University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1984 A new perspective on the mind-body problem. Jesse L. Yoder University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Yoder, Jesse L., "A new perspective on the mind-body problem." (1984). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2055. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2055 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. UMASS/AMHERST A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM A Dissertation Presented By Jesse L. Yoder Submitted to the Graduate School of University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 1984 Philosophy A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM A Dissertation Presented By JESSE L. YODER Approved as to style and content by: Gareth Matthews, Chairperson of Committee JinJU Vere Chappell , Member / » A Cynl^hU Freeland, Member Lf M ^ ' Michael Arbib, Member Michael Jubien, Department Department of Philosophy DEDICATION To Feroline Whitehead, Gareth Matthews, and Tech. Pubs, at Wang. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people deserve mention for their help at various points in my career. I will mention them in roughly chronological order. While I received much valuable help from many of my philosophy teachers at the University of Maryland, several deserve particular mention. Peter Goldstone was my first philosophy teacher and spent many hours explaining philosophy to me. I learned a lot about writing and criticism from Alan Pasch in his seminar on Necessity at the University of Maryland. I learned about Wittgenstein and other contemporary topics from Jack Odell. Many other members of the University of Maryland philosophy faculty and graduate students deserve credit for the many hours they spent teaching me philosophy and discussing philosophy with me during my undergraduate career. It was at Maryland during my sophomore year in college that I first became interested in the mind-body problem and decided to write my Ph.D. dissertation on this subject. At The Rockefeller University I had the opportunity to discuss philosophy freely with many teachers and students. I am especially Philosophy grateful to Joel Feinberg for his Social Philosophy and I believe I learned of Law tutorials at The Rockefeller University. from any more about careful writing and criticism from him than Frankfurt for the many other person. I would like to thank Harry iv hours we spent in tutorials on Philosophy of Mind and Descartes. I also received much insight into the mind-body problem from discussions with Donald Davidson. Norton Batkin, Alan Berger, Adina Schwartz, and Jonathan Lear as fellow students and as friends provided much encouragement, support, and helpful criticism. I am grateful to the members of my dissertation committee with whom I also took courses at the University of Massachusetts. These members include Gareth Matthews, Vere Chappell, Cynthia Freeland, and Michael Arbib. I could not have completed my dissertation in so timely a fashion without Gary Matthews' quick and helpful responses to every chapter I submitted. I have made every effort to incorporate comments made by the members of my dissertation committee in the final version. I would also like to thank my friends in the Technical Publications department at Wang Laboratories for their encouragement and support during the last year while I was writing my dissertation. Jack Cahalan provided sage philosophical comments. I would particularly like to mention Joe Quigley and Mike Albert, my racquetball partners, and Nancy Kraus. I believe that my experience as a technical writer at Wang Laboratories has significantly improved my philosophical writing. Companies and to I am grateful to Commercial Union Insurance a Wang Laboratories for providing me with full-time employment as technical writer during the three years in which I wrote my V dissertation. My work with computers has given me a better understanding of philosophical arguments relating to artificial intelligence and computer models of the mind. Other friends I would like to mention are Steve Shannon, Barbara Winterson, Carl Sosebee, David Morrissey, David Hersh, Tim Bunnell, Larry Hohm, and Alan McMichael. I would especially like to thank Feroline Whitehead for her support, encouragement, and assistance during the entire time I wrote my dissertation. Finally, I would like to mention my cat Pascal, who always remained a friend and has served as an example of someone with a radically different point of view. VI PREFACE I have reproduced all emphasis in the form of italics or underlining in quotations in the form of underlining. Unless otherwise indicated, all such underlining throughout