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Anti-Americanism in South Korea, 1945—1992: A struggle for positive national identity

Kim, Duk-Hwan, Ph.D.

The American University, 1992

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA, 1945-1992: A STRUGGLE FOR POSITIVE NATIONAL IDENTITY by Duk-Hwan Kim submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in International Affairs

Signatures of Committeej^^

Chair :

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L O (3rQ)

1992 The American University _ Washington, B.C. 20016

THE AHSSICilT UHIVEESITY LIBEABY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Copyright

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To my parents

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA, 1945-1992: A STRUGGLE FOR POSITIVE NATIONAL IDENTITY By Duk-Hwan Kim

ABSTRACT The study of anti-Americanism began in earnest only in 1985. Since that time, functionalists have dominated the field with definitions that stress outward manifestations

and varieties of anti-Americanism rather than causes. This study advocates a reorientation toward the emotional, social psychological foundations of anti-Americanism to understand how and why it arises and to determine what unites different

varieties of the phenomenon. Accordingly, the discussion draws heavily upon recent perspectives in social psychology,

psychology, and anthropology, with special emphasis on the

applications of Henri Tajfel's social identity theory and

Helen Lewis's shame theory. A new definition is offered which distinguishes between anti-Americanism and anti- American sentiments. Common to both, it is argued, is a shame-based anger that is aimed less at the United States and more at negative national self-images. The goal of anti-

American movements is to reduce the considerable ambivalence

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inherent in anti-American sentiment by stressing American hypocrisy and immorality. Once this is achieved, these movements attempt to redefine the national identity in positive terms, without reference to U.S. standards of comparison.

In addition to presenting a new interpretation of anti- Americanism, this study identifies the distinctive features of Korea's social and historical experience that contributed to the subsequent growth of anti-Americanism and anti- American sentiments — including a dependency-oriented

patronage system that governed both domestic politics and Korea's relations with the outside world. The study then traces the ideological and organizational development of anti-Americanism as it fused with radical opposition to repressive government. In assessing the impact of this movement on college campuses, it is argued that anti- Americanism, along with Marxist rejection of American political and economic principles, gained the sympathy of

most students. Measuring the prevalence of the more diffuse anti-American sentiments off-campus awaits refinements in survey questions. The study does attempt to demonstrate, in

the meantime, that anti-American resentments are common within the general population. A summary of the sources of mistrust in Korean-U.S. relations leads to the conclusion that trust-building measures may mitigate bilateral

tensions. Ultimately, however, the reduction of anti- iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. American sentiments depends on the ability of Koreans to find pride in their growing national accomplishments and to redefine their identities in terms of present abilities rather than past shortcomings.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

It is a rare Korean student of political science who fails to consider, at some point in his or her career, the state of South Korean-U.S. relations. Devout nationalists, Koreans are exceptionally attentive to matters affecting their country's development and its standing in the world community. And no other country has greater influence over

South Korea's future than does the United States— as military ally, trading partner, a- . world leader. With my interest in international relations, it is especially

understandable that I should have chosen as my dissertation

topic some issue of importance to both South Korea and the United States. Anti-Americanism in South Korea seemed an appropriate choice since it had been conspicuously neglected by scholars in both countries, despite its troubling

implications for both Washington and Seoul. What was less foreseeable to me was how much my

studies would lead to a broader consideration of anti- Americanism. At first I hoped to understand why so much tension exists in a bilateral relationship cemented by a

forty-year old military alliance and a history of close cooperation in matters of foreign policy and trade. But as I

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. consulted comparative studies of anti-Americanism for insights, it occurred to me that the key to understanding the Korean-U.S. dilemma lay in perceiving the broader question of what anti-Americanism is, at bottom, how it

spreads, and how it may be contained. The answers I found in general works on anti-Americanism were not satisfying. Most of the recent studies recognized that anti-Americanism is more than a momentary fit of pique at some wrongful or misguided U.S. policy or action, more than distaste for some

offensive aspect of American culture. In many cases, anti- Americanism was described as a smoldering resentment that was not sparked by a failure to resolve discrete and narrow differences of interest with the United States. But what I wanted to know, and could not find in these studies, was a

precise identification of what animates this smoldering resentment. This unsatisfied curiosity led to readings outside the field of political science and into psychology, social psychology, and anthropology. If I have shown insufficient understanding of the propositions encountered

in these fields, I nevertheless hope that this attempt to apply their findings will spawn more productive efforts to

understand anti-Americanism in all its forms. This dissertation is thus more a case study of anti- Americanism than it is the study of the specific social and political movement with which it became identified in South Korea. It does not offer as exhaustive treatment of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. opposition politics in South Korea. Rather, it seeks to identify and account for the similarities and differences between the anti-Americanism of radical activists and the milder, less consistent, anti-American sentiments of the general population. I hope at some later time to research more fully the anti-American sentiments of political

conservatives in South Korea, as well as those of less politically-oriented groups such as the millenarian followers of Cheunasandc. My primary aim is to suggest a new approach to the

study of anti-Americanism and, relatedly, nationalism. While most previous studies have focused outward at the manifestations of resentment toward the United States, this endeavor looks inward. As the title indicates, anti- Americanism is defined here as a struggle for positive national identity. It is a struggle, not merely a search, because the process is agonizing, gradual, and highly

ambivalent. It concerns positive national identity, because an identity based on shameful, negative self-images cannot sustain a country. America itself, for the purposes of this

study, is regarded as the symbolic representation of "the

other", enabling nations to shape their identities based on an evaluation of how they compare to the United States and how well they command its respect and attention. Some

readers may object that U.S. policies are not given the prominence they deserve in an analysis of what causes anti- vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Americanism. Underlying many of these objections, however, is the assumption that anti-Americanism is simply anger at what the United States does. In this study, however, it is

argued that anti-Americanism, as distinct from criticism of U.S. policies, is anger at how America makes one feel about oneself. In other nations, all too often, this anger is based on a sense of national shame. I would like to express my gratitude to the Graduate Honor Awards Committee of The American University for the

generous financial support it extended to me as a Hall of Nations Scholar. My thanks are also due to the members of my dissertation committee. Dr. Nicholas Onuf, Dr. Masaru Tamamoto, and Dr. John Merrill. In particular, I am deeply indebted to my committee chairman. Dr. Onuf, for his incisive but good-natured criticism and unflagging encouragement. I am also especially grateful to Dr. Merrill

for sharing his expertise in Korean affairs with me and

making many valuable comments. But if this study is intelligible to English-speaking readers, it is due mainly to my wife, who undertook to edit the entire manuscript and

offered many constructive criticisms. I owe her my deepest thanks, too, for her enthusiasm, which sustained me through a difficult period.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT...... ii

PREFACE...... V

LIST OF TABLES...... xiii Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION...... 1

Studies of Anti-Americanism in South Korea General Studies of Anti-Americanism A Neglected Field Principal Findings

Leading Definitions Toward a New Approach Social-Psychological Perspectives New Definitions

Principal Objectives of this Study 2. GROUP IDENTITY, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND NATIONALISM AS "PRESTIGE STRATEGY"...... 41

From Self-Concept to Group Concept in the Social Sciences The Rediscovery of Shame and its Role in Identity Formation

Studies of Cross-Cultural Contact and Social Change Pre-Nationalist and Nationalist Strategies for Survival

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. What is Nationalism? A Critique Nationalisms, West and East

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA: 1945-1972... 87 The Social and Historical Context Dependency and Resentment: The Antecedents of Anti-Americanism in South Korea: 1945-1948 Korean Sentiments Toward the United States from 1945 to 1948: A Summing Up

The First Republic Pro-Americanism as Mythology Dependence on the United States Rebirth of the Student Movement: The April 19 Uprising and the Second Republic

Fulfilling Nationalist Strategies: America as Help and as Hindrance in the Park Era: 1961-1972 ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA: 1972-1980... 161 The Yushin Regime and the "End" of Politics Relations with the United States The Student Movement of the 1970s: Shame, Guilt, and the Rise of the Romantic Left Yi Young-hee and the Allegory of Vietnam

The End of Yushin

THE RISE OF RADICAL ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE 1980s...... 190

The Kwangju Uprising: National Trauma Chun's Consolidation of Power U.S. Policy and the Rise of Anti-American Sentiments After Kwangju

Kwangju Aftermath: From Anti-American Sentiment to Anti-Americanism

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Rise of Anti-American Ideology The Revisionist Appeal: Bruce Cumings and the Search for a New Mythology The Radical Debate Over Strategy Anti-American Activities: 1980-1985

Recruitment Patterns

Radical Influence and Value Change on Campus in the 1980s ANTI-AMERICANISM AFTER 1985...... 243 The Further Erosion of Government Legitimacy 1986: Radical Anti-Americanism at High Tide The Ascendancy of the Anti-Imperialist Line

Chamintu's Anti-American Activities and Influence The Emergence of Minmintu Radical Anti-Americanism from the 1987 Elections Impact of the Collapse of Socialism in the Soviet Bloc The End of Ideology on Campus?

Congruity and Incongruity between the Goals and Beliefs of Radicals and Moderates on Campus

Off-Campus Sources of Radical Anti-Americanism Non-Marxist Sources of Anti-American Sentiments The Green Movement Anti-American Novels and Poems Anti-American Sentiments Among the General Public

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7. SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS...... 310 Shared Beliefs Shared Emotional Responses Components of Mistrust Components of Trust

8 . CONCLUS IONS...... 344 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 350

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES Table Page

1 . Support for Anti-American Demonstrations by Age...... 283 Support for Anti-American Demonstrations by Level of Education...... 284 Support for Anti-American Demonstrations by Income...... 284 Country of Preference: Most Favored, Least Favored...... 286

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Studies of Anti-Americanism in South Korea

One of the earliest articles on anti-Americanism anywhere was C. Sarkar's 19 67 review of anti-Americanism in

Asia. 1/ Discursive in style and approach, Sarkar's article concluded that anti-Americanism in Asia was likely to persist as long as the United States maintained a dominant presence in the region. He saw America, in image and in

reality, as a boorish superpower, insensitive to "Asian dignity" (Sarkar 1967:25). Notwithstanding the strong

conclusions of this article, anti-Americanism in Asia remained a neglected topic. In South Korea, until 1980, pro-

Americanism was said to be the rule and anti-Americanism

virtually non-existent. American and Korean specialists on

South Korea were primarily concerned with U.S.-Korean security relations and, increasingly, economic ties.

After the emergence of a predominantly anti-American student movement in 1980, more American and Korean scholars

turned their attention to the politics of dissent in South

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Korea. The anti-American dimension of the student movement remained neglected, however. For example, a 1981 article on "Students, Intellectuals, and the Churches; Their Roles in Korean Politics" referred to growing anti-Americanism in South Korea in one inconspicuous sentence (Kinney 1981:193). The occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul in 1985 convinced more scholars on both sides of the Pacific

that anti-Americanism was a growing phenomenon and one worthy of serious examination. At the first United States- Republic of Korea Bilateral Forum, held at the University of California, Berkeley, in August 1985, three Korean scholars presented papers outlining Korean views of the Korean-

American relationship (Scalapino 1986). These contributions were seminal, marking a shift in the almost exclusively government-to-government approach of previous studies of Korean-U.S. relations. Yet all provided little more than brief sketches of the unequal nature of the Korean-U.S.

relationship (Kim Kyong-dong 1985:15) and lists of Korean grievances.

At the Berkeley Forum, Yoo Se-hee detailed the foreign

policy views of various activist organizations in South

Korea. Among the chief real or alleged grievances he mentioned were the increasing military role of a neo- militaristic Japan, the increasing militarization of the Korean economy, its continued military and economic

dependence on the United States, the desire of the U.S.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. government for a permanent division of Korea, and the destructive impact of U.S. and Japanese economic policies on the South Korean economy. Although criticizing some of these views as "too idealistic and even too egocentric", Yoo, like fellow contributor Kim Jin-hyun, concluded that the United States must understand that developing a more equal relationship with South Korea is in its own interest (Yoo Se-hee 1985:132; Kim Jin-hyun 1985:15). In contrast, Auh Taik-sup, writing generally about Korean perceptions of U.S.-Korean relations, did not take the anti-American specter too seriously. He believes that "a well-orchestrated media publicity campaign staged by the government" has

successfully challenged the message of blatantly anti- American organizations, and that these organizations will collapse in the future as a result (Auh 1985:111). Since the Berkeley Forum of 1985, only a few English-

language academic articles have appeared on anti-Americanism

in South Korea. A brief survey by Shorrock (1986) took the position that anti-Americanism in South Korea was the inevitable consequence of U.S. support for the military

regime in Seoul. Shorrock concluded that anti-American feeling was "prevalent" in South Korea at mid-decade, warning that it could become explosive if the United States continued to favor dictatorship over democracy (Shorrock 1986:1218).

A more elaborate examination of anti-Americanism in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. South Korea was presented by Kim Jin-hyun, a participant in the Second United States-Republic of Korea Bilateral Forum

held at Berkeley in 1988. Kim's purpose was twofold: to describe the sources of anti-Americanism and to advocate a more "rational" attitude to America among Koreans, one that treats the United States neither as a "demon [n]or an angel" (Kim Jin-hyun 1988:231).

Reflecting prevalent opinion in South Korea, Kim

identified radical activist student groups, labor organizations and Christians as primarily responsible for

spreading anti-Americanism. 2/ At one point he argued that "Third World ideology and the romantic peace movement" of Western Europe have had a definite impact on some, though not most, of the Korean intellectual community (1988:231) . But Kim listed at least seven other causes for the phenomenon, noting that disaffection is not limited to activists alone.

To Kim, anti-Americanism had developed in response to: 1) close relations between the U.S. government and the (unpopular) Chun Doo-hwan regime;

2) questions about the U.S. role during the 1980 Kwangju massacre;

3) U.S. trade and economic policies ;

4) frustrations connected with "social modernization" and "stable democratization"; 5) changing views of the national interest;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6) increasing knowledge of the United States; 7) overly pro-American attitudes of conservative Koreans.

Absent from Kim's discussion was any unifying theme. None of these separate elements were ranked according to importance or related to one another. He introduced to breakdown theory (#4), the theory of clashing national interests (#3 and #5), and the theory of anti-Americanism as a reflection of domestic debates (#7 and possibly #2). Kim's predictions for the future revealed a similar unwillingness to measure the comparative weight of these factors. For example, he predicted that if South Korea "continues its success" in economic and political modernization, 3/ anti-Americanism would remain relatively

modest in comparison with anti-Japanese, anti-Chinese, and

anti-Soviet sentiments (1988:232). 4/ Elsewhere he claimed that the waning of anti-Americanism depends on South Korea joining the ranks of the First World and achieving peaceful

coexistence with the North (Kim 1988:238). He also assumed

that one variant of anti-Americanism was likely to persist. This he called "anti-pro-Americanism": the response of

outgroups to the monopoly on power held by pro-American conservatives (1988:239). Although Kim hoped and expected that anti-Americanism would decline, his optimism was contingent on so many factors as to seem unwarranted. In a later article (1989:763) Kim made more explicit his assumption that anti-Americanism was based on rational

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. criticism of U.S. policies. He suggested that, in the current climate, more and more Koreans are coming to regard

the United States as just another foreign country, rather than a country with whom Koreans enjoy a special relationship. By abandoning their "bitter disillusionment", Koreans might be on the threshold of establishing "an entirely new and more mature relationship based on an equal

partnership" with the United States. A more focused theoretical perspective emerged in a Korean-language article by Chang Dal-jong, published in 1989. Chang evaluated the "political and social roots of anti-Americanism", interpreting it as the watchword of a

broadly based social movement. Like Shorrock he believed that the movement was successful as long as it championed democracy. But Chang, writing two years after the appearance of Shorrock's article, had seen how middle class sympathy for anti-U.S. activists dwindled once the movement shifted

to the reunification issue. Concerning the root causes of

anti-Americanism, Chang concluded that U.S. failure to support what he termed "progressive liberalism" was by far

the most important factor (1989) . Perhaps the most trenchant academic analysis of anti- Americanism in South Korea in recent years has been advanced by Choi Sung-il in a 1989 article for Korea Scope. Like

Chang, Choi maintained that anti-Americanism was an outgrowth of the movement for democracy. This movement arose

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in opposition to an illegitimate regime, whose rise to power was based on the brutal massacre of Korean civilians at Kwangju. But precisely because Choi saw this movement as a response to regime illegitimacy, he dismissed the notion that it was ever extremist. Instead, Choi characterized it as essentially nationalist movement which, in its early

stages, was not motivated by any political philosophy, least of all Marxism. Over the years, wrote Choi, it has evolved from a posture of criticism to one of rejection.

Still, Choi saw anti-Americanism as "broadening" and "deepening" rather than becoming more isolated over time, as Chang suggested. Central to Choi's contention was the belief that anti-Americanism was fueled by "the [Korean] perception

of pervasive U.S. influence on Korean politics" (p.13). Moreover, the movement has been popular, since it aims to recover national autonomy and respect. Contrary to the upbeat thrust of most works on Korean-American relations

(Koo and Suh:108), Choi's analysis suggested that the future

of bilateral relations was not bright, since "the two countries do not share the same vision and objectives." Not

only is anti-Americanism likely to persist in South Korea, but it is likely to increase in other parts of the world, fueled by political and economic development. Choi's assessment was frequently astute and well-

reasoned. It was a brief overview, however, not an in-depth study. Like the articles reviewed above, it neither defined

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. anti-Americanism nor gauged its intensity and prevalence. Moveover, the consistency of argument (i.e. that U.S. policies were to blame for growing anti-Americanism) , was

undermined by Choi's tantalizing, but unexamined, suggestion that changing domestic circumstances could once again redirect blame for Korea's ills onto domestic villains. The question thus remains: is anti-Americanism best understood as a rational opposition to the object, the United States,

based on clashing national interests, or is it more of an emotional reaction conditioned by subjective needs. Lacking a theoretical perspective, most Korean scholars find themselves simply repeating the litany of

Korean grievances against the United States without pausing to evaluate them. The connection between these grievances and full-blown anti-Americanism is taken for granted. Thus, the insensitive remarks of a few U.S. officials are given

equal prominence with political and trade policies. Anti-

Americanism is generally conceived of as any form of opposition to U.S. policies or negative images of America. The ways in which it is spread, manipulated, or held in

check are barely addressed. Much disagreement exists about

the main factors responsible for either increasing or diminishing anti-American sentiments, although all agree that anti-Americanism is predicated upon conflicting national interests. And the authors' analyses appear

strongly influenced by deeply held biases. But it is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. important to note that the study of this subject has barely begun, particularly in South Korea itself.

Theoretical Perspectives on Anti-Americanism

A Neglected Field

Perhaps more than anything else, the surprising inattention of Korean scholars to the question of anti- Americanism in South Korea stems from a widespread unwillingness to acknowledge the problem. As this study will attempt to show, anti-Americanism is an exceptionally painful topic. It is painful for what it reveals about Korean national identity. It is also painful because it threatens to undermine the nationalist credentials of any

Korean scholar who attempts an objective study of the phenomenon.

But what accounts for similar neglect on the part of

American scholars?

Editors Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald E. Smith asked this question in their pioneering volume, Anti-Americanism in the Third World, published in 1985. They suggested that

the subject can be disagreeable for Americans as well. It requires them to confront the nation's basic self-image as a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. just power and to recognize that hostility toward America is a real problem. In addition, they suspected that "on a more academic level, the neglect of anti-Americanism as a subject for research may be related to the less than satisfactory way in which "public opinion" has been understood in

relation to foreign policy making within the United States." (1985: xi) . Yet American scholars have churned out millions of words of analysis about America's failures in Vietnam, its racial prejudices, poverty, and countless other moral and

social failings. Another answer is provided by Thompson (1988:23), writing in Anti-Americanism: Origins and Context— a work

that owes much to the theoretical framework offered by Rubinstein and Smith. According to Thompson, if the foreign policy establishment regards anti-Americanism more as a "preoccupation" than a "policy", then scholars who write mainly for this establishment are likely to reflect this bias by not treating this subject as a separate issue. Perhaps a more fundamental problem is the problem of conception. The prevailing view holds that anti-Americanism

is a category of foreign opinion. Therefore, the subject should be evaluated using the methodology of public opinion research. 5/ It is odd that Rubinstein and Smith themselves held this view. They refuted the idea that anti-Americanism refers merely to any negative opinion of the United States.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Their definition strongly implies that it is a form of prejudice (i.e. generalized hostility); still, they never made this explicit. To identify anti-Americanism as a form of prejudice would be to take it out of the bounds of pure

political science and into the field of social psychology. Why, then, have social psychologists not undertaken the job? For one thing, social psychology in America has frequently focused attention on individual attitudes and behavior within a group, not on the group itself. Renewed American interest in the group dates only from the 1980s. (Steiner 1974). Second, social psychologists appear reluctant either by background or inclination to consider a whole nation as a fit object of research. They may wish to avoid the problems of overgeneralization that plagued earlier, crude studies of the national "mind" or character.

Political scientists have demonstrated greater

willingness to venture into studies of the whole nation

from the perspective of political culture. Why hasn't anti-

Americanism found a place in their field? Again, it seems that the obstacle is one of conception— or preconception. Studies of political culture are rarely carried beyond national boundaries. They usually explore public attitudes

toward domestic politics. Anything more would be a matter for the field of international relations.

Indeed, anti-Americanism has received some "disguised"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. attention in international relations. The most important work has been done by area specialists who study anti-

Americanism as a by-product of nationalism. 6/ In this regard we should note the singular contribution of Dawisha to Rubinstein and Smith (1985). His article was actually much more a historical treatment of Arab nationalism than it was of anti-Americanism (Dawisha 1985) .

