DOCSLIB.ORG

Birds of a Feather? How Politics and Culture Affected the Designs of the U.S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Birds of a Feather? How Politics and Culture Affected the Designs of the U.S Birds of a Feather? How Politics and Culture Affected the Designs of the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Soviet Buran by Stephen J. Garber Candidate for master's degree in Science and Technology Studies Virginia Tech - Northern Virginia campus Committee: Dr. Gary Downey (chair), Dr. Anne Fitzpatrick, Dr. Richard Hirsh January 2002 Keywords: Space Shuttle, Buran, technological style 1 1 1 Contents Chapter 1: Introduction p. 3 -The Political and Cultural Factors Argument -Background on the Two Shuttles -Literature Review Chapter 2: How Technology and Politics Intertwined p. 9 -The U.S. Shuttle's Development -Energiya-Buran Development Chapter 3: The Impact of Culture p. 25 -U.S. Technological Style and the Space Shuttle -Soviet Technological Style and the Energiya-Buran Chapter 4: Summary and Conclusions p. 43 Appendices: I. Key U.S. Figures p. 46 II. Key Soviet Figures p. 47 III. U.S. Bibliography p. 48 IV. Soviet Bibliography p. 54 V. Chronology p. 60 VI. Glossary p. 61 VII. Curriculum Vitae p. 62 2 2 2 Chapter One: Introduction -The Political and Cultural Factors Argument What can we learn from comparing similar technologies that were designed and built in different countries or cultures? Technical products depend upon both technical and non- technical goals as socio-cultural factors determine which projects get funded and how they are conceived, designed, and built. These qualitative socio-cultural factors mean that there is almost always more than one possible design solution for a particular problem. By comparing how two major space projects were conceptualized and designed in the United States and Soviet Union, this case study aims to illuminate more broadly how political and cultural factors can influence the selection of technical designs, as well as the general conduct of engineering and science, in the space sector. Who gets what how? By applying this classic political science question, I aim to show how specific domestic and international political considerations greatly affected the designs of the U.S. Space Shuttle and its counterpart, the Soviet Buran, during the 1970s and 1980s. In the U.S., the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had successfully put humans on the Moon but was under intense pressure to scale back its further grandiose plans for space exploration in light of budget considerations and escalating U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia. Thus, NASA's Space Shuttle ended up being a compromise: it was very sophisticated technologically but never fulfilled the goal of inexpensive access to space. While the Soviets had taken an early and commanding lead in the space race in the 1950s and early 1960s, by the beginning of the next decade, they had fallen behind. The Soviet leadership mobilized its industrial aerospace capabilities to create a Shuttle at least as large and capable as NASA's Shuttle. The Soviet space industry was also undergoing a major reshaping in 1974 as the result of the deaths of certain key players and other bureaucratic maneuverings. The political upshot was that the Soviets decided to build a Shuttle more to uphold their perceived international prestige than for any specific technical reasons and the project turned out to be a technological dead end. In addition, the Cold War backdrop had very significant political-military influences in both countries. While the “military had little or no interest in the Shuttle” according to one key U.S. Air Force official, NASA nevertheless needed the military’s political support and so accommodated the Shuttle’s design to meet Air Force requirements. Whether the Air Force really intended to utilize the capabilities it requested is unclear; this official also stated that “I don’t think there was an Air Force mission clearly defined.”1 In the Soviet Union, some mid-level space managers said that the U.S. Shuttle could drop nuclear weapons on their homeland. Thus, they pushed for a symmetrical response: the Buran Shuttle. This rationale for building an expensive, complex new spaceflight system may seem overly paranoid in retrospect, but top Soviet leaders embraced it. A major problem with this thin rationale was that the Soviets didn’t really understand what the U.S. Shuttle was designed for, but ended up copying it in some superficial ways to assuage their political leadership. To understand some of the cultural factors affecting the designs of the U.S. Space Shuttle and the Soviet Buran, it may be useful to address two science and technology studies concepts: 1 John McLucas interview with Stephen Garber, January 9, 2001, passim; the quotes are from pp. 12 and 44. McLucas was Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office from 1969 to 1973, when the Shuttle’s design was being finalized. He then was Air Force Secretary from 1973 to 1975 and has maintained a personal and professional interest in space issues throughout his career. 