Reconstruction in Syria. Challenges and Policy Options for the EU And

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SWP Research Paper

Muriel Asseburg Reconstruction in Syria Challenges and Policy Options for the EU and its Member States

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

SWP Research Paper 11 July 2020, Berlin

Abstract

∎ Syria’s civil war has long since been decided in favour of the regime. There is no prospect of a negotiated settlement, reconciliation or lasting stabilisation. ∎ Syria faces enormous challenges, well beyond the rebuilding of infrastructure and housing. It will also need assistance to restart its economy, stabilise its currency and renew its public services, in particular education, health, electricity and water. ∎ The funds required for comprehensive reconstruction are extremely unlikely to become available, given the attitude of the Syrian leadership, the economic ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the geopolitical interests of regional and global powers. Nor are resources likely to be deployed in line with the needs of the population. ∎ The EU and its member states have made engagement in Syria’s reconstruction conditional on viable steps towards a negotiated conflict settlement and a political opening. They should adapt their approach to align better with the current realities and challenges on the ground. ∎ That means in particular targeting humanitarian aid more effectively, dismantling certain sectoral sanctions and supporting the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure – even in areas controlled by the Syrian government. This would represent a more effective contribution to improving living conditions and avoiding further erosion of public services. ∎ Lasting stabilisation will require fundamental reforms. In this vein, Brus- sels should spell out its “more for more” approach. ∎ Europe should refrain from normalising relations with the top leaders of the Assad regime and instead step up its support for prosecution of war crimes, grave human rights violations and the use of internationally banned weapons.

SWP Research Paper

Muriel Asseburg Reconstruction in Syria Challenges and Policy Options for the EU and its Member States

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

SWP Research Paper 11 July 2020, Berlin

SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They are also subject to fact- checking and copy-editing. For further information on our quality control procedures, please visit the SWP website: https:// www.swp-berlin.org/en/ about-swp/quality- management-for-swp- publications/. SWP Research Papers reflect the views of the author(s).

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN 1863-1053 doi: 10.18449/2020RP11

Translation by Meredith Dale

(Updated English version of SWP-Studie 7/2020)

Table of Contents

5 Issues and Recommendations

7 The Syrian Leadership’s Approach: Reconstruction as the Continuation of (Civil) War with Other Means 8 Politicised Reconstruction 10 International Aid on a Short Leash

12 The Context: The Interests of Regional and Global Powers 12 Russia and Iran 13 Turkey 14 China 14 Arab Gulf states 15 Syria’s Neighbours 15 The United States 16 Interim Conclusion

17 Challenges of Reconstruction 17 War Damage and Its Consequences 18 War Economy and Sanctions 20 The Consequences of Death and Displacement 22 Interim Conclusion

23 The European Approach: No Reconstruction without Political Opening 23 European Positions and Instruments 25 Growing Divergence

26 Conclusions, Policy Options and Recommendations 26 A More Realistic European Approach 28 More Effective Assistance 28 European Contribution to Rehabilitation of Basic Infrastructure 29 Testing Damascus with an Offer 29 Reviewing the Sanctions Regime 30 Supporting Refugees and IDPs 30 The “More for More” Approach 31 No Blind Eye to Grave Human Rights Violations

34 Abbreviations

Dr. Muriel Asseburg is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP.

Issues and Recommendations

Reconstruction in Syria Challenges and Policy Options for the EU and its Member States

Even if the fighting is not over, the Syrian regime has won the civil war in military terms. Damascus and its allies controlled about two-thirds of the country by spring 2020, and the Assad regime appeared set to recapture the remaining areas. There is currently no prospect of a negotiated settlement, reconciliation between conflict parties and population groups, or lasting peace and stabilisation. The armed conflict in Syria, which began in 2011 following the violent suppression of a protest movement, has had disastrous consequences for the country’s population, infrastructure and economy. It is estimated that reconstruction will cost US$250 to US$400 billion or even US$1 trillion, depending on the source. The enormous challenges extend far beyond mine clearance and physical rebuilding of infrastructure and housing: a huge loss of (skilled) labour, contraction of the economy, currency devaluation and the collapse of public services head the list. Reconstruction has already begun. But this is not a comprehensive nation-wide programme, centrally planned and managed with international funding. Rather, diverse actors implement projects, mainly at the local level. Few of them pay much heed to the needs of the population. The prime concern for the leadership in Damascus is to consolidate its grip on power. Reconstruction efforts are directed towards cementing demographic changes, rewarding the loyalty of old and new elites through lucrative investment opportunities, and compensating the regime’s international supporters – first and foremost Russia and Iran – with access to Syria’s resources. At the same time the legal and political framework for humanitarian aid that Damascus has created ensures – in the areas it controls – that the regime has the last word on decisions about where international aid is deployed, by whom, and to whose benefit. The Syrian leadership is adamant that it will accept foreign engagement in reconstruction only from friendly countries and without conditionality. But Damascus’s allies are neither willing nor able to fund comprehensive nation-wide reconstruction. Other potential funders categorically reject engage-

SWP Berlin Reconstruction in Syria July 2020

5 Issues and Recommendations

ment (the United States), hesitate (the Arab Gulf That road has been closed by the military successes states), position themselves for later engagement of the Assad regime and its allies. It means, secondly, (China) or concentrate exclusively on particular rejecting the illusion that Damascus could become regions, even integrating them (at least partly) into a reliable partner for economic recovery and recon- its own economy and administration (Turkey). Given struction, for counter-terrorism and for return of the attitude of the Syrian leadership and the irrec- refugees. It encompasses, thirdly, not confusing the oncilable geopolitical interests and visions for Syria’s current economic and currency crisis and the erosion future political and societal order of the regional and of state capacities in Syria with an imminent collapse global powers it is extremely unlikely that Syria will of the regime – still less in favour of an alternative receive sufficient funding for reconstruction. The political force that would unify and stabilise the economic repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, country. especially the collapse of the oil price, are likely to Europe should contribute more effectively than further constrain available funding. hitherto to alleviating suffering, promoting improve- Europe – in the sense of the EU and its member ments in living conditions and stopping the rapid states plus the UK – has made its engagement con- erosion of public services. In this vein, it should work ditional on viable steps towards a negotiated conflict to enhance the effectiveness of UN aid, dismantle settlement and a political opening. Its involvement those sectoral sanctions that stand in the way of has therefore been largely restricted to humanitarian recovery and under certain conditions even support aid. At the same time the EU has imposed compre- rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in areas con- hensive sanctions. But the European approach has trolled by the regime. But lasting stabilisation will had little influence on the conflict dynamics on the require fundamental reforms. To that end the EU ground or the behaviour of the Assad regime. This is, should flesh out its “more for more” approach to lay amongst other factors, because the sanctions regime out a concrete path for largely normalising relations and the conditionality of reconstruction assistance with Damascus in return for political opening and are configured for a regime change agenda that is no structural reforms. Europe should, however, refrain longer a realistic prospect (even if the EU has softened from normalising relations with the top leaders of its rhetoric, no longer talking explicitly about regime the Assad regime and instead step up its support for change or power-sharing, but an inclusive political prosecution of war crimes, grave human rights viola- transition). At the same time, Brussels has still not tions and the use of internationally banned weapons. spelled out what kind of change in Damascus – below the threshold of political transition – would lead to which European concessions. Another prob- lematic aspect of the European approach is that the combination of its sanctions and the restrictions that apply to humanitarian aid hinder the provision of effective assistance to the population. In view of the deepening economic crisis, such aid is urgently needed. As it stands, the EU risks contributing to cementing a situation in which the Syrian population remains permanently dependent on international aid and on the regime’s benevolence. In light of these observations the present research paper examines the question of how the EU and its member states can adjust their approach to Syria in such a way as to better align it with the current realities and challenges on the ground, bring Europe’s instruments into line with its interests, and make best possible use of the narrow available leeway. That would presuppose, first of all, admitting that Euro- pean incentives and sanctions will not bring about a negotiated conflict settlement or a political opening.

SWP Berlin Reconstruction in Syria July 2020

6 The Syrian Leadership’s Approach: Reconstruction as the Continuation of (Civil) War with Other Means

The Syrian Leadership’s Approach: Reconstruction as the Continuation of (Civil) War with Other Means

In military terms, the civil war in Syria has long since under UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen at the end of been decided in favour of the regime. Damascus and October 2019,4 agreeing on meaningful constitutional its allies now control about two-thirds of the country1 reforms or a negotiated conflict settlement (assuming and Damascus seeks to reconquer the remaining areas. the talks continue at all). Not only are important There is no prospect of a negotiated conflict settle- groups entirely absent,5 but Damascus has also made ment, reconciliation between conflict parties and it abundantly clear that it has no interest in power- population groups, or lasting peace and stabilisation. sharing or a political transition – and therefore dis- This is because – alongside a multitude of domestic tanced itself from “its own” delegation. and foreign militias – five regional and global Nevertheless, Syria’s reconstruction is already powers (Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey, United States) well under way. Yet, it does not follow the standard with irreconcilable geopolitical interests and visions approach of the international financial institutions for Syria’s future political and societal order have a (IFIs), which would revolve around a comprehensive military presence in the country.2 Also, remnants of nation-wide programme with central planning and the “Islamic State” (IS) and other radical rebel groups management and international funding. Instead are expected to form the core of a new insurgency diverse actors implement a variety of projects, mainly and terrorist network. They are likely to hamper at the local level. As a rule, they do not pay heed stabilisation efforts and have broader destabilising to the needs of the population. Instead, in the vast effects.3 And there should be no expectation of the majority of cases, they serve to further specific inter- Constitutional Committee, which began its work

1 See map on page 33. 4 For the background see Muriel Asseburg, “Syria: UN 2 There are also French special forces operating with the Mediation at the Mercy of Regional and Major-Power Inter- anti-IS coalition. See International Institute for Strategic ests”, in Muriel Asseburg, Wolfram Lacher and Mareike Studies (IISS), “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa”, Transfeld, Mission Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and The Military Balance 120, no. 1 (2020): 324–87 (376ff.). Yemen, SWP Research Paper 8/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen- 3 See Dareen Khalifa and Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Has Turkey’s schaft und Politik, October 2018), 28–43, https://www.swp- Incursion into Syria Opened the Door for an Islamic State berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/ Comeback?” War on the Rocks, Commentary, 21 February 2018RP08_Ass_EtAl.pdf. 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/has-turkeys- 5 Missing in particular are the Kurdish-dominated self- incursion-into-syria-opened-the-door-for-an-islamic-state- administration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the comeback/ (accessed 26 February 2020); Jeff Seldin, “Islamic strongest Kurdish party, the PYD. Nor is the dominant rebel State Poised for Comeback, US Defense Officials Report”, formation in Idlib province, the Al-Qaeda offshoot Hay’at Voice of America, 4 February 2020, https://www.voanews.com/ Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), involved in the talks. Unlike the Kurd- middle-east/islamic-state-poised-comeback-us-defense- ish self-administration, however, HTS has expressed no inter- officials-report (accessed 26 February 2020). est in participation.

SWP Berlin Reconstruction in Syria July 2020

7 The Syrian Leadership’s Approach: Reconstruction as the Continuation of (Civil) War with Other Means

ests and priorities and as such largely represent the Politicised Reconstruction continuation of (civil) war with other means.6 In this vein, few of the development projects initiated Damascus aims to cement by Damascus are designed to restore buildings and demographic changes, reward neighbourhoods for their former residents or to en- loyalty and compensate its able refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) international supporters. to return. The intention instead is to consolidate patronage networks of old and new regime supporters The Syrian leadership initiated the reconstruction in the population and among the economic elites. At phase already in autumn 2017. Consolidating its grip the same time, population groups that are regarded as on power is its prime concern. Rather than compre- (potentially) unreliable experience collective punish- hensive nation-wide reconstruction, the objective is ment and displacement, especially in political and to employ limited means in a politico-economic logic. strategically important areas – such as the suburbs With most of Syria’s oil and gas fields and agricultural of Damascus. This approach will both deepen pre- land still outside the regime’s control, its strategy existing socio-political cleavages and create new ones. concentrates on real estate and buildings. Reconstruc- Since 2011 the regime has issued more than sixty tion efforts are directed towards cementing the popu- laws and decrees regulating housing, land and prop- lation transfers that have occurred in the course of erty rights (HLP), urban planning, and investment fighting, forced displacement and so-called reconcilia- issues.9 Together they form the legal framework for tion agreements; rewarding the loyalty of old and reconstruction and grant the government powers, new elites through lucrative investment opportuni- such as the authority to designate development zones ties; and compensating the regime’s international where private property can be expropriated.10 supporters with access to Syria’s resources.7 What the Syrian leadership has not initiated is any process addressing crimes committed during the conflict, mission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic”, https:// www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/ transitional justice measures or reconciliation be- Documentation.aspx (accessed 31 January 2020); on the tween the population groups, nor structural reforms use of chemical weapons: Organisation for the Prohibition to enhance inclusion, participation and rule of law. of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), OPCW Releases First Report by On the contrary, grave human rights violations and Investigation and Identification Team, 8 April 2020, https://www. 8 war crimes continue. opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/04/opcw-releases-first- report-investigation-and-identification-team (accessed 10 6 See Khalil El-Hariri, “War by Other Means” (Beirut: April 2020). Carnegie Middle East Centre, Diwan, 17 June 2019), https:// 9 For details see the unpublished study by the Gesellschaft carnegie-mec.org/diwan/79297 (accessed 6 March 2020); für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Housing, Land and Synaps Network, “War by Other Means – Syria’s Economic Property Issues in Syria and Resulting Fields of Actions for Ongoing or Struggle”, September 2019, http://www.synaps.network/ Planned Programs of German Development Cooperation (May 2018). syria-economic-battleground (accessed 30 January 2020); 10 This includes the internationally controversial Law Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Battle over Syria’s Recon- No. 10 of April 2018 (amended in November 2018), which struction”, Global Policy 11, no. 1 (2020): 113–23. forms the basis for expropriations in connection with recon- 7 For an analysis of the regime’s approach, see Salam Said struction. Further relevant provisions in this context include and Jihad Yazigi, The Reconstruction of Syria: Socially Just Re-Inte- Law No. 3 of 2018, which empowers a government com- gration and Peace Building or Regime Re-Consolidation? Inter- mittee to earmark buildings for demolition; Decree 63, national Policy Analysis (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, which enables the government to freeze assets and seize December 2018), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14939.pdf property of (alleged) members of the opposition under the (accessed 6 March 2020). Counter-terrorism Law of 2012, and Decree 66 of 2012 on 8 The documented crimes committed in Syria by the development zones. See Human Rights Watch, Rigging the regime and armed groups include in particular besiegement System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding and starvation of civilian populations; deliberate targeting in Syria (June 2019), 43–46, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/ of civilians and civilian facilities; arbitrary detention, dis- local/2012220/syria0619_web4. pdf (accessed 30 January appearance and torture; forced displacement and forced 2020); Human Rights Watch, “Q&A: Syria’s New Property resettlement; looting; and the use of banned weapons. For Law”, 29 May 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/ a documentation see the regular reports at: United Nations qa-syrias-new-property-law (accessed 30 January 2020); Human Rights Council, “Independent International Com- Joseph Daher, Decree 66 and the Impact of Its National Expansion

