Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings Is a Comprehensive Anthology That Includes Classic and Contemporary Readings from Leading Philosophers

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings Is a Comprehensive Anthology That Includes Classic and Contemporary Readings from Leading Philosophers 11 111 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 11 11 Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings is a comprehensive anthology that includes classic and contemporary readings from leading philosophers. Addressing most major topics within the philosophy of mind, O’Connor and Robb have carefully chosen articles under the following headings: • Substance Dualism and Idealism • Materialism • Mind and Representation 111 • Consciousness Articles by the following thinkers are included: Zimmerman Swinburne Lowe Robinson 11 Smart Kripke Zuboff Lewis Putnam Block Chalmers Fodor Dretske Searle Davidson Dennett Churchland Levine McGinn Jackson Carruthers Harman Hasker Lockwood Unger Kim 111 Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay written by the editors, which aims to guide the student gently into the topic. The book is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject including discussion of leading philosophers in the field. Ideal for any philosophy student, this book will prove essential reading for any philosophy of mind course. Timothy O’Connor is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. He is editor of Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (1995) and author of Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (2000). 111 David Robb is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Davidson College. He is the author of several articles on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. 11 Routledge Contemporary Readings in Philosophy Series Editor: Paul K. Moser, Loyola University of Chicago Routledge Contemporary Readings in Philosophy is a major new series of philosophy anthologies aimed at undergraduate students taking core philos- ophy disciplines. It is also a companion series to the highly successful Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy. Each book of read- ings provides an overview of a core general subject in philosophy offering students an accessible transition from introductory to higher-level under- graduate work in that subject. Each chapter of readings will be carefully selected, edited, and introduced. They will provide a broad overview of each topic and will include both classic and contemporary readings. Philosophy of Science Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg Metaphysics Michael J. Loux Epistemology Michael Huemer with introduction by Robert Audi Philosophy of Mind Timothy O’Connor and David Robb 11 111 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Contemporary Readings 11 11 Edited by Timothy O’Connor and David Robb 111 11 111 111 11 First published 2003 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London ECP4 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Editorial matter © 2003 David Robb and Timothy O’Connor All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Philosophy of mind: contempory readings/edited by Timothy O’Connor and David Robb. p. cm. – (Routledge contemporary readings in philosophy) Designed to be used with: Philosophy of mind/John Heil. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Philosophy of mind. I. O’Connor, Timothy, 1965– II. Robb, David, 1966– III. Heil, John. Philosophy of mind. IV. Series. BD418.3.P47 2003 128′.2–dc21 2002044532 ISBN 0-203-98769-1 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0–415–28353–1 (hbk) ISBN 0–415–28354–X (pbk) 11 111 CONTENTS 11 11 List of contributors ix Preface xi PART I: SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND IDEALISM 1 Introduction 3 Further Reading 10 111 IA SUBSTANCE DUALISM 13 1 Dean W. Zimmerman, “Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the Soul” 15 2 Richard Swinburne, “The Soul” 30 11 IB THE PROBLEM OF INTERACTION 47 3 E.J. Lowe, “The Problem of Psychophysical Causation” 49 4 Jaegwon Kim, “Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism” 65 IC IDEALISM 79 111 5 Howard Robinson, “The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleian Idealism” 81 Questions 103 PART II: MATERIALISM 105 Introduction 107 Further Reading 118 111 IIA THE IDENTITY THEORY 119 6 J.J.C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” and 11 “Postscript (1995)” 121 v CONTENTS 7 Saul A. Kripke, “Naming and Necessity” 138 8 Jaegwon Kim, “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction” 159 9 Arnold Zuboff, “The Story of a Brain” 185 IIB FUNCTIONALISM 195 10 David Lewis, “Reduction of Mind” 197 11 Hilary Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States” 210 12 Ned Block, “Troubles with Functionalism” 222 13 David J. Chalmers, “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia” 234 Questions 255 PART III: MIND AND REPRESENTATION 257 Introduction 259 Further Reading 267 IIIA INTENTIONALITY 269 14 Jerry A. Fodor, “Meaning and the World Order” 271 15 Fred Dretske, “Representational Systems” 304 16 John R. Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs” 332 IIIB PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES AND ELIMINATIVISM 353 17 Donald Davidson, “Thought and Talk” 355 18 Daniel C. Dennett, “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works” 370 19 Paul M. Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes” 391 Questions 413 PART IV: CONSCIOUSNESS 415 Introduction 417 Further Reading 424 IVA THE PROBLEM OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS 425 20 Joseph Levine, “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap” 427 21 Colin McGinn, “Can We Solve the Mind–Body Problem?” 438 22 Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know” 458 vi CONTENTS 11 IVB MATERIALIST THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 465 23 David Lewis, “What Experience Teaches” 467 24 Gilbert Harman, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience” 491 25 Peter Carruthers, “Brute Experience” 510 111 IVC CONSCIOUSNESS AND ALTERNATIVE VARIETIES OF DUALISM 523 26 William Hasker, “Emergent Dualism” 525 27 Michael Lockwood, “The Grain Problem” 542 11 28 Peter Unger, “The Mystery of the Physical and the Matter of Qualities: A Paper for Professor Shaffer” 560 11 Questions 590 Index 591 111 11 111 111 11 vii RUNNING HEAD 11 111 CONTRIBUTORS 11 11 Ned Block is Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at New York University. Peter Carruthers is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland. David J. Chalmers is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona. 111 Paul M. Churchland is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. Donald Davidson is Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor of Philosophy 11 at the University of California, Berkeley. Daniel C. Dennett is University Professor, Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, and Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. 111 Fred Dretske is Senior Research Scholar at Duke University and Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University. Jerry A. Fodor is State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. Gilbert Harman is Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. William Hasker is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Huntington College. 111 Frank Jackson is Professor of Philosophy in the Philosophy Program, 11 Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. ix CONTRIBUTORS Jaegwon Kim is William Herbert Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. Saul A. Kripke was McCosh Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University until his retirement in 1998. He is currently Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduate Center. Joseph Levine is Professor of Philosophy at Ohio State University. David Lewis was, until his death in 2001, the Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. Michael Lockwood is Lecturer in Philosophy in the Department for Continuing Education at Oxford University. E.J. Lowe is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Durham. Colin McGinn is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. Hilary Putnam is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. Howard Robinson is Professor of Philosophy at Central European University and Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. John R. Searle is Mills Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley. J.J.C. Smart was Professor of Philosophy at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University from 1976 until his retire- ment at the end of 1985. He is currently an Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Monash University. Richard Swinburne is Emeritus Nolloth Professor of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion and Emeritus Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford University. Peter Unger is Professor of Philosophy at New York University. Dean W. Zimmerman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. Arnold Zuboff is Lecturer in Philosophy at University College London. x 11 111 PREFACE 11 The sciences of the mind have grown rapidly since the mid-twentieth century. There is now a sizeable body of empirical knowledge concerning the structures and processes in the human brain which underpin, e.g., 11 thought, sensation, and emotion. More generally, the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science is burgeoning on several fronts. Contemporary philo- sophical reflection about the mind – which has been quite intensive – has been influenced by this empirical inquiry, to the extent that the boundary lines between them are blurred in places. Nonetheless, the philosophy of mind at its core remains a branch of metaphysics, traditionally conceived. Philosophers continue to debate 111 foundational issues in terms not radically different from those in vogue in previous eras. The present volume gathers together some of the best recent writing on such issues.
