Der Schmutzige Krieg Gegen Syrien

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Der Schmutzige Krieg Gegen Syrien Tim Anderson Der schmutzige Krieg gegen Syrien Washington, Regime Change und Widerstand Ist die Katastrophe in Syrien das Ergebnis von unglückseligen Zufäl­ len? Sind Krieg und Chaos im Nahen Osten Folge mißglückter Befrie­ dungsversuche? Der Politikwissenschaftler Tim Anderson belegt auf der Grundlage akribischer Recherchen: der Krieg in Syrien ist Teil ei­ nes geostrategischen Plans der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, um die Region nach ihren Interessen neu zu ordnen. Gesellschaftliche Aus­ einandersetzungen und Modernisierungsprobleme wurden zum Anlaß genommen, durch Provokateure Nationalstaaten zu destabilisieren. Pseudo-islamische Terrormilizen zerstören gezielt die Infrastruktur Sy­ riens. Dirigiert und finanziert werden jene Söldnertruppen von rivali­ sierenden Anrainerstaaten wie Saudi-Arabien oder Katar. Sie begehen kriminelle Terrorakte, um diese sodann der syrischen Regierung zuzu­ schreiben. Bereitwillig wirken liberale westliche Medien, Nichtregie­ rungsorganisationen und Politiker mit bei den ›false-flag‹-Manövern, um den syrischen Präsidenten und die syrischen Streitkräfte als Mons­ ter zu entmenschlichen. Doch Anderson macht Hoffnung: es hat sich eine neue ›Achse des Widerstands‹ in der Region herausgebildet, die eine selbstbestimmte Zukunft der Völker im Mittleren und Nahen Os­ ten ermöglichen wird. Da Anderson sich vornehmlich auf anerkannte westliche Quellen aus Presse, Denkfabriken und Wissenschaft beruft, und einen üppigen Quellenanhang an jedes Kapitel anfügt, stellt DER SCHMUTZIGE KRIEG GEGEN SYRIEN eine erstklassige Argumentations- und Orientierungshilfe dar. »Obwohl jeder Krieg ausgiebig von Lügen und Täuschung Gebrauch macht, basiert der schmutzige Krieg gegen Syrien auf einem Maß an Desinformation, das seit Menschengedenken noch nicht gesehen wurde.« »Dieses Buch ist eine sorgfältige wissenschaftliche Arbeit, aber auch ein Plä­ doyer für das Recht des syrischen Volkes, seine Gesellschaftsform und das politische System selbst zu bestimmen.« »Die Gewalt ging in diesem langen Krieg aus westlicher Sicht von der syri­ schen Armee aus, die Zivilisten angreifen und töten würde. Aus syrischer Per­ spektive sahen die Menschen aber täglich Terroristenangriffe auf Städte und Stadtzentren, Schulen und Krankenhäuser, und Massaker durch NATO-Frei­ heitskämpfer, an einfachen Menschen, und erst dann die Gegenangriffe der Armee.« 2 Tim Anderson Dr. Tim Anderson ist Dozent für politische Ökonomie an der Un­ iversität Sydney. Er forscht und schreibt über Entwicklungen, Rechte und Selbstbestimmung in Lateinamerika, der Asien-Pazifik-Region und des Mittleren Ostens. Er hat zahlreiche Kapitel und Artikel in wissen­ schaftlichen Büchern und Zeitschriften veröffentlicht. Sein aktuelles Buch trägt den Titel: LAND UND LEBENSBEDINGUNGEN IN PAPUA NEU GUINEA (2015). Anderson hat während des Krieges zweimal Syrien besucht. Da­ bei führte er auch Gespräche mit Mitgliedern der syrischen Regierung, einschließlich Präsident Assad. Der schmutzige Krieg gegen Syrien (The Dirty War on Syria) Washington, Regime Change und Widerstand © Tim Anderson, 2016. Erste deutschsprachige Ausgabe Übersetzung aus dem Englischen: Jochen Mitschka, Hermann Ploppa ISBN 978-3-9812703-9-6 © 2016 im Liepsen Verlag, Marburg Druck: Clausen & Bosse, Leck Umschlag-Gestaltung: Blazek Grafik Lektorat: Hermann Ploppa Im Original veröffentlicht in Englisch durch: Global Research, Canada (Hervorhebungen durch Übersetzer.) Siehe auch Internetseite http://dirty-war-on-syria.blogspot.com 3 Eine Bemerkung zu den Quellen Der aufmerksame Leser wird bemerken, daß ich ein breites Spektrum an unterschiedli­ chen, meist englischsprachigen Quellen benutze. Dies tue ich nicht, weil ich Englisch spreche, sondern weil ich auch an andere englisch Sprechende denke, an die sich dieses Buch hauptsächlich wendet. Ich möchte, daß ihnen die relevanten Quellen zugänglich sind. Außerdem ist mir das weit verbreitete Vorurteil bekannt, das im Westen gegenüber Quellen aus Rußland, dem Iran, Syrien oder Latein-Amerika gehegt wird. Es gab Gele­ genheiten, bei denen Übersetzungen notwendig wurden, darunter auch Interviews in Sy­ rien. Ich habe auch vorwiegend westliche Quellen benutzt, wo immer das möglich war, nicht weil sie mir zuverlässiger erscheinen, sondern um jede Behauptung auszuschlie­ ßen, ich hätte mich zu sehr auf syrische Quellen verlassen. Die Berichterstattung der westlichen Medien über diesen Krieg war im Allgemeinen katastrophal, war sie doch tief eingebettet in die Entschlossenheit ihrer Regierungen, zu intervenieren. Trotzdem verwende ich diese Darstellungen, erstens, um ihre Positionen deutlich zu machen, und zweitens, um die Bestätigung meiner Auffassungen in Geständnissen der Aggres­ sor-Regierungen aufzuzeigen, die ihren eigenen