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8 Politicised Reconstruction

Damascus has used these powers not only to seize and the Katerji brothers to the latter. This has oc- land and buildings on a large scale without adequate curred in an economy suffering under sanctions, transparency or compensation (and as such prevented capital flight and contraction as a result of the armed IDPs and refugees returning to strategic locales),11 but conflict and international punitive measures, and also demolished whole neighbourhoods, above all in plagued more strongly than ever by nepotism, corrup- the Damascus suburbs, in Homs and in East Aleppo. tion, lawlessness, informality, criminality and legal Rather than repairing war damage, such state devel- insecurity. A central role is played by the “conflict opment projects are designed to alter the composi- elites”,14 in the sense of local actors whose relation- tion of the population, generally to the detriment ships to politicians, the administration, the security of groups perceived as poorer and less loyal. Many apparatus and local militias allowed them to play a Syrians find it impossible to register property rights decisive role during the fighting, mediating trans- because they live (or lived) in informal settlements actions for example between areas controlled by dif- without deeds, or because their documents were lost ferent forces or with foreign entities. They now play while fleeing or through the destruction of land a prominent role in reconstruction, even if the gov- registries. It is estimated that informal settlements ernment does also take targeted action against promi- account for at least 30 to 40 percent of Syria’s hous- nent individuals in these circles.15 ing.12 In addition, logistical difficulties and security On the other side, attempts to persuade Syrian concerns leave many IDPs and refugees unable to entrepreneurs living abroad to begin investing in make an appointment with the authorities. Syria again have failed to date. The principal reason Regime supporters among the economic elites are for this is the country’s politico-economic circum- offered profitable investment opportunities, often in stances, which in addition to the aforementioned luxury housing developments.13 In the process mem- problems also include a restrictive investment en- bers of the old elites and a new class of war profiteers vironment and a lack of reliable property guaran- have acquired monopolies in central sectors of the economy; the president’s cousin Rami Makhluf and

Mohamed Hamsho belong to the former, Samer al-Foz 14 Samer Abboud, The Economics of War and Peace in Syria (New York: Century Foundation, Report 31 January 2017), (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 7 March 2018), https:// https://tcf.org/content/report/economics-war-peace-syria/ atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/decree-66-and-the- ?agreed=1 (accessed 30 January 2020). impact-of-its-national-expansion/ (accessed 30 January 2020); 15 See also the unpublished study by the Syrian consulting “Amendments to Law No. 10/2018 and Legislative Decree firm Etana, The Business Base of the Syrian Regime: Frontmen, Shell No. 66/2012 in Syria”, Syrian Legal Development Programme – Companies and Reconstruction (May 2019). In the course of 2019 Human Rights and Business Unit, https://www.hrbu.syrianldp. the Syrian leadership began taking very public action against com/post/amendments-to-law-nr-10-2018-and-legislative- members of the business elites. This included action against decree-nr-66-2012-in-syria (accessed 30 January 2020). corruption and money laundering, enforcing taxes and levies, 11 Human Rights Watch, Syria: Residents Blocked From and confiscating assets. It does not, however, represent a Returning (16 October 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/ fundamental untangling of the intimate networks of politi- 2018/10/16/syria-residents-blocked-returning (accessed cal and economic elites. See, for example, “Assad Orders 30 January 2020). Measures against Rami Makhlouf’s Companies”, Asharq 12 Samir Aita, “Reconstruction as a Political-Economy Al-Awsat, 27 August 2019, https://aawsat.com/english/home/ Issue: The Case of Syria”, Cairo Review of Global Affairs, article/1875991/assad-orders-measures-against-rami-makh 18 September 2019, https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir- louf%E2%80%99s-companies (accessed 30 January 2020); forum/reconstruction-as-a-political-economy-issue-the-case- Chloe Cornish, “The Men Making a Fortune from Syria’s of-syria/ (accessed 30 January 2020). War”, Financial Times, 3 October 2019, https://www.ft.com/ 13 This applies for example to the Marota City project content/525ec4e4-e4a3-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc (accessed in the Damascus suburb of Basateen al-Razi, see “Luxury 30 January 2020); “Syrian Government Seizes Assets of Busi- Marota City Project Shows Blueprint for Syria’s Rebuilding nessman Rami Makhlouf”, Al Jazeera, 24 December 2019, Plans”, Arab News, 6 November 2018, https://www.arabnews. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/syrian-government- com/node/1399411/middle-east (accessed 30 January 2020); seizes-assets-businessman-rami-makhlouf-191224155408157. Rashmee Roshan Lall, “Rebuilding Syria, One Luxury Hotel html (accessed 30 January 2020); Kheder Khaddour, “The at a Time”, Arab Weekly, 21 September 2019, https://thearab Wrath of Caesar”, Diwan blog (Carnegie Middle East Center, weekly.com/rebuilding-syria-one-luxury-hotel-time (accessed 1 June 2020), https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/81946 (accessed 30 January 2020). 10 July 2020).

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9 The Syrian Leadership’s Approach: Reconstruction as the Continuation of (Civil) War with Other Means

tees.16 Transparency International ranked Syria as sure that humanitarian aid is distributed as it would the world’s third most corrupt country in 2019.17 wish – to secure the allegiance of businesspeople According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and population groups regarded as loyal, and to pun- the draft investment law published in 2019 would at ish others. The latter applies in particular to residents least slightly improve the investment environment. of former rebel strongholds such as the Damascus It is designed to reduce bureaucracy and create suburb of Duma and East Aleppo.22 incentives by reducing import tariffs and improving In this vein, the regime places heavy restrictions on access to financing.18 Still, Syria occupies 176th place international organisations, especially their access to (out of 190) in the World Bank’s “Doing Business population groups in need of assistance. It regularly 2020” Ranking.19 Even if individual improvements denies requests for field visits, needs assessments, were achieved in 2018/2019,20 substantial progress on monitoring and evaluation (or simply ignores them), repatriating capital is unlikely without significantly and the same applies to permission to conduct cross- deeper reforms that would make guarantees against frontline operations.23 In order to carry out their work, asset seizures credible.21 international organisations are required to cooperate with local partners approved by the regime. These are the relevant ministries, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent International Aid on a Short Leash (SARC) and “NGOs” like the Syria Trust for Development, which is headed by the president’s wife Asma al-Assad At the same time, the legal and political framework who is subject to EU and US sanctions.24 These actors for international assistance established by the regime ensures that, in the areas it controls, humanitarian 22 For an analysis of this approach and examples of how and development organisations cannot operate in- international aid is distributed in terms of regime stability dependently. rather than need, see Haid Haid, Principled Aid in Syria: A Framework for International Agencies (London: Chatham House, The regime decides who supplies July 2019), 5–10, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/ international aid, where it goes, default/files/2019-07-04-PrincipledAidSyria.pdf (accessed 30 March 2020); Human Rights Watch, Rigging the System and who profits. (see note 10). 23 According to Haid Haid, for example, in 2015 the Syrian Damascus decides who supplies international aid, leadership ignored no less than 75 percent of UN requests where it goes, and who profits. In this way it can be to supply aid, and only half of the requests which were answered actually resulted in a delivery; see Haid, Principled 16 Joseph Daher, The Political Context of Syria’s Reconstruction: Aid in Syria (see note 22), 6. In 2017 Damascus approved only A Prospective in Light of a Legacy of Unequal Development (Florence: 27 percent of UN requests to supply aid, in the first four European University Institute [EUI], December 2018), https:// months of 2018 just 7 percent, see Lisa Barrington, “2018 cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/60112 (accessed 6 March 2020). Worst Year in Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis: U.N. Official”, 17 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index Reuters, 18 May 2018. According to humanitarian organisa- 2019, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019 (accessed 26 Feb- tions the access situation has not improved noticeably since ruary 2020). then; telephone conversation between author and repre- 18 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report Syria sentative of Human Rights Watch, February 2020. On (January 2020), 6. Damascus’s politicisation of humanitarian aid see also José 19 World Bank Group, Doing Business 2020, https://www. Ciro Martínez and Brent Eng, “The Unintended Consequences doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/pdf/db2020/ of Emergency Food Aid: Neutrality, Sovereignty and Politics Doing-Business-2020_rankings.pdf (accessed 26 February in the Syrian Civil War, 2012–15”, International Affairs 92, 2020). no. 1 (2016): 153–73; Reinoud Leenders and Kholoud Man- 20 World Bank Group, Economy Profile Syrian Arab Republic – sour, “Humanitarianism, State Sovereignty, and Authoritarian Doing Business 2020, 61, https://www.doingbusiness.org/ Regime Maintenance in the Syrian War”, Political Science Quar- content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/syria/SYR.pdf (accessed terly 133, no. 2 (2018): 225–57, https://onlinelibrary.wiley. 26 February 2020). com/doi/full/10.1002/polq.12773 (accessed 10 April 2020). 21 Abboud, The Economics of War and Peace in Syria (see note 24 For an overview of needs, donors, regional distribution 14); Katherine Nazemi and Alexander Decina, “No Business and implementation partners for international aid, see UN as Usual in Syria” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment OCHA, “Syrian Arab Republic – Organizations Implement- for International Peace, Sada Blog, 20 June 2019), https:// ing Humanitarian Activities Based within Syria”, 2019, carnegieendowment.org/sada/79351 (accessed 6 March 2020). http://www.ocha-sy.org/4wspresence2019.html; idem., “Inter-

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10 International Aid on a Short Leash

are often under the influence of the security apparatus – which is responsible for grave human rights violations – and/or function as fronts for government officials, army officers or militias. The programmes of international organisations and their concrete execu- tion have to be approved in detail – and sometimes also implemented – by these gatekeepers. What is more, Damascus has also undermined the independ- ence of international organisations, for example by intervening in their recruitment and procurement to the benefit of pro-regime entrepreneurs (some of whom are subject to EU/US sanctions). This diverts international aid to finance those responsible for human rights violations, at least to an extent.

active Humanitarian Response Dashboard (within Syria)”, 2019, http://www.ocha-sy.org/4wsresponse2019. html; idem., “Syrian Arab Republic – Communitites and Key Facts (HNO 2019)”, 2019, http://www.ocha-sy.org/findlocation.html (all accessed 31 January 2020); on cooperation with front organisations of the Assad regime, see also Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “UNHCR on Aid to Syria: What’s Important Is to Deliver”, The National, 15 July 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/world/ mena/unhcr-on-aid-to-syria-what-s-important-is-to-deliver- 1.886179 (accessed 6 March 2020).

