. (Moscow: Nauka. 1977). thsee: Luftfahrt-Verlag Walter Zuerl.n.d.), 112. 255-56. 24. Ibid., 266. 2. Ibid.. 168 ff. 25. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last 3. Voennyi Entsikiopedicheskii SJovar' (Moscow: Voyen- Testament (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), 16-29. 44—56. izdat. 1983).43. 155. 250-62: and Oleg Penkovsky. The Penkovsky Papers (New 4. N. V. Ogarkov, Vsegda v Gotovnosti k Zashchite Ote- York: Doubleday & Company. 1965). 252-57. chestva (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1982), 44. Ogarkov identified 26. M. A. Gareev, M. V. Frunze— Voennyi Teoretik (Moscow: four other factors that have shaped the development of military Voyenizdat, 1985), 238-39. art in the postwar fashion in a fundamental way. These are the 27. V. D. Sokolovsky, Voennaia Strategiia, 3d ed. (Moscow: scientific-technical revolution in military affairs, which has Voyenizdat, 1968). 289. promoted qualitatively new military technology and weaponry 28. M. V. Zakharov, ed.. Voprosy Strategii i Operativnogo Js- and mandated a search for new methods and means of employ- kusstva v Sovetskikh Voennykh Trudakh 1917-1941 (Mos- ing them, the increased tempo of technological change, which cow: Voyenizdat, 1965); and M. V. Zakharov. ''O Teorii has reduced the time between qualitative leaps and thus accel- Glubokoi Operatsii," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurna!, no. 10 erated change in military affairs: the growth in the significance (October 1970): 20. of strategic means of conducting war to such an extent that 29. S. L. Sokolov, “Aviatsionnaia Podderzhka Sukhoput- such means can directly influence its course and outcome: and nykh Voisk." Voennaia Mysf, no. 7 (July 1965): 33. the transformation of the very process of troop control, which 30. Ibid.. 34. has become more integrated and reliant on automated systems. 31. Ibid., 36-37. 5. Kozhevnikov, 164ff. 32. Ibid.. 33-36. 6. A. S. Yakovlev. 50 Let Sovetskogo Samoletstroeniia (Mos- 33. A. Yakovlev, Tsel' Zhizni (Moscow: Political Literature cow: Voyenizdat, 1968). 117-19. Publishing House, 1966), 595-99. 7. Ibid., 235-36. 34. N. Semenov, "Gaining Supremacy in the Air." Voennaia 8. . Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discus- Mysl', no. 4 (April 1968). as trans. FPD 0052/69 in Joseph D. sion of the Hole of Science in Preserving Democracy (Boston: Douglas, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Selected Readings from Simon & Schuster. 1949). 109-10. "Military Thought." 1963-73, vol. 5, Studies in Communist 9. Voiska Protivovozdushnoi Oborony Strany: Istoricheskii Affairs, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Ocherk (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1968), 349-58. 1982), 203. 10. M. M. Kir'ian, Voenno-Tekhnicheskii Progress i Voo- 35. Lynn Hansen. "The Resurgence of Soviet Frontal Avia- ruzhennye Sily SSSH (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982). 238. tion," Strategic Review, Fall 1978. 73-74. 11. Ibid., 242. 36. V. Meshcheriakov, "Osnovnye Etapy Razvitiia Ob' edi- 12. David Holloway. The Soviet Union and the Arms Race nennykh Vooruzhennykh Sil NATO." Voenno-Istoricheskii (New Haven: Press. 1983). 28-38. Zhurnal, no. 1 (January 1984): 77-80. 13. Voennyi Entsikiopedicheskii Slovar’. 154. 37. N. V. Ogarkov, fstoriia Uchit BditeJ'nosli (Moscow: 14. Kir'ian, Voenno-Tekhnicheskii, 256-65. Voyenizdat. 1985). 40-54. 15. V D. Sokolovsky, ed.. Voennaia Strategiia, 2d ed. (Mos- 38. V. G. Reznichenko. ed.. Taktika. 2d ed. (Moscow: Voyen- cow: Voyenizdat. 1963). 10. izdat, 1984). 14-18, 45-71, 91-92. 16. Voennyi Entsikiopedicheskii Slovar'. 720. 39. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Michael 17. P. S. Kutakhov. Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (Moscow: MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Wash- Voyenizdat. 1977). 54. ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 1987), 117 ff. 18. Kir'ian. Voenno-Tekhnicheskii. 253-54. 40. On these developments, see S. V. Ivanov, ed., Nachal'nyi 19. Ibid.. 264. Period Voiny (Po Opytu Kamponii i Operatsii Vtoroi Mirovoi 20. S. A. Krasovsky, ed., Aviatsiia i Kosmonavtika SSSR Voiny) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974), 4-22; M. M. Kir'ian, Vne- (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1968), 349. zapnost’ v Operatsiiakh Vooruzhennykh Sil SShA (Moscow: 21. Ibid.. 350. Voyenizdat, 1982); Reznichenko. 152-73; and Ogarkov. Islo- 22 facob W Kipp. "Soviet Naval Aviation." in Soviet Naval riia Uchit Bditel'nosti, 76-90. Influence Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, ed. Michael 41. Jeffrey Simon. Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Com- MccGwire and John McDonnell (New York: Praeger Publish- mand and Control (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press. 1985). ers. 1977). 208-9. 192-94. For the best discussion of the OMG, see Christopher 26 AIR POWER JOURNAL

Donnelly. "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: A Chal- Voyenizdat. 1979), 72-73. lenge for NATO," Military Review 63. no. 3, (March 1983): 43- 55. On the abolishment of PVO Strany and the reemergence 60. of Voiska PVO as a force designed to provide forward air de- 42. Kir'ian, Naucho-Tekhnicheskii. 284: and 1. E. Shavrov. fense and support of theater-strategic operations, see Russell G. ed.. Lokal'nye Voiny: Istoriio i Sovremennost’ (Moscow: Breighner. "Air Defense Forces." in Soviet Armed Forces Re- Voyenizdat, 1981 ),252—53. view Annual, ed. David (ones (Gulf Breeze. Fla.: Academic In- 43. Krasovsky. Aviotsiia i Kosmonavtika SSSR. 324-25. ternational Press. 1984). vol. 7 (1982-1983), 158-76. 44. Bill Gunston. Aircra/t of the Soviet Union (London: Os- 56. Georg Panyalev, "MiG 29 Fulcrum: Details to Date." In- prey Publishing. Ltd., 1983), 196-97. ternational Defense Review, no. 2 (February 1987): 145-47. 45. Ibid., 200-2. 57. Iu. Kisliakov and V. Dubrov. "Novye Cherty Vozdush- 46. Roger E. Bort, "Air Assault Brigades: New Element in the nogo Boia." Aviatsiio i Kosmonavtika. no. 9 (September 1984): Soviet Desanl Force Structure." Military Review 10 (October 1 2 - 14: no. 10 (October 1984): 30-31: no. 11 (November 1984): 1983) : 34. 13- 15: and no. 12 (December 1984): 30-32. 47. V. Perelygin. “Sviaz" v Peredovom Otriade (Iz Opvta De- 58. 1. E. Shavrov and M. I. Galkin. Metodologiia Voenno- istvii Sviazistov Nochiu)." Voennyi Vestnik, no. 5 (May 1986): Nauchnogo Poznaniia (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1977), 398-99. 77-80. 59. M. A. Gareev, 7‘aklicheskie Ucheniia i Manevry f/stori- 48. Krusnaia Zvezda (24 January 1984), 1; and “Taktiches- cheskii Ocherk) (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1977), 5-7, 261-63. kaia Zadacha." Voennyi Vestnik, no. 5 (May 1986): 32: and 60. Jeffrey Simon. Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Com- "Razbor Reshenii Takticheskoi Zadachi." Voennyi Vestnik. mand and Control (Boulder. Colo.: Westview Press. 1985), no. 10-(October 1986): 16-17. Soviet authors have also ana- 192-94. lyzed Western writings on the helicopter in aerial combat. See 61. M. M. Kir'ian et al., Istoriio Voennogo Iskusstva (Mos- M. Fesenko. "Vertolel Protiv Vertoleta." Aviotsiia i Kosmon- cow: Voyenizdat. 1986), 404. ovtika. no. 3 (March 1984): 46-47. 62. Andersen. Drozhzhin, and Lozik. 71. 49. Bill Gunston and Mike Spick. Modern Fighting Helicop- 63. S. V. Seroshtan, "Radioelektronnaia Bor'ba v Lokal'nykh ters (New York: Crescent. 1986). 76-77. 144—47. Like all other Voinakh na Blizhnem Vostoke," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhur- Kamov helicopters. Hokum appears to have a coaxial rotor sys- nal. no. 3 (March 1985): 62-67: and R. Loskutov and V. Moro- tem very different from Mil OKB's Hind or Havoc. The supe- zov, "Nekotorye Voprosy Taktiki Vooruzhennogo Konflikta v riority of such a rotor system for an aerial combat environment Livane v 1982 Godu," Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal. no. 7 in terms of direct shaft-lo-lift power, ability to climb and de- (July 1984): 75-78. On the Soviet analysis of the Falklands con- scend rapidly, and maneuver swiftly by using control surfaces flict. see Jacob W. Kipp. Naval Art and the Prism of Contem- as against a tail rotor must be judged against the problem of ro- poroniety: Soviet Naval Officers and the Falklands Conflict tor fouling during turns and banks when the blades are under (College Station. Tex.: Center for Strategic Technology. Texas dynamic loading. In looking at the helicopters built by Mil A & M University, 1984). OKB and the park of helicopters around the world. A. M. Vol- 64. Kerry L. Hines. "Soviet Short-Range Ballistic Missiles: odko and A. L. Litvinov pointed out recently that conventional Now a Conventional Deep-Strike Mission." International De- rotor-tail-rotor ships seem to have considerable advantages fense Review, no. 12 (December 1985): 1909-14. over coaxial-type helicopters. It is still unclear whether the Ka- 65. P. H. Vigor. Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory (London: Macmil- mov OKB has made such a breakthrough and that a new gen- lan Press. 1983). 1-9. eration of coaxial interceptor-helicopters has arrived. On the 66. Richard Simpkin. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Mil approach, see A. M. Volodko and A. L. Litvinov, Osnovy Twenty-First-Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence Konslruktsii i Tekhnicheskoi Ekspluatatsii Odnovinlovykh Publishers. 1985), 145-61. Vertoletov (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1986), 3-24. 67. A. N. Lapchinskv. Vozdushnaia Armiia (Moscow: Gos- 50. Iu. Kisliakov and V. Dubrov. “Novye Cherty Vozdush- voyenizdat. 1939). 144. nogo Boia," Aviatsiio i Kosmonavtika. no. 11 (November 68. Voennyi Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar', 2d ed. (Moscow: 1984) : 14. Voyenizdat. 1986), 205. 51. Kir'ian. Voenno-Tekhnicheskii. 287-88; and V. A. So- 69. In assessing trends in the development of ground force kolov. "Razvitie Taktiki Istrebitelei-Bombardirovshchikov v tactics into the twenty-first century. Col Stanislaw Koziej of the Lokal'nykh Voinakh." Voenno-fstoricheskii Zhurnal, no. 4 Polish People's Army identified the basic direction of such (April 1986): 65-72. changes as "the transformation of traditional land combat into 52. Bill Sweetman. "Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot," International air-land combat. . . ." This he explicitly associated with the de- Defense Review', no: 11 (November 1985): 1759-62. velopment and introduction of precision weapons and heli- 53. V. K. Strel'nikov. "Razvitie Sredstv PVO i Opyt Ikh Pri- copters on an increasingly broader scale, as well as the rapid meneniia v Lokal'nykh Voinakh." Voenno-Isloricheskii Zhur- tempo of electronization and automation of the basic processes nol, no. 5 (May 1986): 62-67. of armed combat. See Stanislaw Koziej. "Przewidywane ki- 54. lu A. Andersen. A. I. Drozhzhin. and P. M. Lozik. Proti- erunki Zmian w Taktyce VVojsk Ladowvch." Przeglad Wojsk vovozdushnaia Oborona Sukhopulnykh Voisk (Moscow: Ladowych. no. 9 (September 1986): 9. THE ESSENCE OF LEADERSHIP 17

The Essence of Leadership Continued from page 7 leader, and you are no commander. It has to four things I would have to do so that the be a sincere interest. day 1 died I would consider myself success- Finally, and the most obvious, you must ful. These are professional things, not the live what you say. If you preach honesty personal things such as being a good father and morality and good conduct and what- and raising a family and things like that. In ever else you preach, such as getting the job order to be successful. I would have to find done to the best of your ability and getting it out whether or not I was afraid to die. done right the first time, that’s the way you Would I turn and run when somebody shot must live, because if you don’t you won’t at me? Would I conduct myself in combat in get what you want from your subordinates. such a manner that it was obvious that I was You have to be the shining example, and afraid to die? I think with the record of 265 you must never fail. It is easy to be a leader combat missions—most of which were and a commander from eight o’clock in the ground support, armed reconnaissance, and morning until five o'clock in the afternoon. missions of that nature—I have proven to From five in the afternoon until eight in the myself that I will not turn and run when morning is when it is tough to be a com- somebody shoots at me and that I am not mander. That’s when you have to get out of afraid to die. bed and go get somebody out of jail. That’s Second, I wanted to fly at least 37 combat when the crises come up and you have to missions. Where I got the number 37. I will function like you have just had 24 hours of never know, but 1 felt if I flew that many I sleep and you are perfectly rested and per- would be successful. Obviously I made that fectly in control of the situation. You have goal. got to be a commander 24 hours a day. You The third thing was that if I stayed in the can’t be horsing around the officers club; Air Force—and I wasn’t sure at the age of 24 you can't be making a spectacle of yourself I was going to make it a career—1 wanted to out on the street. You have got to get along be at least a lieutenant general. Thanks to not only with your people but with your ci- the work of many people. I became a lieu- vilian counterparts with whom you tenant general. associate. Finally, I wanted to become a millionaire I say this because I have tried to use these before I died. Obviously my first three ob- guidelines for being a commander. When I jectives were counterproductive to my was 24 years old, before I went to Korea, I sat fourth, and I haven’t reached it yet, but I am down and I decided at that time there were still working on it! □ N DEVELOPING the scenario for a areas of Soviet plans, objectives, and NATO-Soviet conflict used in Red strengths or weaknesses. Storm Rising, placed a great deal of emphasis on Soviet maskirovka.' MaskirovkaI is frequently mentioned in Terminology passing in many other novels, articles, and In studying the USSR, most Westerners monographs dealing with the USSR. But are faced immediately with several prob- there have been all too few attempts to de- lems. A primary example is that of attempt- scribe maskirovka as an entity. That is the ing to understand the Soviet/Russian purpose of this article. Maskirovka is most perspective on events. The Russian "mind- simply defined as a set of processes de- set” has been influenced by many factors of signed to mislead, confuse, and interfere which Americans are generally unaware or with accurate data collection regarding all the significance of which have been elusive. SOVIET MASKIROVKA 29

For example, the term American imperi- English. Maskirovka is an excellent exam- alistic interventionists as used by the Sovi- ple. In US military terms, maskirovka is ets may be interpreted in the United States often referred to as “camouflage,” "conceal- as a reference to our involvements in Cuba, ment,” and "deception." Translators fre- the Philippines, or Vietnam. To the Soviets, quently use the term camouflage, and the it brings to mind the fact that during the use of this single English term inherently . the United States, as well gives the reader a biased perception of what as Britain, France, and Japan, had military is actually presented in the Russian. For ex- forces fighting against Bolshevik forces in ample, research in translated Russian works Russia. This is one example of the differ- where the term camouflage has been used ence in perspectives. creates a view that is different from research Another major problem is that Russian where the term concealment has been se- terms are not always easily translated into lected. This is complicated by the Russian

Soviet Masl

C har les L. Smit h 30 AIR POWER fOURNAL word kamufliazh, which translates into Implementation English as camouflage. In the Russian con- text, the term refers to what in the West is Due to its complex nature, the concept of classified as disruptive painting (fig. 1). An- maskirovka is incompletely understood in other example is the selection of decoys, the West. This article contains three simpli- dummies, or models for the Russian use of fied models to illustrate the concept by re- false objects. In English there are subtle dif- flecting its implementation, organizational, ferences between these terms. and doctrinal-philosophical aspects. Ob- Maskirovka is actually a very broad con- viously, these are not all-inclusive but cept that encompasses many English terms. rather provide a beginning framework for These include: camouflage, concealment, understanding. The implementation as- deception, imitation, disinformation, se­ pects include form, type, environment, and crecy, security, feints, diversions, and sim- nature of activity (fig. 2). These factors have ulation. While terms overlap to a great been subdivided into additional categories. extent, a complication is that the Russian Within the Soviet military, gaps in the im- term is greater than the sum of these English plementation of maskirovka are considered terms. Thus, those in the West should at- a breach of security and are recognized as a tempt to grasp the entire concept rather than threat to survival. its components. Maskirovka is not a new concept in the USSR. Its roots can be traced Forms to the Russian Imperial Army. Several So- The forms of maskirovka, as shown in figure viet authors trace it back to Dmitry Don- 2, consist of concealment, imitation, simu- skoy’s placing a portion of his mounted forces in an adjacent forest at the Battle of Kulikovo Field in 1380. Seeing a smaller VVe o f t e n translate the Russian term maskirovka as force than anticipated, the Tatars attacked, “cam ouflageTo the Soviet military person, the term only to be suddenly overpowered by the means much more. concealed force.2 This concept, because of the Soviet “mind-set," permeates the entire nation. It is practiced throughout Soviet society and is not just a military term. It is a part of pub- lished Soviet data and figures as they relate to the economy, agricultural, or industrial production. An example of this, which per- tains to both industry and the military, oc- curred in the period before World War II and at the onset of . The USSR had purchased 100-mm artillery pieces from Germany before the war. and German intelligence estimates of the capa- bilities of the were based in part on the use of these guns. Following their in- vasion in June 1941, the Germans were shocked to encounter much more powerful Soviet 130-mm artillery pieces. The USSR had purchased the German guns and scrapped them while producing their own guns at the same time—a classic instance of maskirovka. SOVIET MASKIROVKA 31

lation, demonstrative actions, and disinfor- mation. These may be employed singly but are most commonly conducted in conjunc- tion with one another. Concealment. This is one of the primary forms of maskirovka and involves a series of measures to eliminate or reduce possible detection of revealing signs of troops, equipment, plans, or production. Construc- tion or modification of ships under over- head awnings is a form of concealment as is the use of smoke screens on the battlefield. In the Russian context, this form of maski- rovka is similar to the English term con- cealment, plus camouflage. It involves the use of such things as nets, screens, and other devices (fig. 3). The construction of tanks and armored personnel carriers within automobile plants is another means of concealment. Maskirovka implementation crosses the spectrum of Imitation. Imitation involves the creation techniques in various environments. Gaps in imple­ of false objects that appear to be real. Use of mentation are considered a breach of security by the Soviets. collapsible and pneumatic mock-ups of military equipment on the battlefield is one kind of imitation. A number of Soviet arti- cles on maskirovka cite the successful uses of these objects during the Great Patriotic Concea/ment through the use of netting and other tech­ niques is used to reduce detection by intelligence War (1941-45).3 On several occasions dur- sources. Properly done it can be a very effective ing the war, turrets from damaged tanks technique. were placed on wooden frames to imitate

Figure 3. 32 AIR POWER JOURNAL

Types of maskirovka or opponent regarding plans or military op- Maskirovka erations. A Soviet offensive may begin with Methods optical tight thermal radar sound radio attacks in several locations to divert the en- emy’s attention to areas away from a main disruptive painting X X thrust.5 The zones of demonstrative actions (kamulliazh) may be subjected to excessive aerial and maskirovka nets XX X X ground reconnaissance prior to an intense decoys artillery barrage. The actual point of the and X X dummies main thrust may not be subjected to the

decoy devices XX X XXX same level of activity until the enemy has begun to respond to the false attacks. feigned activity X X X X X X

smoke X XX Disinformation. As practiced by the So- viets, disinformation has received a great blackouts and XX XX deal of attention in recent years. Examples brownouts such as sending false letters and providing Figure 4. untrue information to Western journalists have been widely publicized. One depart- ment of the KGB, or Committee of State Se- The Soviets have analyzed the types of maskirovka and how each method affects mission concealment curity, deals with disinformation of this and deception. This thorough approach is much more nature at many levels. Disinformation can a part of Soviet doctrine than its US counterpart. take many approaches. When the Germans invaded the USSR in 1941, they were using actual tanks. This technique has also been Soviet-produced maps. These proved to be demonstrated in Soviet exercises. During highly inaccurate, showing factories and one exercise, a damaged bridge was re- towns where there were swamps or show- paired but still appeared damaged while a ing trails where major roads existed. The decoy bridge was erected upstream. The “enemy” made repeated strikes against the decoy while not bothering the repaired A downward-pointing light is employed by Soviet sol­ structure. Another example of imitation diers to evade detection while allowing the individual to see at night. would be the construction of an airfield or factory that is not used. Simulation. Closely related to imitation but of a more active nature is simulation. This involves creating the distinctive signs and activity near features or objects that concealment- is designed to hide. Creation of a dummy antiaircraft site using collapsi- ble mock-ups is imitation; however, equip- ping the site with devices that emit noise and smoke, together with movement of troops around the facility, is simulation. This latter technique was widely used by the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War.4 One false artillery position that simulated such activity was struck by 117 bombs in one day. Demonstrative Actions. Demonstrative actions or feints serve to mislead an enemy SOVIET MASKIROVKA 33 drive toward was greatly slowed when the Germans realized that a road that they thought their tanks could use did not exist. This forced the vehicles to travel over rough, rocky terrain at much slower speeds. Disinformation by all military units re- garding impending operations has also been widely noted. Prior to the Soviet amphibi- ous assault at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea in September 1943, false orders were published stating that this would be a di- versionary landing and that the actual main landing would occur two days later farther to the west. When the actual landing began, the Germans were waiting for the “real” assault.