Recommended publications
  • Gibson's Ecological Approach: Perceiving What Exists
    1 TRENDS IN INTERDISCIPLINARY STU DIES AVANT The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard AVANT Pismo awangardy filozoficzno-naukowej 2/2012 EDITORS OF THIS ISSUE / REDAKTORZY TEGO NUMERU Witold Hensel, Dawid Lubiszewski, Przemysław Nowakowski, Nelly Strehlau, Witold Wachowski TORUŃ 3 ISSN: 2082-6710 AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard AVANT. Pismo Awangardy Filozoficzno-Naukowej Vol. III, No. 2/2012 (October-December 2012), English Issue Toruń 2012 The texts are licensed under / Teksty udostępniono na licencji: CC BY-NC-ND 3.0. Graphics design / Opracowanie graficzne: Karolina Pluta & Jacek S. Podgórski. Cover/Okładka: pictures by / obrazy autorstwa: Teresa Young (front/przód: "The Ripple Effect"; back/tył: " Flight Of The Humblebee"). Graphics inside by / Grafika wewnątrz autorstwa: Karolina Pluta. Address of the Editorial Office / Adres redakcji: skr. poczt. nr 34, U.P. Toruń 2. Filia, ul. Mazowiecka 63/65, 87-100 Toruń, Poland www.avant.edu.pl/en [email protected] Publisher / Wydawca: Ośrodek Badań Filozoficznych, ul. Stawki 3/20, 00-193 Warszawa, Poland www.obf.edu.pl Academic cooperation: university workers and PhD students of Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń, Poland). Współpraca naukowa: pracownicy i doktoranci Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. The Journal has been registered in District Court in Warsaw, under number: PR 17724. Czasopismo zarejestrowano w Sądzie Okręgowym w Warszawie pod numerem: PR 17724. ADVISORY BOARD / RADA NAUKOWA Chairman/Przewodniczący: Włodzisław
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Merleau-Ponty for Cognitive Science
    Chapter 1 1 Merleau-Ponty for Cognitive Science Preamble: A Remarkable Convergence My attention was first drawn to the relevance of Merleau-Ponty for cognitive science through reading Andy Clark's Being There (1997). Clark indicates that Merleau-Ponty's depiction of everyday intelligent activities in terms of "the playing out of whole organism-body-world synergies" is close in spirit and execution to Clark's own project. Moreover, Clark is particularly fond of Merleau-Ponty's stress on the activity of the organism in perception, and he coins the term 'continuous reciprocal causation' to describe this interaction between perceiver and perceived. Clark thus sees Merleau-Ponty as presenting a kind of 'free-form interactive dance' view of perception, which he endorses on the grounds of its compatibility with "recent work in the computational foundations of animate vision." (Clark 1997, p172) I want to take a moment to look at the compatibility that Clark refers to – with the findings of researchers in animate vision – which I think is surprisingly compelling. I offer this as a kind of intuition pump for appreciating the affinity between Merleau-Ponty's writing and certain developments within cognitive science. In the main part of this chapter, I'll go through the ways in which this affinity has been cashed out, supported, and formalised. Merleau-Ponty and animate vision Animate vision is a new engineering paradigm of robot vision which seeks to replace the traditional account of a system which constructs and updates an accurate 3-D model of the viewer's surroundings. This traditional approach is often unfavourably referred to as passive or pure vision and is generally criticised on the grounds that it makes infeasible computational demands on the observer robot, especially when it comes to tasks involving a moving object, a moving observer, or, in the worst case, both.
    [Show full text]
  • Perspectives on Ethical Leadership: an Overview Drs Ir Sophia Viet MTD
    Perspectives on ethical leadership: an overview drs ir Sophia Viet MTD Paper submitted to the International Congress on Public and Political Leadership 2016 Draft version. Do not site or quote without the author’s permission Abstract There is a growing scientific interest in ethical leadership of organizations as public confidence in organizational leaders continues to decline. Among scholarly communities there is considerable disagreement on the appropriate way to conceptualize, define and study ethical leadership. This disagreement is partly due to the ontological and epistemological differences between the scholarly communities, resulting in different views of organizations, on the role of organizational leadership in general, and on ethical leadership of organizations in particular. Because of the differences in their ontological and epistemological assumptions scholars endlessly debate the concept of ethical leadership. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the academic concepts of ethical leadership by classifying these concepts in terms of their ontological and epistemological assumptions and views of organizations into the modern, symbolic and the critical perspectives of postmodernism and communitarianism. Each category represents a particular set of perspectives on organizations, business ethics, and ethical leadership. The overview can serve as a guide to decode the academic debate and to determine the positions of the scholars participating in the debate. In addition it can serve as a multi-perspective-framework to study lay concepts of ethical leadership of (executive) directors of contemporary organizations. In this article the overview serves as a guide of how to classify some of the most common concepts in the debate on ethical leadership. Introduction There is a growing scientific interest in ethical leadership of organizations as public confidence in organizational leaders continues to decline.