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11 The Context: The Interests of Regional and Global Powers

The Context: The Interests of Regional and Global Powers

Russia and Iran concentrated on reforming and upgrading the Syrian security sector.27 Iran places greater weight on streng- The regime in Damascus has made it abundantly thening allied militias and bolstering its ties with clear that it will accept foreign engagement in recon- local communities to entrench its influence in Syria. struction only from countries that took its side in the Both countries have signed MOUs on investments civil war and grant assistance without conditionality.25 in Syria. These concentrate on the oil, gas, minerals, But Russia and Iran are struggling with their own electricity, agriculture and tourism sectors. In some economic crises, also caused in part by sanctions. cases Iran and Russia find themselves competing over They are in no position to fund a comprehensive re- profitable concessions, above all for phosphate min- construction in Syria. Rather, the memoranda of ing and in the oil and gas sector.28 Tehran has signed understanding (MoUs) that Tehran and Moscow have MoUs with Damascus to develop the port at Latakia, signed with Damascus have two principal aims: Both construct several power stations and establish a third governments want to recoup the costs of participating mobile phone network. Moscow has secured agree- in the war through resource extraction and a share in ments to expand and manage the naval base at Tar- lucrative investment projects. And both are looking to tus, mine phosphates near Palmyra and operate a secure their long-term strategic interests with military fertiliser plant in Homs. Russia has also secured bases and control of ports and transport links. At the exclusive exploration and drilling rights for oil and same time the interests and strategic objectives of gas in Syria and its coastal waters. Iran has made the Assad regime’s two main partners are not always slower progress than Russia on realising economic identical but at times contradictory.26 Russia priori- projects, but remains influential as a major trading tises reinforcing (central) state functions and has partner and supplier of petroleum products.

25 See for example the statement by the Syrian prime 27 See Yury Barnim, Reforming the Syrian Arab Army: Russia’s minister: “Khamis: Investment Opportunities Will Be Given Vision, Discussion Paper 4 (Geneva and Istanbul: Geneva to Countries That Stood by Syria”, SANA (Syrian Arab News Center for Strategic Policy [GCSP] and Omran Centre for Stra- Agency), 8 August 2017, https://sana.sy/en/?p=111457 (accessed tegic Studies, March 2019), 3f., https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/ 26 February 2020). 2y10s7R3ZIZ5bgMFacQKkFx7E3XAdDccH5OSWyZGupATj 26 For more detail on the different approaches and methods EocJRepTEy (accessed 2 March 2020). On Russia’s interests employed by Moscow and Tehran, see Sinan Hatahet, Russia and approaches in general, also Joost Hiltermann, Andrey and Iran: Economic Influence in Syria (London: Chatham House, Kortunov, Ruslan Mamedov and Tatyana Shmeleva, Squaring March 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ the Circle: Russian and European Views on Syrian Reconstruction russia-and-iran-economic-influence-syria (accessed 26 Feb- (Moscow: Russian International Affairs Council, 5 June 2019), ruary 2020); Faysal Itani, “Geo-Economics: Russia and Iran https://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/squaring- in Syria” (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 17 May 2019), the-circle-russian-and-european-views-on-syrian-recon https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ struction/?sphrase_id=29878654 (accessed 31 January 2020). faysal-itani-in-syria-studies-geo-economics-russia-and-iran-in- 28 Hamidreza Azizi and Leonid Issaev, Russian and Iranian syria/ (accessed 26 February 2020); Anton Mardasov, “Are Economic Interests in Syria (Pre-2010 and Intra-war Period), Dis- Russia, Iran Engaged in Tug of War over Syria?” Al Monitor, cussion Paper 8 (Geneva and Istanbul: GCSP and Omran 30 January 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/ Centre for Strategic Studies, May 2019), https://dam.gcsp.ch/ originals/2019/01/russia-iran-syria-rivalry.html (accessed files/2y10nlGNuebJ3zh4kU5wS7N66uuFm35TYDmJjO9jyzKVQ 31 January 2020). YbDoO7vybkfq (accessed 24 March 2020).

SWP Berlin Reconstruction in Syria July 2020

12 Turkey

Iran has also granted the Assad regime sizeable dominant Kurdish PYD party, and to create instead an loans in recent years, while Russia supplied financial alternative local elite loyal to Turkey. resources to support the currency. But neither pos- Accordingly, Turkey has established new security sesses the resources to finance Syria’s reconstruction. structures in the areas it controls. The SNA is de facto As a consequence Moscow has been seeking to per- under Ankara’s command. Turkey is also training suade others to shoulder that burden, directing its civil police to deploy there, and has established mili- requests in particular to Europe and the Arab Gulf tary police units to tackle excesses committed by SNA states. The Russians calculate that this would not only forces.31 And it has replaced the institutions of the reduce their own burden in stabilising the country, PYD-dominated self-administration with local coun- but also potentially pave the way for the international cils that exclude not only the PYD but also represen- rehabilitation of Bashar al-Assad. Moscow has clearly tatives of the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and communicated to Europe that it expects it to dis- Kurdish activists who are critical of Turkey. The oppo- mantle sanctions and support reconstruction – and sition Syrian Interim Government (SIG) plays only a that these steps are in Europe’s own interest because, nominal role. The new structures created by Ankara the Kremlin argues, that is the only plausible path are largely integrated into the Turkish administra- to stability and eventually allowing the refugees to tion. Like the security structures they are funded return.29 mainly by revenues from the Turkish-Syrian border crossings. Turkey coordinates and controls humanitarian aid Turkey on the ground through its disaster and emergency agency AFAD. It has also invested massively in infra- Turkey is the main international actor engaged in structure rehabilitation, education and health – actual reconstruction in Syria. But its activities are above all in the area occupied in 2016 in Operation restricted to the areas of northern Syria that it brought Euphrates Shield – in order to provide public ser- under its control – along with the allied militias of vices to the population. Neighbouring Turkish pro- the Syrian National Army (SNA, which emerged from vinces and entrepreneurs are active there. Armed the Free Syrian Army, FSA) – in the course of the groups also play a prominent role in economic rela- military interventions of 2016, 2018 and 2019.30 tions. The involved Turkish actors see Syria above all Ankara’s prime objective is to permanently prevent a as a market for Turkish products and an investment contiguous Kurdish self-administration under the opportunity for Turkish capital. Their interest in reviving local economic structures is less enthusiastic. 29 “Putin Urges Europe to Help Rebuild Syria So Refugees What is more, against the backdrop of the meltdown Can Return”, Guardian, 18 August 2018, https://www. of Syria’s currency, over the last few years the use of theguardian.com/global/2018/aug/18/putin-urges-europe-to- the Turkish lira has become widespread in the areas help-rebuild-syria-so-refugees-can-return (accessed 31 Janu- controlled by Turkey or allied militias.32 ary 2020); Diana Hodali, “Rebuilding Assad’s Syria: Who Should Foot the Bill?”, Deutsche Welle, 8 September 2018, In northern Syria Ankara apparently https://www.dw.com/en/rebuilding-assads-syria-who-should- wants a buffer zone under permanent foot-the-bill/a-45389963 (accessed 31 January 2020). Turkish control. 30 See Map on page 33. On the different circumstances and approaches in the areas under Turkish control, see Khay- rallah al-Hilu, Afrin under Turkish Control: Political, Economic In the course of Turkey’s military operations local and Social Transformations (Florence: EUI, July 2019), https:// Kurds were expelled from Kurdish-majority areas (and cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/63745 (accessed 10 March 2020); not all of them have been allowed to return since). In Engin Yüksel and Erwin van Veen, Turkey in Northwestern their place IDPs have been resettled, for example Syria (The Hague: Clingendael, 4 June 2019), https://www. clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/PB_Turkey_in_ Northwestern_Syria_June_2019.pdf (accessed 10 March 2020); Gregory Waters, Between Ankara and Damascus: The Role of the Turkish State in North Aleppo, (Washington, D.C.: 31 Al-Hilu, Afrin Under Turkish Control (see note 30), 5f. Middle East Institute, 20 June 2019), https://www.mei.edu/ 32 Marie Jégo and Laure Stephan, “La Turquie consolide publications/between-ankara-and-damascus-role-turkish- sa présence en Syrie à travers sa monnaie”, Le Monde, 7 July state-north-aleppo (accessed 6 March 2020). 2020, 5.

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13 The Context: The Interests of Regional and Global Powers

from the suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo.33 It would port of Tripoli (Lebanon) since 2012 and expressed also appear that Ankara’s plan to resettle Syrian refu- interest in reopening the Tripoli-Homs railway line. gees in north-eastern Syria is intended not only to Secondly Beijing also hopes that good relations with reduce the financial and societal costs of accommo- Damascus will help it to suppress transnational jihad- dating them in Turkey but also to permanently alter ism, specifically preventing the return of Uighurs who the composition of the region’s population to the have been fighting with the jihadist rebels in Syria. detriment of the Kurds.34 But when it comes to actually going ahead with In principle Ankara’s approach in northern Syria major investments in Syria, China has been cautious. appears to be driven by the intention to establish a Few of its promises of aid, investment and loans have buffer zone under permanent Turkish control. That is actually materialised. And major Chinese investments a venture that would create lasting conflict between in Syria are unlikely as long as the security situation Ankara and Damascus. The risk of a protracted guer- remains unstable, the economic structures are charac- rilla conflict is also present: already, the PYD’s terised by legal insecurity, corruption and nepotism, People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, and Chinese labour and capital would therefore be at YPG) have responded to Turkish military and cleans- risk. Washington’s secondary sanctions are also likely ing operations with attacks intended to destabilise to deter China from cooperating with Damascus; one Ankara’s occupation, reconstruction projects and indication of this is the withdrawal of companies that the local councils it established. Turkey’s military have apparently been operating as fronts for the Chi- operations in cooperation with the SNA have also nese technology company Huawei in Syria and Iran.36 further exacerbated ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs in Syria. Arab Gulf states

China The Arab Gulf states were Syria’s biggest investors until 2011. But they too have hesitated to re-engage. Beijing has expanded its humanitarian aid in Syria The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain did since 2017, and laid the groundwork for future eco- execute a U-turn at the end of 2018, reopening their nomic relations.35 That year China hosted a trade fair embassies in Damascus and signing various MOUs on Syria reconstruction projects and committed US$2 with the Syrian regime during a series of mutual billion for establishing industrial parks there. In 2018 visits.37 The Gulf states – together with Egypt and it promised US$23 billion in loans and donations for Arab countries, including Syria. Business delegations 36 Steve Stecklow, Babak Dehghanpisheh and James Pom- have visited in both directions. China’s policy towards fret, “Exclusive: New Documents Link Huawei to Suspected Syria is largely guided by two objectives. Firstly Bei- Front Companies in Iran, Syria”, Reuters, 8 January 2019, jing wants to develop an economic partnership com- https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-iran-exclusive/ patible with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In that exclusive-new-documents-link-huawei-to-suspected-front- context China has been expanding the Mediterranean companies-in-iran-syria-idUSKCN1P21MH; Steve Stecklow and Moira Warburton, “Key Events in Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou’s Extradition Case”, Reuters, 20 January 2020, 33 Even before Turkey’s military operations, flight and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-tech-events- forced displacement had caused significant changes in the timeline/key-events-in-huawei-cfo-meng-wanzhous-extra composition of the population in the Kurdish-dominated dition-case-idUSKBN1ZJ15Z; Pan Yuanyuan, “The Looming areas. See overview in al-Hilu, Afrin under Turkish Control Threat of Sanctions for Chinese Companies in Iran”, (see note 30), 14ff. The Diplomat, 1 February 2020, https://thediplomat.com/ 34 Sinem Adar, Repatriation to Turkey’s “Safe Zone” in Northeast 2020/02/the-looming-threat-of-sanctions-for-chinese- Syria, SWP Comment 1/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft companies-in-iran/ (all accessed 3 February 2020). und Politik, January 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 37 Taylor Luck, “Postwar Syria? Arab World Moving to 10.18449/2020C01/ (accessed 10 March 2020). Bring Damascus Back into the Fold”, Christian Science Monitor, 35 For more detail, see John Calabrese, Syria and China: In 19 January 2019, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle- War and Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Insti- East/2019/0117/Postwar-Syria-Arab-world-moving-to-bring- tute, July 2019), https://www.mei.edu/publications/china-and- Damascus-back-into-the-fold. For more detail on the UAE, see syria-war-and-reconstruction (accessed 31 January 2020), also Joseph Daher, The Dynamics and Evolution of UAE-Syria Relations: for the figures in the following. Between Expectations and Obstacles (Florence: EUI, October 2019);