represents the emphasis of the original author. vii ABSTRACT A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM May 27, 1984 Jesse L. Yoder, B.A., University of Maryland M.A. , University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews The principal critical objective of this dissertation is to examine three contemporary theories about the mind-body problem: dualism, anomalous monism, and functionalism. The dualism examined is closely linked to Cartesian dualism, while functionalism is a form of materialism. Anomalous monism is a kind of dual aspect view. All these theories have a long tradition with different formulations and exponents. I examine three contemporary exponents of these views: Saul Kripke, a dualist, Donald Davidson, an anomalous monist, and Daniel Dennett, a functionalist. I argue that each of these theories is incorrect or has serious difficulties. The chief difficulty for dualism is in giving an account of mind-body interaction. The chief difficulty for anomalous monism is that internal tensions within the theory relating to Davidson's conception of physical events and scientific laws have the consequence that anomalous monism applies to the viii entities of physics and chemistry but not to events in the brain. The most serious difficulty for functionalism is in accounting for the qualities of subjective experience. I then discuss two criteria for identifying mental phenomena: incorrigibility and intentionality . I consider the problem of mind-body interaction as a problem for dualism. I argue that the mind-body problem is misconceived in that it is supposed that a univocal definition of 'physical' can be given. I state three different definitions of this term: one containing a scientific conception, one an objective conception, and one a personal conception. In my final chapter, I formulate a plural aspect view that accounts for mind-body interaction. On this view, mind is an aspect of body and body is an aspect of mind. This plural aspect view can be derived from a more general theory I call Viewpoint Pluralism. IX TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv PREFACE vii ABSTRACT viii INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter I. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 1.1 Introduction 3 1.2 The Mind-Body Problem as a Philosophical Problem 4 1.3 Dualism 8 1.3.1 Types of dualism 9 1.3.2 Early Greek conceptions 12 1.3.3 Plato 16 1.3.4 Descartes 23 1.3.5 Summary of dualist positions 27 1.3.6 Conclusion 29 1.4 Materialism 29 1.4.1 Aristotle 30 1.4.2 Hobbes 34 1.4.3 La Mettrie 37 1.4.4 Five types of materialism 41 1.4.5 Summary 1.5 Plural Attribute Monism 45 1.5.1 Spinoza 47 1.6 Idealism 1.7 Pluralism 1.7.1 Leibniz 1.8 Conclusion ^4 61 II. SAUL KRIPKE'S DEFENSE OF DUALISM 2.1 Introduction 61 2.2 Kripke's Theory of Proper Names 62 2.2.1 Names and some general terms are rigid designators 63 2.2.2 Identity statements between rigid designators are necessary 65 X 2.2.3 Origin is an essential property 66 2.2.4 Summary of Kripke's metaphysical views 67 2.3 Kripke's Arguments Against the Identity Thesis 68 2.3.1 Kripke's argument that a person is distinct from his body 68 2.3.2 Event identity 70 2.4 Feldman's Criticisms 71 2.4.1 Feldman's criticism of Kripke's argument that Descartes is not identical to his body 72 2.4.2 Feldman's criticism of Kripke on event identity. .79 2.5 Feldman's Three Conceptions of Events 83 2.6 Other Issues Relating to Dualism 87 2.6.1 The problem of interaction 88 2.7 One Consequence of Kripke's View on Origin 91 III. DONALD DAVIDSON'S ANOMALOUS MONISM 98 3.1 Introduction 98 3.2 Davidson's Views in "Mental Events" 101 3.3 Davidson's Argument for Anomalous Monism 103 3.4 Davidson's View of Mental and Physical Events 107 3.5 Davidson's Mental and Physical Domains 115 3.5.1 Davidson's claim that every scientific law must draw on a homonomic domain 126 3.6 Davidson's Argument for Anomalous Monism 130 3.7 Davidson's Demonstration of Identity 132 3.8 Conclusion 135 IV. DANIEL DENNETT'S DEFENSE OF FUNCTIONALISM 4.1 Introduction 138 4.2 Dennett's Flowchart of Pain 139 4.2.1 The personal/sub-personal distinction 145 4.2.2 Dennett's account of pain 149 4.2.3 Perceptual analysis 154 4.3 Are Our Intuitions About Pain Inconsistent? 159 4.4 Robot Emotions 164 4.5 Summary 166 V. INCORRIGIBILITY AND INTENTIONALITY : TWO CRITERIA FOR MENTAL PHENOMENA 169 5.1 Introduction 169 5.2 Incorrigibility 1^0 5.2.1 Mental events and mental features 171 5.2.2 Rorty's definition of incorrigibility 175 XI 5.2.3 Mental features 185 5.2.4 Conclusion about Rorty's defense of incorrigibility 188 5.2.5 Rorty's argument for materialism 189 5.3 Intentionality 5.3.1 Chisholm's criteria for intentional sentences.