Curiously, Rubinstein and Smith themselves gave rather short shrift to nationalism despite their acknowledgement that it animates major ideological movements such as Marxism and Islamic fundamentalism (1985:22). Nowhere was it

defined, distinguished from anti-Americanism, or commented upon further. This neglect is even more apparent in Thornton (1988) and Haseler (1985). General studies of nationalism have likewise ignored

the particular problem of anti-Americanism. There has been

some theoretical interest in determining the extent to which xenophobia plays a role in nationalism. But most students of nationalism are concerned with the domestic political context of their subject. That is, they are primarily interested in how nationalist ideals and programs are put

into place. What role external pressures play in shaping national identity is seldom made the focal point of such analyses.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Principal Findings

Before examining theoretical perspectives on the subject, let us turn to a summary of findings by contributors to Rubinstein and Smith (1985) and Thornton (1988), and by Haseler (1985). All of these scholars viewed anti-Americanism as a multifaceted phenomenon. Among its characteristic features they noted the following:

Anti-Americanism as a response to a high degree of dependence on America, U.S. penetration of politics, economy, and society. Those concerned with Third World anti- Americanism were most likely to stress this aspect of the

problem (Horn 1985:152; Roett 1988:70-76; Langley 1988:78- 88; Kizilbash 1988:69; Grayson 1988:143). While Haendel (1985) did not challenge the prevailing view that a high U.S. profile in the Third World is positively tied to anti-

Americanism, he found no evidence of a close correlation between anti-Americanism and the presence of MNCs, suggesting that the focus by some on MNCs may be misplaced (1985:214).

Anti-Americanism as a response to threats to cultural

identity. Most studies of anti-Americanism, whether of the Western or non-Western variety, stress this aspect. The problem is not so much the disdain for the values imported from America as the fear that these values will overwhelm them, i.e. that they will lose their sense of uniqueness

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (Toinet 1988:140; Parker 1988:57; Kizilbash 1988:65; Doran and Sewell 1988:111; Grayson 1988:42; Horn 1985:164). In non-Western countries, attachment to traditional values is a strong but often secondary concern (Kizilbash 1988:59).

Anti-Americanism as a perceptual distortion. Most analysts would agree that anti-Americanism involves distorted or highly selective perspectives. Why should this

occur, however, is not so clear. Doran and Sewell, in their chapter on anti-Americanism in Canada, held a minority view in attributing perceptual distortion to a lack of information, in addition to deliberate distortion (1988:106). Haseler saw deliberate distortion at work but

believed more information would have no effect as it would be used selectively (1985:10). In his article on Chinese perceptions, Shambaugh accepted the importance of perceptual distortion, but believed that fundamentally different value

systems are the reason for distortions (1988:156). Grayson, on the other hand, dismissed the argument, concluding his study of Mexican sentiments with the observation that "to

know Americans is not necessarily to love them" (1985:45).

Anti-Americanism as cultural phenomenon. Adopting a minority viewpoint, Shambaugh (1985) held that cultural differences are sufficient to generate anti-Americanism. This view must be distinguished from the view of anti- Americanism as a response to threatened cultural identity, which is about fears of losing autonomy and control.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Shambaugh's assessment was not corroborated by the other contributors. Kizilbash, for example, claimed that "very few" Pakistanis interpreted anti-Americanism as an aversion

to American culture (1988:67). Similarly, Rubinstein and Smith (1985:2) doubt that "differences per se generate hostility"; what is crucial is that these differences be "politicized" and that they "define group identities" (1985:3). And Thayer, writing about Japan, saw few signs of

anti-Americanism, despite the still considerable differences between Japanese and American cultures.

Anti-Americanism as a rejection of Western society and democracy. Ironically, this is the formulation used most often by scholars studying intellectuals in Western Europe

and the United States (Haseler 1985:35; Burns quoted in Horowitz 1985:50; Spiro 1988:128; Glickman 1985:175). Western society is meant here to represent "bourgeois values" and capitalism.

• Anti-Americanism as elite phenomenon. Using this popular perspective, some authors contend that certain elites are more prone to anti-Americanism than others, e.g.

political, intellectual, or bureaucratic elites (Doran and Sewell 1988:111; Spiro 1988:12 3; Haseler 1985:36; Rubinstein and Smith 1985:4; Glickman 1985:186). Evin, writing about

Turkey (1985:132-3), and Grayson, writing about Mexico (1985:38-44), held that intraelite rivalry can often inflame anti-American sentiment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Anti-Americanism as opposition to U.S. policies based on "national interests". Most analystsbelieved that fluctuations in the intensity of anti-American sentiments

are predicated upon changes in the compatibility of U.S. and domestic national interests (Embree 1985:144-147; Rubinstein and Smith 1988:36-37,43; Glickman 1985:176-182; Parker 1988:56; Kizilbash 1988:67). This position raises the still unanswered question of whether popular indignation at U.S. foreign policies is created, manipulated, or autochthonous.

Anti-Americanism as a response to weakening U.S. self- confidence, prestige. In this view, a diminishing fear of reprisal has encouraged some forms of anti-Americanism (Thornton 1988:12; Haseler 1985:8; Parker 1988:52). Conversely, Thompson believes that the reassertion of American will and power, combined with the relatively

successful track record of market economies, has reduced anti-Americanism in the 1980s (1988:32).

• Anti-Americanism as a reflection of domestic debates. As Toinet observed, citizens of other countries may hold the

United States up as a mirror to look at themselves (1988:137). Also taking this view was Evin, who believed that, in Turkey, the United States is sometimes the surrogate target of resentment toward Turkish capitalists (1985:132); similarly, Shlapentokh, (like many other Soviet scholars) thought that Soviet polemics about America were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. really more about competing visions of the Soviet future (1988:169).

Anti-Americanism as a means of keeping the polity unified or mobilized. Instrumental anti-Americanism is widely recognized as an element of most anti-Americanism, although distinguishing it from the popular variety is often

difficult in practice as Embree noted (1985:148). Unlike Doran and Sewell (1985) and Haseler (1985:5), Horowitz saw instrumental anti-Americanism as uniting opposition forces rather than the polity as a whole (1985:51). An interesting contrasting analysis by Glickman posited that a unified

polity is a precondition for anti-Americanism. "Deep, active, and persistent anti-Americanism usually requires

cultural coherence or political strength, beyond the present resources or command of black African states..." (1985:171). Turning now to a summary of the authors'assessment of future prospects, it is clear that the majority regarded

anti-Americanism more as an occasional irritant than a serious problem. Only Grayson, writing about Mexico,

expected anti-Americanism to intensify. The rest envision more of the same or even a diminution of tensions:

In Western Europe, anti-Americanism will continue among elites but disappear among the populace, who, under the

influence of the U.S. democratic model, will become pro-

American (Spiro 1988:131-132). In France, anti-Americanism will persist due to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. competitive quality of cultural nationalism there, as in America (Toinet 1988:141). In Canada, anti-Americanism will continue to surface mainly as an occasional instrument in the hands of

politicians. It will vary in intensity, based on the degree to which Canadian interests are directly challenged (Doran and Sewell 1988:110).

In the Arab world, anti-Americanism will continue within the limits set by mutual interests (Parker 1988:57) In Africa, the failure of statist policies has made the United States more attractive than ever before. And anti- Americanism cannot thrive in countries lacking cultural coherence and political strength (Glickman 1985:171,184).

In Latin America, less anti-Americanism can be expected in the Southern Cone, where the United States has been and

is becoming less dominant, while anti-Americanism will persist in the rest of the region (Roett 1988:75-76). In Mexico, increased prosperity may loosen inhibitions on the expression of anti-Americanism that is now imposed by economic dependence. The expansion of the public sector (as

opposed to the generally pro-U.S. business community) may also increase anti-Americanism, particularly as a form of cultural competition (Grayson 1985:45). In China, anti-Americanism will continue regardless of the regime in power (Shambaugh 1988:156).

In Japan, anti-Americanism will continue to be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. insignificant as long as the United States is seen as a tolerant nation, willing to accommodate Japanese interests

(Thayer 1988:104). In Malaysia, anti-Americanism is limited because of the

weakness of the Muslim militant opposition, the satisfactory world economic situation, the interests of the Malaysian government in good ties with the United States, and most important, the relative lack of U.S. penetration (Horn 1985:168).

In Pakistan, anti-Americanism is widespread (for many reasons) but not intense. Prospects for anti-Americanism depend on the degree to which U.S. policies challenge national interests (Kizilbash 1988:67). In Turkey, widespread anti-Americanism is unlikely unless serious policy conflicts arise between the U.S. and Turkish governments (Evin 1985:135). In the Soviet Union, anti-Americanism will diminish as

a consequence of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's program of liberalization; and as a consequence of intensified exchanges (Shlapentokh 1988:171). Around the world, anti-Americanism may "decrease

significantly" if the United States abandons the "hegemonic imperative" (Rubinstein and Smith 1988:44). A similar argument is pursued by Hamid (1985).

• Around the world, anti-Americanism will diminish as more resentment is focused on powerful regional actors (e.g.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. India, and soon, Nigeria and Brazil) (Thornton 1988:13). Around the world, anti-Americanism will intensify in the short term, but may diminish over the long term,

providing that Americans restore their self-confidence

(Haseler 1985:42-43). These predictions highlight each author's view of the major dynamic at work in increasing, decreasing, or perpetuating anti-Americanism. Most authors considered "national interests" to be the most important determinant of the intensity of anti-Americanism in the future. How national interests are defined and by whom is not addressed.

But the clear policy implication is that the United States has at least some ability to moderate anti-Americanism on the basis of efforts to accommodate, wherever possible, the national interests of other countries (Luck and Fromuth

1985) . Another view is that the United States can reduce the degree of anti-Americanism by recovering its self-assurance.

Several authors concluded that the United States, could do little to mitigate anti-Americanism. Toinet and

Grayson, for example, perceive anti-Americanism as a function of cultural competition, largely unresponsive to changes in policy. To Shambaugh, anti-Americanism represents

a xenophobic reaction to American values. And Spiro, the most optimistic of all contributors, believed that anti-

Americanism in Europe will eventually disappear; the elitist character of those societies will be gradually transformed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. due to the powerful influence of the U.S. democratic model. Although highly informative, the three major studies of anti-Americanism (Rubinstein and Smith, Thornton and

Haseler) share a fundamental weakness— they reveal the many forms anti-Americanism can take without managing to put their finger on what all these forms have in common— apart from some degree of hostility toward the United States. Of

course, there is nothing wrong with this if the "varieties of anti-Americanism" are essentially different. Perhaps it makes no sense to lump together the anti-Americanism of a liberal bourgeois European elite with the anti-Americanism

of a Third World Marxist student. However, it is also possible that in the effort to create typologies, fundamental similarities have been overlooked.

Leading Definitions

To determine whether the study of anti-Americanism has been hampered by conceptual problems, let us begin by

examining two leading definitions of the phenomenon. The first is by Rubinstein and Smith, whose perspectives appear to have informed the views of more students of anti-

Americanism than any other. According to the authors,

Anti-Americanism can be defined as any hostile action

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States (1988:35).

To Rubinstein and Smith, the two main links between

types of anti-Americanism are: 1) the outward manifestation of hostility toward the United States and 2) the

"undifferentiated" nature of the attack on the "foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States." The first problem with this definition is that a focus on outward manifestations of hostility (i.e. acts and expressions), does nothing to explain motivation. To understand anti-Americanism we need to know what provokes

the hostility in the first instance. Moreover, the absence of overt hostility does not signify the absence of hostile sentiments. Tellingly, motivations are particularly important to analyses by non-Western scholars. Writing from the point of

view of the subject (the anti-American), these authors

stress that anti-Americanism is a fearful reaction to perceived threats. Hence, what may look like an attack to Americans like Rubinstein and Smith may seem to "insiders"

to be more a cry of fear. This is not to say that the "insider" interpretation is necessarily accurate. But it does appear to be on firmer ground. After all, why should a scholar focus on anti-Americanism as an outward display,

when it is rooted in inward sentiments? The second problem with the Rubinstein and Smith

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. definition is that it excludes too many "anti-Americans". It is possible, as Kizilbash (1988:67) and others have noted, for an individual to feel antagonistic toward U.S. government policies without necessarily rejecting American

values. That is not to say that anti-American "hostility" is not often undifferentiated, merely that it does not have to be.

Just the opposite problem confronts Haseler (1985). According to his definition, anyone who dislikes (any? all?)

American cultural and political values is anti-American. Anti-Americanism is thus

straightforward opposition, ranging from distaste to animus, to the cultural and political values of the United States (p.6).

Haseler interprets such antagonism as "often the

product of rage based on resentment and envy" (Haseler's emphasis) . Still, his definition implies— it seems

unintentionally — that dislike of certain attributes (values) engenders antagonism toward the whole object (America) . Surely it must be possible to dislike aspects of

American culture and political values where they conflict with one's own core values. To insist that such distaste must necessarily be based on resentment or envy would be the

height of ethnocentric arrogance. The problems with these definitions lead naturally to problems with the typologies of anti-Americanism that these

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. authors introduce. Let us begin with Rubinstein and Smith's "issue-

oriented" anti-Americanism. By this, Rubinstein and Smith refer to the "pattern of outbursts directed against the policies of the U.S. government with which a Third World country disagrees." As the authors themselves point out, conflicts that cease once a disagreement is resolved do not fit this category. Only discontent that is not issue- specific can be said to involve anti-Americanism. Yet if

discontent is not issue-specific, how can it be said to be issue-oriented? The view adopted in this dissertation is that smoldering resentments towards the United States are not

centered on issues, but on symbols (cf. Embree 1985:139). Whereas issues involve interests. symbols involve identities. Consider the allegations advanced in recent decades by black African leaders that the United States had

condoned or even supported apartheid in South Africa. Was opposition to U.S. policy based on a rational assessment of national interests? Certainly not. To the contrary, several

nations of southern Africa had important economic ties with

South Africa, ties that they could ill-afford to lose. What irked the leaders of black Africa was the feeling that no black person in Africa (or anywhere else) could retain his

dignity as long as others of his race were being subjected to the humiliations of apartheid. The "pattern of outbursts"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (as Rubinstein and Smith would call it) directed against the United States were really symptomatic of a deep and abiding apprehension that Washington shared Pretoria's contempt for black Africa, or at the very least, that it did not respect black sensibilities. Similarly, for most of the Arab world, U.S. support for Israel does little harm to their respective national interests. It does something far worse: it appears to perpetuate the crisis of Arab identity, an identity shaped in modern times by repeated humiliation at the hands of Israel (Ajami 1981).

Another problem with the typologies introduced by Rubinstein and Smith is that they do not appear to accommodate everyone who could be regarded as anti-American. Excluded from the "issue-oriented", "instrumental", and "revolutionary" categories are (non-radical) non governmental elites and the general public. Perhaps Rubinstein and Smith would assign this group to their "ideological" category. One wonders, however, if it is helpful to categorize members of the general public with

true ideologues, such as the leaders of national, Marxist,

or fundamentalist movements 1988:35).

Haseler has a different solution. First, anti- Americanism that is motivated not by ideology but by resentment he labels "primitive" or "instinctive" anti- Americanism". Included in this category are "rioting in the

Third World and 'peace demonstrations' in Western Europe."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Even Islamic fundamentalism is put in this category (p.14). These forms, says Haseler, should not be "taken seriously" (p.19). They represent the inevitable assaults on American power by the weak and envious. Second, he identifies all other forms of anti-Americanism as "ideological". Yet to Haseler, Marxist anti-Americanism is nearly defunct, having lost its appeal among intellectuals. What is left is a "non- Communist repudiation of liberal democratic capitalism and its attendant values". Even this is not really an ideology, but an elitist "impulse". Fundamentally it represents an elitist assault on democracy. Neither of the two approaches, in my view, offers a

cohesive explanation of anti-Americanism. Each type of anti- Americanism appears to spring from a different source, if these taxonomies are to be accepted. For example, non- ideological, primitive (Haseler), or issue-oriented (Rubinstein and Smith) anti-Americanism consists primarily

of negativistic resentment. Ideological (Haseler, Rubinstein and Smith) anti-Americanism, on the other hand, poses a positive challenge to American political and cultural hegemony. Revolutionary anti-Americanism (Rubinstein and

Smith) is a defense mechanism aimed at securing regime legitimacy. Instrumental (Rubinstein and Smith) or "functional" (Haseler) anti-Americanism is merely a calculated attempt to gain popular support. How is it that many of these forms of anti-Americanism

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. often coexist in time and place? What determines the form that anti-Americanism will take? In short, is there nothing more to a definition of anti-Americanism than the

tautological assertion that it signifies "opposition" to the United States? The functional approaches of both Rubinstein and Smith, and Haseler, appear less than adequate to the task of addressing these questions.

Toward a New Approach

Social-Psychological Perspectives

One of the many important conclusions that can be drawn from the insights contained in Rubinstein and Smith (1985), Thornton (1988) and Haseler (1985) is the notion that studying images will not get us very far in a study of anti-Americanism. Most scholars appeared to agree, whether

implicitly or explicitly, that anti-Americanism is not so much a cognitive phenomenon as an emotional one. The view advanced here attempts to build on this

insight. Images are relevant to a study of stereotypes.

Anti-Americanism, it will be argued, involves not a stereotype, but a prejudice. Whereas a stereotype certainly involves the suspension of critical faculties, it does not necessarily evoke emotions. A prejudice always does.

For Americans, there are many countries in the world

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that conjure up vague images (or stereotypes) but little emotion. The same cannot be said of foreign attitudes toward

the United States. For these nationals, America has tremendous symbolic significance. The attitudes and conduct of the United States towards them and those with whom they identify, helps shape their own sense of identity (cf. Deschamps 1982:90). Hence, the failure of the United States to treat them as equals is not merely insulting, but a threat to their positive national self-image.

America's symbolic significance in the world today is based on its overall dominance in the hierarchy of nations. To borrow terms from a leading anthropological definition, the dominant member of a community is one that occupies the apex of the "attention structure" (Chance 1967;1976). Everywhere around the world, people are interested in what

is happening in America. It dominates the headlines. Whether it wishes to or not, America is regarded as setting

standards that others may accept or reject. It has prestige. American prestige is partly a function of its power

and wealth. For all its setbacks, military, economic and

political, the United States is still a "winner" because it

has more ability than any other country to influence outcomes in the world arena. But being a winner is not enough. Dominance is not to the strong, but to the strong

and legitimate. 7/ The legitimacy of American dominance is founded on its ideology: the democratic idealism of men like

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson. However much the United States is chided for being hypocritical, the virtues of democratic idealism are rarely challenged. Instead, foreign critics attack the chinks in America's ideological armor, capitalism and imperialism (or militarism), because of their presumed incompatibility with the dignity and rights of the common man. For all the Soviet Union's weapons, space technology, and alternative ideology, it was never perceived as "number one", not even by its supporters. Responses to dominance are intensely emotional— and ambivalent. On the one hand, the dominant entity has enormous capacity to inspire. 8/ Numerous accounts by

foreign visitors to the United States attest to a fascination with American creativity, self-motivation, and optimism. As is well known, American popular culture is similarly fascinating. But the "Americanization" of the

world is not taking place within the realm of popular culture alone. In the realm of ideas as well, American social movements (for the dignity of women, disparaged minorities, the handicapped) still command attention in the

world community. Perhaps the greatest personifier of

America's capacity to inspire was President John F. Kennedy, who flattered the world community with his perceived interest in their affairs and support for a world order based on fraternity more than hierarchy. The near-universal

grief expressed upon his death further exemplifies America's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. position at the pinnacle of the structure of world attention. On the other hand, by virtue of its high prestige, the United States sometimes also serves as a basis for unfavorable comparisons. Comparisons are likely when the

foreign nationals perceive their country as sufficiently high in prestige (status) to make comparison feasible (Tajfel 1978:75). While such comparisons can lead to social change, they can also provoke an inclination to self- disparagement . Nationals of lower status countries can suffer as

well. The gap between their level of development and that of

the United States may be so great as to encourage a spirit of defeatism. If the United States has a substantial political, economic, military, or cultural presence in the country, nationals may respond with anger or with fatalistic acquiescence.

The approach to anti-Americanism that follows will

attempt to show that the key motivating force of anti- Americanism (indeed of nationalism as a whole) is collective

shame. It is the animating emotion common to all forms of anti-Americanism (and nationalism) whether political or cultural, organized or diffuse, radical, reactionary, or bourgeois democratic. Indeed, it will be argued here that

shame is the red thread that runs through all human

relationships, whether between individuals, groups, or

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. nations.

This social-psychological orientation is useful for understanding the primary causes of anti-American sentiment. It does not adequately explain how anti-Americanism is manipulated by elites (including students) or how it increases or decreases in intensity. To account for this aspect of the phenomenon, this study will examine the organization of anti-American sentiments. It will be argued that, since anti-Americanism can exist as diffuse sentiments or as part of a crystallized ideology or movement, it must

be informed by both social-psychological and structural theories.

New Definitions

To reflect this distinction between anti-American sentiments and organized anti-Americanism, this study will introduce a simple dichotomy. Diffuse anti-American sentiments consist of a set of largely inconsistent and incoherent attitudes toward the United States, in which sensations of shame (often manifested as resentment or

anger) combine with feelings of admiration. Anti-American sentiments are typical among individuals whose attitudes have not been subjected to rigorous testing, filtering, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reinforcement.

Anti-Americanism, like all isms, involves a systematic expression of beliefs. Like other ideologies, anti-American beliefs are "symbolically charged". They "present, interpret and evaluate the world in a way designed to shape, mobilize, direct, organize and justify certain modes or courses of action and to anathematize others" (D.Kettler in Miller 1987:235). Anti-Americanism is typically the product of an organized movement. 9/ Both diffuse anti-American sentiments and anti- Americanism are based on:

1. The belief that the United States poses a threat to national pride, and/or to the political, economic, social or cultural integrity of a nation or nation-state. 2. An experience of shame, provoked by a perceived inability to preserve a positive identity based on national affiliation.

In the case of diffuse sentiments, the United States is not

necessarily charged with malevolent intentions. The perceived destructive effects of U.S. influence on national identity may be seen as unintended, though inevitable.

