Airpower Journal, Published Quarterly, Is the Professional Journal of the United States Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donal d B. Ri ce

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Ervin C. Sharpe, Jr.

Editor Lt Col Richard B. Clark

Associate Editor Capt John J. Doherty

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst. Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Spring 1992, Vol. VI, No. I AFRP 50-2

Editorial 2

Advocating Mission Needs in Tomorrow’s World Gen John M. Loh, USAF 4

Space: A New Strategic Frontier Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, JrM USAF 14

The Problem with Our Air Power Doctrine X Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF 24

A Carrier Air Wing for the Air Force: Challenges for the Composite Wing Maj Chris J. Krisinger, USAF 32

A New Paradigm for Organizational y Structure Capt Graham W. Rinehart, USAF 43

Pointblank: A Study in Strategic and National Security Decision Making Col Ed Crowder, USAF 55

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 67 Notams Notices of Interest 93 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL

The Decisiveness of Air Power

OLLOWING the Gulf war, an old de- decisive simply refers to a factor that was bate reemerged The central question clearly critical to victory. If that factor had ofF this long-standing dispute is. Can air not exerted a crucial influence, something power be decisive in war? This single else would have been decisive. quarrel has caused more dissension be- If we view the term decisive in the same tween the US Air Force and its sister ser- way when we ask, Can air power be deci- vices than perhaps any other. Much of the sive in war? the answer is clearly yes. It controversy stems originally from some was decisive in Operation Desert Storm. rather extraordinary claims made by early That doesn’t mean that the surface forces proponents of air power. Their prophecies were not important, nor does it mean that that air power alone could win wars were air power could have won the war alone. It not well received by people who had spent simply means that air power in that par- their lives waging war on the surface of the ticular situation was crucial to obtaining earth. Reactions were so strong that they the kind of victory achieved. still overshadow the current issue. When Like new parents, when the early propo- the question, Can air power be decisive? is nents of air power recognized the potential posed, some still hear the old assertion. of the infant airplane, they knew that the Air power can win by itself. A key reason nature of war had changed forever. In that we have not put this debate to rest is that analysis, they were correct. When they we have a void in our definition of terms. predicted that this new player would be a What do we mean by decisive? superstar someday, they were correct. Victory in a sporting event can often be When they said the superstar would win traced to one particular play (making a all by itself, they were exaggerating. first down on fourth and four), or to a cer- Although it made significant contributions tain player’s overall performance (pitching during its adolescence, the player had dif- a no-hitter), or to the contribution of a par- ficulty living up to the top billing the fans ticular portion of the team’s game (free- had predicted. But during Desert Storm, it throw shooting, offense or defense, special emerged a mature superstar. All the effort, teams, etc.). We call that contribution, training, and faith the staff had placed in whatever it was, the decisive factor in the the youngster finally paid off in a decisive game. It isn’t necessarily the final or only performance. contribution, just the key one. Modern warfare is a team effort. As in Does that mean the other plays, players, team sports, on one day. against one team, or parts of the team's effort were unimpor- on one particular field, a team member can tant? Of course not. If a team leaves the turn in a decisive performance. That field claiming victory after making a first doesn’t take anything away from the rest of down on fourth and long, it will lose. If the team. In fact on a professional team, the remainder of the team leaves the court the other members might walk up, slap the because the point guard is having a great player on the back, and sav, ‘‘We knew game, victory will slip away. If the offense you had it in you! Way to go!" Then the hits the showers because the defense is player might modestly say, “Aw shucks, it shining, an apparent win will wind up in was really a team effort. 1 was just trying to the loss column. In sports, the term do my part.’’ RBC

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- perienced the effects of force multiplication in spondence should be addressed to the Editor, our personal lives when these concepts are in- Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, voked as a life-style rather than a management Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the style. The Air Force is a way of life—not a sim- right to edit the material for overall length. ple occupation. Like it or not, officers are public officials. We have an absolutely tremendous opportunity now, as perhaps never before, to KUDOS TO THE AUTHORS exemplify duty, honor, and country for our fellow citizens. It is our tremendous advantage to The Fall 1991 issue was the best I've seen in have traditions and codes that we believe in years. “Sex, Power, and Ethics: The Challenge and follow. to the Military Professional" by CMSgt Robert Lt Col Marie C. Shadden, USAF D. Lewallen and "A Revolution in Air Trans- Phoenix, Arizona port: Acquiring the C-141 Starlifter” by Dr Roger D. Launius and Betty R. Kennedy were outstanding! Maj Gen Richard D. Smith, USAF Jim Cunningham’s article "Cracks in the Black Kelly AFB, Texas Dike: Secrecy, the Media, and the F-117A” (Fall 1991) was great reporting! I was the managing editor of Aviation Week during much of this period (until October 1986) and found it the Congratulations on selecting and printing Chief best-kept secret in my experience. We got an Lewallen's outstanding article on "Sex, Power, over-the-transom drawing from an eyewitness and Ethics." The chief cut right to the heart of buff but never used it because we could not the matter. Use and abuse of sex in the work- confirm the shape. Subsequent events proved it place is definitely an ethical problem and has to be quite accurate. I have a barracks bag full far more to do with politics and power than at- of hindsight—yours for a dime. tractive physical characteristics or self-control. Herbert J. Coleman 1 have seen many forms of office “horseplay" Washington, D.C. over the past 17 years. Most of them assuredly have not involved mixed-gender supervisors and subordinates, because the Air Force of my CONGRESSIONAL CORRECTION day has been preponderantly male. However, all involved questionable ethics, poor judge- Understanding the technology of the F-117A ment in postsituation analysis, and competition takes a genius: however, 1 learned in the second for power and control. It has always been a grade the difference between a senator and a myst ery to me that peopl e are surpri sed to l earn representative. Jim Cunningham’s "Cracks in that sexual harassment and crimes like rape are the Black Dike" refers to "Sen Barbara Boxer" perpetrated out of greed and a desire for (page 29), but if memory serves me, she has power—not physical lust. been Representative Boxer from California's I wholeheartedly agree with Chief Lewallen Sixth District since January 1983. that ethics must come off the bookshelf and fames L. Crowder find a great deal more use in the "m ission.’’ Tinker AFB. Oklahoma Like time management and delegation, power is a concept that—in itself—is neither good nor bad. How these concepts are translated into physical reality has an unbelievable impact on RICOCHET REJOINDERS mission accomplishment. The concepts are A letter by Col Haywood S. Hansell in the Sum- fully accepted in the workplace, but sometimes mer 1991 issue of Airpower Journal refers to Lt we tend to shed them with our uniforms at the end of a duty day. Many of us have already ex- continued on page 67

3 ONG AGO, Washington Irving wrote the now-familiar story of Rip ADVOCATING Van Winkle, who fell asleep for 20 years in pre-Revolutionary Amer- MISSION Lica. He awoke to an entirely different world in which his townspeople de- nounced him as a traitor when he ex- NEEDS IN pressed loyalty to King George. His previously held knowledge and assumptions did nothing but disorient him, and even TOMORROW’S his trusty weapon was old and useless. By comparison, a modern-day strategist who only nodded off for two years be- WORLD tween 1987 and 1989 would have awoken to a similarly changed world. In fact, our world view “paradigm” has shifted since Gen John M. Loh, USAF 1988. Thomas Kuhn calls paradigms “uni- versally recognized scientific achieve- ments that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners”1 and indicates that the transition from one paradigm to another in science is by revolution, not evolution.2 If we apply Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm to social science, the analogy between scientific ADVOCATING MISSION NEEDS 5 revolutions and recent world political world had two superpowers, and the major changes is complete and perfect. threat to our security was a Warsaw Pact The old paradigm under which we de- attack on Western Europe. termined our national security strategy is The old paradigm focused on a Euro- gone. It is totally inadequate for determin- pean battlefield. We prepared for a high- ing and articulating defense needs in to- threat conventional or perhaps a theater day’s world. Rather, we are operating un- nuclear war. The battlefield was linear der a new paradigm and need a new with little strategic depth. We were out- framework for defining and articulating numbered by the adversary and planned a mission needs. The old framework just defensive campaign to protect our allies won’t do. Mv purpose here is to explain and reestablish prewar borders. how I see this revolutionary paradigm Our heavy, relatively fixed force struc- shift, offer a framework for defining and ture matched this world view. Our strategy advocating needs under the new paradigm, hinged on forward-basing, and we de- and illustrate the framework by discussing signed deploying forces to reinforce in- air superiority mission needs and opera- place forces rapidly. Deploying theater air tional requirements under the new para- forces planned and practiced operations as digm as an example. squadron-sized units operating from established bases in a mature theater with a well-developed communications and lo- The Paradigm Shift gistics infrastructure. Under the old paradigm, our systems re- Since shortly after World War II. we op- flected this Eurocentric force structure and erated under the old paradigm that as- worldview. We designed systems to coun- sumed a bipolar, Eurocentric world. This teract a familiar enemy with known equip- 6 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

ment. Though our adversary modernized projection. Unlike the old paradigm, the- his equipment, the changes were marginal ater air forces are likely to deploy as wings and our response manageable. In this en- to immature theaters with little vironment, we became comfortable with infrastructure. our foe and the forces required to deter The Air Force developed its “Global him. We also made constant, marginal im- Reach—Global Power” approach to realign provements to our systems. Justifying im- thinking about air power to the new para- provements was easy—we had an obvious, digm. A June 1990 white paper articulated definable, and threatening enemy. That the following five objectives of this world is gone, and we must begin to re- strategy: orient our thinking, and especially our ad- • Sustain deterrence (nuclear forces). vocacy of new systems, toward the new • Provide versatile combat forces (the- paradigm. ater operations and power projection). The world of the new paradigm is no • Supply rapid global mobility (airlift longer bipolar but unipolar. The United and tankers). States is the world’s only remaining super- • Control the high ground (space and power in all the elements of national command, control, communications, and power—industrial, economic, social, mili- intelligence [C3I] systems). tary, and political. Though the Soviet • Build US influence (strengthening se- Union remains a threat, the danger of a curity partners and relationships).4 large-scale conventional attack on Western Europe is greatly reduced. The Soviet We’ll use these five fundamental objec- Union, under the new paradigm, is but tives as a planning framework for air one, albeit the most formidable, of several power in the next decade. regional powers or regional coalitions with If our national military strategy and sup- which the United States must be porting force structure have changed, so concerned. must the systems we say are required to Last year, national leaders developed a meet the needs generated by the new para- military strategy to match this new paradigm. For this reason, we must be able to digm. President George Bush, in a 2 Au- articulate how a need or a system relates to gust 1990 speech, reoriented our military our capability, mission, and strategy under strategy to likely regional battlefields and the new paradigm. If we cannot clearly away from the unlikely large-scale Euro- make this link, we are unlikely to find pean conflict.3 Our new strategy is based support for the need. Justifying needs un- on four fundamental pillars: to maintain der the old paradigm is simply inadequate. an effective deterrent, to maintain US influence through forward presence, to respond rapidly and effectively to regional A New Framework for crises, and to retain the capacity to rebuild if the Soviet Union or some other power Advocating Needs reemerges as a world threat. As indicated earlier, the world view of Since our national military strategy un- the new paradigm requires a new frame- derwent this fundamental change, we were work for advocating needs. In Tactical Air forced to rethink our force structure. The Command (TAC), as the leader for stating character of our armed forces is signifi- operational requirements for the tactical cantly changing. It will be a smaller, ex- air forces worldwide, we adapted Glenn peditionary force based primarily in the Kent’s “strategies-to-tasks" idea for our United States. Forward presence instead of framework.5 This framework shows a di- forward-basing is the watchword for the rect link between national strategy at the future. Deploying forces will be designed highest level and operational tasks. We il- not for rapid reinforcement of in-place lustrate our adaptation of the concept forces but for rapid global reach and power through the use of a multilayered spherical ADVOCATING MISSION NEEDS 7

NATIONAL STRATEGY

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY THEATER STRATEGY AND CAMPAIGN CONCEPTS OF AIR OPERATIONS MISSIONS CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

TASKS

model (fig. 1). The largest sphere repre- Figure 1. The Spherical Model sents national strategy and objectives. Suc- cessively smaller spheres are national military strategy, theater strategy, air For example, in the early 1960s. national missions, and operational objectives that military strategy changed from massive re- are made up of the various operational taliation to flexible response. Change in tasks. We use systems and people to per- this larger sphere caused many changes to form these tasks. Concepts of operations the smaller spheres. Most notably, theater are part of both the theater campaign strategies came into their own, and theater sphere and the smaller air missions commanders developed plans to combat sphere. aggression at several levels, from uncon- The model suggests two important ventional warfare to theater nuclear war- points. First, each successively smaller fare. We expanded theater conventional sphere is contained in. and draws its forces while reducing reliance on strategic character from, the larger sphere(s). Thus, nuclear forces. Eventually, an entirely new the nature of our national and theater mili- air mission subset (battlefield air interdic- tary strategies has a profound impact on tion |BAI|) grew from the need to slow how we plan and execute our air missions enemy offensive tempo and to increase the and operational objectives. The second viability of flexible response, which in point is easily derived from the first: turn created new operational objectives, change in any of the larger spheres tasks, and systems needs to fulfill the new prompts changes to the smaller spheres mission. since they draw their nature from the So. change in national strategy or na- larger. tional military strategy causes change to 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

proponent has failed to understand the concept of operations in both spheres. For instance, consider the counterair mission in the recent US Central Com- mand’s campaign plan in Operation Desert Storm. The theater plan required early and complete attainment of air superiority, including defeating both Iraqi air forces and surface-to-air defenses. But the air commander could choose from an endless number of concepts of operation to fulfill that mission requirement and then could choose a concept for destroying enemy aircraft on a continuum from destroying all enemy aircraft in the air to destroying them all on the ground. Likewise, the air commander could deal with surface-to-air defenses on a continuum from only avoid- ing, to suppressing, to totally destroying these systems. Obviously, the mix of choices used to develop the commander’s concept of operations helped define the nature of the operational objectives and tasks within this mission and the systems required to do the tasks. The spherical strategies-to-tasks model, then, shows an unbroken link between the Global Reach—Global Power outlines the new directions systems we use and our national strategy. that the Air Force will he taking in the next decade and into Systems perform tasks that meet opera- the twenty-first century. This “white paper" is must reading tional objectives within the concept of op- for anyone needing to understand the emplcryment of erations for air missions in a theater cam- aerospace power in the emerging new world order. paign. This campaign fulfills a national military strategy that supports an overall air missions, operational objectives, and national strategy. “Requirements” are the tasks. We find ourselves in exactly this features, characteristics, performance, and position today. As I noted, our nation sub- numbers of systems we need to perform stantially altered its military strategy last the tasks that fulfill the objectives ... and year, which should in turn change theater so on up the chain of logic. strategies and campaign plans, our air mis- The model is useful in both determining sions and the way we accomplish them, and advocating requirements. We deter- our operational objectives and the way we mine requirements by moving from the will perform them, and the accompanying larger to the smaller spheres. We must first operational tasks. understand our national, national military, The ‘‘concept of operations” tag in both and theater strategies and the way each de- the theater strategy and campaign plan, fines the subordinate air missions, opera- and air missions spheres is necessary since tional objectives, and operational tasks. the particular concept of operations a com- Once we understand the tasks required of mander develops to achieve objectives also us, we can determine the features, charac- determines the nature of the sphere itself, teristics, performance, and the number of and thus everything contained within the systems needed—in other words, our ‘‘op- sphere. Many schemes for applying tech- erational requirements.” nology to systems fall apart because the To advocate requirements, we move ADVOCATING MISSION NEEDS 9 within the model from the smallest to the political freedom, human rights, and dem- largest sphere. Once we know what sys- ocratic institutions. tems we need, we can show how a system • Healthy, cooperative, and politically performs a battlefield task that fulfills an vigorous relations with allies and friendly operational objective within the concept of nations.6 operations of one of our air missions. These missions, in turn, help to suc- The report identifies challenges to these cessfully complete a theater strategy or objectives and our political, economic, and campaign plan that fulfills national mili- defense agendas to meet the challenges. tary strategy in support of our national These three are the major subspheres to strategy. This is not just an academic ex- national strategy. But it is the defense ercise. It is an exercise in logic and intel- sphere, expressed in our national military- lectual rigor. Unless we can clearly strategy, with which we are concerned establish this systems-tasks-objectives- here. missions-strategies link, we are unlikely to National military strategy significantly win Department of Defense (DOD) or con- changed last year, and earlier in this article gressional support for the systems we I noted the new strategy’s four fundamen- need. As noted earlier, we can no longer tal pillars. Because it focuses on regional assume justification of our needs, and jus- contingencies and relies less on forward- tification under the old paradigm is simply based forces, it will considerably alter the- inadequate. ater military strategies that support it. We Let me illustrate, then, the use of this have not seen the results of this change in framework by discussing the needs for air specific theater strategies (though Opera- superiority—our most critical mission— tion Desert Storm provided a view of what under the new paradigm. they might be like), but we might conceive of three general models for theater military strategies in future regional crises: defen- Using the Framework: sive, defensive-offensive, and offensive. Air Superiority Our strategic aim in the defensive model is, together with an ally, to retain the sta- in the New Paradigm tus quo, usually the existing political As the model indicates, the initial step boundaries. In this scenario, we are most in determining needs is to understand the likely outnumbered by the adversary and nature of our national strategy. This is the would deploy to reinforce an ally and any only sphere which has not changed under forward-based forces we had in the the- the new' paradigm. US national strategy is ater. We would deploy only the number of a statement of overriding national interests forces necessary to deter an aggressor or and objectives and the way the govern- fight a successful defensive campaign. ment will meet them. President Bush, in a Since we are operating w'ithin the sphere 1991 report to Congress, stated four funda- of our new military strategy, we must as- mental objectives for the United States in sume that the bulk of the forces would de- the 1990s: ploy from the United States under crisis conditions. Should hostilities break out • The survival of the United States as a before deployment, we may face condi- free and independent nation, with its fun- tions requiring a forced entry to the damental values intact and its institutions theater. and people secure. Air superiority (part of our “air mis- • A h e a l t h y a n d g r o w i n g U S e c o n o m y t o sions” sphere) will probably be most diffi- ensure opportunity for individual pros- cult to achieve under this model since we perity and a resource base for national en- would begin it from a position of disad- deavors at home and abroad. vantage. Defensive counterair (DCA) • A stable and secure world, fostering would be the most important element of 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

air superiority during the initial phases of and nearly all the forces will deploy from the campaign, followed by offensive coun- the United States to the crisis area. For terair (OCA) and suppression of enemy air that reason, our aircraft and people must defenses (SEAD) as we establish offensive maintain a very high state of readiness and air capability in the theater. be able to travel long ranges with little The second model I call defensive- supporting airlift. And we must provide a offensive. In this campaign model, our sanctuary free from air attack for all de- forces would join with allies to deter or ployed forces in friendly territory. But we fight a defensive phase while planning an cannot completely define our needs until offensive phase in the theater to meet na- we determine the objectives and tasks that tional strategic objectives. Though we may lie within the theater strategy and national be outnumbered initially, we would military strategy spheres. Rather than dis- establish numerical superiority and build cussing objectives and tasks for all three a logistics and base structure before the of- models, we will, for the sake of brevity, ar- fensive phase began. In most cases, this bitrarily choose the middle (defensive- theater strategic model will require the offensive) model and develop objectives majority of our deployable forces. This and tasks under that concept. model best represents the Desert Shield/ An air commander will have many ob- Storm scenario. jectives under any theater strategy model, Air superiority under this model would and the following list is certainly not ex- be less difficult to achieve than in the haustive. But it does include the major ob- purely defensive model since we assume jectives of the counterair mission required in the defensive-offensive model that we to fulfill theater strategic goals. And, of will eventually establish numerical superi- course, the commander’s concept of opera- ority. Like the previous model, our coun- tions clearly affects which objectives are terair forces will initially focus on DCA, accomplished and in what order. but OCA and SEAD will be the heart of the The defensive phase of the defensive- counterair effort, especially during the of- offensive model would include these fensive phase. objectives: The final theater strategy model is the offensive model. It envisions the use of • Deploy quickly with as little airlift as any in-place and rapidly deployable forces possible and with air refueling. to achieve a limited strategic aim in a sur- • Rapidly bed down units and C3I ele- gical, fast offensive campaign. This is the ments in an immature theater. only conceivable purely offensive model • Establish theater air defense and C3I since (again under the new national mili- network. tary strategy “sphere”) we will not be pos- • Establish 24-hour DCA coverage tured for a purely offensive use of force ex- immediately. cept in limited-objective scenarios. • Defeat enemy air attacks on friendly Air superiority should be the easiest to airfields, forces, ports, and depots. achieve under this scenario; we would not • Build theater air forces to support of- undertake the offensive action unless air fensive campaign. superiority is assured. The most likely re- The offensive phase of the model would quirement for our counterair forces in this add these objectives: model is a quick OCA/SEAD strike to neutralize air forces and air defenses, leaving • Suppress, disrupt, and destroy the only a low-density, surface-to-air threat enemy air defense network. remaining. • Destroy enemy air forces on the Already we see some of the needs for an ground and in the air. air superiority fighter emerging. Because of • Defend friendly bases, forces, and of- our national military strategy, we can ex- fensive air packages. pect to need force under crisis conditions, • Maintain a theaterwide C3I network. ADVOCATING MISSION NEEDS 11

Each of these objectives includes thou- • Destroy enemy aircraft in friendly or sands of tasks that, when properly accom- enemy airspace. plished. achieve the objectives. Again, for • Fight successfully while temporarily the sake of illustration, we’ll discuss here outnumbered in enemy airspace. only a few of the tasks required of air-to- Having worked from the largest to the air fighter aircraft. Obviously, we’re view- smallest sphere defining our strategies, ing only a small portion of the entire missions, objectives, and tasks, we are strategies-to-tasks model. now in a position to say what characteris- Air-to-air fighters must do these tasks in tics and systems we need on future air su- the defensive phase: periority fighters—our requirements. And • Deploy within 24 hours of these are not just arbitrary requirements. notification. We need them to be able to do the tasks • Defend themselves during theater which support the objectives that fulfill our air mission goals in a specific theater entry. • Operate from short airfields with little strategy. infrastructure at some distance from the Earlier, I noted the high readiness and expected engagement area. long-range characteristics required by our • Detect and destroy numerically supe- new national strategy. In addition to those rior enemy air forces attacking friendly characteristics, a future air superiority forces and bases. fighter needs: • Avoid enemy surface-to-air missiles. • High reliability because of the ex- • Operate autonomously or in conjunc- pected poor theater infrastructure and the tion with airborne and ground command need for 24-hour DCA coverage. and control elements. • Long-range, high-volume radar • Fly a sortie rate of “x” sorties per day. coverage because of the need for self- And, during the offensive phase, these defense during theater entry, the need to tasks are added: The F-15 Eagle was designed primarily for air-to-air roles • Avoid enemy surface-to-air missiles in conventional force deployments. As was seen in Desert while ingressing enemy airspace. Storm/Desert Shield, and as is foreshadowed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US will need to redirect • Operate autonomously or in conjunc- its national resources into developing defense forces that can tion with airborne command and control perform multiple roles and depltry rapidly to any theater elements in enemy airspace. anywhere in the world on short notice. 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 Lockheed's YF-22 is a fighter aircraft for the next century. The fighter of the future must allow Air Force units to quickly achieve and exploit air superiority through a capability to shift rapidly between offensive and defensive roles.

conduct autonomous operations, and the need to fight effectively when outnumbered. • High loiter time because of the 24- hour DCA coverage requirement. • Short takeoff and landing distance because of poor infrastructure. • High speed since poor infrastructure will induce malpositioning of air superiority forces in theater. • Superior technology, including assured first-look, first-kill capability because of the need to fight effectively while outnumbered. • High speed and low signatures, which we require to fight outnumbered and to avoid enemy surface-to-air threats during the defensive and initial portions of the offensive phases. • An onboard self-protection suite for diet that we will have to establish air supe- the same reasons. • Passive detection to protect low riority after a lengthy deployment under signatures. crisis conditions. The models also indicate that we may have to force an entry into a Again, though this is not an exhaustive theater. Two of the three models predict list of requirements, it serves our purpose that air superiority forces will be fighting here of illustrating the process. These are outnumbered far from home. not simply elaborate requirements we For these reasons, our technology and dreamed up but real requirements that re- equipment must be clearly superior. Air sult from actual tasks and objectives a the- superiority is not a mission we can win ater commander wants from an air superi- 101-98 in overtime. We must triumph in ority force. the air convincingly and quickly to be able Having defined our operational require- to do other theater missions. Today’s ments, we are able to design a system that fighters are inadequate to ensure decisive best fulfills them. A new aircraft is needed victory on tomorrow’s battlefield. to achieve the requirements I have just de- The second reason we need the F-22 is scribed. The Air Force has chosen the F-22 the spreading sophistication of the air de- as that aircraft. Some have argued that our fense threat around the world. No matter future air superiority requirements may be where the next conflict occurs, we can ex- met by upgrades to the F-15, or some F-15 pect to face a highly developed air defense derivative. This is a flawed and incorrect system. The next-generation air superiority conclusion for three reasons. fighter must avoid sophisticated surface- The first reason we need a new aircraft to-air threats while defeating advanced is the overriding importance of air superi- enemy air forces. In many cases, it will be ority. It is every theater commander’s first required to do these tasks while outnum- objective. The foregoing national military bered. No modification or derivative of ex- strategy and theater strategy models pre- isting fighters gives us the combination of ADVOCATING MISSION NEEDS 13

low signatures, weapons, avionics, and ing new systems and improving our train- supportability required to meet these ing, readiness, and sustainment programs. needs. More importantly, it rests on the solid Finally, we need the F-22 because of the foundation of the new paradigm. F-15’s advancing age. When we field the In A.D. 150, Ptolemy of Alexandria de- F-22 nine years from now, the average veloped an earth-centered model of the F-15 will be 25 years old. Some will be universe. Astronomers used this paradigm over 30. The F-22 is an aircraft for the next for nearly 1,400 years to explain planetary century, not the 1990s. Had we used the motion until Nicolaus Copernicus the- modification/derivative concept when de- orized that the earth actually rotated veloping the F-15, we would now have an around the sun. The paradigm changed. A F-4 derivative as our frontline air superi- post-Copernican astronomer who at- ority fighter facing MiG-29s, Su-27s, and tempted to explain planetary motion with Mirage 2000s on the battlefield. We would the Ptolemaic model would not only have have given away air superiority—our most been wrong, but also foolish. Should we critical need. continue to advocate mission needs and This is a brief example of the new think- operational requirements based on the old ing required in today’s world. The paradigm, the evaporating bipolar para- strategies-to-tasks framework provides a digm that is so tempting and easy to do, systematic, logical approach for develop- we too would be wrong—and foolish. □

Notes

1. Thomas S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolu 3. President George Bush, "In Defense of Defense." speech tions (Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 1970), viii. to the Aspen Institute Symposium. 2 August 1990. 2 Ibid . 12. As an example. Kuhn traces three paradigms 4. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice. The Air Force present in the history of physical optics. In the seventeenth and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Global Power century, light was seen as material corpuscles. In the eight- (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, June 1990). eenth century, the paradigm changed and scientists saw light 5. as transverse wave motion: and after Albert Einstein. Max 5. Glenn A. Kent, A Framework for Defense Planning Planck and others, the paradigm changed again. Scientists (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation. 1989). now see light as photons that exhibit some characteristics of 6. President of the United States, Nationu) Security Strat- waves and some of particles of motion. egy of the United States (Washington. D.C.: The White House. 1991), 3-4. SPACE A NEW STRATEGIC FRONTIER

Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman, Jr ., USAF

HIS article considers how the on the battlefield with information critical unique medium of space can help to the prosecution of hostilities. Since the meet the challenges facing our na- formation of Air Force Space Command in tion. The subject is timely in that the early 1980s, the space community has Tspace operations are finally coming intobeen working hard to develop the requisite their own—specifically, the application of policy, strategy, acquisition, and opera- space assets to support Air Force missions. tional underpinnings to meet the challenge The article’s title may be a misnomer, for of a range of military conflicts. However, it space systems are not really very new' but was not until Operation Desert Storm that clearly will become more important to the space systems were able to make broad, Air Force and to the nation during the re- critical contributions to the outcome of a mainder of the 1990s and beyond. For over conflict. To better appreciate what the fu- 30 years, the Air Force has evolved its ture holds for space in the Air Force, one space capabilities to provide national deci- must review how our presence in space sion makers and operational commanders evolved to this point. SPACE 15 Evolution fense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) became operational in the With the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, mid-1960s. A host of military and civil the United States—particularly the US Air communications satellites were de- Force—was galvanized into action to meet veloped, especially on the civilian side, the threat posed by the potential Soviet spawning an enormously profitable indus- domination of space. Because the new me- try within the United States—one which dium had uncertain operational applica- still leads the world. tions, the research and development (R&D) Early space pioneers such as Gen community took the lead in acquiring and Bernard A. Schriever built systems which operating our space programs. Our launch pushed the technology barriers. To keep vehicles were, by necessity, converted in- abreast of the rapidly expanding technol- tercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ogy base, scientists incorporated the latest and a wide range of space-based ca- in the state of the art in each new satellite, pabilities were developed. Satellite sys- making each one slightly different from its tems pushed the state of the art and were predecessor. A number of experiments understandably technology-driven. also grew into major satellite programs. In- The early satellites focused on meeting stitutionally, the Air Force space com- strategic missions. For example, a missile munity during this time was essentially warning system known as the missile de- guided by Air Force civilian leadership. fense alarm system (MIDAS)—the forerun- The nature of the Air Force space busi- ner of our currently deployed Defense ness began to change in the mid- to late Support Program—became one of the first 1970s due to a variety of factors. One of "operational” Air Force satellites in the the most important was that US military early 1960s. To provide detailed mete- forces were gradually becoming more orological data to strategic users, the De- dependent upon space systems as applications were developed from new or evolving satellites. More and more communications traffic was being moved from terrestrial systems to satellites such as the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). The Vietnam War proved the utility of DMSP weather satellites, and the early-morning aircraft weather scout became a thing of the past. Visionaries were already looking to a time when satellite- 16 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

Soviet military space systems were not as sophisticated, technically capable, or as long-lived; nevertheless, the Soviets were beginning to integrate them into their overall force posture.