Interessen eigentlich zuwiderlaufen. Am Ende findet man einen Verweis über eindeutige und unabhängige Quellen. Danksagung Ich danke meinen syrischen Freunden, meinen Lehrern, die mir halfen, Einsicht in ihr erstaunliches Land und ihre Kultur zu erhalten, und den Konflikt besser zu verstehen. Ich kann unmöglich all jene aufzählen, die mir ihre Zeit geschenkt haben, um mit mir zu sprechen. Aber ich will unbedingt meinen guten Freunden Reme, Elham, Jasmine, Ah­ med, Maram, Hanadi, Tania, Fawaz, Maher, Lyad, Samer, Mazen, Rana, Afraa und Mo­ hammed ausdrücklich danken. Ich möchte mich auch für einige Lehrstunden bedanken, die ich von zwei syrischen Lehrern des Islam erhalten durfte. Durch den verstorbenen Scheich Mohammed Said Ramadan al Bouti habe ich die Ehrenhaftigkeit und Humanität vieler konservativer reli­ giöser Menschen schätzen gelernt. Darüber hinaus hat das Treffen mit dem charisma­ tischen Mufti Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun meinen Glauben an eine echte Spiritualität, die in ehrlicher religiöser Überzeugung liegt, zurückgebracht. Dieser Glaube ist ein willkommenes Gegenmodell zu den angeblichen Muslimen, die den derzeitigen Kon­ flikt am Leben erhalten. Ich werde die Erklärungen von Mufti Hassoun über ›Shami Is­ lam‹ niemals vergessen. Noch einmal: Dank an alle meine syrischen Lehrer. Selbstverständlich liegt die letztend­ liche Verantwortung für den folgenden Text ausschließlich bei mir. Tim Anderson, Sydney, Australien, 15. Januar, 2016 4 Inhaltsverzeichnis 01 Einführung: Der Schmutzige Krieg gegen Syrien ......................................................... 6 02 Syriens und Washingtons ›Neuer Mittlerer Osten‹ .................................................... 14 03 Faßbomben, parteiliche Quellen und Kriegspropaganda ........................................ 23 04 Daraa 2011: Ein weiterer islamistischer Aufstand ..................................................... 33 05 Bashar al-Assad und Politische Reformen ..................................................................... 44 5.1 Die Reformbewegung ........................................................................................................ 45 5.2 Bashar al-Assad, im Augenblick dämonisiert, bleibt in Syrien ................................... 50 06 Die Dschihadisten des Imperiums ...................................................................................... 62 6.1 Imperialismus, Wahabismus und die Bruderschaft ....................................................... 63 6.2 Die Dschihadisten des Imperiums in Syrien ................................................................... 69 07 Eingebettete Medien, eingebettete Wächter .................................................................. 80 7.1 Die liberalen Kriegstrolle .................................................................................................. 82 7.2 Techniken der Beeinflussung ............................................................................................ 85 7.3 Die Nichtregierungsorganisationen des ›Humanitären Krieges‹ ................................. 90 08 Das Hula-Massaker neu aufgerollt .................................................................................. 101 8.1 Das Hula-Massaker .......................................................................................................... 102 8.2 Unbequeme Beweise ........................................................................................................ 105 8.3 Abweichende Meinungen in der UNO .......................................................................... 110 8.4 Die Folgen ......................................................................................................................... 111 09 Chemiewaffen-Fälschungen: Die Ereignisse in Ost-Ghuta ................................... 116 9.1 Chemiewaffen in Syrien .................................................................................................. 117 9.2 Das Ereignis von Ost-Ghuta ........................................................................................... 118 9.3 Fälschungen von Chemiewaffenangriffen und vermißte Kinder .............................. 122 10 ›Schutzverantwortung‹ und das Doppelspiel .............................................................. 127 11 Gesundheitsversorgung und Sanktionen ...................................................................... 134 12 Washington, Terrorismus und ISIS: Die Beweise ..................................................... 140 13 Westliche Interventionen und der koloniale Geist .................................................... 153 14 In Richtung auf einen unabhängigen Mittleren Osten ............................................ 159 14.1 Fakten-Check 1: Es gab niemals irgendwelche ›moderaten Rebellen‹ .................... 160
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