A third element is necessary for anti-American sentiments to crystallize into "true" anti-Americanism: a generalized mistrust of U.S. intentions. This generalized

mistrust 10/ identifies anti-Americanism as a virulent form of prejudice much like anti-Masonism or anti-Semitism. Anti- Americanism will generally include belief in all or almost 32

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. all of the elements noted in definition 1. Diffuse anti- American sentiments may be based on just one or more of these elements. Frequently, anti-Americanism involves a preoccupation with conspiracies and unseen forces. It can be stimulated by wrenching national crises. But it is generally consolidated through participation in group activities with like-minded individuals. Those who harbor diffuse anti-

American sentiments may, on occasion, be amenable to the conspiracy theories advanced by virulent anti-Americanism, but their views are still inconsistent, vacillating between benign and malevolent views of U.S. intentions. Once they tip the balance in favor of malevolent views, once these

views achieve greater cognitive consistency, such individuals may be said to have crossed the permeable borders of diffuse anti-American sentiments into true anti- Americanism. This approach sees basic similarities between the anti-Americanism of Islamic fundamentalists and that of

Marxist revolutionaries. Both represent historically conditioned responses to the same phenomenon: the perceived

threat to national pride and integrity posed by the United States.

Principal Objectives of this Study

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Before identifying the aims of this study, it is perhaps necessary to note what this study does not aim to

do. It does not seek to portray anti-American sentiment as pathological per se. Following the arguments of Lewis (1971) and Scheff (1990), it is assumed that anti-American sentiments are as "normal" to human beings as is the sense of shame itself. Moreover, expression of anti-American sentiments can even be healthy if anger is accompanied by acknowledgement of the underlying shame. It is repression of shame that may lead to pathology. (Scheff 1990:30)

Repression of shame may also "be the root cause of the ...transmission of threat from person to person in an ongoing society, and from generation to generation over time." (p.19)

Turning from the language of psychoanalysis to

sociology, 11/ it should be stressed that this is a study of a form of preiudice. As such it focuses on the subject, not

on the object of prejudice (the United States). It would be inappropriate, therefore, to devote space to objective

criticisms of U.S. foreign policy (although such criticisms

can certainly be made) . The point is to examine the selective biases and emotional content of anti-Americanism.

1 2 / U.S. policies and diplomatic conduct will be discussed in order to better understand how they were received by "anti-Americans". How did these groups construe U.S.

policies and actions? Did they consider alternative

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. interpretations of U.S. behavior or just one? The study will transgress these bounds somewhat in it concluding remarks in order to sketch the implications of the findings for U.S.

foreign policy. The first objective of this study is to call attention to the importance of six attributes of an adequate understanding of anti-Americanism: 1) an integrated perspective that incorporates relevant findings from

anthropology, sociology, and social psychology; 2) an affect-oriented analysis of international behavior, in which the role of shame is evaluated; 13/ 3) an application of structural analyses to determine how anti-American and "pro- American" organizations or governments succeed or fail in

their efforts to influence public opinion; 14/ 4) an attention to demographic variables that may influence the degree of anti-Americanism in certain categories of individuals; 5) an interpretive orientation based on the study of pamphlets, testimonials, literature,

historiography, symbols, and appeals, as well as an analysis of the cultural and sociolinguistic context of anti-

Americanism; and 6) an awareness of the historical context of anti-American sentiment. Of all these attributes, affect-orientation may be the most important for explaining the origins and prevalence of anti-American sentiment. As to the intensity of anti-

Americanism and the conditions in which it is likely to be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. overtly expressed, structural explanations are likely to be the most useful. The second objective of this study is to answer the following questions about anti-Americanism in South Korea:

1) What factors are responsible for the rise of anti- Americanism in South Korea? Which of these are most important? 2) How widespread is the phenomenon? 3) What do the anti-American groups stand for and how

influential are they? 4) To what degree do anti-American groups differ in values and outlook from the general population?

5) What determines the intensity of anti-Americanism among groups and at different times? 6) To what extent is anti-Americanism a distinct phenomenon, separate from circumstances of domestic politics? To what extent is domestic politics a factor?

7) What are the likely prospects for anti-Americanism in

South Korea? 8) What impact have changes in U.S. policies or diplomatic

style had on the level of anti-Americanism in the past? To fulfill these objectives. Chapter 2 will identify concepts in the social sciences that, it is believed, will provide new insights into the nature of anti-Americanism. Emphasis will be on the significance of 1)social identity,

2) prestige and attention structure, and 3) shame (which are

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. borrowed, respectively, from social psychology, anthropology, and psychology), concepts that have been studied intensively only in the past two decades. The discussion will proceed with an application of these concepts to the study of nationalism. It will be argued that

studies of nationalism and anti-Americanism could be more fruitful if the concepts introduced here replaced the now- dominant functional approach. Chapter 3 will integrate previously introduced concepts with a discussion of the distinctive features of Korea's social and historical experience that contributed to

the subsequent growth of anti-Americanism and anti-American

sentiments. Chapter 4 traces the development of an organized anti-American movement as part of a radical challenge to the dictatorial Yushin regime. The impact of this movement on college campuses is assessed in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 6 also compares this phenomenon with the diffuse anti-American sentiments evident in the general population and analyzes

developments after 1986. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the sources of mistrust in Korean-U.S. relations and a

review of the dissertation findings.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NOTES

1. Journalist Thomas Morgan published his book Among the Anti-Americans in the same year. The book is valuable for its interviews with leading nationalists and others with views on anti-Americanism. But it was never intended as a theoretical treatment of the subject.

2. More unusual is his assertion that, for the first time, the "reactionary sentiments" of certain "conservative groups"— angered by U.S. trade pressures— may now be contributing to anti-Americanism (Kim 1988:232). 3. Kim does not appear to recognize that the question of success is open to very different interpretations) anti- Americanism will remain relatively modest in comparison with current anti-Japanese, anti-Chinese, and anti-Soviet sentiments (Kim 1988:232). 4. As we shall see, Kim's assessments about the strength of anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese feeling had been overtaken by events.

5. For an early and illustrious example of this approach see Angus (1938). Much more numerous are the works that review or reproduce foreign impressions of the United States. One of the most interesting accounts— of French opinion— is provided in Strauss (1978). See also Knoles (1968), Pachter (1976), Commager (1947), Miyoshi (1979), Joseph (1959), to name only some representative examples. 6. For a list of such works, consult the excellent bibliography in Gordon (1989).

7. Recent studies of dominance in apes and children show that dominance is not always predicated on physical strength (Kummer 1968; Omark 1980; Chance 1970).

8. On the dominant capacity to inspire see Freedman (1979: 36-37).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9. It may also be an instrument of social change: Ideologies bring the issue of a society's worth to the level of consciousness and guide men's actions over historical terrain that is, looked at in comparison to traditional society, terrifyingly unfamiliar and uncharted. This, I believe, helps to explain why ideologies are rapidly spreading from the West to the societies of the so-called "developing world". . . [I]deology is itself an active agent of historical change (Mullins 1972) .

10. "Generalized" in the same sense that prejudices are generalized. This term corresponds to Luck and Fromuth's "predisposition" (1985:227) and Rubinstein and Smith's use of the term "undifferentiated". 11. Thomas Scheff is a sociologist who has called attention to the implications of Helen Lewis's psychological theories for his field. I am profoundly indebted to his "rediscovery" of Lewis, and to the sociological insights he draws from her pioneering research.

12. I must agree with those who argue that it is difficult to avoid making judgments about the truth or falsehood of anti-American perceptions (Tai, Peterson & Gurr 1973:456). I began with this intention and did not fare very well. Nevertheless, I think it is possible to rise above this problem to some extent by avoiding the temptation to provide one's own definitive interpretation of events. The scholar's obligation is to demonstrate the selective perceptions of the individuals or groups in question. Of course, subjective biases creep into the analysis here as well: the scholar must determine which alternative perceptions were plausible and thus worthy of consideration. 13. Robert Jervis, one of the foremost theorists of decision-making in international relations and critic of the dominant realist (rational choice) paradigm: "Most political scientists, myself included, have been remarkably slow to explore the implications of emotions on beliefs and calculations... More frequently, affect has simply been ignored or treated as an "add on" rather than as integral to the decision process" (1985:5). For an overview of challenges to the rational choice paradigm see chapter 8 in Vasquez (1983), especially pp. 204-213. Shame, in my view, is likely to replace "frustration" (a concept which sociology has largely abandoned because it is too vague to be useful. For an example of how frustration has been linked to threat perception see Pruitt (1965). For a critique of frustration-aggression theory see Berkowitz (1978).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14. This approach heightens the scholar's awareness of the power of both symbols and resources as they are manipulated by opposing groups; it also corrects a potentially overdeterministic approach to anti-Americanism which ignores the extent to which certain strategies and tactics can inflame or check anti-Americanism in the populace (e.g. Gamson 1975; Tilly 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977) .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2

GROUP IDENTITY, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND NATIONALISM AS PRESTIGE STRATEGY

From Self-Concept to "Group Concept" In the Social Sciences

One of the most widely held assumptions in psychology and social psychology today is that self-concept (an individual's identity) is determined through interaction with others. Cooley's (1909) "looking glass self" and Mead's (1934) "generalized other" were among the earliest and most

influential presentations of this view. Both interpreted self-concept as arising from the subject's view of himself through the eyes of others and through the internalization of group norms. These views have formed the basis of now widely accepted views in psychology that positive self-

concept is essential to mental health (LeVine 1972:141). 1/ Mead's and Cooley's views have informed major approaches in

social psychology including reference group theory (Shils and Janowitz; Merton 1957:254; Newcomb 1943) and relatedly, relative deprivation theory (Lenski 1954; Gurr 1970)

cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), group approaches to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. attribution (Howard 1984) and studies of ethnie and racial conflict 2/. These perspectives were further developed by a broad range of interpretive sociologies including symbolic- interactionism and ethnomethodology (Goffman 1959,1967; Garfinkel 1967; Berger 1967:17), and interpretive

anthropology (Geertz 1973; Foster 1972; Shweder and LeVine 1984). Despite these important contributions to social science, most theorists were preoccupied with studies of the self largely independent of social context. This tendency was finally reversed in the 1970s with the publication of studies on intergroup behavior by Tajfel (1972;1978) and his

colleagues, including Turner (Tajfel and Turner 1979). 3/ The central contribution of social identity theory (SIT) was to stress the collective basis of intergroup conflict. Tajfel and Turner maintained that social phenomena could not be explained by recourse to individualistic theories of motivation and behavior. The proper level of

analysis for social behavior was the group.

SIT posited that in addition to personal identity, an

individual has a social identity. Just as personal status affects self-image, so does the status of the group or groups to which one belongs. Recalling the conclusions of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reference group theory, Tajfel showed that the individual strives for membership in "status groups" that fulfill the deeply emotional need for positive self-identity. The

exception to this occurs in fixed social orders, in which social mobility is seen as neither legitimate nor possible (Van der Berghe 1967). Like individuals, status groups collectively strive to preserve positive social identity (termed "positively valued distinctiveness, or P.P.) when it is threatened by an outgroup (Turner and Brown 1978:204-5). Suppose, for example, that ingroup esteem is challenged by a wealthier outgroup. The ingroup may 1) develop new, more favorable standards of comparison (e.g. based on race, education, religion etc.); 2) adjust ingroup values so that previously unfavorable comparisons become favorable (e.g. poverty is

moral or pure, rather than immoral or impure); 3) find a new outgroup with which to make favorable comparisons (e.g. a

poorer outgroup, or one that is wealthier but socially stigmatized), or 4) strive to raise ingroup status relative to the outgroup through competition (e.g. work hard to

increase ingroup wealth).

This study will argue later in this chapter that these four P.P. strategies provide an exemplary model for understanding nationalist and other group responses to challenges from other cultures and nations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Rediscovery of Shame and its Role in Identity Formation

Looking back at the 1970s, it now seems that a major paradigmatic shift was under way in the social sciences. For while Taj fel was rediscovering the group in social

psychology, similar lines of inquiry were returning to sociology and psychology. Taken together, these efforts represented a concerted challenge to the individualistic and rationalistic bias in the social sciences, which held that the truest insights into human behavior could be obtained through intensive (and often cognition-oriented) analysis of the individual psyche. Although Darwin (1872), McDougall

(1908), and Cooley (1922) had stressed a conception of humans as social beings and had regarded shame as a quintessential aspect of the human's social self, twentieth century social science remained, for the most part, deeply

wedded to individual-centered phenomena such as guilt and

anxiety. Among the early pioneers in the rediscovery of shame were Piers and Singer (1953), Erikson (1956), and Lynd

(1958), all of whom posited an intimate connection between shame, pride, and identity. Nevertheless, a classic and exhaustive social science reference text entitled Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (Berelson and Steiner 1964) still found it possible to omit "shame" from its lengthy index, while other key words such as "anger" and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "emotion" were restricted to brief entries applicable mainly to children. Possibly hampering the study of shame was the widespread misconstrual of ideas advanced by anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1989— [1946]) in a classic study of Japanese culture. Benedict had argued that, in Japan, shame is more widely used to sanction immoral behavior than is guilt. By this she did not mean that guilt was necessarily less prevalent in Japan, or that shame feelings were necessarily less frequent or any less painful in the United States

(1989:222-3). Her objective was to show how these emotions are used in the service of moral systems. Unfortunately, Benedict's depiction of Japan as a "shame culture" and the

United States as a "guilt culture" reinforced American tendencies to dismiss the incidence of shame in their society. Almost alone, sociologist Goffman (1959, 1967) showed that the shame experience (or rather one form of it—

embarrassment) was more widespread in Western society than

had been previously acknowledged; in fact, together with pride, it was primary social emotion. 4/ But it was left up

to psychologist Helen Lewis (1971) to provide an in-depth analysis of the inner workings of shame (Scheff 1990:76). According to Lewis, shame is a painful response to a

negative self-evaluation. In contrast to guilt, which

involves self-reproach for some voluntary transgression (act), shame centers on a condemnation of the self's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. perceived incapacity (1971:30). That negative self-image is derived, ultimately, from an evaluation of the self using a specific or generalized "other" as a referent. But rather

than seeing shame and guilt as opposed to one another, or mutually exclusive, Lewis observed that shame and guilt often coincide. To use an example that will recur in this dissertation, a non-Western elite may experience a sense of shame at perceived national shortcomings and attempt to

emulate American (or Western) ways in order to compensate for perceived deficiencies in personal status. This act, however, designed to boost one's self-image, may also spawn guilt at seeming to have rejected one's own culture and

people. Of the two emotions, shame is the more painful, because it involves anger at the whole self (1971:39-40). Of all Lewis's insights, none are more valuable for the purposes of this study than her contention that shame is

intimately connected with anger when shame feelings are not acknowledged and discharged (viz., chiefly through laughter). Unacknowledged shame leads to pathological states of "helpless anger" or even "humiliated fury" which persist in varying degrees of intensity. These states evoke

a desire to retaliate, whether at the "other" who occasioned the shame or at a witness who merely observed it (p. 198).

Judging from this behavior it appears that the outward object of hostility is often ill-defined and of secondary

importance. The real target is the self.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Until recently, Lewis's psychological theories were not recognized for their applications to the study of

intergroup relations (Scheff 1990). Throughout the 1970s, social scientists continued to examine the outward manifestations of group shame.

Studies of Cross-Cultural Contact and Social Change

As Tajfel, Turner and their colleagues in social psychology were exploring the ways in which status groups strive for positive social identitv. anthropologists like

LeVine and Barkow were engaged in similar research into the nature of prestige. Both the social psychological and anthropological approaches were founded on the premises of

self-esteem theory; both were primarily concerned with the behavior of status groups. However, the absence of cross

citations suggests that their approaches were shaped within their respective disciplines. 5/ While Tajfel and his fellow social psychologists had

framed their theories primarily with intranational groups in mind, anthropologists, including LeVine and Barkow, were

also interested in the impact of contacts between different cultures. In his highly absorbing study. Dreams and Deeds.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (1966) LeVine was mainly concerned to illustrate how different ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo) responded to Westernizing influences in their country. His conclusions about the achievement orientation of each group need not concern us here. What is relevant is his description of the

fragility of ingroup esteem following contacts with higher status cultures. He concluded that

...events since 1900 have afforded the Hausa maximal protection from the withdrawal of status respect which often accompanies colonialism. In the system of indirect rule they were allowed to retain their own rulers and continue the traditional life fostered by those rulers. Lord Lugard's agreement insulated them from Christian missionaries and Western education, so that they never suffered the jolts to cultural self esteem which are inflicted on a non-Western people by mission Christianity, by knowledge of the outside world, and by a new scale of educational values... [T]hey could continue to see as undiminished in splendor their traditonal culture with its monarchy, orthodox Islam, orientation toward Mecca, and Koranic schooling. They did not suffer the invidious comparison with European culture or Europeanizing Africans which southern Nigerians did.

Inspired in part by this study, Barkow pursued the

question of how "prestige systems" are destroyed or

preserved. Although adopting an anthropological perspective,

Barkow's discussion of successful "prestige strategies"

(1975;1989) mainly corresponded to the first of social psychology's four P.D. strategies outlined above. When prestige systems break down, according to Barkow, the best

and most likely alternative is for the lower status group to

adopt the prestige system of the "superior" culture, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. thus regain prestige by identifying with the dominant society. This observation corresponds to Tajfel's notion that individuals seek out membership in higher status groups when the social order is sufficiently unstable. Barkow also suggested that individuals who neither adopt the Western prestige system nor reject it in favor of tradition will

suffer from low self-esteem (1989:226). Barkow pointed out that contacts with highly prestigious outsiders do not threaten a society's prestige system all at once. Given the social distance between the two groups, the ingroup does not perceive the outgroup as

"real people" (cf. Minogue 1967:148). As Tajfel would observe, there are simply no points of comparison between

the two groups (1978:75). With prolonged familiarity, however, the conception of outsiders as gods is no longer tenable. It is at this point that group prestige (survival) strategies are required.

Do all groups develop prestige strategies? Tragically, history shows that many do not. A well-known example, the

19th-century Tahitians, "lost their taste for life"

(Moorehead:114) after extended contact with European sailors

and missionaries. Many grew listless, turning to alcohol and near- or total self-destruction as a people. This is not only true of many (though not all) European-dominated

aborigines of Australia and North and South America, but also of the aborigines of Taiwan (Buruma 1989:190-93), whose

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contacts with Han Chinese settlers date from the Qing Dynasty. Whereas Barkow conceived of groups as striving for

prestige, fellow anthropologist Wallace (1956), writing two decades earlier, saw them striving for intearitv (but cf. Wallace 1966:213). Wallace was more concerned with group strategies for survival in the face of stress. reflecting the enormous influence of relative deprivation theory at the time. But whether conceived of as a response to stress or outgroup prestige, his discussion of "revitalization movements" is extremely valuable for understanding the

nature of cultural strategies. In Wallace's coinage:

A revitalization movement is defined as a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture (p. 422) .

This was intended as a general term encompassing many

distinctive strategies (movements) for survival. As Wallace noted, a revitalization movement may consist of more than one "subclass" of movement. And members of a group may hold ambivalent attitudes to some of the themes of these movements :

"Nativistic movements" are revitalization movements characterized by strong emphasis on the elimination of alien persons, customs, values and /or material from the mazeway [mental image]. "Revivalistic movements" emphasize the institution of customs, values, and even aspects of nature which are thought to have been in the mazeway of previous generations but are not now present. "Cargo cults" emphasize the importation of 50

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. alien values, customs, and material into the mazeway, these things being expected to arrive as a ship's cargo as for example in the Vailala Madness. "Vitalistic movements" emphasize the importation of alien elements into the mazeway but do not necessarily involve ship and cargo as the mechanism. "Millenarian movements" emphasize mazeway transformation in an apocalyptic world transformation engineered by the supernatural. "Messianic movements" emphasize the participation of a divine savior in human flesh...(p. 423)

The study of revitalization movements by Wallace and

others did much to illuminate the ways in which one society responds to challenges from another. But what determines the choice of "prestige strategy"? Why is it that some societies apparently fail to cope with the challenges posed by other,

more prestigious, societies? An interesting answer to both questions was offered by Champagne (1983). A predecessor, Worsely (1968:227-8) had suggested that "stateless" societies lack the political institutions necessary for

sustaining political or military resistance to more powerful

outsiders. As a result, their only defense is a religion- oriented millenarian movement. Using the same structural approach. Champagne refined this argument, maintaining that neither centralization nor specialized political

institutions are sufficient to determine what form of

resistance or accommodation a society will adopt. Citing the works of Levy (1966) and Eisenstadt (1978) on structural differentiation in society. Champagne argued that

revitalization movements arise in structurally non differentiated societies. Cultural, political, economic, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. kinship institutions are fused, making adaptation difficult. (To paraphrase Barkow, these societies have cohesive

prestige systems. An attack on one element is an attack on the whole of it) . Although members of the structurally nondifferentiated societies of Delaware and Iroquois Indians wanted to pursue strategies for survival. Champagne

maintained that they could not.

Before the rise of revitalization movements, groups in both societies advocated adoption of Christianity and American political and economic institutions as a means to group survival, but most members of these societies were unwilling or strongly opposed to making major changes in their economic, political and cultural organization (1983:759).

Champagne then contrasted their situation with that of the

Choctaw and Cherokee societies.

The more structurally differentiated Cherokee and Choctaw societies, which had extralocal forms of political and social integration, did not respond to political subordination and the loss of the fur trade with revitalization movements. Both structurally differentiated societies readily accepted American economic and political innovations which resulted in increased differentiation and specialization of sub macro political and economic institutions (1983:759).