Air Force Space Command These factors led the Air Force to begin studying ways to improve its organizational structure for prosecuting space operations. A series of studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to the conclusion that the time had come for a more comprehensive and operational focus on Air Force space programs. This decision was based upon the belief that an operational space command was required for the Air Force to expand its potential in space. Thus, Air Force Space Command was established in the fall of 1982. A year later. Naval Space based navigation using the global position- Command was created, followed in 1985 ing system (GPS) would revolutionize nav- by United States Space Command and in igation and weapons delivery. Finally, the 1988 by Army Space Command. These or- tactical utility of data from space programs ganizations now serve both as the advo- began to be explored. cates for space systems within their re- With the expansion of space missions spective services and as the operators of came corresponding increases in the size these systems, once they are developed of the Air Force space budget. Space- and deployed. related funding climbed from 2 percent of In the course of its relatively brief exis- the total Air Force budget in the 1960s to tence. Air Force Space Command has grad- 6-7 percent in the 1980s. Another impor- ually grown in responsibility and re- tant and related figure is that the Air Force sources. At the outset, its mission was was spending about 75-80 percent of the confined to operating missile-warning sat- Department of Defense’s (DOD) space ellites and sensors, and conducting space- budget and also possessed about 85 per- surveillance activities. In 1985 it assumed cent of the space manpower in DOD. Air satellite command-and-control respon- Force leadership naturally began to pay sibilities. In 1990 the space-launch func- more attention to a $6-bi 11 ion space tion, as well as the responsibility for asso- budget. ciated launch facilities and down-range The space threat posed by the USSR was tracking sites, was transferred to Air Force also expanding. The Soviets fielded the Space Command from Air Force Systems world’s only operational antisatellite Command. (ASAT) system and a full complement of Air Force Space Command and the reconnaissance and communications satel- space mission also received significant im- lites. Further, the Soviet Union—year in petus with the enunciation of Air Force and year out—demonstrated an extraor- space policy by Secretary of the Air Force dinarily robust space-launch capability, Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., and Air Force including the ability to launch satellites Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch in De- rapidly. Compared to Air Force systems, cember 1988. Two key tenets of the policy SPACE 17

were that (1) the future of the Air Force is Indeed, as Gen George L. Butler, com- inextricably tied to space and (2) space mander in chief of Strategic Air Command, power will be as decisive in future combat suggested in a recent speech on the chang- as air power is today.1 ing geopolitical environment, multipolar Another key tenet of the space policy relations and emerging nation-states that was that the Air Force made a solid corpo- are asserting their independence from the rate commitment to integrate space boundaries of World War II may well lead throughout the Air Force. This direction to increased factionalism and a higher po- resulted in a number of initiatives: incor- tential for low-intensity conflict.2 This is porating space into Air Force doctrine; already occurring in Iraq, in the Baltic establishing personnel policies to stimu- states’ press for independence, and in the late the cross flow of space-trained people secession movements within Yugoslavia. between Air Force Space Command and Though the imminent threat of global nu- other combatant commands; and expand- clear war has diminished, the geopolitical ing space education in the Air Force pro- transformations in the Soviet Union and fessional military education curriculum. Eastern Europe do not necessarily promise This policy and the commitment inherent a reduction in the conventional threat to in these statements have far-reaching US interests throughout the world. The implications. 1990s are likely to be characterized by the military growth of nonaligned countries— the military multipolarity which Dr Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., has described so well.3 A Changing Environment The decade will also likely be characterized by continued economic dislocation As we look to the challenges of the and regional political instability. 1990s and beyond, the essential ingre- dients that lead to an expanded role for What this means for the Air Force was space are coming together. The Air Force captured by Secretary of the Air Force has clearly stated an aggressive space pol- Donald B. Rice in his white paper The Air icy to guide its actions; technology has ma- Force and U.S. National Security: Global tured to the point that the tactical benefits Reach—Global Power. In this paper, the of space systems can be readily available secretary stressed the strengths of the Air to our combat forces; and we have in place Force—its inherent characteristics of the organizational structure—a rapidly ma- speed, range, flexibility, precision, and turing operational command for space (Air lethality—to meet national objectives. One Force Space Command)—to provide the of his stated objectives for the Air Force is stimulus and advocacy for new space to support US defense strategy by controll- applications. ing the high ground through space, as well The environment in which space sys- as command, control, and communica- tems will be employed has changed dra- tions systems.4 The secretary’s vision that matically over the past few years. Today space is the ultimate high ground certainly and for the foreseeable future, the Air underscores that it will undoubtedly play Force faces significant reductions in its a more prominent role in the future of the budget and force structure. These reduc- Air Force and in our national security tions result primarily from two factors: (1) strategy. domestic budget imperatives, as the nation As the Air Force gradually contracts and tries to bring the deficit under control, and reduces its presence in Europe and in the (2) the startling political and social trans- Pacific, it will also draw down the formations in both the Soviet Union and forward-deployed, terrestrial support sys- Eastern Europe. The latter also implies a tems which it has counted on over the reduced strategic and conventional threat years. Many communications sites, naviga- from traditional adversaries. tional aids, weather stations, and collec- 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

tion activities will be disbanded. Inevita- employment of space capabilities. For ex- bly, as the United States projects forces to ample, Gen Carl Steiner—joint task force future trouble spots, many of these essen- commander in Panama—was very familiar tial support functions will be replaced by with the tactical utility of space, having space systems. spent time with XVIII Airborne Corps at Many people speak of air power projec- Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Consequently, tion and the speed with which air power when reviewing the lessons of the brief responded to the events in Southwest conflict in Panama, General Steiner stated Asia. Space power plays an important that “‘space doesn’t just help.... I cannot power-projection role as well: at the in- go to war without space systems’.”6 stant that Iraq invaded Kuwait, space sys- Despite some of their shortcomings, the tems were the first forces on the scene. operations in Grenada, Libya, and Panama This fact is very significant when one con- were key milestones for space operations siders that the next conflict may be a and contributed to our knowledge of the come-as-you-are war. Air Force communi- employment of space capabilities. The real cations satellites will provide secure, reli- test, however, was Operation Desert Storm. able command and control of our forces Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. anywhere on the globe. Space-based navi- McPeak has described Desert Storm as gation will be readily available to provide “the first space war.”7 This war was a wa- unprecedented accuracy worldwide to sol- tershed event in military space applica- diers, sailors, and airmen. In addition to tions because for the first time, space sys- providing high-resolution global weather tems were both integral to the conduct of data for forecasting and environmental terrestrial conflict and crucial to the out- monitoring, data from weather satellites come of the war. During the five-month will be directly integrated into mission period of Operation Desert Shield, while planning and the selection and allocation the terrestrial logistic tail was being of weapon systems. established to support the coming Desert Space will be the primary source of Storm operation, the space infrastructure warning of impending attack and will was also being created in-theater. A robust characterize that attack. Highly capable mix of user sets, mobile terminals, and satellites will also continue to monitor portable receivers for receiving and dis- arms control agreements and to assess the seminating space-based surveillance, world situation to avoid surprises. In Sec- weather, communications, and naviga- retary Rice’s words, “Collectively, these tional data was deployed. Other major capabilities add up to global knowledge commands also began considering space and situational awareness.”5 The accuracy solutions to improve their mission effective- of his comments about space would be ness. Once hostilities began, space systems graphically illustrated a few months later were ready and made vital contributions. in Operation Pesert Storm.

Combat Operations Desert Storm Although space systems were used in The global positioning system came of operations Urgent Fury (Grenada), El Dor- age in the desert of the Arabian Peninsula. ado Canyon (Libya), and Just Cause (Pan- The setting—miles and miles of sand ama), the employment was incomplete and dunes with few distinguishable land- often ad hoc. That is, only a subset of the marks—was perfect. GPS provided real- full range of space systems was used. time, passive navigation updates to vir- Moreover, the individual commander’s tually every weapon system in-theater. knowledge of space often determined the Planes, helicopters, tanks, ships, cruise SPA CE 19

missiles—even trucks used to deliver food marked that “satellites were the single to the front—relied on GPS receivers to most important factor that enabled us to precisely establish their position, speed, build the command, control, and com- and altitude (for aircraft). munications network for Desert Shield.”9 During the early days of our buildup in The key point is that space systems for the Saudi Arabia, only a few hundred GPS re- first time were the primary means for 85 ceivers were in-theater. The demand— percent of intratheater as well as interthea- particularly by the US Army—outstripped ter communications. normal production and even resulted in As for weather information, DMSP pro- soldiers writing contractors directly for the vided an unprecedented volume of mete- small GPS lightweight receiver. The indus- orological data to our forces. DMSP trans- trial base turned to, and by war’s end portable vans distributed weather data 4.500 receivers were in use. That scenario directly to the Air Force component com- has to be the ultimate in operational pull. mand, to aircraft carriers, and to Marine Air Force special operations forces em- aviation units. Because our DMSP vans are ployed GPS in all their aircraft to ensure large, they are airlift-intensive. Therefore, the silent and very accurate navigation late in the war we introduced two pro- that is so essential to their survival. Spe- totype portable satellite-receive terminals cial Pave Low helicopters used GPS re- that were small enough to be carried in the ceivers to fly nap-of-the-earth missions back of the Army’s high-mobility multi- both day and night with equal confidence. purpose wheeled vehicle. GPS provided Air Force F-16s passive nav- Coalition air forces routinely planned igation to the initial point on their bomb and flew aircraft sorties based upon runs. British Puma helicopters were outfit- satellite-derived weather information. In- ted with GPS. and, according to Squadron deed, the selection of weapons was based Leader Alexander Smyth, commander of upon the weather conditions over the tar- the 33d Air Rescue Squadron, “[GPS is] es- get. Accurate weather forecasting was crit- sential now, especially for night flying in ical in deciding whether to employ preci- the desert. I am sure with GPS we will lose sion guided munitions, because target fewer helicopters.’’8 In all cases, the sys- visibility was essential for laser designa- tem performed magnificently—well be- tion. Further, by doing channel com- yond expectations. parison of DMSP's microwave imagery, Communications capacity and channel analysts were able to determine the mois- availability have historically been short- ture content of soil and thus identify falls in conflict. The need to communicate routes which would support the weight of easily and securely is critical to prosecut- armored forces that would conduct Gen ing military operations. As demand grew Norman Schwarzkopf’s brilliant “ left during Desert Storm, we moved a DSCS hook” into Iraq in late February 1991. satellite from Pacific Ocean coverage to In- dian Ocean coverage to augment our communications capacity. This was the first time a DOD satellite had been repositioned to support US combat operations, illustrating the inherent flexibility of our sophisticated geosynchronous satellites. With three DSCS satellites, we were able to allocate sufficient channels and band- width to support 128 tactical terminals for the duration of the conflict. This network was so effective that Gen Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re- 20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

In addition, space-based, multispectral by contractors. Last, although the Air imagery (MSI) products provided by land Force demonstrated the flexibility of space satellite (LANDSAT) proved useful to all systems by repositioning a satellite to sup- the military services. This imagery was port the communications demands of the used to identify beach landing zones in Southwest Asia conflict, this feat neverthe- coastal areas, to update maps, and to pre- less highlighted our need to be able to pare route plans and weapons-delivery more rapidly augment our on-orbit plans. All phases of the preparation and capabilities. execution of air, land, and sea attack were carried out more effectively due to the availability and accuracy of this multispectral environmental data. The importance of Operation Desert The Future Storm as a catalyst for accelerating the fu- What can we anticipate for the Air Force ture development of tactical space applica- in terms of its role in space in the 1990s tions cannot be overstated. However, this and beyond? First and foremost, there is conflict also underscored certain short- no question that the flying commands of comings in our use of space. Operational the Air Force will become much more planning for the use of space systems was deeply committed to integrating space sys- not well developed when Iraq invaded tems into their force structure and opera- Kuwait in August 1990. Military planners tional planning. took advantage of the five months preced- ing Desert Storm to get ground- and space- based assets into the theater and to school the users in how to better employ space Global Positioning System products. In addition, because some of the We can anticipate that the demand for GPS equipment used to receive signals was not receivers will increase dramatically. The standardized and not supportable by blue Air Force has a long-range plan to install suiters, it ultimately had to be maintained GPS capabilities into the cockpits of our first-line aircraft. Due to budget considerations, the integration plan will proceed very gradually. But the performance of GPS during Desert Storm may accelerate that process. As Air Force pilots become more familiar and comfortable with GPS, they will discover new and unanticipated applications to enhance combat capabilities. The important fact is that the user—the crew member—rather than the engineer or space operator, will develop these new applications. GPS will ultimately be like air-conditioning—people will wonder how they did without it. Launch The Air Force must improve its launch capacity if it wishes to maintain control of the space theater. Derived from ICBM systems, our current launch vehicles and the associated processes do not provide the re- SPACE 21

sponsiveness needed to replace or aug- Multispectral Imagery ment on-orbit assets. The military utility of multispectral imag- Our space launchers have served us ery was also shown in Southwest Asia. well, but the space community is launch- MSI was the only source of wide-area ing the equivalent of the F-4 series fighter coverage available, and it played an impor- into space. Space launchers need the same tant role in trafficability and terrain analy- relative modernization that our modern- ses, as well as invasion planning. LAND- day fighters have had. The Air Force and SAT provided the majority of this data. the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- ministration are currently cooperating on a national launch system to meet a variety of Composite Wing civil, commercial, and military launch requirements. The military requirements for Organizationally, the Air Force is taking this system are affordability, responsive- direct steps to integrate and operationalize ness, flexibility, and maintainability. This space. It may be able to go further by system will mark the transition from the studying the possibility of establishing 1950s-based space-launch equipage to a wings with the full spectrum of combat more sustainable launch system for the capabilities—deep strike, interdiction, twenty-first century. The United States electronic warfare, and refueling—organic must pursue this course if it is to remain to the unit. If the Air Force moves in that the world’s premier space power and direction, these composite wings must also space-faring nation. include people trained in space operations, as well as the requisite terminal and receive equipment. This would be the ultimate integration of space within the Air Missile Defense Force and would assuredly enhance the utility of space to our combatant units. Desert Storm also gave the concept of strategic defense a substantial shot in the arm. The success of the Patriot missile against Scud missiles should win public approval— Onboard Processing and thus congressional support—for a The Air Force also needs space systems missile-defense system. The Patriot, which designed to provide user-friendly data is basically a 1970s design, has shown that streams. One approach is to employ satel- with today's technology it is possible to lite onboard processing. Satellites on orbit develop a system to counter far more so- collect information, do the requisite data phisticated threats than the relatively processing and reduction on board, and primitive Scud. By the turn of the century, then downlink the final product directly to at least 20 countries will possess the ca- the combatant in the field or in the air. pability to launch ballistic missiles of This capability would have been a power- some type. If numerous countries obtain ful tool in the Scud-hunting operations of sophisticated missile inventories— Desert Storm. Currently, this capability is combined with chemical, biological, or nu- very expensive to incorporate on our satel- clear warheads—the Air Force will have to lites. But great technological strides in mi- respond with more advanced space-based crominiaturization are being made so that warning sensors to track, discriminate, and in the foreseeable future, military space target them. Ultimately, the United States systems will no longer need the terrestrial will rely on space-based interceptors to ground-processing infrastructure associ- negate threatening missiles, and the Air ated with today’s satellites. Force will continue to need a responsive Advancements are also needed in de- surveillance-and-warning capability to veloping techniques and equipment to deal with this multifaceted threat. fuze satellite bit-streams of data together. 22 AIRPOVVER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

In the past, architectures for individual space systems were developed in relative isolation or in a stovepipe fashion. Modern computer advances will enable Air Force planners and operators to receive and cen- trally exploit fuzed bit-streams of weather, warning, navigation, surveillance, and communications.

Antisatellite Systems It is also quite reasonable to expect that as the world evolves into a more multipolar environment, space capabilities will mir- ror that expansion. Simply put, space technology for the range of military functions will become available to many nations. The successful conclusion of hostilities in Southwest Asia necessarily requires a look at what could have changed the Space-Based Weapons tempo of the campaign. The ability of the United States to maintain the initiative One final observation concerns the need to and to sustain surprise by masking its mil- fully explore the concept of space-based itary actions would have been much more force application. This subject has many difficult if Saddam Hussein—or a future political overtones, but the Air Force adversary—had his own space-reconnais- should—consistent with treaty obliga- sance assets. tions—conduct the research and planning This prospect argues for an ASAT sys- necessary to assess the feasibility of such tem to assure that, just as US forces systems and the national security achieved control of the air and the bat- implications. tlefield, we can control space as well (i.e., achieve space superiority). Such a pro- posal speaks to the idea of an indivisible Conclusion regime between air and space that Gen Thomas D. White, former Air Force chief Looking ahead a few years, one can of staff, captured over 30 years ago in coin- speculate that advocates of both air power ing the term aerospace.10 Dr Pfaltzgraff and and space power will likely be talking Dr Edward N. Luttwak also refer to this as about similar issues. It is equally reason- a "seamless” regime between air power able to expect the leadership from Air and space power projection.11 Just as it Combat Command, Air Mobility Com- would be unthinkable in a future conflict mand, Air Force Special Operations Com- to permit an adversary to use an aircraft to mand, and other commands to espouse the reconnoiter our battle lines for intelligence value of space-based sensors that provide and targeting, so is it equally unacceptable real-time communications, weather, navi- to allow enemy reconnaissance satellites gation. early-warning, and surveillance in- free and unhindered flight over US mili- puts directly into both the aircraft and tary positions. An operational ASAT ca- their weapons loads. They would also be pability designed to eliminate an adver- relying on satellites that designate targets, sary’s space capabilities must be silently guide aircraft toward the objective, considered an integral part of this coun- and identify enemy defenses as part of try’s force structure. mission execution. SPACE 23

Finally, the commander of Air Force first century by fulfilling the 1988 space pol- Space Command may well address the ad- icy tenet to ensure “the evolution of space vances in defensive and offensive space- power from combat support to the full spec- based force-application systems. The Air trum of military capabilities.”12 □ Force is fully committed to meet the twenty-

Notes 1. Memorandum. Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. Al- 1992/93 (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. dridge. Jr., and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch, 1991). 25. to all Air Force major commands and special operating agen- 7. Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, briefing. cies. subject: Air Force Space Policy. 2 December 1988. National War College, subject: Desert Shield/Desert Storm. 6 2. Gen George L. Butler, commander in chief. Strategic Air March 1991. Command, speech to the Center for Defense journalism. Na- 8. Capt Mark Brown, “British Totally Sold on GPS." Space tional Press Club. Washington. D.C.. 29 September 1990. Trace: The Air Force Space Command Magazine. April 1991. 3. Dr Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Jr.. "The United States as an 7. Aerospace Power in the Emerging Security Environment." in 9. Gen Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Staff, speech to the Armed Forces Communications ed Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Max- Electronics Association, Washington, D.C., December 1990. well AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, forthcoming). 10. House, Testimony of General Thomas D. White before 4. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice. The Air Force the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, 86th and L'.S. Motional Security: Global Beach—Global Power Cong.. 1st sess., February 1959. (Washington. D.C.: Department of the Air Force. June 1990). 11. Pfaltzgraff; and Dr Edward N. Luttwak, "Air Power in 12. US Military Strategy." in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz 5. Ibid. (forthcoming). 6. Quoted in The United States Air Force Report to the 12. Memorandum, Aldridge and Welch. 102nd Congress of the United States of America, Fiscal Year ELDOM in military history has~ there occurred a series of events as THE PROBLEM momentous as those of the few' months between November 1990 andS March 1991. The Warsaw Pact threat WITH OUR that had been in some ways so comfort-' able, so stable, and so predictable for the' AIR POWER past 45 years has now dissolved. Yet the' unexpected rise of the Saddam Hussein- menace demonstrates that the world is still. DOCTRINE a dangerous place. The threats to our national interests have transformed; they- have not disappeared. As the world Lt Col Phillip S. Meil in ger , USAF changes, the Air Force must change with it. Unfortunately, it is ill-prepared to move into the new world; in fact, the Air Force- was becoming increasingly unable to deal effectively with the old world. Since the end of the Vietnam War, our service has been uncertain of its overall purpose and unsure of the fundamental principles underlying air power. Gen Michael Dugan,

& 5 rt AIR POWER DOCTRINE 25 former Air Force chief of staff, reportedly nificantly reoriented its strategy, doctrine, said in exasperation a few years ago, and technology. Also of fundamental importance, the leadership of the USAF Ask a sailor about sea power, and he’ll give changed hands as tactical airmen took you a speech on the maritime strategy. Ask a over. This process was solidified when soldier about ground power, and he'll tell Gen Charles Gabriel became chief of staff you about AirLand Battle. But ask an airman in 1982—the first fighter pilot to hold that about air power, and he'll tell you what time happy hour starts at the club. position in three decades. Since then, not only has every chief been a fighter pilot, This has not always been the case. I but two have even held the position of have no doubt that if someone had asked commander in chief, ^Strategic Air Com- the average Air Force officer in 1960 about mand (C1NCSACJ. Indeed, Gen George the purpose of air power, he or she would Butler, current CINCSAC, is the first readily have been able to explain its im- bomber pilot to head the command in six portance to national security. What has years. Today, tactical airmen hold all of gone wrong? Why are we now so unable to the following positions: chief and vice- articulate the most basic beliefs concern- chief of staff; the commanders of Tactical ing our profession—how air power should Air Command (TACpAir Training Com- be employed in war? mand, Air Force Systems Command, Unit- Although the roots of the problem are ed States Air Forces in Europe, Pacific Air decades deep, the catalyst that brought Forces, Air University, US Air Force Acad- matters to a head was the Vietnam War. emy, Air National Guard, and Air Force All the services had fought hard but were- Reserve; as well as the key staff positions troubled by some aspects of their perfor- of operations and plans, logistics, acquisi- mance. The responses of the various ser-' tion, personnel, legislative liaison, and in- vices, however, were dissimilar. The Viet- spector general. This shift in personnel has nam War caused deep soul-searching changed the entire culture of the Air Force within the Army, both in public and pri- over the past decade. vate. Books by Richard Gabriel and Paul Since the mid-1930s, bombardment ad- Savage; Gen Douglas Kinnard; the vocates had dominated American air pseudonymous "Cincinnatus”; and others power. The great commanders of the Sec- were visible expressions of the unease that ond World War who later went on to run permeated the ArmyJP All of them stressed the new Air Force were ideological de- how unprepared the Army had been, both scendants of Gen William (“ Billy”) structurally and psychologically, for un- Mitchell. These included Gens Henry conventional war. As a result, the Army (“Hap”) Arnold, Carl (“Tooey”) Spaatz, made great changes but, somewhat sur- George Kenney, Nathan Twining, Lauris prisingly, maintained its strategic focus on Norstad, Curtis LeMay, and others.- These a Fulda Gap scenario that emphasized men and their ideas regarding the primacy heavy divisions and maneuver warfare.- of strategic bombing rose to power for The Navy and Marines endured less tur- three main reasons: (1) the trench carnage moil during the wai and therefore engaged of World War I that killed millions of peo- in little public or private introspection ple had a profound impact on soldier, ci- afterwards. In reviewing their role in na- vilian, and airman. They sought to avoid tional security, they elected to organize such slaughter, and strategic air power of- and equip themselves as they had prior to fered hope; (2) technological development Vietnam; hence, the Navy’s focus re- in the interwar years—the era of the Great mained on the carrier battle group and the Depression—favored safe, reliable, Marines' on amphibious assaults. In other economical, and long-range aircraft like words, the Army, Navy, and Marines re- the airliner and its military counterpart, acted to the war as if it were an aberration. the bomber. This development nudged avi- The Air Force, on the other hand, sig- ation technology—and, therefore, air 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 power doctrine—in a specific direction; (3) see itself as isolated, ignored, and inferior. the final reason for the emphasis on bom- Most high command and staff positions bardment was pragmatic: airmen wanted were reserved for officers who had been independence from the Army. In order for “SACumcized.” Furthermore, SAC’s "spot them to justify that status, air power had to promotion” system, which immediately perform an independent mission—some- jumped crew members one grade when thing not tied to the direct support of sur- they were selected to serve on lead bomber face forces. Strategic air power, because of crews, caused widespread resentment.4 its ability to strike directly at a nation’s SAC saw itself as a worldwide, all- centers of gravity, performed that mission. weather, day-and-night, war-fighting To a great extent, the awesome power of organization—the tip of America’s nuclear the strategic air forces—especially re- spear—while the rest of the Air Force was flected in the two atomic strikes against merely “in training status.” Japan—contributed significantly to the Change began in the late 1950s when re- surrender of the Axis and ensured that an tired Army general Maxwell D. Taylor independent Air Force would become a re- challenged the logic behind massive reality. The main combat component of the taliation, calling instead for a more “flex- new Air Force was Strategic Air ible response” to deal with “small” wars.5 Command. General LeMay, Air Force chief of staff, On the other hand, the tactical air force shrugged off such criticisms with the re- fell on hard times even though it had sponse, “ ‘If you have the power to stop a played a crucial role during the war. The big war, certainly the same power ought to American people had endured 15 years of be capable of stopping a small war’.”6 Tay- the Depression, followed by a world war, lor’s thoughts appealed to the new Ken- and were weary of belt-tightening. Large nedy administration, however, and he was defense expenditures were unacceptable, recalled to active duty as chairman of the and budget cutting was the order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From that position, he day. Because TAC seemed less relevant in worked to reorient American defense pol- an era of atomic weapons, it suffered the icy. Simultaneously, the US stumbled brunt of the cuts.3 There was a brief re- more and more deeply into the Southeast surgence of interest in tactical air during Asia imbroglio. the Korean War, but the budget axe fell The US military, including the Air again after the armistice in 1953. Force, was trained and equipped to fight a Under President Dwight Eisenhower, nuclear war with the Warsaw Pact, not a “massive retaliation”—to be carried out by limited war in Vietnam. A strategic air SAC—became the national military strat- campaign—the main tenet of US military egy. During the two decades of SAC domi- doctrine—was not launched against North nation. the rest of the Air Force came to Vietnam and could not be launched ^ 0C\ against the Vietcong.7 At the same time, however, tactical airmen who had devoted much of their training to nuclear delivery over the previous decade found themselves having to relearn the tactics of interdiction and close air support. In the after-

For many years. Air Force leadership was dominated by ad\’Ocales of strategic bombing, such as then-Maj Gen Curtis LeMay (center, with Brig Gen William F. McKee, left, and Maj Gen Earle E. Partridge). The tactical air force experienced most of the budget cuts in the 1950s. an era noted for a strategy of massive retaliation with atomic weapons. AIR POWER DOCTRINE 27

math of the war. the USAF—like Congress the defense of alliance territory. The objec- and the American people—was disillu- tive of NATO war plans was to deter war, sioned by the seeming inability of strategic but if deterrence failed, to tgpel an invader air power to produce a victory. Many felt and maintain alliance boundaries. For air that tactical air power had borne the brunt power, this meant establishing air superi- of the air war. Moreover, low-intensity ority throughout the alliance area and in- conflict seemed ever more likely in the fu- terdicting the follow-on echelons of invad- ture, and SAC seemed irrelevant in a ing forces. There were no plans for allied counterinsurgency. air power in Europe to conduct strategic, As a consequence of these currents, tac- conventional strikes deep in enemy terri- tical airmen slowly began to dominate the tory. In short, for 40 years the NATO polit- top positions within the Air Force. In ical decision to appear nonaggressive dic- many cases, however, these airmen had tated a military strategy that emphasized not developed an appreciation for air defense, not offense, and envisioned air power’s full potential across the spectrum power in a purely tactical and reactive of conflict. Several reasons accounted for role. Since our forces in Europe con- this deficiency: First, technology limited stituted the largest bloc of air assets out- not only the range and capability of fighter side the US, this policy inhibited broad aircraft—even when armed with nuclear strategic thinking throughout the Air weapons—but was so complex that just Force. Thus, air commanders of our largest learning to fly single-seat, supersonic air- combatant command have been virtually craft equipped with various onboard com- prohibited from planning strategic air puters, communications, and delivery sys- operations. tems was a full-time job for any pilot. One must note that SAC had also devel- Becoming proficient in an F-15 or F-16 oped a flawed view of air power over the could easily dominate an aviator’s life, and years. Although it saw a different facet little time remained to consider anything than did TAC. the overall picture was sim- other than the tactical aspects of air war. ilarly incomplete. SAC saw strategic nu- (In addition, of course, “flying is so much clear operations and little else. In time, the sheer fun that no normal fighter pilot command became so absorbed with deter- would want to consider something more rence instead of war fighting that it lost abstract.’P) track of how to employ and exploit strate- Second. Congress and the Department of gic air power in nonnuclear operations. In Defense had agreed over the years that a sense, nuclear weapons retarded the mat- strategic air power was an economical uration process because merely selecting method of assuring deterrence and de- targets and scheduling warheads became fense, so they had not encouraged the de- so easy to do. SAC seemed unable to dis- velopment of tactical air power. Third, and cuss air war except in terms of a largely perhaps most importantly, TAC had been hypothetical and increasingly unlikely nu- so busy fighting for its institutional life clear exchange.10 At the same time, SAC from 1945 to 1975 that its leaders did not became equated in the eyes of the public always have the inclination or incentive to with environmentally suspect nuclear understand air power in its broadest sense. power. Dr Strangelove, “carpet bombing.’’ These factors conspired to produce a nar- and immorality. All of these factors put row focus exemplified by a TAC com- SAC on the defensive in attempts to de- mander who stated that ‘“ the missions of fend its mission and articulate its needs. the tactical air forces are the strategic air It is no surprise, therefore, that SAC had defense of the United States and support difficulty projecting a mission for the B-2 of the army. It’s as simple as that’.“a in the face of a declining Soviet threat. Al- This problem of insufficient attention to though the stealth bomber has always been conventional strategic operations was ex- billed as an effective aircraft across the acerbated by a NATO strategy that stressed spectrum of conflict, the emphasis was on 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 its utility as a nuclear deterrent and as a hunter of mobile nuclear missiles.11 It was Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice who initially pushed hard for the B-2’s conventional role, and Operation Desert Storm convincingly demonstrated the requirement for a stealth bomber with a conventional capability.1'2 Let me n ow s u m - marize what I see as the problem. In 1951 Gen Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force . chief of staff, preached the “indivisibility” of air power. The terms strategic and tactical were anathema to him because they tended to split air power into artificial camps identified by aircraft nomenclature; weapons type; or weight of ordnance, range, and the number of crew members.13 Vandenberg knew, however, that the true issue was the nature of the target—not the aircraft. There were strategic targets and there were tactical targets, but one should use the most appropriate aircraft for the - specific objective, regardless of its nomen- . clature. Airmen learned this concept of indivisible air power through long and painful experience in World War II, but over the next two decades those lessons and ex- By the 1960s, the Air Force was better equipped for nuclear periences faded. The bomber and fighter, war instead of the low-intensity conflict being fought in camps increasingly polarized. When the/ Vietnam. Many tactical airmen who were trained in nuclear crisis of Vietnam struck, a divided Air delivery had to relearn the tactics of air interdiction and Force had no intellectual foundations to close air support. Here, F-4 crew members climb aboard fall back on, so it stumbled towards Army their jet at Cam Ranh Bay Air Base. South Vietnam, in 1968. doctrines that eventually culminated in AirLand Battle and deep operations that make that conflict a poor model for the fu- viewed air power in a supporting—not ture. One retired Air Force chief of staff complementary—role. Air leaders allowed stated that ‘“ [air power) continues to pre- their limited experience to become their pare the ground for land warfare— I do even more Limited theory. As a result, we not believe it can win any land battles now have airmen who believe that the pri- alone’.”14 Unique though the specifics of mary mission of the Air Force is to support the Gulf war may be, airmen had been pre- the land battle. dicting the general results since 1920. Air One would think that the Gulf war, the power had always promised decisive re- most decisive air war in history, would sults, and although it had indeed delivered sweep away the doubts and uncertainties on those promises over Germany. Japan, regarding the potentialities of air power. the Sinai in 1967, and North Vietnam in Unfortunately, that may not be the case. 1972, many people insisted on muting or Some leading airmen are still reluctant to diluting those lessons. Even our over- draw lessons regarding the role of air whelming victory in the Gulf air war power in future wars. Instead, they are seems not to have removed all of these quick to downplay the decisiveness of air doubts. power in the Gulf war and point out the The Air Force is ideologically adrift, en- unique circumstances that supposedly cumbered with a doctrinal gap that dis- AIR POWER DOCTRINE 29 torts both its self-image and the image it presents to others. On the one hand, SAC has developed a highly complex nuclear deterrent and nuclear war-fighting strategy; on the other hand, the tactical air force has honed its abilities to complement the ground forces to a fine pitch. The gap lies between these two extremes. The concept of conventional strategic air power— together with its ability to be decisive at the operational and strategic levels of war—has been forgotten. Indivisible air power has been utterly divided—organizationally, bureaucratically, and doc- trinally. We have misplaced our concepts of conventional strategic operations. The rapidly evolving world now confronting us requires that we find those concepts again—quickly. Air War College students listen to a lecture in 1973. a time All is not gloom. The new commanders when the Air Force risked learning the wrong lessons from of SAC and TAC have already stated their the Vietnam experience. The concept of "indivisible air intention of examining their commands’ power" faded in the two decades following World War II to doctrine and force structure. The current the point that the sen’ice. so long divided into fighter and targeting review at SAC appears to be the bomber camps, had no solid intellectual base to fall back on first step in revising the nuclear war plan during the Vietnam era. and ending the mechanistic cycle of scheduling more targets in the single integrated operational plan (SIOP) merely be- can paralyze and immobilize a modern, in- cause more warheads are available. At the dustrialized nation. Saddam Hussein was same time, conventional operations are re- virtually cut off from his people and mili- ceiving greater emphasis.15 Similarly, TAC tary forces, often resorting to the centuries- is working closely with the Army to re- old method of using couriers to pass in- write the increasingly obsolete AirLand structions. Iraqi communications, trans- Battle doctrine to reflect the realities of portation, and the electrical power grid Desert Storm, which saw ground forces were rendered inoperative. The military supporting the dominant air effort. Of re- infrastructure of Iraq was similarly devas- lated interest, the Air Force will soon tated, as was its capability to produce establish composite air wings composed of weapons of mass destruction. several different aircraft types, similaFlo Most impressively, the coalition con- those in Proven Force, the joint task force ducted this strategic air campaign at the that operated from Turkey during the Gulf same time its operational-level air cam- war. These new organizations should help paign was destroying the Iraqi army. After reduce the distinction between “fighter six weeks the Iraqi military infrastructure wings’’ and “bomber wings.” Of far greater was a shambles, and Saddam’s military import for the future, however, are the forces were broken, wanting only to sur- lessons of the Gulf war. render. Air power achieved the main polit- Air power’s greatest asset has always ical goals of the coalition and produced been its flexibility: the range, speed, preci- one of the most lopsided victories in histo- sion, and punch of aircraft make them ide- ry. At a cost of fewer than 200 coalition al weapons for waging war at the opera- lives, nearly 100,000 Iraqi troops were tional and strategic levels. Desert Storm killed or captured, while at the same time demonstrated how a strategic air campaign the number of civilian casualties as well as 30 AIRPOYVER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