3 3 3 technological style and the social construction of technology (SCOT). SCOT adherents believe that broadly-construed social groups strongly influence the design of technology, perhaps more than "purely objective" or quantifiable technical factors. Social groups also define what technological issues come up for discussion. Indeed, "a problem is defined as such only when there is a social group for which it constitutes a 'problem.'"2 SCOT philosophy argues that different engineers working in different political environments, for example, may well design rather different airplanes, spacecraft, and so forth. Technological style dovetails closely with SCOT in proposing that there is no single best technical way to design any particular technology, in contrast to Taylorist and Fordist schools of production management. Instead, a technology's design depends upon the designers' implicit and explicit goals, as well as the designers' cultural setting. Thomas Hughes, a preeminent historian of technology, notes that technological "system builders, like artists and architects, have creative latitude" to design their systems in a variety of ways.3 Thus technology is not the impartial, objective application of science. Hughes writes that technological style facilitates comparative history, as historians can write about how the same type of technology, whether electrical power systems or spacecraft, develops differently in different geographic regions. Natural geography, indigenous natural resources, and historical precedent, in addition to an international technology base, all influence technological development. While technological style could be employed as an analytic tool at levels such as the individual company or geographic region, it is "primarily meant to account for national differences in technology."4 Hughes gives the example of Germany building a few, large electrical generators during World War I because of a copper shortage; this thrifty design style continued there after the shortage had passed.5 Technological style or a specific 'culture of technology' embraces "distinctive values, ideas, and institutions…[such as] technical efficiency" or sophistication.6 Numerous other examples are possible to illustrate the importance of cultural factors in the designs of specific technologies. In this case study, a number of cultural factors influenced the choices, whether implicit or explicit, that the spacecraft designers in both superpowers made. In the U.S. and especially at NASA, engineers often tried to devise innovative, elegant solutions to design problems. By contrast, their Soviet counterparts had long favored adaptation over invention. These broad generalizations had specific impacts when, for example, NASA engineers declined to adapt for the Shuttle their successful rocket designs of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Abandoning proven technology, they opted instead for an entirely new space transportation system. True to form, the Soviets hurriedly adapted the overall configuration of the U.S. Shuttle without fully considering whether this approach would mesh well with their technical goals. Soviet engineers were proficient at frugal allocation of resources and jury-rigging technical fixes and saw no need to duplicate NASA's earlier deliberations over potential Shuttle configurations. 2 Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker, "The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts" in Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, editors, The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997). This book as a whole is an excellent primer for SCOT concepts. 3 Thomas P. Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems" in Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, p. 68. 4 Wiebe E. Bijker, "The Social Construction of Bakelite: Toward a Theory of Invention" in Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, p.172. 5 Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems," pp. 68-70. 6 Edward W. Constant, II, "The Social Locus of Technological Practice: Community, System, or Organization?" in Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, p. 229. 4 4 4 Clearly many configurations were possible for both Shuttles. Designers were obviously limited by certain laws of physics and by certain technical goals. Social, political, and cultural factors strongly influenced the selection of these technical goals, however. By analyzing which political factors and aspects of national technological style were most relevant to the design of the U.S. Shuttle and the Soviet Buran, I aim to show how these two space transportation systems
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1 Police Chief No, Chief Politician Yes the Life of Leon Mercer Jordan, and the Shaping Memories of His Father and Grandfather
    1 Police Chief No, Chief Politician Yes The Life of Leon Mercer Jordan, and the Shaping Memories of His Father and Grandfather By Robert M. Farnsworth 2 Dedicated to James C. Olson, whose professional dedication to history led him to complete his biography of Stuart Symington despite years of physical difficulty near the end of his life. His example challenged me in my elder years to tell the story of a remarkable man who made a significant difference in my life. 3 Preface How All This Began I moved from Detroit to Kansas City with my wife and four children in the summer of 1960 to assume my first tenure-track position as an Assistant Professor of American Literature at Kansas City University. The civil rights movement was gathering steam and I had made a couple of financial contributions to the Congress of Racial Equality while still in Detroit. CORE then asked if I were interested in becoming more socially active. I said yes, but I was moving to Kansas City. It took them months to catch up with me again in Kansas City and repeat their question. I again said yes. A few weeks later a field representative was sent to Kansas City to organize those who had showed interest. He called the first meeting in our home. Most who attended were white except for Leon and Orchid Jordan and Larry and Opal Blankinship. Most of us did not know each other, except the Jordans and the Blankinships were well acquainted. The rep insisted we organize and elect officers.