    [Show full text]
  • Epistemology After the Modal Turn Traditionally
    Philosophy 513/Topics in Recent and Contemporary Philosophy: Epistemology after the Modal Turn Princeton University Spring 2019 Tuesdays 7-9:50 Marx 201 Professor Thomas Kelly 221 1879 Hall [email protected] Traditionally, philosophers have often given a starring role to notions like evidence and reasons for belief when theorizing about knowledge. However, in the last decades of the twentieth century and the opening decades of the twentieth-first, this traditional paradigm has been largely supplanted by alternative approaches. There are at least two complementary sources for this relatively recent, radical break with tradition. First, Edmund Gettier’s apparent refutation of “the traditional analysis of knowledge,” along with the failure of early, theoretically conservative attempts to “patch” that analysis, loosened the hold of the traditional paradigm on the philosophical imagination and created a demand for novel theoretical frameworks. More constructively, that demand for innovative approaches was met when the modal revolution, which had first entered analytic philosophy through logic and metaphysics (think Kripke, Lewis) hit epistemology. When epistemology took the modal turn, the result was an entirely new set of intriguing frameworks and powerful conceptual tools for theorizing about knowledge and related notions. Among these are the ideas that that we should think of knowledge in terms of the elimination of contextually salient possibilities (Lewis), that it consists in tracking facts (Nozick, Roush), and the increasingly influential picture of knowledge as safe belief (Williamson, Sosa). We will critically examine this currently flourishing tradition, beginning with seminal accounts by Lewis and Nozick, and continuing up to some of the latest developments.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom and Determinism (Topics in Contemporary Philosophy)
    1 Determinism: What We Have Learned and What We Still Don’t Know John Earman 1 Introduction The purpose of this essay is to give a brief survey of the implications of the theories of modern physics for the doctrine of determinism. The survey will reveal a curious feature of determinism: in some respects it is fragile, re- quiring a number of enabling assumptions to give it a fighting chance; but in other respects it is quite robust and very difficult to kill. The survey will also aim to show that, apart from its own intrinsic interest, determinism is an excellent device for probing the foundations of classical, relativistic, and quantum physics. The survey is conducted under three major presuppositions. First, I take a realistic attitude toward scientific theories in that I assume that to give an interpretation of a theory is, at a minimum, to specify what the world would have to be like in order for the theory to be true. But we will see that the demand for a deterministic interpretation of a theory can force us to abandon a naively realistic reading of the theory. Second, I reject the “no laws” view of science and assume that the field equations or laws of motion of the most fundamental theories of current physics represent science’s best guesses as to the form of the basic laws of nature. Third, I take deter- minism to be an ontological doctrine, a doctrine about the temporal evo- lution of the world. This ontological doctrine must not be confused with predictability, which is an epistemological doctrine, the failure of which need not entail a failure of determinism.
    [Show full text]
  • Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition*
    1 Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition* In recent decades, an intriguing view of human cognition has garnered increasing support. According to this view, which I will call ‘the hypothesis of extended cognition’ (‘HEC’, hereafter), human cognitive processing literally extends into the environment surrounding the organism, and human cognitive states literally comprise—as wholes do their proper parts— elements in that environment; in consequence, while the skin and scalp may encase the human organism, they do not delimit the thinking subject.1 The hypothesis of extended cognition should provoke our critical interest. Acceptance of HEC would alter our approach to research and theorizing in cognitive science and, it would seem, significantly change our conception of persons. Thus, if HEC faces substantive difficulties, these should be brought to light; this paper is meant to do just that, exposing some of the problems HEC must overcome if it is to stand among leading views of the nature of human cognition. The essay unfolds as follows: The first section consists of preliminary remarks, mostly about the scope and content of HEC as I will construe it. Sections II and III clarify HEC by situating it with respect to related theses one finds in the literature—the hypothesis of embedded cognition * I would like to thank Aaron Meskin, David Chalmers, Philip Robbins, and Josh Osbun for comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Shorter versions of the paper were presented at the Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference (2001), Texas Tech University, and the 2002 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association.