With the creation of composite wings, consisting of a variety of aircraft, the distinction between "fighter wings" and "bomber wings" will diminish. Here. RF-4s of the 7440th Composite Wing. Incirlik Air Base. Turkey, prepare for a mission during the Gulf war. the amount of collateral damage was replace a premium on the ability to project markably small.16 We must not underesti- power—precisely and over great distances. mate or overlook the ability of air power to Although air power seems the logical tool achieve such results in the future as well. for this strategic mission, the Air Force as In the years ahead, the US will no doubt an institution has been curiously reluctant continue to need the military weapon, but to embrace it.17 We must overcome that the American people—always impatient hesitation, and the time is propitious. For- with long wars and heavy casualties—will tunately, the train that left the station insist on- short, surgical, and near- without us several years ago while we bloodless operations. The success of Oper- were looking the other way has now mo- ation Desert Storm will heighten these im- mentarily stopped. It’s time to climb back peratives, and—coupled with a decline in on board. □ the number of our overseas bases—we will c\ tty Notes

1. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage. Crisis in Com- though a bomber advocate during and after the war, he had mand: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill and started his career as a fighter pilot and in Europe commanded Wang. 1978); Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover. the Ninth Air Force, the largest tactical air unit in history. N.H.: University Press of New England, 1977); and "Cincin- 3. TAC actually disappeared for two years as a separate natus." Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the command. For budgetary reasons, it was combined with Air United States Army during the Vietnam Era (New York: W. Defense Command in 1948 to form Continental Air Com- W. Norton and Co., 1981). mand. TAC reemerged in 1950 as a result of the Korean War. 2. A possible exception was Gen Hoyt Vandenberg. Al- 4. The dominance of SAC in the early 1960s was even AIR POWER DOCTRINE 31

more pervasive than that of TAC today. Virtually every key its nuclear mission. Long Island Newsday, 22 October 1989, Air Staff and major command position—including the com- 11- 2 . mand of TAC—was held by bomber pilots r 12. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice. The Case for 5. Gen Maxwell D. Taylor. The Uncertain Trumpet (New the B-2: An Air Force Perspective (Washington. D.C.: Depart- York: Harper & Brothers, 1959). ment of the Air Force. June 1990). 5. Quoted in Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas, Concepts. Doc- 13. Maj Grover E. Myers. Aerospace Power: The Case for trine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 2. Indivisible Application (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University 1961-1984 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, De- Press. September 1986), 9-15. cember 1989), 85. 14. Quoted in Barbara Opall. "Desert Storm Lifts U.S. Air 7. One could argue endlessly over the role and impact of Power Role." Defense News. 15 April 1991, 38. Similarly, an air power in the Vietnam War. Most airmen maintain that air commander in Desert Storm commented, "'People should Rolling Thunder was not strategic bombing at all. merely a not read this as the dawn of a new era of warfare'." David A. halfhearted interdiction campaign. The ''94-target plan” ad- Fulghum, "Desert Storm Highlights Need for Rapid Tactical vanced by airmen in 1964—a true strategic air campaign— Intelligence." Aviation Week

Maj Chris J. Krisinger, USAF*

HILE meeting informally with proval of plans that had been under con- Air Force students attending sideration for some time. the US Naval War College in Composite wings—units combining the early March 1991, Gen Merrill various aircraft necessary to form complete WA. McPeak, the Air Force chief of staff, dis- mission packages—stand to be a major closed that the Air Force would soon orga- change to the present USAF force struc- nize new “composite wings.”1 He went on ture. Their advent also represents a doctri- to say that several bases had already been nal shift away from today’s monolithic identified as possible sites for the new wings and squadrons of specialized, ho- units. Those remarks were among the first mogeneous aircraft. public acknowledgements of high-level ap-

'In the process of writing this article. I spoke with many of Change Prompts Search the Navy carrier aviators who attended the US Naval War College with me- I want to thank the pilots, flight officers, for Alternatives maintenance officers, and air "bosses" who gave me a much appreciated insight into how an aircraft carrier and its air The 1992 defense budget marks the true wing operaie. start of massive restructuring of the mili- CARRIER AIR WING FOR THE AF 33

tary that will shrink total US forces by tional and operational alternative for op- one-fourth over the next five years. Staying timizing a combination of factors. Among combat ready while scaling down is argua- the most important are streamlined plan- bly the single greatest challenge for the Air ning, combat punch, and rapid response. Force throughout this time span. In order Before we had a clear idea of the severity to absorb its share of the reductions, the of the cuts to our present and prospective Air Force is examining alternatives to the defensive forces, the composite idea origi- way it is presently equipped and nated with improved combat capability as organized. Possibilities include reducing its sole focus. Nevertheless, the composite personnel, radically realigning and stream- wing could also be one of the solutions to lining organizational units from the wing the challenges of shrinking forces and a to the major command (MAJCOM) level, changing national security environment. and closing numerous overseas and state- Planned composite wings will place at side bases. one base, under one commander, all the The total number of Air Force combat air forces necessary to form complete war- units also will be cut over the next five fighting packages having maximum effi- years. Tactical air forces will shrink from ciency and combat effectiveness. Central approximately 33 wings (24 of which are to their existence will be the union of in the active Air Force) to about 26 (15 ac- groups of different aircraft, each contribut- tive) under the Department of Defense’s ing a specialized capability. Wings styled plans.2 primarily to deliver firepower might mix In order to confront potential threats vet counterair fighters, long-range bombers, remain within the new force-structure shorter-range interdiction aircraft, and limits, the Air Force will require a smaller, close air support aircraft, along with sur- more capable force that emphasizes the veillance and command-and-control (C2) traditional virtues of air power: speed, aircraft. Composite units tailored more for range, power, flexibility, precision, and logistics and combat support would have a economy of force. The cuts may also larger proportion of transports and tankers. prompt a new look for forward-deployed These organizations will also allow crews units, which will continue to play an im- from a wide range of aircraft to train under portant role in exercising the “global a single command. Such integrated train- reach—global power’’ that Secretary of the ing is intended to build unit familiarity, Air Force Donald B. Rice espoused in his cohesion, and esprit de corps that will im- white paper of June 1990.3 prove overall combat effectiveness. In the future, more of the striking power The composite wing concept received a that goes with US commitments to its critical boost during the Persian Gulf war, allies and to collective security arrange- which validated the need for organiza- ments will be based on US soil. Thus, the tional changes to help the Air Force meet Air Force must design and field forces that the strategic challenges of the post-cold have more mobility and flexibility. Fur- war era. The experience of the Gulf war af- ther, aerospace forces will have to bring firmed that air power’s effectiveness will appropriate powrer to bear across the entire be enhanced if aircraft can be deployed in spectrum of conflict and be able to act on integrated units ready for immediate oper- short notice. In brief, the Air Force must ations. During Operation Desert Shield, we explore different organizational and opera- had more than five months to bring to- tional schemes to accommodate this new gether the collective capabilities of the strategic environment. allied air forces and prepare them for the integrated air operations of the war, which Why the Composite Wing? began on 16 January 1991. Time to assem- ble such an ad hoc composite force may Composite wings are both an organiza- not exist in the next contingency. 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 specific carrier air wing, a squadron is also A Moving Picture, joined with other units of like aircraft in Not a Snapshot homogeneous groups known as functional wings. During peacetime, these “funcs” re- The Naval War College was an main ashore at home bases, providing especially appropriate setting for General economies of scale for the logistics and McPeak’s remarks because in his landmark maintenance of similar aircraft and fur- article on the composite wing he wrote, nishing overall standardization and neces- “The best example of a composite wing is sary training systems for both operators provided by the modern aircraft carrier, and maintainers. where the typical deck loading creates a The Navy’s air wings are based and true composite unit with a range of capa- organized this way to deal with the very bilities tailored to the mission.’’4 If the issues that will also affect a new Air Force analogy of the aircraft carrier is to be in- composite wing. In the Navy’s view, func- structive to the Air Force as it forms com- tional wings of like aircraft yield posite wings, then a “moving picture’’ of economies of scale that accrue cost savings the carrier wing is more helpful than a and benefits for a variety of factors: logis- static image or “snapshot.” The popular tics, maintenance, standardization, train- notion of the complete carrier air wing, ing, personnel, and support services. The with its assortment of aircraft on board Air Force may have to further expand its and ready for integrated operations, repre- search for new organizational and opera- sents only one day in the life of the wing. tional ideas that preserve the essence of This single image does not convey the life composite forces, yet reap the substantial of the wing in the days before, during, and benefits of its present homogeneous bas- after deployment. We need some insight ing. Perhaps the diversity of forces neces- into these activities if we are to visualize sary to form a composite wing can be the challenges and realities the Air Force found in units in geographic proximity to will face in organizing and “fighting” a one another. In such a fortunate situation, composite wing. Further, other ideas and these units could retain their present bases issues unique to the Air Force (e.g., doctri- to operate and train more closely and fre- nal, fiscal, and institutional) need discus- quently; share common training areas; and sion, revision, and refinement to prepare ultimately prepare for rapid, integrated the composite wing for active duty. response.

Basing for the Composite Wing Readiness of The ship'itself is the carrier air wing’s the Composite Wing forward operating location for integrated Embarking an entire integrated wing operations. When not embarked for a aboard a carrier is the culmination of a cruise or deployment, aircraft of the same lengthy and extensive cycle of prepara- type are based ashore at various naval air tions known as a workup. The process be- stations. For example, all the F-14 Tomcat gins with individual aircrew training and aircraft and squadrons for all the East competence at home bases, gradually pro- Coast aircraft carriers are based at Oceana gresses to unit proficiency, and finishes Naval Air Station, Virginia. Similarly, the with integrated operations training—both rotary-wing aircraft of the East Coast car- on and off the carrier—for the entire air riers are based with each other; the anti- wing. A wing is not considered ready for submarine aircraft are together; and so integrated air operations until it completes forth throughout the Navy’s carrier air the final phase of its workup. Further, a wings. Although designated as part of a carrier—together with its embarked air CARRIER AIR WING FOR THE AF 35

wing—may not be considered ready for combat operations until it finishes a training exercise with other ships in the battle group to coordinate the inner and outer air battle. Once the high-tempo deployment is complete, the wing enters a stand-down period. At this point, the cycle has come full circle, and the air wing begins the process all over again. Because workup cycles coincide with carrier deployments—which in turn drive personnel turnover—the Navy must monitor the status of the various wings, coordinate their workup cycles, and establish a deployment rotation among the carriers. This scheduling maintains a portion of the carrier force in a combat-ready state while the remainder is in varying stages of repair. preparation, and training. The Air Force will have to consider the implications of such a training cycle for composite wings. Can the service accept the potential degradation of combat readiness resulting from a phased training cycle? Currently, within a narrow margin of capability, the Air Force attempts to /if the Air Force assembles composite wings, it would do continuously maintain all active-duty tac- well to study how the Navy operates its carrier air wings. tical fighter wings in a combat-ready The composite nature of the carrier air wing is evident from status. If a composite wing must go this deck shot of the USS Theodore Roosevcll, CVN-71. and through a preparation cycle to achieve its complement of aircraft. fully integrated operations capability, the Air Force will have to rotate combat-ready forces in general—will greatly benefit from status among the wings to accommodate the advances and experience gained in the the different stages of preparation and Gulf war. The C:,I capability presently readiness. available gives the Air Force and any new composite wing an extraordinary ability to Command, Control, plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute complex air operations against determined Communications, opposition. and Intelligence The most important C3I development during Operation Desert Storm was the in- Success in the recent air campaign tegration of air power under one air com- against Iraq was a result of the synergy be- ponent commander, with one air tasking tween two important factors: unification of order (ATO) and one set of objectives. the command system and technological These simplified lines of command were improvements. Both factors played impor- enhanced by modern equipment and tech- tant roles in developing a system of com- niques, enabling unprecedented ease of mand. control, communications, and intel- communications among Air Force, Army, ligence (CJI) that reached new levels of Navy, Marine Corps, and allied air assets. effectiveness and efficiency during the The system allowed US Central Com- war. Future composite wrings—and air mand’s air component (CENTAF) to ‘“ use 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 a single [ATO] for all services for the first sorted any number of ways’.”8 This tech- time ever’” to provide effective, detailed, nology gave CENTAF unparalleled under- central direction under stressful standing of the entire situation in the air conditions.5 and the ability to adjust air power much These advancements imply that the more quickly to rapidly changing condi- composite force-package “gorilla”6 will tions within the theater. Indeed, if the C3I operate in a much more orderly environ- capability of Desert Storm is continually ment, thus easing the integration of di- improved, made available during training, verse Air Force assets in theater opera- and used in exercises by joint and com- tions. One may also reasonably assume bined aerospace forces, we can expect that the Air Force composite wing will not great improvements in the planning and be the gorilla, but only a major body part. execution cycle of integrated theater air In theater air warfare (as was the case in operations. the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations), the ultimate composite force package will be made up of Air Force, Navy (including ship- and submarine-launched cruise missiles). Marine, Army, and allied Maintainability aerospace forces. A present and future re- and Logistics quirement for the C3I system, therefore, is to communicate with and incorporate all Physical space on the aircraft carrier is a joint and allied air forces in the theater. precious commodity that forces the air The C3I advances displayed during Des- wing to be as lean an organization as pos- ert Storm also provide a way to streamline sible, while retaining maximum capability. the planning and execution cycle for fu- Yet the Navy has not developed a better al- ture air operations. The length of the pres- ternative to keeping two levels of main- ent cycle is one of the great concerns that tenance—organizational and intermediate— General McPeak addressed: aboard the ship. An intermediate maintenance capability It is worth noting that the battle situation is essential to the sustainment of opera- and friendly force status are likely to change tions and provides an important repair ca- more or less continuously, with the effect pability that often supplants the remove- that the ATO. when eventually executed, is quite likely to have been overtaken by and-replace type of repair at the organiza- events__ tional level. Engine, airframe (for battle- damage repair), and hydraulics are exam- It is a disgrace that modern air forces are still shackled to a planning and execution cycle ples of “shops” that provide essential ser- that lasts three days.7 vices which a mere surplus of spare parts cannot replace. If one anticipates sus- The modern equipment available to tained theater operations, the composite shorten and streamline that cycle includes organization should not pare away new airborne battlefield command and intermediate-level sustainment capability control center (ABCCC) aircraft. In Desert in the interests of mobility, as is currently Storm, ABCCC technology allowed being proposed.9 CENTAF’s airborne battle staff to carry out Logistics could also influence the dis- the ATO for close air support and, if nec- persal of composite wing aircraft to sepa- essary, revise it while airborne. “Revisions rate locations and thereby influence the included adding targets for attack aircraft conduct of integrated operations. For in- with leftover ordnance and calling for ad- stance, a forward base’s runway and tar- ditional strikes on targets that had sur- mac systems designed for fighter opera- vived the first time around.” In addition, tions may not support sustained “jumbo” the fact that the ATO was computerized or heavy-aircraft operations of tankers, meant that it could be “ ‘searched and bombers, or transports because these svs- CARRIER AIR WING FOR THE AF 37 terns’ width, length, or weight-bearing capacity may be insufficient. Could Flexibility Another example comes from Operation Be Lost? Desert Storm. One of the primary reasons for operating B-52s from bases outside the The proposed organizational arrange- Middle East was ‘‘the absence of local port ments of a composite wing run the risk of facilities that could accommodate the large lessening the very attribute it seeks to number of heavy, unguided conventional maximize: flexibility. That is, if the struc- munitions needed by the bombers.”10 That ture and assets of the composite wing are is, finding an operating location for the considered inviolable, it will become diffi- aircraft was not the problem. Rather, find- cult to integrate the unit into joint theater- ing one that could handle the bombs was level operations. the difficulty. Furthermore, a forward base A theater c o mma n de r may draw upon with fuel storage adequate for fighter oper- air assets from all the services and proba- ations may not be able to support the bly from allies as well. For a theater air greater demand of tankers, bombers, or campaign, the commander will call on transports. these assets to perform a variety of mis- If a composite wing is deployed to for- sions, attack multiple targets, phase the air ward operating locations for sustained the- effort over an extended period of time, and ater operations, logistical considerations provide any specialized capabilities they may force the wing to disperse its forces can. Their efforts will undergo many and conduct integrated operations from changes and variations and demand great several bases. These arrangements revert to flexibility from the air component. C2 issues and reinforce the need to con- Air Force doctrine holds that air power tinually improve the mechanisms for coor- works best under the concept of cen- dinated planning (joint or otherwise), sta- tralized control and decentralized execu- tus reporting, and ATO transmission. tion. Air forces are consolidated under a

Currently, the Air Force maintains its wings in combat-ready status. If composite wings enter a preparation cycle or "work-up," as do carrier air wings, the Air Force—like the Navy—may consider rotating combat-ready status among its wings. Shown are aircraft of a composite wing at Incirlik Air Base. Turkey, during Operation Desert Storm. 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 central commander for unity of effort as mand to activate Nineteenth Air Force as well as economy of effort. This consolida- an operational headquarters. Based in the tion gives limited air assets enhanced com- United States, this unit and its offshoots— bat power while one employs as much or composite air strike forces (CASF)—were as little air power as is necessary. to be “integrated self-supporting organiza- Therefore, the operational challenge for tion^] that could immediately deploy to a employing theater air power is determin- crisis area and operate until such time as ing the proper apportionment and allot- normal operational forces could be moved ment. When, where, and how much to use into the area to augment or replace are questions of operational art, which in [them].”11 A CASF included all elements turn affects decisions on campaigns and of a modern air force—counterair fighters, force management. Since the amount of air ground-attack aircraft, reconnaissance power is limited and finite, the com- planes, bombers, tankers, and transports— mander strives to concentrate firepower at and could be tailored for the situation. the right times and places to meet overall The Air Force employed the CASF con- objectives. cept on several occasions during the late Thus, in a theater situation the com- 1950s when US policy was shifting from posite wing may best serve theater goals if massive retaliation toward flexible re- its assets are divisible and can be sponse. The service believed that fast- “chopped” to other operations. A hypo- acting tactical air forces could provide an thetical example is helpful here. If a Navy increasingly effective deterrent against air strike is planned but the only air- “brushfire” conflicts of limited or local refueling tankers available are in the com- wars. In 1958 a unit called Composite Air posite wing, does the Navy mission pro- Strike Force Bravo deployed to the Middle ceed? Are the composite wing’s tankers as- East and was on the scene in Lebanon signed to the mission? If so, does the within 12 hours of that nation’s request for composite wing stand down because it is US military assistance in the unstable af- now less than fully capable? What if the termath of a military coup in Iraq. During mission requires more than one of the the Quemoy and Matsu crisis later that composite wing’s capabilities? This exam- year, CASF X-Ray Tango deployed to For- ple could be repeated with any of the mosa to deter Chinese Communist aggres- highly specialized capabilities of the com- sion and help defend the Chinese Na- posite wing (e.g.. Wild Weasel air defense tionalist homeland.12 suppression, electronic warfare, airlift, or The advantages accrued by the US in airborne warning and control system crisis resolution made possible by fast- [AWACS] early warning). acting. flexible air forces were recognized One achieves maximum flexibility when at all levels of government. Yet, Nine- the air component commander can tailor teenth Air Force and its CASFs met sus- forces as necessary to achieve unity—as tained internal resistance and were for- well as economy—of force. Thus, the com- mally inactivated in July 1973.13 posite wing will be best prepared for com- The reasons for the demise of this bat if it is flexible enough to operate in a composite-force venture are understand- number of schemes and can be integrated able. Nineteenth Air Force existed only as with varying capabilities and force sizes. a headquarters for planning and admin- istrative functions and possessed no forces of its own. It had to rely on other num- Not a New Idea bered air forces and their combat assets to provide the units necessary for any action. The idea of composite, or integrated, Air Assembling and training forces dedicated Force units is not new. In July 1955 the to the CASFs was even more of a problem Air Force authorized Tactical Air Com- in peacetime, when the priorities, sched- CARRIER AIR WING FOR THE AF 39

ules, and agendas of different organiza- The Navy has not developed a heller alternative to keeping tions competed with each other. two levels of aircraft maintenance—organizational and intermediate—aboard a carrier. Air Force plans for the The planned structure of the composite composite wing call for a reduction in intermediate-level wing will include combat forces and will maintenance in the interest of mobility. This may not he avoid repetition of the problems faced by feasible, however, during sustained theater operations. the CASFs. However, the historical experience of the CASFs brings to light the dilemma of the sometimes contending or- detrimental to the other. In the case of ganizational structures in place for peace Nineteenth Air Force, the obvious benefits and war. Will the “operational” organiza- of such a unit for contingency response tional structure, designed to maximize could not make up for what it lacked in combat effectiveness and quicken response the ability to organize, train, and equip time in a contingency, produce unneces- forces in peacetime. sary obstacles for the peacetime chain of Similar organizational issues exist for command when the unit must organize, the composite wing. What will the peace- train, and equip its forces for its wartime chain of command look like to orga- fighting mission? Conversely, will peace- nize. train, and equip the units? Will it time organizational arrangements be suffi- report through an existing MAJCOM— cient to prepare composite forces for their namely Military Airlift Command, Strate- envisioned combat employment? gic Air Command, or Tactical Air Com- Peacetime and wartime organizational mand? If so. will that command assume arrangements are necessarily interdepen- budgetary responsibilities for aircraft not dent. A change in one may be beneficial or now a part of that command? Will each 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 composite wing rely on the various 3. Preserve the three-level maintenance MAJCOMs for training and standardization system for composite operations and for of aircrews and support personnel? There Air Force operations in general. The are many other questions as well. ability to sustain high-intensity operations is critical to effectiveness in modern combat. The intermediate level of maintenance (i.e., more complex repairs done by organic capability, particularly while de- Additional Thoughts ployed) is essential for sustainment and and Ideas should be only grudgingly surrendered for the sake of greater mobility. The Navy’s As similar organizational structures, the adherence to the three-level system, even carrier air wing and Nineteenth Air Force with the space limitations aboard ship, (i.e., CASFs) met many of the same chal- suggests that the system is valuable and lenges that confront the Air Force’s pro- worth further investigation. posed composite wing. Although their 4. Expect a composite wing to have a methods and answers may not solve all is- cyclic readiness posture rather than the sues relevant to the composite concept, the constant combat readiness of regular units. case studies stimulate alternative ideas The various stages of training—from indi- that can be the basis for additional profes- vidual proficiency to group readiness to sional debate. integrated operations—will allow the wing The more promising ideas include the to have only peak periods of readiness. following: 5. Expect (worst case) that a composite 1. Supplement the composite wings by wing will have to conduct operations from having more units that are based close to more than one location if it is deployed for each other work and train together. This theater operations. Limitations imposed on will preserve the economies of scale for an operating location by size, facilities, or basing similar aircraft and allow greater security will require the dispersal of tailoring of forces for exercises or con- forces. Thus, the C2 system must be capa- tingencies. Present Air Force basing in the ble of communicating all necessary infor- southeastern US is a good example of units mation from various locations. close together, each with a variety of air- 6. Let the composite wing be flexible craft. that could work and train in a more enough to allow the tailoring of its forces composite fashion without redistributing to smaller packages and to integrate itself forces. into larger joint or combined operations. 2. Be aware that both the carrier air This flexibility may also entail the wing’s wing and CASFs neatly fit into a larger supporting the operations of other forces effort by joint and combined forces and by providing certain of its specialized ca- could “ plan, control, and operate with pabilities, such as electronic warfare. land, naval, or amphibious forces.”14 The 7. Finally, be aware that neither tech- new composite wing will operate in a nology nor the reorganization of forces theater that can include ground, sea, or air into new units will be sufficient to ensure forces, possibly comprised of joint or com- success of the composite concept. Success bined resources. It cannot become too in- will hinge on the development of a perma- dependent of other units operating in the nent. yet progressive, attitude that orients same environment. Instead, the wing must aerospace forces more closely to integrated be ready and able to communicate and op- operations. This new attitude must be erate with all other forces. This situation present not only in the composite wing it- suggests that the C2 system must still be self, but must permeate those other units able to transmit and communicate an ATO and organizations that are in constant con- to all engaged forces in a theater. tact with it. CARRIER AIR WING FOR THE AF 41

Some runway or tarmac systems of forward bases may not be Onward and Upward able to accommodate the larger aircraft in a composite wing, such as these KC-J35 tankers. If so. the commander The idea of the composite wing is most may ha\’e to disperse the wing's aircraft and conduct alluring when one considers certain sce- integrated operations from several bases. This possibility narios, notably those requiring faster re- makes command and control all the more important. sponse and longer reach. The US would enjoy an improved ability to employ highiy mobile, flexible, and well-trained overseas reinforcement responsibilities. forces that can hit very hard, be used in di- This decision is based on the economies of verse scenarios, and intervene across the scale accompanying that organizational spectrum of conflict. Air Force units de- scheme. ployed to the Persian Gulf in the vast Des- However, as the composite wing is de- ert Shield and Desert Storm operations veloped and nurtured, and as it matures had that particular look, in aggregate, of from concept to force structure, issues and the force structure required for the sce- challenges will emerge that must be re- narios just described. solved before the new gorilla is ready for The Air Force, now working to institu- active duty. The case study provided by tionalize that look by creating a new wing- the Navy’s carrier air wings can be helpful. level structure, may concentrate its efforts Furthermore, the Air Force can draw from on composite forces—units and combina- its own historical experience with CASFs tions of units made up of different kinds of in the 1950s and the recent operations in aircraft capable of applying air power over the Middle East. More importantly, the Air both long and short distances. These units Force has within itself the corporate ex- would also have the much-desired oppor- perience and expertise to build the most tunity to live and train together during lethal, flexible, and responsive force possi- peacetime and thus be amply prepared for ble as it chooses prudent methods to en- contingency operations. sure the continued security of the United The chief of staff gave his assurance in a States. □ recent article that the Air Force "will not run wild with composite wings."15 Rather, Notes the service will retain some wings in the 1. On 1 March 1991. General McPeak addressed the collec- well-known monolithic form, particularly tive body of the US Naval War College, Newport. R.I., and then attended an informal luncheon with the students and those units based in the US and having faculty members from the Air Force. His comments about the 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 composite wing and possible basing options were part of a wing features a two-level maintenance program. One level is session consisting of prepared remarks along with a question- organizational—that is, on-aircraft maintenance done on base and-answer session. by the wing. The second level is off-aircraft maintenance 2. Casey Anderson, "Air Force on Course for Major done at the depot. This concept is a significant departure Restructuring," Air Force Times. 18 February 1991. 3. from the existing three-tiered maintenance system. Presently, 3. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice. The Air Force simple problems are handled on the flight line; more com- and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Globol Power plex repairs are done at base shops; and the most difficult (Washington. D.C.: Department of the Air Force. )une 1990). work is done at depots, usually located far from the base. This white paper advances several key ideas intended to 10. Casey Anderson. "The Power of One: SAC Says Unity shape air power doctrine of the future. Among them are a Was Key in Gulf." Air Force Times, 6 May 1991, 26. power projection strategy for the Air Force and a belief that 11. Robert Frank Futrell. Ideas, Concepts. Doctrine: Basic future scenarios will involve sharp, short-duration Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 1, 1907-1960 operations. (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, December 1989). 4. Gen Merrill A. McPeak. "For the Composite Wing," Air- 450. power Journal 4. no. 3 (Fall 1990): 9. 12. Ibid.. 611-12. 5. James W Canan. "How to Command and Control a 13. Dr Jim George, Tactical Air Command Office of His- War," Air Force Magazine 74. no. 4 (April 1991): 15. tory. Langley AFB. Va.. telephone interview with author, 24 6. The chief of staff's affectionate term for the composite April 1991. force package. McPeak, 4. 14. 19th Air Force (Langley AFB. Va.: TAC Office of His- 7. Ibid.. 6-7. tory, April 1991), 1. 8. Canan. 17. 15. fames W. Canan, "McPeak's Plan." Air Force Magazine 9. The logistics concept being developed for the composite 74. no. 2 (February 1991): 21.