Types antiradar camouflage screen Another means of approaching the concept of maskirovka is to analyze its various types Figure 6 (figs. 2 and 4). These have been well docu- mented in Soviet military writings. Here again, these may be divided into several Radar maskirovka. Both radar-absorbent and radar- subcategories. Several of the types generally reflecting techniques are used to misdirect enemy conform to bands of the electromagnetic intelligence. spectrum and function against military re- connaissance systems such as aerial pho- tography and radar or against target vation. It may employ a series of nets or acquisition systems. Other types are de- screens, either artificial or natural, sur- signed to counter radio, acoustical, or other rounding the sides and top of a complex or attempts to gather information. Specific re- installation. Another form may simply be sources or methods are designed for use in signs giving false identities to facilities. the various types of maskirovka. Also included in this type of maskirovka The relationship between these factors are the use of camouflage clothing, the uti- was discussed in an article written by two lization of terrain to mask movement of East German officers. The article was later forces, and the use of smoke screens. The republished in Voyennaya M ysl’, the jour- primary purpose of screens and nets is to al- nal of the Soviet General Staff and most ter the apparent shape of the object as well prestigious of all Soviet military journals.6 as its shadow. The Soviet definition of Adding additional significance is the fact optical maskirovka includes the near or re- that the entry in the Soviet Military Ency­ flected infrared portion of the electromag- clopedia on maskirovka is very similar to netic spectrum. Thus, activities include the earlier article.7 those designed to counter “camouflage-de- Optical/Light. Maskirovka can also be di- tecting films.” Special paints are employed vided into a variety of types that cut across in the manufacture of screens and nets to the forms previously described. For exam- present realistic imagery." Blackouts and ple, optical/light maskirovka is used to night-vision devices serve to ensure light counter reconnaissance systems that in- maskirovka. One device is designed to con- volve photography as well as human obser- stantly point downward, thereby allowing 34 AIR POWER JOURNAL

ployed to deny information to enemy recon- naissance and guidance systems that employ sensors in the thermal portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. Here also the method of employment varies with the form. There are two primary ways of em- ploying thermal maskirovka to facilitate concealment. Both have the objective of re- ducing the thermal contrast between the ob- ject to be concealed and the background surrounding it. Special air- or water-cooling systems, insulation, and other methods may be used to reduce temperatures or dissipate heat. Thermal screens and special paints may also be employed. On one exercise, a field kitchen was located under tall conifer- ous trees and excess heat piped under- ground away from the site to other parts of the forest. This piping and the tall trees ef- fectively dispersed the heat. A second Figure 7. method is to increase the temperature of the overall background. This may be accom- plished through the use of heaters. Heaters Three different types of radar reflectors. These reflec­ may also be used to initiate and simulate ac- tors are designed to make it difficult to determine ac­ curately the location or omounl of activity in a given tivity in a different location. At the same area. Each motorized rifle battalion carries 30 of the time that the field kitchen was being con- corner radar reflectors. cealed, a fire was placed on an iron plate un- der a canvas cover away from the kitchen.10 This created a thermal replication of the light to be applied where required without kitchen. Reconnaissance or other thermal being detected (fig. 5). sensors would detect the simulated kitchen Optical and light types of mctskirovka but not the actual one, thereby causing an may be employed to achieve several forms enemy to make an invalid assumption. of mctskirovka. The most obvious is the use Radar. Radar maskirovka employs sev- of nets, screens, and blackouts to conceal eral techniques to counter all forms of radar. items, while mock-ups and dummy lights Figure 6 shows two primary techniques for serve as a form of imitation. In such in- countering radar. One is to analyze topo- stances. nets and screens that are badly in graphic maps and relief models to deter- need of repair may be placed over mock-ups mine areas of “radar shadow” or dead space to indicate poorly executed maskirovka.9 where known ground-based radars cannot Construction of an apparently real runway scan. Another technique to deceive ground- complete with dummy aircraft at an airfield based radars is to place an object behind a is another form of imitation. Movement of net containing metallic or other radar-re- empty vehicles using their headlights along flecting strips. The first technique involves secondary roads at night or during the day the elimination or reduction of any radar re- with the goal of replicating a buildup of turn, while the second bombards the sensor forces in an area is the application of light or with radar energy. Another means of ac- optical means to achieve simulation or complishing the first method is through the demonstration. use of special coatings and may be consid- Thermal. Thermal maskirovka is em- ered in the design of weapon systems. In a SOVIET MASK!ROVKA 35

i~rp

a — Bridge 1 — Floating corner reflectors, b — Bay simulating a radar image 4 — Corner reflectors, placed in the bay of a false bridge

2, 3 — Radar image 5, 6 — Radar images of the real bridge (2). of the bay before (5) and the false bridge (3) and after (6) camouflaging

Figure 8.

Two examples of radar reflectors in use. On the left, radar reflectors are used to simulate a secon d bridge on the radar return. A! right, corner reflectors are used to disguise the actual size of a bay of water.

1973 article, one Soviet naval author in dis- present but will give no indication of its na- cussing maskirovka of ships pointed out ture. This makes it difficult to accurately de- that right angles on ships create bright re- tect movement along the road or activity in turns on radar scopes or imagery." The Ty- the area, thus adding an element of confu- phoon-class , which appeared in sion and possibly concealing any activities. 1983, has very few right angles on the su- Corner reflectors may be issued or produced perstructure, a form of stealth technology. in the field from wood and metallic foil. Radar reflectors are a passive means of During the mid-1970s, each Soviet motor ri- jamming radar systems. These may be cor- fle battalion was provided 30 corner ner, pyramid, spherical, or dipole reflectors reflectors. that are designed to reflect radar energy Radar reflectors may also be used for im- back to the sending radars. When sus- itation and simulation. Corner reflectors pended in pairs along a road or scattered in placed inside or beside dummy tanks will an area, corner reflectors create a bright re- imitate the radar image of a tank." Radar re- turn on a radar scope that masks any activ- flectors may be placed on motorcycles that ity along the road or within the area (fig. 7).12 travel up and down roads to simulate heavy The sensor will indicate that something is traffic. An article in the Soviet Military En- 36 AIR POWER JOURNAL

cyclopedia by Maj Gen A. I. Palii, of the En- gineer Troops, contains a discussion and sketches showing the use of radar reflectors to alter the landscape as it appears on radar (fig. 8).14 Reflectors can be used to create false bridges as well as to make coves ap- pear to be solid ground. One Soviet book points out the success of similar reflectors used by the Germans to deceive 100 Amer- ican and British aircraft who dropped their bombs on a lake in Berlin.15 Sound. Complete silence is obviously a major means of sound maskirovka. Troops, equipment, and other facilities should op- erate as quietly as possible in combat to avoid detection. The reverse of this is em- ployed for imitation simulation and dem- onstrative actions as well as for disinformation. During the preparations for the L’vov-Sandomierz offensive in 1944, Col Leonid Brezhnev, as political officer for The diagram above shows the organizational structure the 18th Army, was responsible for creating of maskirovka as well as the spectrum of organizations that are involved. the sounds of two tank armies on the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. This was an area where there were very few troops. Us- Soviet tank units were relocated while their ing loudspeakers, the Soviets were able to command and other radios remained in the convince the Germans that a major thrust old positions and continued broadcasting. was to come from this location. At least one German division was deployed from the re- Environment and Activity gion of the real Soviet attack to defend the left wing of the front from an anticipated at- Maskirovka may be conducted in any envi- tack by the false tank armies.16 ronment to deny information to sensors. Sound maskirovka onboard a submerged Radio/Radar. Radios are both a blessing submarine is designed to counteract acous- and a curse. They allow speedy communi- tical sensors within the aquatic environ- cations but often reveal locations of facili- ment. Regardless of the environment, the ties otherwise concealed. Analysis of the form and type of maskirovka may be either pattern of radio use may, for example, help active or passive. While most aspects of identify command posts. One means of re- maskirovka involve some form of activity, ducing this problem is to disperse radio an- others (such as silence) require none. The tennas away from command posts, thereby best example of active and passive actions is focusing an enemy’s attention on another in an area of radar. The use of special radar- area. Radios also serve as a means of simu- reflecting or absorbing netting and possibly lation, demonstration, and disinformation. radar reflectors tied down in an area is con- Apparent inadvertent transmissions may sidered passive. Moving reflectors up and actually be designed to spread false infor- down a road is considered active, as is jam- mation. A simulation such as the one Sec- ming an enemy’s radar systems using false retary Brezhnev was involved with required transmissions or dispersing radar-reflecting false radio transmissions to replicate the So- chaff. In the Soviet military, these active viet tank armies. In other instances, large methods are part of normal maskirovka. SOVIET MASKIROVKA 37

while in the West they are considered radio electronic warfare.

Organization Maskirovka has many organizational fac- tors. The second of the three simplistic models shows the organizational factors (fig. 9). These factors include the level of im- plementation, mobility, and the branch of the armed forces involved.

Level Maskirovka is employed at all levels of mil- itary activity. At the tactical level, it often involves more concealment and imitation than simulation and disinformation. Here the primary objective is to make the location of small units difficult to determine. Oper- Maskirovka principles and contributing factors. Soviet ational as well as strategic maskirovka are maskirovka is the product of a carefully designed hi­ based on successful tactical efforts. At these erarchy of military thought. higher levels, larger units and greater areas are involved with greater emphasis on sim- ulation, demonstrative actions, and volve close coordination between the five disinformation. branches and Rear Services of the Minister of Defense’s forces, as well as with the Mobility KGB’s border guards and MVD troops. This The mobile or fixed nature of an object has is especially true at the front and theater of a great bearing on the implementation as- military operations (TVD) levels during pects of maskirovka. In this regard, items wartime when these may be under one such as tanks or field artillery frequently as- commander. sume both modes. Thus, while in a fixed mode, a tank may be masked by netting. While it is in motion, such netting is un- called for and other means of concealment Doctrine are required. All Soviet military operations are based on a carefully defined and structured hier- Branch of Armed Forces archy of military thought (fig. 10). These in- The aspects already described, as well as clude military doctrine, science, and art, as the doctrinal inputs detailed below, apply well as numerous contributing factors. to all branches or services of the Soviet Political strategy, technical capabilities, armed forces. Aspects that apply to small and many other factors have an impact on units in the Ground Forces apply also to na- Soviet military doctrine, science, and art. val troops, KGB border guards, troops of the An analysis of these factors is beyond the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and to scope of this article; however, in the realm troops of the other forces and services. Mas­ of maskirovka they all have led to the for- kirovka at the operational level would in- mulation of several principles. 38 AIR POWER IOURNAL

Principles Variety. Repetitious patterns of maski­ Regardless of the type, form, environment, rovka must be avoided and variety em- nature, and organizational aspects, maski- ployed. This is the principle of variety. rovka is governed by four major principles. Some German sources indicate that Soviet These principles are not described in the efforts at maskirovka during the Second Soviet Military Encyclopedia, but they are World War were predictable. As German discussed by military personnel both in forces moved into new positions, they books and articles. In spite of changes in scanned the areas held by the Red Army in technology, these principles remain valid, an attempt to locate specific positions such and the Soviets believe they must be prac- as command posts. They would suspect cer- ticed for maskirovka to be successful. Sev- tain locations as the site of these positions eral principles have subelements that some based upon their past experiences. In many Soviet military authors may regard as sepa- instances, such suspicions were confirmed. rate guidelines. They also have a certain Several authors have pointed out that the amount of overlap. The four principles de- Soviets tend to follow the “approved” so- scribed below appear to be the most perti- lution to many matters, including locations nent and consistent in Soviet military for units and command functions. Soviet at- writings. These are activity, plausibility, va- tempts at disinformation also were said to riety, and continuity. follow a pattern that, once recognized, re- vealed the maskirovka effort. Activity. The principle of activity or ag- gressiveness stresses that all maskirovka Continuity. The final principle is that of must be persistent to give the enemy a false continuity both in peace as well as in war. It idea. The objective is to cause the enemy to is difficult to successfully employ maski­ make incorrect estimates of a situation.17 rovka on a new factory or installation after Once a form or type of maskirovka has been all construction has been completed. Mas- implemented, it may become necessary to kirovka must be part of all plans and must change it. For example, after an airfield has be continued throughout an operation. An been attacked and has once again become extremely significant example of a violation operational after repairs, maskirovka efforts of this principle occurred in 1962 and led to might be made to make it appear still out of the Cuban missile crisis. Maskirovka efforts commission and abandoned. were employed from the beginning of the operation to conceal deployment of mis- Plausibility. All efforts at maskirovka siles to Cuba. However, no efforts at con- must be plausible. This is an especially im- cealm ent were made during the portant principle. Regardless of the type or construction of launch sites. US reconnais- form of maskirovka involved, the enemy sance assets were able to detect these sites must believe.what he sees is real when in based upon their pattern. fact it is not.18 At the tactical level, slit trenches must not be cut across natural con- tours but should blend with the terrain. Research and Writings Maskirovka that does not blend into the Maskirovka has been the subject of many ar- background will, in effect, pinpoint the lo- ticles in Soviet military periodicals and cation of the object. Placing a dark-colored books. Several of these are accounts of re- net over a tank in an area of sand and light search either within the USSR or from for- brush is obviously less plausible than using eign sources. Obviously, because of the a matted sand-colored net. False targets nature of the topic, many specifics are not should be located in sites where their pres- presented in their analyses. Soviet articles ence would be expected; that is, a radar site “based on foreign sources” often serve as a would not normally be located in a deep means of discussing or presenting tech- depression. niques and technologies that the Soviet mil- SOVIET MASKIROVKA 39

itary believes would add to its maskirovka Conclusions efforts. Because of this, articles and descrip- This article began by citing examples of tions of this type should be carefully scru- maskirovka in the novel Red Storm Rising. tinized. While the implications have not The author of that book presents numerous been ascertained, a 1969 Soviet book de- examples of military maskirovka, including scribed in detail several means of reducing the use of noise decoys by submarines, dis- radar returns. Items analyzed included persal of radio antennas and transmitters West German ceramic plates that dispersed around command posts, and stealth aircraft. radar energy, a West German three-layer ab- sorbing material, and a corrugated-surface The article then focused on the Soviet material designed in Britain that also ab- armed forces and used three simplified sorbed radar energy.19 models as a means of addressing the topic. maskirovka is a The same purpose is served by articles As indicated in the article, that cite examples of “good” or “bad” mas- complex and well-structured Russian con- cept that is also well funded and carefully kirovka from the Great Patriotic War. To a large extent, these reviews of military his- planned. tory provide insights into current views and In spite of the numerous military exam- ples included, the book Red Storm Rising ongoing debates. Soviet maskirovka has also been studied in the West to a limited uses maskirovka primarily to describe ac- extent. One problem has been that of scale. tivities in the political arena. Some of the Research and articles have included in- aspects described in the book differ from depth studies of smaller components such those employed by the military, but other as smoke screens without analyzing how factors are essentially the same. Disinfor- these mesh into the entire concept. Other mation rather than concealment may be- approaches have been to discuss several come the primary form, but the four main components without examples of im- principles still are of utmost significance. plementation. Although these have added Because of this, maskirovka must be greatly to the understanding of maskirovka, understood in its broadest context by all additional studies and analysis are needed. who deal with the USSR. □

Notes 1. Tom Clancy. Red Storm Rising (New York: G.P. Putnam's i Vooruzheniye (Technology and Armament). 1955. Sons. 1986) 11. M. Kuklin, "Camouflaging Ships," Tekhnika i Vooruzh- 2. F Myshak, "Modern Camouflage." Tekhniku-Molodeghi. eniye (Technology and Armament). May 1973, 26-34. March 1968. 1-3. 12. Dorofeyev and Shamshurov. 3. C. Smith and ). Zebrowskii. Evolution of Soviet Doctrine 13. S. I. Korulratenko and A. 1. Molodtsov, Camouflage on Maskirovka of Fixed Installations. Technical Report EL-85- Training for Troops (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1969). 8 (Vicksburg. Miss.: US Army Corps of Engineers. 1985). 14. A Palii, "Radioiokatsionnaia Maskirovka," in Sovet- 4. Yu. Dorofeyev and V. Shamshurov. Engineering Meas- sknya Voennaya Entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclope- ures Against Modem Weapons (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1974). dia/, vol. 7 (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1958), 5-6. 5. V. A. Yefinov and S. G. Chermoshentsev, "Maskirovka," 15. Yu. G. Stepanov. Prolivo-Rodiolokolion- Nuya Maski- in Sovetskaya Voennayu EntsikJopediya |Soviet Military En- rovka (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968). cyclopedia!. vol. 5 (Moscow: Voyenizdat. 1978), 175-77. 16. N. Kobrin. "Operational Deception: Examples from 6. Kh. Adam and R. Gebel', "Military Camouflage." Voyen- WWII," Soviet Military Review. April 1981. noyo Mysl’ (Military Thought/. November 1971, 79-86. 17. A. A. Beketov, A. P. Belokon', and S. G. Chermashen- 7. Yefinov and Chermoshentsev. tsev, Maskirovka Deystviy Prodrazdeleniy Sukhoputnykh 8. V. Shchedrov. "Camouflaging Troops during Regrouping Voysk (Ground Troop Concealment) I Moscow: Voyenizdat, and Maneuvers." Voyennayo Mysl' (Military Thought). June 1976). 1966, 61-69. 18. V. A. Malsulenko, Operational Field Camouflage (Mos- 9. Dorofeyev and Shamshurov. cow: Voyenizdat, 1975). 10 V. Aleshinskiv. "Protection of the Unit Rear," Tekhnika 19. Stepanov. C ol John R. B rancato, USAF DEFICIENCIES IN POW COMMAND 41

UCH IS written of late about the not been remedied to this day. It proposes need for warriors to think in derivative doctrinal solutions. terms of fighting across a spec- trum of conflict—the range of violenceM experienced and applied by a na- Background tion’s armed forces. On the one end, there is total war; on the other, low-intensity con- The need for effective command in a flict. Somewhere in between lie limited war POW environment is captured succinctly in and a variety of lesser and greater scenarios. a Department of Defense pamphlet on the Each point in the spectrum is characterized Code of Conduct: “Strong leadership [is] es- by different strategies, different doctrine, sential to discipline. Discipline is the key to different tactics, and even different weap- camp organization, resistance, and even ons. Warriors, it is said, should study the survival.”4 To achieve the goal of strong differences in order to prepare themselves leadership, Article IV of the Code of Con­ to fight any kind of conflict when the need duct provides, among other things, “If I am arises.1 senior, I will take command.” Despite all this emphasis, there is one Those eight words, although seemingly point on the conflict spectrum that has been clear and straightforward, have proven ex- largely ignored—perhaps forgotten—in the ceedingly ambiguous in war, most recently US armed forces. This is the conflict waged in the Vietnam War. The problem appears to by and against prisoners of war (POWs). be a lack of appreciation by policymakers of That the condition of being a POW is even the variety of circumstances that prisoners on the spectrum is perhaps not fully under- of war face. This, in turn, has resulted in a stood within the military establishment. lack of interpretative doctrine on the However, two short policy pronouncements subject. at the highest levels of government make it Left unanswered are a number of ques- clear that it is. The first is Article III of the tions. Is every prisoner eligible to com- Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed mand? What is the definition of senior? Forces of the United States,2 an executive What if the senior prisoner declines the order of the president that has this pertinent command? What if the senior prisoner is statement: “If I am captured, I will continue physically, mentally, or morally unfit to to resist by all means available." The second command? What is the extent of the com- is a Department of Defense directive that mand—a room, a building, the entire states: compound? There is some evidence that, in the review The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to of the Code of Conduct conducted by the continue resistance . . . by all means available Department of Defense immediately follow- is not lessened by the misfortune of capture. ing the Vietnam War, the US Army desired Contrary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to have questions such as these answered.5 enemies which U.S. forces have engaged since However, the principal concern of the other 1949 have regarded the PW compound as an services at that time was not the technical extension of the battlefield. The United States problems of POW command but the issue of PW must be prepared for this fact.3 (Emphasis added.) how much a prisoner was expected to en- dure under torture— that is, when and how This article explores some of the gaps in much information should he be permitted US doctrine on the all-important matter of to divulge to his captors without violating POW command. It identifies deficiencies— the Code of Conduct? some of which were pointed out by Ameri- That issue was resolved in a 1977 amend- can servicemen who were prisoners in the ment to the Code of Conduct, which Vietnam War—that, for some reason, have changed two words in Article V. Instead of 42 AIR POWER JOURNAL

“I am bound to give only name, rank, ser- enlisted men committed suicide. Another vice number, and date of birth,” the code went on to become a spokesman for Marxist now provides, “I am required to give name, causes.8 rank, service number, and date of birth.”6 This, and other cases like it, led to im- (Emphasis added.) Thus, there is no longer provements in 1978 in the Manual for a connotation of impropriety to giving more Courts-Martial, United States, which now than the so-called big four. states expressly what many military law- Another important concern during the yers previously believed was implied by en- postwar review was the lack of a clear state- forceable custom—that a member of the US ment in military law on whether a member armed forces can indeed be prosecuted for of one military service could be under the disobeying an order of the senior US officer command of a member of another military who takes command in a POW environ- service. Despite the nation’s long history of ment, regardless of the senior prisoner’s ser- unified fighting, there was confusion on this vice or department.9 point after Ted Guy, an Air Force colonel Having considered the larger issues of held by the Vietcong, preferred charges un- permissible disclosures and cross-service der the Uniform Code of Militacy Justice command, perhaps it is now time for the De- against three and five Army enlisted partment of Defense to resolve the technical men after they all were repatriated. Accord- problems of POW command—problems ing to evidence from a variety of sources, that touch on basic doctrine—before the the enlisted men formed what was referred to as the “Peace Committee” while in cap- tivity and at every opportunity they defied Colonel Guy, who was the senior officer and commander in their POW compound. They also collaborated with the Vietcong, to whom they voluntarily gave information that led to Colonel Guy’s brutal torture, and they freely made statements against the Vietnam War and against the United States.7 Such conduct in any previous war fought by the United States would surely have re- sulted in court-m artial and severe punishment. However, the secretaries of the Army and Navy dismissed Colonel Guy's charges, both on the technical uncertainty of whether the "Peace Committee” was under Colonel Guy’s orders in the camp and on the political grounds of putting the unpopular Vietnam War behind the country. One of the

Rules for conduct of POW camps seemed fairly straightforward for World War II POWs, even when the Geneva Convention was not strictly followed by the enemy. Since that conflict, the question has become much more complicated. Pictured here are POWs cap­ tured on Bataan shortly after their release from Bilibid Prison in February 1945. DEFICIENCIES IN POW COMMAND 43

next war. In this connection. AFM 1-1, Who Is Eligible Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States A ir Force, states that "command to Command? structures are developed . . . in peacetime to Every service except the US Marine Corps ensure smooth transition from normal con- has its own rules on eligibility to command. ditions to . . . war.”10 (Emphasis added.) In the US Air Force, for example, chaplains and enlisted members may never com- mand, and health care providers may com- mand health care activities only. Judge advocates may command but only with the Some Doctrinal Deficiencies advance approval of the judge advocate and Solutions general.11 The Army and the Navy have rules restricting still other categories of ser- Who is eligible to command? Who has vicemen from general command. In the Ma- seniority? What if the senior person is either rine Corps, everybody is eligible to reluctant or unfit to command? And how far command, but the Marine Corps has no does one’s command extend within the chaplains or physicians. POW environment? Such fundamental The Department of Defense has taken the questions point up the need for clear position that the individual eligibility rules doctrine. of the services should apply in a POW camp. However, it has explicitly recognized that an enlisted member may be the senior prisoner in a particular camp or setting and may, therefore, command under that circumstance.12 The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,13 a treaty ra- tified by the United States that ranks with acts of Congress as the "law of the land,” looms over both the service rules and the Department of Defense pronouncement. It expressly provides that, with the exception of chaplains and medical personnel, all mil- itary members are combatants. Chaplains and medical personnel are noncombatants and, accordingly, cannot be considered or treated as prisoners of war, even while they can be detained by an opposing armed force (Article 33). The real problem here, of course, is the Department of Defense requirement to fol- low individual service rules on eligibility. Even in a POW camp, it seems, individual service prerogatives are not easily subordi- nated. Colonel Guy’s predicament with the enlisted “Peace Committee” was not an iso- lated case of legal uncertainty. In the early days of the Vietnam War. there was even a question among officers as to whether POW command was unified. This, too, was 44 AIR POWER JOURNAL

doubtless the product of prevailing notions be uniform for all the services, if for no other of service independence, as this passage reason than ease of application under war- from Adm Jeremiah Denton’s book, When time conditions.15 The categorization in the Hell Was in Session, illustrates: relevant Geneva Convention seems compel- One thing Larry [Maj Larry Guarino] and I had ling. If all are combatants except chaplains to settle was the chain of command. The Code and medical personnel, then everybody ex- of Conduct demands that in a POW situation, cept chaplains and medical personnel command must be established on a rank and should be eligible to command in a POW seniority basis; that is, when officers of equal environment. rank are involved, seniority takes precedence. Also, enlisted persons might indeed be

The actions of POWs became a serious question in the Korean War and revisions were made as to expected conduct, but no overall doc- trine was ever developed. Air Force 1st Lt Floyd O'Neal is shown at left giving a confession that was forced out of him by his captors and at right after his release, at which time the confession was retracted.