    [Show full text]
  • The Emergence of Space Law
    THE EMERGENCE OF SPACE LAW Steve Doyle* I. INTRODUCTION Space law exists today as a widely regarded, separate field of jurisprudence; however, it has many overlapping features involving other fields, including international law, contract law, tort law, and administrative law, among others.1 Development of space law concepts began early in the twentieth century and blossomed during the second half of the century into its present state. It is not yet widely taught in law schools, but space law is gradually being accorded more space in law school curricula. Substantial notional law and concepts of space law emerged prior to the first orbiting of a man made satellite named Sputnik in 1957. During the next decade (1958-1967), an intense effort was made to bring law into compliance with the realities of expanding spaceflight activities. During the 1960s, numerous national and international regulatory laws emerged to deal with satellite launches and space radio uses and to ensure greater international awareness and governmental presence in the oversight of ongoing activities in space. Just as gradually developed bodies of maritime law emerged to regulate the operation of global shipping, aeronautical law emerged to regulate the expansion of global civil aviation, and telecommunication law emerged to regulate the global uses of radio and wire communication systems, a new body of law is emerging to regulate the activities of nations in astronautics. We know that new body of law as Space Law. * Stephen E. Doyle is Honorary Director, International Institute of Space Law, Paris. Mr. Doyle worked fifteen years in federal civil service (1966-1981), fifteen years in the aerospace industry (1981-1996), and fifteen years in the power production industry (1996-2012).
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography
    Bibliography Books and reports Blandford, R.D. (Chair) New Worlds, New Horizons in Astronomy and Astrophysics Committee for a Decadal Survey of Astronomy and Astrophysics, National Research Council, 2010 Bondi, Hermann. et al Pioneering in Outer Space Heinemann Educational Books, 1971 Clarke, Arthur C. The Exploration of Space Temple Press, London, 1951 Department of Energy/NASA Satellite Power Systems Concept Development and Evaluation Program. DoE/NASA, October 1978 http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/1978DOESPS-ReferenceSystemReport.pdf Satellite Power Systems (SPS) Space Transportation Cost Analysis and Evaluation. DoE/NASA, November 1980 http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/1980DOESPS- SpaceTransportationCostAnalysis.pdf Dick, Steven J. (editor) Remembering the Space Age: Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary Conference. NASA SP-2008-4703, 2008 http://history.nasa.gov/Remembering_Space_Age_A.pdf © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 235 M. van Pelt, Dream Missions, Springer Praxis Books, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53941-6 236 Bibliography Dyson, George Project Orion: The True Story of the Atomic Spaceship Henry Holt & Company, Inc., USA, 2002 Ehricke, Krafft A. Solar Transportation In Space Age in Fiscal Year 2001, Proceedings of the Fourth AAS Goddard Memorial Symposium American Astronautical Society, 1966 Friedman, Louis. Human Spaceflight, from Mars to the Stars The University of Arizona Press, 2015 Gatland, Kenneth W. & Bono, Philip Frontiers of Space Blandford Press, UK, 1969 Hansen, James R. Chapter 9, Skipping “The Next Logical Step” in Spaceflight Revolution; NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo NASA History Series SP-4308, USA, 1994 http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4308/ch9.htm Koelle, Heinz-Hermann. Nova and Beyond, a Review of Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle Concepts in the Post-Saturn Class Technical University Berlin, Germany, 2001 Konecci, Eugene B.
    [Show full text]
  • Paper Session III-A-History of the First NASA Contract with Russia
    1994 (31st) Space Exploration and Utilization The Space Congress® Proceedings for the Good of the World Apr 28th, 2:00 PM - 5:00 PM Paper Session III-A - History of the First NASA Contract with Russia Barbara D. Connelly-Fratzke NASA Headquarters, Office of Space Systems Development Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings Scholarly Commons Citation Connelly-Fratzke, Barbara D., "Paper Session III-A - History of the First NASA Contract with Russia" (1994). The Space Congress® Proceedings. 18. https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1994-31st/april-28-1994/18 This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress® Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. History of the First NASA Contract with Russia Barbara D. Connelly-Fratzke NASA Headquarters Office of Space Systems Development This story begins after the end of the cold war with the Soviet Union. after perestroika had its initial impact on the economy, at about the time the Russian space firms were beginning to lose government support and fac ing hard times ahead. As part or the FY92 Budget approval, Congress, in its wisdom, directed NASA to investigate the Russian space hardware and determine its feasibility for use in the U.S. space program. At the invitation of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Russian firm NPO Energia, NASA made a reconnaissance visit to NPO Energia to open discussions concerning Russian space hardware.