SWP Berlin Reconstruction in Syria July 2020

14 Syria’s Neighbours

Jordan and with Russian support – have also argued likely loss of pilgrimage revenues. This will also con- for Syria’s suspension from the Arab League to be strain the ability of these states to raise significant lifted, to date without success.38 The background here sums for Syrian reconstruction at least in the short is that the Gulf monarchies possess a great interest in to medium term. curtailing Iranian and Turkish influence in Syria – even if they have themselves begun to seek an understanding with Tehran in light of Washington’s in- Syria’s Neighbours creasingly erratic policy in the Gulf. But few Gulf Arab investment projects in Syria have yet been oper- Other countries in the region possess a strong interest ationalised, let alone realised. And the aforementioned in seeing the country stabilise, refugees return and obstacles created by secondary sanctions and Syria’s bilateral trade relations resume. This applies first and politico-economic structures also hinder financial foremost to Syria’s neighbours Lebanon, Jordan and flows from the Gulf monarchies (and from other Iraq. Lebanon in particular hopes to profit directly potentially interested countries). It also seems as if from Syrian reconstruction. But that does not mean Washington may have intervened directly, in particu- that any of the three can be expected to make rele- lar to block any thawing of relations between Syria vant investments, given that they are each facing and Saudi Arabia.39 An additional factor is that the their own serious economic and internal challenges. state budgets of the Gulf monarchies have been Israel is the only neighbour with which Syria is drained by the repercussions of the Covid-19 pan- officially at war, having occupied the Syrian Golan demic, in particular the collapse of oil sales and the Heights since 1967 (and annexed the territory in 1981). Israel has no intention (or possibility) of be- coming involved in reconstruction. But it can be ex- Kinda Makieh, “UAE Firms Scout Trade at Syria Fair, Defying pected to continue its efforts to weaken Iran’s diplo- U.S. Pressure”, Reuters, 31 August 2019, https://www.reuters. matic and military influence in Syria.40 com/article/us-syria-emirates/uae-firms-scout-trade-at-syria- fair-defying-u-s-pressure-idUSKCN1VL0HB. For Bahrain, “Damascus ‘Grants Bahraini Royal’ Lucrative Business Deal The United States as Gulf Regimes Rally round Syria’s Assad”, New Arab, 3 April 2019, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2019/4/3/syria- regime-rewards-bahraini-rapprochement-with-royal-business- Since 2017 the United States under President Donald deal (all accessed 30 March 2020). Trump has successively scaled down its ambitions in 38 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Support Lacking to Readmit Syria. Today it is involved above all to prevent a resur- Syrian Regime to Arab League, Group’s Head Says”, The gence of IS and to counter Iranian influence. In this National, 25 December 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/ vein, it is engaged on the ground, with patrols in north- world/support-lacking-to-readmit-syrian-regime-to-arab-league- eastern Syria, a presence in al-Tanf on the Iraqi bor- group-s-head-says-1.955909 (accessed 31 January 2020). For der, and limited stabilisation assistance in the areas Egypt David Awad, “The Business of War: Egypt, Others Eye liberated from IS east of the Euphrates. It also sup- Reconstruction Bids”, Al Monitor, 12 September 2017, https:// plies humanitarian aid.41 At the same time, Washing- www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2017/09/egypt-invest- ton has clearly signalled its lack of interest in con- reconstruction-process-syria-iraq.html#ixzz6Cc BQmmns (all accessed 31 January 2020). 39 Daher, The Dynamics and Evolution of UAE-Syria Relations 40 Gil Murciano, Preventing a Spill-over of the Iran-Israel Conflict (see note 37), 12; “U.S. Pressing Gulf States to Keep Syria in Syria: E3 + Russia Should Lead the Way Out, SWP Comment Isolated: Sources”, Reuters, 19 February 2019, https://www. 27/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018), reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-gulf/u-s-pressing- https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/preventing-a- gulf-states-to-keep-syria-isolated-sources-idUSKCN1Q70VO; spillover-of-the-iran-israel-conflict-in-syria/ (accessed 10 April Hussein Bakeer and Giorgio Cafiero, “Bashar al-Assad and 2020). the Greater Arab World”, Atlantic Council website, 8 Feb- 41 “House Hearing on U.S. Policy towards Syria” [video], C- ruary 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ Span, 23 October 2019, https://www.c-span.org/video/?465609- syriasource/bashar-al-assad-and-the-greater-arab-world/; Sami 1/house-hearing-us-policy-syria (accessed 27 February 2020); Moubayed, “Iran Ties Hinder Gulf Normalisation with Syria”, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Armed Conflict in Syria: Arab Weekly, 22 December 2019, https://thearabweekly.com/ Overview and U.S. Response, CRS Report (Washington, D.C., 12 iran-ties-hinder-gulf-normalisation-syria (all accessed 30 February 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf March 2020). (accessed 27 February 2020).

SWP Berlin Reconstruction in Syria July 2020

15 The Context: The Interests of Regional and Global Powers

tributing to Syria’s reconstruction.42 Instead in 2019 it external actors treat reconstruction as the continua- expanded its “maximum pressure” campaign to Syria tion of (civil) war by other means. Tensions are likely with a new set of direct and secondary sanctions (so- to grow – even between Damascus and its allies called Caesar sanctions), warning others against co- in Moscow and Tehran – concerning priorities, ap- operating with the Assad regime or with individuals proaches and profits. Even after the fighting has responsible for grave human rights violations.43 In ended rehabilitation and reconstruction will therefore June 2020, the sanctions and a first batch of designa- remain fragmented, localised and driven by particular tions of individuals and entities went into effect.44 interests. The needs of local populations, as well as those of refugees and IDPs, are likely to come second to profit-seeking and politico-economic and geostra- Interim Conclusion tegic interests. The political and social dimensions of reconstruction (transitional justice, reconciliation) The regional and global powers involved in Syria have will remain absent.45 This is unlikely to lead to long- irreconcilable geopolitical interests and visions for term stabilisation. Syria’s political and societal order. In addition, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic will significantly reduce the revenues of the Arab Gulf states, which could otherwise (at least theoretically) have been potential investors. Thus sufficient funding for early and comprehensive reconstruction should not be expected. Rather both the Syrian leadership and

42 See, for example, Natasha Turak, “No US Assistance on Syria Reconstruction until Iran Is Out: Top US Diplomat”, CNBC, 19 January 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/12/no- us-assistance-on-syria-reconstruction-until-iran-is-out-top-us- diplomat.html (accessed 31 January 2020); Karen DeYoung and Shane Harris, “Trump Instructs Military to Begin Plan- ning for Withdrawal from Syria”, Washington Post, 5 April 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/trump-instructs-military-to-begin-planning-for- withdrawal-from-syria/2018/04/04/1039f420-3811-11e8-8fd2- 49fe3c675a89_story.html (accessed 26 February 2020). 43 US Congress, “Title LXXIV – Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019”, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (December 2019), 2611–35, https://rules. house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/CRPT- 116hrpt333.pdf (accessed 29 January 2020); see also the Statement of Secretary of State Pompeo, U.S. State Depart- ment, “Passage of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019”, press statement Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, 20 December 2019, https://www.state.gov/passage-of- the-caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act-of-2019/ (accessed 29 January 2020). 44 U.S. State Department fact sheet: https://www.state.gov/ caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/; for the initial round of designations: https://www.state.gov/syria-caesar-act- designations/. For the US approach see also the transcript of an event at the Hudson Institute with US Syria envoy 45 On the irreconcilable geopolitical interests of the rele- James Jeffrey, 12 May 2020, https://www.hudson.org/ vant actors and the resulting discrepancy between challenges research/16032-transcript-maximum-pressure-on-the-assad- and offers in connection with reconstruction, see also Erwin regime-for-its-chemical-weapons-use-and-other-atrocities van Veen, The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction: A Case of Ma- (all accessed 11 July 2020). tryoshka (The Hague: Clingendael, April 2019).

SWP Berlin Reconstruction in Syria July 2020

16 War Damage and Its Consequences

Challenges of Reconstruction

It is estimated that reconstruction will cost US$250 to water and sewerage. Housing, health, education and US$400 billion or even US$1 trillion, depending on agriculture have also suffered massively. The destruc- the source.46 But what does reconstruction actually tion is very unevenly distributed. The worst damage is mean? The armed conflict that began in 2011 follow- concentrated in areas that were contested, sometimes ing the violent suppression of a protest movement for years, and recaptured by the regime and its allies leaves Syria facing enormous challenges. These, the from the rebels or the IS. This applies in particular relevant UN institutions, the World Bank, researchers to the eastern suburbs of Damascus, to the Yarmouk and Syrian civil society largely agree, extend far refugee camp at the southern periphery of the capital, beyond mine clearance and physical reconstruction and to East Aleppo, Al-Raqqa, Homs and Hama. of infrastructure and housing.47 In particular it is Almost all the provincial capitals have been battle- necessary to create the conditions for the different fields at some point during the civil war; many his- parts of society to live together in peace, to compen- torical centres (such as the ancient city of Aleppo, sate the losses of human capital and human develop- which is listed as world heritage by UNESCO, and the ment, and to restart the economy and basic public historic centre of Homs) have been gravely damaged services. or destroyed, as have the ancient sites of Palmyra. On the peripheries, whole neighbourhoods and suburbs lie empty and ruined. In Homs, Al-Raqqa, parts of War Damage and Its Consequences Aleppo and the suburbs of Damascus, aerial bombing has caused destruction comparable to that of the Sec- The war has wreaked great destruction on Syria’s ond World War in Europe. By 2017 the World Bank infrastructure. The energy sector (including oil and estimated that almost 30 percent of Syria’s buildings gas production and electricity generation) has been had been heavily damaged or destroyed.48 In spring especially badly affected, as have transport links, 2019 a UN report took stock of 140,000 buildings that had been damaged, of which 40,000 had been completely destroyed and another 50,000 severely affect- 46 US$250 billion: “Security Council Briefing on the ed.49 Services including healthcare, education, drink- Situation in Syria, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura”, United ing water and electricity are severely restricted, espe- Nations Department of Political Affairs, 27 November 2017, cially in the (formerly) contested areas. According to https://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-statements/ the UN, by 2018 the fighting had left almost half the 27112017/syria (accessed 28 January 2020); US$400 billion: country’s health facilities impaired or inoperable and “President al-Assad in Interview to Russian NTV Channel: one-third of schools destroyed or damaged. More than Any Constitutional Reform in Syria Is a Wholly Syrian Matter”, SANA, 24 June 2018, https://sana.sy/en/?p=140830 (accessed 28 January 2020); US$1 trillion: “Syria Needs $1 Trillion 48 World Bank, The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Con- Dollars to Rebuild from the Ashes (and China Is Waiting)”, sequences of the Conflict in Syria (Washington, D.C., 10 July National Interest, 6 February 2017, https://nationalinterest. 2017), v–x, 17–75, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ org/blog/the-buzz/syria-needs-1-trillion-dollars-rebuild-the- syria/publication/the-toll-of-war-the-economic-and-social- ashes-china-19337 (accessed 28 January 2020). See also Shar- consequences-of-the-conflict-in-syria (accessed 29 January mila Devadas, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Norman V. Loayza, 2020). Growth after War in Syria (Washington, D.C.: World Bank 49 For detail on damage, see United Nations Institute for Group, Development Research Group, August 2019), 3, http:// Training and Research, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas (March documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/424551565105634645/ 2019), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ pdf/Growth-after-War-in-Syria.pdf (accessed 26 February reach_thematic_assessment_syrian_cities_damage_atlas_ 2020). march_2019_reduced_file_size_1.pdf (accessed 29 January 47 See the literature discussed in this section. 2020).

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17 Challenges of Reconstruction

50 percent of the sewerage system was operating at full extent of contamination with explosives had not reduced capacity or not at all, with about 70 percent even been assessed.55 Serious incidents are frequent, of waste water discharged untreated.50 with returnees and children at particular risk, and the contamination creates significant problems above all More than half the remaining for agriculture, rubble clearance and humanitarian population lives in areas with high access. risks from unexploded ordnance.

In Homs for example, UN Habitat reports that War Economy and Sanctions almost 54 percent of the buildings are no longer hab- itable. Some 60 percent of neighbourhoods are no Syria’s economy has contracted considerably in the longer functional, because their infrastructure has course of the conflict. In 2018 the UN estimated the been destroyed and basic services are lacking. As a damage to the economy at more than US$388 billion: result about 40 percent of the residents have moved direct physical destruction about US$120 billion and to other neighbourhoods or fled the city altogether.51 loss of productivity about US$268 billion.56 In the first In the Yarmouk refugee camp and the surrounding five and a half years of the war alone – from mid- areas of Damascus about 80 percent of the buildings 2011 to the end of 2016 – the loss of GDP amounted have been destroyed; of the roughly original 800,000 to about US$226 billion, or about four times Syria’s inhabitants only about 1,000 remained.52 In Aleppo total GDP in 2010. Real GDP declined by about two- the population fell from about 2.5 to 1.6 million, in thirds over the same period.57 the eastern suburbs of Damascus from about 390,000 The main reasons for the decline in productivity to 270,000.53 The decline was especially dramatic in were loss of production factors (in particular the specific suburbs of the capital: in Duma from about physical destruction of factories in Aleppo, Homs and 120,000 (2004) to 40,000 (2019), in Harasta from the Damascus suburbs), withdrawal of investment, 80,000 to 2,600 and in Arbin from 90,000 to 19,000.54 loss of labour and skills, and lack of fuel, electricity These places are also especially severely affected by and raw materials.58 Additionally the war economy landmines, IEDs and unexploded ordnance. In 2019, shifted incentives away from productive activities.59 according to UN OCHA, 10.2 million Syrians (more War-related degradation of transport and commercial than half the country’s remaining population) were networks and supply chains also played a decisive living in areas with high risk of explosion. And the

50 UN OCHA Syria, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview (March 55 “Syria in 2020: The Deadly Legacy of Explosive Violence 2019), esp. 5, 6, 28, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ and Its Impact on Infrastructure and Health”, ReliefWeb, files/resources/2019_Syr_HNO_Full.pdf (accessed 29 January 18 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab- 2020); for damage see also World Bank, The Economics of Post- republic/syria-2020-deadly-legacy-explosive-violence-and-its- Conflict Reconstruction in MENA (Washington, D.C., 1 April impact (accessed 31 January 2020); “Syria – Explosive 2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/23540 Hazard Contamination”, UNMAS website, March 2019, 1491413228678/The-Economics-of-Post-Conflict- https://unmas.org/en/programmes/syria (accessed 29 January Reconstruction-in-MENA (accessed 29 January 2020); World 2020); UN OCHA Syria, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), v–x, 17–75. See also (see note 50), 52f. more recent reports from the Center for Operational Analysis 56 “Experts Discuss Post-conflict Reconstruction Policies and Research (COAR) on damage, challenges and politico- after Political Agreement in Syria”, UNESCWA, 7 August economic dynamics in individual regions of Syria at: https:// 2018, https://www.unescwa.org/news/syrian-experts-discuss- coar-global.org/nosap/. post-conflict-reconstruction-policies-after-political- 51 UN Habitat, City Profile Homs: Multi Sector Assessment (May agreement-syria (accessed 28 January 2020); “The Latest: 2014), https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download- UN Says Civil War Has Cost Syria $388B in Damage”, AP, manager-files/Homs%20RCP.pdf (accessed 27 March 2020). 9 August 2018, https://apnews.com/aa0aaa2c44cd430196f 52 United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 572227b45c150/The-Latest:-UN-says-civil-war-has-cost-Syria- Syrian Cities Damage Atlas (see note 49). $388B-in-damage (accessed 10 February 2020). 53 Ibid. 57 World Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), vii. 54 COAR, Eastern Ghouta: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile 58 Devadas, Elbadawi and Loayza, Growth After War in (July 2019), 18, https://coar-global.org/nosap/ (accessed 27 Syria (see note 46), 33. March 2020). 59 World Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), i.