Larrv thought that was fine, but since he was in called on to command if there are no officer the Air Force and I was in the Navy, what we prisoners. One vivid example involved a had was two one-man armies. Eventually, I group of exclusively enlisted prisoners in convinced him that he was wrong. The senior Vietnam, which included an American sol- ranking officer is in command over men of all dier by the name of George E. Smith. Smith services. So far as Larry and I were concerned, that was me. Larry gave in gracefully and apparently was not only opposed to the US agreed to accept my orders. Perhaps it seemed military presence in Vietnam in particular like a Mickey Mouse exercise, but the question but also to US military authority in general. of command soon became of immense Challenging the authority of the senior en- importance.'4 listed man in this group, Smith told him: If command in a POW camp is unified Go get your damned court and try me right command, then the eligibility rules should here! Otherwise, you son of a bitch, keep your DEFICIENCIES IN POW COMMAND 45

problems, however. It potentially conflicts with the applicable Geneva Convention.18 Under Article 79, the convention intro- duces the concept of "prisoner of war rep- resentative," which is roughly equivalent to the position of commander. The senior of- ficer is the prisoner of war representative in camps containing both officers and enlisted members, or officers only. However, in camps containing enlisted members only, the convention provides that the prisoner of war representative will be elected for six- month terms by secret ballot of the prison- ers. By legal interpretation, the Department of Defense has resolved this apparent con- flict between the convention and the Code of Conduct as follows:

The Geneva Conventions . . . provide addi- tional guidance to the effect that in . . . camps containing enlisted personnel only, |the] pris- oner’s representative will be elected. . . . [S|uch a representative is regarded by U.S. pol- icy as only [a] spokesman for the senior mili- tary person. The prisoner’s representative does not have command, unless the [prison- ers] ele ct . . . the senior m ilitary person. The senior military person shall assume and retain actual command, covertly if necessary.1'1

Clearly, the Department of Defense should promulgate uniform rules on com- Lt Col Ilater Brig Gen) Robinson Risner was one of the mand eligibility, at least for POW camps. senior POWs in Vietnam. His rank in the chain o f com- mand and his span of authority while a prisoner are Until this happens, out of mathematical ne- two of the doctrinal issues that are still unresolved. cessity alone, the US Air Force at least should change its regulation on command eligibility to permit enlisted command in a POW environment. There are those who would argue that US Air Force publications mouth shut. I'll punch you in the goddamned on this subject should also emphasize an in- nose.15 stitutional intent to deal with any George E. Smiths in blue uniform with the utmost Smith then did what he threatened, punching his enlisted commander in the severity.20 face. When he returned to the United States, he wrote a book in which he recounted this—a book which by its own admission is sympathetic to the Vietcong.17 Like the Who Is Senior? members of the “Peace Committee,” Smith was not court-martialed on return. This problem was summarized by Brig The concept of POW command by the Gen Robinson Risner, who was a prisoner of senior enlisted member is not without legal the North Vietnamese for seven years: 46 Ain POWER JOURNAL

Establishing who was the senior ranking offi- cer was no small task as the number of POWs What If the Senior Prisoner increased through the years. There were sev- Declines Command? eral factors which complicated this. Some of us were given promotions while we were in In his book titled In Love and War, which prison. Yet. verification of the effective date of he coauthored with his wife, Vice Adm the promotion was almost impossible. Con- James B. Stockdale tells of a time when, ceivably. we could hear about a recent pro- after being returned to the main compound motion almost at the time it occurred. But due after he was held in isolation by the North to bombing pauses or the lack of pilots being Vietnamese, he asked fellow prisoner. shot down, we might not learn of another pro- Comdr (later Rear Adm) Jeremiah A. Den- motion until months or years after it was ef- ton, Jr., to remain in command even though fected. To solve that, we went by the rank at the time of shoot-down. Mine was lieutenant Stockdale, then also a commander, was sen- colonel. Although 1 became full colonel in less ior. Stockdale felt he could not take com- than three months after shoot-down [in 1965], mand because he was emotionally “out of in the POW chain of command I remained a gas.”2' In a 1974 speech, the senior Ameri- lieutenant colonel until 1971, when an excep- can prisoner. Brig Gen John P. Flynn (a colo- tion was made by [the senior ranking prisoner nel in Vietnam, later a lieutenant general) in Vietnam| Colonel John Flynn.21 said he approved of this practice.24 Other prisoners described cases of senior officers There is no guidance in the Code of Con­ in their camps who declined command be- duct, Department of Defense publications, cause they did not wish the exposure to or service regulations on how to deal with their captors that command brought them.25 the problem of defining the senior prisoner. It seems reasonable to permit the senior Yet there ought to be because this has prisoner to decline command if he is phys- proved to be a matter of grave concern ically incapacitated, and perhaps even if, in among real prisoners.22 his own mind, he is not mentally able to One solution is the one actually used in command. Yet, there is no central guidance Vietnam, as explained by General Risner. on these points, and the Department of De- Another, and perhaps better, solution is to fense has taken the position that command honor reports of promotions and promotion “may not be evaded.”26 effective dates brought in by new prisoners, Certainly, the Department of Defense po- but only when the newcomer can state that sition is a rule of accountability applying to he has either seen the written promotion or- the senior prisoner, not a rule appointing der or has been officially instructed to make the senior prisoner to command. It is well such a report if he himself should ever be- settled in military law that, while the duty come a prisoner. of taking command may devolve on the sen- Anything short of representations such as ior, command itself does not automatically these would seem to be too unreliable for devolve. Command must be affirmatively the other prisoners to honor. For example, taken, either by assuming it or by being for- rumors may not be true; announcements of mally appointed to it.27 Therefore, if the sen- promotion selection may be confused with ior prisoner declines command, he may actual promotion, which usually follows at have violated the Code of Conduct or an- a later date; and action may be taken to de- other applicable directive, but command it- lay a promotion or rescind a promotion se- self is left open for the next senior prisoner lection without public awareness. to take. In any case, there is a need for a rule here, What is needed here is a policy pro- and for everyone to know what the rule is. nouncement to the effect that there are ac- Otherwise, the command situation in a ceptable and unacceptable reasons for POW camp can be confusing and ripe for declining command in a POW camp. In disagreement and dissension. either case, however, the next senior pris- DEFICIENCIES IN POW COMMAND 47

oner has the duty of taking command. The officers under the Uniform Code of Military Department of Defense has already placed Justice. However, the charges were dis- such a duty on the next senior prisoner,28 missed by the secretary of the Navy.29 but it has not recognized a distinction be- If the Department of Defense agrees that tween acceptable and unacceptable necessity allows—perhaps even demands— reasons. that a junior relieve a senior who, for ex- ample, is collaborating with the enemy, then should not the department be willing What If the Senior Prisoner to authorize this in a written rule where spe- Is Unfit to Command? cific procedures and safeguards can be pre- scribed? If the people of the United States This is closely related to the previous have expressly authorized the vice presi- question. Just as there are acceptable and dent to relieve a reluctant president—and unacceptable reasons for declining com- have prescribed a detailed procedure for mand, there are different kinds of unfitness. doing so in the next to the last amendment Some prisoners may be physically or men- to the United States Constitution,311 then tally unfit, others morally unfit. In either there should be sufficient precedent to au- case, what is contemplated here is a proce- thorize a similar procedure in POW camps. dure for relieving a senior of command when he will not give it up himself—that is, What Is the Extent when he will not decline to take it or con- tinue it. of POW Command? Obviously, this presupposes that a junior This question evolves from a concern prisoner will be willing to unilaterally re- with reliable communications. If the senior lieve a senior prisoner who does not wish to prisoner in a compound has communica- be relieved. In a non-POW context, there are tions with all of the prisoners in the com- no rules prescribing such a procedure in pound, is it necessary to have a commander any of the services, even though the fic- in each of the buildings? If lack of a means tional mutineers in Herman Wouk’s famous of communicating with each other pre- book. The Caine Mutiny, thought the US cludes having a camp commander, is it nec- Navy had such a set of rules. The unwritten essary to have a commander in each room if rule of military law is simply one of pro- the senior prisoner in the building can com- ceeding at your own risk, based on reason- municate with everyone in the building? ableness and necessity under the Issues such as these introduce the prin- circumstances. Nothing was ever written ciple that command should extend as far as out of fear that a written procedure might communications extend. In other words, a encourage its own use. prisoner in solitary confinement—truly iso- Yet, a POW environment is surely differ- lated from the rest of the prisoners—cannot ent. Captivity means long periods without effectively command the rest. On the other communication with superior authorities. hand, a prisoner in one building can indeed In Vietnam, there were at least two reported command prisoners in another if he can di- cases in which superior officers, who were rectly or indirectly communicate with prisoners themselves, attempted to relieve them, and they with him. lesser commanders for cause. One involved General Risner described the situation in a Navy captain and the other a Marine lieu- Vietnam: tenant colonel. Each disobeyed orders not to meet with visiting “peace” delegations |Another] obstacle was the geographical loca- led by Jane Fonda and Ramsey Clark. Each tion of the various cellblocks within a given prison, as well as the number of different pris- attempt at removal was ultimately success- ons. Many men were constantly being shuffled ful but troubled. After repatriation, Admiral from one cell to another. Finally, the most dif- Stockdale preferred charges against the two ficult obstacle was simply the process of com- 48 AIR POWER JOURNAL

munications itself. For instance, when I just An old and recurring theme in Russian went to the Zoo in 1965, I was able to contact poetry says that when one discovers he has all of the people in all of the buildings. 1 could get a message to them and an answer in a max- traveled far on the wrong road, he should imum of two days. The Vietnamese started still turn around and go back. In the Amer- cracking down on this and made it more diffi- ican version, it is said that it is never too late cult. When I was moved into isolation, I had to fix something that is broken if you have only intermittent contact for the next few not used it. Such is the case for doctrine on years.31 POW command. Admiral Denton emphasized the impor- The suggested solutions to the problems tance of communications: presented in this article are founded on the principles of simplicity and effect.36 That is, There was one advantage in the new location. they will be relatively easy to teach and rel- Colonel Flynn, who had been isolated, was in Building Zero. With so many of us now in the atively easy to learn once they are adopted same building, he could be in touch with the and written. Also, they will work. Most im- rest of the camp, which enabled him to exer- portant, they will help ensure that future cise command.32 (Emphasis added.) battles, waged by future prisoners of war, This principle of span of communica- will not be soon forgotten on the spectrum tions is founded on logic and reason. Had it of conflict. □ been expressed formally— perhaps in a well-taught Department of Defense direc- Notes tive—at the time of the Vietnam War (it still 1. See. for example. Thomas A. Fabyanic. "War. Doctrine, has not been), US prisoners would have and the Air War College," Air University Review. January-Feb- been more sure of themselves in taking com- ruary 1986, 9. 2. Executive Order (EO) 10631, CFR (Code of Federal Regu- mand at the appropriate time. lations). title 3.1954-1958 comp., page 266; as amended by EO 12017. Federal Register42. no. 214. 3 November 1977, CFR. ti- tle 3, pt. 152 (1978). Hereafter cited as the Code of Conduct. Conclusion 3. DOD Directive 1300.7, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct. 19 December 1984, Military doctrine is simply what is offi- end. 2, para. B3(a). This directive is attached to AFR 50-3. cially understood to be the best way to do Code of Conduct Training, 25 April 1986. 4. AFP 34-10 (DOD Gen.-llA), Code of the US Fighting military things.31 To be effective, it must be Force. 1979. 10; DOD Directive 1300.7. end. 2, para. B4(a)(2). widely taught and widely believed.34 How- 5. Department of Defense, Report of Defense Review Com- ever, it cannot be either if it is neither for- mittee for the Code of Conduct. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense (Manpower. Reserve Affairs, and Logis- mulated nor articulated. tics), 1976. vol. 2, IV—29. Why is there a doctrinal void here? It ap- 6. In its entirety. Article V states: pears that no one can say with certainty. When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war. I am required to give name. rank, sendee number and date of Perhaps the repatriation of the US prisoners birth. I will evade answering further questions to the ut- from Vietnam has made the problem less ur- most of my ability. 1 will make no oral or written state- ments disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to gent, even though no one had a good per- their cause. ception of the problem until the 7. Zalin Grant. Survivors (New York: W. W. Norton. 1975). repatriation. Perhaps the lack of hostilities 8. For another example of misconduct by US sendeemen in the years following the Vietnam War has who were prisoners of war in Y'ietnam, see James N. Rowe. Five Years to Freedom (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1971), given the matter a low priority. Perhaps 196. Major Rowe reported that one US soldier complained to people still believe that the eight words, “If him. "Who elected you |commander|?" 9. Manual for Courts-Martial. United States. 1984. pt. IV, I am senior, I will take command,” are all paras. 13c(l), 14c(l)(a)(i). and 16c(2)(c)(i). Hereafter cited as that is necessary for thinking warriors. MCM. One thing is certain. In time of actual war, 10. AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United Stales Air Force, 16 March 1984. 4—3. when there were prisoners of war, these 11. AFR 35-54. Rank. Precedence, and Command, 15 Sep- eight words were not enough. They bred tember 1984. paras. 9. I la. 1 lb. and 1 lc; AFR 110-1, The fudge Advocate General's Department, 7 August 1986, para. 6: US confusion at least in four of the five areas Code, title 10. sec. 8581 (1982). presented in this article.35 12. DOD Directive 1300.7, paras. B4(a)(4) and C4. DEFICIENCIES IN POW COMMAND 49

13. Adopted by the United States on 2 February 1956. See 22. John A. Dramesi, inCode of Honor (New York: W.W. Nor- Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) 3364, ton, 1975), makes the following statement: United States Treaties and Other International Agreements |T|here were disagreements. Paul Brudino said we should (UST). vol. 6. 3316; United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS). vol. change the rules for determining who was senior because 75, 135. This is one of four conventions of 1949. Each is a sep- Risner was not the senior ranking officer and he felt Ligon arate treaty to which the United States is a party. did not deserve to be leading us because of his long un- 14. Jeremiah A. Denton. Jr., When Hell Was in Session (Mo- willingness to take command while we were in Little Ve- bile. Ala.; Traditional Press, 1982), 28. gas. I said to Paul, "Well, it depends on what rules have 15. ft is unified. See DOD Directive 1300.7, end. 2, para. been established. As far as 1 know, at the Zoo, it was your B4(aj(4). See also the improvements to the Manual for Courts- rule to determine seniority according to your rank at the Martial. United States in the sections listed in note 9 above, time you were shot down." He denied giving that order which aid unified command. Another associated issue that and insisted that Risner should be the ranking officer. never came up in the Vietnam War was whether the command "W ell, that's the way it is now." I said, "unless, of course, can be combined. There is no guidance in any US directive, the criteria for determining rank or seniority are revised." regulation, or doctrinal pronouncement on this. However, just (pp. 192-93) as the American colonel did in the movie Von Ryan's Express, the senior American officer prisoner in Vietnam did impose his 23. Jim and Sybil Stockdale, In Love and War: The Story of a will on allied prisoners. He recounted that “we called our- Family’s Ordeal and Sacrifice During the Vietnam Years (New selves the 4th Allied POW Wing because this was the fourth York: Harper and Row. 1984). 400. war in which we have had allied prisoners and, of course, the 24. Flynn. 14. allies being the three Thais and one South Vietnamese." Ad- 25. Dramesi. 20. dress by Brig Gen John P. Flynn, to the Air Command and Staff 26. DOD Directive 1300.7. end. 2, para. B4(a)(4). College. 24 June 1974 (Unpublished text available in the USAF 27. AFR 35-54, para. 10. Historical Research Center. Maxwell AFB, Alabama). One 28. DOD Directive 1300.7, end. 2. para. B4(a|(4): "If the sen- commentator has suggested that the question of whether Amer- ior person is incapacitated or otherwise unable to act for any ican soldiers will submit themselves to the command of a sen- reason, command will be assumed by the next senior person. ior prisoner who Is from an allied nation is a decision for the 29. Holman J. Barnes. It., "A New Look at the Code of Con- senior ranking American prisoner. See Donald L. Manes. Jr.. duct" (Unpublished thesis presented to The Judge Advocate Barbed Wire Command: The Legal Nature of the Command General’s School. , 1974, 52-53, available Responsibilities of the Senior Prisoner in a Prisoner of War in Air University Library, Maxwell AFB. Alabama). Jane Fonda Camp." Military Law Review, October 1960. 17. Perhaps the was thought by many former Vietnam POWs. several judge ad- nineteenth-century observation of Gen Sir Edward Hamley ap- vocates. and some others to be an actual traitor for her actions plies here: "(T actics is] the opinion of the senior officer pres- during the war. These included her activities in Hanoi (such as en t." Q uoted in Jay Luvaas. T he E d ucation of an Arm y: British posing on an antiaircraft gun and making pro-North Vietnam- Military Thought. 1815—1940 (Chicago: U niversity of Chicago ese speeches to American POWs). and her activities in the Press. 1964). 153. United States (such as calling American POWs "liars" when 16. George E. Smith. P.O.W.: Two Years with the Vietcong they said they were tortured by the North Vietnamese). She has (Berkeley. C alif.: Ram parts Press. 1971). 116-17. recently said through her publicist that she "very much regrets 17.Ibid. all the pain and hurt that |she) caused.” See "Fond of Fonda?” 18. See note 13. Air Force Times, 17 August 1987, 68. 19. DOD Directive 1300.7. end. 2, para. B4(a)(6). See also 30. Amendment 25 to the US Constitution is unartfully writ- AFP 34-10. 10; and AFP 35-19. Prisoner of War. Rights and ten and fraught with procedural ambiguities. The procedure Obligations under the Geneva Convention. 1 March 1980, 7. can be written more simply for prisoners of war. Note that there is no express recognition in the Manual for 31. Risner. 203—4. Courts-Martial, United States of the proposition that an en- 32. Denton, 168. Denton, Risner. and Dramesi all reported listed member of one military service can be prosecuted for that, on occasion, several prisoners assumed command of dif- disobeying an order of the senior prisoner in command who is ferent but overlapping locations, or the same location in quick an enlisted member of another military service. In the opinion succession. See. for example, Risner. 206: "(T|here were four of many military lawyers, however, an enlisted commander in (commanders] in a matter of a few days. Needless to say, there a POW camp has the same authority (to issue orders that must were a lot of code names going around and quite a bit of con- be obeyed but not to impose nonjudicial punishment under the fusion." Lower ranking prisoners were mainly concerned with Uniform Code of Military Justice) as a commander who is a the leader of their own building. See Jay Jensen. Six Years in commissioned officer, regardless of service, under the enforce- Hell (Bountiful, Utah: Horizon Publishers. 1974). 149. able customs of the armed forces. See the pertinent sections of 33. This popular view of doctrine has been attributed to Maj the MCM cited in note 9 for the situation on senior prisoners Gen LB. Holley. Jr.. USAFR, Retired, arguably the academician who are commissioned officers. who has had the greatest influence on the development of aero- 20. The Smith case illustrates why it is important for com- space doctrine since World War II. See Dennis M. Drew. “Of manders and judge advocates, if they desire to attain a higher Trees and Leaves: A New View of Doctrine." Air University Re- plane of effectiveness, to be students of military history. Com- view. January-February 1982. 41. manders should consider Clark Becker's "scientific" observa- 34. Robert C. Ehrhart. "Some Thoughts on Air Force Doc- tion: The history that lies inert in unread books does no work trine." Air University Review, March-April 1980, 35, quoting in the world." Jay Luvaas. "Military History: Is It Still Practic- Maj Gen Dale O. Smith: "The best doctrine is worthless if it is able?”. Parameters. March 1982. 13. Lawyers should remem- not well known and believed." ber Sir Walter Scott's observation in Guy Mannering that a 35. For two other areas of potential trouble, see note 15 (com- lawyer who knows only the law is a mere mechanic, but a law- mand of or by allies), and note 19and accompanying text (com- yer who also is a student of history can presume to call himself mand in camps with no officers). an architect. 36. AFM 1-1 (p. 2-9) states. "Command structures . .. and 21. Robinson Risner. The Passing of the Night (New York: procedures must all be clear, simple, and unencumbered to Random House. 1973), 203. permit ease of execution."

SUPERMANEUVERAB1L1TY 51

Editor’s Note: Colonel Siuru’s survey of possible technological innovations and po­ tential capabilities may seem a bit outside the Airpower Journal’s usual focus on the broader issues of using one’s fighting forces lighter Technology to best effect. It may also appear somewhat technically oriented to our readers who are of the Future not in the pilot or engineer specialties. Both of these observations may be true. However, as has often been submitted in this journal, there is a relationship between doctrine and technology which if not care­ fully assessed and redefined periodically can lead a military force astray. This may be due to a doctrine outstripped by new technological capabilities or by overly C ol W il l ia m D. S iu r u , Jr ., an ambitious doctrine not in consonance with USAF, Retired technical realities. In this instance, one wonders what changes to tactical and especially opera­ tional doctrine we should be contemplating when and if supermaneuverability comes to fruition in operational forces. The advent of radar was initially seen as sim ply better “eyes” for extending a search area, but quickly made its impact felt in the entire realm of tactical and operational air doc- trine. Some forces were quick to use the ca­ pability to advantage (m odified their doctrine) while others were not. Now may be the time to consider the integration of su­ permaneuverability into our doctrine. Your ideas are welcome.