    [Show full text]
  • The SKYLON Spaceplane
    The SKYLON Spaceplane Borg K.⇤ and Matula E.⇤ University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, 80309, USA This report outlines the major technical aspects of the SKYLON spaceplane as a final project for the ASEN 5053 class. The SKYLON spaceplane is designed as a single stage to orbit vehicle capable of lifting 15 mT to LEO from a 5.5 km runway and returning to land at the same location. It is powered by a unique engine design that combines an air- breathing and rocket mode into a single engine. This is achieved through the use of a novel lightweight heat exchanger that has been demonstrated on a reduced scale. The program has received funding from the UK government and ESA to build a full scale prototype of the engine as it’s next step. The project is technically feasible but will need to overcome some manufacturing issues and high start-up costs. This report is not intended for publication or commercial use. Nomenclature SSTO Single Stage To Orbit REL Reaction Engines Ltd UK United Kingdom LEO Low Earth Orbit SABRE Synergetic Air-Breathing Rocket Engine SOMA SKYLON Orbital Maneuvering Assembly HOTOL Horizontal Take-O↵and Landing NASP National Aerospace Program GT OW Gross Take-O↵Weight MECO Main Engine Cut-O↵ LACE Liquid Air Cooled Engine RCS Reaction Control System MLI Multi-Layer Insulation mT Tonne I. Introduction The SKYLON spaceplane is a single stage to orbit concept vehicle being developed by Reaction Engines Ltd in the United Kingdom. It is designed to take o↵and land on a runway delivering 15 mT of payload into LEO, in the current D-1 configuration.
    [Show full text]
  • Documenting Apollo on The
    NASA HISTORY DIVISION Office of External Relations volume 27, number 1 Fourth Quarter 2009/First Quarter 2010 FROM HOMESPUN HISTORY: THE CHIEF DOCUMENTING APOLLO HISTORIAN ON THE WEB By David Woods, editor, The Apollo Flight Journal Bearsden, Scotland In 1994 I got access to the Internet via a 0.014 Mbps modem through my One aspect of my job that continues to amaze phone line. As happens with all who access the Web, I immediately gravi- and engage me is the sheer variety of the work tated towards the sites that interested me, and in my case, it was astronomy we do at NASA and in the NASA History and spaceflight. As soon as I stumbled upon Eric Jones’s burgeoning Division. As a former colleague used to say, Apollo Lunar Surface Journal (ALSJ), then hosted by the Los Alamos NASA is engaged not just in human space- National Laboratory, I almost shook with excitement. flight and aeronautics; its employees engage in virtually every engineering and natural Eric was trying to understand what had been learned about working on science discipline in some way and often at the Moon by closely studying the time that 12 Apollo astronauts had spent the cutting edge. This breadth of activities is, there. To achieve this, he took dusty, old transcripts of the air-to-ground of course, reflected in the history we record communication, corrected them, added commentary and, best of all, man- and preserve. Thus it shouldn’t be surprising aged to get most of the men who had explored the surface to sit with him that our books and monographs cover such a and add their recollections.
    [Show full text]
  • Air & Space Power Journal, November-December 2012, Volume 26, No. 6, AFRP 10-1
    November–December 2012 Volume 26, No. 6 AFRP 10-1 Senior Leader Perspective Airmen ❙ 4 Delivering Decision Advantage Lt Gen Larry D. James, USAF Features For and from Cyberspace ❙ 12 Conceptualizing Cyber Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Col Matthew M. Hurley, USAF Manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ❙ 34 Strategic, Tactical . Both? Maj Tyler Morton, USAF The F-22 Acquisition Program ❙ 53 Consequences for the US Air Force’s Fighter Fleet Lt Col Christopher J. Niemi, USAF Personnel Recovery ❙ 83 Strategic Importance and Impact Col Lee Pera, USAF Paul D. Miller Darrel Whitcomb Departments 113 ❙ Views A Culminating Point for Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance . 113 Col Jon Kimminau, PhD, USAF, Retired Realizing the Potential of Analytics: Arming the Human Mind . 130 Maj Robert D. Folker Jr., USAF Capt Kyle Benjamin Bressette, USAF Lightning Strikes and Thunder Claps: The Strategic Bomber and Air Superiority . 137 Maj Wade S. Karren, USAF 146 ❙ Historical Highlight The Evolution of Air Force Targeting Capt John R. Glock, USAF 175 ❙ Book Reviews Leading with Honor: Leadership Lessons from the Hanoi Hilton . 175 Lee Ellis Reviewer: Dr. Richard I. Lester Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis—Suez and the Brink of War . 178 David A. Nichols Reviewer: Maj Thomas F. Menza, USAF, Retired 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century . 182 Andrew F. Krepinevich Reviewer: 2d Lt James W. Anderson, USAF (active) Drugs and Contemporary Warfare . 184 Paul Rexton Kan Reviewer: Jan Kallberg, PhD Flying from the Black Hole: The B-52 Navigator-Bombardiers of Vietnam . 186 Robert O.
