Reconstruction in Syria. Challenges and Policy Options for the EU And
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SWP Research Paper Muriel Asseburg Reconstruction in Syria Challenges and Policy Options for the EU and its Member States Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs SWP Research Paper 11 July 2020, Berlin Abstract ∎ Syria’s civil war has long since been decided in favour of the regime. There is no prospect of a negotiated settlement, reconciliation or lasting stabilisation. ∎ Syria faces enormous challenges, well beyond the rebuilding of infra- structure and housing. It will also need assistance to restart its economy, stabilise its currency and renew its public services, in particular educa- tion, health, electricity and water. ∎ The funds required for comprehensive reconstruction are extremely un- likely to become available, given the attitude of the Syrian leadership, the economic ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the geopolitical interests of regional and global powers. Nor are resources likely to be deployed in line with the needs of the population. ∎ The EU and its member states have made engagement in Syria’s recon- struction conditional on viable steps towards a negotiated conflict settle- ment and a political opening. They should adapt their approach to align better with the current realities and challenges on the ground. ∎ That means in particular targeting humanitarian aid more effectively, dismantling certain sectoral sanctions and supporting the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure – even in areas controlled by the Syrian govern- ment. This would represent a more effective contribution to improving living conditions and avoiding further erosion of public services. ∎ Lasting stabilisation will require fundamental reforms. In this vein, Brus- sels should spell out its “more for more” approach. ∎ Europe should refrain from normalising relations with the top leaders of the Assad regime and instead step up its support for prosecution of war crimes, grave human rights violations and the use of internationally banned weapons. SWP Research Paper Muriel Asseburg Reconstruction in Syria Challenges and Policy Options for the EU and its Member States Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs SWP Research Paper 11 July 2020, Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2020 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They are also subject to fact- checking and copy-editing. For further information on our quality control pro- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https:// www.swp-berlin.org/en/ about-swp/quality- management-for-swp- publications/. SWP Research Papers reflect the views of the author(s). SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 doi: 10.18449/2020RP11 Translation by Meredith Dale (Updated English version of SWP-Studie 7/2020) Table of Contents 5 Issues and Recommendations 7 The Syrian Leadership’s Approach: Reconstruction as the Continuation of (Civil) War with Other Means 8 Politicised Reconstruction 10 International Aid on a Short Leash 12 The Context: The Interests of Regional and Global Powers 12 Russia and Iran 13 Turkey 14 China 14 Arab Gulf states 15 Syria’s Neighbours 15 The United States 16 Interim Conclusion 17 Challenges of Reconstruction 17 War Damage and Its Consequences 18 War Economy and Sanctions 20 The Consequences of Death and Displacement 22 Interim Conclusion 23 The European Approach: No Reconstruction without Political Opening 23 European Positions and Instruments 25 Growing Divergence 26 Conclusions, Policy Options and Recommendations 26 A More Realistic European Approach 28 More Effective Assistance 28 European Contribution to Rehabilitation of Basic Infrastructure 29 Testing Damascus with an Offer 29 Reviewing the Sanctions Regime 30 Supporting Refugees and IDPs 30 The “More for More” Approach 31 No Blind Eye to Grave Human Rights Violations 34 Abbreviations Dr. Muriel Asseburg is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. Issues and Recommendations Reconstruction in Syria Challenges and Policy Options for the EU and its Member States Even if the fighting is not over, the Syrian regime has won the civil war in military terms. Damascus and its allies controlled about two-thirds of the country by spring 2020, and the Assad regime appeared set to recapture the remaining areas. There is currently no prospect of a negotiated settlement, reconciliation between conflict parties and population groups, or lasting peace and stabilisation. The armed conflict in Syria, which began in 2011 following the violent suppression of a protest move- ment, has had disastrous consequences for the coun- try’s population, infrastructure and economy. It is estimated that reconstruction will cost US$250 to US$400 billion or even US$1 trillion, depending on the source. The enormous challenges extend far beyond mine clearance and physical rebuilding of infrastructure and housing: a huge loss of (skilled) labour, contraction of the economy, currency devalua- tion and the collapse of public services head the list. Reconstruction has already begun. But this is not a comprehensive nation-wide programme, centrally planned and managed with international funding. Rather, diverse actors implement projects, mainly at the local level. Few of them pay much heed to the needs of the population. The prime concern for the leadership in Damascus is to consolidate its grip on power. Reconstruction efforts are directed towards cementing demographic changes, rewarding the loyalty of old and new elites through lucrative invest- ment opportunities, and compensating the regime’s international supporters – first and foremost Russia and Iran – with access to Syria’s resources. At the same time the legal and political framework for hu- manitarian aid that Damascus has created ensures – in the areas it controls – that the regime has the last word on decisions about where international aid is deployed, by whom, and to whose benefit. The Syrian leadership is adamant that it will accept foreign engagement in reconstruction only from friendly countries and without conditionality. But Damascus’s allies are neither willing nor able to fund comprehensive nation-wide reconstruction. Other potential funders categorically reject engage- SWP Berlin Reconstruction in Syria July 2020 5 Issues and Recommendations ment (the United States), hesitate (the Arab Gulf That road has been closed by the military successes states), position themselves for later engagement of the Assad regime and its allies. It means, secondly, (China) or concentrate exclusively on particular rejecting the illusion that Damascus could become regions, even integrating them (at least partly) into a reliable partner for economic recovery and recon- its own economy and administration (Turkey). Given struction, for counter-terrorism and for return of the attitude of the Syrian leadership and the irrec- refugees. It encompasses, thirdly, not confusing the oncilable geopolitical interests and visions for Syria’s current economic and currency crisis and the erosion future political and societal order of the regional and of state capacities in Syria with an imminent collapse global powers it is extremely unlikely that Syria will of the regime – still less in favour of an alternative receive sufficient funding for reconstruction. The political force that would unify and stabilise the economic repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, country. especially the collapse of the oil price, are likely to Europe should contribute more effectively than further constrain available funding. hitherto to alleviating suffering, promoting improve- Europe – in the sense of the EU and its member ments in living conditions and stopping the rapid states plus the UK – has made its engagement con- erosion of public services. In this vein, it should work ditional on viable steps towards a negotiated conflict to enhance the effectiveness of UN aid, dismantle settlement and a political opening. Its involvement those sectoral sanctions that stand in the way of has therefore been largely restricted to humanitarian recovery and under certain conditions even support aid. At the same time the EU has imposed compre- rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in areas con- hensive sanctions. But the European approach has trolled by the regime. But lasting stabilisation will had little influence on the conflict dynamics on the require fundamental reforms. To that end the EU ground or the behaviour of the Assad regime. This is, should flesh out its “more for more” approach to lay amongst other factors, because the sanctions regime out a concrete path for largely normalising relations and the conditionality of reconstruction assistance with Damascus in return for political opening and are configured for a regime change agenda that is no structural reforms. Europe should, however, refrain longer a realistic prospect (even if the EU has softened from normalising relations with the top leaders of its rhetoric, no longer talking explicitly about regime the Assad regime and instead step up its support for change or power-sharing, but an inclusive political prosecution of war crimes, grave human rights viola- transition). At the same time, Brussels has still not tions and the use of internationally banned weapons. spelled out what kind of change