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Capt Graham w . Rin ehar t , USAF

T IS increasingly obvious that the Air can help improve the way the Air Force Force lives in a constantly changing does business. organizational climate: force reductions put end strength in constant flux, Iplanners struggle with budgetary uncer- Changing World and tainty. and missions are realigned among Static Structure units. As we redesign our forces to fit real- world constraints and continue meeting Managerial science—or art, if you mission requirements, it is important that prefer—has progressed significantly over we seriously consider how we envision the past century, thanks to the work of our organizations and determine whether many innovative and creative individuals our traditional organizational structure is whose work casts doubt on the ability of meeting our needs. If that structure is in- the traditional, pyramidal organizational adequate, we must find a new way to structure to fulfill our needs. In addition, understand the organizational systems we the demographics of the work force have manage or work within. With this in mind, changed: modern people are more edu- this article explores a powerful new con- cated and more aware of their rights than cept of organizational design, relates it to were previous generations, and their de- the Air Force, and discusses whether this sire for personal and professional fulfill- breakthrough in organizational structure ment may not allow them to be pigeon-

io ic io io i i------1------1 ioic io /i lociioi i----- 1-----1 i----- 1—i io io o i ic io ic oicii o iic io 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

Figure 1. Traditional Organization Chart

holed in their jobs.1 Unfortunately, their relation to other components of the organizational development and structure organization can they begin to work to- has not progressed at the same pace; in- ward overall goals instead of their own stead, it has kept today’s work force, man- agendas. In order for Air Force personnel agers, and organizations confined to an to take the service ahead confidently into early industrial level of organizational the next century, it is vital that they know sophistication. how they fit into the mission profile. An idea that is gradually gaining accep- The Air Force—along with the rest of tance among leaders is that if a well- the Department of Defense (DOD), most of educated and self-aware work force (like the federal government, and the majority the one we are privileged to have in the of corporate America—has for years relied Air Force) is to excel, it needs something on the traditional organizational structure: more than directions and instructions. If a pyramid of authority with workers along airmen, officers, and civilians are to con- the bottom, executive management at the tinue accomplishing the Air Force mission top, and usually a vast array of middle in an outstanding manner, knowing what managers crowding the bulk of the struc- to do and even how to do it is not enough. ture. What does a chart of such an organi- These people also need to know why they zation tell us (fig. 1)? It certainly tells us do what they do (i.e., how their jobs affect who is at the top and bottom of the organi- the mission). Only when individuals ac- zation (largely important to those at the cept the importance of the mission itself top and a painful reminder to those at the and the importance of their duties in ac- bottom). Looked at carefully and prag- complishing that mission will they be able matically, it shows us whom we will catch to do all that is expected of them.2 More hell from if things don't go right. It is very importantly, only when people understand handy at letting each of us know where we NEW PARADIGM FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 45 stand in relation to everyone else, goals they have been given, regardless of especially in terms of the authority and re- the effect on the rest of the unit or on the sponsibility we have. overall mission. Particularly significant is In addition, this kind of organizational the fact that many of these goals are forgot- chart provides a graphic display of that ten when mission accomplishment is para- most ubiquitous phenomenon of military mount (e.g., in times of crisis, everyone service: the chain of command. Looking at focuses on the mission to the exclusion of the chart and the chain in terms of co- everything else). In normal operations, herence of action and organizational effi- however, focusing on the systems of con- ciency. we see it as a graphic display of trol instead of the mission leads to the be- the most hated aspect of government lief that as long as goals and standards are service—bureaucracy and its accompany- being set and met, the organization is oper- ing red tape. Every military member and ating correctly, regardless of what is hap- civil servant has complained about exces- pening outside.4 sive red tape, wondering if it served any The organizational chart is incapable of higher purpose than securing the jobs of giving us a key piece of information that is bureaucrats. Can something similar be said basic to overcoming the divisive nature of about the way the organizational chart MBR, providing for individual fulfillment, finds places for their jobs? and improving organizational effective- The organizational pyramid is well ness. It does not, will not, and indeed can- suited to what became the predominant not show us how the pieces of our organi- Air Force style of management, namely zation fit together to accomplish the management by results (MBR). MBR is the mission. Consider the organizational chart logical extension of the management by in figure 1, which is atypical, incomplete, objective (MBO) style that the military and simplistic—but is nonetheless useful. latched onto during and after the (Secre- Is it strikingly obvious from the chart how tary of Defense Robert S.) McNamara era. the organizational elements fit together or In MBO and MBR. goals and objectives are how they feed into one another to reach set and passed down through the pyramid, the overall aim of the organization? Per- and tight systems of control are estab- haps such relationships should be intu- lished to monitor the goal achievement. itively obvious from the identity of the Rewards are parceled out when goals are elements, but our intuition may not be met, and people in charge when things go completely trustworthy. In order to give all badly look for new jobs.3 Today we recog- members of the organization a clearer pic- nize that management (i.e., putting things ture of how their jobs contribute to the in their proper places) must be secondary mission, one needs a new organizational to leadership in the military setting and structure. that MBO, MBR, and many other manage- The basis for this new structure is not ment fads have not given us what we need new; like many innovations, it is an origi- to improve our operations. nal application of an old idea. That idea These complex systems of control focus dates back over 40 years and is responsible attention on short-term attainment of goals for a managerial revolution that brought a rather than long-term effects on the aims of beaten and demoralized country to the the organization (mission accomplish- forefront of the modern world. ment). This often results in conflict between elements of the organization, especially when their assigned goals may An Old Idea be mutually exclusive (e.g.. an engineering squadron must improve responsiveness to Rediscovered work orders by X percent while reducing In 1950 the Air Force was about three overtime by Y percent). Supervisors years old, struggling to build its own iden- within the organization strive to meet the tity and assert its position within DOD. 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

America as a whole had no such problems sumers. Companies must conduct research because our position in the world was un- into new ways to meet consumer needs equalled. Not only had our military might and obtain feedback from consumers in triumphed in two theaters of operations, order to continuously improve the product but our economic power was the envy of or service. No longer is it acceptable to set everyone. By 1950 we had turned our at- up a system and simply manage its opera- tention away from building military hard- tion; rather, leadership is required. ware to building a plethora of consumer Leaders must understand who their goods which the rest of the world rushed customers are and how the system ele- to buy. ments work together to satisfy their The year in question is chosen with customers’ needs. The responsibility for care. It is particularly significant because optimizing the system to achieve organiza- in the summer of 1950 an American tional aims is theirs alone. quality expert was invited to occupied What does this economic example have Japan by the Union of Japanese Scientists to do with the military, and why spend so and Engineers to lecture about quality and much time on it? As budget battles loomed statistical techniques. What Dr W. ever larger on the fiscal horizon in the Edwards Deming taught the Japanese 1980s, DOD picked up the philosophy of enabled them to rebuild their shattered continuous quality improvement that the country and rise to the top of the world Japanese had learned from this American. economy. Dr Deming taught the Japanese Although the Navy spearheaded the drive that continuous improvement of product for improved quality, the entire DOD of- and service quality was the key to captur- ficially adopted the philosophy in 1988. ing and keeping the marketplace.5 Called “total quality management” Dr Deming also carefully taught the Jap- (though more aptly named “total quality anese that optimization of their organiza- leadership”6), the quality philosophy grad- tional systems would be necessary if ually became accepted in some Air Force quality were to continually improve. To circles, primarily in the areas of weapons this end. he drew on a chalkboard a dia- development, logistics, and maintenance. gram similar to figure 2, in which mate- Because developing, procuring, and main- rials, tools, and equipment come in from taining advanced weapons like those we various suppliers and are processed recently used so effectively in Kuwait and through a series of steps to make the final Iraq will undoubtedly grow more expen- product, which is then distributed to con- sive as time goes by (especially given our

LEADERSHIP: DESIGN AND CONSUMER REDESIGN *------RESEARCH

Figure 2. System Flowchart (Adapted from W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1986], 4) NEW PARADIGM FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 47 reliance on technological superiority), it was prudent to “adopt the new philosophy”7 and begin to continually improve our operations. It became clear that only with a commitment to improving the quality of our operations and organizations could we hope to maintain our competitive edge. But how does the quality philosophy bring us a new paradigm for organizational design?

The Organization as a System Each Air Force organization is a system (i.e., a collection of interrelated and inter- dependent elements that work together to achieve the aim of the whole). After understanding the inner workings and clearly establishing the mission, one may optimize or fine-tune the system to fulfill the mission with the least waste and the highest effectiveness. Reduction of waste and The total quality management (TQM) philosophy of Dr W. Edwards Deming teaches leaders to continually review improvement of quality lead directly to their operation to find new ways of improving products or improved productivity. Optimizing the en- services. A major step in the Air Force's implementation of tire system (as opposed to optimizing only TQM was the establishment of the Air Force Quality Center a small portion of the system) requires a at Maxwell AFB. Alabama. Here, the center's staff attends a thorough understanding of how the ele- seminar. ments fit together, how changes in one element affect other organizational units, and what value each organizational part adds allowed—no, encouraged—to operate inef- to the final product or service. In addition ficiently (in economic terms, at a net loss to knowing how the system works, how- to themselves)? ever. achieving the best results requires a Every military member can think of in- leadership commitment to optimizing the stances in which suboptimization (i.e., whole system and not allowing the subor- people looking out for themselves) has re- dinate parts to execute their own programs sulted in problems accomplishing the mis- blindly. sion. A few examples will suffice: aircraft Although recognizing this fact is con- grounded for lack of spare parts; conceptually easy, it causes us to wonder how struction projects delayed because the user well our Air Force systems are optimized. demanded changes at the last minute; ma- How well do we understand how the ele- terials returned to supply because they ments fit together to accomplish the mis- were “equivalent” but would not do the sion? Do we realize that emphasis on one job; purchases sent out for competitive bid area may improve that area but at the same when only one manufacturer in the world time reduce productivity in other parts of could deliver the product; officer perform- the organization and thus have a negative ance reports and enlisted performance re- effect on the whole? Do we understand ports redone because an “x ” went outside that in order to optimize the entire system, the box or because the endorser rewrote some subordinate parts may actually be what the additional rater had already re- 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

MISSION „______MISSION / MISSION PLANNING EVALUATION/ REQUIREMENTS

THE MISSION • Bombs on Target • Air Superiority • Sorties Generated • Missiles on Active Alert • Airmen, Officers Trained • Weapons Systems Developed

Figure 3. System Flowchart Applied to Mission Accomplishment written; patients given the wrong medica- Southern California, the new paradigm tion (or no medication); hazardous waste uses the system flowchart (fig. 2) to de- returned to the source because the scribe the organizational structure.9 accumulation-point manager was not Consider the elegance of the new para- trained on the latest version of the re- digm. Using the system flowchart as an or- quired paperwork. We are naive to assume ganizational chart, all members of the or- that we live in a perfect world, work for a ganization can see clearly where they fit perfect Air Force, and don’t need to worry into the system and how they must work about quality or optimized systems. together with other members and other It seems almost sinful to some managers units to accomplish the mission. Neither to suggest that accomplishment of the mis- the traditional pyramid chart nor the more sion may require spending a little more convoluted matrix organizational structure money now to buy the proper materials, can portray these working relationships. tools, and equipment. Instead, we save as The only relationship pictured on the pyr- much money as possible up front and amid is the one between superior and sub- spend more later to correct subsequent ordinate. Consequently, the organization is problems.8 Some people balk at the idea designed and built for pleasing one’s supe- that increased emphasis on and resources riors. even if doing so jeopardizes the mis- devoted to training may ultimately save sion. By comparison, the flowchart places time, money, and lives by decreasing the everyone within the context of mission ac- risk of accidents and mistakes. As difficult complishment and examines every activity as it may be for these individuals to ac- in relation to the value it adds to the cept. such is the essence of optimizing the mission. entire system: some components may have to operate below their potential in order to maximize total combat effectiveness and An Air Force System thus accomplish the mission. Figures 3-5 put the new paradigm in Air Optimizing a system and recognizing the Force terms. Figure 3 replaces the ‘‘con- organization as a system come together in sumers” of the industrial model with the the new paradigm for organizational de- “mission,” the ultimate organizational sign. Developed by Dr Nida Backaitis—a purpose of the unit. The mission may be protege of Dr Deming—of the University of strategic or tactical, involving everything NEW PARADIGM FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 49

Ftgur© 4. Expanded System Flowchart with Air Force-Related Applications from nuclear alerts in support of deter- Figure 4 expands this Air Force model, rence to close air support in Operation using the organizational elements depicted Desert Storm. In every case, leaders must in the pyramidal chart we first considered. combine operational and support assets to One may of course debate the exact place produce operations that accomplish the of each element in the flowchart; ul- mission objective. (Note that when the timately, building the system in proper mission involves delivering products or working order is a command respon- services to other Air Force units, the in- sibility. Regardless of the actual placement dustrial and Air Force models become al- of elements, the chart clearly displays the most indistinguishable.) idea of each separate organizational en- The “consumer research" and “design tity’s knowing its relative position in the and redesign" of figure 2 have been re- unit and its effect on the outcome of the placed with "mission evaluation and re- mission. quirements" and “mission planning," The commander is charged with accom- respectively, in figure 3. These elements plishing the mission of the unit—for exam- provide both continuous evaluation of the ple. the airlifting of cargo and troops by a success of the organization and predic- Military Airlift Command wing. Working tions of future requirements, and then feed backward on the flowchart from the mis- changes back into the system to improve sion (the right number of troops and its operations. Such functions keep the equipment in the right place at the right system focused on the mission and are the time), we first find the aircraft and air- commander s sole domain. Only the com- crews who actually perform the mission. mander who has clear vision and under- Right behind them we find the crew chiefs standing of the mission objective can and maintenance personnel who keep the optimize the system toward mission aircraft airworthy. If we look carefully, we accomplishment. will probably find instructors and 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

standardization/evaluation officers who and optimize the unit for the purpose of keep the aircrews trained, as well as air accomplishing the mission. Therefore, be- traffic controllers who keep the operations cause the squadron supports the base mis- smooth. Working backward even further, sion, flight-line operations are shown as we find the supply squadron that provides the primary customer in figure 5 (impor- the proper tools, parts, and individual tant support functions are also recognized equipment; mission planners and sched- as customers). Why must a primary ulers; aerospace medicine and life-support customer be identified and given priority? functions; and technical-order libraries Although the subordinate unit’s role is im- and contractor support personnel. If we portant, it may not be synonymous with enlarge our vision enough, we find safety the mission. The Air Force does not exis* technicians, on-the-job training monitors, solely to run trucks around a base or build civil engineering facilities crews, and buildings or develop new technology. Be- transportation services. The further back cause the base and wing commanders are we go through the flowchart, the more we responsible for overall mission accom- see of what goes into accomplishing the plishment, they fit each unit into the mission. whole system toward that end. For each We would see similar functions whether subordinate unit, therefore, the primary we considered a Strategic Air Command customers who support the overall mis- missile wing, a Tactical Air Command sion take precedence. More importantly, fighter wing, or a Space Command early- the success of each subordinate unit is de- warning center. In each case, one may determined strictly in terms of overall mis- fine the mission and depict on the flow- sion success. chart those units that directly contribute to The commander of the transportation the mission. The problem is finding the squadron may be tempted to measure suc- configuration that matches how the mis- cess in other terms because the unit is a sion is accomplished. few steps removed from the overall mis- If figure 4 presents too broad an applica- sion. Selection of another measure (e.g., tion of this new paradigm, figure 5 illus- speed of repair, speed of turnaround) may trates a conceptually easy example. Here, result in impressive-looking charts and part of a transportation squadron is di- proud briefings, but the overall effect on vided into vehicle maintenance and vehi- the mission may be less than optimum. cle operations, both of which are placed Consider the effect if the transportation on the system flowchart. The squadron has squadron so emphasizes speed of repair many possible inputs and many cus- that mechanics no longer take the time to tomers, a few of which are shown. Vehicle diagnose problems fully, or jury-rig re- operations supplies vehicles to organiza- placement parts or materials, or work so tions on the base and provides operators in furiously that they become fatigued and some cases (e.g., base taxi). Supporting op- begin to make mistakes. Vehicles that are erations is vehicle maintenance, but while repaired quickly only to break down operations is the main customer of mainte- quickly may not contribute to mission ac- nance, the reverse is also true to some de- complishment. The unit commander must gree (shown with the dashed line). Note show leadership, establish the unit’s mis- that the planning function feeds back not sion so it aligns with the overall mission, only into the two main processes, but also and then measure the unit’s success in the into the pool of suppliers, where informa- same terms. tion about the required vehicles is As mentioned above, the commander is provided to the General Services Admin- responsible for building and optimizing istration (GSA) and feedback on trainees is the system for mission accomplishment. given to appropriate technical schools. Before the system is designed, the leader The transportation squadron com- must study the mission requirements and mander has the sole responsibility to build plan the system to facilitate mission sue- NEW PARADIGM FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 51 PLANS AND MISSION

Figure 5. Transportation Squadron Example cess. Once the system is in place and ships within and between operational working, the leader’s task consists of units, can be a valuable tool in maintain- evaluation and further prediction (fig. 4). ing unit effectiveness.10 Is the unit accomplishing the mission sat- isfactorily? If so. how can it improve? If not, what must it change: timing, targeting, numbers of operational aircraft missiles, number of qualified personnel? How will Problems and Potential the mission requirements change in the future. and what will we need to meet them? Early on. this article maligned the tradi- Answers to these questions lead into mis- tional organizational design and pointed sion planning, where the leader works to out several deficiencies. In the interest of improve the unit’s capabilities by optimiz- addressing the topic fully, it should also ing the whole system. Such improvement mention potential problems with the new may require difficult choices, such as de- structural paradigm. ciding between spending more money for The first and most obvious problem with maintenance and spare parts or for fuel the new paradigm is its complexity. A sin- and flight time. In the present austere en- gle unit may produce an organizational vironment. these choices are especially chart that is relatively clear and unclut- difficult, but the touchstone that judges tered, but at the wing or base level the in- them is the mission itself. terrelationships become much more com- Optimization is not a fire-and-forget plicated. Second, this method of weapon; it is a continuous struggle on the structuring the organization requires a part of the leader to meet the mission re- thorough knowledge of the customers of quirements most effectively. Especially to- each organizational element. For the main- day. when mission requirements or unit tenance squadron that serves the fighter capabilities are undergoing drastic change, wing, the customer-supplier relationship the commander must have an understand- is relatively clear, but civil engineering ing of what goes into fulfilling the mission, and the hospital serve all of the other units or readiness will be sacrificed. The system on base. Such a situation recalls the first flowchart, by clearly depicting relation- problem: graphically plotting all of the 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 possible combinations would make for an and capabilities would have been a mis- impossible chart. take. Leaders must continuously look for- Is it necessary to show all of the possible ward, asking what future weapons and tac- interactions? If the result is confusion, the tics will be required for mission success. exercise is probably fruitless. Indeed, little Thus, the system flowchart puts research would be gained by trying to display all of and development (R&D) in its proper con- the interrelationships. To reap the benefits text. R&D should and does look forward to of the new organizational concept, we may new and better ways to accomplish the not—for example—have to show that sup- mission. In addition, it should continually ply serves the entire base through issuing feed information back into mission plan- equipment. However, showing that the ning to ensure that technological advances fuels section serves flight-line operations are properly incorporated into strategy and may be important. Commanders must de- tactics.11 termine how the organizational pieces fit together to fulfill the mission; those relationships become the basis for the organi- The Choice zational flowchart. A third problem is that the new para- The key question, however, may be digm seemingly leaves little room for an- whether the difficulties posed by the new cillary functions (e.g., chapel; public af- paradigm are outweighed by its advan- fairs; morale, welfare, and recreation). tages. As Air Force leaders understand the Where do they fit into the mission? Show- necessity of improving operations within ing those relationships that affect mission their organizations, they may look for new accomplishment focuses the attention of ways to explore the relationships between executive leadership on how to improve it, and within their units and to determine and shows us how our efforts affect the how well or poorly they work together. If rest of the unit. These functions contribute we recognize our people’s need to under- in subtle and intangible ways, and their stand their contribution to the organiza- contributions to the mission may not be tion, we may look for new ways to clarify clear. If they did not contribute to the mis- working relationships and improve unity sion at all. we might question how impor- toward the mission. The new paradigm al- tant they are. Because they contribute in lows us to do this—not necessarily easily ways that are not clear, we instead ques- but certainly effectively. tion where they fit in. Just as “nothing is useful for every pur- Despite these problems with the new pose, and perhaps everything is useful for paradigm, it seems to be a promising tool s o m e p u r p o s e , ” 12 t h e o l d a n d n e w p a r a - for improving the way the Air Force plans digms for organizational structure are use- and conducts operations and support. It ful tools. The important difference be- provides a clearer picture of how units tween them is what they are useful for. should work together to fulfill mission re- The old paradigm is useful for visualizing quirements and gives airmen, officers, and the chain of command, the lines of au- civilians a better understanding of how thority, and the system of reporting within they contribute to mission success. the unit. The new paradigm is useful for One final advantage of the new para- visualizing how the organization works to- digm is very subtle. Recall that the first ad- gether to accomplish the mission. In the aptation of the system flowchart to the final analysis, our choice will depend on military (fig. 3) involved changing “con- whether we need to focus our attention on sumer research” to “mission evaluation who works for whom, or on how we ac- and requirements.” Limiting this evalua- complish the mission and how we can tion process to current operational results continue to improve. □ NEW PARADIGM FOR ORGANIZATIONAL STRUGTURE 53

Notes 1. Although the present work force is more educated than Ishikawa and Dr Genichi Taguchi. but the roots of the Jap- its predecessors, this distinction may be compromised by the anese quality revolution are in the lectures Dr Deming first increasing mediocrity of American education. A 1983 report delivered. The entire nation of Japan recognizes this fact by made the somber prediction that the present generation naming their highest quality award the Deming Prize. would be the first in the history of our country to grow up 6. See Joiner and Scholtes. less educated than their parents. The National Commission 7. The second of Dr Deming's 14 points. Doming, 26-28. on Excellence in Education. A Nation at Hisk: The Impera- See also Howard S. Gitlow and Shelly J. Gillow. The Deming tive for Educational Reform (Washington, D.C.: Government Guide to Quality. Productivity, and Competitive Position Printing Office. April 1983), 5-16. (Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987); Nancy R. 2. If people know what they are expected to do, they put Mann. The Keys to Excellence: The Story of the Deming Phi forth their best efforts to accomplish the mission. Without losophy, 3d ed. (Los Angeles: Prestwick Books, 1989), and knowing why their jobs are necessary or how they affect the William W. Scherkenbach. The Deming Route to Quality and jobs of others around them, however, they may wreak havoc Productivity: Road Maps and Roadblocks (Washington. D.C.: on the organization and compromise its success. W. Edwards CeePress Books, George Washington University. 1988). Deming. Out of the Crisis {Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts 8. The fact that much of this practice is dictated by legisla- Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced Engineering tive mandate makes it understandable but does not make it Study. 1986). 18-19. right. 3. Interestingly, the original version of MBO was much dif- 9. Related by Dr Deming at the Quality, Productivity, and ferent from the MBO that is usually implemented. Goals and Competitive Position Seminar. 5-8 February 1991, Green- objectives are certainly useful planning tools, but MBO as ville, South Carolina. The new paradigm is also described in practiced uses them as benchmarks against which managers Joiner and Scholtes. 4-5. and workers are judged. This practice encourages the 10. Having gone through this exercise, readers may wish to achievement of objectives by either cutting corners or fudg- construct a system flowchart of their own organizations to ing figures, because the objectives become instruments of fear visualize the inner relationships and the path to mission that are used to control subordinates. success. 4. See Brian L. Joiner and Peter R. Scholtes. "Total Quality 11. We seem to have adequately assimilated the capa- Leadership vs. Management by Results” (Madison. Wis.: bilities of advanced technology into our tactics in recent Joiner Associates. Inc.. 1985). campaigns, but—historically—changes in tactics have moved 5. Japan in 1950 would remain under occupation rule for much more slowly than advances in weaponry. See Robert L. two more years. The Japanese quickly implemented Dr O'Connell, Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, Deming's ideas and later brought more American quality ex- and Aggression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). perts like Dr loseph M. )uran and Dr Armand V. Feigenbaum 12. Clarence Irving Lewis, Mind and the World Order to teach their management about quality. Japan has also pro- (New York: Dover Publications. Inc., 1956), 15. duced several quality experts, notable among them Dr Kaoru Winter 1991 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF

for his article Air Power in Desert Storm and the Need for Doctrinal Change

Congratulations to Lt Col Price T. Bingham on If you would like to compete for the Ira C. his selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner Eaker Award, submit an article of feature for the best eligible article from the Winter length to the Airpow er Journal, Walker Hall, 1991 issue of the Airpow er Journal. Colonel Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is for Bingham receives a $500 cash award for his the best eligible article in each issue and is contribution to the Air Force’s professional open to all US military personnel below the dialogue. The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov- and is made possible through the support of ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Win- equivalent. chester, Massachusetts.

54 POINTBLANK A STUDY IN STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING

Col Ed Crowder, USAF

OINTBLANK was the code name examines the political background that af- for the British-American combined fected the administration of Franklin D. bomber offensive of World War II, Roosevelt from 1932 to 1941; weighs the a campaign mandated by the Al- importance of the American-British staff Plies’ "Casablanca directive” of 1943 andconversations of March 1941 and the re- carried out from May 1944 to April 1945. lated Rainbow 5 plan; dissects the so- Having attained almost mythical status in called AWPD-1 plan, the strategic foun- today’s Air Force, this operation was one dation and predecessor of Pointblank; of the key campaigns that "proved” the de- reviews the Pointblank campaign results; cisiveness of air power in war and led to and draws lessons for today’s national se- the establishment of the Air Force as a sep- curity decision makers and military arate service in 1947. Given this legacy of strategists. notoriety and importance, one could reasonably expect an analysis of Pointblank to produce insights into strategic and national security decision making of general Political Background applicability to policymakers and strate- In the United States during the 1920s gists alike. Toward that end, this article and 1930s, aviation enthusiasts—in-

55 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

Above all, arguments for air power fed on a widespread image of naval armaments as the foremost expression of militarism__ The fighting within the military services sharpened the image of airmen as chal- lengers of militarism and waste.2 With this public sentiment as a back- drop. during his 1932 presidential campaign Franklin D. Roosevelt courted and flattered Mitchell and supported the idea of a major role for air power in US national defense. As late as 1937, the Roosevelt administration was still popularizing military aviation as a primarily defensive arm for stopping invasions by air or sea.3 However, the Munich agreement of 30 September 1938, in which France and Brit- ain made concessions to Germany to avoid war, initiated a change in the administration’s private—if not public—view of air power. William Bullitt, US ambassador to President Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that air power France, summarized his analysis of the would be less expensive, cause fewer casualties, and he more Munich appeasement in a cable to Roose- likely to succeed than a traditional war by land or sea. Gen velt: “If you have enough airplanes you Henry //. Arnold saw FDR's 1938 decision to increase aircraft production as a “Magna Carta" for the Army Air don't have to go to Berchtesgaden.”4 Thus, Corps. Here. President Roosevelt confers with General Bullitt and other members of the Roosevelt Arnold in Sicily during World War II. administration felt that the threat of Nazi air attack was one reason for Britain’s and France’s appeasement of Hitler.5 Lind- bergh, who was in Germany in October eluding Charles A. Lindbergh and Gen 1938, reported to Roosevelt through Joseph William (“Billy”) Mitchell—popularized Kennedy, US ambassador to England, that the airplane as an improved instrument of ‘“Germany now has the means of destroy- both transportation and war. Although ing London, Paris, and Praha [Prague] if Giulio Douhet and others emphasized the she wishes to do so’.”6 offensive nature of air power, Mitchell Based on public opinion, the Nazi stressed the .utility of long-range bombard- threat, and Bullitt's admonition, Roosevelt ment aircraft for defense, an idea that was concluded that a large air force with an of- more in tune with American public opin- fensive capability would serve as a deter- ion of the time.1 Due largely to Mitchell's rent to further German aggression.7 Fur- efforts, Americans came to view Army avi- thermore, in September 1938 Roosevelt ation as predicted that aerial warfare “would cost less money, would mean comparatively a way to uphold New Era virtues of econ- fewer casualties, and would be more likely omy, efficiency, and technological innova- to succeed than a traditional war by land tion. The argument for air power appealed to or sea.”8 Soon afterward, at a meeting with widespread sentiment for the reduction of key members of his administration in federal expenditures— It also responded to postwar disillusionment with involvement November 1938. the president announced in European wars by portraying a self-reliant that he wanted to expand the air force to America that would defend its shores with- 10.000 aircraft and production capacity to out venturing abroad. 10.000 planes a year. Not only was this de- POINTBLANK 57

cision “a bolt from the blue,”9 it was "far it, President Roosevelt approved a pro- beyond the airmen’s own plans for expan- posal for a secret conference between sion that autumn.’’10 Gen Henry H. Arnold, American and British military staffs. Held chief of the Army Air Corps, left the meet- from January to March 1941, the con- ing delighted, "feeling that the Air Corps ference produced a final report known as had finally ‘achieved its Magna Carta'."11 ABC-1, which had the following key Finally, Roosevelt also envisioned an provisions: added benefit: high levels of airplane man- 1. The main effort should be in the ufacturing would ‘“ mean prosperity in European theater. The strategic defensive this country and we can’t elect a Demo- should be maintained in the Pacific. cratic Party unless we get prosperity.... 2. There will be a sustained air offen- Let’s be perfectly frank’.”12 sive against both Germany and other re- But the Munich agreement did not gions under enemy control that contribute change the sentiments of the public and to German military power. Congress. Isolationists did not trust Roose- 3. The Allies will build up forces for an velt, no matter how strongly he professed invasion of the Continent and a subse- his intention to avoid war. Roosevelt biog- quent offensive.15 rapher Frank Freidel points out that in Congress, the isolationists introduced a Ironically, the Army Air Corps was not the constitutional amendment that would driving force behind ABC-1’s second point have required a national referendum to de- on the sustained air offensive because no clare war, a threat which Roosevelt took Army Air Corps representative was invited seriously. Republicans urged Roosevelt "to to take part in writing ABC-1. Instead, the take a firm stand for peace ... ‘to steer inclusion of this point was the work of Air clear and keep quiet’.” Even after the Ger- Vice-Marshal John C. Slessor of the Royal man invasions of Poland and France in Air Force (RAFJ, a strong advocate of stra- 1939 and 1940, respectively, public and tegic bombing.16 congressional opinion opposed direct US Following the issuance of ABC-1, the participation in the war.13 Joint Army-Navy Board (a joint planning In the three years following Munich, organization) directed that the joint plan Roosevelt simultaneously tried to prepare called Rainbow 5 be modified to include for and prevent war. Further, he continued the provisions of ABC-1. Subsequently, the to emphasize air power as the best instru- joint board as well as Secretary of War ment for achieving these objectives: Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox approved both ABC-1 For Roosevelt ... air power seemed an ideal and the modified Rainbow 5 and submit- instrument, decisive yet humane, for deter- ted them to Roosevelt for his approval. Al- ring, limiting, or at the worst, waging war. though Roosevelt took no action on these Meanwhile, it also served American and plans, Stimson directed the Army to fol- hemispheric defense, objectives so uncon- troversial that the expansion of American air low their provisions since they had not power could proceed with minimal opposi- been explicitly disapproved.17 tion— Therefore, Roosevelt’s new aerial policy squared with the dominant prejudices and priorities of Americans: alarm over fas- cist aggression, aversion to military expedi- tions abroad, desire to preserve American AW PD-1 isolation, and faith in aviation as a benign technology.14 On 9 July 1941, Roosevelt wrote to Stimson and Knox, requesting that they ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 develop production requirements needed to win a possible war with the Axis. The In 1940, consistent with his policy of joint board, anxious to respond rapidly to preparing for war while trying to prevent his request, decided that each service 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

would develop its own requirements, but rence, or passive defense. In addition, the within the guidance of ABC-1 and Rain- joint board had directed that requirements bow 5.18 be developed in accordance with the pol- The Army General Staff War Plans Divi- icies in ABC-1 and Rainbow 5, which ex- sion (WPD) was tasked to develop require- plicitly included a provision for a sus- ments for the Army, including the Army tained air offensive against Germany.22 Air Corps. However, in an audacious move that had great impact on the strategy of the war. Lt Col Harold L. George, chief of the Military Objectives newly created Air War Plans Division In view of the policy guidance in ABC-1 (AWPD) of the Air Staff, argued for and and Rainbow 5, AWPD debated the objec- won the right for AWPD to develop re- tives of the air strategy, finally settling on quirements for the Army Air Corps.19 three alternatives: The requirements plan subsequently developed by AWPD. called AWPD-1, estab- 1. Defeat Germany, then Japan, through lished the strategy that was later used in air power alone. Pointblank. To analyze this strategy, one 2. Attempt to defeat Germany, then may use a simple model that breaks down Japan, through air power alone; failing that, prepare the way for a land invasion of strategy into three components: military objectives based on national policy, mili- the Continent (then Japan). 3. Prepare the way for an invasion of the tary strategic concepts (i.e.. how to achieve the objectives), and military resources. The Continent; then defeat Germany through airland operations against the enemy army latter can be either the resources available (with similar operations to follow in the or the resources required to carry out a military strategic concept, depending on Pacific).23 whether the strategy is of the operational Army doctrine dictated the selection of • or force-development variety, respectively.20 the third option as the military objective The simplest approach for determining for AWPD-1. On the other hand, Army Air resource requirements was the path taken Corps doctrine as taught at the Air Corps by WPD for determining those of the Tactical School (ACTS) and the collective Army: develop force requirements compar- heart of the members of AWPD— all former able in size and capability to the forces instructors at ACTS—dictated the first op- then fielded by the Axis, discounted by tion as the objective.24 But the collective the quantity and capability of fielded Brit- brain of AWPD selected the second option ish forces. AWPD took a different ap- as the objective for the very practical rea- proach: develop a strategy and then calcu- son that the AWPD members knew they late requirements from that.21 Thus, could not “sell” the first option to the AWPD-1 was a requirements plan based Army, which would have to approve on a force-development strategy—that is. a AWPD-1.25 After all, half an air power loaf strategy for how the war should be fought was better than none. if the required resources were actually produced and available in the time frame envisioned. Strategic Concepts AWPD-1 specified four air tasks to be ac- National Policy Guidance complished in the postulated war: 1. Conduct a sustained ... Air Offensive Roosevelt’s letter to Secretary Stimson and against Germany ... to destroy [its] will and Secretary Knox contained only one piece capability to continue the war and to make of national policy guidance: defeat poten- an invasion either unnecessary or feasible tial enemies. Although vague, this direc- without excessive cost— tive was important because it called for 2. Provide air operations in defense of the military victory—not containment, deter- Western Hemisphere— POINTBLANK 59