    [Show full text]
  • Approaching Contemporary Philosophy Historically
    APPROACHING CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS HISTORICALLY: On IDEALISMS, REALISMS, and PRAGMATISMS, Combining Undergraduate Teaching & Research Cinzia Ferrini University of Trieste [email protected] Abstract: As guest editor of this special issue of Esercizi Filosofici, the author introduces Kenneth R. Westphal’s and Paolo Parrini’s position papers on pragmatism, idealism and realism by elucidating the background and rationale of the workshop she organized on 29 April, 2015 at the Department of Humanities of the University of Trieste, within the frame- work of her undergraduate course in «History of Modern and Contemporary Philosophy». The Appendix lists questions posed by students and by the audience, to which the invited speakers replied in discussion following the presentations; their respective replies follow their main papers. Key Words: Teaching systematic philosophy historically; research and teaching for under- graduates; contemporary issues and modern philosophy; pragmatism. 1. Background The workshop, «A Real Dialogue on an Ideal Topic», with Kenneth R. Westphal1 and Paolo Parrini2 on idealism, realism and pragmatism took 1 Kenneth Westphal has held (full) professorships in philosophy in England (Norwich, Canterbury), visiting professorships at Northwestern University and at the Martin Luther Universität Halle (a.d.Salle), and research fellowships in Heidelberg, Bielefeld (twice) and Göttingen. He has now settled in Istanbul as Professor of Philosophy at Boðaziçi Üniversi- tesi. The main focus of his research is on the character
    [Show full text]
  • 5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism Robert L
    Contemporary Civilization (Ideas and Institutions Section XII: The osP t-Enlightenment Period of Western Man) 1958 5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism Robert L. Bloom Gettysburg College Basil L. Crapster Gettysburg College Harold A. Dunkelberger Gettysburg College See next page for additional authors Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/contemporary_sec12 Part of the European Languages and Societies Commons, History Commons, and the Philosophy Commons Share feedback about the accessibility of this item. Bloom, Robert L. et al. "5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism. Pt XII: The osP t-Enlightenment Period." Ideas and Institutions of Western Man (Gettysburg College, 1958), 53-69. This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/ contemporary_sec12/5 This open access book chapter is brought to you by The uC pola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The uC pola. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 5. Immanuel Kant and Critical Idealism Abstract The ideas of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) are significant enough to be compared to a watershed in Western thought. In his mind were gathered up the major interests of the Enlightenment: science, epistemology, and ethics; and all of these were given a new direction which he himself described as another Copernican revolution. As Copernicus had shown that the earth revolved around the sun, rather than the sun around the earth, so Kant showed that the knowing subject played an active and creative role in the production of his world picture, rather than the static and passive role which the early Enlightenment had assigned him.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century Jason Stanley Rutgers University
    Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century Jason Stanley Rutgers University In the Twentieth Century, Logic and Philosophy of Language are two of the few areas of philosophy in which philosophers made indisputable progress. For example, even now many of the foremost living ethicists present their theories as somewhat more explicit versions of the ideas of Kant, Mill, or Aristotle. In contrast, it would be patently absurd for a contemporary philosopher of language or logician to think of herself as working in the shadow of any figure who died before the Twentieth Century began. Advances in these disciplines make even the most unaccomplished of its practitioners vastly more sophisticated than Kant. There were previous periods in which the problems of language and logic were studied extensively (e.g. the medieval period). But from the perspective of the progress made in the last 120 years, previous work is at most a source of interesting data or occasional insight. All systematic theorizing about content that meets contemporary standards of rigor has been done subsequently. The advances Philosophy of Language has made in the Twentieth Century are of course the result of the remarkable progress made in logic. Few other philosophical disciplines gained as much from the developments in logic as the Philosophy of Language. In the course of presenting the first formal system in the Begriffsscrift , Gottlob Frege developed a formal language. Subsequently, logicians provided rigorous semantics for formal languages, in order to define truth in a model, and thereby characterize logical consequence. Such rigor was required in order to enable logicians to carry out semantic proofs about formal systems in a formal system, thereby providing semantics with the same benefits as increased formalization had provided for other branches of mathematics.
