Syria Alert Issue IX 14 November 2012 Syrian National Coalition For
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Key Actors and Abbreviations
Key actors and abbreviations The Assad regime and its allies ‘The regime’ Bashar al-Assad, Syrian President 2000– Hafez al-Assad, Syrian President 1971–2000 Asma al-Assad (née Akhras), Syria’s First Lady 2000– Maher al-Assad, brother of Bashar al-Assad, Commander of Republican Guard and 4th Armoured Division Anisa Makhlouf, mother of Bashar al-Assad Assif Shawkat, brother-in-law of Bashar al-Assad, head of military intelligence 2005–9, deputy minister of defence 2011–12 Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Bashar al-Assad, wealthy businessman Manaf Tlass, Republican Guard General, defected 2012 Farouk al-Sharaa, First Vice President of Syria 2006– Walid al-Muallem, Foreign Minister 2006– Bouthaina Shabaan, political and media adviser to the Syrian President 2008– Ba’ath – Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the ruling party of Syria since 1963 Mukhabarat – Set of notorious regime intelligence agencies Shabiha – Gangs of irregular pro-regime thugs NDF – National Defence Force, formed 2013 Russia Vladimir Putin, Russian President 2000–8, 2012–, Russian Prime Minister 2008–12 Dmitri Medvedev, Russian President 2008–12, Russian Prime Minister 2012–20 Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister 2004– Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Foreign Minister 2011– Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran 1989– xii 5146.indd xii 19/06/20 5:00 PM KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS xiii Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranian President 2005–13 Hassan Rouhani, Iranian President 2013– Ali Akbar Salehi, Foreign Minister 2010–13 Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister 2013– Qassem Suleimani, Commander -
PRISM Syrian Supplemental
PRISM syria A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS About PRISM PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners Vol. 4, Syria Supplement on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; 2014 relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development Editor Michael Miklaucic Communications Contributing Editors Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct Alexa Courtney communications to: David Kilcullen Nate Rosenblatt Editor, PRISM 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Copy Editors Fort Lesley J. McNair Dale Erikson Washington, DC 20319 Rebecca Harper Sara Thannhauser Lesley Warner Telephone: Nathan White (202) 685-3442 FAX: (202) 685-3581 Editorial Assistant Email: [email protected] Ava Cacciolfi Production Supervisor Carib Mendez Contributions PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Advisory Board and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States Dr. Gordon Adams and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to prism@ Dr. Pauline H. Baker ndu.edu with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Ambassador Rick Barton Professor Alain Bauer This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Ambassador James F. Dobbins without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. -
HOW to HELP SYRIA RECOVER? Policy Paper 2
HOW TO HELP SYRIA RECOVER? Policy Paper 2 Author: Collective of the “SDGs and Migration“ project This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Diaconia of the ECCB and can under no cirmustances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union. The document is part of the „SDGs and Migration – Multipliers and Journalists Addressing Decision Makers and Citizens“ project which is realized in the framework of the Development Education and Awareness Raising (DEAR) programme. Graphic design: BOOM s.r.o. Translation: Mánes překlady a tlumočení The following organizations are involved in the “SGDs and Migration” project, managed by Diaconia of ECCB: Global Call to Action Against Poverty (Belgium), Bulgarian Platform for International Development (Bulgaria), Federazione Organismi Cristiani Servizio Internazionale Volontario (Italy), ActionAid Hellas (Greece), Ambrela (Slovakia) and Povod (Slovenia). 1 POLICY PAPER The humanitarian situation in Syria, and its regional and global dimension With the Syrian crisis about to enter its 10th year, the humanitarian situation in Syria and in the neighbouring con- tinues to be critical. Despite the fact that in some areas of Syria the situation has largely stabilized, in Northwest and Northeast Syria there is the potential for a further escalation. There are risks of new displacements and increased humanitarian needs of a population already affected by years of conflict and depletion of resources, as witnessed in recent months as a result of the Operation Peace Spring in the Northeast and the ongoing Gov- ernment of Syria (GoS) and Government of Russia (GoR) offensive in the Northwest. -