3. Provide air operations in Pacific defense— 4. Provide ... support of the surface forces in the invasion of the Continent and for major land campaigns thereafter. Large tactical air forces would be required for this task, when the Army was ready for invasion.26 The first air task reflected the premier strategic concept that underlay AWPD-1: strategic bombardment designed to undermine the will and capability of Germany to continue the war. The fourth air task addressed another strategic concept, an invasion followed by airland operations; however. AWPD-1 did not draw on this concept for its generation of requirements. Indeed. AWPD assumed that an invasion might not be required, due to the strategic bombing campaign. If it were in fact necessary, the Allies could plan for and obtain large tactical air forces as D day drew* near.27 In the 1930s the ACTS faculty, which included the four members of AWPD, enthu- siastically adopted and advocated the doc- Then-Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell. Jr., directed efforts to trine of strategic bombardment, which was develop AWPD-42. a predecessor of the Pointhlank based on the following postulates: operations plan. AWPP-42 called for a combined bomber offensive whereby the Army Air Forces would bomb during 1. Vital Targets Postulate. Modern na- the day. and the Royal Air Force would conduct night tions need industries to produce weapons attacks. for their forces and to provide products and services to their populations. Indus- tries contain vital targets that, if destroyed, they should be destroyed in six months. will paralyze those industries, which in (An otherwise detailed account of the de- turn will undermine both the enemy's ca- velopment of AWPD-1 provides no hint of pability and will to fight. a rationale for this particular amount of 2. Bomber Accuracy Postulate. Aircraft time—it was apparently arbitrary.29) can deliver bombs with adequate accuracy to destroy the vital targets. 3. Bomber Invincibility Postulate. Un- Resources escorted bombers can penetrate air defenses on their way to the vital targets and Having identified vital targets, AWPD of- not suffer unacceptable losses.20 ficers determined the number of bombers required to destroy the 154 targets in six In its search for vital targets. AWPD months. Other calculations were per- identified three critical German industries: formed for nonbomber aircraft, taking into f 1) electric power. (2) transportation, and consideration the required number of (3) oil. To hedge against the possibility bombers and the nonbombing air tasks that that bombers were not invincible, AWPD had to be performed. However, there was members added to this list the “overriding one type of aircraft for which they did not intermediate" goal of neutralizing the Luft- calculate requirements—the escort fighter. waffe. AWPD then identified 154 vital tar- After all, their doctrine told them that they gets in these four areas and decided that did not need this aircraft.'0 Nevertheless, 60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 following a discussion of German air de- Roosevelt’s intention to lead the nation to fenses, AWPD planners did include the war.33 However, public outcry over the following statement in AWPD-1 regarding plan was silenced three days later by the escort fighters: Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. For the Consideration of all these factors leads to the most part, Congress funded the Victory conclusion, that by employing large num- Program, thus providing the resources for bers of aircraft with high speed, good defen- the eventual Pointblank campaign.34 sive firepower, and high altitude, it is feasi- German agents in the US quickly cabled ble to make deep penetrations into Germany the plan to Berlin, where the German Gen- in daylight [emphasis in original]. eral Staff immediately recognized its im- It is believed that the degree of reliability of portance. On 12 December, Hitler issued conducting sustained offensive air opera- his “Fiihrer Directive 39” in reaction to tions would be greatly enhanced by develop- the Victory Program. This directive called ment of an escort fighter.31 for massing air defenses around key Ger- man industrial targets, increasing attacks The four men of AWPD completed in the Atlantic to prevent US forces from AWPD-1 in nine days. To their relief, both reaching Europe, and assuming the strate- Gen George C. Marshall and Secretary gic defensive on the Eastern Front. For- Stimson approved AWPD-1 in September tunately for the future Allied war effort, af- 1941. Why? According to historian ter visiting the Eastern Front and Michael Sherry. witnessing setbacks there. Hitler angrily the general staff still believed that destruc- and irrationally rescinded Directive 39 on tion of the enemy’s ground armies was the 16 December, thereby minimizing the only sure path to victory. But doubts about damage done by Wheeler’s security leak.35 the survival of Britain and Russia ran large in the War Department, making a land invasion of the Continent seem remote at best: hence even conservative officers acknowl- edged the imperative of first weakening Ger- Pointblank many by bombing. Strategy, then, along with An updated requirements plan called Roosevelt's wishes about how to fight the AWPD-42 was completed under the direc- war, made the War Department amenable to tion of Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell in a vision of air war that would have seemed ... fanciful a few years earlier.32 September 1942. This plan envisioned a combined bomber offensive involving daylight attacks by the Army Air Forces The Victory Program and the Leak and night attacks by the RAF.36 Like AWPD-1, AWPD-42 did not call for escort Roosevelt incorporated the AWPD-1 re- fighters: unlike AWPD-1, it did not even quirements, along with those of the Army mention the need to develop these aircraft. land forces and the Navy, into his so- Instead, the plan presented this optimistic called Victory Program. Public opinion at assessment: the time seemed to favor an increase in defense production because it was good for With our present types of well armed and ar- the economy. But on 4 December 1941, the mored [unescorted] bombers, and through entire Victory Program plan (classified Se- skillful employment of great masses, it is cret), including the AWPD-1 objectives possible to penetrate the known and pro- and target lists, was leaked to the Chicago jected defenses of Europe and the Far East without reaching a loss-rate which would Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald prevent our w'aging a sustained offensive.1 by Sen Burton Wheeler, who had obtained it from a source within the Air Corps. Even though AWPD-1 and AWPD-42 Wheeler and both newspapers were had been approved as production require- staunchly isolationist and believed that ments plans only, the US Eighth Air Force public exposure to the plan would prove accepted them as authoritative strategic POINTBLANK 61

plans until January 1943. when Roosevelt the combined chiefs made a one-sentence and Churchill met with their Combined addition to the Casablanca directive, Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca. Morocco, to which—to American and British airmen— discuss Allied strategy.38 This group pro- changed its entire thrust: duced a document known as the “Cas- To accomplish the progressive destruction ablanca directive," drafted by Air Vice- and dislocation of the German military, in- Marshal Slessor and approved by the prin- dustrial, and economic system, and the un- cipals at the conference. Like ABC-1, the dermining of the morale of the German peo- Casablanca directive called for a sustained ple to a point where their capacity for armed air offensive and stated that its purpose resistance is fatally weakened. This is con- was strued as meaning so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined operations on to bring about the progressive destruction the Continent (emphasis added].42 and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the un- According to General Hansell, for the com- dermining of the morale of the German peo- bined chiefs, “the real objective of the ple to a point where the capacity for armed bombing offensive was making possible an resistance is fatally weakened.39 invasion of the Continent," whereas the airmen thought that “ 'Fatal weakening’ meant impending collapse of the entire Strategy German state, not simply a breach in the In response to the Casablanca directive, a coast defenses of France.”43 team began developing the Pointblank operations plan, which—unlike AWPD-1 and AWPD-42—had to be based on existing ca- Campaign Results pabilities. The general Pointblank strategy The Pointblank campaign began in May differed from that of AWPD-1 in only one 1943, but inclement weather, heavier-than- respect: like AWPD-42, it called for the anticipated attrition of unescorted RAF to continue bombing enemy cities at bombers, diversions of bombers from night. Daylight precision bombing, in ac- Pointblank to other operations, and cordance with AWPD-1 principles and changes in targets by the Combined Chiefs ACTS doctrine, was to be the mission of of Staff all hampered the initial effort. In the Army Air Forces.40 particular, heavy losses from fighter at- The final Pointblank operations plan re- tacks soon proved that bombers were defi- tained as an “overriding intermediate” objective the neutralization of German fighter strength but changed other target types and priorities of AWPD-1 and AWPD-42 in accordance with the latest operations analysis. Following its presentation by Gen Ira C. Eaker, commander of Eighth Air Force, the plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington on 20 April 1943.41 Sometime between this date and final approval of the Pointblank plan by the Com- bined Chiefs of Staff at the Trident Con- ference in Washington on 18 May 1943,

Heavy losses at the hands nf enemy fighters shook airmen's belief in httmher invincibility, a doctrine-based mis conception that was corrected by the introduction of escort fighters. 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 nitely not invincible, so that a high pri- German economy. It reduced war production ority was given to fielding escort fighters.44 in all categories and made it difficult to Consequently, full-scale bombing opera- move what was produced to the front.49 tions did not get under way until February Yet, one must note that the term deci- 1944, and operations uninterrupted by di- sive is misleading if it is taken to mean versions to other missions did not com- that strategic air power was all that was mence until September 1944, well after the necessary to win the war. In actuality, air Overlord invasion in June.45 power was not employed alone in World Nevertheless, Pointblank was successful War II, so there is no empirical evidence in achieving the neutralization of the Luft- on what its solitary impact might have waffe prior to the initiation of Overlord. been. All we know is that it had consider- Much of this success was due to the addi- able impact in combination with the So- tion of long-range escort fighters to the viet land campaign on the Eastern Front bomber formations and the resultant attri- and the Allied Overlord invasion in the tion of German fighters and their pilots, west. The following passage from the Stra- something not envisioned in AWPD-1 or tegic Bombing Survey shows that decisive AWPD-42.46 The diary of German fighter in context meant something like made a pilot Heinz Knoke reflects the effect on the m ajor contribution: Luftwaffe: Allied air power was decisive in the war in Once again Division Control reports those Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably sug- blasted concentrations in sector Dora- gests that it might have been employed dif- Dora__ ferently or better in some respects. Neverthe- This report has now come to have a different less, it was decisive. In the air, its victory significance for us: it is a reminder that, for was complete. At sea, its contribution, com- the moment, we are still alive.... bined with naval power, brought an end to the enemy’s greatest naval threat—the Every time I close the canopy before taking U-boat: on land, it helped turn the tide over- off, I feel that I am closing the lid of my own whelmingly in favor of Allied ground forces. coffin__ Its power and superiority made possible the Every day seems an eternity. There is success of the invasion [emphasis added].50 nothing now: only our operations which are hell, and then more waiting—that nerve- Superior air power was, then, a racking waiting for the blow which inevita- necessary—but not sufficient—condition bly must fall, sooner or later.47 of Allied victory in Europe in World War Though controversial, both the US Stra- II. Air power alone could not guarantee tegic Bombing Survey and Albert Speer, victory, but neither could the Allies have Hitler’s armaments minister, thought that won without it. Pointblank’s post-Overlord operations were “decisive,” especially in their effects on oil and transportation. According to Lessons Speer, Three major lessons can be drawn from I shall never forget the date May 12 (1944). this analysis of Pointblank and its founda- On that day the technological war was de- tions in strategy and policy. None of these cided__ With the attack ... of the American lessons are about policies and strategies Eighth Air Force upon several fuel plants ... per se. Instead, they are primarily lessons a new era in the air war began__ It meant about the processes of policy and strategy the end of German armaments production.48 formulation. The US Strategic Bombing Survey had this to say about transportation: Multiple Roles of the President The attack on transportation was the deci- The first and most important lesson for na- sive blow that completely disorganized the tional security decision makers and mili- POINTBLANK 63

tary strategists alike is the impact of the The Pointhlank bombing campaign had a devastating effect threefold nature of the presidency. Be- on German oil production and transportation. 7 his cause the president is the head of his polit- deslnu tion is ev ident in a reconnaissance photograph of the ical party, head of the executive branch of oil plant at Bottrop. Germany. government, and commander in chief of the armed forces, the Clausevvitzian notion that national defense and politics are inex- an ally, and relatively uninformed public tricably intertwined is an inescapable opinion all played major roles in (he for- truth in our government. As with early air mulation of national security policy and power theory and its related national pol- strategy for Pointblank. icies and strategic concepts, many This lesson is certainly not new, but it is politicians—including the president— often wished away by military strategists embrace or oppose policies and strategies and inadequately recognized by civilians for all the wrong reasons, from a military who are influential or have a hand in or national security point of view. Con- making national security policy. Mutual versely, many strategists do not consider recognition and accommodation must be a political factors when devising strategy, feature of both the policy-making and forgetting that the president is more than strategy formulation processes; otherwise, commander in chief. For example, domes- substantial disconnects may result, to the tic politics and economics, the desires of detriment of national security. 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

Panacea Strategies timized for the situation at hand, a phe- From 1932 until at least 1941, the Roose- nomenon addressed by Graham Allison in his organizational-process model. velt administration was searching for a Allison maintains that in order for orga- military strategy that would (1) be popular nizations such as government departments with the public, (2) be relatively inexpen- to make decisions on and carry out com- sive, (3) have a low public profile, (4) re- plex policies, strategies, or plans, they sult in low casualties, and (5) produce must use a previously established standard quick victory with minimum effort—in procedure or an authoritative statement of other words, a “panacea” strategy. Al- the way things are done in the organiza- though most of the upper levels of the War tion (i.e., a doctrine).51 Especially under Department held a more realistic view of the pressures of time, an organization strategy, AWPD planners and their supe- tasked to develop a policy, strategy, or riors in the Air Staff had not only con- plan will use available doctrines as build- ducted a similar search for a panacea strat- ing blocks, even if these doctrines are not egy, but thought they had found it. completely in consonance with the actual The fact that the Pointblank campaign strategic situation. The resultant doctrinal turned out well—at least according to the strategy may therefore contain small or Strategic Bombing Survey and Albert large flaws that will have to be addressed Speer—has led some subsequent policy- during execution of the strategy if it is to makers and strategists to continue the succeed. search for panacea strategies and to con- In AWPD-1 and AWPD-42, the lack of tinue to think that air power alone might escort fighters was a doctrine-based flaw provide one. This way of thinking was cer- that the Air Corps, fortunately, was able to tainly true of the Rolling Thunder cam- rectify during the execution of Pointblank. paign in Vietnam and appeared to be evi- Both common sense and the wartime ex- dent in some quarters with regard to perience of the Luftwaffe and RAF should Operation Desert Storm. It seems clear, have pointed to a need for escort fighters. however, that the real lesson of World War However, the doctrine of the Air Corps II was that neither air power nor land Tactical School said that bombers could power alone but the combination of both always get through unescorted, and the au- was responsible for the defeat of Germany. thors of AWPD-1 and AWPD-42 were In the final analysis, panacea strategies steeped in that doctrine. The point here is are invalid because they address only “war that because decision making is based in on paper." In real warfare, fog and friction an organizational process, correct strat- ensure that there are no effective panacea egies depend on correct doctrines. Strate- strategies, and the principle of mass dic- gists should be in the forefront of those tates that, where possible, we apply both people who try to ensure that doctrines are air power- and land power against the based on experience, are realistic, and are enemy’s center of gravity. up-to-date. Otherwise, their efforts are bound to be flawed and prone to failure. Strategies of Doctrine Another important lesson of Pointblank is Conclusion that strategies do not spring into being as detached, rational solutions to objectively The lessons of Pointblank are about the perceived military problems. Rather, they processes of national security policy- are formulated to respond to subjectively making and the formulation of military perceived problems and tend to be con- strategy. Unfortunately, many texts and structed of existing military doctrines. educational programs, as well as most Therefore, strategies are not necessarily ra- “shoptalk," seem to focus on the product tional in the sense of having been op- of these processes: the policies and strat- POINTBLANK 65

egies themselves. There is no doubt that the simple reason that a policymaker or studying historical national security prod- strategist who uses a faulty process or mis- ucts is a valuable endeavor for policy- understands the nature of the process will makers and strategists. But the foregoing have difficulty turning out a product that analysis of Pointblank demonstrates a like is not equally faulty. □ need to study the processes involved, for

Notes t. Michael S. Sherry. The Rise of American Air Power: American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941 (Wash- The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni- ington. D.C.: National Defense University Press. 19821, 2-3. versity Press. 1987), 22. 29. 25. Hansell. Air Plan, 75-76. 2. Ibid.. 35. 26. Ibid., 76-77. 3. Ibid . 49. 61-62. 27. Ibid.. 77. 4. Orville H. Bullitt, ed.. For the President. Personal and 28. Hansell, Strategic Air War. 7. 10. Secret: Correspondence between Frunklin D. Roosevelt and 29. Hansell. Air Plan. 80. 84-85. William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972), 288. 30. Ibid.. 15-18. 86-88. 5. Sherry, 76. 31. AWPD-1 (1941), United States Air Force Historical Re- 6. Quoted in Telford Taylor. Munich: The Price of Peace search Center document no 145.82-1. Maxwell AFB, Ala., (New York: Doubleday. 1979). 849. tab 1. "Intelligence," 12. 7. Sherry. 79. 32. Sherry. 100. 8. Haroid L. Ickes. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes 33. Gaston. 97-98. (New York: Doubleday. 1954), 2: 469. 34. Freidel, 392. 9. H. H. Arnold. Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949). 35. Gaston, 100-103. 177. 36. Hansell. Air Plan. 100. 102. 10. Sherry. 79. 37. AWPD-42 (1942). Special Collections, Air University 11. Arnold, 179. Library. Maxwell AFB. Ala., part 4. "Report," 5. 12. Quoted in John Morton Blum. From the Morgenthau 38. Hansell. Air Plan, 144. Diaries, vol. 2, Years of Urgency, 1938-1941 (Boston: 39. Ibid.. 153. Houghton Mifflin. 1965), 118. 40. Ibid.. 151. 13. Frank Freidel. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous 41. Ibid.. 153-55, 158-63. 168. with Destinv (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.. 1990), 260, 301. 42. ibid.. 168. 321. 43. Ibid.. 170. 171. 14 Sherry. 81-82. 44. William R. Emerson, Operation Pointblank: A Tale of 15. Haywood S. Hansell. Jr.. The Air Plan That Defeated Bombers and Fighters. The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Hitler (Atlanta: Higgins-McArlhur Longino and Porter. 1972), Military History, no. 4 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: United 58-59 States Air Force Academy. 1962), 33; and Herman S. Wolk, 16. Haywood S. Hansell. Jr.. The Strategic Air War against Strategic Bombing: The American Experience (Manhattan. Germany and Japan: A Memoir (Washington. D.C.: Office of Kans.: MA/AH Publishing, 1981), 22. Air Force History. 1986), 28-29. 45. Hansell. Air Plan. 180-92. 17 Louis Morton. "Germany First: The Basic Concept of 46. Ibid.. 208-9 Allied Strategy' in World War II." in Command Decisions, ed. 47. Heinz Knoke. trans. John Ewing, 1 Flew for the Fuhrer: Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington. D.C.: Chief of Military The Story of a German Airman (London: Evans Brothers. History. Department of the Army. 1960). 37. 1953). 143, 167. 18. Hansell. Air Plan. 61. 48. Albert Speer. Inside the Third Reich (New York: Mac- 19. Ibid.. 65-66. millan. 1970). 346. 20. Arthur F Lykke. Jr.. “Toward an Understanding of 49. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey's (1945- Military Strategy’," in Military' Strategy Analysis—SF 613 1946; reprint, Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. Octo- Readings: Book 2. ed. William P. Snyder'(Maxweli AFB, Ala.: ber 1987), 30. Air War College. 1990). 1-3. 50. Ibid.. 37. 21. Hansell, Air Plan. 62-63. 72-78. 51. Graham T. Allison. Essence of Decision: Explaining 22. Hansell. Strategic Air War. 30-32. the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.. 23. Hansell. Air Plan, 73. 1971), 67-68. 24. Ibid , 30-40, 63; and lames C. Gaston. Planning the Basis of Issue

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Ricochets without incendiary bombing by B-29s and continued from page 3 without the two atomic bombs. Of course, the Air Force had an institutional interest in justi- Col Richard H. Estes’s article on Giulio Douhet, fying the countervalue bombing of Japan. The Italian theorist of massive countervalue bomb- B-29 bomber cost $3 billion to develop. $1 bil- ing (“Giulio Douhet: More on Target Than He lion more than the A-bomb. Can we expect that Knew.” Winter 1990). The letter attempts to the authors of the Strategic Bombing Survey establish the validity of Douhet's thinking by would have admitted that those B-29s and the quoting the Strategic Bombing Survey’s opin- horrible civilian casualties they inflicted were ion that strategic bombing by B-29s was the ma- redundant to victory over Japan? jor factor in winning the war against Japan. Joseph Forbes However, the Strategic Bombing Survey’s Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania opinion is open to dispute. The massive incendiary bombings of Japanese cities did not actually seriously damage Japanese industrial production. The factories in the bombed areas and Thank you for printing my letter on rescue the civilian workers killed had both been idled lessons from Operation Desert Storm in the Fall by the lack of raw materials caused by the de- 1991 issue. However, one sentence was edited struction of the Japanese merchant marine by in a way that altered the entire meaning. My American submarines and tactical air power. Of letter said, “With only a handful of viable res- course, urban civilians were frightened of air cue missions, it would seem CSAR could per- attacks and wished they would cease. But manently be assigned as one of SOF’s missions weren’t Japanese civilians also afraid of dying and save the money that would be spent on re- in resisting an American invasion? Didn’t they vitalizing the rescue world.” It was printed as wish that Japan wouldn’t be invaded? Didn't “ . . . and the money saved could be spent on re- the destruction of the Japanese surface fleet and vitalizing the rescue world.” Perhaps I could the defeat of Japanese ground forces across the have written ” ... and save the money that Pacific have an effect upon Japanese morale? would otherwise be spent on revitalizing the It is obvious that by late 1945 Japan would rescue world." It’s a small point, but one I feel have surrendered under threat of invasion requires mentioning. Capt Paul R. Harmon. USAF Hurlburf Field. Florida net assessment

War from the Top: German and British Mili- Wilt begins with the leadership and manage- tary Decisionmaking during World War II by ment styles of Hitler and Churchill and then Alan F. Wilt. Bloomington, Indiana 47405: examines how' these two leaders arrived at most Indiana University Press, 1990, 390 pages, of the critical decisions of the war. The next $35.00. level of decision making which the author discusses involves the British chiefs of staff and Among the huge number of books on the Sec- German High Command and General Staff: ond World War that are currently available, this here, he emphasizes the strategies that each one represents a significant new study of the side planned and conducted. Among the 11 war. Dr Alan F. Wilt has succeeded in accom- campaigns Wilt uses to compare and contrast plishing what few historians have: he has com- the planning and execution of strategies are pared and contrasted Britain’s and Germany's Poland, France, the Battle of Britain, Barba- conduct of the war. These two European rossa, El Alamein, Kursk, the Battle of the powers provide a good subject for this type of Atlantic, and Ardennes. Wilt also points out examination since both were combatants for the that since Britain was foremost a sea powrer. duration of the war. Furthermore, little com- Churchill quickly realized in 1940 that the only parative research in this area exists, which opposition Britain could offer German aggres- makes the book all the more valuable. sion would be a replay of its great Napoleonic 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

coalitions. During these, Britain subsidized oth- ferences explain the ultimate Allied triumph in ers to fight on the Continent and used its own the Second World War. superior sea power to protect its island empire. War from the Top is a clearly written, In contrast, Germany strived to become the excellent book that will appeal to the historian dominant European land power. and Air Force officer alike. Dr Wilt has made a Churchill controlled the grand strategy of valuable contribution to the field of World War Britain but left the details to his military chiefs. II research. Hitler, however, became war minister after 1st Lt Gilles Van Nederveen becoming chancellor and in 1941—disgusted Bolling AFB, Washington. D.C. with the army’s performance on the Eastern Front—assumed the position of army chief of staff. Both men were risk takers, influenced by Politics and War: European Conflict from their participation in the First World War, and Philip II to Hitler by David Kaiser. both were obsessed with offensive operations. Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138: Harvard The comparison between how both countries' University Press, 1990, 435 pages, $29.95. war machines marshalled their resources for the conflict is another fascinating part of this David Kaiser’s Politics and War is a bold and book. The ability of Albert Speer to produce wide-ranging examination of the sources and war materiel at the height of day and night consequences of war in modern European his- raids by the Allies on German cities and pro- tory. Dividing the last half millennium of Euro- duction centers is one of the more remarkable pean conflict into four distinct periods (1559— points that Wilt makes. 1659, 1661-1713, 1792-1815, and 1914-1945), Germany had a more centralized command Kaiser argues that in each era there existed cer- system, but only on paper. In reality, the armed tain prevailing systemic and ideological factors forces chain of command was fragmented. Wilt that produced common patterns of political also points out that the Waffen SS (Hitler’s pri- behavior. These patterns of behavior, in turn, vate army) and the Ministry of Armaments and virtually determined the nature of contempo- War Production both had major roles in the rary domestic politics, international relations, war. By stark contrast, the British chief of staff and warfare. system had everything the German command According to Kaiser, warfare during the years system lacked: accountability, realism, flex- 1559-1659 originated in the efforts of ibility. systematic coordination, and unity. ambitious monarchs to increase their sway over Churchill made no changes among his chiefs of realms still dominated by powerful and fiercely staff after he found the right people, but Hitler’s independent aristocrats. Such efforts were changes in the German High Command became doomed to failure because the monarchs of more frequent as the war progressed early modern Europe simply lacked the money From the start. Britain conducted its war on a and the military means to coerce recalcitrant global basis while Germany fought a European noblemen. Kaiser’s larger point is that the cha- war. But once the attack on the Soviet Union otic nature of the years between 1559 and 1659 began, Germany was forced to change its strat- was a "natural consequence" of contemporary egy. Wilt examines advantages such as intel- structural factors—chief among them the unde- ligence (code name Ultra) and materiel pendable character of mercenary armies and of superiority (Allied tank production), especially the military entrepreneurs who led them. These with regard to how they affected the war on factors made almost continuous conflict all but both sides. Of greatest interest to Air Force inevitable. officers are the battles which deal with air- During the Age of Louis XIV (1661-1713), ground support and strategic bombing versus kings came into their own. Monarchs now air defense. enjoyed greater revenues, exercised near- Wilt concludes that (1) Britain’s strategy was monopoly control over the increasingly potent more realistic than that of Germany and (2) this instruments of violence available to the state strategy proved that war by committee could (i.e.. standing armies), and generally pursued a and did work. Wilt emphasizes that despite skillful and moderate course in matters of war German superiority in the operational and tacti- and diplomacy. In Kaiser’s opinion, these struc- cal spheres, the British possessed stronger lead- tural changes and a markedly different political ership. superior high command structures, and context-explain the differences between the genuine strategy. He asserts that these dif- limited wars of the late seventeenth and early NET ASSESSMENT 69

eighteenth centuries and the protracted and their preordained parts, and events occur with ruinous wars of the previous era. a kind of dreary inevitability. Surely, real his- Bv the end of the eighteenth century, new tory works in ways more flexible and oblique political and intellectual currents had given than that. Men undoubtedly are influenced by rise to significantly different ideas about the the circumstances in which they find them- nature and uses of war. Reason came to replace selves, but one may suppose—indeed, one religion as a convenient sanction for national should suppose—that the wills and choices of aggrandizement. This new rationalization for individuals count for something and that in violence shortly was wedded by a rising new some cases they count for a good deal. class of men to a new ideology of state power. Politics and War is an important study that The result was a new era of general war in serious students of European history will find Europe (Napoleon and all that). worth conjuring with. Just remember that the As the nineteenth century wore on, two other levers and pulleys of history sometimes work factors emerged that further abetted the growth in ways that are trickier than David Kaiser of state power and powerfully shaped the polit- would have us believe. ical behavior of state leaders: the impulse Lt Col James Titus. USAF toward imperialism and the idea of national- USAF Academy, Colorado ism. As construed by several generations of European intellectuals, publicists, and politicians, these two notions became increasingly The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instru- fanciful and even bizarre. (Thus, nationalism ment of Government, to 1950 by Arthur B. came to mean that each European nationality Darling (edited by Bruce D. Berkowitz and should have an opportunity to form its own Allan E. Goodman). University Park, Penn- nation-state, an idea the Nazis carried to a hor- sylvania 16802: Pennsylvania State Univer- rifying extreme in trying to force a racially sity Press, 1990, 420 pages. $60.00 hard- homogeneous state out of heterogeneous Mit- cover/$ 17.50 soft cover. teleuropa.) Tragically, the difficulty in reconcil- Serious practitioners and students of intel- ing these notions with reality did not diminish ligence should add The Central Intelligence their influence on patterns of political Agency to their professional libraries. The late behavior. The ultimate result was two world Arthur B. Darling, the agency’s first historian, wars. researched and wrote the original narrative This is an ambitious, stimulating, and diffi- from 1952 to 1953. Restricted for decades to a cult book. Bringing to bear an impressive com- limited few with need-to-know access, it is the mand of his subject, first-rate writing, and a first CIA document to be declassified and trans- very acute intellect, Kaiser has given us a ferred to the National Archives for release to sweeping and provocative analysis of European the public under the agency’s historical-review conflict in the modern era. But for all the program. undoubted merits of his study, Kaiser's inter- Darling was a professional historian who pretive approach struck this reviewer as unbal- taught for years at his alma maters. Phillips anced and incomplete. Andover Academy and Yale University. Rec- The problem turns on what one chooses to ommended by Sherman Kent, a former student believe about historical causation. Does the who was serving in the Truman administration genesis of historical events lie in human beings as chairman of the Board of National Estimates, or in the circumstances in which they happen Darling took leave from Andover to serve three to find themselves? The best answer probably is years as CIA historian. He is probably better that it lies in both—that the two are entangled remembered for his excellence—and tough- and that it is the historian’s job to make some ness—as a teacher than for his writing. Among sense of their complex interrelationship. This is his other Andover students were Dr J. Kenneth the point at which Kaiser’s rather abstract anal- McDonald—the current CIA historian—and ysis leaves one feeling that he has viewed a President George Bush. During the 1988 presi- multidimensional picture through only one dential campaign. Bush cited Darling as his side of a stereoscope. In Kaiser's history, cer- favorite teacher: “He was tough, demanding, tain key structural factors determine the nature yet exceedingly fair. He knew American history of contemporary political behavior, which and made it come alive.” rigidly determines everything else. Almost Through excellent introductions, chapter wholly molded by circumstance, men play synopses, and editing, Bruce Berkowitz and 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