HE MANNED fighter quite likely will be around well into the twenty-first century both in an air-to-air and air- to-ground role. To date, no un- Tmanned, remotely piloted vehicle has shown the potential of attaining the potency of the marriage between a skilled pilot and a well-designed fighter, and this is not ex- pected to change in the near future. Thus, the emphasis today is on technology that will allow fighters to survive and win in combat. There is great interest today in an area of technology that goes under the ge- neric title of “supermaneuverability.” Here are three examples of aircraft whose success in comb at was due to their agil­ ity: the Sopwilh Camel (above) of , the P-51 Mus(ang (right) of World War II. and the F-86 Sabre (below ) of the Korean War. Our next generation of /ighters w ill need to main- tain this agility advantage through the use of superma­ neuverability if they are to follow in the successful path of their predecessors.

52 SUPERMANEUVERABILITY 53

What Is favor of greater speeds and more sophisti- cated electronics and weapons, which leads Supermaneuverability? to heavier and more cumbersome fighters. Fortunately, the current high interest in su- Credit for coining the word supermaneu- permaneuverability indicates this experi- verability goes to Dr W. B. Herbst, who in- ence may not be repeated. troduced the idea in 1980. Doctor Herbst, of The best way to ensure combat surviva- West Germany’s Messerschmitt-Bolkow- bility is to have both the best aircraft and the Blohm, defined supermaneuverability as the best pilot to fly it. In the past, the United capability to execute maneuvers with con- States has leaned on the assumption that trolled sideslip at angles of attack well be- even though the Soviet and American yond those for maximum lift. Today Doctor fighter pilots are probably equal in ability, Herbst’s definition is termed poststall ma- our fighters were more capable because we neuvering and is one of many important had a technology advantage. This is defi- ideas included in the category of nitely changing. The experts believe that supermaneuverability. new Soviet fighters like the Su-27 Flanker, The term supermaneuverability has been MiG-29 Fulcrum, and MiG-31 Foxhound expanded to other concepts that can dra- are approaching the capabilities of our matically enlarge the flight envelope of an F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s. To give our aircraft in terms of airspeed, turn rate, climb pilots the edge, new designs incorporating rate, acceleration, and so forth. Superma- advanced technologies are needed as well neuverability implies capabilities and tech- as revised tactics to get the most out of the nology demands beyond those achievable improvements. Enhanced maneuvering is through more efficient wings, better per- high on the list of these technologies. forming engines, or more sophisticated One of the things that has changed the flight control systems. Capabilities such as tactics of air-to-air combat in recent years is increased usable lift, dynamic lift over- the all-aspect missile. With the normal in- shoot, , and unsteady aero- frared (IR) heat-seeking missile, a pilot had dynamic effects used in synergetic fashion to maneuver so that he was behind the en- are all means of obtaining greatly enhanced emy to make a kill since IR missiles had to maneuverability. home in on the hot engine exhaust. Today radar-guided missiles and missiles with much more sensitive IR sensors can home in Why Supermaneuverability? on other parts of an aircraft. These all-aspect missiles can be fired from any direction, and Ever since the first fighter appeared in fighters so equipped need only to get their World War I, agility has been the key as to noses pointed in the general direction of the who survives in an aerial duel. Interest- enemy. The who can get his ingly, the emphasis on agility has been nose pointed within the required field of rather cyclic since the fighters of World War view first is the one most likely to survive. I. Agility seems to receive the greatest em- While increased turn rate might seem to phasis during and right after a war when ac- be the obvious answer, it is not always the tual combat experience demonstrates its best solution. For one thing, high turn rates importance. Examples of very agile fighters mean high G-loads, and today’s fighters are include the Sopwith Camel of World War I, pushing the acceleration tolerance of even the P-51 Mustang of World War II, the F-86 the most physically fit pilots. Also, high Sabrejet used in the Korean conflict, and the turn rates result in high drag, which can F-15 and F-16 that were designed around quickly decelerate an aircraft to the point experience gained in Vietnam. There seems where the aircraft has lost the maneuvera- to be a tendency to forget experiences dur- bility advantage that comes with high ing times of peace and to sacrifice agility in speed. As any fighter pilot knows, the name 54 AIR POWER jOURNAL of the game is to be able to fire the first shot to 70 to 90 degrees for short periods of time. while still retaining enough speed to fly Poststall maneuvering will allow fighters to away to make another kill or to avoid being make drastic changes in direction within killed. extremely short distances and times. As an Supermaneuverability can also be impor- example of poststall maneuvering, let us tant in allowing an aircraft to avoid an en- look at an engagement between two fighters, emy missile. With very high agility, the one with poststall maneuvering capability fighter would be able to outfly the missile and one without it (fig. 1). The supermaneu- and break lock with the missile’s guidance verable fighter could turn much faster than system. Aircraft with greatly enhanced ma- a conventional aircraft and dissipate much neuverability could perform some very er- less energy in the process. Quite conceiva- ratic evasive maneuvers. bly, it would have the adversary in its Incidentally, supermaneuverability is not weapon system field of view several critical limited to manned fighters. Most of the su- seconds before the other aircraft has com- permaneuverability concepts could also be pleted its turn and is in firing position. used on unmanned craft such as air-to-air Normally, even the best designed wings missiles. Thus, we could have supermaneu- will at angles of attack above 20 de- verable missiles trying to destroy superma- grees. Stalls usually result in “departure” neuverable aircraft and supermaneuverable normally leading to loss of control. To make aircraft evading supermaneuverable poststall maneuvering work, the aircraft missiles. will have to be controllable at very high an- gles of attack. Lack of controllability at high angles of attack occurs because normal con- trol surfaces lose their effectiveness. Air- Poststall Maneuvering speed is often quite low when there is a high angle of attack, and the violent vortices in The enhanced maneuvering concept re- the wake of a stalled wing have a drastic ef- ceiving the greatest interest today is the idea fect on the vertical and tail surfaces. This of “poststall maneuvering,” that is, flying at means that conventional aerodynamic con- very high angles of attack, perhaps even up trol surfaces such as and elevators SUPERMANEUVERABILITY 55

will have to be helped by other techniques Here the idea is to increase the angle of at- such as vectored engine thrust to maintain tack so rapidly that the airflow remains at- control. tached to the wing well beyond the angle it would normally separate, thus providing a momentary increase in lift that could be Other Ways to Achieve used for enhanced maneuvering. One method to achieve dynamic lift over- Supermaneuverability shoot is to use a rapidly rotating airfoil, that One method to enhance maneuvering ca- is, one that oscillates or pitches and plunges pability is to simply use all lift inherent in a at high frequencies. Although this concept particular design, although the word simply is still in a very exploratory stage, wind-tun- might be an oversimplification. For exam- nel tests, computer simulations, and expe- ple, many fighters could fly at higher angles rience with blades have of attack without stalling and thus generate demonstrated the potential of this idea. more lift, but they are limited by such det- rimental aerodynamic phenomena as buf- feting, wing rock, nose slice, and poor directional stability. Some of the phenom- Other Unique Ways to Fly ena can be corrected by subtle changes in aircraft design that result from wind-tunnel While perhaps not strictly fitting the def- testing and computer simulations. inition of supermaneuverability, there are A measure of supermaneuverability can other ideas that could give future fighters be obtained through dynamic lift overshoot. the capability needed to survive in combat. One way of obtaining unconventional maneuvering is by using thrust vectoring, that is, changing the direction of the thrust The maneuverability of the F-16 (left) and F-15 (below) produced by an aircraft’s engine. Inciden- were developed from lessons learned in Vietnam . Test aircraft such as the Agile Falcon indicate we may not tally, thrust vectoring is one improved agil- have forgotten those lessons as has often been the case ity technique that is already in use on an in peacetime aircraft development. operational military fighter, the AV-8 Har- 56 AIR POWER JOURNAL

rier, a vertical and/or short takeoff and land- ing (VSTOL) aircraft used by the US Marine Corps as well as the and Navy. While the Harrier was aimed at VSTOL capability, pilots soon found that by swiveling the Pegasus engine’s four nozzles in flight, some unique and useful maneu- vers are possible. Thus “vectoring in for- ward flight” (VIFF) was born. For instance, by using VIFF the Harrier can decelerate more rapidly than other aircraft and can do it without reducing engine rpms that will be needed for subsequent acceleration or with- out extending telltale speed brakes. Two-dimensional, rectangular nozzles with horizontal doors for thrust deflection are an alternative to swiveling nozzles. Be- sides deflecting thrust, the nozzles can re- verse the thrust to reduce landing distances Poststall maneuvering (P ST) capabilities w ill allow aircraft to fly at angles of attack well beyond the point or to increase in-flight maneuverability. o f stall, in this case by pointing the nose up. rolling 180 While rectangular nozzles cannot deflect degrees, and dropping back to a more normal angle of the exhaust to the degree found in the Har- attack for the kill. The non-PST aircraft w ould still be rier, the thrust-vectoring capability is still completing its turn. substantial. The thrust vectoring available from the two-dimensional nozzle is espe- cially valuable for maneuvering at high an- gles of attack and low speeds where ordinary aerodynamic control surfaces lose their effectiveness. For this reason, some form of thrust vectoring will undoubtedly be an integral part of any supermaneuvering technique. Getting the maximum usable lift is highly dependent on the aircraft's design, with different techniques Thrust vectoring brings with it another working for each aircraft. The end objective is to pre­ important capability—a short takeoff and vent departure at high angles of attack. landing (STOL) ability. This feature is needed in future fighters as well as in other military aircraft because in any future major war, aircraft will probably have to work out of severely bomb-cratered airfields. Other ways to use unconventional aero- dynamics to achieve enhanced maneuvera- bility were investigated in the control configuration vehicle (CCV) and the ad- vanced fighter technology integration (AFTI) programs (fig. 3). In these programs, modified F-16s demonstrated some very new ways to fly. Normally an aircraft flies in “coupled modes" so that when it turns it also rolls and when it climbs the angle of at- Figure 2. SUPERMANEUVERABILITY 57

tack increases. In the CCV and AFTI F-16s, fer aircraft with decreased drag, this con- the maneuvers were decoupled. When de- cept makes some interesting flight motions coupled, the aircraft can rise vertically possible. To move sideways without roll- without raising its nose, raise or lower its ing, the control surfaces on the front and nose without climbing, make a wings-level rear wings could be deflected in unison to turn, or fly straight ahead while pointing its provide equal but canceling rolling move- nose off centerline, and perform several ments. To make rapid pitch-up maneuvers, other interesting maneuvers. The decou- the front and rear surfaces could be de- pled maneuvers demonstrated by the mod- flected in opposing directions. Moving all ified F-16s would be especially attractive surfaces downward results in lift augmen- for fast and precise pointing before firing tation that allows the aircraft to rise essen- weapons in air-to-air combat. The extra few tially vertically. seconds and increased accuracy could give Some degree of enhanced agility can be the pilot the necessary edge to survive. achieved by using high technology to im- The joined wing is another concept that prove already proven aircraft designs. Take, could provide enhanced maneuverability for example, the mission adaptive wing (fig. 4). A joined-wing aircraft has its tail (MAW). With flexible composite materials wing swept forward to be joined with the and actuators buried inside the wing, the rearward swept main wing so that the wings wing’s surface contour can be changed form a diamond when viewed from the top without using conventional flow-disrupting or head-on. Besides providing a lighter, stif- empennages such as flaps, spoilers, and ail-

The AV-8 V STO L aircraft, with its maneuverable thrusi nozzles, showed in the Falklands conflict the advantages of aircraft capable of vectoring in forward flight (VIFFJ over conventional aircraft in air-to-air combat. 58 AIR POWER JOURNAL

formal definition of agility being the sum of the two factors. A highly maneuverable fighter that is difficult to control will not be successful, and the opposite is also true. The F-86 and MiG-15 are examples of the need for agility. The MiG-15 could easily outmaneuver the F-86, but it was harder to control. Therefore, F-86 pilots were able to achieve impressive kill ratios over the MiG- 15 by controlling the F-86’s flight path bet- ter to get into position to make a kill. An integral part of enhanced maneuvera- bility is relaxed static stability. Most aircraft are designed to be inherently stable so that they automatically return to straight and level flight, for example, after a wind gust or a pilot command. While good static stability means a forgiving airplane, it is incompati- ble with the superior maneuverability de- sired in a fighter. Today’s newer fighters are normally designed with relaxed static sta- bility, that is, with little, zero, or even neg- ative static stability. Without the sophisticated stability augmentation sys- tems used in modern fighters, pilots could not maintain control of their aircraft. Future aircraft with superior agility will Figure 3 , integrate many technologies such as pro- pulsion, aerodynamics, and controllability Shown above are some of the unique maneuvers that are possible when an aircraft's maneuvering modes are uncoupled. These maneuvers have been dem on­ strated in m odified F-16sas part of the Control/ed Con­ figuration Vehicle and Advanced Fighter Technology The joined wing creates a com bined effect with a for­ Integration programs. ward-swept tail and rearward-swept main wing. The control surfaces can then be used to effect lift and pitch w ithout rolling the aircraft. erons. This means that the wing is less prone to stall-at high angles of attack during high G turns and that high lift-to-drag ratios needed for enhanced agility are possible.

The Importance of Controllability The above discussion of concepts has fre- quently mentioned the importance of being able to effectively control an aircraft during unconventional maneuvers. Controllability and maneuverability go hand in hand, the SUPERMANEUVER ABILITY 59 obtained through advanced digital fly-by- chanics cannot maintain sufficient blood wire and later, fly-by-light control systems. pressure in the brain. G-LOC occurs sud- The latter uses fiber optics in lieu of wires. denly, with the pilot being unconscious for approximately one-half minute, enough to spell disaster in a high-performance air- craft. Even when the pilot recovers, he could still be disoriented for quite awhile Could the Pilot and be unable to handle the high stress of Be the Weakest Link? close air combat and perhaps not even to fly safely. While technology can be used to produce There must be solutions to the physiolog- supermaneuverable fighters, it might be the ical problems associated with supermaneu- physiological capabilities of the human verability. G-suits will have to be more pilot that could put the upper limit on ma- responsive. Because G-LOC depends on neuverability. For example, the pilot can how high the head is elevated above the become disoriented when his aircraft heart, the pilot’s seat could be reclined. In- moves against intuition and experience. It clinations of about 65 degrees are needed, may take extensive training to get used to so the seat would have to be articulated so flying sideways, flying at attitudes well into the pilot can sit more erect for normal flight the stall regime, or being able to point the and then recline for combat maneuvering. nose up or down without climbing or div- Other solutions could include special ing. Control systems may have to be de- drugs. For instance, carbon dioxide injected signed so that the pilot only provides the into the oxygen seems to help, and even the initial command while the computer per- use of “smelling salts" may speed up the re- forms the rest of the maneuver sequence. covery of consciousness. Then there is the problem of gravity-in- Techniques are needed to detect when duced loss of consciousness (G-LOC). This the pilot becomes unconscious and auto- occurs when there is a rapid or sustained in- matic flight controls must take over. Be- crease in Gs and the body’s defensive me- cause things happen so rapidly in high-

The X-31A aircraft has been designed to “break the stall barrier." Under joint US and West German devel­ opment, the X-31A will incorporate several new tech- nologies to expand the flight envelope. 60 AIR POWER JOURNAL performance aircraft, detection must be changed on the simulator usually by rewrit- done instantaneously and preferably before ing software rather than designing and complete pilot blackout. Techniques must building new expensive hardware. Thus, have low false alarm rates so that override new ideas can be tested fairly inexpensively does not occur while the pilot is conscious and without endangering an aircraft or its and still in control, especially during pilot. combat. One safe and relatively cheap way to Some of the methods currently being re- flight-test new ideas is to use a remotely searched include detecting the drooping or piloted research vehicle (RPRV). These sub- lolling of the pilot’s head that is associated scale, unmanned aircraft, which are re- with loss of consciousness. There is also the motely controlled by a “pilot” on the monitoring of the pilot’s grip on the con- ground, are built at reduced scale and need trols. A more sophisticated measurement not be man-rated. One successful RPRV was involves sensing the loss of blood pressure Rockwell International’s Highly Maneuver- pulse in an artery near the brain with a spe- able Aircraft Technology (HiMAT) RPRV cial sensor mounted in the pilot’s helmet. built a few years ago, which produced much Another technique involves monitoring the important design data for future fighters. pilot's eye-blink rate. It is well known that No matter how much computer simula- just before a person blacks out, the eyes stop tion is done or how many RPRVs are flown, blinking automatically and there is a fixed the best concepts will still have to be flight- stare. tested with a live pilot behind the stick. For Several detection devices would be used example, the CCV and AFTI F-16s men- in “jury” fashion to reduce false alarms. tioned previously tested some unique ma- Furthermore, this could be augmented by neuvering techniques, and the mission monitoring the G history of the flight and adaptive wing has been grafted to a F - lll determining when the aircraft is in a high G for flight-testing. Now the Grumman-built environment and when override might be X-29 is flight-testing some other ideas. needed because of the possibility of Another “X” airplane that will be used in blackout. supermaneuverability developments is the X-31 Enhanced Fighter Maneuverability (EFM) program. The primary emphasis of this joint US-West German program will be on poststall maneuvering at very high an- Developing gles of attack. Rockwell International and Supermaneuverable Fighters Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm plan to have the X-31 flying by 1989. The development of any new aircraft can Enhanced maneuverability, ranging from be extremely expensive. Some of the un- minor changes in current aircraft to revolu- proven techniques for achieving enhanced tionary new aircraft, will be needed if our agility could be dangerous if tested in fighters are to survive and win in future aer- manned experimental aircraft. Therefore, ial conflicts. While the technology commu- much of the initial development will be nity is developing a plethora of potentially done with simulators that provide realism valuable supermaneuverability concepts, approaching that experienced in a real an equally important part of the equation is fighter cockpit. To see how various super- the development of tactics and doctrine that maneuverable concepts might fare in actual can make the best use of the technology. combat, two or more simulators can be tied Thus, experienced air tacticians and fighter together so that the simulated aircraft pilots must have an important role in the “flown" by experienced pilots can interact. development of effective and usable Different maneuvering concepts can be supermaneuverability. □ SUPERMANEUVERABILITY 61

References Callaway. Capt Charles R.. and Russell F. Osborn. "Aerody- e.V., Munchen 17. bis 19. Oktober 1983. namics Perspective of Supennaneuverabiiity." Paper pre- Lang, Col James D.. and Maj Michael S. Francis. "Unsteady sented at the Third Applied Aerodynamics Conference of Aerodynamics and Dynamic Aircraft Maneuverability." Pa- the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics per presented at the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research (A1AA). Colorado Springs. Colo.. 14-16 October 1985. and Development (AGARD) Symposium on "Unsteady Dy- Herbst. W. B. “Future Fighter Technologies.” Journal of Air­ namics: Fundamentals and Applications to Aircraft Dynam- craft. August 1980, 561-66. ics." 6-9 May 1985. Gottingen. West Germany. ______“Supermaneuverability.” Jahrestagung Wolkovitch, Julian. "The Joined Wing: An Overview." Journal 1983 de Deutschen Cesellschaft fur Luft- und Raum/ahrt of Aircraft. March 1986, 561-66.

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THE HUMAN ELEMENT AND AIR COMBAT

Some Napoleonic Comparisons

M ai M ar k K. W el l s, USAF

For the military professional, there is no simple ESPITE THE renewed popularity formula to learn warfighting. Gaining that of military history, Air Force knowledge is a continuous process that is the product of institutionalized education and members have different opinions training, experience, and personal effort. about the value of the discipline. DWhile no one denies its importance in gen- AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine eral terms, debates about the proper way to of the United States Air Force study and use it continue, especially in Air

63 Force institutions like the US Air Force Academy and the Air University.1 By its na- ture, history is a highly subjective disci- pline. A “high-tech” service like the Air Force sometimes struggles with subjects not easily quantified or defined by workable equations. Additionally, many Air Force of- ficers, particularly aviators, have a difficult THE HUMAN ELEMENT AND AIR COMBAT 65 time relating much of the military history they read to what they expect to do in com- bat. Aviators who are used to dealing with state-of-the-art technology and high-speed aircraft are often reluctant to see any con- nection between what they are training to do and what was done on any battlefield even 10 years earlier. Several recent books can help potential combat aviators overcome this difficulty. The best, like John Keegan’s The Face of Battle and Richard Holmes’s Acts of War, do so by dealing with the human dimension of ground combat.2 It is important for avia-

The modern airman can learn many lessons from the World War l experiences of the average aircrew and of dashing aces such as Baron (rightj and Capt Eddie Rickenbacker IbelowI, who learned their lessons from their cavalry predecessors.

HUMAN ELEMENT AND AIR COMBAT 67

quently in combat narratives. These include motivation, action under fire, cohesion, and leadership. A quick survey of the Napo- leonic era, to use just one example, will find many comparisons within this framework. Enough comparisons can be demonstrated to validate this kind of approach in other periods of military history. The goal is to demonstrate the one constant that runs throughout conflict—the role of man.

Motivation Motivation, sometimes called the ‘‘will to combat,” clearly relates to both air and ground engagements. An explanation of the nature and character of motivation has been the subject of many volumes. The motivation to air combat can easily be identified with nineteenth-century con- cepts of honor and chivalry. The earliest combat aviators were often compared to dashing cavalrymen of the . Most of the comparisons were driven by the need for governments to create he- roes, mired as the armies were in the trag- edy of World War I’s ground stalemate. The new, glamorous, and relatively clean air war provided the kind of setting necessary Death came quickly in B-17 /ormations such as the for the creation of these heroes.3 one above and was not as impersonal as we often de­ A closer examination of typical Napo- pict. That is a lesson of combat for all ages. The leonic cavalrymen reveals that these super- fighter squadron of World War 11 (left) needed as much cohesion as that required of any ground unit. ficial comparisons are more accurate than The aircrews were closer to their Army counterparts, might be expected. Consider, for example, and the lessons learned cam e from the historian David Chandler’s description of sam e sources. Napoleonic hussars as ‘‘the darling of the la- dies . . . expected to maintain the highest standard of bravery, swaggering bravado, tors to take this kind of historical analysis and boasting.”4 Such a description could one step further, however, and consider the easily fit the stereotypical combat aviator, human dimension in air combat. By doing especially the fighter pilot. so they can enhance the usefulness of all the According to Chandler, part of the moti- military history they read. vation for cavalry combat was the love of In this regard, it is possible to compare air fighting, sport, and hunting. Combatants re- and ground combat in any era. While it is spected their mounted enemies for holding difficult to single out any particular emo- similar ideas. Cavalrymen were admon- tion, circumstance, or example of behavior ished to ride well, die unflinchingly, and ac- and demonstrate its primacy in ground or knowledge courageous opponents. So, too, air battle, several seem to stand out fre- are fighting airmen.5 Fig. 1 — The American combat-box. This formation was designed to utilize the immense defensive armament of the US bombers to the fullest The staggered formation allowed for a reasonable con- centration of lire from any angle.