    [Show full text]
  • Highlights in Space 2010
    International Astronautical Federation Committee on Space Research International Institute of Space Law 94 bis, Avenue de Suffren c/o CNES 94 bis, Avenue de Suffren UNITED NATIONS 75015 Paris, France 2 place Maurice Quentin 75015 Paris, France Tel: +33 1 45 67 42 60 Fax: +33 1 42 73 21 20 Tel. + 33 1 44 76 75 10 E-mail: : [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Fax. + 33 1 44 76 74 37 URL: www.iislweb.com OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS URL: www.iafastro.com E-mail: [email protected] URL : http://cosparhq.cnes.fr Highlights in Space 2010 Prepared in cooperation with the International Astronautical Federation, the Committee on Space Research and the International Institute of Space Law The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs is responsible for promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and assisting developing countries in using space science and technology. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs P. O. Box 500, 1400 Vienna, Austria Tel: (+43-1) 26060-4950 Fax: (+43-1) 26060-5830 E-mail: [email protected] URL: www.unoosa.org United Nations publication Printed in Austria USD 15 Sales No. E.11.I.3 ISBN 978-92-1-101236-1 ST/SPACE/57 *1180239* V.11-80239—January 2011—775 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT VIENNA Highlights in Space 2010 Prepared in cooperation with the International Astronautical Federation, the Committee on Space Research and the International Institute of Space Law Progress in space science, technology and applications, international cooperation and space law UNITED NATIONS New York, 2011 UniTEd NationS PUblication Sales no.
    [Show full text]
  • Using Energia (Arduino)
    Using Energia (Arduino) Introduction This chapter of the MSP430 workshop explores Energia, the Arduino port for the Texas Instruments Launchpad kits. After a quick definition and history of Arduino and Energia, we provide a quick introduction to Wiring – the language/library used by Arduino & Energia. Most of the learning comes from using the Launchpad board along with the Energia IDE to light LED’s, read switches and communicate with your PC via the serial connection. Learning Objectives, Requirements, Prereq’s Prerequisites & Objectives Prerequisites Basic knowledge of C language Basic understanding of using a C library and header files This chapter doesn’t explain clock, interrupt, and GPIO features in detail, this is left to the other chapters in the MSP430 workshop Requirements - Tools and Software Hardware Windows (XP, 7, 8) PC with available USB port MSP430F5529 Launchpad Software Already installed, if you Energia Download have installed CCSv5.x Launchpad drivers (Optional) MSP430ware / Driverlib Objectives Define ‘Arduino’ and describe what is was created for Define ‘Energia’ and explain what it is ‘forked’ from Install Energia, open and run included example sketches Use serial communication between the board & PC Add an external interrupt to an Energia sketch Modify CPU registers from an Energia sketch MSP430 Workshop - Using Energia (Arduino) 8 - 1 What is Arduino Chapter Topics Using Energia (Arduino) ............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Human Spaceflight Plans of Russia, China and India
    Presentation to the ASEB Committee on NASA Technology Roadmaps Panel on Human Health and Surface Exploration June 1, 2011 by Marcia S. Smith Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC Russia Extensive experience in human spaceflight First animal in space (1957), first man in space (1961), first woman in space (1963), first spacewalk (1965), first space station (1971) Seven successful space stations (Salyut 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and Mir) before partnering in International Space Station (ISS) No people beyond low Earth orbit (LEO), however For earth orbit, continues to rely on Soyuz, first launched in 1967, but upgraded many times and is key to ISS operations Designed space shuttle, Buran, but launched only once in automated mode (no crew) in 1988 06-01-2011 2 Russia (2) Existing reliable launch vehicles Proton is largest: 21 tons to LEO; 5.5 tons to geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) Attempts to build Saturn V-equivalent in 1960s and 1970s failed (N1 failed four times in four attempts 1969-1972) Energiya booster in 1980s only flew twice (1987 with Polyus and 1988 with Buran). Abandoned for financial reasons. Was 100 tons to LEO; 18-20 tons to GTO; 32 tons to lunar trajectory. RD-170 engines for Energiya’s strap-ons live on today in other forms for Zenit, Atlas V, and Angara (under development) 06-01-2011 3 Russia (3) Robotic planetary space exploration mixed Excellent success at – Moon (Luna and Lunokhod series, plus Zond circumlunar flights) Venus (Venera series) Halley’s Comet (Vega 1 and 2—also Venus) Jinxed at Mars More than a dozen failures in 1960s - 1970s Partial success with Phobos 2 in 1988 (Phobos 1 failed) Mars 96 failed to leave Earth orbit Phobos-Grunt scheduled for later this year; designed as sample return from Phobos (includes Chinese orbiter) 06-01-2011 4 Russia (4) Grand statements over decades about sending people to the Moon and Mars, but never enough money to proceed.