Allan Goodman have taken Darling’s long- during the height of the cold war—now dras- dormant CIA manuscript and brought it to life tically changed if not over—it is still useful. in this 1990 publication. Their efforts, along First, it establishes an accurate and vital public with Darling's scholarship and extensive use of account of the origins of the CIA. Second, and source materials—including the files of the possibly more meaningful, the book covers the National Security Council, the wartime files of main controversies over the establishment, the Office of Special Services, and interviews responsibilities, and turf of the agency. Many of and correspondence with many of the principal the same arguments persist and underlie players—result in a worthwhile final product. debates regarding the operations and organiza- The book is a historical account of how the tion of the vast US intelligence bureaucracy. CIA was created in the years immediately fol- The Central Intelligence Agency is the first lowing World War II. By offering the most volume in a planned series of Pennsylvania detailed and best-documented account to date State University Press publications based upon of the agency’s early years, it reveals the politi- the materials released through the CIA cal and bureaucratic struggles that accom- historical-review program. Although it is not panied the creation of the modern US easy to read at times, Darling’s work nonethe- intelligence community. less fills a major gap in our understanding of For Darling, the study carries dual themes: the national intelligence community. One the development of the theory of central intel- hopes that subsequent volumes are just as use- ligence and the growth of the instrument of ful, scholarly, and well presented. government. These themes are so interrelated that they are not to be treated separately. The Lt Col Frank P. Donnini, USAF Langley AFB, Virginia issues concerning the former theme are those of individual versus collective responsibility and the rivalry between the director of central intelligence (DCI) and the chiefs of the military services who were his board of advisors. Ridgway Duels for Korea by Roy E. Appleman. Sometimes the distinction was a fine one: Gen College Station, Texas 77843: Texas A&M Hoyt Vandenberg was the second DCI (June University Press, 1990, 580 pages. $39.50. 1946 to May 1947) before becoming the newly created USAF's second chief of staff (April This book is not about Gen Matthew B. Ridg- 1948 to June 1953). way, who plays only a bit part in this story. Two questions arise from a consideration of Rather, it is a ground-combat history of a seven- the latter theme—the growing instrument of month period early in the Korean War that government. Should the national institution recounts tactical encounters—regiment by continue as a cooperative interdepartmental regiment—in mind-numbing detail. Roy Apple- activity? Or should it become an independent man, a former official historian for the US agency, drawing its authority and direction Army, has produced three other books of this from the legislative rather than the executive genre that deal with the Korean War: because branch of government? this study concludes in July 1951, it is likely Darling argues that, in the modern era, effec- that he will produce several more. tive intelligence is as much the product of In earlier works, Appleman described the effective organizations as of brave and inge- outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and nious individuals. Thus, he feels that centraliz- the hasty retreat of South Korean and American ing the collection and dissemination of forces: their determined stand at the Pusan information while coordinating the production perimeter: the brilliant counterstroke bv Gen of estimates improves the effectiveness of intel- Douglas MacArthur at Inchon and the subse- ligence. The book's subtitle reflects this view. quent retreat of the North Koreans: the pursuit By arguing that intelligence should be an of the defeated enemy to the banks of the Yalu instrument of government. Darling makes two River; the Chinese intervention: and the allied points: by using the term instrument, he means retreat southward once again. It is now Novem- that intelligence should be a tool, separate from ber 1950, and although the pace of the Chinese the policy-making process: by using the term advance has slowed, there is still talk of government, he implies that intelligence should evacuation from the Korean Peninsula. It is a not be produced by a single agency (e.g., CIA or grim picture, but a new commander now any other), but by the government as a whole. arrives to restore the fortunes of the United Despite the fact that the book was written Nations forces. NET ASSESSMENT 71

General Ridgway found an Eighth Army with obviously an enormously important issue, but low discipline and even lower morale. His it is dismissed in barely one paragraph. The immediate goal was to bolster fighting spirit by main problem is that Appleman’s research is announcing that evacuation was not an option: based almost exclusively on Army unit reports they would stand, fight, and push the enemy and histories. Archives that would provide a back into North Korea. For the next six months, broader understanding of the ground war or its they slowly and methodically did precisely context, such as Joint Chiefs of Staff files, were that. By July 1951 the front was established not consulted. The flood of secondary sources roughly along the 38th parallel, and there it published in the past several years has sim- would largely remain for the last two years of ilarly been ignored. None of the sources cited the war. are less than a decade old, and most were writ- The emphasis throughout the book is on tac- ten nearly 30 years ago. The result is a gross tics, with little discussion of strategy. We are distortion—a tale of tactical ground encounters given no insight into Ridgway’s mind, other devoid of any operational- or strategic-level than his vaguely stated goal of driving the context. One should ask whether this type of enemy back. Indeed, Appleman states on sev- drum-and-trumpet history serves any worth- eral occasions that Ridgway’s "strategy” was while purpose. Only the most devoted dilet- simply to kill as many Chinese soldiers as pos- tante or buff will find anything of value in this sible. We are apparently expected to view this book. as inspired. Never explained is the wisdom of Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger waging a war of attrition against an enemy Maxwell AFB. Alabama many times our size. In fact, one can see Ridg- way’s aim to "bleed China white” as the direct Lightning over Bougainville: The Yamamoto ancestor of the disastrous nonstrategy of Mission Reconsidered edited by R. Cargill Vietnam—the body count. If any vision were Hall. Washington, D.C. 20560: Smithsonian displayed in 1951, it belonged to Gen lames A. Institution Press, 1991, 220 pages. Van Fleet, who assumed command of the Eighth Army in April when Ridgway moved up Lightning over Bougainville is not a conven- to replace General MacArthur as supreme com- tional mystery. In most cases, a true mystery or mander. Van Fleet chose to implement Ridg- detective story concludes with a neat solution. way’s strategy of attrition by increasing fivefold This book offers no solution—perhaps because the amount of artillery fire used by the ground no solution is possible. forces. Substituting firepower for manpower at On 18 April 1943, Adm Isoroku Yamamoto, least has some logic. commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Appleman is unfamiliar with air operations. Fleet, was shot down over Bougainville, in the He states, for example, that in 1951 Gen Hoyt S. Solomon Islands, by a flight of American P-38 Vandenberg was "Commanding General" of the Lightnings. The still-unanswered question is, “Army Air Forces” and "directed B-27 opera- Which pilot shot him down? Or was it two tions from Washington." Actually, Vandenberg pilots? Hall’s book collects most of the known was the chief of staff of the Air Force; he did information about the Yamamoto mission not direct combat operations from Washington: (known as the Y mission). It begins with a nar- and there were no B-27s. Although Appleman rative of the events leading up to the mission is not deliberately antagonistic towards air and follows that with transcripts of panel dis- power, he sees it from the narrow view of the cussions about the mission which were held at infantryman and therefore discusses only close the Admiral Nimitz Museum in April 1988. air support. Wider issues—such as the neces- Also included is the transcript of an interview sity of air superiority for success in the ground with the lone Japanese survivor of the attack, as battle, the significance of strategic air opera- well as 45 pages of appendices that reproduce tions, or the need for air interdiction—are primary source documents related to the Y mis- ignored. sion. One would think that this wealth of mate- The author set out to write a “combat his- rial should be enough to put the matter to rest. tory" of one brief period in the Korean War. but But it does not. Only God knows for certain he has done far less. He provides little analysis what occurred on that day—and He isn’t or insight. For example. Appleman notes that telling. in January 1951 Ridgway discussed with the Aside from the central issue of whether Capt American ambassador the possibility of Thomas G. Lanphier, Jr., or 1st Lt Rex T. Barber employing atomic weapons in Korea. This is shot down Admiral Yamamoto, Hall also raises 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 a philosophical question: What are the moral Shooting Blanks: War Making That Doesn’t implications of targeting a specific individual Work by James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. for destruction during wartime? In other words, Nofi. New York 10016: William Morrow and what is the moral demarcation line between Company, Inc., 1991, 513 pages, $25.00. combat and assassination? Yamamoto masterminded the attack on Pearl War is a dynamic process in which condi- Harbor, and—according to Lanphier—this tions change suddenly—sometimes radically. made him ‘‘an easy man to hate ... one it would Even the most probing minds have failed to be an honor to destroy.” It is in this context understand warfare’s amorphous nature, to- that Hall poses the moral question (which, of gether with its underlying forces and their course, was not evident to most Americans liv- interrelationships. The preeminent nineteenth- ing in 1943), “Was the hunt for Yamamoto one century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz of military necessity, or one fueled by racial made the insightful observation that war is an hatred and revenge for Pearl Harbor?” The extension of politics by other means. This, moral dilemma becomes even more difficult however, is too narrow a definition for the true when Hall points out that records uncovered nature of war. In effect, once the political deci- after the war show that Yamamoto urged his sion is made to wage war, societal factors are country to use caution and restraint before it what actually contribute to the accomplishment embarked on a path toward war. The book does of political aims. The nature of war is a man- not answer the question for us. It is something ifestation of societal influences: the conduct of that can only be considered subjectively. war is defined by the clash of cultures. War is How relevant is this moral dilemma to 1992? the most comprehensive of human endeavors Fifty years after Pearl Harbor, the United States and is embodied in the fabric of a society—in found itself faced with exactly the same prob- its particular strengths and weaknesses, irre- lem: Would it have been morally correct to spective of political motivation. In order to have targeted Saddam Hussein during the Per- avoid ‘‘shooting blanks,” one must acknowl- sian Gulf conflict? If not for Hall’s book, I edge that the preparation for and conduct of would have paid scant attention to the matter. war are intimately integrated with society. For forcing us to think reflectively about moral These fundamental influences—the social, standards during combat, we readers should economic, political, and technological dimen- thank Mr Hall. Besieged daily by a flood of sions of society—dictate the characteristics of news events, we tend to forget about universal any country’s armed forces. Therefore, these truths. same societal attributes affect whether a coun- Only slightly less intriguing than the philo- try’s armed forces “shoot real bullets or blanks” sophical issues is the substance of chapter 3, a in war. This book relates “what happens when discussion about the planning and execution of you call out the troops and the results are not the mission, written by Col John W. Mitchell, what you expected.” James F. Dunnigan and the flight leader. It is a forceful reminder of the Albert A. Nofi place the conduct of war within complexity of mission planning and its impor- its societal context and then—through the tance to success. cultural lenses of various national character- Lightning over Bougainville is a gold mine of istics—analyze the failures in the conduct of unanswered questions. Why weren’t all of the contemporary war. American pilots debriefed after such a signifi- The authors state that their book is designed cant mission? Why were none of the surviving as “a guide to the phenomenon of shooting Japanese airmen debriefed after the war? We blanks” and attempts to develop a clearer still don't know. understanding of the problems associated with Today, when mysteries are neatly resolved at evaluating military power, including its the end of a two-hour movie, we feel uneasy strengths and limitations. The obvious causes about a book that leaves so many unanswered of shooting blanks are (1) misunderstanding questions. We are also unsettled by the tough one’s own military capabilities. (2) miscalculat- moral issues it raises. After reading Lighting ing an opponent's capabilities, and (3) creating over Bougainville, most of us know more than an inappropriate military force as a conse- we did about the Yamamoto mission, but we quence of (1) and (2). Among the national phe- still wish that there had been gunsight cameras nomena that create a false illusion of military on our airplanes over Bougainville that day. power—which in turn leads to shooting Ron Callahan blanks—are “intelligence confusion, amateur- Placerville, California ism, media muddle, procurement puzzle, and NET ASSESSMENT 73 wrong-war syndrome." By examining these ington, D.C. 20560: Smithsonian Institution phenomena. Shooting Blanks reveals the soci- Press, 1991, 426 pages, $19.95. etal influences that affect a country’s armed forces, as reflected in fighting style and organi- Brig Gen Robinson Risner, a former Vietnam zational customs. These influences can have a prisoner of war, once told a group of Air Force detrimental effect on a military force’s combat Academy cadets that “a man who refuses to power. quit cannot be beaten.” This simple statement Divided into 12 chapters. Shooting Blanks also comes to mind when one reads about an- thus analyzes the qualitative basis of military other great Air Force general—Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. Born in a time of legal segregation, os- power. This methodology' contrasts with that of tracized by classmates and fellow officers be- T. N. Dupuy. who used complex mathematical cause of his race, and continually told he was equations in his Numbers. Predictions 6- War to capable—for a “black” officer—Davis refused to assess the available statistics on past wars and give up. A man possessed with that kind of de- thereby quantify the chances of success in termination indeed could not be beaten, and future wars. Shooting Blanks looks into the General Davis proved this simple philosophy limitations of military organizations—their through his impeccable leadership. This book technological base, national intelligence appa- is his story of an incredible journey. ratus. and information and communication networks. any of which might influence a par- Davis begins this venture by thanking his ticular failure in war. The last chapter. “Living father—the only black active duty Army officer with the Problem." is most intriguing because in America at the time—for instilling in him a the authors offer some solutions. For example, sense of perseverance. Davis continually used to avoid "amateurism,” one must promote an that quality to overcome racial obstacles after in-depth analysis of national traits, draw on the entering West Point in 1932. “Silenced” during experience of combat veterans, and use history his four years, he nevertheless excelled and "to keep the experience of war fresh.” To elimi- graduated 35th in a class of 276, high enough to nate the "wrong-war syndrome.” one must use join the coveted Corps of Engineers. But Davis invaluable historical perspectives to trace had his heart set on being a pilot. However, the national martial characteristics and ensure that Army barred him from the Air Corps because of our political and military leaders get their pri- his race, and he found himself an infantry orities straight before employing military force. officer. This book is easy to read and is thought- Davis joined the 24th Infantry Regiment at provoking. However, it does not live up to its Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1936. He and his declaration that “you now know what shooting wife, Agatha, were alienated by the white of- blanks is, what causes it. and what can be done ficers, including the regimental commander: to lessen its effects." It is a good introduction to “Not a single white officer extended us a wel- the relationship between societal factors and come to the 24th. It was West Point all over military force, but much of the book's analysis again" (page 57). Yet Davis excelled at this as- is superficial and unsubstantiated (unfor- signment and was eventually allowed to join tunately. the authors include no footnotes, and the Air Corps. One of the original Tuskegee air- the bibliography is sparse). What needs to be men. Davis was ordered to Tuskegee Army Air- understood is that every war is circumstan- field, Alabama, in 1941. tial—unique to the time, geography, opponents’ In 1942 Davis became the commander of the societies, and a myriad of other factors that 99th Pursuit Squadron, formed from this group make any war’s outcome tentative. Influenced of black airmen which—along with the 332d by society, armed forces are effectively ham- Fighter Group—won fame and distinction for pered by what they have become rather than operations in North Africa, Italy, and bomber- what they might be. I recommend Shooting escort missions over Germany. He proved to be Blanks only as a primer on the intricacies of an effective commander and was asked to re- military affairs. turn to the United States to replace the white commander of the racially strife-torn black Maj Michael R. Terry 477th Medium Bombardment Group at Self- Grand Forks AFB. North Dakota ridge Field, Michigan. Demanding professionalism, discipline, and respect for all people regardless of race, Davis dramatically boosted the Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: An Auto- morale and cut the accident rate to zero. How- biography bv Benjamin O. Davis. Jr. Wash- ever, the war ended before the 477th could ar- 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

rive in the Pacific. Within three years, segrega- sues. In many cases, he tempers contemptible tion would also end—in principle—in the acts committed against him and his wife by newly created US Air Force. writing that although they were despicable, it The wartime performance of the black fighter was the norm for that time. His description of units that Davis commanded in Europe and his 1949 Montgomery is also sheathed in his de- success with the 477th helped prove that blacks scription of the Gathering of Eagles in 1986, were capable of serving alongside whites. But when his welcome to the town was “warm and Davis still faced racial challenges. In 1949 he completely consistent with the South’s well- entered the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, justified reputation for hospitality" (page 172). Alabama. The Air Force had ended segregation, Davis has few axes to grind, but when he does but Alabama had not. '‘Maxwell,” writes Davis, complain, it is well deserved. This book is not “was guilty of some of the worst foot-dragging” only an autobiography of a great man, it is also (page 161). Realizing that societal attitudes of one with a message. white Air Force people would not change “Overseas,” writes Davis, “we had ex- easily, Davis again overcame prejudice through perienced freedom, equality, and friendship— his professionalism. qualities of life that had been missing for us in His final student appraisals at the Air War the United States” (page 311). Though he and College reflected this change. For the first time, his wife have unquestionably done more than Davis received no evaluations that "said ... I their share to alleviate this situation, Davis was capable for a Negro officer and well suited feels that more could be done by eliminating for duty with black troop units” (page 171). He the prevailing sense of "hyphenated American- was truly overwhelmed because “several of his ism." “We are all simply Americans,” he classmates at Air War College had been at West writes. “The unnecessary labeling of people by Point when (he) was a cadet. At Maxwell they race, religion, or ethnicity does nothing to bring were as pleasant as any of the other students— the many diverse groups of Americans to- apparently the shepherd had spoken, and the gether__ I do not find it complimentary to me sheep had fallen into line” (page 175). Al- or to the nation to be called ‘the first black West though still not able to sleep or eat in some ac- Point graduate in this century’” (page 423). commodations in civilian America. Davis was Fortunately, the first full biography on this becoming an equal in the military. American is an autobiography. It is well written After Maxwell, he served at the Pentagon, and well researched. No other person could where "there were no car pools in those days, write of the barriers and triumphs with the and if there was work to be done, one stayed honesty and grace which Davis has provided. until it was done” (page 182). Davis next served His work is destined to become one of the lead- in a variety of command positions in Korea, ing biographies on Air Force generals—and Taiwan. Germany, the Philippines, and Japan. Americans—in this century. Promoted to lieutenant general, he was named Capt Phillip L. Osborne. USAF chief of staff. United Nations Command; chief Goodfellow AFB. Texas of staff. United States Forces in Korea; and commander. Thirteenth Air Force. He was deputy commander in chief, US Strike Command, Da Nang Diary by Col Tom Yarborough. New York 10010: Saint Martin’s Press. 1990, 280 MacDill AFB, Florida, when he retired in 1970. Davis continued his public service after his pages, $19.95. retirement by working on safety and security is- This book tells the story of the author’s year sues in the Department of Transportation. He in Vietnam as a “covey” (the unit call sign) for- was the force behind establishing better airport ward air controller (FAC) from April 1970 to security in the rash of skyjackings in the 1970s, April 1971. It’s an exciting and worthwhile requiring shoulder belts in autos, and establish- tale, told by a born storyteller. And it's some- ing the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit. As a thing more than an adventure story, both for member of Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Com- the general reader and for the military mission on Military Compensation. Davis professional. fought the battle to retain the 20-year retire- Da Nang Diary captures the reader from the ment compensation package. He retired from outset with a prologue that frames the book's this role in 1975 but has remained active in chronology and message. As an "old head" on a public service. second tour (in 1973), the author notices a gag- Davis weaves his unique story with that of a gle of newly arrived FACs. He thinks back to changing nation, both in power and in social is- his days as a new guy with thousands of NET ASSESSMENT 75

questions—both trivial and important—all of of air combat, as well as the universal ex- which he wanted answered at once. The narra- perience of maturing and adapting to a world tor recalls how the gulf that separated new ar- that no one can be prepared for. If you're look- rivals and veterans stifled those questions and ing for a good read, this is a sure bet. If you ac- how that made him feel. With that in mind, he cept the author’s offering of experiences to grabs a fresh beverage, joins the new arrivals, widen your understanding of war and people, and invites the new guys’ questions. you'll gain still more. The narrative that follows—the chronicle of Lt Col Charles M. Westenhoff, USAF Yarborough’s first combat tour—provides the Washington. D.C. answers to those big and little questions. It begins with his arrival in Vietnam, the humilia- tion of in-processing, and the experience of combat qualification. Almost immediately he Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm begins a stint as a standard covey FAC, flying of Low Intensity Conflict the Ho Chi Minh trail, learning the landscape, edited by Max G. discerning elusive targets, and controlling Manwaring. Boulder, Colorado 80301; West- attacks. After a brief period flying with an view Press, 1991, 139 pages, $24.95. “X ray" (Laotian backseater), Yarborough Uncomfortable Wars is a collection of articles switches to Prairie Fire missions—escorting about low-intensity conflict. Dr Max G. helicopters which infiltrate and exfiltrate long- Manwaring, an associate with Booz-Allen & range reconnaissance patrols. Hamilton, Inc., in Panama, has ably consoli- The action is constant and intense, yet slowly dated a series of articles that address the evolves as the war changes and the author gains development of a coherent national and mili- experience and awareness. He suddenly real- tary strategy for countries experiencing politi- izes that cal instability and revolution. I had changed radically in my six months of flying “Uncomfortable war,” as Dr William Olson combat missions. The mechanics of being a FAC, states in the foreword, is “that type of conflict so complex and mystifying to me in the begin- which, because of our recent history and the ning, had become second nature, almost a lack of consensus on the threat, challenges our reflex.... traditional rationale for using national power in Most of all, in a really hot situation, my instincts support of national interests." In other words, had developed to the point where they could in- uncomfortable wars are not clean. They do not stinctively handle the present while my mind's lend themselves to a major operational maneu- eye projected ahead, anticipating— 1 saw myself ver like the “left hook” in the Gulf war. The for the first time as being truly combat ready, (page 174) problem is that uncomfortable wars are “difficult to come to grips with conceptually,” are Yarborough maintains the action throughout “politically sensitive,” and are "filled with but keeps adding insights and reaches increas- ambiguities that cloud (their) nature." ing extremes of human experience as the book The traditional view holds that there are progresses. The narrative is very personal and three major actors in uncomfortable wars: the honest, the imagery stunningly visual, kinetic, government and its armed forces, the enemy, and expertly crafted to maintain suspense. and the people. In this new paradigm, there are For the professional military reader, Da Nang two more actors: the external supporters of the Diary offers a window into a particular ex- threatened government and the external sup- perience of a particular war, a window re- porters of the insurgents. The political dimen- markably free of distortions. It doesn’t seem sion, both internal and external, is now the possible to understand war—especially air biggest player in the equation. The authors warfare—without an understanding of the par- provide a paradigm, or framework, to build a ticulars and details; the imperatives and sur- coherent strategy. The use of Clausewitz’s con- vival mechanisms; and the sights, sounds, and cept of the center of gravity is particularly wel- textures that individual experiences of war con- come because it allows the reader to vey. Each of these perceptions is interwoven in understand where the strategic and operational the narrative—some explicitly, others with a focus should be. The authors’ use of opera- subtlety that is easy to miss in the pace of “the tional art as it pertains to uncomfortable wars year of 53 weeks.” provides the means by which military men may For the general reader, Da Nang Diary relates understand the nature of a very complicated both an extreme and very personal experience conflict. 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

In what is probably the best article in the required reading for all officers on operational book, ‘‘Toward an Understanding of Insurgency staffs, for all strategic planners, and for all dip- Wars: The Paradigm,” Dr Manwaring succinctly lomats and policy shapers who have no describes how “the center of gravity is the peo- experience with South America or with Claus- ple of a country.” If the Clausewitzian center of witzian concepts as they apply to uncomfort- gravity is the "source of all power and move- able wars. ment,” then "people," he writes, "are the fun- Maj Daniel W. Jordan III, USAF damental source of physical, psychological, Heidelberg, Germany and moral strength.” In the next article, “Strategic Vision and Insurgency in El Salvador and Peru,” Dr Man- Case Studies in the Development of Close Air waring and Lt Col John T. Fishel, an Army staff Support edited by Benjamin Franklin Cool- officer at US Southern Command, state that ing. Washington, D.C. 20402: Office of Air strategic vision must come before everything Force History, 1990, 606 pages. else. They write, “It is incumbent on senior decision makers and their staff to identify cor- Probably no other area of aerial operations rectly the primary center of gravity, rank the engenders as much argument as close air sup- others, and link policy, strategy, force structure port (CAS). Attacking enemy troops was one of and equipment, and campaign plans to solving the earliest missions performed by air forces, the central strategic problem.” This one state- yet the application of air power in this role has ment probably represents the most important been debated by succeeding generations of air lesson that military and diplomatic planners and ground commanders. The historical back- can learn from the book. To illustrate their ground to this debate is selectively chronicled point, the authors use case studies from El Sal- in Benjamin Franklin Cooling's noteworthy vol- vador and Peru. ume from the Office of Air Force History. In “The Umbrella of Legitimacy,” Col Court- The book contains 10 case studies written by ney E. Prisk, a former Army staffer with the an impressive group of contributors. In the first Joint Chiefs of Staff and a senior associate with study, Lee Kennett covers the development of Booz-Allen & Hamilton, writes about the most CAS by European air forces and the United difficult task for an incumbent government—its States Army Air Corps through 1939. The fol- ability to maintain its moral right to govern. If lowing six studies weigh the book heavily the insurgents’ goal is to attack that moral right, towards World War II by dealing with the war they will do so by proving that the legitimate in Europe and the war in the Pacific. Specifi- government cannot provide essential civil and cally, Williamson Murray writes about the Luft- military services. The burden is on the legiti- waffe ground support efforts from 1939 to 1941. mate government to maintain its legitimacy, Kenneth Whiting follows with an examination with or without external help. Colonel Prisk’s of Soviet air-ground operations from 1941 to article helps clarify this complicated concept. 1945. David Syrett then analyzes the British The final article in the book, “The Need for and American experience in North Africa from Strategic Perspective: Insights from El Sal- 1942 to 1943. Alan Wilt looks at Allied CAS vador,” ties all the themes together. Dr operations in Italy from 1943 to 1945. Will Manwaring and Colonel Prisk posit three basic Jacobs follows with an analysis of Allied air tenets for success in uncomfortable wars. First, efforts in support of the breakout in France in decision makers must understand the environ- 1944. Last, Joe Taylor covers the American ment they work in. Second, one must under- experience in the Southwest Pacific. Three stand that legitimacy—“the moral right to studies are devoted to the period after World govern—is the central target of the insurgent.” War II. Allan Millett covers the Korean War. Third, from strategic vision and perspective, all John Sbrega examines CAS in Southeast Asia, else must follow. and—in the final case study—Brereton Green- The challenge, of course—even after reading hous covers the Israeli experience. Disappoint- this work—is that it is one thing to identify a ingly, no chapter deals with CAS solely in the paradigm, but another to put it into practice. context of a low-intensity conflict, such as the Because of its limited scope, this book does not British in Malaya or the French in North Africa. address that issue. In the book's final chapter, I. B. Holley. Jr., puts Uncomfortable Wars would not be appropri- the topic in perspective by making suggestions ate for military readers who are concerned with to current military leaders on how to avoid the tactical level of war. However, it should be reinventing the CAS wheel in future conflicts. NET ASSESSMENT 77

Though written by different authors, the case Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the studies cover basic topics such as doctrine, Landmark Battle by Richard B. Frank. New organization of forces, background and descrip- York 10022; Random House, 1990, 800 pages, tion of relevant campaigns and individual oper- $34.95. ations, command and control (C2) arrangements, technology and weaponry, and descriptions of key people involved in decisions that August 1942 was the start of the battle for shaped the use of CAS. Uniformly well written, Guadalcanal, the first US air. land, and sea the studies are illustrated with maps and pho- offensive against the Axis powers during World tographs where appropriate and include short War II. As such, the battle will always have a bibliographic essays. Because the same basic special place in American military history. The information is provided for each study, it is fighting was closely contested and represented possible to compare and contrast the various the only time when the US and Japan would experiences. meet as near equals on the battlefield. Thus, Though one can draw many parallels and Guadalcanal was a real test of leaders (junior as conclusions from these studies, two seem well as senior officers), tactics, and strategy. obvious. First, air forces value other missions Later battles with Japan would also test men more highly than CAS. Despite the proven and strategy, but these clashes would be greatly necessity for CAS on the battlefield and regard- influenced by the US superiority in logistics. less of the time period or country, there is Guadalcanal has had no shortage of excellent reluctance (sometimes great reluctance) to chroniclers. Richard Frank rightly acknowl- embrace this mission. This was true in World edges his debt to his predecessors: Samuel Eliot War I, it was true of the Luftwaffe on the eve of Morison’s History of United States Naval Oper- World War II, it affected American CAS efforts ations in World War II (volumes 4 and 5), in Southeast Asia, and it caused the Israeli air Samuel Griffith’s The Battle for Guadalcanal, force to put CAS in third place on its list of pri- and Thomas G. Miller's The Cactus Air Force. ority missions. Only when a military is faced Given the quality of these previous histories, with the absolute necessity for ground support one may ask why we need another book about are air forces allocated; priorities established; the battle, particularly one that bills itself as the and command, control, and communications "definitive account." Frank’s work is more than (C3) sorted out. just a recapitulation of known facts. He ties The second conclusion is that C3 is the crit- together the many aspects of the battle and ical element in establishing effective CAS. The emphasizes the vital role that intelligence and success of the Luftwaffe early in World War II logistics played in US and Japanese strategy. and of the Israeli air force in its conflicts was Additionally, he uses Japanese sources that not due to overwhelmingly superior quantity or were not available to earlier authors. quality. Agreeing to an effective system of C2 The strong points of Guadalcanal are its and developing a working communications extensive use of new sources and its organiza- capability are far more important than any tion. Each major aspect of the battle is preceded other factor in providing effective air support to by a short overview of both US and Japanese ground troops. Technology can provide the air- strategy and the perspective of each side's craft, weapons, and countermeasures necessary senior military leadership. This technique puts to operate above the battlefield, but these assets a "human face" on the strategy, sets the stage, are of little use unless we integrate them into and explains what the principals did and why the conduct of the battle. they did it. Further, Frank gives his readers The concluding chapter by I. B. Holley, Jr., is close-up views of the infantry line units, an excellent summation of the many points to destroyers, and fighter planes in an effort to be drawn from these case studies. As the Amer- involve them in the heat of battle. ican military digests the lessons from the Gulf Secondary strong points are the author’s war and faces the prospect of shrinking commentary on all levels of leadership on both resources. Air Force and Army officers who are sides. From colonel to admiral, many of the tasked with the integration of CAS into the land leaders who fought at Guadalcanal are evalu- battle would be well served by reading this ated here. The book points out the difference a book. leader can make in the outcome of a battle in which forces are nearly equal. Frank’s vignettes Maj Budd A. Jones, USAF on Japanese leaders and their influence on the Durham, North Carolina battle are particularly valuable. 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