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Still a Crucial Actor. Inclusivity the Order of the Day in Dealings with Syria's Opposition
Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Co Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Still a Crucial Actor WP S Inclusivity the Order of the Day in Dealings with Syria’s Opposition Petra Becker Summer 2013 brought severe setbacks for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Firstly, one of its most important regional supporters, Qatar lost its leading role in the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, the alliance of states and organisations backing Syria’s opposition, to Saudi Arabia. Secondly, the Brotherhood has been hit by stinging criti- cism of the Egyptian MB’s performance in government and the media witch-hunt against political Islam following the ouster of Mohammed Morsi. In the face of these events the Syrian Brotherhood – to date still a religious and social movement – post- poned the founding of a political party planned for late June. Thirdly, the Brotherhood – like its partners in the National Coalition which opposes the Syrian regime – bet on an American-backed military intervention in August/September. This intervention did not occur due to the American-Russian brokered agreement providing for Syria to join the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. As a result, the National Coalition and its Supreme Military Command have faced defections of major rebel forces, which may lead to a major shift towards Jihadi Salafism and the marginalization of moderate forces on the ground. Yet the Brother- hood remains the best-organised political force within the Syrian opposition alliances and still sees itself becoming the leading force in post-revolutionary Syria. Germany and Europe should encourage moderate forces whatever their political colours and foster the implementation of democratic concepts. -
Reconstruct- Ing Syria: Risks and Side Effects Strategies, Actors and Interests
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ADOPT A REVOLUTION RECONSTRUCT- ING SYRIA: RISKS AND SIDE EFFECTS Strategies, actors and interests 1 2 Cover photo: Jan-Niklas Kniewel RECONSTRUCTING SYRIA: RISKS AND SIDE EFFECTS ADOPT A REVOLUTION CONTENT Summary 04 Introduction 06 Dr. Joseph Daher Reconstructing Syria: How the al-Assad regime is 09 capitalizing on destruction Jihad Yazigi Reconstruction or Plunder? How Russia and Iran are 20 dividing Syrian Resources Dr. Salam Said Reconstruction as a foreign policy tool 30 Alhakam Shaar Reconstruction, but for whom? Embracing the role of Aleppo’s 34 displaced Dispossessed and deprived: 39 Three case studies of Syrians affected by the Syrian land and property rights 03 SUMMARY RECONSTRUCTING SYRIA: RISKS AND SIDE EFFECTS SUMMARY 1 The reconstruction plans of the al-Assad regime largely ignore the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The regime’s reconstruction strategy does not address the most pressing needs of over 10 million Syrian IDPs and refugees. Instead it caters mostly to the economic interests of the regime itself and its allies. 2 Current Syrian legislation obstructs the return of IDPs and refugees, and legalizes the deprivation of rights of residents of informal settlements. A series of tailor-made laws have made it legal to deprive inhabitants of informal settlements of their rights. This includes the restriction of housing, land and property rights through Decree 66, Law No. 10, the restriction of basic rights under the counterterrorism law, and the legal bases for public-private co-investments. These laws also serve the interests of regime cronies and regime-loyal forces. The process of demographic engineering in former opposition-held territories, which has already begun, driven by campaigns of forced displacement and the evictions of original residents, is being cemented by these laws. -
Situation Estimation the High Negotiations Committee The
www.jusoor.co Situation Estimation 0 The High Negotiations Committee The Political Course and Outcome www.jusoor.co Situation Estimation 1 The High Negotiations Committee The Political Course and Outcome www.jusoor.co Situation Estimation 2 Preface On the 9-10/12/2015, the High Negotiation Committee (HNC) had emerged after Riyadh Conference in order to unify the military and political forces of the Syrian opposition in addition to forming a delegation that can negotiate in the 3rd round of Geneva Negotiations. Since its establishment until its recent end, HNC considered as an exceptional situation that took place in the Syrian opposition because was a functional body with specific objectives contrary to the other political bodies. However, it used to fulfil other objectives that were not related to its tasks. Further, HNC was able to establish unique relations with the regional actors, while the Syrian National Coalition faced many situations with regards to regional polarization as a result of the trends of its president. Many political achievements were fulfilled by HNC during the past two years but it had failed to perform well in regards to its major task of negotiating the Syrian regime and lacked flexibility in dealing with this process. Conflicts also took place between HNC and the National Coalition, where the two political bodies worked in parallel lines that intersected sometimes. The course of Astana was in line with the course of HNC and caused the forced absence of HNC’s role in this regard. This report analyzes the conditions related to HNC’s emergence, course, and achievements during the last two years. -