    [Show full text]
  • 2.2 Glock Et Al
    Journal for the History of Book Symposium: Analytical Philosophy Hans-Johann Glock, What is Analytic Philosophy? Volume 2, Number 2 Introduction Hans-Johann Glock..................... 1 Editor in Chief Mark Textor, King’s College London Commentaries Guest Editor Leila Haaparanta......................... 2 Mirja Hartimo, University of Helsinki Christopher Pincock....................6 Editorial Board Panu Raatikainen........................11 Juliet Floyd, Boston University Graham Stevens.......................... 28 Greg Frost-Arnold, Hobart and William Smith Colleges Ryan Hickerson, University of Western Oregon Replies Henry Jackman, York University Hans-Johann Glock..................... 36 Sandra Lapointe, McMaster University Chris Pincock, Ohio State University Richard Zach, University of Calgary Production Editor Ryan Hickerson Editorial Assistant Daniel Harris, CUNY Graduate Center Design Douglas Patterson and Daniel Harris ©2013 The Authors What is Analytic Philosophy? shall not be able to respond to all of the noteworthy criticisms and questions of my commentators. I have divided my responses ac- Hans-Johann Glock cording to commentator rather than topic, while also indicating some connections between their ideas where appropriate. Let me start by thanking the Journal for the History of Analytical Phi- losophy for offering me this opportunity to discuss my book What is Analytical Philosophy? (Cambridge, 2008). I am also very grateful Hans-Johann Glock for the valuable feedback from the contributors. And I thank both University of Zurich the journal and the contributors for their patience in waiting for [email protected] my replies. I was pleased to discover that all of my commentators express a certain sympathy with the central contention of my book, namely that analytic philosophy is an intellectual movement of the twentieth-century (with roots in the nineteenth and offshoots in the twenty-first), held together by family-resemblances on the one hand, ties of historical influence on the other.
    [Show full text]
  • Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: from Planets to Mallards
    Scientific enquiry and natural kinds: From planets to mallards a philosophical monograph by P.D. Magnus pmagnus<at>fecundity.com This is the authors' final draft. Any citations should refer to the final typeset book, published by Palgrave Macmillan. In addition to canonical pagination and nice binding, the book has a cool picture of mallards on the cover. DOI: 10.1057/9781137271259 c 2012 P.D. Magnus, except where indicated; some figures are used by per- mission or under open licenses Acknowledgements5 Introduction7 1 How to think about natural kinds 10 A Why history is no help...................... 11 B Some criteria considered..................... 13 B.1 The induction assumption................ 14 B.2 The essence assumption................. 24 B.3 The science assumption................. 25 B.4 The law assumption................... 26 B.5 Artifacts and artificial kinds............... 28 B.6 The sharpness assumption................ 31 B.7 Starting with language.................. 34 B.8 The intrinsic feature assumption............. 37 B.9 The hierarchy assumption................ 41 1 B.10 The scarcity assumption................. 43 B.11 The implicit simpliciter assumption........... 44 C Keeping score........................... 50 2 A modest definition 52 A First formulation......................... 52 B More or less natural kinds.................... 54 B.1 Lessons from underdetermination............ 55 B.2 The lessons applied.................... 57 C Induction redux.......................... 59 D Natural kinds for settled science................. 61 D.1 Example: the domain of chemistry........... 62 D.2 Fungible kinds....................... 66 3 Natural kinds put to work 72 A Eight planets, great planets................... 72 A.1 Numerology and asteroids................ 74 A.2 Enter Pluto........................ 75 A.3 The constraints of astronomy.............. 78 A.4 Natural kinds and the fate of Pluto..........
    [Show full text]
  • A Perspective on the Mind-Body Problem, with Particular Reference to the Philosophy of Spinoza
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by SAS-SPACE 1 A PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA MARGARET GULLAN-WHUR A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts, University of London Department of Philosophy University College London May 1996 2 ABSTRACT Spinoza's thesis of non-reductive monism was conceived in critical response to earlier dualist and materialist theories of mind. He rejects dualism with respect to both God- Nature and mind-body, yet his principles mark off the mental as severely as is possible without forfeiting monism, showing his awareness that monism (attribute identity) threatens mental irreducibility. The constraints Spinoza imposes in order to preserve mental irreducibility and to make human beings partial expressions of one thinking and extended substance produce a tension between mental autonomy and mind-body identity. However, I propose that while this remains a serious philosophical problem, some degree of tension must persist in any non-reductive monism which succeeds in giving the mental a weighting equal to the physical, and that Spinoza's sensitivity to this requirement is instructive. I argue, on the other hand, that Spinoza's theory of mind is irrevocably damaged by his turning of the traditional Mind of God into the Mind of the Whole of Nature in so far as he extrapolates from this Mind of God-or-Nature to finite minds. In characterising finite minds as partial expressions of "God's" infinite intellect I believe Spinoza becomes caught between his unorthodox conception of God's Mind as all-inclusive and a retained conception of the Mind of God as all truths.
    [Show full text]