Fig. 2 — Head-on view of the combat box.

Examine the words of the famous German the nineteenth-century cavalry competitor, ace, Baron Manfred von Richthofen. His let- not the hot-blooded zealot.7 ters and combat reports are filled with allu- Such sentiments are not reserved only for sions to chivalry, sportsmanship, the romantic notions of World War I. For ex- cavalier spirit, and hunting. He recorded his ample, during the Battle of Britain in 1940, impressions of his most famous adversary, a British fighter pilot described his motiva- Maj Lanoe Hawker, in terms strikingly sim- tion to combat this way: “It’s love of the ilar to those used by a participant in a nine- sport rather than sense of duty that makes teenth-century cavalry duel: you go on without minding how much you are shot up.”8 But he was a plucky devil. With me behind and above him, he even turned round and Obviously, sportsman-like competitive- waved his arm at me, as though to say, “How ness was not the only motivator for nine- is it going?” He was a fine sportsman, but I teenth-century cavalrymen or for modern knew that in time my close presence behind aviators. The will to combat must be driven him would be too much for him.B by an intense desire to defeat the enemy. Col Charles H. MacDonald, a World War II Richthofen demonstrates a similar tone ace with 27 kills, put it this way: when he criticizes his brother, also an ace, for being too much of a shooter and not If I were to pick out the most valuable personal enough of a hunter. The motivation to com- traits of a fighter pilot, aggressiveness would bat, Richthofen believed, should be that of rate high on the list. Time and again, I have

68 HUMAN ELEMENT AND AIR COMBAT 69

Typical French cavalry attack Under Fire In combat the actual circumstances of di- rectly confronting an enemy can vary widely. Despite this, even a cursory exami- nation of combat narratives reveals frequent similarities in the behavior and feelings of participants. In the most general terms, it is fair to say that most combatants feel, at one time or the other, either brave, afraid, ag- gressive, timid, lonely, or confused. We find these kinds of feelings often expressed in stories of both the Napoleonic period and throughout modern . More- over, the actual details of engagements in both eras bear a close resemblance. Eyewitness accounts of air-to-air engage- ments can sound hauntingly like written histories of cavalry encounters. An Ameri- can, Oscar LeBoutillier, described a typical World War I this way: In those few vicious moments the sky was lit- erally filled with tracers: thin, white threads crisscrossing in every direction. Aeroplanes were everywhere. They flashed in and out of the clouds, above, below, and in front of me. I had my hands full trying to get onto an ene- my’s tail, avoid a collision, and get a burst off. It was like trying to catch lightning in a bottle!" seen aggressive action, even from a disadvan- tageous position, completely rout a powerful LeBoutillier’s observations match this de- Nip formation.g scription of a Napoleonic cavalry encounter: Colonel MacDonald's comments on aggres- siveness and, by implication, resolution The impact would usually result in a melee, in may be considered a restatement of the which both sides would lose formation, and thoughts of a nineteenth-century "ace” of the soldiers would mingle in a formless mass cavalry, . Murat, a marshal of of individual combats. . . . It was almost im- France, was famous for his incredible brav- possible to control cavalrymen who had just ery and aggressiveness on the battlefield. He sustained and survived an impact and were was reputedly fond of saying, "Show me a fighting at close quarters for life, loot, and hussar older than 30 years, and I'll show glory.'2 you a coward!”10 Not surprisingly, these kinds of experi- While it’s not possible to speak for all par- ences evoke the strongest emotions in sol- ticipants and every engagement, even a su- diers and airmen. Frequently the violence perficial analysis clearly shows a and stress of their circumstances seems to connection between the motivation to air overwhelm the combatants. That they con- combat and the esprit of Napoleonic caval- tinue to function at all is a tribute to man’s rymen. Battles in the air can be directly ability to prepare warriors for the impact of compared to nineteenth-century encoun- combat. ters on this basis. In this regard, aerial warfare is all too 70 AIR POWER JOURNAL

In the transition from the Army Air Forces of World War II to the separate Air Force of the Korean War Ifar rightJ. many of the ties between ground combat and aerial combat seem to have been lost. The need to Jearn from common sources of experience remains just as strong.

often depicted as relatively clean, even an- tiseptic. Nothing could be further from the truth. Imagine the scene inside a B-17 as it was vividly recorded by a historian of the Schweinfurt raids: The bombers drive ahead through a whirlwind of steel splinters and flame and jagged chunks of red-hot metal. The steel is everywhere: it crashes into wings and engines, slams into bulkheads and airplane bodies. And into the bodies of men, spewing out blood, tissue, in- testines, and brains.13 Inside the dressed formations of Napo- leonic infantry, a soldier’s view was not very different from his twentieth-century flying counterpart: One shot killed and wounded twenty-five of the 4th Company, another of the same kind killed poor Fisher, my captain, and eighteen of our company . .. and another took the 8th and killed or wounded twenty-three. ... At the The tone of Drury’s comments, and the same time poor Fisher was hit I was speaking physical aspects of his situation are similar to him. and I got all over his brains, his head to those experienced by Capt Cavalie Mer- was blown to atoms.1,1 cer near Mont-Saint Jean in 1815. Mercer It is remarkable that anybody could func- and his artillery troops, like their aviator tion in such an environment. Even so, a look counterpart, were the subject of intense en- at some of the reflections of combat partici- emy fire: pants during the actual moment of confron- tation finds other comparisons. A high A black speck caught my eye, and I instantly percentage of participants are scared stiff, knew what it was. The conviction that one for example, but carry on despite their fears. never sees a shot coming towards you unless directly in its line flashed across my mind, to- Capt Richard S. Drury, an Air Force A-1E gether with the certainty that my doom was pilot, described diving on enemy gun posi- sealed. . . . Under such a fire, one may be said tions during the Vietnam War this way: to have had a thousand narrow escapes: and I felt a sort of a cold numbness throughout my made me feel in full force the goodness of him body as I rolled in on the muzzle flashes below. who protected me among so many dangers.16 The tracers came up the way heavy hail comes down from a thunderstorm. I was scared and Even without further examples, it is fair breathing hard. The pass seemed like an hour, to conclude that much of the physical cir- but only seconds passed until I was pulling up cumstances and human behavior of combat and jinking away.15 participants in both the Napoleonic Wars and modern aerial combat are related. This Loss of cohesion can lead to disaster, es- relationship is further demonstrated if we pecially in offensive operations. Consider consider cohesion. for a moment one of the more famous inci- dents relating to this situation. It occurred at the in 1815. Early in the engagement, French infantry advanced Cohesion against Wellington’s left center. Met by By any definition, cohesion is one of the steadfast British infantry and artillery, the most important human elements in any French were repulsed. Wellington there- combat. Gen S. L. A. Marshall’s classic work after directed the British cavalry to charge Men Against Fire identified it as the differ- and complete the rout. The French fled, but ence between defeat and victory when in the British horsemen, excited by their vic- contact with the enemy. Soldiers who main- tory, lost all cohesion. A participant tain group integrity and feel the common observed: bonds of support consistently perform bet- ter when engaged. Marshall’s research pin- in fact our men were out of hand . . . every of- ficer within hearing exerted themselves to the pointed cohesion as the pivotal factor in utmost to reform the men; but the helplessness ground combat participation.17 For infantry- of the enemy offered too great a temptation. If men or cavalrymen of the , we could have formed a hundred men we this meant advancing and using their weap- could have made a respectable retreat, and ons against the enemy. saved many; but we could effect no formation,

71 72 A/R POWER JOURNAL

and were as helpless against their [counter| at- tlefields was the use of the square. tack as their infantry had been against us.18 Employed by infantry to defend itself The British unit’s failure to maintain cohe- against cavalry charges, the success or fail- sion was caused by its members' eagerness, ure of the formation was absolutely depen- overaggressiveness, and eventual panic. It dent on the integrity of its component sides. led to their destruction. Cohesion is no less If, as in the Battle of Quatre Bras in June important to the combat aviator. 1815, an infantry square’s cohesion was Among other things, formation flying is broken, disaster could result: “The 2nd Bat- designed to foster teamwork, mutual sup- talion 44th Regiment was attacked in the port, and cohesion.'9 From the earliest days rear by the Lancers, who were slaughtering of aerial combat, loss of formation or loss of our supernumeraries and rear rank men.”22 cohesion often proved fatal. This principle If, however, the square managed to main- was frequently demonstrated during World tain its cohesion, it was generally imper- War II. vious to even the most violent mounted As an example, let us look at the account attack. Only with the help of artillery might of US Navy ace Edward “Butch” O'Hare as the normal outcome be changed. Attackers he described attacking a much larger group therefore made great efforts to bombard the of Japanese fighters: square with missile weapons in the hopes of making it disintegrate. Timely charges were The entire enemy formation scattered as we designed to complete its dissolution. tore into them. They broke up into sections It does not take a great deal of imagination and singles, climbing vertically in panic to to compare the Napoleonic infantry square gain precious altitude. . . . The battle seemed to a World War II B-17 combat formation. to last an hour, but actually it lasted only a few Created by Gen Curtis E. LeMay precisely to minutes. . . . The record credited our lonely eight Hellcats with 23 confirmed kills and 11 improve cohesion and defensive firepower, probables.20 the “combat box” was also only as good as its components.23 German attempts to de- In O’Hare’s dogfight, the Japanese were not stroy the cohesion of the combat box and to able to maintain any kind of defensive cohe- break up a formation of bombers sound just sion and were defeated. like the combined attempts of French cav- The accounts of rarely publicized Soviet- alry and artillery to reduce British squares Israeli over the Suez Canal in 1970 at Waterloo. repeat the message of the previous passage. According to Israeli participants, the Soviet [1943] As the stream of Flying Fortresses MiG pilots tended to lose cohesion, even neared the target, a definite change in the pat- break up and panic, as soon as the engage- tern of attacks emerged. The masses of twin- ment started: engine strikes sent rockets into the midst of the formations, scattering the planes and diluting In the words of one of the Israeli pilots who the effectiveness of their defensive fire screen. participated in that encounter, the Soviets flew The moment a cripple showed, a swarm of sin- into combat like a bull after a red flag. As gle engine fighters immediately pounced to though they were knocking their heads against deliver the coup de grace.22 a wall. They were like ripe fruit waiting to be picked.21 [1815] Late in the day the French had brought up two guns on the crest of our position, which These comparisons to the unfortunate Brit- fired grape into our square with very deadly ef- ish cavalry more than a century before are fect. . . . Though suffering sadly, and disor- obvious. Whether forces are engaged offen- dered by our poor wounded fellows clinging to sively or defensively, cohesion can become their comrades thinking they were being aban- doned, our little square retained its formation, a vital measure of success. and we reached the hedge.25 Another dramatic example of the impor- tance of cohesion to nineteenth-century bat- For a more up-to-date comparison to air combat, we need only look to the B-52 cell and trail formations used in the Linebacker bombing campaigns over North Vietnam. It is possible to think of the electronic coun- termeasures of the cells as contiguous sides of a defensive structure. It should come as no surprise that the North Vietnamese at- tempted to bombard the sophisticated B-52 "squares” in a way similar to their nine- teenth-century French counterparts. North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile barrages appear designed to break the integrity of the cells and bomber streams as they ap- proached the target area.26 Dealt with indi- vidually, the B-52s were far more vulnerable.

Leadership In the often chaotic conditions of battle, the of leadership remains time- less. Despite individual styles, successful combat leaders often seem to share several common personality traits.27 The circum- v5N _\\\v\ stances under which these traits manifest themselves also share a resemblance. Consider, for example, the courage and determination of nineteenth-century Brit- ish officers as they tried to rally their men to attack the enemy. A foot soldier had this to say about the impact of his commander: The modern Air Force leader shares many things with the Napoleonic Hussar, especially the human General Graham at this critical moment darted element in warfare. to the front, and by one short word, loud and inspiring, made nought of the (French] mar- shal's bravery and combinations. The word was. "Charge!" Like electric fluid it shot from the centre of the British line to the extremities of its flanks, instantaneously followed by the well-known thundering British cheer, sure precursor of the rush of British bayonets.™ A century later, Capt Eddie Rickenbacker would have a similar electrifying effect on the 94th Aero Squadron as it faced mount- ing casualties. A veteran who observed Rickenbacker notes the former racing car driver’s role: He drove himself to exhaustion. He’d fly the required patrol. Then he and I would come back to the field, have a cup of coffee, get into

73 74 Affl POWER jOURNAL

our second ships and go hunting by ourselves. evidence from contemporary battlefields or Most of the pilots he killed never knew what air combat engagements. Admittedly, many hit them. Out of the sun, a quick burst and things have changed in conflict since the gone . . . he developed into the most natural Napoleonic Wars. The physical factors of leader I ever saw.29 battle are different. The size and composi- Gallantry in combat can also be a com- tion of forces vary greatly. Spatial and geo- mon denominator of any age and situation. metric relationships are altogether Frequent circumstances exist where indi- different, as are terrain and logistical fac- vidual acts of heroism sound almost iden- tors. All these aside, several noted experts tical. Judge the sim ilarities in these would agree that the combat psychology of examples of courage in the face of adverse participants in both eras remains essen- odds; the first from the Napoleonic era and tially the same. In the words of one: the second from World War II: Combat psychology constitutes the most sta- He was a brave fellow, and bore himself like a ble, most timeless dimension of war. While the hero; with his sword waving in the air, he political goals of a particular conflict, weapons cheered the men on, as he went dashing upon technologies, and above all else, the tactics the enemy, and hewing and slashing them in appropriate against a given adversary on a tremendous style. Fine fellow! His conduct in- given day can all change virtually overnight, deed made an impression upon me that I shall “combat is combat and a combatant is a com- never forget.30 batant.”33 In company with the other fighters. First Lieu- tenant DeBlanc instantly engaged the hostile On this basis, combat comparisons from planes, and aggressively countered their re- any era and any form of warfare remain peated efforts to drive off our bombers. .. . valid. Short of experiencing combat or DeBlanc courageously remained on the scene spending a great deal of time with combat despite a rapidly diminishing fuel supply and, veterans, about the only way to learn of the boldly challenging the enemy's superior num- nature of war is to study firsthand accounts. bers of float planes, fought a valiant battle Even so, it is very important that potential against terrific odds.31 combat aviators do not confine themselves Some may yet contend that these kinds of strictly to the observations of past aerial comparisons are too contrived. It is fashion- warriors. As we have seen, there are enough able nowadays to point to the incredible ac- similarities in the Napoleonic era to justify celeration in the technology of warfare and a lifetime of study in that one period alone. argue that the fundamental nature of com- The same is true for virtually any age of bat has changed.32 If this argument is valid, conflict. any comparisons between modern warfare Ultimately, the question for all those with and warfare of the past are meaningless. In the potential for serving in combat must be, the slanted logic of this line of reasoning, “How can I improve my understanding of machines are more important in war than myself and the nature of war?” The answer man. can begin with a comparative study of the This view is not supported by eyewitness human element in military history. □

Notes 1. Presentation at Air Command and Staff College. Air Uni- 3. Ezra Bowen. Knights of the Air (Epic of Flight Series) (Al- versity. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 6 November 1986. exandria. Va.: Time-Life Books. 1980). 18. 2. See Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in 4. David Chandler, The Campaigns of (New York: Battle (New York: Macmillan. Inc.. 1986). 30: John Keegan, The Macmillan Inc., 1966), 354. Face of Battle (New York: Viking. 1976), 78: S. L. A. Marshall, 5. Floyd Gibbons, The Bed Knight of Germany: The Story of Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future Boron von Richthofen. Germany's Great War Bird (Garden War (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith. 1978). 38. City, N.Y.: Doubleday. Page and Co., 1927), 38. HUMAN ELEMENT AND AIR COMBAT 75

6. Ibid . 8. 20. Trevor J. Constable and Raymond F. Toliver, Fighter 7. Manfred von Richthofen. The Red Boron. Irans. Peter Aces of the U.S.A. (Fallbrook. Calif.: Aero Publishers. 1979), Kilduf and ed. Stanley M. Ulanoff (Fallbrook. Calif.: Aero Pub- 235-36. lishers. tnc.. 1969). 103—4. 21 Benjamin S. Lambeth. Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 8. Lord Charles Moran. The Anatomy of Courage (London: Lebanon War (Santa Monica. C alif: Rand Corp.. 1984). 28. Constable. 1946|. 78. 22. Sibome. 380 9. Gene Gurney. Five Doivn and Glory (New York: Ballen- 23. Guy Woodward. “The Allied Bomber Offensive Against tine Books, 1958). 118. Germany," Strategy and Tactics. May-)une 1971, 5. 10. fames P. Lawford. Napoleon: The Last Campaigns (New 24 Caiden. 220. York: Crown Publishers. 1977). 19. 25. Siborne. 330-31. 11. Dale M. Tiller. The Day the Red Baron Died (New York: 26. Air War—Vietnam (New York: Arno Press. 1978). 281- Bonanza Books. 1970). 111. 89. 12. Nigel de Lee. French Lancers (London: Almark Publish- 27. , On War. ed. and trans. Michael ing Co.. Ltd.. 19761.29. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University 13. Martin Caiden. Black Thursday (New York: E. P. Dutton Press, 1976), 104. and Co.. I960). 179. 28. Robert Blakeney (28th Foot) quoted by Ned Zuparko, 14. Keegan. 160-61. “Charges. Firelights and Morale," part 1, Empires. Eagles and 15. Richard S. Drury. My Secret War (Fallbrook. Calif.: Aero Lions. March 1983. 12. Publishers, fnc.. 1979). 42. 29. Bowen, 171-74. 16. Cavalie Mercer, fournal of the (Lon- 30. Rifleman Harris (95th Rifles) quoted by Holmes. 343. don: William Blackwood and Sons. 1870), 327. 31. Constable and Toliver, 258-59. 17. Marshall. 149-50. 32. Lt Col Clayton R. Newell. "Operating in the 21st Cen- 18. Maj Gen H. T. Sibome. Waterloo Letters (London: Cas- tury," Military Review, September 1986. 9. sell and Co.. Ltd.. 1891). 61-62. 33. LtCol Barry D. Watts. The Foundationsof U.S. Air Force 19. ATC Manual 51—4. Primary Flying, let. 1982. 7-1. Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. 1984), 112. net assessment

Debating Counterforce: A Conventional Ap- veloped the basic concerns of the apocalyptics. proach in a Nuclear Age by Charles-Philippe Too often, the reader is given a thorough ration- David. Boulder, Colorado 80301: Westview ale for a conventional position that is then count- Press Inc., 1987, 260 pages, $27.50. ered with a weakly presented apocalyptic view. The single point of agreement between the two Charles-Philippe David, the son of Senator camps is shown to be the belief that deterrence Paul David of Canada, earned- his doctorate from must be the central goal. This agreement extends Princeton and is currently a Canadian defense to the realization that absolute deterrence cannot specialist at the College Militaire Royal de Saint- be guaranteed. At this point the conventionalists Jean, Quebec. In Debating Counterforce, he crit- and apocalyptics part company. The conven- ically challenges the American reader to exam- tionalists support developing plans for limiting ine and reevaluate the question that has been at nuclear war if deterrence fails, while the apoca- the core of US defense policy since 6 August lyptics maintain that nuclear war will be so hor- 1945: “What is the proper role for nuclear weap- rible that it is meaningless to plan in terms of its ons to play in today's world?” occurrence. Again what is lacking is a develop- For David the answer to this question is lim- ment of the apocalyptic rationale. Had the author ited to deterrence and, to him, the belief that nu- addressed these issues more fully the reader clear weapons can be incorporated into actual would be better able to appreciate the nuances of operational use is a chimera. Although his views this complicated debate. are clearly at odds with Air Force doctrine, his The author’s arguments are distractingly de- treatment of the issues provides a thoughtful in- pendent on numerous references and quotes sight into the strategist's problem of reconciling from the exceptional bibliography. Because of Clausewitz with the atom. this, Debating Counterforce does not stand alone David argues that deterrence has been the as a reference work. What it does accomplish product of a constantly developing and at times very well is to draw attention to the conflict be- contradictory nuclear policy that is progressing tween the two extremes of nuclear strategic toward ineffectiveness. The reason for this can thought. As a minimum, the reader should be be found in Einstein's famous quote: committed to exploring Brodie, Kahn, and Kis- The splitting of the atom has changed everything singer if the full value is to be drawn from Da- save our mode of thinking and thus we are drifting vid’s first and hopefully not his last book. toward a catastrophe beyond comparison. We shall Lt Col Thomas M. Kearney, USAF require a substantially new manner of thinking if Headquarters United States Air Force mankind is to survive. Washington, D.C. Although deeply critical of US policy, he does an admirable job of objectively outlining its de- velopment from 1946, when Bernard Brodie and William Borden published diametrically op- posed theses, to today’s debates on the Strategic Understanding War: History and Theory ot Defense Initiative (SDI). However, when he ex- Combat by T. N. Dupuy. New York 10017: Par- plores the background of a given policy, the agon Books, 1987, 320 pages, $24.95. viewpoints of the “apocalyptics" (Brodie camp) and the “conventionalists” (Borden camp) are “Students of military art and military science polarized into mutually exclusive extremes that have long sought fundamental laws or theories defy compromise. If there is a central weakness that would explain the interactions of military to his work it is this “yin-and-yang" approach, forces in combat and the outcomes of battles, (p. which consistently casts the conventionalists as xxi) So reads the introduction to Col T. N. Du- a dark force that ignores the warnings of the puy’s Understanding War. A statement on the apocalyptics. This impression possibly could dust jacket calls this book "a sustained and rig- have been avoided had the author more fully de- orously argued attempt to put forward a general