Pre-Nationalist and Nationalist Strategies for Survival

In his study of the Melanesian cargo cult, Worsely (1968) had discerned the "first stirrings of nationalism" (cf. Guiart 1951). Champagne, in turn, saw in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. adaptations of Choctaw and Cherokee societies, the beginnings of state-building. The first represented a

cultural/religious response to the European challenge, the second a political/organizational one. Both elements are evident in the evolution of nationalism in the Third World. Yet, nationalism has attracted remarkably little attention

from sociologists (A.D. Smith 1979:24-25). Implicit in many of the sociological and anthropological approaches to the study of contact between groups and societies is the belief that inequities between status groups (or prestige systems, cultures, etc.) will

ultimately pose a challenge, a potentially "lethal" one, to the less prestigious group. Conquest of the lower status

group by the more prestigious one would undoubtedly hasten the process. But even without force, the assumption is that lower status groups are impelled to respond. In this schema, the behavior of the lower status is motivated even more by

the drive for positive self-identification than it is imposed by the higher status group. 6/

A brief sketch of proto-nationalist and nationalist conduct illustrates the point; When a high status

traditional elite is challenged by a rising cultural outgroup, it may attempt to physically eradicate them, or at least to intimidate them into their previous submission. The

rivalry is not primarily a contest for power. The rival group may be much weaker in resources while richer in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. prestige. Instead, the contest centers on preserving the integrity of a given "prestige system". Melson makes just this point in a cogent analysis of motives for the Turkish massacre of Armenians at the end of the nineteenth century. He contends that the rapidly increasing social success of Armenians "may have...confronted the theory and practice of

Muslim superiority and Armenian inferiority". 7/ Other examples include the massacres of Chinese by Malay elites in Southeast Asia and the attempt by 19th-century Confucian elites in Vietnam to kill or convert their Christian brethren. The Armenians and Vietnamese Christians were

dangerous purveyors of Eurocentric prestige. They seemed to show by example that the superior claims of Islam or of Confucianism were fraudulent (Mortimer 1982:87; Woodside 1987:135). Similarly, the sinocentric world view of the Chinese, combined with an achievement orientation more compatible with that of the West, put new pressures on Malay

identity.

Against Western imperialism the strategy of total rejection, nativism, failed repeatedly. A traditional elite that refused to adapt to new realities became discredited,

and was replaced by a counterelite whose qualifications were their immersion in Western ways. 8/ Traditional elites who had favored selective borrowing

became gradually aware that piecemeal innovations would not stave off the Western challenge. Ottoman rulers eagerly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sought out Western weapons, only to find that military strength required Western style organizational reforms as well (Mortimer 1982:90). Other Ottomans, equating national wealth with national virtue, opted for importing certain Western economic innovations (Hourani 1983:77). Yet for these to succeed, a new educational system had to be

introduced. Not surprisingly, few among the traditional elite desired to discard the traditions upon which their

authority was based (Mortimer 1982:91). Yet as the piecemeal approach failed to yield results, pressures for more thoroughgoing Westernization mounted. 9/ Seized by a sense of desperation, Meiji elites like

Hiroshi Wagatsuma became convinced that Japan had to remake itself as a Western country if it were to survive (DeVos and Romanucci-Roes 1975:315). Resentment that such changes were necessary (White et al 1990:25) was combined with tremendous feelings of admiration. Japan incorporated Western ways under the slogan "Eastern morality and Western technology."

But as Kuwabara points out, this was "a political slogan that allowed Japan to proceed with a clear conscience as

they sought to acquire every possible appurtenance of

European civilization" (Kuwabara 1983:136). More typically, counterelites rather than traditional elites were the agents of nationalist reform. 10/ Their vested interests lay not in the old order but in the new. Western one. To be sure, these Western-educated

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. professionals and intellectuals tried to find face-saving virtues in their old culture, often applauding the native tradition for its superior and intangible "spirit" (Weems 1971;Karpat 1964). Nevertheless, their prescriptions for the future did not include greater doses of spirit, but wholesale changes in the national mentality (e.g. Nehru

1946:531-2). For example, Yi Kwangsu called on Koreans to adopt Western education and Christianity as vehicles of

modernization. Paradoxically, Yi expected that such a course would create a uniquely Korean cultural integrity, freed at last from centuries of servile imitation and dependence on China (Yi Kwangsu 1979). By the turn of the century, sadae. or serving the big power (i.e. China) became a term of disparagement among the Westernized counterelite (Robinson

1984;1988). The counterelites saw new opportunities for establishing national dignity in their country. Yet the goal usually eluded them because they saw themselves and their

nation through Western eyes (Nehru 1946:38). If they did not

measure up to Western standards, or failed to gain

recognition by Western elites, they felt shame. 11/ A good illustration of this is Rosselli's account of the clerical

and administrative elite of 19th-century Bengal. In the words of Macaulay:

The physical organization of the Bengali is feeble even to effeminacy. He lives in a constant vapour bath. His pursuits are sedentary, his limbs delicate, his 56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. movements languid. During many ages he has been trampled upon by men of bolder and more hardy breeds. Courage, independence, veracity, are qualities to which his constitution and his situation are equally unfavorable (cited in Rosselli:122).

The Bengali elite's uncritical acceptance of this gloomy diagnosis shows how susceptible they were to British images of themselves. Even some of the most independent and

brilliant minds in Bengal seized upon the notion that the nation's "indiscipline in matters of food, sleep [and exercise]" were the cause of its misfortunes (Chaudhuri 1951:153). The response, predictably, was a movement to "restore" the nation's physical constitution. It is

interesting to note that all their "nationalist" responses reflected elite, rather than mass concerns. The founding of

a Nationality Promotion Society, the search for past martial heroes— neither of these had anything to do with the struggle of the lower orders for survival.

The same could be said for Korea. After Korea's forced

opening to the outside world in 1876, the Korean elite became preoccupied with Western images of themselves. The views of Western missionaries in Korea were the most

influential, but the impression of travellers, and diplomats also left their mark (Kim Hyung-chan 1984). Jaisohn's (So Chae-pil) observations about the Korean "character" were

typical. He described them as lazy, lacking in moral courage

(i.e. opportunistic), insincere. The traditional elite fvanaban) in particular he condemned as parasitic, given to 57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. intrigue, and corrupt. Jaisohn concluded that these vices had "made Korea poor" (Weems 1971:179-208; cit. p.182). But as was generally the case elsewhere, Korea's moderate

nationalist prescriptions for the future, principally educational reform, seemed more attuned to intellectual elite, rather than mass, interests (Robinson 1988). A more popular "revitalizing" response came from the Tonahak beginning in 1860. This movement, founded by a poor vanaban. appealed to the fears of both traditional elites

and peasants about the future of the old order. It spurned Western learning (Sohakf in favor of Eastern learning (Tonqhak) ■ Combining nativist, revivalist and millenarian impulses, it strived to expel foreign influence, return to

the moral leadership of the glorified past, and establish a just and perfect social order in the near future. Its chief innovation was the promise to destroy the discredited

vanqban class, replacing it with new Confucian-style leaders. In short, the Tonqhak struggled to preserve national integrity with revitalizing, rather than

nationalist, solutions. The response was tremendous. Tens jf thousands of peasant soldiers made war on the government.

Only the timely intervention of Chinese troops saved the Yi Dynasty from collapse.

The crushing of the Tonqhak movement spelled doom for

two strategies of rejection: the purely nativist response of most traditional elites fwiionq choksal ("defend orthodoxy,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ban heterodoxy") and the revivalist-millenarian Tonqhak. A new strategy was born in the aftermath of Japanese

occupation (1905) and annexation (1910) of Korea. As with nativism and revivalism, this one involved rejection of Western (and by extension, Japanese) prestige. But like the pro-Enlightenment reformism of Jaisohn, Yi Kwangsu and others, it adopted a nationalist program. This new strategy evolved into the Korean communist movement. Communism attracted Koreans seeking a middle ground

between rejection and admiration of Western values. It involved not so much a rejection of all Western values, as of Western hypocrisy. It expressed profound admiration for the Western idea that people were the masters of their own

fate. At the same time, it expressed indignation that only whites, or capitalists, or some other select group was in reality allowed these privileges. Communists were by no means the only nationalists to

feel this way. The Japanese, for example, were humiliated by the failure of the Versailles Conference to denounce racism and accept them on equal terms (Lauren 1988) . So were Indian

and African members of the colonial British civil service,

who were barred from white-only clubs and the most prestigious positions. Regardless of the means employed, the process of

national self-strengthening involved intense feelings of shame, acknowledged or not. As Nehru put it, "1 was ashamed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of much that I saw around me, of superstitious practices, of outworn ideas, and above all, our subject and poverty- stricken state" (1946:37). The colonial middle classes, in

particular

[W]anted some cultural roots to cling to, something that gave them assurance of their own worth, something that would reduce the sense of frustration and humiliation that foreign conquest and rule had produced (1946:343). Nationalists found different ways to cope with the shame— including, in the end, rejecting nationalism. India's Mohandas Gandhi, a Western-trained lawyer, had felt the stinging shame of British colonial rule as well as apartheid

during his early experiences as a lawyer in South Africa.

Ultimately he turned his back on the West, denying that the West had anything to teach India. Instead of adopting P.O. strategy four, that of competition, he changed the terms of comparison with the West (P.D. strategy 2). India should not

compare itself with the West on the basis of its material achievements, he argued. What counted was spirituality, which India had in abundance. Poverty, of which most Indians

had been ashamed, became, to Gandhi, a sign of moral

superiority (Fischer 1983). Another example of the urge to drop out from competition can be found in the case of Burma. Exposed much more briefly and superficially to colonial rule than India,

Burma did not develop a strongly acculturated elite class.

Gradually under the leadership of Ne Win, it cut itself off 60

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. from all models, Western, Soviet or Chinese (Leach 1972:43), becoming one of the most isolated states in the world

community. Other elites found their range of options limited by the absence of a cohesive, national memory. Where little national identity existed, as in much of sub-saharan Africa, for example, a sense of national mission was lacking. Even the most spirited pleas by African patriots could not, by themselves, change this state of affairs. Consequently, elites and alike often seemed to succumb to defeatism.

Many more states opted to strive to compete for prestige in a Western-dominated system. During the process, modernizing elites often felt betrayed. The illustrious Argentinian writer and "Teacher-President" Domingo

Sarmiento, had written an essay as a young man extolling

English virtues. But as a young exile in Europe, he found that the vaunted superiority of Western Europe was as much

mirage as reality. He saw in Europe a "sad mixture of greatness and abjection, of wisdom and brutalization, sublime and filthy receptacle of all that both elevates and

degrades man" (Leonard 1976:106). Angered by the superior

arrogance of the Western Europeans, who at that time

dominated the "structure of attention" in the world, Sarmiento turned to America (Kiernan 1969:287). For Sarmiento, America became the "the last word in modern

civilization" (Leonard 1976:110).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. By the 192 0s, the nations of Europe appeared to agree.

European identity had hardly been an issue before, but with

the emergence of a new, rival American civilization, some European elites grew anxious. Did the rise of America presage European decline? Before long, the idea of one Europe gained appeal. Just two decades into "the American

century", U.S. dominance was beginning to reshape the images of formerly confident nations (Strauss 1978:215).

What is Nationalism? A Critique

It was suggested earlier that a commitment to both revitalization and state-building are central to nationalism, both as an ideology and as a social movement. Using the case of non-Western countries, this study has attempted to make more explicit the links between pre- or

proto-nationalist strategies to maintain group prestige, and nationalist ones. Putting this all together, a definition may be advanced as follows:

Nationalism is an ideology and a social movement aimed at revitalizing the nation and building state institutions. It arises for the purpose of replacing a discredited, "shameful" prestige system with one that protects the national identity and integrity. 12/

If Champagne (1983) is correct, we should add that the emergence of nationalism depends not only on the existence

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of a "national identity" but also upon structural differentiation and centralized institutions in a society. How does this definition accord with prevailing theories of

nationalism? Not very well. The dominant approach begins with a study of the phenomenon in France, where it is supposed to have arisen. England is then passed over rather quickly as the focus shifts to the rise of romantic nationalism on the

central, southern, and eastern peripheries of Europe. So Eurocentric is this focus that the case of nationalism in the Third World is often relegated to one residual category, such as "reactive nationalism", (Rostow

1962:98), defensive nationalism (Kohn 1967), or "negative nationalism" (Alba 1968), as opposed to the presumably more autonomous, positive strivings that marked the nationalist impulse in Europe. Most non-Western students of nationalism

appear to adopt this assumption. Cha Ki-byuk, for example, basing his discussion on Kohn (1944) writes that unlike the "open", "autonomous", and "superior" nationalism that developed in the West, non-Western nationalism was and

remains "cloistered", "irrational", and "inferior". In Western Europe, nationalism had been "supported by politically nd economically strong citizens, the middle

class, and organized workers." In the non-West, "nationalism was supported by a feudalistic aristocracy and an ignorant lower class." Finally, in Western Europe,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. nationalism evolved alongside liberalism, whereas in the non-West, it developed in resistance to liberalism, and to outside influence generally (Cha 1979:256-7). Although most Western scholars have not advanced this idea in such frankly disparaging terms, it does represent the majority opinion among them. In this view, nationalism is the byproduct of industrialization, or in Deutsch's case, market capitalism (1966). Proponents of this view can be further divided into three positions: those that suggest that nationalism is a tool of industrialization (Davis 1955; Smelser 1968; Gellner 1983); that nationalism is a consequence of rising individualism, created with the

beginnings of market capitalism and industrialization (Deutsch 1966:179); that nationalism is the product of crisis resulting from industrialization— this crisis is identified as a "weakening social fabric" (Kedourie 1970:24- 26; Smith 1979:67).

Non-Western states were preindustrial at the time of their contacts with the Western imperial powers. If

industrialization (Kedourie 1966; 1970) or "modernization"

(Gellner 1983) stimulates nationalism, and industrialization was essentially a Western import, nationalism must necessarily also be a Western import. Gellner is unusual in denying fundamental differences between Western and non- Western nationalism, but as Haas (1986) rightly points out,

his theory does not support this case.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Further interpretations explain why nationalism persists in the post-industrial era. Rostow (1962) says that nationalism is in part a reaction to modern anomie, or a drive for "unity" as Smith (1979) terms it. In a similar

vein, Gellner points to the need for "cultural homogeneity". For him, nationalism is "an inescapable consequence of the atomised, mobile, and universally literate modern society" (1987:113). Oddly, however, the most atomized, mobile, and

literate members of these societies appear to be the least susceptible to nationalist urges. Gellner himself admits to doubts about the completeness of his theory, citing the "emergence of new regional nationalities, not always fed by

genuine cultural differentiation" (1987:114). Missing in all these functional approaches is a precise understanding of nationalism's appeal among different peoples living in varying circumstances. In Minogue's apt phrasing, "once an idea becomes a 'function'

all blood has been drained out of it" (Minogue 1992). Many authors vaguely hint at social "frustrations". Yet as noted elsewhere, frustration as an explanatory

concept has been largely discarded by social psychologists. And those who use it in the context of nationalism are no more successful at demonstrating its utility. Smith concludes his survey of 2 0th-century nationalism this way:

[N]ationalism's persistence and appeal must be derived 65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. from the conjunction of the three sets of forces that shaped it originally: longstanding ethnic traditions, the birth of new secular ideals, and the peculiar characteristics of modernization and its social concomitants. It is at these three levels that research needs to be focused if we are to grasp nationalism's manifold and continuing appeals; their conjunctions and interplay can alone reveal why this particular ideal and movement should have gained the immense hold that it has achieved over the minds and hearts of modern generations. The specific conditions that foster given nationalist movements naturally vary with successive historical periods and in different milieux; yet the ubiquitous nature of its basic ideals suggests that we should search for the common threads in the pattern of nationalism (1979:196-7).

Smith thus neatly summarizes the problem with the

functional approach. For all the effort that Smith and like- minded scholars have devoted to classifying types of nationalism, we are really no closer to understanding underlying motivations, (of. Waldron 1985; Stokes 1978; Breuilly 1985:33). We may learn something of their attributes— the "varieties of nationalism" (Snyder 1976)— just as we may learn something of the varieties of anti-

Americanism (Haseler). But we learn little about their common bonds.

Even Breuilly, a critic of the functional approach, does not advance a general theory of nationalism,

concentrating instead on the same taxonomic approach to nationalist movements that he objects to in functionalists.

Breuilly stresses that nationalism is, at bottom, a political movement, a struggle for power rather than a

struggle for identity. Yet like many functionalists, he

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. doubts that any one theory can explain all varieties of nationalism. Breuilly believes that viewing nationalism as a political movement helps to avoid confusing xenophobia with nationalism. 13/ For this he criticizes the nationalist school (e.g. Hayes; Kohn) whose general discussions about the search for national identity appear tautological.

Breuilly rightly asks what it means to say that people search for national identity (Barbu 1966:184-185; Rostow

1962). Why not some other form of identity? To answer this question we must once again return to a discussion of Tajfel and Barkow. Tajfel's social identity theory posited that the identity of the ingroup is shaped

through interaction with a more prestigious outgroup. Barkow called these groups prestige systems. What happens when a pre-national, solidary "(in)group" comes in contact with a more prestigious "outgroup", one that is organized as a nation-state? As it develops a defensive orientation, the

ingroup becomes sensitive to what it perceives as outgroup

images of itself. Unless it is able to isolate itself from

further contacts with the outgroup, it is likely to adopt a self-image that corresponds with the outgroup images of itself.

At this point, the ingroup has three choices. It can strive to raise its prestige by overcoming the unfavorable

points of comparison (p.d. strategy 4). It can take some of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the sting out of its lost prestige by rationalizing failures and shifting the focus of social comparison. Or, it can

uncritically accept disparaging outgroup images of itself, in which case the group is vulnerable to increasing marginalization and eventual disintegration. (As we have seen, the most decisive variable influencing the range of choices appears to be the existence or absence of crucial structural preconditions) . For the pre-national ingroup that chooses p.d. strategy 4, the task is clear. First, it will have to develop a national ethos, replete with its own (rival) history, myths, heroes, and symbols. Second, it must build state institutions that are the match of the outgroup. Until it attains a position of rough parity (of prestige) with the outgroup, members of the ingroup will feel ambivalent about themselves. They will be simultaneously

proud of past accomplishments and ashamed of their present, "inferior" status. Once the ingroup achieves parity of

prestige, nationalism will disappear. 14/

What if a pre-national group pursuing p.d. strategy 4 is identified by a prestigious outgroup chiefly in terms of its racial attributes? Social identity theory would predict

that the group would define itself more by race than by any other attribute. Of course, the example that comes most readily to mind is Africa, where racial consciousness far outweighs national or religious affiliation (i.e. Islam) as

a source of identity (Mazrui 1977:26). In the Middle East,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. however, among people of the same racial stock as Europeans, the focus of nationalist energies is the Arabic umma

(community, nation, "folk") . 1 5 / In Japan, national affiliation is combined with a keen racial consciousness (Lauren 1988; White et al 1990; Ishihara 1989), the product

of Western preoccupations with race. 1 6 / Barkow's concept of prestige system also advances our understanding of the nature of non-nationalist responses to the Western challenge. As noted earlier, Gandhi in India, Ne Win in Burma, and the Ayatollah Khomeini (see fn.4) all

chose to reject the Western prestige system. Yet as Rubinstein and Smith have observed, "Hinduism and Buddhism .. . suffered the dislocations and humiliations of several hundred years of Western imperialism but manifest little of the bitterness and hostility still felt within Islam." (Rubinstein and Smith, 1985:4). Perhaps the reason lies in

the nature of Hindu and Buddhist prestige systems, on the one hand, and the Islamic prestige system, on the other. In the former case, the prestige system is "loose" rather than

fused. 1 7 / Hindu and Buddhist "ideologies" are syncretic; authority within their prestige systems is neither strongly

centralized, nor a fusion of religious and secular forms. Islam, by contrast, makes totalist claims on its followers, its powers reinforced by the existence of strong religious/state authority. (Lévi-Strauss 1977; Ajami 1981). In this section I have outlined a view of why groups

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. embrace or reject nationalism, based on the example of the Third World. Yet, as already noted, most theories of

nationalism have been based primarily on the Western experience. How well does the model advanced here apply to the case of nationalism in Europe? The following sketch,

drawing upon case studies of French, English, and German nationalism, aims at demonstrating that Western and non-

Western nationalisms are more similar than generally recognized. Furthermore, an understanding of the underlying similarities of Western and non-Western nationalism is

crucial to an understanding of anti-Americanism as it exists in both Western and non-Western countries.

Nationalisms, West and East

Most surveys of nationalism begin with the French Revolution, But, for the purpose of this study, we will

start with late eighteenth century Germany. It was in Germany that "romantic nationalism" began, and it is with romantic nationalism that the nationalisms of the non-West

appear to have the most in common. When the non-Western societies confronted the West, they— that is to say the elites most of all— felt acutely ashamed of their newly-discovered inadequacies. Arabs were

filled with "self-hatred" and "cynicism", alleviated only

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. temporarily by "wild dreams of past glory" (Sharabi 1988) . The Japanese thought themselves "deplorable" and "shameful",

admiring in their culture only what Westerners had chosen to admire about Japan (Kuwabara 1983). Black Africans, chiefly by virtue of race, were the most humiliated of all (Mazrui 1977:215). As time passed, self-deprecation was joined by

anger at disillusionment and rejection. Nationalists, like spirited and admiring students, wanted to learn from their teacher. But they soon found out that the teacher was a fraud and a hypocrite; an arrogant master who was not willing to admit them to the camaraderie of free academic exchange.

For the German counterelite (writers, professionals, academics), France was that teacher.