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18 War Economy and Sanctions

role. As a consequence trade with neighbouring coun- The most noticeable consequence for ordinary citi- tries collapsed as well.60 zens in Syria has been a significant increase in the cost of living.64 In combination with a massive rise in un- Investment Collapses employment, they have become increasingly dependent on international aid and remittances.65 In June Syrian oil production was largely stopped by the 2020, the head of the WFP warned of famine;66 ac- war, and most of what was left still remained outside cording to its figures, 9.3 million Syrians were experi- Damascus’s control in early summer 2020.61 Oil was encing food insecurity (up from 6.5 million 2018), a formerly one of Syria’s main exports and a central further 2.2 million were at risk of food insecurity; source of revenues for the state. Together with high more than 80,000 children were chronically malnour- military spending, the collapse of state revenues ished.67 (because of the loss of oil and tax revenues and the collapse of foreign trade) led to a steep decline in Damascus lacks the resources to public investment – from 9 percent of GDP in 2010 pursue economic reconstruction or to 0.5 percent in 2016.62 Damascus covers its budget invest in infrastructure. and current account deficits by drawing on currency reserves, printing money and borrowing at preferen- The government’s budget for 2020 proposes a tial terms from Iran and Russia. This has in turn led slight overall increase in spending, by 3 percent to to a noticeable increase in public debt, dwindling US$9.8 billion, partly to fund higher public sector currency reserves and a dramatic devaluation of the salaries and pensions. The only planned spending Syrian pound. Before the uprising in 2011 one US cuts are a reduction in subsidies, including those on dollar cost about 50 Syrian pounds. In October 2019 fuel. As a result the fiscal situation is likely to remain the price reached about 630 pounds. By mid-January tight. It is also dubious whether the spending can 2020, against the backdrop of an escalating financial crisis in Lebanon, it had spiked to 1,200 pounds. By 10 March 2020); Cash Crash: Syria’s Economic Collapse and the June 2020, with financial meltdown in Lebanon, the Fragmentation of the State, COAR, Thematic Report (6 July impact of Covid-19 and the psychological effect of US 63 2020), https://coar-global.org/2020/07/06/cash-crash-syrias- sanctions, it reached a record high of 3,200 pounds. economic-collapse-and-the-fragmentation-of-the-state/ (accessed 10 July 2020). 60 Between 2011 and 2015 alone, Syria’s exports shrank 64 Ben Parker, “Briefing: What to Watch in Syria This by 92 percent. World Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), vii. Year”, New Humanitarian, 8 January 2020, https://www. 61 According to the World Bank, production fell from thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/1/8/Syria-aid-recon about 368,000 barrels/day in 2010 to about 40,000 in 2016. struction-refugees-peace-conflict-Idlib-UN-NGOs-Turkey- World Bank, The Economics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Russia (accessed 29 January 2020); World Food Programme MENA (see note 50), 27. Of these, only about 10,000 bar- (WFP), Market Price Watch Bulletin (Syria Country Office, rels/day were produced in areas controlled by the regime. November 2019), https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP- World Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), vii. According to 0000111576/download/?iframe (accessed 29 January 2020). EIU in 2019 production was 25,000 barrels/day. EIU, Country 65 The World Bank estimates that in 2018 the remittances Report Syria (see note 18), 8. According to SOHR in autumn from more than nine million Syrians living abroad amounted 2019 about one-third of Syrian territory and 70 percent of its to about US$1.6 billion; see EIU, Country Report Syria (see oil and gas wells were controlled by the Syrian Democratic note 18), 6. EIU cites an official unemployment rate of 43.5 Forces (SDF). SOHR, “5 Years of International Coalition In- percent in 2019; ibid., 10. The value of remittances has col- volvement in Syria: One-third of the Country and 70% of Oil lapsed though in the wake of measures adopted by the gov- and Gas Are under Its Control, while Thousands of Victims ernment during the Covid-19 pandemic. and Violations Awaiting Investigation”, 2 October 2019, 66 Damien McElroy, “Stark Warning of Syrian Famine http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=142551 (accessed 29 January from UN Food Programme Chief”, The National, 12 June 2020, 2020). https://www.thenational.ae/uae/stark-warning-of-dangers-of- 62 World Bank, The Economics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction syrian-famine-from-un-food-programme-chief-1.1032650 in MENA (see note 50), 29. (accessed 10 July 2020). 63 See also Two Countries, One Crisis: The Impact of Lebanon’s 67 WFP, WFP Syria Country Brief (June 2020), https://docs.wfp. Upheaval on Syria, COAR, Thematic Report (21 December org/api/documents/WFP-0000117465/download/?_ga= 2019), https://coar-global.org/2019/12/21/two-countries-one- 2.77749910.385596067.1594389871-685302436.1594389871 crisis-the-impact-of-lebanons-upheaval-on-syria/ (accessed (accessed 10 July 2020).

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19 Challenges of Reconstruction

actually be covered by further borrowing and/or The comprehensive sanctions against Syria’s rulers, higher revenues resulting from the recapture of terri- businesspeople and institutions cannot to date be said tory and the restoration of control over border cross- to have led to any change in behaviour, political con- ings.68 Damascus definitely does not possess the cessions or ending of human rights violations. But resources to expand its investment in infrastructure research does indicate that the measures have con- or pursue economic reconstruction. tributed significantly to Syria’s economic contraction, although it is difficult to isolate the impact of sanc- Sanctions tions from other factors (in particular war damage, flight and forced displacement). It is incontrovertible, A complex and extensive sanctions regime has played however, that they hamper remittances and food im- a decisive role in Syria’s economic decline. Since 2011 ports, increase production costs and negatively affect sanctions have been imposed by the United States, the production of medical goods. As such, it must be the European Union, the Arab League and Turkey.69 assumed that they contribute to increasing unem- Although the UN itself has not imposed sanctions and ployment, reducing wages and salaries, and increas- certain Arab states (such as Iraq) and Turkey have ing the cost of living.71 The tightening of US sanctions not enforced theirs strictly, restrictions on trade and on Iran has also had knock-on effects in the form of finance, travel bans and asset freezes have had far- fuel shortages and price inflation in Syria. The com- reaching consequences, both intended and unintended. prehensive secondary sanctions adopted by the US They target representatives of the regime, state insti- Congress in December 2019 aim in particular at pre- tutions (in particular the central bank and the oil venting reconstruction.72 sector), as well as individuals accused of responsibility for grave human rights violations. But they also affect independent entrepreneurs, humanitarian aid and The Consequences of Death and the supply of basic necessities for the population.70 Displacement

Observers assume that more than half a million

people have been killed in the course of the fighting 68 EIU, Country Report Syria (see note 18), 6. 73 69 On US sanctions, see U.S. State Department, Syria Sanc- in Syria and hundreds of thousands more injured. tions, https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/ (accessed 29 Janu- The biggest humanitarian emergency of our time is 74 ary 2020); for a list of individuals and entities subject to playing out in and around Syria. More than half sanctions, see U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Sanctions List Search, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ (accessed 71 Erica S. Moret, “Humanitarian Impacts of Economic 29 January 2020); for EU sanctions, see EU Sanctions Map, Sanctions on Iran and Syria”, European Security 24, no. 1 Restrictive Measures against Syria, https://sanctionsmap.eu/#/ (2015): 10ff.; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special main/details/32,34/?search=%7B%22value%22:%22%22,%22 Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures searchType%22:%7B%7D%7D; for Arab League sanctions, see on the Enjoyment of Human Rights on His Mission to the Syrian “Syria Unrest: Arab League Adopts Sanctions in Cairo”, BBC, Arab Republic (11 September 2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/ 27 November 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_39_54_Add.pdf (accessed east-15901360 (accessed 29 January 2020); “Nas al-‘uqubat 27 March 2020). alatti faradatha al-Jam‘a al- ‘Arabiya ‘ala Suriya” [Text of 72 US Congress, “Title LXXIV – Caesar Syria Civilian Pro- the sanctions imposed on Syria by the Arab League], Reuters, tection Act of 2019” (see note 43). 27 November 2011, https://ara.reuters.com/article/idARACAE 73 There are no independent sources; the UN stopped 7AQ0E420111127 (accessed 29 January 2020). There are also counting deaths in early 2014. Apart from those killed counter-terrorism sanctions imposed by the United Nations, during fighting, it is estimated that around 100,000 Syrians United States, European Union and others, which are directed have been tortured to death in government and IS prisons. primarily against IS and Al-Qaeda. For a detailed account, see SOHR, “About Nine Years of the 70 On the effects of financial and import sanctions in par- Syrian War: Continuous Killing and Destruction while War ticular on humanitarian aid and reconstruction, see Alice Criminals Go Unpunished”, 10 January 2020, http://www. Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter: Safeguarding Humanitarian syriahr.com/en/?p=152653 (accessed 26 February 2020). Action (New York: International Peace Institute, December 74 Syrians represented the world’s second-largest refugee 2019), 8–13, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/ population, according to then UN High Commissioner for 2019/12/1912_Making-Sanctions-Smarter.pdf (accessed Refugees António Guterres in 2014; quoted in UNHCR, 29 January 2020). “Needs Soar as Number of Syrian Refugees Tops 3 Million”,

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20 The Consequences of Death and Displacement

Syria’s population felt compelled to leave their The Syrian health system is homes, with the immediate reasons including grave very poorly prepared for the human rights violations by the regime, IS and rebel Covid-19 pandemic. groups, fighting and destruction, and the collapse of infrastructure. At the beginning of 2020 about 5.6 The conflict has particularly grave long-term million Syrian refugees and 6.1 million IDPs were effects in the education and health sectors. The dra- registered with the UNHCR.75 Many of the IDPs have matic loss of teachers through flight and forced dis- had to flee multiple times in the course of the war, placement leaves a “lost generation” growing up in or have been repeatedly deported or resettled. New Syria. UNICEF estimates that about half of Syria’s waves of displacement occurred at the beginning of children (in Syria and neighbouring countries) are not 2020, above all in the contested province of Idlib.76 A going to school, often because their school building large part of the population has lost their livelihood has suffered serious damage or is being used as a through (forced) displacement, destruction, looting shelter for IDPs. The Syrian health system is now also and economic collapse. At the beginning of 2020 completely dysfunctional. Many health care facilities about 11 million Syrians – two-thirds of the remain- have been destroyed, there are shortages of equip- ing population – were dependent on humanitarian ment and medicines, the majority of health care pro- aid.77 fessionals have left the country. One consequence of this has been a dramatic decline in immunisation Social and Human Capital rates and increases in disease, epidemics and infant mortality.79 Consequently Syria was also very poorly The conflict has had an enormous impact on Syrian prepared for dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic.80 social and human capital. Ethnic and confessional mobilisation and war crimes have left the social con- Limited Returns tract between political leadership and population fractured and the coexistence of diverse ethnic and Although large parts of the country are no longer religious groups deeply harmed. Human development embattled and living conditions for refugees in neigh- has also suffered. While Syria was in the middle cat- bouring states have deteriorated noticeably in recent egory of the UN Human Development Index (HDI) in years, the number of returnees has remained com- 2010, with a two-decade positive trend, it is now in paratively small. The UN still does not see the condi- the bottom category.78 tions in place for safe, voluntary and permanent return of displaced persons. One reason for this is 29 August 2014, https://www.unhcr.org/53ff76c99.html (accessed 28 January 2020). 75 Most of the refugees are in the neighbouring states of Development Report 2019”, 304, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ Turkey (about 3.6 million), Lebanon (about 900,000), Jordan content/table-2-human-development-index-trends-1990– (about 650,000), Iraq (about 250,000) and Egypt (about 2018 (accessed 28 January 2020); UNDP, “Syrian Arab Repub- 130,000). UNHCR, “Operational Portal – Refugee Situation”, lic – Human Development Indicators”, http://hdr.undp.org/ https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions en/countries/profiles/SYR (accessed 28 January 2020). (accessed 28 January 2020). 79 World Bank, The Economics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in 76 UN OCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Recent Developments in MENA (see note 50), 17–29. Northwest Syria, Situation Report 7 (29 January 2020), https:// 80 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Briefing Secu- reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic- rity Council, Emergency Relief Coordinator Warns of Poten- recent-developments-northwestern-syria-situation-13 (ac- tially Devastating Consequences for Syrians Most Vulnerable cessed 26 February 2020). See also Sinem Adar, Steffen Ange- to COVID-19, 31 March 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/ nendt, Muriel Asseburg, Raphael Bossong and David Kipp, 2020/sc14148.doc.htm (accessed 10 April 2020). Conflict The Refugee Drama in Syria, Turkey, and Greece: Why a Comprehen- dynamics have impeded action to deal effectively with the sive Approach Is Needed, SWP Comment 16/2020 (Berlin: Stif- pandemic, see Muriel Asseburg, Hamidreza Azizi, Galip tung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020), https://www.swp- Dalai, Moritz Pieper, The Covid-19 Pandemic and Conflict berlin.org/en/publication/the-refugee-drama-in-syria-turkey- Dynamics in Syria: Neither a Turning Point Nor an Overall Deter- and-greece/ (accessed 26 March 2020). minant, SWP Comment 21/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen- 77 UNHCR, “Operational Portal” (see note 75). schaft und Politik, May 2020, https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 78 Since 2013 alone Syria has fallen fourteen places, see fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C21_Covid United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Human Syria.pdf.