76 NET ASSESSMENT 77

theory of military combat, one which will be stances affecting a force in battle (V) times the valid across history and potent in its applica- quality of force (Q). Therefore, P = NVQ. Dupuy tions for strategies and tactics in military transforms this equation into his combat power policy." formula, which is the basic equation of his Quan- Colonel Dupuy reasons that there are "two tified Judgment Model (QJM). The variable (N) basic ways to use military history. One is to read transforms into force strength (e.g., weapon descriptive military history to obtain a general strength). The variable (V) becomes the environ- appreciation for past wars and famous leaders. mental and operational force effects (e.g., terrain, The other is to use information and data from weather, season, force posture, mobility, fatigue, military history as the basis for historical analy- morale, training, etc.). Finally, the variable (Q) sis." (p. xxiii) becomes the relative combat effectiveness of His historical analysis "seeks to bring to bear troops (e.g., the factor explaining the difference on present problems relevant lessons of the between theoretical outcome and actual out- past." The military analyst “must develop com- come ratios). bat hypotheses by mean (sic) of patterns dis- The application of the QJM is illustrated in the cerned from studying large quantities of combat 1940 Flanders campaign between the Germans data.” (p. xxiii) and the French and British. From this engage- Military' leaders have always searched for ment, Dupuy goes on to illustrate other princi- guidelines, principles, or maxims to help win ples from his combat model: battles. Understanding War considers the con- cepts of Napoleon, Carl von Clausewitz. and An- Relative combat effectiveness toine Henri Jomini and relates them to the Diminishing returns in combat beginnings of today's concept of a theory of com- Movement and rates of advance bat. Furthermore, the concepts of two British Attrition in combat theorists, J. F. C. Fuller and Frederick W. Lan- Friction in combat chester, are discussed. Both have had a profound Technology and human behavior in combat impact on analytical military thinking. Colonel Dupuy discusses Clausewitz’s On War Understanding War takes all these inputs and and shows how Clausewitz attempted to quan- uses practical application of the QJM to an anal- tify his military thinking. What could a quanti- ysis of recent events, including the 1982 war in fiable theory of combat do for us? Dupuy says it Lebanon. could: My only criticism of this book is the lack of ex- planation about the methodology used. Without • Provide a framework for assuring consis- this information, one must question the validity tency in the modeling or simulation of combat. of the models presented. • Help analysts to understand human behav- Gen John R. Galvin, presently serving as SAC- ior in combat. EUR/USCINCEUR says in the book’s Foreword that "the key question is, how much will battle • Provide specific means for dealing with the prediction lend itself to mathematical analysis influence of behavioral factors, such as suppres- sive fire. and how much will always be dependent on sub- jective judgment?” The search for such a formula • Provide a yardstick for the evaluation of is very complex. This book deserves serious at- military judgment, to the benefit of both military tention because it provides a number of impor- and civilian decisionmakers. tant analytical propositions. If the old adage "know your enemy” has any Understanding War is tightly focused toward a validity or truth, then the Soviets’ theory and use theory of combat. Dupuy defines it as "the em- of their Correlation of Forces may be years ahead bodiment of a set of fundamental principles gov- of us in the arena of a practical mathematical erning or explaining military combat, whose model of combat. We need to explore Colonel purpose is to provide a basis for the formulation Dupuy's theories and look at their ability to as- of doctrine and to assist military commanders sist in our nation's defense. We can all profit by and planners to engage successfully in combat at any level." (p. 79) reading this, his latest book. He shows how Clausewitz's Law of Numbers can be written as combat power (P) equals the Maj Barry R. Hess, USAF number of troops (N) times the variable circum- RAF Mildenhull. United Kingdom 78 AIR POWER IOURNAL

March to Armageddon: The United States and New Look defense policy, the growing military- the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present by industrial complex, and the bomber/missile gap Ronald E. Powaski. New York 10016: Oxford hysteria fueled America’s increasing nuclear University Press, 1987, 300 pages, $19.95. buildup. Kennedy appears as the belligerent cold warrior, determined to find “greatness” in con- The recent events involving a possible treaty fronting the Soviet Union. Covering the balance eliminating Soviet and American intermediate- of the sixties and seventies is a cogent review of range nuclear missiles has again brought the nu- the tortured diplomatic and domestic political clear arms race into the public forum. Yet, trac- process that resulted in SALT I and the ABM ing the debate over American nuclear policy Treaty. As the book moves into the eighties it as- back to the dawn of the nuclear age can be frus- sumes more the tone and structure of a debate trating. It has been veiled in secrecy from the be- over Reagan's nuclear policy. ginning, and public view has been afforded only In attempting to deal with this complicated when a crisis or the search for political advan- subject over a period approaching half a century, tage forces the issue into the spotlight. With the the book is very ambitious. It is this very ambi- nuclear weapons debate becoming a prominent tiousness that leads to some problems. Though issue in the American political scene of the Powaski does an excellent job creating an effec- eighties, historians are again examining the com- tive and thorough chronology, each area receives plicated process that gave shape to America’s an extremely abbreviated treatment. This treat- nuclear policy. ment is most often in the form of a short narrative In March to Armageddon, Ronald Powaski at- that includes a synthesis of what other commen- tempts to assemble a one-volume history of the tators have concluded about the described event nuclear arms race from 1939 to the present. Not or period. Unless you are familiar with a partic- unexpectedly, considering the dearth of infor- ular area, you are clearly at the author's mercy for mation about Soviet nuclear policy decisions, the background and applicable arguments, and the book concentrates almost exclusively on how though appearing objective on the surface, Po- American policy evolved and the role this policy waski's general thrust is revisionist. Sections played in the arms race. In particular, Powaski is often conclude with an argument or statement concerned with the question, why has every critical of American motives and actions. After American president since Truman promised to discussing McNamara's decision to deploy the curb the growing number of nuclear weapons, Minuteman 1, Powaski concludes the but none have done so? The answer, he main- with an observation by I. F. Stone that implies tains, lies in America’s reliance on power poli- that the decision resulted from the devious tics, congressional refusal to curb nuclear machinations within an insatiable military-in- weapons procurement, a history of public indif- dustrial complex. In discussing Congress's role ference to nuclear issues, and the tremendous in- in policy development, March to Armageddon is fluence of the military-industrial complex. distinctly critical in tone until the period in the Relying primarily on secondary sources, Po- eighties when objection to the Reagan's defense waski chronologically examines America’s buildup and SDI program appear. growing nuclear capability and the often hap- Despite its revisionist slant, the book does hazard development of policy concerning its have merit. Powaski does an excellent job in ex- possible use. He offers no startling new insights amining the efforts by those opposed to Ameri- into the A-bomb’s development, but vocifer- can nuclear policy and the continuing arms race. ously denounces Brig Gen Leslie Groves’s “com- This opposition existed from the very beginning partmentalization" security system as of nuclear research but found a public voice be- detrimental to any debate (in or out of govern- ginning in the sixties. Those not familiar with ment) concerning the development and use of the early efforts by Neils Bohr, Vannevar Bush, nuclear weapons. In detailing Truman’s decision and others to create an international regulatory to drop the bomb on Japan, Powaski determines group will appreciate Powaski’s discussion. that the United States was negligent in not seek- Despite some weaknesses in objectivity, ing out all possible avenues of negotiation, being March to Armageddon is a welcome addition to instead more concerned with demonstrating our the literature on American nuclear policy. If read new-found military might to the Soviet Union. with the skepticism one should have when deal- Moving into the fifties, March to Armageddon fo- ing with evidence about any emotionally cuses on how interservice rivalry, Eisenhower's charged topic, the exposure to different interpre- NET ASSESSMENT 79

tations will be valuable. With its thorough chro- muscles and the scarlet geysers that filled the air where his colonel's head had been. (p. 81) nology and excellent endnotes, the book is even more valuable as a one-volume reference work Doctor Phibbs tells of attempting to treat mor- on America's evolving nuclear policy. tally wounded soldiers. He tells of men with Maj Budd A. |ones. Jr., USAF limbs cruelly amputated by modern weaponry. USAF Academy, Colorado He speaks of head wounds too severe to dress in gauze. Amid the gore, he delves into the person- alities of the soldiers, contrasting (in his view) The Other Side of Time by Brendan Phibbs. Bos- the ideas and opinions of the enlisted men ver- ton, Massachusetts 02108: Little. Brown and sus those of the officer ranks. He points out the Company, 1987, 341 pages. $17.95. conflict that arises because of these differences. The book has a constant negative undercurrent Dr Brendan Phibbs chronicles his World War toward the officers who planned, ordered, and II experiences as a combat command surgeon in led men into battle. Obviously a humanitarian, an armored unit that spearheaded many attacks the author did not adjust well to the fact that on the enemy. He treated casualties at the front- good men were being led into battle, and subse- lines, often in the streets, in destroyed buildings, quent death, by less than perfect leaders who or in advancing halftracks. He did not make were more often promoted as a matter of expe- rounds in a rear-echelon hospital but huddled diency than because of qualifications. In World shoulder to shoulder with the men while they War II. the US Army did not have the personnel were fighting. systems available to manage “whole-person” At the time Pearl Harbor was bombed and the and “best-qualified" promotion systems. Nor did United States entered the war, he was a physi- it have the time to do so during its rapid wartime cian halfway through a 12-month internship. expansion, a point the author seems to overlook. Shortly thereafter he sought a commission in the A combat command surgeon can be likened to Medical Corps of the US Army and received first a flight surgeon assigned to a flying squadron lieutenant’s bars. He served in combat in France medical element or to a commander of an air and Germany with Combat Command B, 12th transportable hospital deployed to a tactical lo- Armored Division, Seventh US Army, ending the cation. This surgeon stays up on the battle plans, war as a major watching concentration camp vic- the tactics to be used, the expected outcome, and tims from Dachau die from hunger. the projected casualties. The surgeon also keeps He has written this book not only as a skilled abreast of the latest in warfare by associating surgeon but as a humanitarian. With the aid of with the officers and enlisted personnel in the many notes taken during the war and a memory unit. Doctor Phibb’s book makes an excellent ex- of war that still burns brightly 40 years later, he ample of the surgeon's role in this capacity. transfers to the reader images of men dead and This book is not a source for information on lo- dying. The use of technical details and medical gistics planning; therefore, medical planners terminology is deliberately limited. The writing must look elsewhere for references. Although it style is informal and easy to read. There is a is of limited use historically, the book is enter- sprinkling of German words in the text that lend taining and gives a frank view of war and suffer- an additional flavor to particular scenes. There ing—useful for physicians and for other medical are a few scenes graphically depicted in the book personnel. that drive home the point that war is about killing: MSgt William D. Buhrman, USAF George AFB, California We heard the next day how the line of tanks went slithering through the mud against the pillboxes, the young commander standing in the turret waving a map case because the radios weren't working. Or- Space and National Security by Paul B. Stares. ange light winked from behind concrete across the Washington, D.C. 20036: Brookings Institution wide field and M ike’s head was torn from his body; Press, 1987, 219 pages, $28.95 in hardback, his trunk slid kicking into the turret spouting incre- $10.95 in paperback. dible volumes of blood. The carotid arteries and the jugulars were hosepipes. Crimson drenched the Paul B. Stares states that the purpose of his young soldier inside the tank, who screamed and book, Space and National Security, is to address screamed and pounded with his fists and pushed whether the United States should proceed with away at the windpipe and the twitching cervical the development of antisatellite (ASAT) weap- 80 AIR POWER JOURNAL

ons. From the first page, the answer Stares offers verify compliance and thus effectively constrain on this proposition is no. residual and new Soviet ASAT systems. Stares One hundred sixty-five pages offer back- quotes Maj Gen Thomas C. Brandt, deputy to the ground. Long chapters discuss the general oper- chief of staff, who said, “We have an excellent ational characteristics of the Soviet and capability to monitor the employment of the American military space programs, the contri- (current) Soviet ASAT." bution of military satellites to security and war- Stares also states in his summary and recom- fighting capabilities, current threats to and mendations that SDI is a threat to meaningful countermeasures for US satellites, and arms con- ASAT limitations because the techniques for in- trol in space. These chapters appear to offer a tercepting satellites and ballistic missiles are so thorough grounding in these subjects, including similar. This expert opinion has received a de- illustrative tables and charts and considerable gree of notoriety. technical information. Basically, these chapters As a study in the history and technology of live up to the nominal promise of the title and are space and national security, Stares's book is an written in a clear and highly readable style. The excellent addition to any military space library. conclusions of these chapters are limited and However, it is not organized around its thesis. carry appropriate caveats. Appendixes totaling The support for that thesis is terse, and the sup- 24 pages detail superpower space surveillance port does not flow from the subject matter; and survivability capabilities. rather, new evidence is introduced in the sum- In his 7-page introduction and his 13-page mary and recommendations. As a logical argu- summary and recommendations, Stares asserts ment against the continuance of the US ASAT that going ahead with the US ASAT program program. Stares's book is less than could have several negative consequences. comprehensive. These consequences are that America's space Maj Thomas C. Blow, USAF systems would be less secure in wartime, that the Maxwell AFB, Alabama threat of their loss would inject dangerous un- certainties into each superpower's calculations during a severe crisis, and that the use of ASAT Tactics: A Soviet View by V. G. Reznichenko. weapons could escalate a conflict in undesirable W ashington, D.C. 2D402: US Governm ent and uncontrollable ways. Printing Office, 1987, 246 pages, $7.00. Stares asserts that if the United States does not go ahead with its ASAT program, an arms con- The Soviet Military Thought series provides trol treaty could limit Soviet capabilities to a translations of published Soviet works on select level less threatening to US interests than a So- military issues. Tactics is book No. 21 in the se- viet-American ASAT future. Stares devotes two ries. It is also an integrated sequel to several pre- pages to evidencing this contention. vious translations including The Offensive, The “With the appropriate precautions to increase Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, the survivability and redundancy of the exposed and Fundamentals of Tactical Command and satellites," Stares writes, “the risk from Soviet Control. Written in 1984, this volume is a reflec- residual threats can be brought under control." tion of the growth in Soviet doctrine and military He cites as proof for this statement the assertions art and includes Soviet reflections on Afghani- by the program office of the Strategic Defense In- stan under the guise of “mountain” or “special itiative that space-based antimissile systems can condition” operations. The book also reflects a be made survivable in an unconstrained ASAT continuation of the traditional Soviet methodol- future. "If the official SDI view is ill-founded or ogy for dealing with instruction of the Soviet of- overly optimistic,” Stares states, “then one must ficer corps step by step, principle by principle. ask whether the United States would rather live A complete description of the tactical battle- with the lesser threat posed by Soviet residual field establishes the foundation for the book. ASAT systems.” The implications here are that That description is of the modern combined SDI does not intend to rely on space-to-space arms battlefield that has evolved with current ASATs to defend its forces and that arms control Soviet doctrine. The 40-page description is very verification would effectively constrain devel- comprehensive, yet concise, and is potentially opment and deployment of any new Soviet the most valuable contribution to budding Soviet ASAT system. observers. Within that description are tactical As sole evidence that the United States can zones similar to the zones of operation described Tear Out and Remove PLEASE PRINT PLEASE PRINT FEEL LIKE UP?SPEAKING Fill out one of the attached comment cards Fillcards out comment one of attached the card to comment onissue this We are always interested in hearing from our readers. Pleaseuse this in readers. our from Wehearing interested are always AIRPOWER JOURNAL COMMENT CARD COMMENT COMMENT CARD AIRPOWER JOURNAL card to comment on this issue card on tocomment this We arein alwaysinterested hearingPleaseuse fromour readers. this Rank-T«e First name afTi -snm Iiil Last name Initial RanfcTtie F-rstname drop it in any mail box. mail itinany drop City City ______issue articleissue

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by Antoine Henri Jomini. Other concepts and cyclopedia of concepts related to tactical methodology for warfighting at the tactical level operations in war. Only in the context of pre- strongly reflect Jomini's attempt to provide a vious books in the series does it become a coh- •‘cookbook” for the conduct of war. It also re- erent text on the conduct of tactical operations. flects the general attempt by Soviets to use a sci- Read in this context, Tactics becomes a valuable entific approach to war. The content of the book reference tool for analyzing Soviet tactical is an extension of the offensive nature of Marxist- ground operations. Leninist doctrine and the lessons of the Great Pa- Maj Milton C. Nielsen, USAF triotic War (World War II). As is common in So- l/SA F Academy, Colorado viet military writing, that war is often cited as validation of a concept. The largest portion and greatest detail in the book focuses on the offen- The Impact of US Forces in Korea by Lee Suk sive nature of tactical operations. The emphasis Bok. Washington, D.C. 20319: National De- on the offense is followed by defensive opera- fense University Press, 1987, 101 pages, $4.00. tions. and the book concludes with a discussion of logistics at the tactical level. In describing the This short book is not ordinary. It describes defense, it emphasizes a defense that exists to candidly an allied officer’s views on how our prepare for the offensive, a basic Clausewitzian military’s presence has affected his people's view of the defense. The concepts of logistical lives and their living. It affords military readers a support and combined arms movement, as well unique opportunity to “see ourselves as others as movement along independent lines of opera- see us” and to appreciate the consequence of un- tion toward the point of engagement, are also a informed decisions—how they affect our and our reflection of the principles of Jomini. allies' “hearth and home" for a very long and While the book focuses on the offense, de- costly time. The examples are strictly from the fense, and logistics, its emphasis on combined Korean experience, but the lessons are universal. arms warfare provides cohesiveness. The book It begins with a glimpse at the historical and explains tactical operations in the context of op- geopolitical situation that brought US forces to erational art and strategy in a combined arms en- Korea following the defeat of Japan, ending its vironment. Consequently, other theories of Carl 35-year occupation of Korea. The book outlines von Clausewitz surface, including a focus on the and discusses the quality of several US decisions center of gravity via the main axis of attack. That that have shaped the fate of Korea. For example, position also places potentially independent tac- the choice of the 38th parallel as the dividing tics in the broader perspective of an integrated line between the US and Soviet occupation echeloned offensive at the grand tactical level, zones was made by two US Army staff officers, a reflecting Sir B. H. Liddell Hart's expanding tor- colonel and a major. They worked at midnight rent. The book repeatedly cites the Great Pa- with a 30-minute suspense, a small-scale wall triotic War as an example of tactical principles, map of the Far East, and vague guidelines from but it also presents the impacts of newer the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. In conflicts. another decision, the US occupation forces ini- Afghanistan has placed new emphasis on tially chose to retain "despotic Japanese colo- mountain operations and the new applications nial" rulers in government positions when of existing systems. "Valleys (ravines) are en- popular Korean leaders of the provisional gov- tered only after the subunits have captured the ernment, previously exiled in China, were avail- adjacent heights. Strikes against enemy forces able. This decision may have cost an early and putting up resistance in valleys (ravines) are car- peaceful unification of the peninsula. Similarly, ried out by fire support helicopters, artillery, and the US military government chose Koreans who mortars." (p. 121) In addition, the Soviets de- were former members of the Japanese army to at- scribe the ease and strength of defensive opera- tend its English language school. Students from tions in mountainous terrain. this school later formed the officer corps for the The book is somewhat simplistic and discon- Republic of Korea (ROK) army. Korean officers tinuous at face value, but when considered in the loyal to the provisional government would not context of the Soviet military series, it completes attend classes with "the enemy," and the ROK the spectrum of conflict from strategy through military lost much of its tradition, talent, and operational art or grand tactics to tactics. An in- credibility. Later, disregarding intelligence in- itial reading of Tactics provides you with an en- formation, Gen Douglas MacArthur recom- 82 /UR POW ER JOURNAL

mended withdrawal of most of the 45,000 US member of its first class of international fellows. troops in Korea—setting the stage for North Ko- His writing style is obviously affected by the dis- rea’s invasion and a bitter war. During the war, advantage of writing in a language other than his MacArthur, perhaps trying to atone, pursued the native tongue. However, the points he makes and retreating North Koreans too far north, prompt- the insights he gives are well worth accommo- ing China's entrance into the conflict. Later, the dating his walk in our linguistic shoes. decision to accept Kaesong, located below the This is an important book for those who work 38th parallel, as the location for armistice talks with or make decisions concerning our allies— prevented UN forces from pushing the western Korean or otherwise. front to the Yesong River area, where more de- Maj Richard B. Clark, USAF fendable terrain was available. The line still Maxwell AFB, Alabama stands just 25 miles north of Seoul, requiring a concentration of forces around the capital and leaving no ground to give or room for maneuver. Wilbur and Orville: A Biography of the Wright The book also describes the positive and neg- Brothers by Fred Howard. New York 10022: ative effects rapid westernization has had on Ko- Alfred A. Knopf, 1987, 530 pages, $24.95 in rea. It covers the growing pains of a culture not hardback. fully prepared for democracy, the distress expe- rienced by an economy grown dependent on US Larger-than-life heroes all too often become servicemen's dollars, and the social problems of lost in myth, fable, and deification. Wilbur and unaccepted mixed-blood children and transcul- Orville, Fred Howard’s new biography about the tural marriages. , not only humanizes the fathers While the book gives gracious credit to the of aviation but shows once more that genius is 90 United States for maintaining a balance of power percent hard work. In tracing the Wrights’ path in the world, deterring further war on the pen- toward immortality, Howard details the broth- insula. and contributing to the ROK’s economic ers’ total commitment to controlled flight. While strength, it also lays blame for many of Korea's the Kitty Hawk story has been often told, rarely problems at the feet of the United States. It has it been developed with such a smooth mix- claims that the presence of US forces in Korea ture of technical data and narrative prose. It is a has made ROK forces weak and dependent, fascinating success story that has more twists, while simultaneously claiming past US troop villains, greed, altruism, and old-fashioned he- withdrawals have been premature. On one hand, roics than a made-for-TV movie. It was primarily it says US presence has stimulated a North Ko- the steadfast belief by the Wrights in their own rean arms buildup and forced Soviet and genius that secured for them their rightful place Chinese support for the North. On the other in history as the “true” inventors of the airplane. hand, it reminds the United States of its respon- Institutions (including the influential Smithson- sibility to check Soviet expansionism in the ian), lawyers, and powerful business interests Asia-Pacific region. The reader is left with a feel- spent years and fortunes trying to discredit the ing that a superpower's allies may become like importance of their controlled flights in Decem- spoiled children—difficult to please. As in all ber 1903. What may surprise many aviation buffs things, it appears there are advantages and dis- is the amount of energy and invaluable time ex- advantages in combined security. pended by the Wrights in legal fights over critical These points aside, the lessons to be learned patents. Potentially their most productive years from this book should cause us some reflection. were tied up in court and in attempts to market As the author puts it, “Americans do not often their invention. It would be years following the put themselves in Koreans’ shoes. The ability to initial flights at Kill Devil Hill before they could do this occasionally is very important in working interest the US government in their flying ma- effectively with Koreans, and it reduces the chine. Howard's graphic portrayal of this strug- chances of friction or misunderstandings.” (p. gle is so effective you sometimes feel as if you are 75) We would do well to apply this prescription in the Wright cdinp on North Carolina’s outer in our relations worldwide. bank. Despite the mosquitoes and foul December Col Lee Suk Bok is an ROK army officer whose weather, you are as confident as the Dayton bi- entire life has been affected by the impact of US cycle mechanics that man will fly. forces in his homeland. He wrote this book while Why were the Wrights successful when others attending the National Defense University as a with greater funds (Samuel Langley was given a NET ASSESSMENT 83