Long before the French Revolution, Paris had stood at the center of Europe. Although England was a formidable military, economic and political rival, France was at least

in cultural terms, at the pinnacle of the "attention structure" in Europe. In German intellectuals like Herder, this generated resentment. In others, however, France

inspired awe and affection. Already in the 1780s, as O'Brien notes in an excellent study (1988), Francophile Germans had already sought incorporation of the German Rhineland into France. By 1789, some of them found even greater cause for admiration. The French revolutionaries had secured the victory of lofty universal principles for all of mankind to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. enjoy. In stirring tribute, a minor poet, Friedrich Klopstock, wrote of the 'Divine Liberty of the Gauls.' Yet just two years later, in 1792, he changed his mind. "They have become conquerors", he wrote, "traitors to humanity" (0'Brien:42). 18/

As O'Brien shows, the French revolutionaries had promised to fellow patriotes across Europe recognition as républiques soeurs. But when the republics arose in rapid succession around the peripheries of France, they were either annexed outright or treated shabbily, (pp.38-41) 19/

Nevertheless, Klopstock was unusually sensitive. Most German patriotes like J.G. Fichte remained enamored of France until the Napoleonic wars (1804-1815). By then a few had grown wary, arguing as Friedrich Schlegel did, that the French had taken advantage of their superiority to trample on weaker nations (Kohn 1967:180). A critical turning point came in 1806 with the

crushing defeat of the famous Prussian army in the battles of Jena and Auerstadt. The nationalist Ernst Moritz Arndt, who at first heartily admired Napoleon (Kohn 1967:252), later wrote:

"Not until Austria and Prussia had fallen after vain struggles did I really begin to love Germany and condemn the foreigners. It was not only Napoleon. . .that I despised, it was the French. . .Just when Germany lay prostrate did it become to me one and indissoluble (Pundt:1935).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. So ashamed did Arndt become at the helpless condition of Germany that he became ashamed of shame itself. 2 0/ "I hate nothing more hotly and deeply," he wrote, "than you lazy and good-for-nothing fellows [fellow German writers and critics] who are not ashamed to voice German shame in the German language." In the former Francophile Fichte, the humiliations of Jena and Auerstadt stimulated a new interest in race. The French were not superior, argued Fichte, because they were not racially pure (recall P.D. strategy 1). No comprehensive treatment of German nationalism can be offered here. What is simply worth noting is that what began as a movement for cultural revitalization became,

after 1806, a movement for political and economic revitalization as well. Prussian administrative and social reforms, as well as liberal German efforts on behalf of a unified Germany were separate but parallel aspects of an

effort to revitalize the German nation and build a strong

state. The first phase, cultural nationalism, (beginning with Herder) had been stimulated, not by physical danger, but by the shame of Germany's "inferior" prestige system relative to that of France. If German nationalism appears to offer the most striking parallels to nationalism in non-Western countries,

England would appear to offer the fewest. In fact, many scholars have never been entirely sure that there has ever

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. been an English nationalism. But in an influential new history, Newman (1987) argues that English nationalism began as a quest for national identity in 1750 and came to an end

around 1830 with the "renewal" of the English political system. Newman's thesis is that the impetus for nationalism sprang from writers, professionals, clergy, and middle class businessmen, all of whom had grown resentful of the

aristocratic patronage system that made further upward mobility nearly impossible. But as Newman shows, English nationalism was spurred by cultural despair, in particular, the shame of French cultural hegemony in English society. In the mid-eighteenth century, English society was headed by a Francophile aristocracy. It was a profoundly hypocritical class, imbibing the cosmopolitan values of the French Enlightenment while reigning over a closed social

order at home. At the same time, the English bourgeoisie had been gaining confidence. They envied aristocratic prestige, but, convinced of their own abilities, deeply resented their exclusion from participation in this "prestige system" (Kramnick 1977). From the 1740s, Newman contends that intellectuals in

particular were seized with the "fear of national decline" (p. 69). The French were portrayed as plotting the doom of England, with the gullible aristocracy acting as willing pawns. French values corrupted English society, especially

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. its youth (p.98-99). In response, the bourgeoisie proposed to restore old values like freedom and innocence, which had presumably been lost in the course of French domination.

They posed as champions of the people, committed to reviving national history, language and literature (p.114) Like Fichte in the 19th century, English intellectuals grew interested in the myth of Anglo-Saxon virtuosity, while at the same time deprecating French achievements.

As they sought to overturn aristocratic privilege, they invoked new symbols of prestige. Instead of aristocratic patriotism, in which England was envisioned as a "glorified private estate" 21/ (Kiernan in Newman:53), the

bourgeoisie offered nationalism. Nationalism represented a positive program for the political and cultural renewal of society. By fostering internal solidarity, the bourgeoisie could promote a new, more positive national identity. But the bourgeois sense of humiliation by France, and even more so, by the English aristocracy, never matched that of 19th century Germany. For all of England's deference to

France in cultural matters, it was the equal of France in

political, economic and military power. Hence this "renewal nationalism" as Newman sees it, was primarily the product of domestic struggle. Humiliation by France was a secondary consideration. What is interesting, however, is how well the external and domestic

objectives coincided. The bourgeois struggle for recognition

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in their own society spurred the rise of the "theory of the Norman yoke", in which the "counterelite" attempted to show that all of the English nation had been humiliated. As with nationalism in non-Western countries, the nationalism of England was unmistakably linked with the rise of a shame- filled counterelite. Moreover, the aristocracy (traditional elite) was widely perceived as morally bankrupt and incapable of leadership. 22/ The French Enlightenment had shaken the once fixed foundations of the English social structure, emboldening the bourgeoisie to compare themselves with aristocrats. The same was taking place in France itself. As O'Brien put it,

Voltaire "made the Catholic Church ridiculous, and prepared the French people to be ashamed of their own political institutions....[T]he idea that la France and le ridicule should be closely associated was intolerable" (p.25) The

fact that the Catholic Church was "foreign" when other nations like Britain, Prussia, and Russia had national

churches made the sense of national indignity that much

worse (p.26).

Though an English bourgeois contemporary might have disbelieved it, the positive national image had eroded considerably in France. It had suffered humiliations at the hands of the British during the Seven Year's War (1756- 1763) . Like the English, many in France debated whether the

nation was in decline. The Physiocrats especially were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. perturbed by English economic advances and sought reforms that would restore France's former glory. Also as in England, the Anglo-French rivalry was increasingly thought of as a contest between peoples rather than monarchs or states (Acomb 1950:55). A popular play at the time summed up the task before France: "we shall instill in the nation a

self-esteem and self-respect which alone can make it again what it was formerly" (1950:56). The French Revolution, when it came, represented the culmination of struggle between competing systems of prestige. As in England, the crisis of confidence appears to

have been provoked primarily by the discrediting of the old order. Yet, again, the shame suffered by an ambitious

counterelite merged readily with a sense of humiliation by foreigners. If French nationalism was still rather tentative during the period of the French revolution and the

revolutionary wars (Minogue 1967:52) this was not the case in the 19th century.

In 1870, at the Battle of Sedan, Germany not only

defeated the French army but also captured the French emperor, Napoleon III. France was forced to cede Alsace- Lorraine. The national mood yearned in vain for revenge

(revanche). But Prussian humiliation was not repaid in the

19th century. Instead, France witnessed the growth of

reaction (ressentiment) 23/ toward groups that appeared to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. challenge the French image: Jews, Masons, Protestants. 24/ These groups were blamed for divisions in French society (Buthman 1939:41). Most of all, the Prussian humiliation was

not forgotten. France finally had its opportunity to assuage the shame of past decades in World War I. So desperately did it desire revenge that it diverted to Alsace-Lorraine large numbers of troops needed for the defense of Paris.

Germany's defeat in the war assured the future of nationalism in post-World War I Germany.

For Hitler, Lebensraum (living space) served the same purpose as Alsace-Lorraine for Poincare, a tangible object to symbolize an intangible emotion— humiliated fury, rage bound by shame (Scheff 1990:79).

Looking back on English and French nationalism of the 18th century, functionalists might conclude that the

"counterelite" had merely manipulated xenophobic and ethnocentric feelings to their own advantage. The nationalists' real purpose was positive: to integrate the society. The non-Western nationalists' purpose was negative:

to ward off Western influence. 25/

In my view, both Western and non-Western nationalisms were "positive" just as revolutions are positive and rebellions "negative". Both aimed at constructing a new society based on a different and presumably better prestige

system. The difference was that England and France already

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. had centralized political institutions and a high level of

social-structural differentiation. Thus, nationalism was a Western "import" in one

respect but not another. Nationalism as a program offered non-Western societies a new and more prestigious means of organizing themselves. It was not a program of their own making. But nationalism is more than a doctrine; it is also in part, pace Breuilly, the product of a struggle for

national dignity. In this sense, perhaps, we should resurrect the idea that nationalism is (partly) a state of mind, as Hayes and Kohn had argued. 2 6/ It represents the recognition (perceptual and emotional) that group prestige is best served by developing state institutions and a national ethos. Common to both Western and non-Western nationalisms was the sense of shame that one's own group either did not

stand at the top of the attention structure or was losing command over it. Secondly, shame focused inward as well as outward, as counteredites examined the shameful legacy which

they had inherited from their forebears. Recourse to a nationalist program is what makes these sentiments

nationalistic, rather than merely ethnocentric. 27/ If the desire for prestige really is the motivating impulse of all nationalisms. Western and non-Western, then we should expect to see nationalism disappear among those who feel they have achieved it. Writing about the "dawn of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. nationalism" (national sentiments), Norwegian historian and statesman Koht observed that nationalist sentiments were rarely voiced among the dominant nations of Europe. One could readily discern nationalist feeling among the defeated Welsh but not their English victors in the 12th century. The same was true for Scandinavia:

Denmark was...an expansive power... and at various times they succeeded in conquering the whole or part of Norway. For some years of the eleventh century the tables were turned, and Norwegian kings ruled in Denmark. There are no signs that the wars between Denmark and Norway stimulated nationalistic feelings on the Danish side. In Norway, however, they vigorously affected the national mind, and the sagas of the Norwegian kings offer evidence of a brisk boastfulness at the expense of the neighbor nations, particularly of the Danes (Koht 1947:275).

In the case study of anti-Americanism in South Korea that follows, we shall encounter once again the circumstances that stimulated nationalism elsewhere in the world. Most important, we shall see expressions of shame at

America's command of world (and Korean) attention. We shall see how this shame interacts with a pervasive belief that Korea suffers from a shameful historical legacy. Beyond

this, however, we shall also note what factors aggravate these sentiments, in particular, the exceptionally high profile of the United States in South Korea, and the totalist tendencies in Korean government, and Korean society as a whole.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NOTES

1. Leading proponents of self-esteem theory in psychology include Horney (1937); Rogers (1951); Sullivan (1955); Fromm (1941); Coopersmith (1967). Other psychoanalysts influenced by self-concept include Adorno (1950); Burns (1979); Holland (1977); Breakwell (1986). 2. Attribution theory has also been studied as an individual phenomenon by Bem (1967) et al. However, this approach appears to be losing favor with the renewed interest in the group. 3. For reviews of these works as well as assessments of their influence on social psychology in the 1980s see Taylor and McKirnan (1984) ; Walker and Pettigrew (1984). 4. Goffman, it should be noted, confined his analysis to the study of individual, rather than group behavior. 5. Barkow (1975) was clearly aware of and possibly indebted to social psychology's reference group theory, but not (it seems) with Tajfel's formulation of SIT. LeVine and Campbell (1972) provide a fine summary of the literature on ethnocentrism from both sociological and anthropological perspectives. The social psychologists, on the other hand, do not appear to have incorporated anthropological perspectives. Note that Rosenblatt (1964:142) in his review of major theories of ethnocentrism and nationalism, begins his summary with the functionalist conclusion that "ethnocentrism and nationalism are effective at promoting group integration". As his review indicates, many studies focus on varying threats to the group, but few focus specifically on the group's need for positive social identity. This is, of course, a different proposition from the one that postulates the group's need to be a group. 6. For a contrasting view by a political scientist see Gong (1984:238ff). Gong's reservations apparently stem from his concern that such approaches may form the basis of a "modern apology" for Western imperial policies of the past. This is a laudable concern as long as it does not obscure our understanding of the issue. Among proponents of the approach (along somewhat different lines), political scientist Kaplowitz (1990) laments the neglect of national self-images in international relations literature. It appears that in studies of decisionmaking, most political scientists have still not adopted the proposition that "stereotypes of outgroups correspond more to ingroup motives than to outgroup reality" (LeVine 1972:146). 81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7. (Melson 1982). A similar approach is used by Schoenbaum in the case of the Nazi extermination of Jews as well as Nazi policies of exclusion directed against other "upstart" or privileged groups like Freemasons and the clergy. 8. Emerson and Halpern, among others, eguate the rise of nationalism with the rise of the middle classes. But the nationalists were not, strictly speaking, "middle class". Overwhelmingly professional men schooled in Western methods, they did not correspond to a "middle" at all; rather they were challenger elites. Their elitist character was often evident in their relative aloofness from the concerns of middle and especially lower-class citizenry. 9. Mackey (1987) contends that the Saudi Arabian elite found a highly creative solution to the problems of both isolationism and Westernization. Their tremendous oil wealth finances the hiring of Westerners to manage virtually all modern sectors of the Saudi economy. With most of the Saudi population kept at some distance from modernizing ideas, the Saudi elite avoids the need for difficult compromises. The traditional prestige system remains largely intact while national strength and prosperity continues to grow. 10. Gandhi, as we shall see, was a leading exception, a Westernized counterelite who eventually adopted essentially nativist strategies. 11. The tendency to accept stereotypes of oneself as created by the dominant outgroup (not necessarily, but often, the majority) is quite common (Deschamps 1982). For a discussion of how American blacks and Jews tend to accept negative stereotypes of themselves, see the review by Brigham (1970). Note, however, that the majority must be seen as a prestigious outgroup before a minority will succumb to self-disparagement. For example, younger members of the Korean expatriate community in Latin America usually speak fluent Korean and appear reluctant to give up Korean customs. Among their counterparts in the United States, however, this is much less often the case.

12. Contrast this definition with that of Minogue (1967): "Nationalism is a political movement which seeks to attain and defend... national integrity...[I]t depends on a feeling of collective grievance against foreigners." In my view, Minogue, whose works are highly regarded and yet curiously neglected, is close to the mark. Rare among definitions of nationalism, his suggests that, in all cases, nationalism involves being against something just as much as being for something. The definition explains to what ends

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. nationalism is put (defending national integrity) and it explains the character of the movement (political) . What it fails to do is precisely identify why national integrity is important. Relatedly, it fails to identify what sort of collective grievance is involved. In my definition, national integrity is regarded as important because it is assumed that all groups strive to maintain their prestige in the face of challenges from an outgroup. In line with this presumption, the collective grievances that emerge in nationalist ideology and movements involve prestige: the failure to gain recognition from the outgroup, the perceived threats to national integrity, and at a later stage, the very existence of more prestigious outgroup, irrespective of its conduct toward the ingroup.

13. The nationalist school has not provided an adequate answer because it is too often preoccupied with nationalism as an idea. (Breuilly 1985:15) Thus it is not easily distinguished from ethnocentrism, which is a mental- emotional state. I would only add here that "political" seems too restrictive a classification. Broadly speaking, nationalism involves a social program combining political, economic, social and cultural proposals for revitalization. See also fn.l5, below. 14. Haas (1986) asks why Gellner (1983) loses interest in nationalist movements once its members turn into "happy nationalist[s]"? The implications of the theory advanced here are that there are no happy nationalists, only unhappy nationalists and happy patriots. Similar arguments are made by Plumb (1970:144) who claims that Western industrialized society no longer needs the (glorified) past, and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). See also the remarks by Koht in this chapter.

15. Nationalism in the Middle East is based mainly on ethnicity because it is, paradoxically, predicated on a Western prestige system. As Bernard Lewis (1975:80) notes, the writings of traditional Muslim historians lacked an ethnic consciousness. When nationalists incorporate religious symbols they are mainly doing so to preempt the appeal of fundamentalist forces. The nationalist Shah of Iran, in his pursuit of engagement on the West's terms (p.d. strategy 4) did not make a preemptive appeal to Islamic symbols and heritage. (Perhaps he should have). With the transition to Islamic rule, Iran's rulers shifted emphasis to nativist and revivalist strategies. (That is, they rejected a self-image predicated on a Western image of Iran). However, a countervailing tendency toward nationalism is also present among some of Iran's ruling elite, a tendency that appears to be growing over time.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16. (Franklin 1968). In the late 1960s Korean participants in a word association exercise saw "Asia" as yellow, poor, and hungry, and "Asians" predominantly in terms of physical traits: yellow skin and short stature. The most popular associations for Americans were tall, big, and rich (Szalay et al 1971) .

17. I must confess to combining concepts of Champagne and Barkow in ways that they may not have intended. 18. A similar phenomenon occurred in late 19th-century Japan, in which former Sinophiles turned into Sinophobic nationalists (White:197,202 ; Jansen 1954, 1975). 19. O'Brien stresses that French conduct did not cause nationalism in the rest of Europe, but merely hastened its appearance and made it paramount. I would agree up to a point. The other elites of Europe were not likely to acknowledge the superior "French prestige system" indefinitely without showing signs of resentment, as Herder already did in the 1770s. But whether this would have necessarily congealed into full-blown nationalism is another question.

20. The phrasing "ashamed of being ashamed" is Scheff's (1990:18). This is what Scheff, following Lewis and Goffman, refers to as a "shame-rage spiral", a pathological condition in which shame is followed by anger and then more shame, in a sometimes neverending spiral of bitter hatred and humiliation.

21. Kiernan 1976 cited in Newman 1987:53. 22. Hagen (1962) refers to this situation as "withdrawal of status respect." His analyses in some respects parallel Tajfel's.

23. Ressentiment is a quintessentially French expression with no true equivalents in the major languages of Europe. Compared to the weak connotations of "resentment", ressentiment involves smoldering, impotent rage, provoked by humiliation. Nietzsche first brought the term to wider attention but the best treatment is now Scheler's (1972). Note, however, that this ressentiment is actually a French expression of Lewis'(1971) "feeling trap" or Scheff's "shame-rage spiral" fn.9. Scheler observes that ressentiment is particularly common in women, who are often denied the opportunity to vent rage at their dependent, less prestigious roles in society because of social norms restricting such outpourings. Freedman (1979:80) shows that in the Sudan, special rituals have been devised to permit occasional release of ressentiment:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Women are so deprived of active self-expression in the Sudan that a special institution has evolved— secret clubs at meetings of which women dress and act as men; they swear and stomp about in an orgy of self- assertion, accompanied by obvious pleasure and much laughter.

Ressentiment finds a precise analogue in the Korean word han.

24. At times, there was even a hint of anti- Americanism. (Buthman 1939:41) 25. As we have seen, the only "negative" reactions in the non-West have come from nativists, and even so, nativism is almost always combined with other more "positive" strategies.

26. Here I should clarify an apparent contradiction with the point made in fn. 2 above. I agree with Breuilly that the nationalist school does not put the idea of nationalism into its proper "structural" context. But neither does Breuilly pause to consider the basic animating forces of nationalism; ethnocentrism and the belief in the superiority of the national "idea". 27. In their classic, though controversial, study of ethnocentrism, LeVine and Campbell note that "symbols of one's own ethnic or national group or of the values shared by that group (or both) become objects of contempt and hatred (1972:1). Their summaries of ethnocentric stereotypes and of ethnocentric self-images are highly informative. (pp.173-175) Of stereotypes:

1) They are egotistical and self-centered. They love themselves more than they love us. 2) They are clannish, excluding others. 3) They will cheat us if they can. They have no honesty or moral restraint when dealing with us. 4) They are aggressive and expansionistic. They want to get ahead at our expense. 5) They are a hostile people who hate us. 6) They are immoral and unclean.

Self-images are essentially the mirror-images of stereotypes but are worth identifying more explicitly:

1) We have pride, self-respect, and revere the tradition of our ancestors. 2) We are loyal. 3) We are honest and trustworthy among ourselves, but

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. we are not suckers when foreigners try their tricks. 4) We are brave and progressive. We stand up for our own rights, defend what is ours, and can't be pushed around or bullied. 5) We are peaceful, loving people, hating only our vile enemies. 6) We are moral and clean.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA: 1945-1972

The Social and Historical Context

Until very recently, Korean society was predominantly agrarian, with social relations modeled on a system of patron-client relations. The impact of this system on the Korean language and culture cannot be emphasized too strongly. As in other patron-client systems, relations of trust are largely confined to the family and to patron-

client relationships (Gellner 1988:154) Public life is mistrusted and politics is confined to a particularistic

concern with private interests rather than a universalistic concern for the public good (Pagden 1988:136; Gambetta 1988:161)

Paradoxically, people in this type of society are

forever engaged in "the search for 'pure' trust, intimacy or

pristine values as against the more institutionalized relations contaminated by power and instrumental relations".

(Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:16). Pure ideals, rather than universal values form the central concern of such a society.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hence the constant references in Korean politics to rooting out "impure” elements in society. Also incessant is the

refrain of politicians to eliminate "black and white" thinking. Pure ideals are not "mere talk" however. They evoke a highly emotional response in Koreans and can be used to justify unpopular policies. The Korean word for loyalty, ui'ri is one such ideal. It connotes readiness for complete selflessness and self-sacrifice. In January 1965, President

Park justified his decision to send troops to Vietnam, as Washington had requested, by claiming that ui'ri obliged Korea to aid its "blood-ally (hyulmaeng) (Park Hyun-chae et al 1986:67). To be sure, ui'ri evokes an idealized sentiment that does not necessarily override calculations of self- interest. Nonetheless, ui'ri weighs heavily on the Korean conscience. From the discussion of ui'ri it is easy to see how

institutions tend to become "familialized" (Eisenstadt and Roniger:177) as they develop. The totalistic demands imposed upon individuals by these "familial" organizations obstruct

social-structural differentiation in society, and hence, political pluralism. Examples of such institutions include a variety of movements and programs under cabinet, ruling

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. party, or military auspices: the famous Saemaul movement for

rural reform, the consciousness-reforming programs (uishik kaehvokf for ruling party cadres, spiritual culture fchonashin munhwa) programs for bureaucrats, scholars^ and military officers and a host of consciousness-raising

programs for soldiers as well as students at all three levels of education.

The individual's sense of self is largely defined by his place in the collective. Preserving or upgrading one's own status (prestige, or "face"), and more important, that

of one's whole family, is of paramount concern. Preoccupation with face leads to intense shame- consciousness.

The Korean language has a highly developed vocabulary of shame words. Foremost among them is han (see fn. 12,

Chapter 2). Han expresses a sense of impotent anger and

resentment (ressentiment), generally aimed at those higher in rank and toward whom one is obliged to show deference.

Other shame terminology includes words for ridicule, contempt, reputation, grudge, hiding one's face

(dissembling), and hiding pent up feelings of frustration;

also of note are the many words to describe "shame situations" in which an individual begs for a favor or engages in fawning behavior; relatedly there are many words indicating a consciousness of rank in society.