Of interest to today’s military professional the Soviets were to “creep out” covertly or are the lessons to be learned from the battle, all "break out” overtly from the accords forbidding of which still apply today. Such lessons in- the deployment of weapons to space, there clude the need to practice joint and combined might be little the United States could do after operations, as well as the importance of intel- the fact (short of starting a surface war with ligence and logistics to the conduct of a dangerous escalatory potential). Consequently, campaign. Colonel Butler’s premise is an exciting one for a The book’s preface initiates a truly impres- novel. In fact, it might even shock America (as sive reading experience for the military profes- did the destruction of the first battleship from sional or historian. Very few books live up to the air) into taking preventive measures. their advance billing or the praise on their Unfortunately, Colonel Butler wrote his jacket covers. This one does, however, and it novel in the so-called technothriller style popu- may very well be the definitive one-volume larized by novelist Tom Clancy. Rather than account of the land, sea, and air battle for examining depressing social matters, this style Guadalcanal. After finishing the last page of requires a central character—a hero-expert—to text, I was left hoping that Richard Frank easily pull together a multitude of weapon sys- would take up his pen again soon. Guadalcanal tems and use them to solve serious problems. will be a valuable asset to the library of any In this case, the hero is a lieutenant colonel serious military professional. imbued with enough authority to rival that of Oliver North. Although Butler’s descriptions of Lt Col Michael G. McConnell, USAF current systems are lucid and clear to even the Castle AFB, California non-Air Force reader, this approach constitutes only a shallow treatment of the central problem. Worse, since the technothriller style achieves its effect from describing existing weapons and their peculiarities, it may leave the reader with the impression that—given enough cleverness—current systems are adequate to deal with the future threat of a Soviet Red Lightning, Black Thunder by Jimmie H. space blockade. Butler. New York 10014: Penguin Books, One might ask how Colonel Butler ever man- 1991, 436 pages, $19.95. aged to envision a future in which existing US Red Lightning, Black Thunder, the second systems could win a space war. The answer lies novel by retired Air Force colonel Jimmie H. in several fantastic assumptions. Butler asks the Butler, has an extreme premise: if the Soviets reader to accept that a technological break- are the first to put weapons in space, they through allows lasers to be shot 25,000 miles could control access to space. Based on the with accuracy (current estimates average 3,000- notion that a minimally capable strategic 4,000): that the Soviets thus attempt a space defense could effectively suppress a nation's blockade with only one armed, geostationary day-to-day space launches, the premise is satellite; that the Soviet weapon system extreme because it asserts that the Soviets periodically employs undefended targeting sat- would dare wage a limited war for control of ellites: that the US could somehow transform a space if the US were to try to deploy space returning moon-rock-gathering mission (as if arms second. It is also extreme because it we needed more moon rocks) into a military assumes that there is a future race to arm space, one; and that the Americans just happen to that the Soviets remain a threat, and that Soviet decide to deploy weapons to space while the space forces could destroy US space-force Soviet system is still vulnerably sparse. enhancement and achieve a dangerously endur- All this said, if the reader is willing to accept ing dominance in space. These notions have the author’s assumptions, his novel is very not been discussed openly in Washington (if at entertaining. C-141 crew members may find it all), probably because they would displace too especially so. Somehow. Colonel Butler has many political agendas and current modes of managed to integrate many aspects of the thought. However, according to a study by C-141’s mission into the plot, enabling the hero Rockwell International (assuming the Soviet to fight practically the entire war (and win it) space program does not disintegrate), Colonel from a cargo aircraft. In retrospect, one might Butler’s premise is extremely accurate. easily state that this novel is a C-141 crew In fact, as early as 1987 Rockwell Strategic member’s fondest dream. Perhaps we should Defense Initiative researchers reported that if judge it in that context (in which it excels NET ASSESSMENT 79

admirably) rather than as an authentic space augment his father's legend, yet it was fa- novel. milial devotion and a deep-seated need for Maj Thomas C. Blow II, USAF acceptance—disguised as political conviction— Scott AFB, Illinois that drove him to serve in Southeast Asia. As the author was about to discover, the Vietnam War was a poor vehicle for self-validation. Lieutenant Puller arrived in South Vietnam in the summer of 1968 and immediately as- Fortunate Son: The Autobiography of Lewis B. sumed command of "a surly bunch of teenage Puller. Jr. by Lewis B. Puller, Jr. New York misfits” in northern I Corps. The author grew to 10003: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, 389 pages, dislike Vietnamese peasants—whose studied $21.95. indifference towards their liberators bordered Fortunate Son is a major contribution to the on overt hostility—and the futility of search- growing “literature of testimony” surrounding and-destroy missions, which were actually the Vietnam War. It describes in searing detail "placate and pacify" operations. His disgust the physical and emotional price that Lewis only worsened when he was reassigned to the Puller. Jr., paid for serving in an unpopular war perimeter defense of Da Nang. In the coastal and for trying to live up to the impossible wastelands of the South China Sea, Lieutenant legacy established by a doting father. Puller confronted an unseen enemy who tor- To many Americans, Lt Gen Lewis ("Chesty”) mented his men with booby traps and small- Puller remains a symbol of fighting courage. He scale hit-and-run ambushes. It was a dirty little served in the United States Marine Corps for 37 war that the author grew to despise. Because he years (1918-55), fought in five wars, and re- felt personally responsible for the deaths and ceived more awards and decorations— injuries suffered by his men, Lieutenant Puller including five Navy Crosses—than any other came to loathe the albatross of command. As person in Marine Corps history. He was also an the author notes, "I wondered how many eter- uncomplicated cold warrior who quietly en- nities I could survive before the pressures of couraged his son to follow in his footsteps, command finally broke me" (page 140). His which Lewis B. Puller, Jr., eventually did. The purgatorial predicament ended on 8 October latter did so because he was a dutiful son who 1968. While on a search-and-destroy mission idolized his father. To his son, Chesty Puller near Viem Dong, Lieutenant Puller confronted a was a doting mentor and an Olympian god. He squad of North Vietnamese army soldiers. was fearless and incapable of mistakes or un- When his rifle malfunctioned, the author tried fairness, and it was these idealized qualities to escape and stepped on a booby-trapped that the author tried to emulate. howitzer round. As his mangled body lay on The son's motives, however, remained the ground, how did Chesty Puller’s son react? primitive—he was “desperate” for his father's On the one hand, he felt elated at the prospect approval, and he wanted other men to admire of relinquishing his command and going home. him as they did his father. As a result, the au- On the other hand, he felt profound guilt over thor subsequently clothed himself in his fa- abandoning his men and failing to prove him- ther’s values. He unquestioningly adopted the self worthy of his father’s name. The validation elder Puller's hostility towards “monolithic of Lieutenant Puller's sacrifice would now have communism" and came to associate patriotism to occur on the home front, but it would come with retarding its growth. The escalation of the belatedly and at great emotional cost. Vietnam War thus gave Lewis Puller. Jr., an op- The author’s injuries were horrendous and portunity to serve in a holy crusade and gain temporarily turned him into a “snarling ani- the approbation of his father. As a result, the mal." He lost both legs and massive portions of author joined the Marine Corps in the autumn his buttocks, and required numerous operations of 1967. He decided to become a combat pla- to restore partial use of his hands. His ruined toon leader because, in his words, “I could not hands, however, prevented him from learning have faced my father ... if I had chosen an to walk with artificial limbs. Lewis Puller, Jr., easier option" (page 47). With Lieutenant would remain in a wheelchair forever. From a Puller’s assignment to the 1st Marine legal standpoint, he was 100 percent disabled Division—a unit previously commanded by several times over, and after nearly two years of Chesty Puller—family destiny seemed secure. hospitalization—which Fortunate Son de- There was. however, a problem. Lewis Puller, scribes in unflinching detail—the author felt Jr., basically lacked the aptitude and the will to discarded and used. He also felt that his sacri- 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 fice had been in vain. The reason was simple. ther. so he safely focuses on categories or While large numbers of Americans increasingly institutions. As a result, the author’s psycholog- demonized Vietnam veterans as bloodthirsty ical motives and responses, as synopsized in killers and misfits, Lewis Puller, Jr., still this review, are often obscured and must be thirsted for recognition and acceptance. Unfor- pieced together. This is the only blemish in an tunately, most Americans now demanded that otherwise splendid book. he remain invisible. They also demanded that Maj Peter Faber, USAF he act "normal,” while also suggesting that he New Haven, Connecticut was the unlucky detritus of an ignoble cause. As a result, the author raged against others and loathed himself. Lewis Puller. Jr., did take steps to rebuild his Dauntless Helldivers: A Dive-Bomber Pilot’s life. He earned a law degree from the College of Epic Story of the Carrier Battles by Harold L. William and Mary and subsequently worked in Buell. New York 10022: Orion Books, 1991, the general counsel’s office of the Veterans Ad- 348 pages, $22.00. ministration; he was a member of the 1974-75 Presidential Clemency Board, which cleared 95 Dauntless Helldivers is an account of what it percent of the 5,000 deserters and draft evaders took to become a superb dive-bomber pilot, as who sought pardons; and in 1978 he unsuc- was Harold L. Buell. The author is the only sur- cessfully ran for Congress against a combat- viving veteran to have participated in four of evading "patriot.” Yet, in each case the author’s the five carrier battles that took place in the Pa- motives remained self-centered. He tried, but cific during World War II. In addition to his ex- failed, to convince himself that he was in con- pertise as a pilot, Buell had courage and—by trol of his destiny and that he had survived his his own admission—a little bit of luck. wounds for a reason. But beneath the surface, Buell jumped at the chance to become a Navy Lewis Puller, Jr., remained adrift and resentful. pilot, leaving college after two years. The ar- He still compared himself unfavorably with his duous training that he and his fellow aviators now-dead father. As the author notes, “I ... endured eventually led to his earning the cov- wished I had been more like him. and I won- eted "wings of gold,” the badge of a naval avia- dered if I would always find myself inadequate tor. The book clearly conveys his love of flight when I compared myself with him" (page 274). training at Opa-Locka Field near Miami, Flor- Sadly, Lewis Puller, Jr., ultimately found a ida, as well as the extracurricular social ac- bogus peace in alcohol. With unsparing hon- tivities enjoyed by the cadets there. esty. the latter part of Fortunate Son describes Upon graduation from flight training on 1 the besotted author's spiritual collapse and November 1941, he attained one of the most fragile rebirth. His recovery stemmed from the sought-after assignments in aviation—duty as a unconditional acceptance he found in Alco- carrier pilot. By the end of April 1942, he was holics Anonymous, the belated appreciation of on the USS Yorktown waiting for action. This Vietnam veterans, and the equanimous realiza- came soon enough at Coral Sea and Midway, tion that he would never be able to fill his fa- where he flew fleet coverage. Acknowledging ther’s shoes. After a terrifying spiritual odyssey, that the US fleet took the best the Japanese Lewis Puller, Jr., finally concludes that he had could give at Coral Sea, he nevertheless crit- fought the good fight and that he had done so icizes Navy leadership for using 23 hapless with dignity. In short, he makes his own sepa- SBD Dauntless aircraft as defensive fighters in rate peace. an antitorpedo plane patrol instead of em- As suggested earlier. Fortunate Son is a re- ploying them against the Japanese carriers. Like markable portrait of one veteran’s quest for many others, Buell feels that the Substantial meaning and acceptance. Its only flaw, if such a Japanese losses at Midway—four carriers and word is appropriate under the circumstances, is 322 aircraft, together with their valuable senior that its brutal honesty is selective. Throughout pilots—turned the tide of the war in the Pacific. the book, Lewis Puller, Jr., rails against abstrac- But we gained the advantage at great cost. After tions such as the American people, the United losing many of his close friends during those States Marine Corps ("the Marine Corps builds fateful 30 days. Buell was never the same. stumps”), the Selective Service System, and the The author next fought with the "Cactus Air Veterans Administration. Chesty Puller, how- Force” at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal for ever. remains sacrosanct. The loving son re- three months during the battle for that island. fuses to acknowledge any anger against his fa- He notes that the 11 pilots of Flight 300 from NET ASSESSMENT 81

the USS Enterprise were the first carrier flyers intent is to explain why base sites were se- to operate from a land base against the Japanese lected and to provide guidance for future in World War II. He bombed enemy warships planners. and transports that were attempting to reinforce Since the Wright brothers first sold an air- the island. Buell captures the ferocity of the plane to the Army in 1909, there have been battle and emphasizes the importance of stop- three general criteria for locating airfields: geo- ping the Japanese resupply attempts. He con- graphic, military, and political. Air bases re- siders it miraculous that so much was accom- quire physical characteristics such as good plished with so little and is amazed that ground weather, extensive space, level terrain, as well crew's could keep planes flying despite the as proximity to industry, surface transportation proximity of the enemy lines and the danger facilities, and a labor supply. Bases must also from snipers. be located to serve military purposes: air de- Although he expected a training assignment fense requires bases near the borders, but train- after a well-deserved leave, Buell w-as asked to ing bases are more in need of suitable flying return to combat because men of his age and weather. Political considerations are also im- experience w-ere like "nuggets of gold." He par- portant, and Brown argues that the dominance ticipated in many attacks on Japanese worships, of geographic and military considerations in support vessels, and ground targets at Truk, the airfield location has increasingly given way to ‘‘Jimas,” the Marianas, and the Philippines, and political concerns. During the Depression, mili- became known as one of the best dive-bomber tary installations became an important factor in pilots in the Navy. Buell relates how' the might local economies, often meaning either pros- of the US Navy had changed since his Cactus perity or poverty. The case of Selma Field, Ala- Air Force days, maintaining that the Truk raids bama, is instructive: the arrival of the Air Corps proved that his larger unit—Task Force 58— increased the city’s annual payroll from $1.75 could go anywhere and establish air superi- million to $4 million. But simultaneously, the ority. Perhaps the author’s greatest achievement services suffered severe budget cuts necessitat- was his lead attack and direct hit on the Jap- ing base closures, an explosive issue. Then as anese carrier Zuikaku in the first battle of the now, most politicians wanted to trim the mili- Philippine Sea. tary budget but always by closing a facility in This exciting personal account is packed not someone else’s district. Brown’s lesson for mili- only with stories about life as a carrier dive- tary planners is obvious: don’t expect the logic bomber pilot but also with interesting anec- of geographic or military necessity to always dotes about life on the home front. Buell quotes prevail. personal accounts from other sources, but his The author’s argument is compelling, but a own experiences carry the book. Although he more detailed analysis of the economic impact waited a long time to tell his story, perhaps the of bases on nearby communities—crucial to his best tales are the last ones told. thesis regarding the dominance of politics in Dr George M. Watson, Jr. site selection—would have been useful. The Washington. D.C. case of Selma noted above, though perhaps typical, is the only one cited. In addition, Brown’s complaints that the Air Corps was continually starved for construction funds in the interwar Where Eagles Land: Planning a>4-Qei^lop- years are suspect. For example, the junior of- ment of U.S. Army Airfields/1910-19l^\by ficer quarters at Maxwell and Randolph Jerold E. Brown. WestporrsXLonnecJi^ut fields—complete with servants’ quarters—can 06881: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1990, 141 only be described as palatial. Although built in pages. $39.95. the 1930s, even today these homes are so sump- tuous that only generals and colonels are as- Secure bases, including airfields, are essen- signed them. Life was certainly not austere for a tial for military operations. How bases are lieutenant and his family stationed at Maxwell planned and developed is not a particularly Field during the Depression. In addition, the glamorous story, and very little has been writ- author has been poorly served by his editor. ten on it. Jerold E. Brown, a professor at the The prose is awkward in spots and in need of Army's Command and General Staff College, re- tightening. Moreover, there are an inordinate dresses this deficiency with a well-researched number of misspellings and typesetting errors and workmanlike narrative tracing air base de- that seriously detract and distract. velopment up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. His Overall, this is a useful and interesting study 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 that illuminates a forgotten subject. More im- volves military personnel from the chairman of portantly, Brown’s thesis regarding the signifi- the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through members in cance of political and economic factors on the the services’ special operations units (i.e., the location of military bases is timely. Military Air Force’s 1st Special Operations Wing at planners can learn from this book as they chart Hurlburt Field, Florida), down to the most the future of their service. junior enlisted Army SF team members. Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF A complex operation like "hammer" cannot Maxwell AFB, Alabama be carried out by the US military alone. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plays a role, embroiling the director, selected senior advisors, and field operatives. Agent Kate West- land is the major CIA liaison officer, who conveniently happens to be capable and Eyes of the Hammer by Bob Mayer. Novato, attractive—features that Riley cannot ignore. California 94949: Presidio Press, 1991, 330 Thrown in are people—both useful and pages. $19.95. worthless—from the Drug Enforcement Agency, The drug lords and other assorted bad the State Department, and, of course, the White “hombres” in Colombia are getting hammered House inner circles of power. again by "gringos” promoting truth, justice, and Corrupt politicians, nasty accomplices, and the American way. In a military technothriller brutal criminal elements abound on the drug- worthy of its genre. Bob Mayer joins the ranks producing and distributing side. Chief among of Tom Clancy in Clear and Present Danger, them are leaders of the drug cartel families in Stephen Coonts in Under Siege, and Dale Colombia, with the ruthless “ring man" being Brown in Hammerheads in hitting the drug the most dangerous of all. In an original pitting kingpins where it hurts. Eyes of the Hammer. of good versus evil, the explosive climax will Mayer's first novel, is an auspicious beginning. definitely hold the reader’s attention at the end. A former Green Beret, Mayer writes about the The book does have some weaknesses. The little-known world of US Army Special Forces first half seems drawn out as Mayer develops (SF). A select group of hardened warriors is in- his characters, explains how SF troops do their serted into Colombia as the state-of-the-art business, and creates a believable crisis that re- "eyes” of a secret US military operation to quires special operations. Some scenarios seem strike (i.e.. "hammer”) the main cocaine proc- too contrived. For instance, the conflict be- essing laboratories and thus put the heat on the tween "A” teams led by Riley and Vaughn fol- drug cartel. The covert operations " A ” teams lows the usual stereotype of the know-it-all carry the call signs “nail one, nail two," and so young officer who tries to override the exper- on. tise of the combat-ready subordinate. Besides, Like most good technothriller writers, Mayer the use of Vaughn in general is questionable has a central protagonist to build his story since he and his team are in and out of the around. Whereas Clancy has Jack Ryan and story so quickly. Moreover, the long-standing Coonts has Jake Grafton, Mayer has common controversy over male and female roles in com- man hero Dave Riley. Streetwise and tough. bat is overdone, as evidenced by the problems Warrant Officer Riley is a team leader on the between a helicopter copilot (a male captain) clandestine missions. An example of the and his pilot (a female warrant officer with Army’s "be all you can be" type of profes- more flying hours), who is in command of the sional. Riley respects his superiors but is more aircraft. interested in taking care of his own troops at all Notwithstanding these minor points, Mayer times. He demands as much from himself as has written a very good first novel and has from them, especially during SF operations. established himself as one of today’s better mil- Riley must work with a cast of supporting itary technothriller writers. A background in characters—strong, weak, and in-between. special operations gives him credibility and un- From the military comes his boss for this mis- derstanding from “having been there and done sion, Colonel Pike, a legend among Green Be- that.” Mayer is working on two other novels on rets, who is fed up with the Pentagon bu- Green Beret exploits. One can expect them to reaucracy. Others include Captain Vaughn, be even more absorbing and powerful than this assigned as an “eyes of the hammer" team chief successful debut. and Master Sergeant Powers, Riley’s able assis- Lt Col Frank P. Donnini, USAF tant. The covert operation into Colombia in- Langley AFB. Virginia NET ASSESSMENT 83

Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Gordon W. Prange—author of such books as Ugaki, 1941-1945 translated by Masataka At Down We Slept, Miracle at Midway. Target Chihaya and edited by Donald M. Goldstein Tokyo, and God's Samurai—secured the and Katherine V. Dillon. Pittsburgh 15213: English-language rights to Ugaki's diary while University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991, 728 assigned to Gen Douglas MacArthur’s head- pages, $29.95. quarters in 1945. The diary was invaluable to Prange when he wrote his books about the Pa- This remarkable diary provides new insight cific war, and he had always hoped to have the into how one Japanese admiral viewed the Pa- diary published in English for American histo- cific war. In fact, it is the only candid, personal rians to examine. The editors, Donald M. Gold- account of the war by a major Japanese military stein and Katherine V. Dillon, are to be com- leader. A career naval officer. Adm Matome mended for the thorough job they have done. Ugaki was appointed chief of staff of the Com- The diary is divided into 12 parts, each pre- bined Fleet on 10 August 1940. It was this force ceded by a brief commentary which highlights which struck Pearl Harbor. Ugaki served in this details and offers additional explanations about capacity under Adm Isoroku Yamamoto until the entries. both were shot down over Bougainville Island This book is strongly recommended to all on 18 April 1943. Yamamoto was killed, but World War II historians since it is the only can- Ugaki survived and was assigned to the Naval did account of the war by a high-ranking Jap- General Staff. He served there until he went to anese officer. Admiral Ugaki’s writing takes sea again on 25 February 1944 in command of readers from the naval staff in Tokyo to the the First Battleship Division, which included bridge of the battleship Yamato and then the battleships Yamato and Musashi. He de- whisks them from the Combined Fleet con- scribes in vivid detail the destruction and sink- ferences to the South Pacific jungles to a ing of the Musashi in the battle of Leyte Gulf. bunker where Ugaki plans the last-ditch ka- Ugaki was later entrusted with the command of mikaze attacks. Fading Victory is indeed a very the Fifth Air Fleet on Kyushu and organized personal account of the Pacific war from 1941 the famous Special Attack Corps (Tokkotai), to 1945. which conducted suicide attacks against the 1st Lt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF ever-advancing American forces. Bolling AFB. Washington. D.C. Not only is the diary full of strategy, tactics, planning, combat, military thinking, and domestic politics, it also contains critical comments and historical, valuable information on Touch the Sky by Harold Livingston. New York Japan's conduct of the war. Interesting ap- 10016: Morrow, 1991, 432 pages, $19.95. praisals of all of Japan’s enemies (United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, China, and So- Looking for a good novel to read between viet Union) and allies (Italy and Germany) are those technothrillers and real-life experiences? contained in the diary. One can also clearly fol- Touch the Sky would be an excellent choice. low Ugaki’s change in thinking as Japanese de- Harold Livingston has written a work of histor- feats mount. At the opening of the war, we find ical fiction that traces the development of the an admiral who believed in Japan's destiny and aviation industry from World War I to the jet the rightness of its cause. Although arrogant at age. His vehicle for that development is the ex- the opening of the war, he soon tastes bitter de- ploits of Simon ("Si”) Conway, who is driven feat at Midway and becomes even more dis- to build an aviation empire. turbed when Admiral Yamamoto is killed. The Si is introduced as a pilot with the Lafayette reader clearly senses that despite Ugaki’s ra- Escadrille in the air war over France. His ac- tionalization of defeats, he slowly begins to re- complishments as a fighter pilot earn him dis- alize the undeniable fact that the US is growing tinction as an ace and as a nonconformist. stronger while Japan is growing weaker. Al- Livingston’s characterization of Si brings to though he is grimly determined to fight to the mind Bruno Stachel, the German fighter ace last man. he cannot explain what is happening from Jack Hunter’s novel The Blue Max. Like to Japan and is powerless to prevent the final Stachel, Si is out to win. no matter what it defeat. Upon hearing the news of the emperor’s takes. To Si, the chivalry exhibited by his surrender. Ugaki sets off on a suicide mission enemies and comrades is as archaic as the with his Special Attack Corps and is killed 15 massed infantry tactics used in the trenches August 1945. against the machine gun. As a result. Si is an 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 outcast with an unswerving drive to accom- Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the plish goals that he alone knows and has envi- Third World by Janne E. Nolan. Washington, sioned. This drive will push him throughout D.C. 20036: Brookings Institution, 1991, 167 his life. pages. After World War I, Si begins the arduous task of building a fledgling aircraft manufacturing Missile Defense in the 21st Century: Protection company and an airline. Former enemies be- against Limited Threats, Including Lessons come his friends, while current business part- from the Gulf War by Keith B. Payne. Boul- ners as well as former friends and business der. Colorado 80301: Westview Press, 1991, partners become his enemies. These reversals 157 pages. are due to Si’s drive and ambition, which make A year ago. most Americans—including winning the only acceptable outcome. As air- many military people—had never heard of a craft are designed, constructed, tested, man- Scud and thought that Patriots were a New Eng- ufactured, and delivered, Livingston’s charac- land football team. Then along came Operation terization of Si reflects images of Howard Desert Storm. Suddenly, it became apparent Hughes. Just as Hughes fought to prove to the that Soviets and Americans weren't the only world that the design for the “Spruce Goose” people who had ballistic missiles and that aircraft was viable. Si—wearing Hughes’s style these weapons came in forms other than inter- of leather jacket and brown fedora—fights to continental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The threat prove that his aircraft are the best and that his posed by ballistic missiles became very real, vision for himself, his family, and his company and we discovered that we knew precious little is the only path to success. about them. For military people, the need to Si meets numerous challenges that are road- “get smart” in a hurry was especially urgent. blocks to his progress. He removes or circum- The Scud busters of the US Army’s Patriot mis- vents these obstacles as the story line moves sile batteries had become international heroes, through the 1920s and 1930s (including the war and solving the problems associated with de- in China), the Spanish Civil War, World War II, stroying missiles in flight became important— and into the jet age. not just science fiction or a corollary of “Star Throughout the novel. Si’s primary foe and Wars.’’ Who had these missiles? Could we friend is Karl Eisler. Unlike Si, Karl is a man shoot all of them down? What else existed or from the old school who follows a strict code of was being developed to stop these missiles? honor. Meeting for the first time in the skies How could we stop their spread? over France, they build upon their vision for Three books can help us answer these ques- the aviation industry in the postwar era. How- tions and get smart on ballistic missiles. Al- ever. these opposites must eventually clash. though published independently, these books If there is a weakness to Touch the Sky, it form a natural trilogy that takes us from igno- would have to be in the development of the rance on the subject, through the basics of the supporting characters. Granted, Si and Karl missile world, and into the military and politi- dominate the main story; however, their inter- cal issues concerning the proliferation and con- action with family, business associates, and trol of ballistic missiles. enemies forms the basis of who and what Si W. Seth Carus’s Ballistic Missiles in the and Karl are.-More detail in the development of Third World is the place to begin for anyone a few of the subordinate characters would aid with either limited or nonexistent knowledge in the story line's development. This is about the subject. Published as part of the especially true after the book shifts to the post- Washington Papers series from the Center for World War II era. Despite this weakness, Touch Strategic and International Studies, it is an ex- the Sky is an excellent choice for leisurely cellent primer on who the players are in the reading. world of ballistic missiles. Although readers Capt David K. Swafford. USAF with a strong background in ballistic missiles Kirtland AFB, New Mexico or arms control may complain that its treatment of the subject lacks depth, novices will appreciate the fact that it lays out all the basics without being condescending. The text discusses the Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat various types of tactical ballistic missiles and and Response by W- Seth Carus. New York identifies who produces them and who buys 10010: Praeger Publishers, 1990, 78 pages. them. Carus views efforts to control the transfer NET ASSESSMENT 85

of missile technology with an eye towards pos- antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty of 1972 and sibilities for international arms control. This Soviet reaction to missile defense. This ex- stance makes the book useful for military of- cellent study also answers critics of GPALS de- ficers or civilians who suddenly find them- velopment and people who would pursue other selves dealing with the subject of missile pro- alternatives. Although perhaps less well known liferation and its policy considerations. than Trappings of Power, Payne’s book is cer- For a more detailed look at such policy con- tainly of the same high caliber. Both are must siderations. the reader should turn to Janne E. reading for anyone who wants to remain well Nolan’s Trappings of Power. As Ms Nolan versed on the subject of tactical ballistic points out. ballistic missiles have taken on a missiles. significance to many third world countries that Desert Storm showed us that ballistic mis- is far out of proportion to their real military siles have indeed matured to the point that we value. Trappings of Power provides statistical must consider them potential factors in future data on missiles and missile programs for third conflicts throughout the world. Although the world countries as a background to related pol- Scud (actually rather unsophisticated in terms icy matters. Not only does she give a detailed of current missile technology) was the missile treatment of how superpowers and tech- that caught our attention, we need to become nologically advanced nations have transferred aware of the overall issue of tactical ballistic missile technology to the third world, she also missiles and their military and political effects relates how third world nations have worked in the years to come. These three fine books both independently and collectively to acquire will take the reader a long way in developing missile technology and produce it themselves. that awareness. I highly recommend each one Her analysis of the technological potential of and especially commend them as a set. these nations with regard to missile production Lt Col Michael A. Kirtland, USAF is thorough and well documented. Most impor- Maxwell AFB. Alabama tantly. perhaps, she carefully considers technology control and arms control as methods of managing ballistic missile proliferation. The potential for international technology control as Combat Recon: My Year with the ARVN by well as the policy conflicts and problems that Robert D. Parrish. New York 10010: Saint make this control so difficult is especially well Martin’s Press, 1991, 291 pages, $19.95. presented. Of the three books reviewed here, Trappings of Power has received the most pub- Although it claims to open a new chapter in lic attention. Given its emphasis on national se- the history of our involvement in Vietnam, curity policy, it will probably be the most Combat Recon is only a modest addition to the widely read as well. Nolan’s study is entirely growing number of personal memoirs about suitable for academic, government, and high- America’s longest war. level military policymakers. From May 1967 through April 1968, the au- Of most direct benefit to people at the opera- thor was a 26-old company grade officer as- tional military level is Keith B. Payne's Missile signed to the 5th ARVN Infantry Division in Defense in the 21st Century. Completed since Binh Duong Province, located immediately the end of Operation Desert Storm, it is an up- north of Saigon and within III Corps. Lieuten- to-date look at the subject of how to defend ant Parrish spent the first portion of his tour as against the growing threat of ballistic missiles a member of a Military Assistance Command in the third world. Payne looks at both the op- Vietnam (MACV) combat advisory team at- erational and political issues involved with tached to the ARVN Division’s 3rd Battalion, antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) develop- 7th Regiment. The 3rd Battalion conducted nu- ment. He emphasizes the potential for global merous search and destroy operations in the protection against limited strikes (GPALS), an Bing Duong area, which also included the in- outgrowth of the Strategic Defense Initiative famous Iron Triangle. During the latter part of (SDI). His discussion goes well beyond purely his tour, the author transferred to another military considerations to include policy-level MACV team assigned to the 5th Reconnais- problems involved in ATBM and GPALS de- sance Company and G-2 Recondo Company. velopment, testing, and potential deployment. The latter group was an intelligence-gathering The author also carefully considers how unit comprised of juvenile delinquents and GPALS development would affect both the criminals who were recruited from prison with 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 the promise of freedom and “a little larceny on attempt to rescue a downed helicopter crew al- the side.” The 5th Recon Company, in turn, ready saved by others. In the case of the South was primarily made up of Nungs, a fierce tribe Vietnamese, unit commanders beat subordi- of ethnic Chinese who compiled an amazing nates, take bribes, and ignore the advice of their combat kill ratio of 15-1. As an adviser to these MACV advisers. Other officers preoccupy unorthodox units. Parrish repeatedly ex- themselves with bureaucratic politics rather perienced the full terror and exhilaration of than military effectiveness. The 5th Division’s counterinsurgency warfare. During the last four Colonel Quan, for example, repeatedly orders months of his tour, for example, he participated the 3rd Battalion into action in order to either in 69 combat operations and came under fire 35 discredit or kill the unit’s capable commander, times. Such a pace exacted a terrible toll. At the Major Man. As 10 other battalions remain idle, conclusion of his tour, 300 of Parrish’s advisers 50 percent of Man’s men literally become the lay dead, and it was their sacrifice that inspired victims of a personal vendetta. Like the 3rd Bat- him to tell his story. talion, other units also lack ammunition, rely Combat Recon is thus a homage to the brave on outdated equipment, and receive only two fighting spirit of the three ARVN units Parrish replacements for every three casualties they advised. However, although the author hopes to suffer. As a result, individual ARVN com- refute the longstanding canard that South Viet- manders avoid contact with the Vietcong, trade namese forces were hopelessly corrupt and mil- enemy “souvenirs” for US equipment, and itarily inept, he is only partially successful. “probably” pay local guerrillas not to operate Parrish’s reminiscences are often exciting, but in their areas. Finally, in contrast to the au- they do not provide a three-dimensional por- thor’s avowed attempt to rehabilitate the image trait of the South Vietnamese fighting man. The of his advisees, Combat Recon confirms that author may affectionately refer to his advisees the ARVN was often cowardly and inept. Dur- as “my people,” but they either remain faceless ing the Tet offensive, for example. Parrish ob- and in the background or they are mostly card- serves a panic-stricken battalion retreat after board figures: the 3rd Battalion commander, for only a brief firefight in the village of Phu example, is short, personable, and “given to Cuong. Five South Vietnamese tanks then ap- broad smiles and a bit of bull__ t.” while the pear. The lead tank, after absorbing only on? re- G-2 intelligence officer is a “sharp officer” and coilless rifle or RPG round, reverses itself and politically astute. And so it goes. Combat Recon collides with a second tank. The crews then is little more than a simple tale of battles and abandon their vehicles and flee with the re- firefights as experienced by a highly capable maining three tanks. And so it goes. and thoroughly obnoxious American lieuten- Finally, and as suggested earlier, there is the ant. But even the tale is suspect as history, problem of Robert Parrish. It is not unfair to say since the author readily admits that his re- that in 1967-68 he was an immature yahoo and collections are an impressionistic reconstruc- that his unpalatable personality mars Combat tion of especially memorable events supple- Recon. Parrish, for example, disparages combat- mented with random images and emotions. ants without experience, yet he conveniently Nevertheless, Combat Recon does recall, un- glosses over his own evolution from a fanuge wittingly or not, many of the pathologies we (f__ ing new guy) to a savvy jungle fighter. He now associate with the Vietnam War. They ap- repeatedly demonstrates a sneering disdain for pear both in the American and South Viet- the chain of command, which he describes as namese armies, and thus undercut Parrish’s at- “legalistic bull__ t." He further disdains intel- tempt to rehabilitate the image of the ARVN ligence officers: stab-in-the-back journalists; fighting man. In the case of the Americans, the party-loving military bureaucrats; and MACV author provides individual examples of malfea- directives, which he repeatedly ignores. But sance and human folly. They include a colonel most unfortunately, Parrish develops jungle- who confuses body counts with military suc- tainted, topsy-turvy ethical standards. For ex- cess and directs chaotic firefights from the ample, how does one neutralize the hated Colo- obscure safety of a high-flying helicopter, a bat- nel Quan? Why, kill him, of course! As the au- talion commander who seeks joint operations thor observes: “I never dismissed the idea of with South Vietnamese units because they are killing Quan during the entire time 1 was with “career enhancing,” and a thick-witted captain the 5th ARVN Division. If I thought I would who receives the Purple Heart for nonexistent have gotten away with it, 1 might have" (page wounds and a Silver Star for an uncoordinated 68). Then there is the case of Sergeant Likens, a NET ASSESSMENT 87