Bulletin De Liaison Et D'information
INSTITUT KUDE RPARD IS E Bulletin de liaison et d’information n°332 novembre 2012 La publication de ce Bulletin bénéficie de subventions du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères (DGCID) et du Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD) ————— Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro : France: 6 € — Etranger : 7,5 € Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France : 60 € — Etranger : 75 € Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 13 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél. : 01- 48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01- 48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: [email protected] Bulletin de liaison et d’information de l’Institut kurde de Paris N° 332 novembre 2012 • KURDISTAN D’IRAK : FORCES « DIJLA » CONTRE « HAMRIN », KURDES ET IRAKIENS AU BORD DE LA GUERRE • SYRIE : VERS UNE FORCE MILITAIRE UNIFIÉE DES KURDES ? • TURQUIE : DÉCISION DE JUSTICE STUPÉFIANTE DANS L’AFFAIRE PINAR SELEK • CULTURE : MORT DE SHOKROLLAH BABAN • CINEMA : TROIS FILMS KURDES À L’AFFICHE CULTURE KURDISTAN D’IRAK : FORCES « DIJLA » CONTRE « HEMRIN », KURDES ET IRAKIENS AU BORD DE LA GUERRE peine le conflit sur les région est sous la responsabilité pas reconnaître les forces Dijla ni hydrocarbures tempo - des Conseils provinciaux et les croire à leur succès opérationnel. rairement apaisé, c’est mouvements des forces Dijla À au sujet des régions déstabiliseront la sécurité de Loin de baisser le ton, Maliki a kurdes séparées du cette région et en bouleverseront envenimé la polémique en lan - Gouvernement Régional du la réalité politique. -
Private Discounts to Print
Dissent and Reform in the Arab World: Empowering Democrats A Report of the American Enterprise Institute Dissent and Reform in the Arab World Project Edited by Jeffrey Azarva, Danielle Pletka, and Michael Rubin The AEI Press Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute WASHINGTON, D.C. AEI Press Publisher for the American Enterprise Institute 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Washington D.C., 20036 www.aei.org/books © 2008 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI. Printed in the United States of America Contents INTRODUCTION, Jeffrey Azarva, Danielle Pletka, and Michael Rubin 1 PART I: ESSAYS BY PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS 9 1. BAHRAIN 11 Challenging Government Control of Media Omran Salman 11 2. EGYPT 19 Challenges to Democratization Ayat M. Abul-Futtouh 19 3. IRAQ 26 Pluralism—Its Wealth and Its Misery Haider Saeed 26 The Development of Shi’ite Islamic Political Theory Sama Hadad 32 4. JORDAN 41 Building a Political Will Jamil al-Nimri 41 The Challenge of Progress Emad Omar 51 5. LEBANON 59 Together: Equal but Different Jad al-Akhaoui 59 Hezbollah and the Problem of State Control Lokman Slim 63 A Country to Be Born Najat Sharafeddine 71 6. -
Democracy to the Rescue
AJT-10 MIDDLE EAST Andrew Tabler is an Institute Fellow based in Damascus and Beirut studying Lebanese ICWA affairs and Syrian reform. Democracy to the Rescue LETTERS By Andrew Tabler MARCH 2006 DAMASCUS, Syria–As I approached the demonstration, I realized that the more Since 1925 the Institute of things change in Syria, the more the state’s reaction stays the same. It was March Current World Affairs (the Crane- 9, the 43rd anniversary of the declaration of “emergency law” in Syria. For the Rogers Foundation) has provided second year in a row, members of the Syrian Students’ National Union (SSNU) long-term fellowships to enable were busy beating up and chasing off opposition figures staging a sit-in in front outstanding young professionals of the old Ministry of Justice — a stone’s throw away from the radio station where to live outside the United States martial law was declared in 1963 the morning after the Ba’ath Party seized power and write about international in a military coup. Multi-party politics in Syria was suspended that day, all in the areas and issues. An exempt operating foundation endowed by the late Charles R. Crane, the Institute is also supported by contributions from like-minded individuals and foundations. TRUSTEES Bryn Barnard Joseph Battat Mary Lynne Bird Steven Butler Sharon F. Doorasamy Peter Geithner Gary Hartshorn Katherine Roth Kono Cheng Li Peter Bird Martin Dasa Obereigner A mob from the Syrian Students’ National Union (SSNU) abuse and assault a member David Z. Robinson of Syria’s opposition protesting 43 years of “Emergency Rule” in Syria on March 9. -