Rank-consciousness, of course, pervades daily life. In

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. government and private companies alike, an elaborate array of titles give individuals prestige and ensure that there is

no status ambiguity in interpersonal relations. For example, in a newspaper office, an apprentice journalist may look forward to becoming a (1) reporter, (2) a "treated-as-if an assistant department chief", (3) an assistant department chief, followed by (4) a "treated-as-if department chief", (5) an acting department chief, (6) a department chief and so on all the way up to bureau chief. The need for unambiguous status in a hierarchy is

characteristic of patron-client relations. One by-product of such a social structure is that relations are based on unequal but mutual dependence. It is believed that reciprocal relations between persons of unequal power represent the natural order of things. Also typical is the presumption that prestige is a "limited good" (Foster 1965; 1967;1972b; Campbell 1967:41).

One's gain is another's loss. Consequently, if one cannot

win, it is at least worth something to ensure that no one else wins, either (Foster 1972b:58). An example of this is the tendency in the Korean National Assembly for the

opposition to indefinitely block the passage of bills for which the ruling party has an acknowledged majority. The

ruling party then resorts to subterfuge, including locking the opposition out of the parliamentary chamber, in order to pass the bill. To say the least, none of these actions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. promote an inclination to compromise. Although many important features distinguish the

Korean social structure from the Chinese (including greater aristocratic tendencies and clan-orientation), Yi dynasty (1392-1910) Korean society was an integral part of the Confucian world order. This order was fixed. Every individual, group and culture had its accepted place in the hierarchy. All human relations were governed by the "five relationships" fo rvun) of affection between father and son, righteousness between ruler and minister, attention to the

proper functions of husband and wife, proper order between old and young, and faithfulness between friends. Korean rulers accepted with equanimity their country's subservience toward China as embodied in the term sadae (serving the big power). Indeed, their legitimacy derived from the Chinese emperor (McDonald 1990:44). Yet they relished Korea's superior position with respect to Japan, which as "younger brother" was expected to learn Confucian

ways from the Korean "older brother". The Korean elite's pride in their superior ability to emulate Chinese ways soured only with the crumbling of the Confucian order in the

19th century. Gradually, many in the elite began to regard with shame the "colonial" mentality of the past, in which the desire to imitate China suffocated most signs of Korean creativity and innovation.

Although Yi Dynasty rulers deferred to Chinese

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. superiority (formally acknowledged in the ritualistic

tributary system) they did not abandon their right to self-

government. The annual tributes to Beijing indicated a willingness to display deference, not surrender autonomy. During the period of China's Yuan dynasty, when Mongol-led Chinese armies invaded Korea with aggressive designs on its territory, Korean leaders resisted. But the Sino-Korean

relationship on the whole was an unusually amicable one; the

Yuan Dynasty invasion was easily cast as an aberration brought on by the foreign "barbarians" who had conquered China. Although China was unable to spare Korea from the predations of Japan— involving devastating attacks by Hideyoshi Toyotomi in 1592 and 1597, it did rebuff

Hideyoshi's proposal to divide Korea between China and Japan; moreover, it sent some 50,000 troops to aid in Korea's defense. Thus, the Sino-Korean relationship appears to have satisfied both countries.

Western imperial might changed all that. Chinese

influence waned, as China proved unable to resist the manifold challenges posed by Western arms, technology,

wealth and ideas. By the 1870s, in contrast, Japan was a

rising, and highly ambitious new power in the region.

In 1880, disturbed by the implications of the changing directions of power and prestige in the region, the Korean court barkened to the views of Huang Cun-xian, counselor of the Chinese legation in Tokyo. In his book Chaoxian Celue [A

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Policy for Korea] Huang depicted Russia as "the strongest country in the world with burning ambition for territorial expansion" while the United States was "the richest

country", endowed with high cultural standards and a "burning sense of righteousness in favor of the weak against unjust oppression". Huang advised Korea to cultivate the good will of China and Japan but to rely for its protection on the United States, which was strong enough to ensure its security and moral enough not to harbor designs on its territory (Ku Young-rok et al 1984:13; Yi Ho-chae 1988:207- 8). Already in this period, American prestige was widely regarded as paramount. 1/

Korea's friendly disposition toward the United States

was also influenced by direct experience. In 187 6 the Korean court entered into the Treaty of Kanghwa, whose terms had been forced upon Korea by Japan. By comparison, the 1882 Treaty of Commerce and Amity (the Shufeldt treaty) with the United States was concluded without duress and contained provisions that satisfied the interests of both sides.

Korean Defense Minister Yi Young-ik, whether out of wishful

thinking or genuine conviction, was exultant. "Korea's national independence has been guaranteed by the United States as a result of the Treaty of 1882. Now there is no danger at all to Korea.... The United States will be a friendly country (wubang) no matter what happens" (Kim Yong- duk 1972:23).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Of course, to the United States, the Shufeldt treaty signified no more than a normalization of relations between the two countries, involving mutual benefits and mutual good

will. To be sure, Japan's growing military power in the aftermath of its victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 was cause enough for concern. And its 1905 defeat of Russia provoked genuine alarm. But U.S. foreign policy was as yet many decades away from "pactomania". America had neither the will nor the capacity to commit itself to the defense of Korea. 2/ Concerned about America's ability to protect the

Philippines, Secretary of War William Howard Taft negotiated with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura a memorandum (the Taft- Katsura Agreement) in which the United States recognized

Japanese suzerainty over Korea in exchange for a Japanese pledge foreswearing any designs on the Philippines. A similar accord, the Root-Takahira acknowledged Japanese claims in Manchuria. Whether these agreements had any

restraining effect on Japan is open to doubt in light of

subsequent events; nevertheless. Western accounts generally reveal genuine sympathy for Korea and China among American officials and diplomats. To Korean patriots of all political

persuasions, however, Taft-Katsura would forever after symbolize American perfidy. 3/

Before Korea's annexation to Japan in 1910, some

Korean nationalists had observed with great interest Japanese efforts to assimilate Western ideas and methods

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. into an Asian society. Japan was to serve as a conduit for Westernization in the decades ahead, indeed, into the

present period. But with Korea's forcible integration into

the Japanese empire, lingering admiration for Japanese accomplishments were mixed with contempt for its moral bankruptcy. The United States, far from being a symbol of Western colonialism, was a source of inspiration. It had waged a successful war of independence against British imperialists

and had succeeded to the ranks of the great powers (Park

Hyun-chae et al 1984:118). In January 1918, President Woodrow Wilson's support for national self-determination in his famous Fourteen Points galvanized the disparate nationalist groups in Korea. Uniting for the first time at a rally of one million Koreans on March 1, 1919, Korean

nationalists announced their signing of a Declaration of Independence (broadly recalling the American document). Many

nationalists believed the United States would stand up for them at the Paris Peace Conference (Yi Ho-chae 1988:208). Instead, Wilson made concessions to Japan in exchange for

its participation in the proposed League of Nations. Once

again Korean nationalists faced bitter disappointment. In the succeeding months, the March 1 movement was crushed at

the cost of thousands of casualties. Still, to some, America represented hope. On the occasion of a U.S. congressional visit to Korea in 1920, a Korean editorial evoked prevailing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sentiments in the captive nation:

America is a shelter for the downtrodden and a free haven for oppressed people. People suffering under brutal oppression are looking to America and longing for America with one mind. America has become the destination of [Korean] yearning and the promised land... (Dong-A Ilbo. August 24, 1920, cited in D.S. Chang and D.S. Kim 1984:482).

To others, however, the diplomatic failures of pro- Western nationalist Syngman Rhee and the success of the

Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 suggested an alternative course for independence struggle. Many students, especially, were heartened by the example of the Bolshevik Revolution, which seemed to suggest that backward nations, by sheer force of

will, could overcome all obstacles— poverty, oppression, imperialism— and take their rightful place among the fraternity of peoples. Socialism was thus embraced by many Koreans who rejected both colonialism and Confucian socio

political (authoritarian) order. Unlike the United States, which turned a cold shoulder to Syngman Rhee's repeated diplomatic entreaties, the Soviet Union extended considerable sympathy and assistance to the liberation

movement (Scalapino and Lee 1972:19-20). The Soviet attitude

lessened traditional Korean wariness toward Russia. Many activists including Kim Kyu-shik and Yo Un-hyung (Lyuh Woon- hyung) attended the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow (Yi Ho-chae 1988:209). From the 1920s to the early 193 0s Korean socialists played a dominant role in pro-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. independence activities, although their efforts were seriously circumscribed by Japanese colonial authorities (Yi Ho-chae 1988:209; Ko Young-bok 1970:118). During this period, the main slogans of the student protest were "Long live the liberation of oppressed peoples", "Long live the overthrow of imperialism", "Long live the proletarian revolution" (Yu Young-ik 1987:15). At the same time, pro- American sentiments lingered on, even gaining momentum following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into the war in the Pacific. Although Korean intellectuals were forced to participate in anti-American rallies and to write anti-American poems and tracts, these

exercises appear to have had little influence upon the subject population.

Dependency and Resentment: The Antecedents of Anti- Americanism in South Korea: 1945-1948

On August 15, 1945 with the Japanese surrender to the

Allies, Koreans were in a state of wild exhilaration as they

prepared for the arrival of American and Russian liberators. Typical of the mood was this message to the Americans:

To the Soldiers of the United States of America.

Dear Sirs: We Korean have been suffering of the oppression of the Japanese iron rule over the country. Now you and other allied armies broke down the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Imperialistic Militarism of Japan and freed us from the bondage of the enslavement. We every Korean does not know how we could express our appreciation and thanks to you. We are almost weeping with heartfelt joy and excees of admiration but we regret that we are not yet free to express our thanks to you to the fullest extent (HUSAFIK, vol.l, chap.4:44).

At Inchon port, where crowds had gathered to welcome

the American forces, two Koreans were shot and killed by Japanese police, who were maintaining order on U.S. request (Song Nam-hun 1989:92). Contrary to the expectations of many Koreans, the American Military Government (AMG) did not immediately disarm Japanese troops and confine them to POW

camps. Instead the AMG relied upon the Japanese to maintain public order and gather intelligence. 4/ Koreans were incensed to learn that many Americans had higher regard for the Japanese. 5/ The worst blow came on September 1, 1945. Lt. General John Hodge's statement, distributed throughout

the southern half of Korea read as follows:

The armed forces of the United States will soon arrive in Korea for the purpose of receiving the surrender of the Japanese forces, enforcing the terms of surrender and insuring the orderly administration and rehabilitation of the country. These missions will be carried out with a firm hand, but with a hand that will be guided by a nation whose long heritage of democracy has fostered a kindly feeling for people less fortunate. How well and how rapidly these tasks are carried out depend on the Koreans themselves. Hasty and ill-advised acts on the part of its residents will only result in unnecessary loss of life, desolation of your beautiful country and delay in its rehabilitation. Present conditions may not be as you would like them. For the future of Korea, however, remain calm. Do not let your country be torn apart by internal strife. Apply your energies to peaceful pursuits aimed at building up your country for the future. Full

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. compliance with these instructions will hasten the rehabilitation of Korea and speed the day when the Koreans may once again enjoy life under a more democratic rule (cited in Sisa Nonpvona. September 1988).

Perhaps only the better educated bristled at the patronizing tone of Hodge's message, with its concern for

the "less fortunate" whose speedy "rehabilitation" was conditioned on their good behavior. However, no one could have overlooked Hodge's failure to make reference to Korean independence and liberation from Japan. Contrast this statement, which placed Koreans on probation, so to speak, with the effusive Soviet statement issued in northern Korea:

To the Korean people! The Red Army and Allied Armies have expelled Japanese plunderers from Korea. Korea has become a free country... To the Korean people! Happiness is in your own hands. You have found liberty and independence. From now on, everything depends on you.... Working hard is one of the great traits of Korean national character. Long live the liberated Korean people! (Yi chae-o 1984:35)

Many Koreans were startled by the AMG position, for while Korea could certainly not be considered an ally, it

was not an enemy either, having been forced to join the war

effort by Japanese occupation forces. Moreover, most Koreans expected immediate independence. 6/

Although this speech hurt Korean pride (Seoul Shinmun. September 10, 1945 in Kim Hak-jun 1982:149). Korean dismay at the speech was tempered by jubilation over the liberation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of the country. For many, the Americans were "angels" (Park

No-gap 1948:292-3 in Yi Chae-sun 1979:59)

For a time, Korean communists— not to mention other leftists— supported this benevolent view of the United States. The leader of the domestic faction of communists. Park Hun-yong, promptly issued his "August theses" in which

he described the United States as a "progressive, democratic country". (This term had previously been reserved for the

Soviet Union) . Park called for cooperation with the AMG on the grounds that, at the present stage, Korea needed a "bourgeois democratic revolution". Those who insisted upon "proletarian revolution" were castigated as left-wing adventurists (Kim Nam-shik 1984:515-29) . Kim Il-sung, Communist Party leader in the north, agreed (Choi Sang-ryong

1989:125-6). The triumph of Park's strategy of the democratic front thus ensured the cooperation of Korean Communists with the AMG for a time, despite their earlier clash over the AMG's non-recognition of the left-leaning

Korean Provisional Government. Liberation did not simply mean the end of national humiliation at Japanese hands. As in Europe, the end of

World War II unleashed powerful clamorings for a revitalized

political order based on new standards of political, social, and economic justice. Many Koreans expected an end to all that was corrupt, debased, and oppressive in their society. They also anticipated the dismantling of Japan's colonial-

100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. style administrative machinery. The new government was to be would be filled with Korean nationalists who had refused to

cooperate with Japanese colonial authorities. Reformist sentiment was further strengthened by the return of about one million Koreans from Japan, Manchuria and elsewhere (R.

Lauterbach 1947:243). These returnees had lost whatever they had in Korea while abroad and a considerable number of them

were exposed to Marxist-Leninist doctrines. 7/ Among the most important voluntary organizations leading the drive for reform was the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI). Although CPKI included both left-leaning and moderate nationalists, the

CPKI leadership at both central and local levels was

overwhelmingly left-leaning. As Cumings notes, the principal differences between left and right at this time were:

(1) a commitment to a thoroughgoing extirpation of Japanese influences in Korea, with all that this implied for Korean society and for Koreans who had profited from colonial rule; (2) a commitment to a mass politics and mass organizations and to the social equality that this implied; (3) a commitment to the reform of Korea's "feudal" legacy, feudalism being a codeword for gross inequalities in the allocation of resources, particularly land (Cumings 1981:86).

The popularity of the left was further enhanced by the character of the right wing, many of whose followers had collaborated with the Japanese. Even before liberation, when

nationalist sentiments were running high, the right wing's connections to the Korean privileged classes under Japanese

101

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. colonialism — big landlords, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and policemen— had sorely discredited them. Fearing retribution after the war, virtually all bureaucrats and policemen went into hiding. The AMG's early cooperation with Japanese

colonial authorities soon convinced the privileged classes and former collaborators that their future was not so bleak, after all. The conservative Han'auk Miniudana (Korean Democratic Party or KDP), consisting of some nationalists as well as many collaborators was founded on September 4, 1945. Among this group many former collaborators transformed

themselves rather abruptly into pro-Americans. Their opportunism was duly noted by American officials at the time ("SKILA Materials" in Cumings 1981:94). Neither was this appearance of rank opportunism lost on Korean political figures. Kim Ku, chairman of the Korean Provisional Government-in-exile in Shanghai, called the KDP members the "running dogs of the AMG" (Kim Ku 1978:142).

Although AMG quickly cut ties with the hated Japanese colonial authorities, nationalist sentiments were hardly

assuaged when the AMG next turned to the KDP and non-KDP

collaborators to fill the vacant posts. 8/ By comparison with leaders of some of the other political organizations, KDP members were often highly educated. Moreover, their knowledge of English and their Western (as opposed to

Japanese) educational background naturally ingratiated them

with many in the AMG who knew little about the domestic

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. situation. Some were recruited through public advertisements (Seoul Shinmunsa 1979:64) which were open to all. The

majority, however, were selected through personal

connections (Cumings 1981:156; Lauterbach 1947:202). This antagonized much of Korean public opinion. Consistent with U.S. occupation policy in Japan and Germany, the AMG in Korea was committed to the establishment of democracy. However, as in Germany (Herz 1982:25ff) and to a lesser extent in Japan (Gayn 1981), the American

authorities left the actual implementation of democratization to locals. In the Korean case, notably from 1945 until mid-1946, this policy enabled the ultra conservative KDP policymakers within the AMG to seize the initiative. They branded the People's Committees as "little more than armed mobs" (Lauterbach 1947:201) in stark contrast to their popular reputation as reformist

organizations. Similarly, they attempted to discredit the

leaders of Korea's provisional government in exile in Shanghai (Hong In-sook 1985:57). Most important, they cooperated with the hated police force to give right-wing

political groups every advantage, while leftists were routinely arrested and tortured (Henderson 1968:144). Little wonder, then, that the police were soon dubbed the "AMG police forces of the KDP" (Choi Hung-cho in Shim Chi-yon 1984:36).

It would be going too far, however, to say that the

103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. first six months of AMG rule were a period of benign neglect. Largely intolerant of U.S. press criticisms, politically conservative, and preoccupied with law and order, (Gayn 1981:349ff) the top military authorities ignored land reform and other measures proposed by the State Department. Moreover, lower-ranking officers sometimes interfered to ensure that KDP members held local offices. 9/ Democracy (chavu miniuiu'ui. literally "free democracy") was thus robbed of real content, and became an empty codeword for policies that preserved existing privileges and did nothing to provide opportunities for others. The AMG's failures were not confined to the political arena. The abrupt dismantling of the controlled economy under the Japanese led to a tremendous inflationary spiral as speculators hoarded grain and other goods. Many Korean farmers saw their standard of living decline dramatically.

Corruption was also rampant when the AMG arranged for sales of industries, land, and other properties previously

owned by the Japanese. 10/ Most sales were made to privileged Koreans who were well-connected with compatriots

in the AMG, notably interpreters for American officers. 11/ The AMG record looked worse (from the perspective of the many have-nots in Korea) when compared to that of the Soviet-controlled north, where land reform had been promptly carried out and collaborators who had not managed to flee

south were punished. Moreover, General Hodge declined to

104

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. meet with the moderate nationalists who headed the "Korean

People's Republic", a provisional government which the AMG finally outlawed on December 12, 1945 (Henderson 1968:126). To many nationalists, the basis of AMG policy was the deeply offensive assumption that Koreans were still incapable of managing their own affairs. Korean disenchantment with the United States was not confined to its criticism of the AMG. In December 1945 at the Moscow Conference, the Big Three allied powers (United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union) set up a trusteeship of Korea for up to five years and provided for a U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission to prepare for a unified provisional

government. At first, U.S. officials, including General Hodge, claimed that Stalin had proposed the plan. Anger at the Soviet Union turned to outrage at the AMG when Koreans

learned that the United States was actually the principal force behind the initiative, against Stalin's wishes. 12/ Fearful of mass uprisings. General Hodge ordered his troops to stay on base.

Perceptions of AMG ineptitude were now inflamed by the

growing impression that the United States was blocking Korea's right to national self-determination. By the spring of 194 6, popular resentment was cause for alarm (Gayn 1981:353-4; Seoul Shinmunsa 1979:130-1). According to a spring 194 6 poll conducted by Koreans for American

intelligence, "53 percent of Koreans questioned said they

105

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. had an 'unfavorable' impression of the Americans " (Lauterbach 1947:246-7). Korean gratitude toward Americans was not obliterated, but it was eroding quickly. Moreover, another poll conducted in August gave the AMG added reason to believe that close cooperation with the KDP could be a grave political liability. According to this poll, conducted by the AMG's own Public Opinion Bureau, 85 percent of respondents opposed dictatorship and favored the establishment of representative government in Korea. When asked ideological affiliation, 7 percent supported Communism, 14 percent favored capitalism, and 70 percent favored socialism. Results of the poll suggest that the

clear majority of Koreans supported some form of social democracy. (Seoul Shinmunsa 1979:129; Choi Jang-jip 1987:122) . Disturbed by the outcome of these polls, the AMG

initiated a series of measures aimed at reversing its growing political isolation. First, the United States

attempted to garner support for the trusteeship proposal by cutting ties to the extreme right wing, who were among the

most vocal in their opposition to trusteeship. But AMG

efforts were further hampered by the fact that only the communists supported trusteeship. 13/ Unwilling to become isolated from their strongest supporters, the AMG finally abandoned the trusteeship idea.

Second, and more important, the AMG shifted support to

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. members of the moderate left and right. Not only had the extreme right proved to be a strong political liability, but

the AMG was disturbed by growing signs that the extreme left

was getting funds and orders from Moscow. 14/ In April the AMG encouraged moderate members of the People's Party, long disaffected by Communist domination, to form a new party. On May 8, 1946 the new group, led by Yo Un-hong (Lyuh Woon- hong), established the Social Democratic Party fSahoe Miniudang). According to the AMG, social democratic parties

"were much like those of other political parties but with pronounced emphasis on opposition to interference by any foreign countries which might desire strategic bases,

harbors, or economic privileges in Korea". 15/ In June, the AMG encouraged moderate socialist Yo Un-hyung (Lyuh Woon- hyung (Yo Un-hung's older brother and chief leader of the moderate, anti-KCP left) and liberal democrat Kim Kyu-shik to form a coalition committee. But on July 22, 1946,

immediately upon his return from a visit to north Korea, KCP leader Park Hun-yong announced his opposition to the provisional efforts to build a coalition government unless

certain demands were met. 16/ Korean politics was now more polarized than ever. The

KCP 17/ now judged the United States to be an imperialist country allied with the forces of reaction in Korea and

elsewhere. The change in party line spurred a dramatic increase in mass violence. A September 1946 general strike

107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was followed in October by mass rioting involving tens of thousands of protestors Taegu city and elsewhere northern

Kyongsang Province including Taegu City. Political slogans reiterated the demands of Park Hun-yong for power to be returned to the people's committees, among other things. But angry followers appeared most eager to wreak retribution on police and former collaborators (Cumings 1981:357). After the failure of the second U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission on July 10, 1947, all hope of establishing a unified government on the Korean peninsula disappeared, and

the United States decided to submit the Korean question to the United Nations, where the U.S. could command an automatic majority. The U.N. General Assembly decided to hold general elections to establish a unified Korean government on the Korean peninsula. But the U.N. Temporary

Commission on Korea, (UNTCOK) which was to supervise the election, was denied entry into the Soviet occupied zone north of the 38th parallel. Elections were then held solely in the American-occupied zone in May 1948. Right-wing leader Syngman Rhee was elected president. Soon thereafter, the northern half of Korea established a Korean People's Republic.