    [Show full text]
  • Proton Accident with GLONASS Satellites
    3/29/2018 Proton accident with GLONASS satellites Previous Proton mission: SES­6 PICTURE GALLERY A Proton rocket with the Block D 11S861 stage and 813GLN34 payload firing shortly before liftoff on July 2, 2013. Upcoming book on space exploration Read more and watch videos in: Site map Site update log About this site About the author The ill­fated Proton rocket lifts off on July 2, 2013, at 06:38:21.585 Moscow Time (July 1, 10:38 p.m. EDT). The rocket crashed approximately 32.682 seconds later, Roskosmos said on July 18, 2013. Mailbox Russia's Proton crashes with a trio of navigation satellites SUPPORT THIS SITE! Published: July 1; updated: July 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 15, 18, 19; 23; Aug. 11 Related pages: Russia's Proton rocket crashed less than a minute after its liftoff from Baikonur, Kazakhstan. A Proton­M vehicle No. 53543 with a Block DM­03 (11S­86103) upper stage lifted off as scheduled from Pad No. 24 at Site 81 (launch complex 8P­882K) in Baikonur Cosmodrome on July 2, 2013, at 06:38:21.585 Moscow Time (on July 1, 10:38 p.m. EDT). The rocket started veering off course right after leaving the pad, deviating from the vertical path in various RD­253/275 engines directions and then plunged to the ground seconds later nose first. The payload section and the upper stage were sheered off the vehicle moments before it impacted the ground and exploded. The flight lasted no more than 30 seconds. Searching for details: The Russian space agency's ground processing and launch contractor, TsENKI, was broadcasting the launch live and captured the entire process of the vehicle's disintegration and its crash.
    [Show full text]
  • European History Quarterly 47(3)
    Book Reviews 547 hearing to address the Council, providing one last sample of his oratorical skills (214). The last two chapters deal with the memory of Jerome, placing him on par with Wyclif and Hus and Martin Luther, occasionally finding his likeness with his famous beard in images from the early modern period. The book shows Jerome was an independent thinker who caused much disquiet and alarm in different European university settings. Jerome made waves across Europe and in all probability heightened university masters’ awareness of the connection between Wyclifism, already declared heresy, and the arising Hussitism. Slava Gerovitch, Soviet Space Mythologies: Public Images, Private Memories, and the Making of a Cultural Identity, University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh, PA, 2015; 256 pp., 7 b/w illus.; 9780822963639, $27.95 (pbk) Reviewed by: Andrei Rogatchevski, The Arctic University of Norway, Norway The myth about the Soviet space programme can be summarized as ‘a perfect hero conquering outer space with flawless technology’ (131). It could hardly have been otherwise in a censorship-ridden country that used space exploration, in particular, to prove the superiority of socialism over capitalism. A great deal of information about the programme was for decades routinely concealed not only from the gen- eral public but also from the Communist rulers, whose versions of space flight communication transcripts were doctored for fear of funding withdrawal. Even the cosmonauts and their ground control sometimes did not want to enlighten each other (until afterwards) about the full scale of in-flight problems. Thus, Gagarin, while in orbit, was misinformed about its height, because his engines turned themselves off too late and propelled his spacecraft to an apogee of 188 miles, instead of the expected 143 miles.
    [Show full text]