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21 Challenges of Reconstruction

that the UNHCR still does not have unhindered access Interim Conclusion to returnees to ensure their security and for service provision. For that reason, the UN and international Under current conditions economic recovery in Syria organisations like the IOM are not actively supporting in a form that would create jobs, provide adequate return.81 In the course of 2019, according to UN fig- incomes, and stimulate food production for local mar- ures, 87,000 refugees returned to Syria, for the period kets will be almost impossible. Nor is the state itself 2016–2019 the figure was 220,000; in both cases likely to succeed in increasing its revenues in the overwhelmingly from Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.82 medium term and resuming the provision of basic Surveys conducted by UNHCR in 2018 show that services to the population, even if Damascus wanted the main reasons for Syrian refugees not to return are to do so. The main obstacles are the sanctions, includ- fear of political persecution, lawlessness and forced ing the tightening of American secondary sanctions, conscription, and feeling unsafe or being unable to and the traditional dysfunctional politico-economic reclaim property because of missing documentation. structures, compounded by the distortions of the war An August 2019 report by the Syrian Network for economy. Human Rights (SNHR) demonstrates that these concerns over personal safety are anything but ground- less. It documents almost two thousand cases where returnees were arbitrarily detained. Almost one-third disappeared; fifteen are known to have died under torture. Many of those who were released were, according to SNHR, later detained again or conscripted.83 Moreover many refugees assume that they would not find adequate livelihoods if they returned, because of destruction of housing, looting, and legislation designed to enable expropriations and property seizures especially from displaced persons. Refugees also expect that access to basic services will be heavily restricted, especially in (formerly) embattled areas.84

81 “United Nations Seeks Negotiated Political Solution as Syria Conflict Enters Ninth Year, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council”, United Nations press release, SC/13751, 27 March 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ sc13751.doc.htm (accessed 29 January 2020). This assessment is shared by the German government. See Chancellor Angela Merkel at a press conference with Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan on 24 January 2020 in Istanbul, “Video – Merkel stellt der Türkei weitere finanziellen Hilfen in Aussicht”, Tagesschau.de, 24 January 2020, https://www.tagesschau.de/ multimedia/video/video-651383.html (accessed 29 January 2020). See also Muriel Asseburg, Perspektiven für Flüchtlinge statt Anreize zur Rückkehr nach Syrien, SWP Kurz gesagt (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik website, 29 April 2019), http://bit.ly/SWP19KG0429 (accessed 10 March 2020). 82 UNHCR, “Operational Portal” (see note 75). It must, however, be assumed that the actual figure is higher and that not all of those who returned did so voluntarily. 83 SNHR, “The Syrian Regime Continues to Pose a Violent Barbaric Threat and Syrian Refugees Should Never Return to Syria”, 15 April 2019, http://sn4hr.org/blog/2019/08/15/54146/ (accessed 29 January 2020). https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the- 84 World Bank, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic mobility-of-displaced-syrians-an-economic-and-social-analysis and Social Analysis (Washington, D.C., 6 February 2019), 16–20, (accessed 30 March 2020).

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22 European Positions and Instruments

The European Approach: No Reconstruction without Political Opening

The EU and its member states have made engagement Brussels continues to assume that a lasting stabilisa- in reconstruction in Syria conditional on a political tion will be impossible under the leadership of Bashar transition as laid out in UN Security Council Resolu- al-Assad. In the same vein, Assad is not regarded as a tion 2254 (2015) or at least viable steps towards an cooperation partner, also in connection with accusa- inclusive conflict resolution and a political opening.85 tions of war crimes and the use of internationally Correspondingly, European engagement on the banned weapons. European support for a reconstruc- ground has remained largely restricted to humani- tion under Assad, in this perspective, would only con- tarian aid. At the same time the EU has imposed tribute to shoring up a repressive regime, cementing comprehensive sanctions on Syrian institutions and conflict lines and thus sowing the seeds of future individuals. But recent years have seen an incremen- confrontation.87 tal erosion of the EU’s united front on Syria. A debate about European interests and entry points for more consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/03/fac- effective engagement has not yet been held, not least conclusions-syria/ (accessed 6 March 2020). out of fear that the member states’ positions could 87 Discussions between the author and European diplo- diverge even further. mats: St Petersburg, December 2019; Berlin, December 2019; Beirut, January/February 2020, and by telephone with Brus- sels, March 2020. Also in van Veen, The Geopolitics of Syria’s European Positions and Instruments Reconstruction (see note 45). For the argument, see also Steven Heydemann, Beyond Fragility: Syria and the Challenges of Recon- Under the conditional approach of the April 2017 struction in Fierce States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, Syria strategy, the EU and its member states pursue June 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/beyond- the following objectives: to end the war through an fragility-syria-and-the-challenges-of-reconstruction-in-fierce- inclusive political transition; to address the humani- states/ (accessed 6 March 2020); André Bank, Der “Siegfrieden” in Syrien und die Grenzen multilateraler Politik, Focus Nahost tarian needs of especially vulnerable groups; to sup- (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies port democracy, human rights and freedom of expres- [GIGA], December 2019), 8, https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/ sion; to promote accountability for war crimes; and system/files/publications/gf_nahost_1907.pdf (accessed 6 86 to enhance the resilience of the Syrian population. March 2020); Adopt a Revolution, ed., Reconstructing Syria: Risks and Side Effects: Strategies, Actors and Interests (Leipzig, 5 April 85 UN Security Council, Resolution 2254 – Middle East (Syria), 2019), https://adoptrevolution.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/ S/RES/2254 (2015), 18 December 2015, http://unscr.com/en/ 01/Adopt_1812_Layout_EN_final_N.pdf (accessed 6 March resolutions/2254 (accessed 6 March 2020); European External 2020); Muriel Asseburg and Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria’s Action Service (EEAS), “Syria: Speech by HR/VP Josep Borrell Reconstruction Scramble”, Syria Studies (2017): 15–30, in the EP on the Current Security Situation in Syria”, 12 Feb- https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/ ruary 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters- 1573/1207 (accessed 6 March 2020); Kristin Helberg, “Syrien homepage/74537/syria-speech-hrvp-josep-borrell-ep-current- als Beute: Der Wiederaufbau einer Diktatur”, Blätter für deut- security-situation-syria_en (accessed 6 March 2020). sche und internationale Politik, 2018, no. 11, 83–92, https:// 86 Council of the European Union, “Council Adopts EU www.blaetter.de/ausgabe/2018/november/syrien-als-beute- Strategy on Syria”, press release, 3 April 2017, https://www. der-wiederaufbau-einer-diktatur (accessed 6 March 2020).

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23 The European Approach: No Reconstruction without Political Opening

Apart from engagement in the anti-IS coalition,88 Since 2011 Europe has imposed comprehensive Europe’s main concrete contribution is humanitarian sanctions against the Syrian state and against Syrian aid. Taken together, the EU and its member states are individuals and entities. These measures have been by far the largest donor in this area. Between 2011 regularly updated and extended annually by decision and late autumn 2019 they provided more than €17 of the member states.93 The sanctions firstly target billion in humanitarian aid for Syrians in the coun- individuals who are responsible for violent repression try itself and in neighbouring states.89 Germany is of the population and use of internationally banned the second largest bilateral donor after the United weapons, whose activities directly benefit the Assad States.90 According to the German UN ambassador regime, or who profit from transactions that violate Christoph Heusgen, Germany has contributed more housing, land and property rights (HLP rights); in- than €8 billion in humanitarian aid to Syria since dividuals and firms associated with them are also 2012.91 In almost all cases the assistance is imple- targeted. The circles affected by sanctions include mented on the ground by UN agencies and inter- leading entrepreneurs, members of the Assad and national non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Makhluf families, ministers, high-ranking members In principle, this aid is restricted to emergency relief of the armed forces and intelligence services, mem- for the population, refugees and IDPs. Further-reach- bers of pro-government militias, and individuals ing measures dubbed “humanitarian plus” or “early associated with the production, dissemination and recovery” are only supported to a very small extent use of chemical weapons. Europe has imposed travel by a handful of member states.92 For a time additional bans and/or asset freezes on 273 individuals and 70 funding (so-called stabilisation assistance) was chan- entities (as of May 2020).94 nelled to areas controlled by the opposition, and to a lesser extent by the Kurds, to strengthen local politi- All EU member states cal structures. To a limited extent the EU and its support continuing sanctions – member states also support small rehabilitation and but unity is eroding. development projects run by INGOs and Syrian civil society organisations. The purpose of sanctions is secondly to restrict the regime’s financing opportunities and repressive capacities and to isolate it internationally. To that 88 See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on end Europe has instituted an arms embargo against the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as Well as the Da’esh Damascus and placed export restrictions on equip- Threat, 23 May 2016, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ ment that can be used for internal repression. It has document/ST-9105-2016-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 6 March 2020). also imposed an oil embargo, frozen assets of the 89 Council of the European Union, “Overview – Syria: Syrian central bank in the EU, and curtailed Syria’s Council Response to the Crisis”, 10 February 2020, https:// finance and banking sector’s dealings with Europe, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/syria/ (accessed 6 which makes trade with the country difficult. Exports March 2020). The United States has been the largest single of military and dual-use goods to Syria are prohibited. donor to the humanitarian response in Syria and Syrians The sanctions package also includes far-reaching displaced in the region, providing over US$10.6 billion in sectoral measures that hinder reconstruction. This humanitarian assistance. U.S. Department of State, Near East applies in particular to restrictions on funding for oil Bureau, “U.S. Relations with Syria: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet”, 6 May 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with- syria/ (accessed 11 July 2020). 93 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 90 In 2019 alone, Germany supplied more than €300 mil- 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 Concerning Restrictive Meas- lion in humanitarian aid. Auswärtiges Amt, “Humanitäre ures against Syria”, Official Journal of the European Union, 10 Hilfe in Syrien”, 4 February 2020, https://www.auswaertiges- May 2011 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/syrien-node/humanitaere- uri=OJ:L:2011:121:0011:0014:EN:PDF (accessed 6 March 2020). hilfe-syrien/2303004?isLocal=false&isPreview=false (accessed The EU also implements UN sanctions against Al-Qaeda and 9 March 2020). IS. 91 German Mission to United Nations, Twitter, 5 March 94 Council of the European Union, “Syria: Sanctions against 2020, https://twitter.com/GermanyUN/status/123561981456 the Regime Extended by One Year”, press statement, 28 May 0980993?s=20 (accessed 9 March 2020). 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 92 Discussions between the author and European diplo- 2020/05/28/syria-sanctions-against-the-regime-extended-by-one- mats, Beirut, January/February 2020. year/ (accessed 11 July 2020).

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24 Growing Divergence

and electricity infrastructure projects; the ban on (Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland).97 While such steps European Investment Bank (EIB) funding for projects have not to date been realised, sanctions have repeat- that would benefit the Syrian state; and restrictions edly been undermined by member states. on cooperation in banking and transport, for example in the case of the Syrian airline.95

Growing Divergence

To date all EU member states have regularly voted to continue the sanctions. But cracks are appearing in the European stance. The background to this is the military gains made by the regime and its allies, concern over the persistence of the refugee crisis (and the possibility of new refugee movements), and Russia’s overtures for European support for reconstruction as well as business interests of some European companies. Germany, France and the United Kingdom are the most insistent on adhering to the existing position.96 Other European states have either never broken off diplomatic relations (Czech Republic) or only down- graded them (Bulgaria), resumed relations with relevant top figures in the regime (Italy, Poland) or publicly and ostentatiously discussed reopening their embassy and expanding economic engagement

95 Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/2011”, Official Journal of the European Union, Document 02012R0036, 27 September 2017, https:// eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1512995969 284&uri=CELEX:02012R0036-20170927 (accessed 6 March 2020); Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 Concerning Restrictive Measures against Syria”, Official Journal of the European Union, Document 02013D0255, 27 September 2017, https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1521627773811& uri=CELEX%3A02013D0255-20170927 (accessed 6 March 2020). 96 Auswärtiges Amt, Joint Statement on the Ninth Anniversary of the Syrian Uprising by the Governments of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 15 March 2020, https:// www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/ninth- 97 On the respective EU member states’ relations with Syria, anniversary-syrian-uprising/2319040. It includes the state- see International Crisis Group (ICG), Ways out of Europe’s Syria ment: “Yet, we will not consider providing or supporting any Reconstruction Conundrum, Middle East Report 209 (Brussels, reconstruction assistance until a credible, substantive, and 25 November 2019), 22f., https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront. genuine political process is irreversibly underway. Absent net/209-syria-reconstruction_1.pdf (accessed 6 March 2020); such a process, reconstruction assistance for Syria would Anchal Vohra, “Europe Doesn’t Even Agree on Assad Any- only entrench a deeply flawed and abusive government, in- more”, Foreign Policy, 8 March 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/ crease corruption, reinforce the war economy and further 2019/03/08/europe-doesnt-even-agree-on-assad-anymore/ aggravate the root causes of the conflict.” (accessed 6 March 2020).