By the end of the year. South Korea was in the early stages of a civil war. On Cheju Island, insurgent backers of the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP), supported by some 80 percent of local residents (Merrill 1989:66) battled with

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. police and right-wing youth organizations. The year-long conflict resulted in the deaths of more than 30,000 people

18/, at least 10 percent of the island's population, with conflict erupting on much of the mainland as well.

Korean Sentiments toward the United States, 1945-1948

An AMG report summarizing Korean attitudes toward the United States through the fall of 194 6 is an apt starting point.

Although they know we are trying to help them, they are highly suspicious of the United States motives in Korea, resent need for help as well as any controls, and blame all their national ills on anyone who is not Korea[n].... Generally speaking, Koreans fear Russia and Russians, and feel friendly toward the United States, believing that we are willing to help them. However, outside propaganda is making them suspicious of undisclosed United States motives in Korea. Like all Orientals, they tend to follow the man who shows the power. They know almost nothing of the history of the war. The great mass of Soviet troops and heavy material rolling into North Korea and the Russian handling the Japanese ruthlessly both before and after surrender, makes it easy for them to believe Russia is the greatest of all world powers and did the most to drive out the Japs. They are watching the world-wide steamroller tactics and political successes of Russia and the growing political belief that if they dont' tie to Russia they are lost appears to be in some degree overcoming their distrust and dislike. Our occupation here has been reasonably successful, and, fundamentally, what we have done is appreciated by thinking Koreans. However, they all expected complete freedom and independence before or as soon as we removed the Japanese Army, and can see no need for continued occupation. (HUSAFIK, Part II, Chap.II:144)

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The AMG summation begins with the observation that most Koreans were generally convinced of American good intentions. Dramatic confirmation of this view is offered in

by Merrill and Gayn. While the left was engaged in fierce battles with the right on Cheju island, they "left the American military goverment company on the island undisturbed" (Merrill 1989:64). The guerillas did distribute leaflets among the local residents that referred to the

American forces as "cannibals" and noted their intentions "to destroy them [along with their Korean collaborators], and to stop them from killing people. But these remarks were highly unusual, and no hostile actions against Americans

were ever reported (Kim Pong-hyon and Kim Min-ju 1963:85 cited in Merrill 1989:67). One U.S. official who witnessed the brutality of the 1946 uprising in Taegu marveled at the crowds' reaction to him. "I walked through [the crowd squatting in front of the

Taegu police station] and nobody even gave me a dirty look"

(Gayn 1981:419). Later, during the 1948 Yosu-Sunch'on uprising, American missionaries escaped harm by draping

hand-sewn U.S. flags across the gates of their compound (Merrill 1989:106). Gayn observes:

We [Americans] did far more than just transport Korean police to the trouble areas, or supply arms, or maintain preventive patrols. Our troops— come here as liberators— had fired on crowds, conducted mass arrests, combed the hills for suspects, and organized posses of Korean rightists, constabulary and police for mass raids.

110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gayn's amazement at Korean restraint is understandable. But his account, aimed at an American

audience and brimming with indignation over inept AMG policies, overlooks three important considerations. First, Korean press accounts and public addresses of all but the

most radical politicians indicate that Americans were not portrayed as intending to harm Korea. Instead of criticizing the AMG, Koreans generally criticized Korean bureaucrats in the AMG and Korean interpreters who they

believed were misleading the Americans. 19/ Second, the Korean elite, regardless of political persuasion, frequently expressed their admiration for American democracy, much as they lamented their own inability to forge a political coalition on which to base a democratic government. Third, the majority of Korean citizens were poor, illiterate, predominantly rural, and— for the most part, fatalistically aloof from politics. Their first confrontations with

Americans inspired them with awe. 20/ As Yu Young-ik (1990:16) notes, many Koreans were dazzled by American prosperity and power. But his description of Korean sentiment after the Korean war is arguably true of the period of AMG occupation as well:

The frequent contact between Korea and the United States in the 1950s because of the Korean War fundamentally changed Korea's deeply rooted Confucianist world view. The Korean war was fought with the most modern technology. Koreans witnessed the prowess of American science and technology. As a result, Koreans began to discard disparaging and

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reserved attitudes toward the West, including the United States, and began to welcome the introduction of Western civilization into Korea. In other words, by the 1950s, Koreans had completed the first phase in the process of reforming their world outlook which had been under way since the late 19th century.

More than this, there was an acute sense of social distance between ordinary Koreans and Americans. Some members of the elite, particularly the Western-educated elite, reacted angrily to all real and perceived slights by Americans. But commoners were just as likely to tolerate American misconduct as to challenge it. To many Americans were often deemed unapproachable— much as a yangban was once considered unapproachable by virtue of his great social distance from common stock. As late as 1962, a widow whose husband was killed by an American GI testified in court that

"although my husband left this world miserably because of bad luck, I hope Corporal Ramos will be treated mercifully,

because he is a son of a precious family" (Anonymous 1965:251-2). By this the woman meant that the GI belonged to a family of high status, not in the literal sense, because she knew nothing of the GI's family, but because he and his

family were Americans. 2 1 / At the same time, as the AMG report correctly indicates, there was no small measure of ambivalence toward America and Americans. Two principal factors are responsible for this: the prevalence of political nationalism, and

widespread fears of the loss of Korean cultural integrity—

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. or cultural nationalism. 22/ By political nationalism, I mean the development of a national political strategy for overcoming the shame of reputedly illegitimate political institutions and leadership. Within this category falls all Korean humiliation at the nation's political and economic weaknesses, most particularly its lack of independence in the immediate post-WW II period. Already, as we have noted

briefly in the case of the Social Democrats, we have seen a among educated Koreans a widespread desire for Korea to distance itself from all great powers, and to concentrate its energies on the formidable tasks of national economic

and political development. But left-wing Koreans were not the only ones angry at Korea's inability to free itself of U.S. control; nor were they the only ones who were humiliated by the notion that Koreans had to earn "an honored place in the family of nations. Right-wing

nationalists like Pyun Yong-tae, future foreign minister

under Syngman Rhee, complained in 1948 that the United States was a "nation-crusher", that because of its fumbling,

hypocritical policies it bore part of the blame for domestic discord. Like the left, Pyun also doubted U.S. intentions at times, although mainly because of the "fellow travellers" in the U.S. State Department (Pyun Yong-tae 1953:83-4, 87). Did these manifold resentments based on political

nationalism constitute anti-Americanism? Strictly speaking,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and in accordance with the definition of nationalism introduced here, the answer must be no. America's fundamental commitment to Korean independence was not questioned. Nor were the instances of suspicions and mistrust usually sustained or applied indiscriminately to

all aspects of U.S. conduct. On the other hand, the considerable anger and resentment provoked by American slights and insults cannot be accurately described as "bimi" . a merely critical attitude to discrete U.S. policies and actions. The strong sense of national shame made it

possible for Korean attitudes to shift from "bimi" to a transitional phase of "ripe for banmi" but not yet "banmi" (one ascribing to anti-Americanism). In other words, of those Koreans who were ashamed of their inferior national status and unwilling to accept it, nearly all fit the category of not yet "banmi" but susceptible to it.

Cultural nationalism provided the other impetus for the move beyond "bimi". Although mainly an elite phenomenon, cultural nationalism had its counterpart (and its roots) in the ethnocentrism of the average Korean. Cultural nationalism involved a proprietary elite concern with the

cultural integrity of the nation. At the level of the common Korean, who was not yet as suffused with national spirit, cultural nationalism or, more properly, ethnocentrism, involved the fear that foreign ways were undermining the legitimacy of traditional forms of authority and introducing

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a numbing sense of inadequacy to his group identity. Sexual freedom for women, for example, presaged the

loss of male dominance. It threatened not only traditional forms of masculine identity, but all of Korean traditional culture, which had relegated women to a quite subordinate role. Moreover, the GIs fraternization with Korean prostitutes seemed to symbolize the displacement of the Korean man by the rich and superior American man, and the weakness of the Korean nation, which was powerless to prevent this despoiling of national honor. One contributor

to a Korean popular magazine accused the AMG of "destroying our lovely, traditional culture, calling it 'feudalistic'". He complained that "they are forcefully introducing

arrogant. Western, alien culture." "Even during 36 years of Japanese brutality" the author exclaimed that " we never experienced this kind of . . .disorderliness and immorality"

(Yi U-jin 1948:12 Im Hon-young 1985:429). The humiliation

was made complete with all too frequent acts of rudeness and condescension by the U.S. soldiers (Agnes Kim 1953:211-213). Still, by the 1950s, Koreans could declare that the

United States had become "a foreign country which does not

feel foreign" to Koreans (Park Sang-sup 1988:255). It seemed only natural to many Koreans in those years that the more modern their country became, the more it would come to resemble America.

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Pro-Americanism as Mythology

Whatever the underlying resentments that lingered below the surface of U.S.-Korean relations, the new government of Syngman Rhee was careful not to let them show. Rhee became the first in a line of Korean politicians and

statesmen (not to mention their American counterparts) to create a myth of pro-Americanism, a notion that the United States and South Korea enjoyed harmonious, conflict-free ties based upon mutual respect and friendly feelings. 23/ The mythology served several purposes. First, it

secured the legitimacy of the newly elected South Korean government by linking its future with that of its prestigious patron. 2 4/ A frequently heard remark was that

the United States was responsible for the happiness of Korea (Park Kwon-sang 1984b;477).

Second, and relatedly, pro-Americanism uplifted public morale, depressed by years of political fratricide,

confusion, and economic distress, by depicting Koreans as being on the winning side. It mattered little that the north appeared to be making greater economic strides than the

south, because the south had the more powerful and prestigious patron. To be a client of such a patron was the surest road to national prosperity and respectability.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Third, pro-Americanism gave President Rhee the aura if not the reality of a statesman committed to democracy. It

became a shield for the contradictory nature of his

political appeals, authoritarian at one time and democratic at another. It implied a general commitment to the welfare of the Korean public, without specific commitments to the establishment of democratic institutions. Long hostile to Japan, Rhee elevated its status to principal foreign foe of Korea, surpassing even Communist China and the Soviet Union. 25/ (One must add that another foe increasingly portrayed as foreign was the communist government of North Korea). If the Rhee government was a mass of underlying

contradictions, the same must be said of Korean society. Popular aspirations for democracy were associated with images of American power, justice and prosperity. Yet Korean language, culture and politics had developed in the context of a highly stratified, authoritarian society. Democracy came to be defined more by what it was against (communism) that what it was for. Indeed, these were

awful times for democracy. Steadily over his term of office,

interrupted only by the Korean war, Rhee eliminated his political rivals by execution and through mass arrests involving tens of thousands of reputedly communist citizens.

Others rivals were assassinated under circumstances that suggested government complicity (Henderson 1968:166).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Democratic requirements like free press and freedom of assembly were suspended whenever Rhee chose to invoke the 1948 National Security Law. The police emerged as the most powerful organization in the country (Han Sung-joo 1974:20).

Pro-Americanism was embraced even more

enthusiastically during the Korean war (1950-53). It quickly became clear that without the timely intervention of U.S. troops under the United Nations flag. South Korea would have

been completely overrun and conquered by the north. War increased South Korean dependence on the United States ; the post-war tasks of economic recovery ensured that this dependence would continue for some time to come. 2 6/

The United States sent 400,000 troops to Korea, suffering 30,000 casualties. A prominent Korean scholar and political figure, Yu Chin-o said: "The United States saved Korea during the Korean war just as the Ming tried to save

the Yi Dynasty from the Japanese [Hideyoshi's invasion] with [Chinese] Chunbyong ("soldiers from heaven"). [The United

States] deeply impressed the Korean people as their Messiah"

(Park Kwon-sang 1934b:477). The poet Roh Chon-myong

described U.S. soldiers during the war as "angels" who have come to save South Korea. ("Mumvuna Chonsaui Mudum Aoaeso"

in Kim U-chang 1988:226). Characterizations of Americans as

angels and saviors dated from 1945 and would be reinforced by the Korean war.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Many Koreans were deeply moved by the U.S. war effort. To them, the United States had acted as a loyal, generous, even altruistic patron 27/ (Paek Nak-jun 1982:80). The

government encouraged these views. A junior high school textbook authorized by the government states "democratic countries want other countries' prosperity as much as they want their own. That is why many countries, including the United States are giving us aid. They have no designs on our territory, nor are they trying to exploit our natural

resources" (Park Kwan-suk and Yuk Chi-su 1956 in Kim Jin- kyong 1988:62). The official emphasis on American goodwill, combined with the emotional appeal of symbols (e.g. America as guardian angel) spread pro-American sentiments. However, an unfortunate by-product of pro-Americanism was the tendency to overlook America's distinctive national interests in

South Korea, such as maintaining a favorable strategic balance in the region. In Korean culture, the pursuit of one's own interests is laden with connotations of

selfishness and immorality. Official pro-Americanism did nothing to counteract such presumptions. It accepted them,

representing the United States as a "pure" power. Pro-Americanism's ideological companion, anti communism, also gained in popularity as the north became a

real and imminent threat. What remained of the South Korean

communist movement following the bloody civil war on Cheju

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and elsewhere from 1948, suddenly reemerged in June 1950. Many who joined the invading North Korean army or formed guerilla bands were killed during the course of the war.

Innocent villagers believed to have been informants for these guerillas were themselves massacred by police or the South Korean military. Moreover, the south was flooded by nearly one million anti-communist North Korean refugees, while a much smaller number of south Korean civilians went north. The outcome, for South Korea, was stronger popular support for anti-communism.

Nevertheless, we must not assume that socialism had been discredited as well. Despite pervasive intimidation of the public through the police and organized bands of street toughs, including the Anti-Communist Youth Corps, the socialist candidate in the 1956 presidential elections, Cho

Pong-am, managed to garner 30 percent of the ballots nationwide. In Taegu, where elections were marred by massive tampering by Rhee supporters, Cho carried the plurality. Cho's personal popularity and widespread disaffection with

Rhee may explain much of the socialist's appeal. But as we shall see when political repression briefly collapsed, many

students harbored fervent nationalist aspirations that often took socialist forms. 28/

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Dependence on the United States in these years took every form imaginable: economic and military dependence for national survival, technological and material dependence for modernization of the infrastructure, even political dependence. Indeed, the hobbled opposition welcomed not only U.S. influence, but U.S. intercession. For example, in 1952, following Rhee's declaration of martial law and his intimidation and disbarment of dozens of opposition National Assemblymen, the opposition "pleaded with the American Embassy to 'save democracy'" (Henderson 1968:259). 29/

Much as Rhee despised Koreans who bowed before Americans (Oliver 1978:204), he was repeatedly reminded of his own need to appease the United States. For example, in 1959 fiscal troubles forced the United States to cut back

sharply on economic aid to South Korea, increasing

malnutrition and further weakening already tenuous popular

support for the government. Moreover, having adopted U.S.- style democracy as an ideal, the Rhee government was vulnerable to U.S. charges that it was not democratic (Kim

Joungwon 1976:181). Finally, Rhee constantly worried about the consequences of negative U.S. newspaper coverage on American public support for his government (Oliver 1978). One could plausibly argue that he was more sensitive to U.S.

public opinion than opinion in his own country. Like Rhee,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the South Korean press keenly followed U.S. press and

public opinion about Korea. Thus, the Korean government and press together were instrumental in confirming widespread impressions that Korean destiny was in the hands of the United States. For degrees in nearly any field, students developed

America "fever", a strong yearning to get a degree from an American university. Under Japanese colonial rule, study in Japan had provided the fast track to membership in the local Korean elite. But from 1953 to 1976, of 13,851 studying abroad 11,961 students had chosen the United States (Park Dong-so 1980:85). 30/ Not only university students studied in America. Some government bureaucrats, journalists and professors also took courses there to augment their skills. And from 1954 to 1960, 9,186 Korean military officers received supplemental training in America (Taehanminquksa 1988:72). As Professor

Park Dong-so observed: "...Koreans who studied in America were overwhelmed by the level of American academic achievement and power and they recognized the wide gulf that existed between [the United States and Korea]. As a

consequence, they were in great awe of the United States" (Park Dong-so 1980:90). Many admired the "free", "efficient", and "rational" atmosphere on American

university campuses (Song Chang-hwan 1958), even if American students were sometimes too "complacent" (Kim Kyong-won

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1962). Americans, in general, were praised for their "can- do" spirit (An Ho-sam 1959). It became fashionable among intellectuals to use English terminology in conversation and

in writing. Scholars disagreed as to whether America's "materialist" society represented a new civilization (Yi Po- hong 1959) or merely the degradation of an older (European one) much as Rome represented Greek civilization in degraded form (Chong Ha-un 1954). But the majority opinion was overwhelmingly positive. America was a land of "Money first. Ladies first, and Speed first" (Kim Ki-du 1958). It was

progressive because of its inherently competitive spirit (Yu Ik-tong 1962). For many, America symbolized regard for the dignity of the individual. It was "a nation where one can enjoy maximum freedom within the limits of the law. . . Even the bus driver enjoys on his bus, without fear, exactly the

same rights that the President enjoys (Kim Hyang-sok 1963).

Especially during and after the Korean war, the general population became enamored with American popular

culture. Acquaintance with American ways soon became a badge of sophistication, while traditional Korean culture was disparaged. Apart from special public performances,

traditional Korean music and dance presentations were hard to find. American movie stars and singers became the idols of Korean youth. Western aesthetic standards took the place of the traditional.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Koreans took for granted that modernization was not a general process into which any country could enter once

certain material/economic conditions were met. Rather, modernization was considered a process of Americanization or acculturation to American ways. Modernization was tacitly accepted as a process in which national identity— rooted in pre-modern culture— was partly forfeited for the sake of national prosperity and a more virtuous society

Some elites were wary of this process; most embraced it. Some were dismayed to discover that few Koreans understood what America was really all about. "True Americanism is faith in mankind", wrote one college dean. He lamented the superficial ways in which most Koreans had chosen to "Americanize" themselves. Their approach was steeped in contradiction, "like wearing a Korean horse-hair hat and Western clothing" (Kim Ha-tae 1959). Even for those who failed to grasp the "true" meaning

of America, it was clear that modernization/Americanization brought increased national prestige. Thus we can say that ambivalence toward the mixed benefits of modernization corresponded in some measure with ambivalence toward the United States. This conflicted perspective could become more

pronounced as familiarity with American ways increased. Elites tended to be the most ambivalent. They were more concerned than most about the development of a strong national identity, yet perhaps more prone to national self-

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. deprecation than others, given in part to their greater familiarity with the sources of American strength (Kang Hwa-

yong 1964). Inner conflicts ensued that pitted elite desires to uphold national pride against their ambitions for personal prestige (based on the manipulation of American status symbols). Those who chose to adopt American standards

of prestige ran the risk of feeling guilty at having rejected their own culture. This sense of guilt would become more pronounced in the Chang Myun period discussed in the

next chapter. 31/

Rebirth of the Student Movement: The April 19 Uprising

Dissatisfaction with the Rhee government had been building for years, the product of blatantly fraudulent elections, police brutality and intimidation, and economic

stagnation. The March 15, 1960 national elections further

tested the people's capacity to endure wholesale fraud. At first only a few score high school students dared to

protest. Then on April 11, with the gruesome discovery of

the body of 19-year old Kim Chu-yol, the mood changed. Kim's death during a small demonstration in Masan had been covered up by police. Enraged residents soon sacked government

offices, killing the local police chief. On April 19, 100,000 demonstrators throughout South Korea demanded new

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. elections. The police overreacted, killing 142 (Lee Chong- shik 1982:29). The United States then lodged a "strong protest" with the Korean ambassador in Washington, calling for new and fair elections and an end to police brutality.

32/ When it was learned that Rhee had finally agreed to

resign, demonstrators shouted "Long Live America! Long Live [Ambassador] McConaughy ! ". The crowd then marched to the U.S. embassy to celebrate Rhee's ouster. The student demonstrations, together with vigorous protests from the opposition and dissatisfaction in the military, probably would have sufficed to topple the regime. Nevertheless, the United States was widely perceived as having been instrumental in convincing Rhee to step down, on April 27. The success of the U.S. effort confirmed popular beliefs, namely, that the United States government was on the side of the people; that it was prepared to act selflessly on their behalf; that it could overthrow any Korean government if it chose to do so; and that looking to

the United States for support in domestic political

struggles was a legitimate and advantageous course of

action. Consequently, President Dwight. D. Eisenhower received a tremendous welcome during his visit to Korea that August (Sasangqe eds. 1960:79-81).

The most active students, particularly those from prestigious universities like Seoul National (SNU), were far from content to rely on others, however. In the following

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. months, buoyed by their role in overthrowing the Rhee Government, students looked forward to spearheading the drive for thoroughgoing reform. Demonstrations aimed at

ousting the discredited National Assembly began anew in early May. But students realized that it was not enough to oppose the debased political and economic order. They had to put something in its place. Accordingly, in July, SNU students founded the National Enlightenment Movement fKukmin Kaemona Undone).

Confucian in tone, the new movement was aimed at the

revitalization of every aspect of Korean society. At bottom, however, the movement was quintessentially modern, emphasizing citizen participation and distrust of politicians. To help Koreans make the transformation from subjects to citizens, students organized a National

Enlightenment Unit on July 6. From SNU alone, some 7,000 students volunteered service to rural areas to spread word

about political rights. The rural initiative, though admirable, was naive. Students did little more than apprise peasants of details surrounding the urban-based uprising

that spring (Ko Young-bok 1983:116) A more influential element of the National Enlightenment Movement was its subsidiary organization known as the New Life Movement (Shin Saenghwal Undone) , also

founded in July. The New Life Movement, first and foremost,

proposed to create a self-reliant basis for economic

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. development. 33/ Such ideas had been brewing for some time.

