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SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONAL ART CASS SERIES on SOVIET MILITARY THEORY and PRACTICE Series Editor - David M SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONAL ART CASS SERIES ON SOVIET MILITARY THEORY AND PRACTICE Series Editor - David M. Glantz Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas This series examines in detail the evolution of Soviet military science and the way the Soviets have translated theoretical concepts for the conduct of war into concrete military practice. Separate volumes focus on how the Soviets have applied and refined theory in combat and on how they have structured their forces to suit the requirement of changing times. 1. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War 2. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle 3. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War 4. David M. Glantz, The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive 5. David M. Glantz, Soviet Air Assault: The Vertical Dimension of Maneuver SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONAL ART IN PURSUIT OF DEEP BATTLE Colonel David M. Glantz Acting Director, Soviet Army Studies Office, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas With a Foreword by General Carl E. Vuono Chief of Staff, United States Army FRANK CASS First published 1991 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon,OX144RN and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS 270 Madison Ave, New York NY 10016 Transferred to Digital Printing 2005 Copyright C 1991 David M. Glantz The views expressed here are those of the author. They should not necessarily be construed as those of the U.S. Department of Defense or the United States Army. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Glantz, David M. Soviet military operational art: in pursuit of deep battle. - (Soviet military theory and practice) 1. Soviet Union. Military forces, 1917-1979 I. Title II. Series 355\00947 ISBN 0-7146-3362-3 (cased) ISBN 0-7146-4077-8 (pbk) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Glantz, David M. Soviet military operational art: in pursuit of deep battle/ David M. Glantz. p. cm. — (Soviet military theory and practice) Includes index. ISBN 0-7146-3362-3 (cased) ISBN 0-7146-4077-8 (pbk) 1. Military art and science—Soviet Union—History—20th century. I. Title. II. Series: Glantz, David M. Soviet military theory and practice. U43.S65G57 1990 355\00947—dc20 89-31675 CIP All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be repro­ duced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited. To Colonel John Stewart (Ret) for his unwavering support in most difficult circumstances CONTENTS Tables ix Abbreviations xvi Foreword by General Carl E. Vuono xvii Preface by Christopher Donnelly xix Author's Preface xxiii 1. The Soviet Study of War 1 History and War 1 Military Doctrine 2 Military Science 5 Military Art 6 Military Strategy 8 Operational Art 10 Tactics 13 2. The Nature of Operational Art 16 Roots of Operational Art 16 Development of Operational Art 18 The Emergence of Deep Operations 24 The Test of War 27 Operations and the Revolution in Military Affairs 30 Reemergence of the Operational Level and the Rebirth of Deep Operations 35 3. The Framework of Operations 39 Missions 39 Territory 41 Actions 42 Forces 46 Conclusion 48 4. The Formative Years of Soviet Operational Art: 1917-1941 50 Introduction 50 The Civil War and Leninist Base of Military Doctrine (1917-1921) 53 viii SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONAL ART The Evolution of a Socialist Military Doctrine (1921-1929) 64 The Technical Reconstruction of the Armed Forces and the Theory of Deep Operations (1929-1937) 74 Crisis in the Soviet Military Establishment (1937-1941) 88 5. The Great Patriotic War and the Maturation of Operational Art: 1941-1945 99 Tragedy and Rebirth of an Army (1941-1942) 99 An Army in Transition (1943) 121 Triumph of Arms (1944-1945) 138 6. Operational Art and the Revolution in Military Affairs 159 The Last Stalin Years (1946-1953) 159 The Nuclear Era and the Revolution in Military Affairs (1953-1968) 177 7. Refinement of the Revolution in Military Affairs 205 Background 205 Force Structure 211 Military Doctrine 215 Military Strategy 218 Operational Art: Front and Army Operations 224 Tactics: Corps and Division Operations 237 Conclusion 243 8. Perspective on the Future 245 Background 245 Military Strategy 247 Operational Art and Tactics 251 Force Structure 258 Conclusion 265 Notes 267 Index 290 TABLES 1. Hierarchy of Terms 3 2. Definitions of Strategy and Tactics 17 3. Relationship of Terminology with Mission, Territory, Action, and Force 40 4. Forms of Combat Action 43 5. Front Composition: 1918-1921 58 6. Army Composition: 1918-1921 59 7. Front and Army Operational Formation: 1919-1920 60 8. Rifle (Infantry) Division Composition: 1918-1921 62 9. Combat Formation, 51st Rifle Division at Perekop, 1920 63 10. Rifle Corps TOEs: 1920s 67 11. Rifle Division TOEs: 1920s 67 12. Cavalry Division TOEs: 1920s 68 13. Front Operational Formation - 1930 71 14. Army Operational Formation - Offense 1930 72 15. Army Operational Formation — Defense 1930 73 16. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1930 74 17. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Defense 1930 75 18. Front Operational Formation 1936-1941 80 19. Shock Army Operational Formation 1936-1941 81 20. Army Operational Formation - Defense 1936-1941 82 21. Corps Combat Formation - Defense 1936-1941 84 22. Theoretical Army Structure: 1936 85 23. Rifle Corps TOEs: 1930s 85 24. Rifle Division TOEs: 1930s 85 25. Cavalry Forces: 1930s 86 26. Mechanized Forces: 1930s 87 27. Air Assault Forces: 1930s 88 28. Army Structure: 1940-1941 93 29. Rifle Forces: 1939-1941 94 30. Cavalry Forces: 1940-1941 94 X SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONAL ART 31. Tank Forces: 1938 95 32. Mechanized and Tank Forces: 1939-1940 95 33. Mechanized Forces: 1940-1941 96 34. Artillery Units: 1941 97 35. Air Assault Forces: 1941 97 36. Rifle Forces: December 1941 103 37. Rifle Forces: 1942 104 38. Tank Forces: December 1941 105 39. Cavalry Forces: December 1941 105 40. Tank Corps: 1942 106 41. Tank Armies: 1942 107 42. Mechanized Corps: September 1942 108 43. Front Operational Formation - Defense, Summer 1941 110 44. Army Operational Formation - Defense, Summer 1941 111 45. Front Operational Formation — Defense 1942 112 46. Army Operational Formation — Defense 1942 113 47. Front Operational Formation - 1941 114 48. Front Operational Formation - 1942 115 49. Army Operational Formation — 1941 116 50. Army Operational Formation - 1942 117 51. Rifle Division Combat Formation — Defense 1941 118 52. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Defense 1942 119 53. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1941 120 54. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1942 121 55. Rifle Forces: 1943 124 56. Cavalry Forces: 1943 125 57. Mechanized and Tank Forces - 1943 125 58. Front Operational Formation - Winter 1942-1943 130 59. Front Operational Formation - 1943 131 60. Army Operational Formation - Winter 1942-1943 132 61. Army Operational Formation — 1943-1944 133 62. Front Operational Formation - Defense 1943 134 63. Army Operational Formation - Defense 1943 135 64. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense Winter 1942-1943 136 65. Rifle Corps/Division Combat Formation - Offense Summer-Fall 1943 137 TABLES xi 66. Rifle Corps/Division Combat Formation - Defense Summer-Fall 1943 138 67. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Defense Winter 1942-1943 139 68. Rifle Forces: 1944-1945 142 69. Cavalry Forces: 1944-1945 143 70. Mechanized and Tank Forces: 1944-1945 144 71. Front Operational Formation - 1944-1945 148 72. Army Operational Formation - 1945 149 73. Front Operational Formation - Defense 1945 154 74. Army Operational Formation - Defense 1945 155 75. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1945 156 76. Rifle Corps/Division Combat Formation - Defense 1945 157 77. Postwar Reorganization of Forces 163 78. Front Operational Formation - 1946-1953 170 79. Army Operational Formation - 1946-1953 171 80. Rifle Corps Combat Formation — Offense 1946-1953 172 81. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1946-1953 173 82. Combined Arms Army Operational Formation - Defense 1946-1953 174 83. Rifle Corps Combat Formation - Defense 1946-1953 175 84. Rifle Division Combat Formation - Defense 1946-1953 176 85. The Zhukov Reorganization 181 86. Force Reorganization of 1961-1962 184 87. Force Reorganization of 1963-1968 186 88. Front Operational Formation - 1958-1962 187 89. Army Operational Formation - 1958-1962 188 90. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1958-1962: Against a Prepared Defense 189 91. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1958-1962: Against a Hasty Defense 190 92. Front Operational Formation - Defense 1958-1962 191 93. Combined Arms Army Operational Formation - Defense 1958-1962 192 xii SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONAL ART 94. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - Defense 1958-1962 193 95. Front Operational Formation - 1968 194 96. Army Operational Formation - 1968 195 97. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1968: Against a Prepared Defense 201 98. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - Offense 1968: Against a Hasty Defense 202 99. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - Defense 1968 203 100. Force Structure: 1987 212 101. Front Operational Formation - 1987: Against an Unprepared Defense 228 102. Front Operational Formation - 1987: Against a Partially Prepared Defense 229 103. Front Operational Formation - 1987: Against a Fully Prepared Defense 230 104. Army Operational Formation - 1987: Against an Unprepared Defense 232 105. Army Operational Formation - 1987: Against a Partially Prepared Defense 233 106. Army Operational Formation - 1987: Against a Fully Prepared Defense 234 107. Front Operational Formation - Defense 1987 236 108. Combined Arms Army Operational Formation - Defense 1987 237 109. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - 1987: Against an Unprepared Defense 240 110. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - 1987: Against a Partially Prepared Defense 241 111. Motorized Rifle Division Combat Formation - 1987: Against a Fully Prepared Defense 242 112.
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