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25 Conclusions, Policy Options and Recommendations

Conclusions, Policy Options and Recommendations

Reconstruction in Syria touches above all on three they risk losing even the little influence they might European interests. Firstly Europe has an interest in have had. Only if the funding of reconstruction, the a lasting stabilisation where Syria is no longer the resumption of diplomatic relations and sanctions source of conflicts, refugee movements and terrorism. relief are advanced collectively and deliberately can Secondly it serves Europe’s interests if refugees and they generate positive political momentum.98 IDPs are enabled to return voluntarily under safe and dignified conditions. Thirdly it is in Europe’s interest to see prosecutions for human rights violations, war A More Realistic European Approach crimes and the use of internationally banned weapons, to deter future perpetrators, lay the groundwork It would therefore make sense to adjust the European for reconciliation in Syria and prevent further erosion approach to better correspond to current realities, of the rules-based international order. bring European interests and instruments into line, To date however Europe has been able to bring and make the most effective possible use of the little little influence to bear on the conflict dynamics on influence that Europe can have.99 The precondition the ground, on a negotiated peace settlement or for this would be firstly to admit that Europe will on the actions of the regime; nor has it been able to not achieve through incentives and sanctions what establish legal accountability for the crimes commit- Damascus and its allies have crushed by military ted in Syria. One reason for this is that European means: a conflict settlement negotiated between the states possess no relevant military presence and have Syrian conflict parties, a political opening leading to largely refrained from throwing their political weight an inclusive and participatory political system and onto the international scales. Another is that the instruments available to them – above all conditionality of EU reconstruction assistance, recognition and 98 Roderich Kiesewetter, “Wiederaufbau jetzt? Die Rolle the sanctions regime – hardly affect the regime’s Deutschlands und Europas”, Die politische Meinung – Zeitschrift cost-benefit analysis, not least because conflict dy- für Politik, Gesellschaft, Religion und Kultur, no. 553 (4 Decem- namics have changed fundamentally since the Rus- ber 2018): 18f., https://www.kas.de/de/web/die-politische- meinung/artikel/detail/-/content/wiederaufbau-jetzt- (accessed sian military intervention. While the military 10 March 2020); Eugenio Dacrema and Valerie Talbot, eds., successes of the regime and its backers have averted Rebuilding Syria: The Middle East’s Next Power Game (Milan: Isti- a political transition, Europe is still chasing regime tuto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale [ISPI], September change – or offering European engagement in a 2019, esp. 137–43, https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/ “day after” scenario. It certainly excludes cooperation files/pubblicazioni/ispi_report_rebuilding_syria_2019.pdf not only with the top regime leaders, but also with (accessed 27 March 2020). representatives of state institutions. Yet, given the 99 For alternative suggestions see also Julien Barnes-Dacey, actual military and political conflict dynamics, a sce- Society Max: How Europe Can Help Syrians Survive Assad and Coro- nario of inclusive transition will remain unrealistic navirus, ECFR, April 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/society_ for the foreseeable future. Europe has not to date max_how_europe_can_help_syrians_survive_assad_and_ adequately thought through how its interests, as laid coronavirus.pdf; Erwin van Veen, Hope Springs Eternal: out above, can be pursued under the assumption that EU Options for Dealing with the Assad Regime (The Hague: Clin- gendael, March 2020), https://www.clingendael.org/sites/ the Assad regime survives. One thing is clear: If the default/files/2020-03/Policy_brief_EU_options_Assad_March_ EU member states break ranks towards Damascus 2020_0.pdf (both accessed 11 July 2020).

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26 A More Realistic European Approach

the rule of law, and measures of transitional justice also make sense to more closely coordinate the dif- that would lay the basis for reconciliation between ferent multilateral processes – the Astana Process, conflict parties and population groups. It includes, the so-called Small Group and the Geneva Process – secondly, rejecting the illusion that Assad’s inner and seek synergies.103 A start was made in October circle could be a reliable partner for stabilisation, eco- 2018 with a first meeting of the French, German, nomic recovery and reconstruction, or for counter- Russian and Turkish leaders, but this has not been terrorism and return of refugees. Their prime concern followed up. is consolidating their grip on power. Everything else As long as the current leadership retains its power is subordinate to that, even at the expense of large in Syria, stronger European engagement is unlikely parts of the population. That also means that com- to achieve power-sharing or a political opening or a prehensive reconstruction – as an undertaking that negotiated conflict settlement. And Europe rightly involves much more than physical rebuilding, and stresses that the countries responsible for stoking the where a return to the status quo ante is incompatible conflict or for causing war damage bear a special with lasting peace100 – cannot be achieved with the obligation to finance the reconstruction. Nevertheless current leadership in Damascus.101 Thirdly, the cur- Europe should seek to contribute to alleviating suf- rent economic and currency crisis and the erosion of fering and preventing a further deterioration of living state capacities in Syria should not be confused with conditions by improving the effectiveness of humani- an imminent collapse of the regime – still less in tarian aid, offering support for rehabilitation of basic favour of an alternative force that would unify and infrastructure (even in areas controlled by Damascus stabilise the country. Instead the further erosion of as long as certain conditions apply) and lifting those state capacities is much more likely to be associated sectoral sanctions that impede recovery and recon- with renewed protest and fighting in so-called rec- struction. Such an approach will necessitate coordi- onciled areas as well as a reorganising of insurgency nation with the Syrian government at least at the groups.102 Such a development also threatens desta- technical level. The “price” will be that Damascus bilisation spilling across Syria’s borders in the form will interpret this as at least indirect recognition of of terrorism and renewed refugee movements. its own legitimacy. First and foremost, Europe should considerably But it is also clear that far-reaching reforms are pre- step up diplomatic activity. It should push for crisis conditional for lasting stabilisation. In this vein the management and temporary arrangements that pri- EU should spell out its “more for more” approach,104 oritise protecting the civilian population (for example laying out a future path of political opening and in the contested province of Idlib), and promote a structural reforms in Syria on the one hand and Euro- negotiated peace settlement. In this context it would pean support for recovery and reconstruction and a normalisation of relations on the other. At the same time realpolitik should not mean neglecting core Euro- 100 Aita, “Reconstruction as a Political-economy Issue” pean interests, such as the prevention of war crimes (see note 12); Faten Ghosn, “The Hard Road Ahead for Syria and the preservation of a rules-based international Reconstruction”, Current History (December 2018), http:// order. Europe should refrain from normalising rela- www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=1533 (accessed tions with the top leaders of the Assad regime and 6 March 2020). instead press for prosecutions for war crimes, grave 101 The World Bank points out that the pace of reconstruction and future economic growth in Syria will depend in the first place on the manner in which the conflict ends, as this will be decisive for the volume of reconstruction assis- 103 Russia, Turkey and Iran coordinate in the Astana For- tance, the numbers of returning refugees, and the strengthen- mat; Egypt, Germany, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the ing of social capital in the sense of trust between different United Kingdom and the United States consult in the Small population groups. This assessment gives little grounds for Group. For the efforts of the UN Special Envoy in Geneva, optimism. See the growth forecasts for different conflict- see https://www.unog.ch/Syria. ending scenarios in Devadas, Elbadawi and Loayza, Growth 104 The then High Representative Federica Mogherini first after War in Syria (see note 46). formulated this approach in EEAS, Elements for an EU Strategy 102 See, for example, Abdullah Al-Jabassini, Festering Griev- for Syria: Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the ances and the Return to Arms in Southern Syria (Florence: EUI, Council, JOIN (2017) 11 (Strasbourg, 14 March 2017), 15–18, April 2020), https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/66786 (ac- https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/celex3a52017jc00113aen cessed 10 April 2020). 3atxt.pdf (accessed 6 March 2020).

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27 Conclusions, Policy Options and Recommendations

human rights violations and the use of internationally European Contribution to Rehabilitation banned weapons. of Basic Infrastructure More specifically, the following measures should be considered. The dilemma for Europe is that sustainable stabilisation in Syria can be achieved neither in cooperation with the current leadership in Damascus nor against More Effective Assistance it, i.e. by bypassing state structures. To date the focus of so-called stabilisation assistance has been on regions The humanitarian aid supplied by the EU and its outside the regime’s control. As much as Syrians in member states via UN agencies and INGOs in Syria is these regions need support, supplying stabilisation to a large extent manipulated and politicised by the assistance has become ever more difficult there. In- regime. Thus, rather than being dispensed according dependent local structures capable of functioning as to international standards for humanitarian aid, it cooperation partners for rehabilitation and recovery serves the interests of regime preservation. At the same have largely ceased to exist under the HTS-dominated time it is beyond doubt that Syrians will remain – “Salvation Government” in Idlib province and in and increasingly so – dependent on external support the territories controlled by Turkey and its allies. for the foreseeable future. It would therefore be They are unlikely to survive for long in the contested crucial to undertake efforts to improve the effective- areas under the Kurdish-dominated self-administra- ness of European aid. tion in north-eastern Syria. And while more effective In that vein the EU has established a “Joint Pro- approaches for areas outside government control are gramme Mechanism” to ensure that six UN agencies urgently needed, they cannot address the challenges registered in Damascus pursue a coordinated regional the majority of Syrians face. approach in their work. If other donors join it and In regime-controlled areas Europe already supports a critical financial mass is achieved, this mechanism local civil society initiatives realising small-scale reha- could gain greater weight in future negotiations with bilitation projects – without having approval from Damascus about access, visas and implementation Damascus but involving the relevant stakeholders and modalities. This could offer a way to prevent Damas- thus permitting a degree of local ownership.107 It cus privileging or disadvantaging individual UN orga- should continue to do so. But this approach can only nisations according to their perceived usefulness or be expanded or reproduced to a limited extent with- risk.105 In order to strengthen this approach, Europe out endangering its local protagonists and/or the should channel a greater share of its support via the projects being appropriated by Damascus. And even mechanism and encourage other donors to partici- if such an approach allows local priorities to be better pate in it. identified and addressed by including relevant local In addition, a strong audit mechanism involving actors, it will not be able to adequately meet the enor- donors and UN headquarters should establish inde- mous challenges of reconstruction. Also, with the pendent monitoring and evaluation ensuring pro- September 2018 local elections, local political struc- fessional selection and vetting processes for local UN tures operating independently of Damascus have personnel and transparent procurement procedures largely disappeared.108 Damascus has effectively which would guarantee that humanitarian organisa-

tions are able to freely choose their local implementa- 107 Discussions between the author and representatives of tion partners. This would allow them to reduce their the EU, international NGOs and Syrian NGOs implementing dependency on local organisations and businesses that rehabilitation projects in Syria, Beirut, February 2020. 106 are directly or indirectly connected to the regime. 108 The National Progressive Front, which is dominated by the Baath Party, stood about 70 percent of the candidates in the regime-controlled areas (often unopposed) and now dominates the local councils. The elections also served to provide local warlords with posts that allow them to exert 105 Discussions between the author and European and EU decisive influence on local reconstruction priorities. For an diplomats, Beirut, February 2020. analysis of the revival of the Baath Party and its mass organi- 106 For details see the recommendations in Haid, Principled sations, and the relevance of the elections for reconstruction, Aid in Syria (see note 22), 5–10; Human Rights Watch, Rigg- see Agnès Favier and Marie Kostrz, Local Elections: Is Syria Mov- ing the System (see note 10). ing to Reassert Central Control? (Florence: EUI, February 2019),

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28 Testing Damascus with an Offer

blocked a decentralisation that would permit autono- Testing Damascus with an Offer mous local units or any counterweight to the centre.109 It would therefore make sense to move rapidly One way to test whether such a form of engagement to a form of assistance that places considerably more is actually possible would be for Europe to make an emphasis on rehabilitation of basic infrastructure offer for a large-scale rehabilitation project that is and improves living conditions through employment so attractive that it would be difficult for Damascus programmes and local procurement.110 Europe’s self- to publicly reject it.111 Instead of scattering support imposed restriction to emergency assistance stands across a multitude of UN agencies and INGOs, Europe in the way of effective support for the population. could bundle part of its aid in an exemplary offer, Ultimately it risks contributing to cementing a situa- for example to restore the basic infrastructure in one tion in which living conditions deteriorate and the of the most heavily damaged cities, and thus create a population remains permanently dependent on inter- precedent.112 The project would not be conditional national aid and on the benevolence of the regime. on the regime changing its behaviour on the political This applies in particular to cities, neighbourhoods level. But Damascus would have to agree to the sup- and rural areas that were controlled by the opposition port being aligned on the needs of the population. In and suffered massive destruction during their recap- concrete terms that would mean that no population ture. Europe should make decisions about mine clear- group would be excluded, currently separated quar- ance, housing (re)construction, restoration of basic ters would be reconnected, HLP rights would be safe- infrastructure (water and sewerage, power, health, guarded; the project would be based on independent education), and local programmes for securing liveli- needs analyses and identification of priorities, with hoods exclusively on the basis of the needs of the po- the participation of the local population; implement- pulation and not on the political stance of the regime. ing partners would be chosen by Europe without The decisive criterion for any European engagement interference; and independent monitoring would be in such rehabilitation projects should therefore be allowed. Europe should build into such a proposal a whether such projects can be realised without violat- system of indicators and benchmarks to ensure that ing property rights or disadvantaging population implementation is stopped immediately if these prin- groups on the basis of (insinuated) political loyalties. ciples are undermined by Damascus.

