MITCHELL INSTITUTE Policy Papers
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Vol. 19, March 2019 L INS EL TIT CH U IT T E MITCHELL INSTITUTE M f s o e r i Ae ud Policy Papers rospace St Key Points The Force We Need: Air Force aircraft present fundamentally uni- Key Factors for Shaping the Air Force que, effective, and efficient policy options for the Future to U.S. leaders not found elsewhere in the Department of Defense (DOD) or the other By Lt Gen David A. Deptula, USAF (Ret.) military services. Dean, The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, The Air Force aircraft inventory is too small to and Douglas A. Birkey Executive Director, The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies meet current national security demands. It is time to chart a prudent path forward to enable the Air Force to grow the capacity it needs. Abstract Today, the United States Air Force is the smallest it has ever been For too long, the DOD has made resource since its founding as an independent military service in 1947. This decisions within service-centric stovepipes. dynamic now translates to fewer national security options presented This impedes the ability to consider “best to combatant commanders and decision makers, and increased risk at value” options and solutions in a holistic DOD- a time when threats are on the rise around the world. Potential U.S. wide fashion. adversaries and competitors understand this vulnerability, and have moved to take advantage of this opening. Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson is While the nation possesses other military air assets in the Navy, correct, the Air Force does need to grow. Her Marine Corps, and Army, those are aviation arms designed to support target goal of 386 squadrons simply meets the core functions of their respective services. Individually, they lack demand that already exists. This does not the scale, scope, and the capabilities necessary to facilitate independent, reflect surplus capacity. Failure to meet this theater-wide, full-spectrum operations. The Air Force is unique in its goal will burn out existing resources with too organization to project range, mass, lethality, and survivable power in many core mission areas registering as “high a theater-wide fashion, free from organic surface mission obligations. demand, low density.” The current pilot crisis The Air Force needs a force-sizing method to clearly articulate aircraft requirements, highlight any gaps that may exist or emerge, is a lead indicator of this problem. and help guide modernization decisions. Nor is a force-sizing model alone enough. Leaders need to ensure that resources are available to adequately build the Air Force the United States requires. If tradeoffs are required, then available funds must focus on mission areas that yield the most effective, efficient set of options. Introduction on the globe, anytime; secure and maintain During a recent speech, Secretary of the theater-wide air superiority; gather vital Air Force Heather Wilson issued a warning: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance “We must see the world as it is. That is why (ISR) on a global scale; facilitate command the National Defense Strategy explicitly and control of forces; and execute global recognizes that we have returned to an era of mobility in a matter of hours. These attributes great power competitions. We must prepare.” are vital to empowering successful, decisive World events back up this assertion in no strategies against highly capable adversaries. uncertain terms. With China aggressively While the U.S. possesses other military expanding its territorial zone of control in air assets in the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Pacific Ocean far in Army, those forces are organized under An undersized U.S. Air Force excess of international norms aviation arms designed to support the and Russia pursuing overt core functions of their respective services. translates to fewer national acts of hostility in places Individually, they lack the scale, scope, security options, and the like Ukraine and Syria, the and the capabilities necessary to facilitate global threat environment independent, theater-wide, full-spectrum assumption of significantly is growing to levels unseen operations. Naval carrier air wings are first increased risk at the since the Cold War. Nor and foremost focused on defending the ships are all challenges limited of naval surface action battle groups. Their strategic, operational, and to great power competition. small size also limits their ability to project tactical levels of conflict. North Korea’s possession of large scale, sustained airpower. Aircraft car- nuclear weapons and Iran’s rier availability rates govern the percentage continued assertiveness in the Middle East of airplanes available to employ at any given are generating strategic-level threats from time—a number normally less than 50 regional actors. Finally, persistent instability percent. Marine Corps aircraft are tied to in places like the Middle East, Africa, and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) beyond continues to demand military and are generally not available for theater attention. These combined pressures drove taskings. The same holds true for organic Wilson to conclude a fact long known Army aviation assets with their function throughout the defense community: “The directly assigned to their Army organiza- Air Force is too small for what the nation tional units. Regardless, the radius of an expects of us.”1 Army attack helicopter’s average mission is An undersized U.S. Air Force translates quite limited, and they are highly vulnerable to fewer national security options and the to anti-aircraft weapons in contested assumption of significantly increased risk environments. The Air Force is unique at the strategic, operational, and tactical in its organization to project range, mass, levels of conflict. Fall back courses of action lethality, and survivable power in a theater- hazard ceding the initiative to potential wide fashion, free from organic surface adversaries, projecting forces vulnerable to mission obligations. Combatant commands attack, incurring high rates of attrition, while (COCOMs) understand this value, and it is also increasing the likelihood of drawn-out a key reason why they place a high priority wars, perhaps even defeat. The basic reality on Air Force aircraft and personnel. As one is that Air Force airpower provides a unique Air Force analysis recently detailed: “In asymmetric advantage for the United States the last five years, [Air Force Global Strike through its ability to strike targets anywhere Command] has gone from supporting Mitchell Policy Papers 2 one enduring COCOM requirement to disseminate information to ensure that the an average of 12 annually, a 1,100-percent most effective mix of assets will be at the increase.”2 Given the Air Force’s small right time and place to best net a desired bomber fleet of 157 aircraft, a record low effect while minimizing undue vulnerability. number by historic standards, meeting this This stands as an imperative for success in demand presents challenges. Nor is this a the information age—a concept to achieve one-off situation, with nearly every Air Force an intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; mission set in high operational demand with strike; maneuver; and sustainment complex fewer aircraft available to meet the spectrum often referred to as a combat cloud. of these requirements. Potential adversaries have studied the Recognizing the need to align established American way of war—forms available resources with demand, in 2018 of power projection which have generally Wilson articulated the requirement to grow remained static since the end of the Cold operational Air Force squadrons from 312 to War. These challengers have worked to 386 by the 2025-2030 timeframe. In doing both emulate the strengths and probe the this, she explained, “It’s not just getting weaknesses inherent in these methods. There larger—the way we fight will be is a reason why Russia, China, and many Potential adversaries have different…how will we present European nations are focused on developing studied the established multiple dilemmas for our fifth generation stealth fighters for their adversaries.”3 This is an impor- air forces. It is also why Chinese military American way of war— tant statement, for fighting and leaders speak openly about using advanced forms of power projection winning against today’s threats, anti-ship missiles to sink American aircraft and those in the future, is a carriers, with one recently mocking that which have generally very different proposition than “we’ll see how frightened America is” in the remained static since the fighting against past threats. face of such action.4 Maintaining the status Established methods of power quo amidst such pressures is not a viable end of the Cold War. projection must be challenged or sustainable option. Leaders must press in the pursuit of more effective, efficient, forward with the charge of improving the and survivable concepts of operation. effectiveness, efficiency, and survivability of Accordingly, leaders must adopt the measure U.S. military power. of merit of “cost-per-desired effect”—the The time to act is now, with the Air actual enterprise mission expense associated Force’s present circumstances harkening back with securing desired aims—versus the to a statement made by then-Secretary of traditional upfront unit acquisition expense Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the early years as a decision metric. For example, a stealth of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars—when aircraft is far more cost-effective than the the impact of a Cold War peace dividend alternative of a strike package of over a dozen saw the U.S. military stretched thin to meet legacy aircraft to net the same objective at combat requirements. “You go to war with far greater risk. Additionally, it is important the Army [Navy, Air Force, and Marines that leaders understand the qualities they Corps] you have, not the Army [Navy, Air need to acquire for a modern military.