Syria's Military Opposition
Jeffrey White Andrew J. Tabler Aaron Y. Zelin SYRIA’S MILITARY HOW EFFECTIVE, OPPOSITION UNITED, OR EXTREMIST? SYRIA’S MILITARY HOW EFFECTIVE, OPPOSITION UNITED, OR EXTREMIST? Jeffrey White Andrew J. Tabler Aaron Y. Zelin POLICY FOCUS 128 | SEPTEMBER 2013 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2013 in the United States of America by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Cover photo: A member of the Free Syrian Army stands guard at a checkpoint after clashes with pro-government forces in Salqin city in Idlib, October 2012. REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih Contents Update U.S. Military Action in Response to the August 21 Chemical Weapons Attack ■ v Introduction Posing the Question, Patrick Clawson ■ 1 1. The Military Opposition on the Ground, Jeffrey White ■ 3 2. Opposition Unity and Western Supply, Andrew J. Tabler ■ 20 3. Causes for Pause: Spoilers and Risk, Aaron Y. Zelin ■ 25 Conclusion Implications: Realistic Appraisal, Targeted Assistance, Patrick Clawson ■ 35 The Authors ■ 37 ■ Map 1. Areas of Control ■ 2 Tables 1. Areas of Control and in Dispute, July 2013 ■ 4 2. Rebel Combat Effectiveness in Syria ■ 11 3. Examples of Rebel “Operations” ■ 11 4. Claimed Regime Armor Losses, March—May 2013 ■ 14 Figures 1. -
PUBLIC AI Index: MDE 24/029/2001 UA 226/01 Prisoner of Syriariad
PUBLIC AI Index: MDE 24/029/2001 UA 226/01 Prisoner of Conscience 7 September 2001 SYRIARiad Seif (m), Parliamentarian, Age 54 Riad Seif, an independent member of the Syrian National Assembly (Parliament) was arrested on 6 September, one day after hosting a political seminar at his house in the outskirts of Damascus. Amnesty International considers Riad Seif to be a prisoner of conscience, arrested solely for his opinions and peaceful opposition activities. Between 400 and 500 people reportedly attended the seminar organized by Riad Seif and hosted by the National Dialogue Forum, during which the guest speaker Professor Burhan Ghaliun, called for political reform and democratic elections. According to an official spokesperson, Riad Seif was prosecuted following a “special permission” from the National Assembly which removed his parliamentary immunity. Syrian press reports state that a judge issued a warrant for his arrest, but it is not known what he has been charged with. BACKGROUND INFORMATION Riad Seif is a leader and organizer of the National Dialogue Forum (a group within the emerging civil society movement in Syria) and the second member of parliament to be arrested in the last four weeks. Mamun al-Homsi was arrested on 9 August, two days after he began a hunger strike in protest at official corruption and the massive powers wielded by the security forces. (See UA 205/01, 10 August 2001, MDE 24/026/2001) Another prominent opposition figure Riad al-Turk was detained last week, three years after being released from prison, where he was held as a prisoner of conscience from 1980 to 1998 because of his opposition to the Syrian government. -
De-Escalation Zones in Syria
June 2020 Syria / Iraq Office De-escalation zones in Syria Background and status quo of a paradox Gregor Jaecke, David Labude In May 2017, as part of the Astana peace talks, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed on the establishment of four so-called de-escalation zones in Syria. These zones were designed to be areas in which all hostilities should cease and in which civilians should be protected from attacks. The deal had been preceded by a massive deployment of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, followed by increasing international pressure on Syria and its ally Russia. Three of these safe zones no longer exist today. The last one that remains, in Idlib, is under heavy pressure after severe recent fighting. In actual fact, the protection for the Syrian population that had been promised when the zones had been created was not provided by this agreement at any time. The establishment of these zones did not contribute to the peace process in Syria and, therefore, to ending the war. It is worthwhile, however, to take a closer look at how this agreement was reached and how the four zones have developed in order to identify the failures of the various international actors. These failures could defeat hopes for finding a solution for the plight of the Syrian refugees for decades. Resolving this issue will crucially depend on whether Europe and the United States (US) will become more engaged in Syria in the future and whether they will be more successful in exerting political and economic pressure on the regime and its allies – mainly Russia.