War Department grant of $50,000) and more for- Brookings Institution Press. 1987, 586 pages, mal training were not? The reasons are several. $39.95 in hardback, $18.95 in paperback. First of all. the Wright brothers approached the problem of developing a flying machine system- This is undoubtedly one of the most provoca- atically. They researched the available informa- tive books ever written on the Soviet military. tion on flying/gliding and then set out in a very MccGwire argues the case for a strictly logical re- pragmatic fashion to test their theories. Nothing lationship between Soviet force development was left to chance. Weather data, for example, and Soviet strategy and doctrine. He relates the was collected to find a test site. North Carolina changes in force structure over the last 20 years was the closest place that met the requirements beginning with the Soviet perception in Decem- for constant winds during their bicycle shop’s ber 1966 that escalation to an intercontinental slow winter season. Through painful trial and er- nuclear exchange with the United States was no ror (both brothers would have brushes with longer inevitable in the event of a war breaking death in flying accidents), the Wrights learned to out either at the theater or local level between the fly. They built experimental gliders to test wing two states or their respective allies. Therefore, arrangements and control surfaces. When they the strictly theater operation in Europe and Asia were not flying, they were trying to “puzzle became a feasible proposition and one that re- through” some temporary roadblock. It was in quired new trends in force structure, conven- this arena that their mechanical pragmatism be- tional and nuclear alike, to implement a strategy came the genius of invention. for fighting such wars while deterring the US Imagine, if you will, learning to fly an airplane strategic nuclear forces. MccGwire then pro- at the same time you are inventing it! There were ceeds to chart the ensuing 20-year development few. if any, precedents for what they were learn- in terms of the logical requirements imposed by ing to do above the shifting sand dunes. When Soviet strategy for fighting and winning such a they tried too steep a turn or applied too much war while preventing the nuclear exchange. , they crashed. In this fashion they devel- Thus, we get a grand tour of the ensuing weap- oped the first rudimentary basics of flying. Very ons programs of the Brezhnev period conceived carefully and patiently they “invented” three-di- of in the light of these strategic requirements. mensional control of a flying machine. It was this This is by no means the standard litany of Soviet system of wing warping, used in conjunction weapons programs that they are simply stockpil- with a vertical rudder, that became the basis for ing weapons for no conceivable strategic pur- the Wright patent for controlling flying ma- pose. On the contrary, MccGwire seeks to chines. After their historic flight on 17 December underscore the shifting perspectives on war and 1903, the Wrights spent the next several years strategy over this 20-year period, the most fruit- improving their invention and trying to market it ful in Soviet strategic thought since 1937. His in both the United States and Europe. mastery of the data and of the evidence is un- Perhaps the most valuable contribution that questioned, as is his capacity for marshaling the Howard has made in this volume is his careful data into a coherent argument with a real stra- pursuit of the Wright story following the first tegic point to it. Disdainful of the “bean-count- flight. The Wright brothers are pictured in full ing" fallacy that afflicts much of American possession of pettiness, jealousy, and all the thinking about the Soviet military, MccGwire of- frailties of "normal" humans. In discussing their fers instead a compelling and articulated alter- battles with other aviation pioneers, the author native view of Soviet military developments. provides an excellent survey of the uncertainty However, such a view is not wholly to every- they all faced. Fred Howard shows by comparing one’s taste, including this reviewer’s. It is diffi- the work of these early aviators that it was clearly cult to see the relationship between these the Wright brothers who took the airplane from developments and Soviet foreign policy that is an experimental stage to a practical working ma- promised in the title. Indeed, such a relationship chine. It is an exciting story well worth reading. is absent. The political dimension is absent in re- Col Pat O. Clifton. USAF gard to international relations of the USSR and to Kelly AFB. Texas the internal politics of the military services with the possible exception of the debate between Adm S. G. Gorshkov and the leadership on the Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy by role of the Soviet navy, a debate that ultimately Michael MccGwire. Washington. D.C. 20036: was won by Marshal N. V. Ogarkov and the army 84 AIR POWER JOURNAL against Gorshkov. Moreover, in his analysis of proxy form when it involves two or more coun- what the Soviets consider to be the real strategic tries. The author’s carrying argument is that the requirements of their position, the author some- academic and governmental counterinsurgency times sounds remarkably like an apologist for “craze” of the early 1960s precipitated signifi- them, which he surely is not. Just because the So- cant attitudinal and policy backlash as the Viet- viets may assume they have these requirements nam War “traumatized" the United States. But does not confer upon them an ex post facto ra- now circumstances permit needed enhance- tionality or allay the fears of all their neighbors as ments or restructuring of military capability for to the purposes for which these enormous stocks low-intensity operations—counterinsurgency, may be used. The explanation offered by Mcc- aid to insurgents, counterterrorism, peacekeep- Gwire for the introduction of the SS-20 as merely ing, and reversal of coups. a routine upgrading ot the SS-4 and SS-5 surely There is nothing new here that the public-do- is insufficient to ease European fears of Soviet main literature of this decade (especially Sam motives. In the absence of a political dimension Sarkesian, Bard O’Neill, and Stephen Sloan) has to the analysis of the years 1966-85, it becomes not covered much more effectively. The book difficult to understand the enormous concern surveys the literature on such subjects as hostage generated about where the Soviet leadership and rescues and peacekeeping operations, but it to- the military were going. Regrettably, though tally lacks citations or references to US military MccGwire also suggests, rightly I believe, a doctrinal and training publications that are new reorientation of Soviet military strategy available to the public. The weaknesses of the during 1983-85, the pressure of publication work are due in good part to this omission. As ex- deadlines prevents him from discussing where amples, the author stumbles on airlift mobility Gorbachev’s programs are leading the Soviet (not considering the C-141 aircraft while dealing military. Of necessity the study ends with the w'ith the C-5 and C-130); the nature and doctrine year 1985. That is unfortunate in light of recent of US Army Ranger forces; and the actual, dedi- developments—Gorbachev’s admission that cated force structure capabilities of the US Air there is a Soviet space defense system; possible Force in low-intensity operations. changes in Soviet perspectives on local war as a The book has a logical enough plan, but its result of Afghanistan; and the hue and cry about heavy use of repetition and enumeration in the a new Soviet defense doctrine coupled with the first 130 pages of text make it tiring, and the book search for usable military conventional power in as a whole gives the impression of lectures and the European theater, which explains the Soviet article segments more or less fitted together. The military’s support for an intermediate-range nu- author’s references/citations could lend support clear force (INF] agreement. These criticisms to this judgment. However, a list of sources, a notwithstanding, the book is must reading for all bibliographic essay, and substantive chapter those who study Soviet military programs either notes are helpful aids for the reader who might out of obligation, or curiosity, or both. Even if we wish to inquire further on points. disagree with the author, we will not soon find a The two-thirds portion of the book that defines better exponent of his case. and evaluates the problem is better than the re- Dr Stephen Blank mainder, which offers what appears to be a hur- Maxwell AFB, Alabama ried and very superficial policy/structural remedy. In the former, the author does better with peacekeeping and terrorism than with counterinsurgency or “aiding insurgents," Wars Without Splendor: The US Military and where he never really dissects or defines these Low-Level Conflict by Ernest Evans. Westport, complex and controversial doctrines. As for the 06881: Greenwood Press, 1987, latter part of the book, he simply does not have 160 pages, $27.95. the defense establishment or legislative refer- This book attempts to place the US involve- ences, operational concept familiarity, or ment with low-level conflict in historical and enough pages to do more than sweep a large hand policy contexts, to define its parameters, and to across a small map. For example, his repeated suggest a revised military approach. It defines use of the term covert and the total absence of low-level conflict as having lower casualty rates clandestine reveals an unfamiliarity with the im- over time than conventional conflict and as portant legal and operational differences be- being either subnational or of an indirect or tween plausible denial of sponsorship and the NET ASSESSMENT 85

undetected, surprise conduct of small military power to initiate war is the presidential choice to operations. This is more troublesome as the au- use military force to repel a sudden attack on the thor apparently believes that the Green Berets United States. Wormuth and Firmage argue that were almost exclusively directed by the CIA dur- the framers of the Constitution intentionally ing their Vietnam War operations. To hold this gave Congress the war power as a check against out to readers without any mention of the Mili- the impulsive use of military force by the exec- tary Assistance Command Studies and Observa- utive branch. The authors claim this exclusive tion Group (MACSOG) and its geographic congressional power to initiate war was one of subcommands, suggests secondhand informa- the wisest of many checks and balances built tion or poor advice from interviewees. Finally, into our Constitution, but they also admit this di- the author never uses the term special opera- vision of power has not prevented presidents tions forces (SOF), which includes Rangers, from committing acts of war without congres- Army Special Forces (Green Berets), and Navy sional authorization. SEALs, whom he considers in the book. But the Wormuth and Firmage particularly deplore term also includes psychological operations bat- the recent attempts by "controversialists" to talions, US Air Force SOF (fixed-wing and heli- strip the legal authority to initiate war away from copter insertion, extraction, resupply, and fire- Congress and give it to the president. The au- support aircraft; combat controllers; etc.), and thors argue that Congress has aided and abetted civil affairs units, none of which he mentions. this revisionism by illegally bargaining away its This calls into question his sketchy capability- rightful control of the war clause of the Consti- restructuring advice. According to the briefly tution. As a result, presidents since Franklin D. stated credentials of the author, he is perhaps out Roosevelt have systematically invaded the leg- of his depth here, although he has presented an islative power of Congress to declare war and orderly low-level conflict overview that is suita- have tried to exercise unilateral war powers ble for a nonexpert civilian reader. To a military without the concurrence of Congress. The con- reader I would suggest a quick reading of Part I sequence, according to Wormuth and Firmage, is and the bibliography but no more. that presidential conduct in the Cuban missile Col August G. Jannarone, USAF crisis, Vietnam, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Iran, and Lima, Peru Lebanon has been, to one degree or another, illegal. Wormuth and Firmage’s remedy is for Con- gress to take back what it has unconstitutionally To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of given away. In order of severity, the authors sug- Congress in History and War by Francis D. gest that Congress use its control over the budget, Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage. Dallas, Texas the power of advice and consent, “sense of Con- 75275; Southern Methodist University Press, gress" resolutions and formal censures, the leg- 1987, 360 pages, $27.50. islative veto, legal action through the judicial In this scholarly and exhaustive legal study, system, and impeachment as ways to correct the the authors examine the power to initiate war in imbalance of power that exists. These correc- American constitutional law and the history of tions are necessary, according to the authors, be- the uses of that power. In either case, Wormuth cause the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is not a and Firmage are no friends of the "imperial pres- complete remedy for the present imbalance. idency." Yes, the authors concede, the Consti- Wormuth and Firmage argue that section 8 of the tution does direct the legislative and the resolution gives the president a “blank check" to executive branches to share power in conducting engage in acts of war if he has advance authori- foreign policy. But when it comes to war, Wor- zation from Congress. The authors firmly point muth and Firmage insist the office of the presi- out that "only Congress may declare war, and it dent has never carried the power of war and may declare only present wars, not future wars.” peace. Instead, the Constitution assigns the Since you cannot be in a future state of war, Wor- power to initiate war solely to Congress. The muth and Firmage see section 8 as yet another president, as commander in chief, performs vital unconstitutional delegation of congressional functions in conducting war, but the “composi- war power to the president. tion, structure, use, and actions of the armed Finally, the authors believe that the Whiggish forces are entirely determined by acts of Con- bias against executive power that the framers gress.” The only exception to this exclusive wove into the Constitution is relevant and prac- 86 AIR POWER JOURNAL

tical today. Wormuth and Firmage believe the Air Force history from the 1910 experience of nature of war in the nuclear age does not make Benny Foulois with pilot training by corre- deliberation and debate an anachronistic luxury. spondence to Robbie Risner’s leadership as a If anything, they argue a nuclear world demands fighter pilot and POW in the Vietnam War. that "collective conscience, rather than individ- The strength of this work lies in the qualifica- ual whim, must prevail." Instead of having an tion of the individual authors. For those at all fa- unfettered president, the authors argue deliber- miliar with Air Force history, such names as ation and debate are essential before we take DeWitt S. Copp, Haywood S. Hansell, and Noel those first steps toward a nuclear war that, once F. Parrish are familiar. The individual chapters taken, may not be retraceable. To Wormuth and reflect the variety of authors, ranging from Jacob Firmage, speed and efficiency are the ends of a Neufield’s highly analytical ‘‘Bernard A. totalitarian state, and not those of a republic ded- Schriever: Challenging the Unknown,” outlining icated to liberty. Schriever's impact on Air Force research and de- This is a thoughtful and erudite work. One velopment, to T. R. Milton's journalistic and ad- sees, however, an implicit political vision be- ulatory “Robinson Risner: The Indispensable hind the call for strict presidential compliance Ingredient," which recounts Risner's exploits in with the Constitution. The authors share the tra- Vietnam. All of the chapters are worth reading. ditional American view of war as a temporary ab- Within the length restraints of these short bi- erration from the status quo. This nostalgic ographies, there are issues one would like to see attitude does not jibe with a world where hostile included that are omitted. John Schlight, in his states use war, across its broad spectrum, as a chapter on Elwood Quesada, makes the impor- common instrument of policy and not as an in- tant point that in the twenties and thirties “Air strument of last resort. A system of deliberately Corps officers still formed a relatively small awkward consensus building would encourage and exclusive group, most of whom knew each American isolationism (an impulse that has other. .. (p. 180) Only in Murray Green’s piece hardly died) and would curtail the active role of on Hugh Knerr, however, does one get a signifi- the United States as the bulwark against dicta- cant glimpse of the competition and disagree- torships of the Left. Given the executive branch’s ment inevitable in any group. Were the Air Corps recent illegalities, the authors would probably officers of the twenties and thirties as unified in argue that in either case it is all for the best. outlook as they appear in this book? Were there Capt Peter R. Faber, USAF competitive cliques? Were the mavericks and USAF Academy, Colorado iconoclasts run off? Claire Chennault certainly felt run off for championing pursuit aviation against the claims of the strategic bombing ad- Makers of the United States Air Force edited by vocates. (See Martha Byrd, Chennault: Giving John L. Frisbee. Washington, D.C. 20402: Of- Wings to the Tiger (Tuscaloosa. Al^.: University fice of Air Force History. 1987, 327 pages, of Alabama Press, 1987], 60, 62, and 101.) The $13.00. role of Harold George as the “Apostle of Air Power" because of his work at the Air Corps Tac- Makers of the United States Air Force is a col- tical School and his part in the writing of “Air lection of 12-biographical essays of men who War Plans Division—Plan No. 1” (AWPD-1), re- made major contributions to the US Air Force lated here by his subordinate and friend Hay- but whose names and contributions are not well wood Hanseil, has been told by the same author known. In his “Introduction: Men with a Mis- elsewhere. (See Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The sion.” editor John Frisbee explains that Mitchell, Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: Arnold. Spaatz, and LeMay were deliberately left A Memoir (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force off the list of 70 from which these 12 were cho- History, 1986] and The Air Plan that Defeated sen. Emphasizing their personal impact on the Hitler [Atlanta, Ga.: Higgins-McArthur/Longino evolution of the Air Force, the careers of these and Porter, Inc., 1972).) A slight compression of 12—Benjamin Foulois, Frank Andrews, Harold that story to permit more than a one-page sum- George, Hugh Knerr, George Kenney, William mary of George’s contribution as the World War Kepner, Elwood Quesada, Hoyt Vandenberg, II commander of the Air Transport Command Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., Nathan Twining, Bernard would have improved the book. Schriever. and Robinson Risner—are presented. This work is not, and was not designed to be, a These 12 provide a chronological cross section of survey history of the US Air Force. It also does NET ASSESSMENT 87

not provide a full picture of the 12 men pre- Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance by sented. A much longer book would be required Richard K. Betts. Washington. D.C. 2U036: to include the details of their private lives. Brookings Institution Press. 1987, 240 pages, The authors do. however, occasionally pro- $28.95 in hardback, $10.95 in paperback. vide personal anecdotes to enliven their text. Donald Mrozek recounts the following exchange 1 liked this book. Being an individual who nor- between Generals LeMay and Twining in August mally would not pick up, much less read, a non- 1945 when Twining arrived to replace LeMay as fiction book with this title, my first sentence is commander of Twentieth Air Force: very complimentary. Those of you who read au- thors like Michener will understand when I say LeMay: "What in hell are you doing here, it took a while to warm to this book. In fact, the Nate?” ' author’s introductory chapter bewilders one Twining: "If you don’t know. Curt, it’s too with its self-diagnosing questions on the “what late." ifs” of nuclear blackmail. He also has a confusing habit of continually redefining the main theme of Mrozek’s source for this exchange is the oral his- his book. 1 don’t believe he is using the correct tory interview of Twining held at the Columbia terminology when he refers to his main focus or University Oral History Project. main theme of the book. He is more often than This anecdote illustrates one of the character- not referring to an intrinsic part of the overall istics of oral history. The same words, with the picture he is painting—the threat of nuclear names changed, in the LeMay-Twining exchange weapon use and how political leaders perceived have been recounted as the exchange between this threat over the past four decades. Generals Hansell and LeMay when LeMay took The meat of the book, chapters 2 through 5, is over command of XXI Bomber Command in Jan- interestingly assembled and nicely fitted to- uary 1945. Oral historians often find that various gether. He presents each blackmail case as a case individuals recount identical lines as being used study, an interesting way to present historical at different times and places. The words may data. Case studies permit the novice to enjoy and have been used as recalled, or the participant, understand the event, how it fits into history, years later, may believe they were used because and its significance. The case study also permits they would have been so effective and the author to weave the facts into a palatable appropriate. story applying the political tone of the era. The The book is laid out for the general Air Force author bases his categorization of lower risk and reader. The editor includes 112 well-selected il- upper risk cases on his interpretation of the sig- lustrations. which he has placed in the text at ap- nificance of their level of danger. His process of propriate spots. At the end of each chapter is a identifying the relative threat in his various case short section on "Sources.” It provides a guide to studies is seemingly set in concrete in chapter 2 further reading for those interested. There are no but becomes fluid by chapter 5. footnotes or endnotes. In this reviewer’s copy, 1 felt very comfortable with the author's in- unfortunately, the Government Printing Office sights into the worlds of the various presidents. binding is so shoddy that the pages started com- He seems to have a genuine understanding of ing out before the first reading was complete. both their political views and personal beliefs. While he uses this insight to develop the case Makers of the United States Air Force is good studies, the only part lacking is the view from the official history and partially fills a huge role in other end of the barrel. Unlike a fictionalized ac- Air Force history. All Air Force professionals count in which one can fabricate an answer or should read it to expand their understanding of possible course of action, without an insider’s their service. All of our professional military knowledge of Moscow’s true action and beliefs, schools should use it immediately. Once a few it is difficult to draw complete conclusions about cycles of students have read it. it should settle at every incident the way our author does. He does one level to avoid repetition. That level should a fine job in giving a factual accounting of the in- be Squadron Officer School. Read it—it’s fun. cidents as best we know it; however, you come away from the book with this small voice saying that we are the “bad guys” in this book. We are Lt Col Lorenzo M. Crowell, Jr., USAF the ones drawing our guns first. The author read- Maxwell AFB, Alabama ily admits that he does not have all the informa- 88 AIR POWER JOURNAL tion and that this fact can have an impact on how oscillation between offense and defense, be- our reaction to the various events/crises would tween “stealth” and "gotcha.” It is in the area of be tempered. This admission does not deter him, “novel technology" that The Future of Air Power however, from pointing the blame at the United is most captivating and germane. Working from States. F. W. Lanchester’s Square Law (developed in The author ends the book by looking to the fu- 1916}—a marginal increase in number is liable ture and the likelihood of future nuclear coer- to be more consequential than a marginal gain in cion. He feels that because of parity, future quality—Brown warns that the West’s long- nuclear threats should be minimal or non- vaunted technological edge may not eternally tip existent. He discusses a number of possibilities the balance away from Soviet numbers. However that would help the world avoid a nuclear show- “belated” Soviet imitation of Western high tech- down. One of the possibilities he discounts as nology may be—and Brown scarcely credits So- only appealing to “a political minority” is the viet R&D with even marginal innovation— United States becoming the lead nuclear power profound differences in priorities provide the again. 1 don’t agree that this idea appeals to only Soviets with a longer term opportunity for taking a political minority. I believe most Americans advantage of new technologies than the West en- would feel most comfortable with being in the joys. Technology, therefore, tends to be applied lead again. Allow me to make one final observa- in military terms faster in the Soviet Union than tion. Perhaps 1 am not the individual to whom in the West. Assuming the Soviets are less con- his book is targeted; however, if the purpose of strained by competing priorities than in the the book is to inform and make a couple of bucks, West, getting things off the drawing boards I’d drop a couple of the 10-dollar words and not faster—and in larger numbers—could result in a begin sentences with the word and. cumulative Western catastrophe. Capt lames C. Bauemfeind, USAF Fortunately, however, Lanchester’s Square Lowry AFB, Colorado Law is reduced in application by the scientific magic of the sigmoid, or S-curve, which refers to the progressive acceleration and retardation of improvements resulting from a given technolog- The Future of Air Power by Neville Brown. Lon- ical evolution. Thus, new genres of air weaponry don; Croom Helm, 1986, 309 pages, $27.50 hardback. tend to mature slowly and unsteadily. For example, the variable-geometry wing, made fa- Any attempt to link the past, present, and fu- mous in 1964 by the F-lll, was actually pat- ture of air power in technical, tactical, techno- ented in France in 1890 (13 years before the logical, psychological, and strategic terms must Wright Flyer) and extensively studied in a wind result in either a reckless jumble of nonsequiturs tunnel by the late 1940s. Similarly, cruise mis- or a stunning achievement. With Neville siles may have “come of age" in the 1970s but Brown’s The Future of Air Power, the result is they date to the 1920s and were seriously pur- unquestionably the latter. sued in the 1940s (in two particularly famous This is a highly readable, fascinating account versions—manned, the lapanese Kamikaze, and of a subject of near overwhelming proportions. unmanned, the German V-l). More common- Well documented and splendidly developed, place examples include radar, jet propulsion, Brown’s book reviews the history, present sta- and the helicopter. tus, and possible—if not likely—future of air Almost as fascinating is Brown's chapter on power, particularly in light of the technological economy and availability versus exotic capabil- dimension.The Future of Air Power devotes at- ity. Here unfolds the synergistic complication of tention to electronic warfare, airfield vulnerabil- spellbindingly wondrous—and spellbindingly ity, the balance in deterrence between manned expensive—technologies. Alas, however, a won- aircraft and ballistic missiles, geography, sur- drous "edge" doesn't stay sharp very long any prise attack, the continued importance of human more, and it may be readily nullified by an factors, and the long gestation period for new equally wondrous—and occasionally simple technology. and inexpensive—counter. Thus, a look-down, Brown, professor in International Security Af- shoot-down aircraft made of miracle materials, fairs, University of Birmingham (England), looks packed with black boxes, computers, IFFs, and at both Western and Soviet air doctrines and es- coated with multiple layers of radar-proof paint pecially how they are influenced by the endless may still be brought down by rifle bullets. Ad- NET ASSESSMENT 89

