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The Experience of Philosophy

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The Experience of Philosophy Contents Preface Vtl Part I: Beginning Philosophy 1. Plato, The Trial of Socrates 2 2. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority 23 3. Jiddu Krishnamurti, The Function ofEducation 30 4. Bertrand Russell, The Value of Philosophy 34 Part II: Where and When 5. Edwin Abbott, Flatland 40 6. Daniel Kolak and David Goloff, The Incredible Shrinking Zeno 57 7. Daniel Dennett, Where Am I? 71 8. Albert Einstein, On the Idea ofTime in Physics 80 9. Kadri Vihvelin, Time Travel: The Rules of the Road 84 Part III: Who 10. Daniel Kolak, Descartes among the Ruins 96 ll. Buddha, On Having No Self 104 12. D. E. Harding, On Having No Head 107 13. René Descartes, On Self and Substance 111 14. John Locke, Personal Identity 120 15. David Hume, Personal Identity 128 16. Thomas Reid, Critique ofLocke and Hume on BehalfofCommon Sense 131 17. Raymond Martin, Personal Identity from Plato to Padit 139 18. Char10tte Perkins Gilman, The Yellow Wallpaper 155 19. AdamjLinda Parascandola, Trans or Me? 168 lil iv CONTENTS Part IV: Preedom 20. Baron Holbach, The Illusion ofFree Will 176 21. David Hume, Liberty and Necessity 182 22. William James, The Dilemma of Determinism 194 23. G. E. Moore, Free Will 201 24. Richard Taylor, Freedom and Determinism 209 25. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Freedom 219 Part V: J(nowledge 26. Plato, Knowledge 226 27. René Descartes, Meditations 250 28. John Locke, Where Our 1deas Come From 259 29. George Berkeley, To Be ls to Be Perceived 263 30. Bertrand Russell, Perception, Knowledge, and 1nduction 268 31. D. M. Armstrong, The 1nfinite Regress ofReasons 282 Part VI: God 32. Anselm, The Ontological Argument 290 33. Thomas Aquinas, The Five Ways and the Doctrine of Analogy 294 34. Blaise Pascal, The Wager 297 35. W. K Clifford, The Ethics of Belief 300 36. William James, The Will to Believe 306 37. David Hume, God and Evil 311 38. Robert Merrihew Adams, Must God Create the Best? 319 39. Raymond Martin, The Elusive Messiah 327 40. Kwasi Wiredu, Religion from an Mrican Perspective 338 41. H. L. Mencken, Memorial Service 349 42. Georges Rey and Christopher Bernard, Does Anyone Really Believe in God? An Exchange 352 Part VII: Reality 43. David Hume, Causation, Reality, and Fiction 368 44. Albert Einstein, Considerations on the Universe as a Whole 373 45. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 377 46. Robert Nozick, Fiction 380 Contents v 47. Daniel Kolak, Quantum Cosmology, the Anthropic Principle, and Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? 383 48. Derek Parfit, The Puzzle ofReality: Why Does the Universe Exist? 409 Part VIII: Experience 49. Thomas Hobbes, Of Sense and Imagination 418 50. John Locke, Experience and Understanding 422 Sl. David Hume, The Senses 432 52. Immanuel Kant, Percepts and Concepts 436 53. Douglas R. Hofstadter, A Coffeehouse Conversation on the Turing Test 449 54. Garrett Thomson and Philip Turetzky, A Simple Guide to Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 463 55. Sara Vollmer, Observation: Whaťs Wrong with the Standard Account and How It Can Be Fixed . 478 Part IX: Consciousness 56. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene 486 57. Arnold Zuboff, The Story of a Brain 491 58. Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat? 498 59. Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia 505 60. Paul Churchland, Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection ofBrain States 508 61. Melinda Roberts, The Reality ofColor 516 Part X: Death 62. Plato, Death and Immortality 526 63. David Hume, Of the Immortality of the Soul 534 64. Raymond Martin, Survival of Bodily Death: A Question ofValues 538 65. Thomas W. Clark, Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity 555 66. Daniel Kolak, The Wine Is in the Glass 565 Part XI: Meaning 67. Leo Tolstoy, My Confession 572 68. Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus 578 69. Richard Taylor, Is Life Meaningful? 582 70. Raymond Martin, A Fast Car and a Good Woman 588 vi CONTENTS Part XII: Ethics 71. Immanuel Kant, The Categorical Imperative 598 72. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 602 73. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 606 74. Mary Wollstonecraft, The Rights ofWomen 613 75. Jonathan Bennett, The Conscious ofHuckleberry Finn 620 76. John White, The Metaphysics of Anti-Semitism 627 77. Richard Garner, Amoralism 639 Part XIII: Values 78. Plato, The Myth ofGyges's Ring 648 79. Aristotle, Virtue and Character 652 80. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 662 81. Jonathan Glover, Openness 672 82. G. E. Moore, Intrinsic Value 679 Epilog: Concluding Unphilosophical Postscript 83. Robert Nozick, A Portrait of the Philosopher as a Young Man 688 84. Freeman Dyson, On Becoming a Philosopher 689 Glossary 691 .
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