Reviewing the Sanctions Regime

It would certainly also make sense to review the exist- https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/61004 (accessed 6 March ing sanctions regime as Europe’s punitive measures 2020); Myriam Youssef, Rim Turkmani and Mazen Gharibah, play a role (albeit a minor one) in preventing reha- Progress in the Wrong Direction: The 2018 Local Council Elections in bilitation, the creation of livelihoods and economic Syria (London: London School of Economics [LSE], February recovery. The most pressing aspect is to clarify the con- 2019), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100171/1/Local_elections_Syria_ ditions for humanitarian exemptions and to avoid CRP_2019.pdf (accessed 6 March 2020). overcompliance with regulations, for example by 109 “President al-Assad: The War Was between Us Syrians banks. Particular scrutiny should also be applied to and Terrorism, We Triumph Together Not against Each Other”, SANA, 17 February 2019, https://www.sana.sy/en/ reviewing those sectoral sanctions (for example with ?p=158819 (accessed 12 April 2020). regard to the electricity sector and EIB involvement), 110 Some EU member states already support projects in the which stand in the way of rehabilitation of basic area of rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. But to date this infrastructure, business activity of independent only accounts for a small proportion of overall assistance; Syrian entrepreneurs and improvements in living ICG, Ways out of Europe’s Syria Reconstruction Conundrum (see conditions. In order to avoid any impression that note 97), 24. Discussions between the author and European diplomats, Beirut, February 2020. For the idea see also Volker Perthes, Syria: Too Fragile to Ignore: Military Outcomes, 111 The idea was developed in discussion with Maxwell External Influence and European Options, SWP Comment 7/2019 Gardiner, COAR, Beirut, February 2020. (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019), 112 COAR’s “Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profiles” of in- https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C07/ (accessed 10 dividual regions could be helpful for such planning. They March 2020). can be found at: https://coar-global.org/nosap/.

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29 Conclusions, Policy Options and Recommendations

sanctions relief represents a political concession to But in the medium term Europe should concen- Damascus, sanctions against top regime figures and trate above all on support for the displaced: through individuals accused of grave crimes and/or violation UNHCR and UNRWA for IDPs, through UN agencies, of HLP rights could be further tightened at the same INGOs and Syria’s neighbours for refugees outside the time. country. Especially in relation to neighbouring states If the respective sectoral European sanctions were it is crucial to expand financial support and intensify lifted, this would remove at least one important the dialogue in order to avoid a worsening of con- obstacle inhibiting rehabilitation (for example in the ditions on the ground and refugees being deported electricity sector) and a further deterioration of living into a situation of uncertainty. conditions. But Europe should have no illusions. But merely feeding and housing refugees is not Apart from Europe’s punitive measures, Syria’s own enough. In fact the Syrian diaspora offers Europe an politico-economic structures and US sanctions also opportunity to tackle one of the country’s biggest obstruct economic recovery and reconstruction. The challenges, namely, to strengthen the human capital comprehensive sanctions package adopted by the US available to Syria when the political circumstances Congress in December 2019 and in effect since June finally permit returns. Europe should therefore put 2020 (so-called Caesar sanctions), with its direct and greater effort and investment into training Syrian secondary sanctions, makes international engagement teachers, doctors, nurses, administrators, engineers in Syria’s reconstruction extremely unattractive. If and other skilled workers in the main host countries Europeans are interested in engaging in rehabilita- (in the region and in Europe). tion activities, they will have to seek humanitarian waivers under the Caesar sanctions. The “More for More” Approach

Supporting Refugees and IDPs Above and beyond current policy options it would be extremely useful to clarify how and under what con- There is little Europe can currently do to facilitate the ditions Europe would be ready to engage in reconstruc- return of refugees and IDPs. The conditions for vol- tion and what a path to normalisation in relations untary, safe and dignified return do not yet exist and with Damascus might look like. In 2017 the then EU cannot be expected to improve quickly. There is no High Representative Federica Mogherini published sign of the required change of stance in Damascus a “more for more” approach that made European nor of the required progress on reconstruction. Even concessions dependent on changes in the regime’s if public services in the country were to function behaviour. This approach has to date not been fleshed again, according to simulations published by the out and actively brought into play vis-a-vis Damas- World Bank, many Syrians would only consider cus.114 To date the EU offers engagement in recon- returning if they felt their personal safety was also struction only if a political transition as per Security ensured. And even if the conditions for safe return Council Resolution 2254 is firmly under way. In this were to exist, the models indicate a negative corre- case, in return for concrete measurable progress, lation between rapid return of refugees and standard Europe would make concrete offers, such as easing of living. The World Bank therefore advises against sanctions; resuming cooperation with the Syrian gov- international efforts to promote early return.113 ernment, for example in the frame of the European In the eventuality of the regime showing genuine Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); mobilising finance for willingness to permit refugees to return, Europe reconstruction together with the IMF and World Bank; should offer its support. That should include creating in the sphere of security; with regard to governance, the necessary preconditions, such as establishing a reforms and services; concerning social cohesion, clear legal framework, procedures and mechanisms peacebuilding and reconciliation; and strengthening to permit orderly restitution of and/or compensation human capital and supporting economic recovery. for land, housing and commercial property. But Brussels has yet to spell out in detail how Damas- cus would have to alter its behaviour concretely (below the threshold of regime change or substantial

113 World Bank, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians (see note 84), 23–26. 114 EAD, Elements for an EU Strategy for Syria (see note 104).

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30 No Blind Eye to Grave Human Rights Violations

regime transformation) and how the European side tion should be dependent on concrete and verifiable would respond to which reform step.115 political steps. The leadership in Damascus cannot at the current First of all this would include elements relating to juncture be realistically expected to regard a fleshed fundamental human rights. This would mean ceasing out “more for more” as an offer it needs to concern systematic abuses, arbitrary detention, torture and itself with. So it is unlikely that operationalisation forced conscription by the Syrian security forces; under current circumstances would bring about any political prisoners would have to be released, the fate change in behaviour. Nevertheless it remains impera- of disappeared persons clarified, and refugees and tive that the European states agree a shared line on IDPs able to return in dignity and safety; HLP rights which behaviour of the Syrian leadership their con- would have to be guaranteed. For there to be any cessions should depend on. It should also be made chance of success in this, impunity will have to be clear to Damascus that the EU and its member states ended and rule of law strengthened.117 Further steps are sticking to the perspective that a lasting stabilisa- would then aim for a political opening and more tion presupposes fundamental reforms. And it is inclusion (for example through elections under inter- worthwhile laying out how a path of rapprochement national supervision with the participation of all might look, because it is by no means excluded that Syrians) and support the Geneva Process (Constitu- a new leadership in Damascus would develop an tional Committee and reconciliation efforts). In return interest in closer relations and/or that Moscow might Europe could gradually resume technical cooperation be prepared to support elements thereof. Precisely with Syrian ministries, go beyond rehabilitation this point should be explored in a dialogue with measures to devise and support plans for reconstruc- Russian partners.116 tion, reforms and reconciliation jointly with state It would therefore be helpful to take a differentiated entities, local stakeholders and Syrian civil society,118 look at the European offers discussed above and sys- and, at an appropriate point in time, appoint a high- tematically review what can already be done and ranking EU envoy for reconstruction and relations what should be conditional on the behaviour of the with Damascus. leadership. As explained above, measures orientated on the basic needs of the population should not be subject to political conditionality. The most impor- No Blind Eye to Grave Human tant consideration here is to ensure that European Rights Violations aid is not diverted and politicised. But any rapprochement with Damascus and engagement in reconstruc- At the same time, normalisation of the relationship with top regime leaders should be excluded. There can be no return to “business as usual” with those 115 ICG, Ways out of Europe’s Syria Reconstruction Conundrum who bear the main responsibility for grave human (see note 97), 28ff., offers a helpful operationalisation of a rights violations, war crimes and use of internationally “more for more” approach, showing in detail the kind of banned weapons. Rather, Europe has a strong interest parallel steps the two sides could take. The approach pro- in ensuring that these actors are brought to justice. posed here is different, in the first place in the sense that The stakes ultimately include securing a rules-based political conditionality is lifted for European measures world order, deterring future potential perpetrators directed at satisfying the basic needs of the population. 116 To date such efforts appear to have been fruitless. For a joint approach with Russia or a division of labour, see also the proposals in Julien Barnes-Dacey, A Framework for Euro- 117 See the proposal for a European approach centred on pean-Russian Cooperation in Syria, Commentary (London: Euro- rule of law in Bassma Kodmani, Europe Is the Key Player in Syria: pean Council of Foreign Relations [ECFR], 17 June 2019), An Alternative Template for Transition (Paris: Arab Reform Initia- https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_framework_for_ tive, 4 October 2018), https://www.arab-reform.net/publica european_russian_cooperation_in_syria (accessed 6 March tion/europe-is-the-key-player-in-syria-an-alternative-template- 2020); Hinnebusch, “The Battle over Syria’s Reconstruction” for-transition/ (accessed 6 March 2020). (see note 6) and Muriel Asseburg and Alexander Aksenenok, 118 SNHR, Joint Statement: A Vision from Syrian Civil Society Economic Reconstruction in Syria – An Area for EU-Russia Selective Organizations about the General Principles of the Rebuilding Process Engagement? EUREN Brief 16 (June 2020), http://www.eu- of Syria, 5 December 2018, http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/ russia-expertnetwork.eu/en/analytics/euren-brief-16 (accessed english/A_vision_from_Syrian_civil_society_organizations_ 10 July 2020). en.pdf (accessed 6 March 2020).

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31 Conclusions, Policy Options and Recommendations

and achieving justice for the victims and/or their relatives. Europe should therefore continue to support the documentation of crimes by (Syrian) civil society organisations and international investigation mechanisms like the IIIM.119 Neither the Syrian authorities nor the International Criminal Court can be expected to prosecute those accused of grave crimes. Syria is not a signatory of the latter, and Russia can be expected to veto any move in the UN Security Council to refer cases to the ICC. Therefore, Europe should instead encourage prosecutions in national courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction, wher- ever possible, and ensure that their law enforcement agencies have the resources to do so.120

119 The “International, Impartial and Independent Mecha- nism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under International Law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011” (IIIM) was established in December 2016 by the UN General Assembly (Resolution 71/248). Its mandate is to gather and analyse evidence and prepare documentation allowing prosecution of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Syria. 120 Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Gerechtigkeit für Syrien aus der Distanz? Das Weltrechtsprinzip und die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung von Völkerrechtsverbrechen in Deutschland”, Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (December 2019), n. p.

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32 No Blind Eye to Grave Human Rights Violations

Map

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33 Abbreviations

Abbreviations

AFAD Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı UNESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commis- (Disaster and Emergency Management sion for Western Asia Presidency, Turkey) UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees AL Arab League UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emer- BRI Belt and Road Initiative (China) gency Fund COAR Center for Operational Analysis and Research UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service (Beirut) UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of EEAS European External Action Service Humanitarian Affairs EIU Economist Intelligence Unit UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for ENP European Neighbourhood Policy Palestine Refugees in the Near East EUI European University Institute (Florence) WFP World Food Programme FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation of the YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection United Nations Units; PYD militias and dominant formation FSA Free Syrian Army (opposition rebel formation) within SDF) GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German development agency) HDI Human Development Index HLP Housing, land and property rights HTS Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant; dominant rebel formation in Idlib province, emerged from the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda) ICC International Criminal Court ICG International Crisis Group IDP Internally displaced person IED Improvised explosive device IIIM International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for the most serious crimes under International Law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 IMF International Monetary Fund INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation IOM International Organisation for Migration IS “Islamic State” KNC Kurdish National Council OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party; Syrian sister party of PKK) SANA Syrian Arab News Agency SARC Syrian Arab Red Crescent SDF Syrian Democratic Forces (militias of the Kurdish-dominated self-administration in north-eastern Syria) SIG Syrian Interim Government (opposition government, based in Gaziantep, Turkey) SNA Syrian National Army (emerged from FSA, allied with Turkey) SNHR Syrian Network for Human Rights (opposition) SOHR Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (opposition) UAE United Arab Emirates UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

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