ditionally. how much added capability do we before, the three arms—land, sea, and air—must buy for every extra dollar we spend? Doubling work together. the cost seldom doubles the capability. To be The future always asks more questions than it sure, significant increases in expenditure tend to answers and Brown’s book is no exception. But provide only marginal increases in capability. if questions about the future cannot be answered For Brown, this is merely a fact of life and one readily, at least asking them can help prepare us that must be meshed with what we can or are for what we might otherwise inadequately antic- willing to afford. Evaluated in light of the Square ipate. The Future of Air Power provides a global Law, five items of reasonable capability at a cost and long-range look at a military dimension for of 2X each might be better—and certainly far which truly "the sky’s no limit.” This is a work cheaper—than three of slightly superior capabil- to learn from and to enjoy. Rare indeed. ity at a cost of 4X each. Lt Col Wayne A. Silkett, USA For Brown, nothing about aviation’s future is SHAPE, Belgium simple. Advances and counteradvances compli- cate exceedingly complex issues to a point of near hopelessness. Also complicating is time. Arms Control and the Atlantic Community by Just as the time for an innovation going from cut- Werner J. Feld. New York 10010: Praeger Pub- ting edge to obsolescence is now compressed, lishers, 1987, 192 pages, $35.95 hardback. time likely will be compressed in an East-West war, Brown believes. Whereas battle losses in Completed June 1986. published 1987, this previous conflicts may or may not have been de- slim volume is a salutary example of the unex- cisive at any given moment, they become in- pected stalking not just the unwary, but even the creasingly critical the shorter the war. Therefore, best prepared. mundane features such as airfield vulnerability, Werner Feld's opening premise is that the tactics, geography, weather, and human factors Chernobyl disaster should serve to focus all na- (fatigue, skill, motivation, valor) become all the tions' attention on the need for a responsible ap- more vital. proach to arms reductions, especially nuclear. Aircraft need not be destroyed, only damaged; The author’s preface regrets lack of progress on aircrews not killed, just wounded; and runways nuclear weapons reduction, claiming “we must not demolished, only cratered to achieve pro- do better in our arms control efforts” if we "want found tactical advantage. Less-than-perfect de- to avoid future Chernobyls.” Leaving aside this struction may be as useful—and much easier to not entirely helpful confusion of politico-mili- achieve (especially for the side with the advan- tary procedure and civilian industrial incompet- tage in numbers). Turning to the weather for an ence, one must still sympathize with an author example, Brown suggests that 10 or 15 percent of whose researches led him to his entirely reason- missions canceled or reduced in effectiveness by able assessment of lack of movement in East- poor weather may not be decisive in operations West discussions. Within months of publica- lasting months or years, but they may lose the tion, we now know, there was simply dramatic battle, campaign, and war when the time from forward movement. The December 1987 Wash- start to finish is weeks. ington INF accord will—if ratified—remove con- Accordingly, the historic capabilities of air siderable numbers of nuclear-delivery vehicles power—to achieve surprise, to mass—are mag- from the inventories of both East and West. nified in a shorter, albeit more intense, conflict. But Feld’s unfortunate timing is our gain. We Applying the Square Law, again superior num- can dip into his book with the benefit of hind- bers of relatively inferior aircraft, radars, antiair- sight. The approximately 100 pages of text (an- craft missiles, or aircrews may tip the balance other 40 contain a glossary, list of acronyms, and away from smaller numbers of superior items. the text of the 1979 SALT II Treaty) open with a Of all air power roles, none is more critical for review of arms control negotiations since SALT future warfare and none more demanding of II: nuclear, chemical, and conventional. Then planners and commanders of all services than Feld examines the history of the interplay be- close air support. Yet for all his emphasis on tac- tween the US and the European NATO partners tical warfare and close air support, Brown is no before assessing prospects for arms control in advocate of merging air forces back with armies. the second Reagan administration. Here again, But neither must air power be completely di- pursuing his principal theme of European inter- vorced from land and sea power. More than ever ests, he reflects on the possible spectrum of US- 90 AIR POWER fOURNAL

European interaction, and its influence on the holm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. chances of creating effective detente through Who would have believed it possible for a US arms control. The book closes by reviewing more Army colonel and his colleagues to move freely recent events (of 1986) and examining scenarios around and photograph a Soviet exercise near for the future, looking particularly at ways to de- Minsk, having demanded that right of inspection velop a common "European” defense policy. just 36 hours earlier? The author's bottom line is that the youth of to- Arms control is here to stay. Any newly awak- day can plan for a meaningful future only if there ened interest will doubtless be stimulated by is an end to the arms race and, in particular, if more of such surprises in the future. Feld's study they can then live in a nuclear-free world. provides a competent introduction to the topic. It is debatable whether such a world is attain- Group Capt Philip W ilkinson, RAF able, or indeed desirable. The process of scien- SHAPE, Belgium tific discovery does not lend itself to reversal. Nuclear know-how is here forever, like it or not. But a world with considerably reduced nuclear stockpiles, with stability in the conventional Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range Planning confrontation, is a worthwhile target. It has been for National Security by Perry M. Smith et al.. the stated aim of NATO’s defense policy since Washington, D.C. 20319: National Defense 1949. However, it has always been clear that University Press, 1987, 133 pages, $3.25 arms control, aimed at reducing manpower and paperback. weapons, could not be just an end in itself. It is a complement, a vital adjunct, to the search for po- When my wife saw this book she asked what it litical stability. was about. When I told her it dealt with planning Feld's book thus has a sound approach in deal- 10 to 20 years into the future, she laughed and ing not only with arms control efforts but also said, “They can’t even plan what you’re doing with the political interplay both between NATO next week. How can they expect to do anything nations themselves and between East and West. like that?” Certainly, any type of planning in- Some editorial confusions mar the presentation volves a degree of forecasting about the future. of historical data: the opening chapter, on nego- The further ahead you plan, the more forecasting tiating history, takes the reader up to early 1986. you must do. The final chapter has details from later that year Creating Strategic Vision is a collection of five (later, in fact, than when the author signed his essays dealing with long-range planning. The preface). That minor irritant does not devalue authors discuss the methods of forecasting and the overall survey. The central chapters are com- give us an example of one in action: alternative prehensive in coverage of European interests, es- futures. pecially in unraveling the complex threads of This is an important book. In the post-Reagan- European attitudes to SDI. The evolution of US buildup period Congress will be cutting the de- nuclear arms control policy is well documented. fense budget to help deal with the deficit. We No doubt many have had their attention can’t afford to buy every item available, so our drawn to arms control by the December 1987 acquisitions must have some type of direction— Washington ceremony. Feld’s book—and espe- a plan. This book is about making such a plan. cially his final chapter, written as the prospects The first essay, by Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, for such a ceremony were still far from bright— USAF, Retired, is an excellent introduction and is a readable and useful survey of recent events overview of long-range planning. According to in the processes of arms control. Those pro- General Smith, the key to long-range planning is cesses. to quote Feld, are usually “glacial” in freeing ourselves of restrictive thinking. One of their slowness. But 1987, the year after he fin- the best methods to accomplish this is alterna- ished his book, has seen remarkable events, not tive futures. As Smith puts it, “Bv considering a just in the nuclear arena. In February the 23 world beyond the year 2000 when the Soviet NATO and Warsaw Pact nations opened discus- Union might no longer be a superpower or when sions in Vienna which should lead to new ne- the United States might be facing one or more gotiations on conventional stability across the high-technology military threats or when the in- whole of Europe. In the closing months of 1987, ternational economic system has collapsed or teams of Eastern and Western military inspec- when a significant number of terrorist groups tors were implementing the terms of the Stock- possess suitcase-sized nuclear weapons, the Nlil ASSESSMENT 91 planner might find avenues of creative in- other than that it's still alive and appears to be quiry.”(p. 4) effective. General Smith stresses two other important The next essay, written by Col John H. Stewart points. First, the future is not beyond our con- 11, USAF, is an explanation of the nuts and bolts trol. Second, a strong commitment from the of long-range planning methods. Colonel Stew- leader is essential. One of the obstacles to long- art describes alternative futures and distin- range planning is determinism—believing the guishes between predictions and projections. A future is determined by forces outside our con- prediction is an idea or opinion about the future, trol. We can influence the future, and our tool is and a projection is an extrapolation from known long-range planning. By establishing our objec- data based on valid assumptions and current tives and our plan, we can make policy decisions trends. and acquisition decisions designed to make our Colonel Stewart also goes into long-range vision of the future come true. Maybe we can’t planning models, including the Futures Group's totally design and build the future, but we can strategy formulation process, William Ascher shape a part of it in our favor. To do this, we’ve and William Overholt’s strategic planning got to have strong commitment from the leader model, and the Air Force’s force structure devel- of our organization. Without that commitment opment model. He discusses how each model and support, long-range planning will never functions, points out key parts of each, and work. speaks to their strengths and weaknesses. The second essay, by Col Jerrold P. Allen, Another part of Colonel Stewart’s essay ex- USAF, is a comparison of long-range planning in plains alternative futures. Stewart probes deeply four US government agencies—the Navy, the into alternative futures methods, discussing Federal Emergency Management Agency trend extrapolation, simulation modeling, cross- (FEMA), NASA, and the Air Force. impact matrix analysis, and the Delphi tech- According to Colonel Allen, the Navy began nique. Once again, he tells us not only how each with a six-month study of business strategic works but also where they're most effective and planning and found what it thought were the where they’re least effective. necessary parts of a strategic planning program. There are also two methods not as grounded By far the most important part was active partic- in scientific method as the others: expert judg- ipation by the key leaders, but unfortunately this ment and genius forecasting. Although more in- part was lacking in the Navy's effort. Without the tuitive than the others these methods are every support of the Navy's leadership, its long-range bit as valid. Expert judgment is the judgment of planning organization withered on the vine and a person based on extensive expertise in the area was disbanded in June of 1982. in question. According to Stewart, “In virtually FEMA’s experience offers another example of all future-oriented work, Expert Judgment is the noninterest by key leadership. This resulted in a link between the real world and methodologies long-range planning program Allen calls vir- which would otherwise be sterile."(p. 80) Gen- tually nonexistent. ius forecasting is more of a vision springing forth The major success story of long-range plan- from the mind of a so-called Renaissance Person. ning is NASA. With strong, active participation Colonel Stewart identifies such figures as Isaac by its leadership NASA ran three major pro- Asimov and Herman Kahn as examples. As the grams—Mercury. Gemini, and Apollo—along author says, though, “The credibility of Genius with a host of unmanned explorations in the Forecasting relies almost totally on the credibil- span of one decade, culminating in manned ity of the person doing it," and our Renaissance landings on the moon. Until the Challenger dis- people “are in short supply.”(p. 81) aster, space shuttle flights had almost become The final essay, written by Dr F. Douglas routine. As Allen puts it. “Despite the Chal- Whitehouse, is a case study of how to do stra- lenger disaster and its current difficulties, NASA tegic planning. Doctor Whitehouse reviews how is the government's leader in the successful use to set national objectives based on national val- of long-range planning systems."(p. 30) ues and how to project future environments. The Air Force began its long-range planning These environments are based on what we know effort in 1978 and has since institutionalized the of past and current trends, events, and patterns process. Colonel Allen describes the formal pro- of interaction. Next, Doctor Whitehouse dis- cess in great detail. So far, no judgment can be cusses alternative strategies to match the differ- made on the success or failure of this program, ent environments—including a hedging strategy 92 AIR POWER JOURNAL

for use if unforeseen circumstances arise. the quality and fidelity of its officer corps, con- The second half of Whitehouse’s essay is an spired to build a case against him. According to example of setting US strategy to cope with two Synder, the Army used questionable and unre- alternative Soviet futures: one where the Soviet liable evidence, pressured prosecution wit- Union is weakened, and the other with an eco- nesses to ensure favorable testimony, nomically and militarily strong Soviet Union. suppressed evidence favorable to the accused, He stresses the need for a US strategy to encour- and attempted to intimidate witnesses favorable age the first outcome and to discourage the latter, to the defense. Synder also alleges that com- then he shows us how much a strategy might mand influence was present and evident to evolve. members of the court. This book serves as an excellent introduction Synder builds a prima facie case for the prop- to long-range planning. For such a small book osition that Ronald Alley was unfairly punished. it’s packed with information. From why we Unfortunately, he does not go beyond this initial should plan, to the methods of planning, to an showing. This at least seemed to be the opinion example of long-range planning, this is a well- of a majority of the Army Board for Correction of put-together addition to every professional's Military Records, which reviewed Synder’s evi- bookshelf. dence in 1982 and ruled that the court-martial Capt Albert T. Mackey, Jr., USAF decision had been “manifestly correct.” Synder Edwards AFB, California does not accept this decision and apparently feels that the Army is still practicing a “cover- up.” However, other than a generalized belief that Army officials do not want to admit that the A Soldier’s Disgrace by Don J. Synder. Peterbor- military justice system could have erred, he does ough, New 03458: Yankee Pub- not advance a credible motivation for a deliber- lishing, 1987, 254 pages, $15.95 hardback. ate cover-up of events which occurred over three On 3 November 1955 a jury of 10 United States decades ago. Army officers, convened as members of a general Ronald Alley died in 1978. He is thus past car- court-martial, voted to convict Maj Ronald E. Al- ing whether his honor is vindicated. But his ley, a US Army Reserve officer on extended ac- widow and his children still live, and the trag- tive duty, of multiple counts of unlawful edy of this story is that it appears from this ac- communication with the enemy while a prisoner count that it may have indeed been possible to of the North Koreans. They also recommended a prove that Alley was denied a fair trial. Synder’s sentence of dismissal from the service, forfeiture account of the hearing before the Army Board in of all pay and allowances, and 10 years confine- 1982 reveals that neither Synder nor the lawyer ment. This sentence was affirmed upon review. who was representing Alley’s family—appar- Major Alley thus became the only US military of- ently on a pro bono basis—was properly pre- ficer in this century actually convicted and sen- pared to present the case. The vote was close, tenced to prison for collaborating with the three to two. Had the evidence been better pre- enemy while a prisoner of war. sented, in standard legal form writh sworn state- The author attempts to show that the convic- ments and affidavits, it might have proved more tion of Major Alley was improper; that he was in persuasive. fact guilty of no conduct that would warrant con- These comments are not meant to demean viction on the charges; and that his actions as a Synder’s considerable efforts to right what he prisoner, while perhaps not strictly conforming perceives, perhaps correctly, as a terrible injus- tice. His documentation and assemblage of the to accepted practice, were justified under the unique circumstances. The author further argues facts may be adequate by journalistic standards, but as presented in his book, they do not meet that, in any event, Major Alley's conduct as a the standard of proof ordinarily required to over- prisoner was no worse than that of many other turn a court verdict. Nevertheless, the book will officers who were not prosecuted or convicted. convince many that Major Alley was unfairly To single him out for punishment was mani- treated by the Army, that he was innocent of the festly unfair. charges, and that he indeed was a man of honor, The basic thesis of the book is that the Army rather than a traitor. They may be right. needed a scapegoat; that for various reasons, which are detailed, Major Alley was a candidate; Lt Col Harvey J. Crawford, USAF and that the Army, eager to deflect criticism of Maxwell AFB, Alabama NET ASSESSMENT 93

I Can Write Better Than That! OK, then do it! Air power Journal is always looking for good ar- ticles written by our readers. If you’ve got something to say, send it to us. We’ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpower Journal focuses on the operational level of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are in- terested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the lack of those keep you from writ- ing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to ex- pand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force per- sonnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532. r I notams K

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional notices of noncommercial na- ture should be sent to: Editor. Airpower Journal. Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

USAF Academy Military History Symposium 0-2A Departs The Department of History at the United States The last of the 0-2A aircraft have left the inven- Air Force Academy has announced that its Thir- tory. Originally bought as light observation and teenth Military History Symposium will be held forward air control aircraft, they were used ex- 12-14 October 1988. The topic will focus on the tensively during the Vietnam War. In more re- role of intelligence in military operations. The cent years they were used as forward air control department has sponsored a symposium series training aircraft and in a utility role for Air Force since 1967, and all but the first symposium pro- Systems Command. ceedings have been published through the Office of Air Force History by the Government Printing B-lB Arrives Office. For further information please write to: The 100th B-lB aircraft rolled off the assembly Capt Mark Clodfelter. HQ USAFA/DFH. USAF line in January prior to delivery to McConnell Academy. CO 80840-5701. Telephone inquiries AFB, Kansas, in May. Final production was com- may be made at (303) 472-3230 or AUTOVON pleted a month and half ahead of schedule. The 259-3230. Air Force now has four wings of B-lB aircraft. Air Force Intelligence Conference 390th Bomb Group Air Force Intelligence is sponsoring a conference The 390th Bombardment Group (H) is seeking on "The Soviet Union—Towards the Twenty- memorabilia for its new museum. The museum, First Century: Political-Military Affairs in the located in Tucson, Arizona, former home of the Gorbachev Era.” The conference will be held 19- 390th Strategic Missile Wing, needs pictures and 22 October in Arlington, Virginia. Individuals memorabilia that reflect life and activity in the interested in presenting papers or participating European Theater of Operations during World in one of the panels should contact: Conference War II. For donations or information please on Soviet Affairs, AFIS/INIS. The Pentagon, write: Edward J. Dempsey, 22 South Westmin- Washington, DC 20330-5110, or telephone (202) ster Drive, Vincentown, NJ 08088. 695-7266.

94 contributors

Intelligence College His former position was research scientist. Center for Strategic Technology. Texas A&M University at Col- lege Station. Before retiring from the US Air Force in 1981. Dr Smith had tours as asso- ciate professor and head of geography. US Air Force Academy; faculty and staff with Armed Forces Air Intelligence Training Center; intelligence officer, 3d Tactical Fighter Wing. Bien Hoa. Republic of South Vietnam; and researcher at the Arctic. De- sert. Tropic Information Center. Aerospace Studies Institute. Air University. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. He was a contributor to the Air University Review. Dr Smith is a gradu- ate of Squadron Officer School. Air Com- mand and Staff College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Jacob W. Kipp (PhD. Pennsylvania State University) is a senior analyst with the So- viet Army Studies Office of the US Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leaven- worth. Kansas, and is currently coeditor with Robin Higham of the Garland Series. Ll Gen Evan W. Rosencrans. USAF. Retired Military History Bibliographies Dr Kipp (USMA: MBA. George Washington Univer- was a professor of Russian and Soviet his- sity). is director. Broadway Air Force Na- tory at Kansas Slate University and has tional Bank. San Antonio. Texas. A served as associate editor of Military Affairs command pilot with approximately 5.000 and Aerospace Historian. He has published flying hours, he has been an operations staff extensively in Russian and Soviet military officer with Headquarters Pacific Air Forces and naval history and coedited with Higham at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and in the Office of Soviet Aviation and Airpower (1977). the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Op- erations; a flight commander, flying safety officer, and assistant operations officer at Westover AFB. Massachusetts; a com- mander of the 531st Tactical Fighter Squad- ron at Misawa AB. Japan, and of the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing at Myrtle Beach AFB. South Carolina; and had assignments at Ramstein AB. West Germany, and Seoul. Col John R. Brancato (BA. Allegheny Col- South Korea. Before his retirement in 1981. lege; JD. Vanderbilt University) is staff judge General Rosencrans was a member of the advocate of the Ogden Air Logistics Center General Purpose Forces Branch of the Chair- (AFLC). Hill AFB. Utah. A US Air Force law- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Study yer with a long-standing interest in military Group During the Korean War. he served personnel law and military history, he has with the 80th Fighter-Bomber Squadron in had other assignments as stuff judge advo- South Korea and Japan. General Rosencrans cate or assistant staff judge advocate in SAC. is a graduate of Air Command and Stuff Col- TAG. MAC. USAFE. and PACAF. Colonel lege and the Industrial College of the Armed Brancato was deputy staff judge advocate at Forces. Headquarters Air Training Command and chief of the Military Personnel Law Division at the Air Force Military Personnel Center. He has published articles in professional law and other journals and has been a fre- quent lecturer on military law at the Air Force Judge Advocate General School and major command judge advocate confer- ences. Colonel Brancato is a graduate of Charles L. Smith (PhD. University of Geor- Squadron Officer School. Air Command and gia) is distinguished professor at the Defense Staff College, and Air War College.

95 Col William 0. S.uru |r . (JSAK Retired iPhD, Aruooa Stale L'nlver»ily|. i> i r n w r» march aaaociata. Space ami Flight Syitvms Laboratory. University of Colorado at Colo­ M a i M a r k Ik W e l l . 11‘S A F A M A f e e s . rado Springs He was director al flight sys­ Tech Ualsarsityl is e flight tnmiwende* with tems engineering. Aeronautical Systems the VStNh Flying Training Sipsedme Ran Division al Wright-Patlersoo AFB Ohio, at doiph AFB Tesaa A lanste pilot with m a s the timaol hia retirement alter a H -year mil than MOO flying hours he has served es en ilary carver Colonel Stunt held a variety at sasutsm predesnor id military history el the technical and management positions in Air US Air Force Academy e T IT instnahu Fane Systems Command, taught in tha En plkut at Rawas AFB. Teaaa and an alnrall gineermg Department al West Point and iommaivier ,n M t IV at Fam hild AFB served aa commander Frank I Seiler Re- Waahusgtun Mar» Walla la a Dutlnguiahed teanh Laboratory US Au Farce Academy Osduaiv at the Squadron (Mom Vhni He has written sis books and many articles snd the Air Command and Stall (adfagr Hs and waa a frequent rontrtbulor to the Air has w nttan bunk revirsra h r the Air Urweee University Review •sty Ib v im and the Airpmser Is s rs s l

0* BOARD OF ADVISERS

Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF. Office of Air Force History Dr Donald D. Chipman, Educational Adviser, Squadron O fficer School Col lames L. Cole, |r., USAF, Deputy Assistant for Joint Matters, ODJS Col Raymond A. Hamilton. Jr., USAF, AFROTC, University of Alabama Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr„ USAFR, Retired. Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn, Chief, Office of Air Force History’

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Strategic Defense Initiative “Over There1' in the Air