MACV enlisted adviser who drunkenly fires his and racist Japan into aggression in the early weapon at a training center near Nha Trang. twentieth century—fascism, ethnic superiority, Not onlv does Parrish remove the evidence, he the Bushido code, chauvinism, and militarism. also lies about the culpability of his besotted Not surprisingly, the authors dismiss the many friend. Third, there is the example of Parrish’s categories of noneconomic factors that now men stealing American weapons for their restrain Japan from aggression—democratic ARVN counterparts. Does the author ruefully values, a large middle class, Japan's coopera- regret their actions? Does he feel queasy about tion all across the globe on financial matters, a lying to an Army investigator sent to recover formal alliance with the United States entering the weapons? No! In Parrish’s words, “ I had a its fourth decade, and a much more mature hard time holding in my laughter until the guy economy than in the 1930s, when both trade was out of earshot” (page 249). Ugh! The pro- and manufacturing as a percentage of gross na- tagonist of Combat Recon frequently confuses tional product were much higher than they are swaggering bravado with manliness, and situa- now. tional ethics with military professionalism. As Indeed. Friedman and Lebard subordinate a result, he does not always preserve his integ- and dismiss almost every factor except physical rity in an admittedly difficult war. resources ("Nothing is less permanent in the Given the above problems, who then should history of nations than ideology" (page 17).) To read Combat Recon? Only those interested in try and make their case, the authors tell us that the mechanics of jungle warfare, and those in- Japan’s future economic (and therefore trigued by tales of small arms combat. political-military) desperation will be a function of the fact, for example, that it must import Maj Pete Faber, USAF eight tons of raw materials for every ton of TVs, New Haven, Connecticut cars, and cameras it exports! Certainly that is a new twist in geopolitical analysis: measuring economic health by the ton! From those kinds of arguments we are to conclude that an ex- The Coming War with Japan by George Fried- tremely insecure Japan will inevitably go to war man and Meredith Lebard. New York 10010: with the United States in the next 10 to 20 Saint Martin’s Press, 1991, 403 pages, $24.95. years. Perhaps Professors Friedman and Lebard dis- With the 50th anniversary of Japan’s attack missed all the other nonresource factors be- on Pearl Harbor recently observed, books pre- cause neither is a Japanese or Asian specialist. dicting the future breakdown of the US- Indeed, the authors seem a curious duo. Pro- Japanese alliance are becoming a growth indus- fessor Lebard writes poetry and teaches creative try on both sides of the Pacific, but especially writing. This may explain the book’s readable in Japan, where anything new is fashionable. style but also its many dramatic, and un- This book joins the crowd, but with several dif- qualified, one-liners. Professor Friedman ferences. First, it is a long book, it is not trivial, teaches political theory (favoring the German and it is extensively if very selectively docu- school) and evidently has an interest in commented. Second, it has a completely deter- puters, logistics, and, more recently, resource ministic geopolitical methodology in keeping statistics. In sum, like most yarns. Coming War with Professor Friedman's extreme “ realist makes a fairly good read provided one does not school” views. Third, the book employs essen- take it too seriously. Clearly the marketers at tially one causative factor—Japan's need for Saint Martin's shaped much of it; the idea was physical resources—to explain why World War to make money by alarming people. Thus, for II in the Pacific occurred and why "the coming example, the preposterous title. The actual title war" between the United States and Japan will of this book should have been something like happen in the next 10 to 20 years. Finally, the Japan's Resource Dilemmas. Past and Present, book is being heavily promoted to make money. and How to Manage Their Future Impact Pru- Coming War’s fundamental flaws are imme- dently without Conflict in a Rapidly Changing diately evident. By pegging their case almost Posl-Cold-War World. Try selling a book with exclusively on physical resources as deter- that title! ministic factors and by dismissing politics, ide- Coming War divides into three sections. The ology. culture, and economic cooperation. first argues that World War II in the Pacific was Friedman and Lebard ignore the whole host of inevitable because of Japan's need for physical other factors that propelled an industrializing resources and control of the Pacific Ocean. The 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

second section states that Japan was rebuilt and ruthless; trade frictions must lead to war, economically because the United States needed and so on. What we have in Coming War, then, a cold war anchor from which to confront the is not an objective or comprehensive analysis Soviets in Asia. The third section, when it but a kind of geopolitical yarn. It is not ul- turns to Japan, argues—predictably—that timately a serious book but. from start to finish, Tokyo’s current need for physical resources a completely deterministic and deliberately will inevitably drive Japan into another war alarmist portrayal. Nevertheless, one can take with the United States. away two useful reminders from this curious As the authors step out onto thinner and book. First, Japan is an island nation that must thinner ice, here is a (small) sampling of the import, across thousands of miles of sea-lanes, one-liners that greet the reader who hangs in to most of its raw materials. Second, it would be a the end of the tale: good idea for the United States Navy to con- • “Both the United States and Japan are vic- tinue patrolling those sea-lanes. tims of forces they can neither control nor Dr Lawrence E. Grinter resist” (page xiv). Maxwell AFB. Alabama • “History, particularly the history of nations. repeats itself many times” (page 1). • “Japan would be insane not to prepare itself for war” (page 12). • “Japan and the United States are equally Splash One: Air Victory over Hanoi by Maj driven by fear" (page 19). Gen Walter Kross. McLean, Va. 22102: Bras- • “ Ja pan ’s purpose in WWI1 was to attain sey’s Macmillan, 1991, 300 pages, $21.98. self-sufficiency in industrial minerals” (page 77). On 7 January 1967, the United States Air • “Trade is basically something physical” Force achieved a stunning aerial victory in the (page 161). skies over Hanoi—seven North Vietnamese • “The Chinese must choose between their MiGs shot down with no US losses. This suc- last two options: the Japanese or the Amer- cess did not come easily. The US Air Force was icans” (page 214). being demoralized by a fledgling force of semi- • “Should the United States choose to with- obsolete Soviet-designed fighters. When Col draw from Diego Garcia and the Indian Robin Olds took command of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, he set out to turn this situation Ocean. India would suddenly emerge in around. The wing, flying F-4Cs out of Ubon control [emphasis is mine] of the Hormuz- Royal Thai Air Base, planned and executed a Malacca Line” (page 215). classic exercise of tactical deception by disguis- • “The American encouragement of Japanese ing its aircraft as an F-105 strike force in order military growth is utterly incompatible to get North Vietnam’s air force to commit to with a desire that this not be transformed air-to-air combat. Maj Gen Walt Kross has writ- into a force-projection capability” (page ten a fast-paced and believable fictionalized ac- 266). count of Operation Bolo. As a fighter pilot who • "The end of the cold war leaves Japan the flew 158 missions in Vietnam (100 over the dominant regional naval power, and proba- North), General Kross provides authentic bly the dominant regional land power if episodes from his own participation in the air the United States should choose to with- war as well as from other actual “happenings” draw from the region” (page 267). (Pardee's famous push, Baht busses, and the • “The American question is the most im- Ubon O Club). The details in the book bring portant and darkest for Japan” (page 287), back those “been there, done that" memories • “In 1941. under identical circumstances [to for us old heads. Those of us who participated the early 1990s] Japan chose war” (page in the Vietnam conflict know his characters 402). too. On the American side, there is the Eagle, You get the drift. Col Clint Adams, a hard-charging, unconven- In short, Friedman and Lebard believe that tional, charismatic leader who is forced to work history repeats itself: nations throb to sub- within the Byzantine rules of engagement that merged destinies: statesmen do not make inde- forced the air war into a conflict that gave every pendent choices—they conform to deep histor- advantage to the enemy. Constantly trying to ical currents; oceans are power vacuums that win but still staying within the rules of engage- must be filled; politics is inevitably zero sum ment, he is forced into defending his plan for NET ASSESSMENT 89

aerial victory, not from the North Vietnamese Teheran Embassy was seized in the seventies. but his own headquarters. There is the Pen- He sets out to explain the US government's tagon staff officer who would rather be flying actions. his desk than flying combat in Pack Six and Terrorism and Democracy does not cover the who does his best to undermine his com- full range of terrorist activities. Its central mander. Then there are the pilots who have to emphasis is strictly on hostage-taking. It go “downtown” every day they fly. focuses on comparing the actions of the Carter These are the men who are the real profes- administration with those of other administra- sional soldiers. They volunteered to be fighter tions—particularly those of the Reagan admin- pilots, ipso facto they volunteered to fight the istration. The author provides the reader, and war. They don’t understand why they are pre- possibly future administrations, with some vented from following the sound military doc- guidelines he found when examining the Carter trine of attacking both airfields or surface-to-air years and the actions of others. He gives some missile sites before they are attacked from attention to the early years of the Republic and them, yet they continue to fly and fight against the administrations of Jefferson and others. high odds every day. Splash One also intro- Turner begins by examining some long- duces us to our North Vietnamese adversaries forgotten events along the Barbary Coast. A as real people with real feelings and motiva- very young United States lost merchant mari- tions. The Dragon. Col Nguyen Tomb, is a skill- ners and often paid ransom and tribute to pro- ful leader of his small but deadly air force. He tect its fledgling trade. Later with the USS continually shepherds his inexperienced pilots, Pueblo. President Lyndon Johnson paid a price having them attack American weaknesses. He is after prolonged negotiations. Turner makes a caught between his own nationalistic pride and case that negotiations and paying the price the requirement to lean on his Soviet adviser have been well established as a viable option in for technical expertise. He likes neither the dealing with terrorists when other options have Americans nor the Russians, feeling that both been closed. countries are exploiting his people. The clash The author turns his attention from historical between the Eagle and the Dragon is a clash be- precedence to the events in Iran. He provides tween leadership styles and cultures as much the reader some inside glimpses of the Carter as a clash between individual pilots. years and the pain of trying to find some option The first novel by an active duty Air Force that would meet the standards set by the presi- general gives those of us who were not there for dent. the Congress, and the American people. America’s best single day in the air war a He examines the reasons and lines of argument glimpse of what it was like. This is an authentic for option after option. He then examines the military story that will be enjoyed by anyone aftermath of the rescue attempt for the lessons who is interested in modern aerial combat. the author believes this option provided. Special attention is given to the Reagan years Col Stu Mosbey, USAF and the problems in Lebanon. One might think Moody AFB, Georgia at first that Turner is attempting to justify the Carter administration's action by denigrating those of Reagan. However, he provides other basic options in light of the sheer number of Terrorism and Democracy by Stansfield Turner. hostage incidents and the range of terrorist ac- Boston 02108: Houghton Mittiin Company, tions that took place after the Israeli invasion 1991. 240 pages, $22.95. and the deployment of the multinational force. These options, while not heralded as princi- Admiral Turner served as director of the Cen- ples. do follow the basic theme that underlines tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Carter ad- Turner’s writing—here and in his book about ministration and as commander in chief of the CIA years. NATO's Southern Flank. He states that he has Basically, the principles or policy options are undertaken this book at the recommendation of (1) assassinations are neither an appropriate his literary agent (p. xi). Its purpose is to pull nor an effective counterterroristic tactic; (2) together what Turner states is a lack in the liter- punitive military attacks are a remedy we ature of terrorism—relating the phenomena, its should use but use sparingly; (3) covert actions objectives, and how it is handled in light of the should be undertaken, but this must be done ju- principles of democracy. The book has another diciously because the probability of success is value to the reader, albeit unwritten. Turner low; (4) rescue operations have a role but will was an insider'' to the events when the continue to be risky for the United States; (5) 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 improved intelligence, especially human intel- Kiiwait. Triumph in the Desert has a 45,000- ligence (HUMINT), is always desirable but dif- word lead essay that makes it easier to under- ficult to achieve; (6) restraint of the media stand and to grasp the importance of the 160 could be helpful, but modest self-restraint is color photographs and illustrations that follow. the most we can expect; (7) economic sanctions CNN: War in the Gulf has an impressive team should be used against state sponsors of terror- of authors led by project director Charles D. ism, even if they take a long time to be effec- Hyman that includes three coauthors who each tive; (8) defensive security is unlikely to receive have extensive military reporting backgrounds: sufficient attention or money; (9) deals are an Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry, Jr., and option we cannot rule out; and (10) legal re- Norman Polmar. Triumph was written by Peter course is the option most compatible with David, a respected correspondent for The American values. Economist, and edited by Ray Cave and Pat Besides the problems with the Reagan admin- Ryan. istration’s handling of the events examined, the The book has a comprehensive photographic admiral examines some other problems. Chief panorama of the conflict and includes photo- among these is the problem of congressional graphs from more than one source. Its use of US oversight. While sounding nice in principle, military photographs and the work of military especially when one wants to berate the execu- artists gives the book a different feel than CNN, tive branch for an action taken, Turner illus- which is essentially a CNN news product. Both trates that it can be a major problem when prac- books use too many peacetime standard ticed. Fear of leaks and delays are well known. “canned” pictures of allied and Iraqi weapons Turner provides the reader with his insights used in the Gulf when it would have been more and experience. effective to use photographs taken in the area of Overall, the book is well written and is far operations. Numerous incorrect identifications more interesting than his earlier work. It has a of military hardware and badly written photo greater discussion of events to help the author captions distract from the quality of CNN: War illustrate his points, is more comparative in a in the Gulf. substantive sense, and has a better writing style From a horrific photograph of an Iraqi firing to grab the reader’s attention than the author’s squad and other haunting photographs of hu- previous work. As they used to say in the re- man suffering to the triumph of American tech- viewer's Marine Corps of the 1950s, “Admiral, nology and the soldier on the battlefield, the you got yourself a 4.0—Well Done." reader will be able to see all the events. Pic- Peter Charles Unsinger tures of the F-117 stealth fighter will thrill, San Jose State University while the Scud bombardment of Israel and the land satellite (LANDSAT) imagery of oil damage in the Gulf and Kuwait will sicken. The losses experienced by some American families is directlv captured in the pictures of the grief- stricken family of a Marine captain at Arlington CNN; War in the Gulf from the Invasion of National Cemetery. A brief summary of the Kuwait to the Day of Victory and Beyond by Kurdish refugee problem is provided at the end Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry, and of both books. Norman Polmar. Atlanta 30348: Turner Pub- Unfortunately, CNN comes across as being lishing, Inc., 1991, 240 pages. $19.95. too much a media event, and the "glorification Triumph in the Desert: The Challenge, the of Peter Arnett leaves the reader asking just Fighting, the Legacy by Peter David. New what exactly is being commemorated, the vic- York 10022: Random House, 1991, 209 pages, tory or CNN’s ability to cover a war live and in color? Although Triumph is better, it still suf- $25.00. fers from the haste with which the book was The aftermath of the Gulf war has led to the produced. In both cases, items were left out, publication of a wealth of books, some targeted and it is still too early to have a comprehensive, at a specific audience and others more general well-researched book of the Gulf War. Triumph in nature. Triumph in the Desert and CNN: War does give the reader a pictorial history of the in the Gulf are two comprehensive, illustrated war, while CNN illustrates what networks can volumes that are attempts to give the reader a accomplish in this day and age without neces- complete history of the war. sarily having any claim to completeness or Both volumes begin with a review of the accuracy. events that took place prior to the invasion of Finally, both books have a surprising lack of NET ASSESSMENT 91

illustrations of the air campaign, which played the reader who believes that our troops always such a crucial role in winning the war. Mem- have enough to eat. For seven days, bad bers of the other armed forces will undoubtedly weather prevented the aerial delivery of sup- find similar faults as they search for good pho- plies. Without even emergency rations. Miller tographs and representations of their service in and his men might have grown too weak to de- the conflict. fend themselves in a firefight had they not ILt Gilles Van Nederveen. USAF risked ambush to hunt wild game and taken the Washington, D.C. chance of revealing their location by cooking it. After several years in airborne infantry reconnaissance, Miller successfully requested assignment to the top headquarters in Vietnam, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam— Reflections of a Warrior by Franklin Miller Special Operations Group (MACV-SOG). Miller with Elwood J.C. Kureth. Novato, California was assigned to SOG-35—the ground studies 94949: Presidio Press, 1991, 205 pages, group—whose combat-oriented mission in- $19.95. cluded everything from setting ambushes to In the spring of 1969. after seeing The Green capturing enemy soldiers to using wiretaps. Berets starring John Wayne at Fort Leonard Miller's extensive experience with weapons Wood, Missouri, I joined several other engineer added to his confidence to the point that peo- trainees in discussing whether the film was a ple sensed the danger he exuded. This added to comedy and speculating about the number of his desire to stay in Vietnam since he realized times the hero would have been killed on a real that he couldn’t act that way in the States. battlefield. Franklin Miller’s account of his six- Miller takes the reader on mission after mis- years of combat in Vietnam makes John sion and offers a superb description of what it Wayne’s fictional hero look like some high felt like: school basketball prospect attempting to stop There you are, skimming rapidly about the Michael Jordan. Fact, as Miller writes it, proves jungle vegetation as you rush toward the mo- more incredible than fiction. ment when you and six other guys will be Miller and his coauthor, Elwood J.C. Kureth. swallowed up by a hostile jungle with no help state that they are not setting the record straight around the corner. You’re fully aware that or preaching a certain point of view; their ob- within the next several minutes you might be jective is to entertain. The work is a remarkable killed or—God forbid—maimed. You know succession of war stories, likely to impress only too well that your survival depends even those of us who served in Vietnam. The mainly on your abilities to move undetected reader experiences Miller’s growth from a like a phantom and to shoot your weapon with "cherry” (new guy) to his earning a Bronze deadly accuracy. You must also rely on the Star, Silver Star, and finally the Medal of skills of those around you, not to mention a Honor. combination of cleverness, audacity, and luck, At the end of his first year in Vietnam, Miller (page 149) realized that—unlike most soldiers—he did not want to go home. By his own admission, he Unfortunately, Miller fails to tell enough couldn't get enough of war. He loved the chal- about himself or to develop subordinate charac- lenge of leading other guys on dangerous mis- ters. We know little about his past, his boy- sions. To his way of thinking, only in Vietnam hood, or his belief that he could not attain the could a private first class have so much respon- same freedom or status in peaceful pursuits. I sibility. gain so much respect, and have such should like to know what events or persons in freedom to operate. Most important, Miller his past drove him to embrace the thrill of com- learned how to remain calm in dangerous situa- bat instead of living a more constructive life. tions. The more time he spent in Vietnam, the No doubt he is different, for he loves action and sharper he honed his combat skills and the less feels comfortable courting death. He appears to afraid he became. He truly believed that he be able to kill easily, but he is not a crazed would not be killed in Vietnam. killer. He acquired skills that are invaluable in Miller mentions many incidents that were wartime, but we never learn why he wanted not related to combat. His several encounters them. It is hard to understand what makes him with deadly snakes are both humorous and in- tick. More difficult still is believing that any triguing. His account about how his unit nearly one man could have endured such traumatic starved to death is fascinating, especially for experiences and still return for more. Miller 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992 claims he cheated death on several occasions. some incredible happenings and fighting dur- This is an understatement, since he was ing the Vietnam War. Miller’s account should wounded several times. be a treasured training resource for the armed Reflections of a Warrior is very difficult to services. He is a great storyteller and deserves put down. It is an action-packed account of much credit for recording his recollections. Dr George M. Watson, Jr. Washington, D.C.

I Can Write Better Than That! OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you’ve got something to say, send it to us. We’ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpower Journal focuses on the operational level of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are interested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 15,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional events of a noncommer- cial nature should be sent to the Editor, Air- power Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg. 1400, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

Air University Review Index nology (AFIT). with a follow-on assignment to The Air University Press has published a com- the Military Studies Division. Applicants plete index of the Air University Review (1947- should have three to seven years of commis- 87). This reference work contains an author sioned service, an outstanding military record, index, a title index, and a cross-referenced sub- and impeccable military bearing and appear- ject index. Any Air Force or other government ance. Interested individuals should consult organization, college or university library, or chapter 8 of AFR 36-20, 0//icer Assignments, similar organization with a need for this index for application procedures or write Capt Jeff can be placed on distribution. Requests for dis- Cohen, Headquarters USAFA/CWIS, USAF tribution and other inquiries should be Academy CO 80840-5421 or call DSN 259- addressed to Capt John Doherty. AUCADRE/RI, 3255/3258. Walker Hall. Bldg. 1400. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. Captain Dohertv can also be con- Recent Releases from tacted at DSN 493-6629 or (205) 953-6629. Base Air University Press libraries may contain copies of previously pub- Force and Accommodation in World Politics by lished issues of Air University Review. Dr Stanley E. Spangler, 1991 (book). The author argues that the United States and its main adversary of the last half-century, the Soviet USAFA Instructor Opportunities Union, have relied almost exclusively on displays or uses of military force in trying to settle The Military Studies Division at the United differences in the international arena. Dr States Air Force Academy is seeking highly Spangler makes the case for conciliation and qualified captains for instructor duty in the summer of 1992 and beyond. This duty in- accommodation as more effective means for volves motivating and teaching cadets in arriving at solutions to differences among university-level courses that stress air power, nations. Dr Spangler is currently on the teach- the art of war, military theory, doctrine, and ing faculty at the Naval War College; he was force employment. Since its inception in 1980. formerly a senior research fellow at Air the curriculum in professional military studies University. has evolved into one of the most interesting Other recent books, monographs, and papers: and demanding areas of study at the academy. Professional Military Education for Air Force A master’s degree is required of all applicants. Officers: Comments and Criticisms by Lt Col Preferred degrees for military studies instruc- Richard L. Davis, USAF, and Lt Col Frank P. tors are in history, military history, political Donnini, USAF, 1991 (book). science, and international relations, or in area Wartime A ir Traffic Control by Maj Pamela studies of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or A. Hamilton-Powell, USAF, 1991 (monograph). the Middle East. Experience in tactical or stra- Air Base Attack: The Promises of Emerging tegic operations or in operationally related spe- Technology by Maj Charles W. Nystrom, Jr., cialties is highly desirable. The division can USAF, 1991 (monograph). sponsor a few highly qualified applicants with Implementing Propensity to Stay into Schol- the appropriate background for a master’s arship Allocation Decisions by Lt Col Michael degree through the Air Force Institute of Tech- A. Schiefer, USAF, 1991 (monograph).

93 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1992

For more information on these or other pub- Material will be returned if a self-addressed, lications or to order publications, contact the stamped envelope is enclosed. Air University Press, Publication Support Branch, AUCADRE/PTPB, Bldg. 1400, Maxwell New AFM 1-1 AFB AL 36112-5532 or call DSN 493-6452 or Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, (205) 953-6452. recently approved a new edition of AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. This revision of the manual is the first since 1984 and represents a significant Desert Storm Submissions departure from previous versions of Air Force Air University and Squadron Officer School are basic doctrine. A team of military doctrine ana- soliciting wartime memoirs from lieutenants lysts from Air University’s Center for Aero- and captains who participated in Operation space Doctrine, Research, and Education was Desert Shield and/or Operation Desert Storm responsible for developing the new two-volume for inclusion in an upcoming book. Submis- manual that reworks basic doctrine from the sions should be no more than 10 typed, double- ground up. Volume I contains the concept spaced pages or the handwritten equivalent. statements that make up Air Force basic doc- Any photos that illustrate the story should trine. Volume II includes 25 essays that lay the accompany the manuscript, along with a bio- historical foundation for the development of graphical sketch and photo of the author. Mail this doctrine. Each doctrinal statement in vol- your submission to Capt Michael Vriesenga, ume I references an essay in volume II to sup- SOS/EDOA, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5582 port its validity. The publication of this new before June 1992. You may call Captain edition marks the first time the Air Force has Vriesenga at DSN 493-2294 or (205) 953-2294. documented the rationale for its doctrine.

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* r Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. A pilot with more than 3.000 flying hours, he flew C-130s during his assignment at Pope AFB, North Carolina, from 1980 to 1985, For the next two years, he was an exchange officer with the Canadian Forces at Cana- dian Forces Base, Edmonton. Al- berta. Canada. From 1987 to 1990, he was assigned to Military Airlift Com- mand's Airlift Operations School. Scott AFB. Illinois, and served as editor of Airlift magazine. Major Krisinger is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. He is a previous contributor to Airpower Journal.

Col George E. (“Ed”) Crowder, Jr. (USAFA; MSSM, University of Southern California: MS. Air Force Institute of Technology), is deputy commander. 416th Operations Group, 416th Wing, Griffiss AFB, New York. He has served in a variety of flying and staff assignments in Strategic Air Command and the Pen- tagon. Colonel Crowder is a graduate of Air War College.

Capt Graham W. Rinehart (BS, Clemson University: MS. Golden Gate University) is assistant professor of aerospace studies. Air Force ROTC Detachment 770. Clemson University. Clemson. South Carolina. Previously, he was deputy director of safety and health. Astronautics Laboratory, Edwards AFB. Califor- nia. Captain Rinehart is the author of Quality Education (forthcoming) and the coauthor of two technical papers. Tear Out and Remove □ □ Detach one of these cards, fill it out, and mail it along with with along it mail and out, it fill cards, these of one Detach GIFT GIFT FOR: GIFT FOR: •5151 Order Processing Code Enclosed is my check for $9.50 for each subscription ordered ($11.90 for international mailkil international for ($11.90 ordered is $9.50 subscription each for myEnclosedfor check I would like to purchase a one-year subscription to Ithe subscription a like one-year to wouldpurchase Enclosed is my check for $9.50 for ($11.90 each mail)iil) subscription ordered for international Ilike would to purchase a to thesubscription one-year Mail to: New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954 BoxP.O. 371954 of Documents, New Superintendent Orders, Mail to: Documents of Superintendent to: Makepayable checks 5151 y 5151 PLEASE PRINT PLEASE Mail to: New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Boxof 371954 Documents, New MailOrders, Superintendent to: Documents of Superintendent Make checksto:payable PLEASE PRINT PLEASE □ IA MASTERCARD Q VISA VISA Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954 Want aSubscription to the fySaeZip Code State Cfly RanfcTde Ran*vT«»e J 2 3 R S First First S R 3 2 J Last initial Name Nam# iy tt ZpCd Cutypreq'd) Country p Z«p Code State City y= -y Initial Last Nan-.e i i i i — .l □ Airpower Journal? Airpower Street Address City State/Country Zip Code Zip State/Country City Street Address Address Street Street Address City State-Country Zip Cod# Zip State-Country City Street Address Street Address MASTERCARD Visa, or Mastercard Number to: Number orMastercard Visa, ii P.O. Box 371954 itbrh A 15250-7954 PAPittsburgh, New Orders,Superintendent ofDocuments . i First Name Initial Last Name Last Name First Initial Name First AIP ER W IRPO -A ii nrvrru

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BUSINESS REPLY LABEL FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 73236 WASH DC POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AIRPOWER JOURNAL Airpower Research Institute Walker Hall Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532

AIRPOWER JOURNAL NO POSTAGE Walker Hall NECESSARY Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532 IF MAILED OFFICIAL BUSINESS IN THE PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300 UNITED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY LABEL FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO 73236 WASH DC POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

AIRPOWER JOURNAL Airpower Research Institute Walker Hall Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532 BOARD OF ADVISERS Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF, Retired, Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF, Retired Brig Gen James L. Cole, Jr., USAF, Chief of Safety, Headquarters, USAF Col Keith W. Geiger, USAF, Retired Dr Richard P. Hallion, Air Force Historian Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr,, USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions may be ordered from New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh PA 15250-7954. Annual rates are $9.50 domestic and $11.90 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Air- power Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. Submit double- spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are DSN 493-5322 and commercial (205) 953-5322.

Summer I99Z

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