Only political repression had kept them from being publicly expressed. Already on April 19, a Korea University declaration affirmed that "[we] think that a strong economic system is more suited to Korea given its backwardness. The state must control...tendencies toward excessive consumption of luxury goods and investment in nonproductive sectors"

(Kim Sam-ung 1984:25). Seven years after the end of the Korean war, Rhee's economic policies had born little fruit. For example, the

Korean consumer industry was woefully underdeveloped. Goods obtained from the U.S. military PX spurred a flourishing black market trade. At a time of rampant poverty, Koreans who could afford to do so bought American luxury items like

cigarettes to vaunt their greater wealth and prestige. Student activists objected vehemently. If South Korea was ever to emerge from poverty, they argued, its citizens

should be more frugal. The government should channel all available resources into domestic industries. As part of their campaign, students publicly burned U.S.-made cigarettes. In so doing, students not only tried to

dramatize their economic cause, but to dampen the prevailing reverence for things American. For most students, the intent was not to disparage America per se, but to downgrade all status symbols that stood in the way of self-reliant economic development. 34/

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Concern for self-reliant economic development was also foremost in the minds of most Korean economic analysts. They

criticized Korean overdependence on foreign raw materials

(Yi Tong-uk 1960), the way the foreign aid was enriching a few "ICA capitalists" while leaving the masses destitute (Yi Tong-uk 1960; Pu Wan-hyok 1960), and the basic premises of aid: namely, to boost Korea's consumer goods industry, while neglecting the development of export capacity (Im Won-taek

1960; Kim Young-nok 1964). Most called urgently for the development of an export-based economy and the diversification of foreign aid (Yi Chong-hwan 1961). In the early months, the tone of the student movement was decidedly moderate. Students chanted "restore democracy and eliminate the communism [of the North]" (Choi Mun-sang 1988:139). They also criticized the North Korean Communist Party which claimed to favor of peaceful reunification while in fact engaging in subversion and serving as Moscow's puppet (Kim Sam-ung 1984:25). Neither did the students heap all blame for the division on the United States. They also blamed Soviet expansionism, the unremitting target of

government propaganda. 35/ What emerged was a consensus in favor of Korean neutrality. U.S. Ambassador Mike Manfield's observations that Korea might one day pursue an Austrian formula of political neutrality were greeted enthusiastically (Yi Sang- wu 1986:297). Students advocated establishing

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as an important step toward reunification of Korea (Kim Sam-ung 1984:24), as well as a means of establishing a more balanced, and thus less dependent, relationship with either superpower. Strong yearnings for national self-assertion influenced student positions on university matters as well. For example, at Yonsei University students rejected

continued control of the administration by U.S. missionaries (who had founded the school), not because the missionaries were bad, but because "true nationalist education" could not flourish under such conditions. Moreover, foreign funding of the university encouraged a "slave mentality" among the Korean people (Yi Chae-o 1984:185-6). By October, frustration and impatience had replaced the initial optimism. 36/ Student activists stormed into the

National Assembly, demanding President Chang Myun's resignation as well as stiffer punishment for corrupt

officials of the Rhee administration. Although the National Assembly finally responded in December with a bill that

barred 1,500 of Rhee's associates from politics for seven years, students remained disillusioned. It is fair to say

that while both sides proclaimed their devotion to democracy, old habits were not easily laid to rest.

Mounting frustration within the student movement prompted a change in emphasis. Democracy now took second place to nationalist appeals for reunification. 37/ In

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. November 264 SNU students organized the Student League for National Unification established in November 1960. Among its goals were the country's "liberation from poverty and defeatism, expulsion of foreign forces, and the rejection of conservative reaction" fllwol Soaak 11,1983:355). This league was soon organized at other universities. Also in

November, students at Yonsei university launched a violent strike, demanding the ouster of faculty and adminstration that had collaborated with the Rhee government. A defiant, more radical tone was setting in. For his part. Prime Minister Chang was not evolving into the assertive nationalist the students were seeking. In December, Chang had announced plans to lessen Korean

dependence on the United States by seeking aid from the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. But in February Chang made concessions to the United States that Rhee had previously rejected. For example, as part of a newly signed

Korean-U.S. aid agreement, the Chang government took the

much criticized step of devaluing the won against the dollar (Yi Chong-hwan et al 1961). In addition, Chang gave the United States the right to supervise the distribution of

American aid to Korea. Since 52 percent of the Korean budget derived from U.S. aid, the United States now actually appeared to be in charge of the government. "The U.S. Ambassador to Korea is becoming a governor-general" (chongdok) (Kim Joungwon 1976:254-5). Increasingly, Prime

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Minister Chang, known to Americans as John M. Chang, was

perceived as the vassal of the United States. 38/ At once, students organized demonstrations to oppose the economic aid agreement. For perhaps the first time in Korean history, handbills with the slogan "Yankee Go Home!" were distributed throughout Seoul (New York Times. February 16, 1961:3). Members of the Student League for National Unification established a Struggle Committee expressly for

the purpose of opposing the agreement. The students charged that South Korea would fall into "economic dependency" fkvonachaeiok vesok), that South Korea would become nothing but a market for U.S. goods, and that this would completely

violate South Korean sovereignty. Moreover, greater dependency on the United States would pose an obstacle to

future reunification with North Korea (Yang Ho-min et al 1986:230) .

Also in February, a coalition of socialist parties and organizations, the products of the freer political atmosphere under Chang, formed the Central Committee for National Independent Unification (Kim Hak-jun 1983:210-16).

Like the student activists, the socialist Central Committee opposed Chang's "unequal treaty" with the United States, (Ilwol Sogak 1983:356-7), denouncing the members of the Chang Myun government as "sadae slaves" (Ilwol Sogak II. 1983:381) The Central Committee also reiterated its demands for the neutralization of Korea and withdrawal of foreign

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. powers, meaning, of course, the United States. The socialist perspective was conveyed in the newspaper Miniok Ilbo. which started publication on February 13, 1961. Until it was banned on May 16, 1961, the newspaper enjoyed an average daily circulation of 35,000, not an inconsiderable figure for that period. 39/ Among other things, it popularized student proposals for neutralization,

north-south economic and cultural exchanges, and a student

conference between North and South Korea (Ilwol Sogak Vol. II, 1983:395). Also endorsing the student and socialist proposals was the 20,000-strong Korean Teachers' Labor Union. Under its more radical leadership, the teacher's union strongly

resembled its counterpart in Japan, which vigorously supported the Japanese Socialist Party. In response, the Prime Minister denounced the opponents of the economic aid treaty as "Communist-

inspired". The charge, so familiar in the days of Syngman Rhee, provoked an even more radical response from student activists at SNU.

On the occasion of the one year anniversary of the April 19 Student uprising, SNU students issued a second declaration. Unlike the original, with its appeals for democracy and freedom, the 1961 declaration called for a national revolution of "anti-feudalistic, anti-foreign

forces and anti-comprador capital". 40/ On May 6, shortly

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. before the military coup, a student at Korea University was even more defiant: "If North Korean Kim Il-sung regime is the Soviet Union's puppet, standing aloof from the Korean people, the South Korean conservative politicians are blind

believers in America, poisoned by free democracy". 41/ But the final and most radical act of the student activists came in May 1961 when student representatives

organized the Preparatory Committee of the All-Korea Student League for National Unification. Its joint communique was highly provocative, expressing admiration for socialist bloc accomplishments in economic development and space science,

for the successful struggle for national liberation in Cuba, and for Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's principles of peaceful coexistence. For the first time, students had indicated a bias toward the "other" superpower. Three days after the SNU students had launched their new reunification movement, with its proposals for a meeting

between North and South Korean students, the military

overturned the Chang Myun government in a bloodless coup. During the ten months of Chang's administration. South Korea had experienced some 2,000 demonstrations involving about 900,000 protesters (Nahm 1988:242)

Why did the movement become more radical? Had many students been radical from the start, did they convert to socialist ideas gradually over the course of several months,

or did the majority simply abandon the field in disgust to

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. more radical activists? Because of long-standing political repression, it has only recently become possible to

interview veterans of the National Enlightenment Movement— and to expect candid replies. But as far as I am aware, no such study, involving hundreds or even dozens of interviews, has ever been undertaken.

In all probability, however, it may be concluded that the majority of students, the politically inactive as well

as the thousands of participants in the National Enlightenment Movement, were moderates committed to

democratic principles and some form of mixed economy. The much smaller group, the Student League for National Unification, apparently attracted relatively few followers. Even this radical group, for the most part, was not so much preoccupied with opposing U.S. (or "Western") imperialism as it was in pressing for national self-assertion. The radical

statements of April and May appeared to have been highly

unrepresentative of most students, probably even of the socialist minority.

It is likely that most students shared radical disillusionment with the Chang government without drawing extreme conclusions. While radical students tended to focus

discontent outward, toward moderate and right-wing leaders

together with their "patrons" in Washington, moderate students appeared to be equally, if not more critical, of Korean society as a whole. In a 1961 poll of college

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. students asking whether South Korea was ready for democracy, 40 percent responded that Koreans were not ready for

democracy while a further 30 percent said that because of the social and cultural gap between Korea and the West, some democratic principles could not yet be realized (Hong Song- jik 1962:122. 42/ Whether moderate or radical, nearly all students were ardent nationalists. Their principal concern was to repudiate the shameful legacy of of the Korean past, in which Korea repeatedly proved incapable of freeing itself from Chinese cultural predominance and conquest by Japan. To

blot out this shame students hoped to create ( changio) a national culture. They hoped for economic and political

self-reliance not because they were hostile to the United

States— they were not— but because they could not bear the ignominy of continued dependence on any foreign power. Students felt that most of the older generation, especially bureaucrats and politicians, had failed to take

the future into their hands. They had not made the efforts necessary to put the Korean state on a sound footing. Some

had been collaborators with the Japanese, some had amassed

wealth through speculation and corruption. As for the rest, they had not shown sufficient courage in combatting these evils. In short, the entire older generation had lost its

"moral purity" (the Korean Confucian equivalent of legitimacy).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. But it would be a mistake to view the student movement in terms of a Freudian animus of sons against fathers as some have done (Feuer 1969) . 43/ The older generation was well aware of its failings, and that of the generations that had come before. The real enemy, for the students, was not

their elders in any literal sense. It was the shameful conduct of their forebears in past generations. (And such shame is often more painful than the shame induced by contemporary failings)(Lynd 1958:53; Mannheim 1952:297). A

typical expression of this sentiment went as follows:

When did our ancestors, even once, dominate the territories of others, seek for civilization in order to reform our national society, demonstrate our power of unity to the outside world, and act with independence in the face of others? ...[0]urs has been a history of being exploited by and relying upon others...Our ancestors were manly until the middle age[s], but this masculine character had disappeared by the time of the establishment of the Yi Dynasty.... While we were sleeping, the world witnessed astounding progress. .. [W]e remained content to weave straw ropes. Koryo celadons are just about all we have inherited, and even these were nothing but a hobby of the nobility... Our history, which is just a pandora's box of evils, had better been burnt. We must not boast about our history. We have to make a fresh, bold start....

The author of those lines was Park Chung-hee (1970b:166- 168) .

Fulfilling Nationalist Strategies: America as Help and as

Hindrance in the Park Era: 19 61-1971

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The public had grown tired of interminable demonstrations and factional strife. Greater political freedom had brought neither stability nor encouragement about South Korea's economic future. But that is not to say that people welcomed a military coup. The coupmakers were

little known figures with nothing to qualify them for running a country except force of arms. 44/ With so few troops involved in the actual takeover, U.S. observers initially believed that the coup would be overturned (New York Times. May 17, 1961). The military junta began its rule with by now familiar aims to combat communism at home and abroad, thoroughly root out corruption, institute government austerity, and chart a

long-range course for economic development. It promised to restore the government to rule by "honest and conscientious civilians" after "completing its mission". To all appearances, the general public was unimpressed, yet

intimidated by the curbs on civil liberties. The Kennedy administration was cautious. Initial statements by U.S. Charge d'Affaires Marshall Green and U.N.

Commander Carter B. Magruder that the United States backed

Chang Myun were made without prior authorization. When Washington did respond, it announced that it had no plans to cut off military or economic aid. On the other hand, the U.S. State Department expressed "deep regret" at the

suspension of democracy. Washington also pressed repeatedly

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. through diplomatic channels for a junta pledge to restore democratic rule at an early date. At the end of May, it rebuffed Korean proposals for a meeting between Kennedy and Lt. General Chang Do-young (junta leader until his removal by Park Chung-hee). By September, U.S. relations with the

junta had improved. 45/ Newly promoted General Park was invited to Washington, boosting his prestige considerably (Shin Pom-shik 1961). During his visit. Park pledged publicly for the first time that the junta would step down in mid-1963 to make way for new elections.

Relations with the United States plummeted again on March 16, 1963. Park reneged on his pledge for elections, promising instead to hold a plebiscite seeking public approval for a four-year extension of military rule. Only the strongest pressure from the Kennedy administration caused Park to back down. 46/ But this time, the public,

including many students who had defied the junta ban on

demonstrations, did not take up a cheer for U.S. intervention. Just as the junta had taken the unparalleled step of publicly rebuking the United States for its "grave interference" in Korean affairs (New York Times. September

6,1963:2), so too were students critical of U.S. conduct. On September 1963, 63 students representing 21 universities and colleges called on the United States to refrain from "unnecessary statements" on Korea's internal affairs. At the same time, they demanded Park's ouster and the establishment

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of a "fresh social and political order (New York Times.

September 11, 1963:17). Did the protests signify the beginning of a new era of psychological independence, in which Koreans no longer expected or desired U.S. intervention to "save democracy"?

Contemporary accounts indicate otherwise. Politically aware groups, such as intellectuals, students, military officers, frequently blamed the United States for intervening in

Korean affairs, while criticizing it for not having done enough to promote democracy. Others blamed the United States

for the oppression they had suffered under Rhee (New York Times. July 22, 1961:3). What had emerged in the 1960s, beginning with the first demonstrations against the U.S.-Korean economic aid agreement, was an increasing public clamoring for national dignity. And Korea's relations with the United States proved

to be one of the most important proving grounds for this national dignity. The dilemma was how to acquire national self-respect while retaining all the benefits, psychological and material, accorded to a loyal client. Koreans appeared

unable to resolve this dilemma in the years and even decades

ahead. Instead, their attitudes toward the United States remained in conflict: sometimes the United States had good intentions, sometimes not; sometimes its democracy was the wonder of the world, sometimes it was a sham. It was possible for many Koreans, (perhaps most although it is

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made Korea look bad. 47/ The demonstrations in favor of a Status-of-Forces agreement make this point about Korean ambivalence toward the United States. In June 1962, 800 Korean university students gathered in Seoul to protest the beating of a Korean thief by two U.S. Army lieutenants. Shouting slogans

like "Agreement first, friendship next!" and "Lynch no, goodwill yes!" they called on Washington to work out an agreement that would end extraterritorial rights for U.S. GIs found guilty of crimes against Korean persons or property (New York Times. June 9, 1962:10). 48/ Student

demonstrators also revived earlier demands for independence from U.S. economic aid and for the development of a self- sufficient economy. A similar demonstration involving 300 students was held the same day in Taegu. Underlying all these demonstrations against U.S.

policies was a criticism of Korea and Koreans more damning than any criticism ever voiced against the United States. A

1965 editorial from the pages of Chonqmaek reflected widespread feelings of self-doubt and self-recrimination:

We have been ...too subservient to international political pressure for the past 20 years....It is a sad irony that Korea, which is proud of its culture and traditions, cannot stand by itself. How long do we have to be afraid of other countries and how long should we

141

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. be flattering sycophants and how long do we have to borrow from other countries, and where does all this behavior come from? Shouldn't we build up our country by our own hands and shouldn't our country's destination be decided by our own efforts? (Kim Jil-rak 1965:16-17). The next major test of national dignity came in 19 64, with the Park Government's decision to normalize relations with Japan. Park had narrowly won the October 1963 elections

in a relatively fair nationwide contest. Recognizing the need for more economic aid than the U.S. alone could provide. Park realized it was time to mend fences with Japan. The United States had long pressed the Rhee

Government do so, particularly since it believed it could no longer sustain such heavy expenditures for foreign aid. Rhee adamantly refused. Park, by contrast, needed no prodding, especially since he was personally far less hostile to Japan than Rhee had been. 49/ Park also concurred with U.S.

efforts to strengthen Japan's influence as a counterweight to Soviet and Chinese influence in Northeast Asia. 50/

But Japan had yet to demonstrate a sufficiently

repentant attitude for its past humiliation of Korea. Moreover, many Koreans still regarded Japan as a threat to

Korean security, if not now, then sometime in the future. U.S. pressures on Korea for a treaty with Japan seemed to signal U.S. intentions to abandon Korea to Japan (Park Chun- kyu 1961). All told, perhaps as many as 3.5 million Koreans took part in debates and demonstrations on the normalization

question (Kim Joungwon 1976:302). Infuriated by U.S.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pressures for normalization, demonstrators shouted "Friendship Yes, Interference no!" , "The U.S. Should Not Support Actions that Eradicate our National Identity",

"Yankee, Keep Silent", and "We Don't Like American Support for the Comprador Park Regime". 51/ Students added rather idealistically that it was time for Korea to "prosper without patrons" (Yi Chae-o 1984:224) Except for the angry reference to "Yankees", the slogans were relatively mild.

Once again, they endorsed friendship with the United States, implied that Japan but not the United States jeopardized Korea's national identity, and that the "Yankee" was not to go home, but merely refrain from meddling. The student

demonstrations received widespread public support. Far more vitriolic was the tone of KCIA founder and former leading member of the junta, Kim Jong-pil. Kim shared student concerns about foreign influence in Korean affairs.

In fact, he called for efforts "to cleanse the prevailing "cheap Yankeeism" from our surroundings and deplored the "corrupt worship" of foreign powers by past regimes. He implied that the United States was an obstacle to reunification. When South Korea had finally escaped from

dependency, it would be free to develop the national

military might fChosun Ilbo. November 19, 1963:5, September 25, 1963:2, November 6, 1963; Seoul Shinmun. November 5,

1963:3) . Among the less politicized general population, there

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were stronger signs that Koreans were, on the whole, favorably disposed toward the United States. A May 1965 poll

conducted by the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul asked: "which

country do you like most?" Sixty-eight percent said they liked the United States most. Only one percent of respondents said they did not like the United States. The next most popular country polled a distant second. An

absolute majority identified the Soviet Union and China as their least favorite countries (Park Kwon-sang 1984:475). In another poll of college students conducted in 1969, students were asked "Which country do you like least?" The response:

Country ! Male Students ! Female Students Japan 37.50% 37.70% PRC 26.03% 32.49% USSR 12.36% 18.45%

USA 2.73% 1 :47% ROC .83% 1.41% India 1.44% .63% FRG 1.79% . 15% UK .65% Australia | .43% I .15%

Source: Ko Young-bok 1970:243. Of course, the poll does not tell us much about the ambivalence toward America and modernity that persisted,

particularly but not exclusively among Korean elites. Modernization in the 1960s was proceeding at breakneck speed, bringing new stresses, and inspiring nostalgia about

a tranquil, gentle past that never existed. Even in a prosperous Western country like France, elites had been

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Although everyone knows that money is precious, never before has every value of life been so controlled by money as our era, "the age of mammon". Pervasive mammonism in our society is not unrelated to the influence of the American way of life [in Korea]. In our country, many aspects of our country's culture, ethics, and morals have been corrupted and degraded by mammonism" (1977:305).

Elsewhere, Song notes:

.. .we must know that many kinds of social immorality and irrationality, disorderliness and confusion, like materialism, selfishness, conspicuous consumption, and profligacy, came to Korea in the name of "Yankeeism" (1977:113).

It is easy to proceed from Song's analysis to an attitude in which America is perceived as posing a generalized threat to South Korea. But as we have already

noted, these sentiments were counteracted by even more

powerful sentiments of admiration and a belief that imitating American strengths was the key to Korea's future as a strong, self-confident nation. Military security was of course paramount as well.

Confronted with a powerful and strongly disliked neighbor to

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the east (Japan), not to mention a hostile regime to the north and its allies to the west and northwest, China and the Soviet Union, South Koreans were keenly appreciative of

American support. It is true that the United States had not proved as reliable as they had expected (or hoped). Koreans already disappointed by past U.S. "blunders" were shocked to

learn of President Richard Nixon's 1972 normalization of relations with China. 52/ Koreans began to speak of America's betrayal. 53/ Still, most Koreans appreciated the value of the United States as an ally and increasingly, as

critical market for Korean goods. 54/ Moreover, Koreans found the distance between the United States and Korea to be psychologically reassuring: the United States seemed to be powerful enough to have uses as an ally, but not close enough to present a credible menace to Korean sovereignty. After 1965, the export-oriented economy was poised for

take off. Over the next 14 years, the value of Korean

exports grew from $639 million in 1965 to $35.4 billion in 1979! Economic growth rates averaged 10 percent throughout

this period. And in the 1970s, substantial investment in agriculture and the rural economy led to agricultural self- sufficiency and a considerable rise in living standards for the nation's once destitute rural population. These

remarkable achievements pacified many Koreans, whose principal grievances had been economic, 55/

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Politically, however. South Korea was not making strides toward democracy. On the contrary, political culture was becoming increasingly "militarized" (Kim Ho-jin 1991:16

Military terminology first permeated civilian culture during the Korean war, when all the country was mobilized for war, and when military values were at a premium. Under Rhee, military culture continued to be disseminated through military training in high schools and colleges. Most males served about three years in the army following graduation

from high school or college. Under Park's military-dominated rule, however, military culture became paramount (Pyong

Choon Hahm 1964:173). Park sought the same sort of obedience, discipline and upright character in his people

that he had once demanded of his troops. All those who resisted his will were enemies. Military culture fused with the absolutist values of Korean Confucianist morality, which divided individuals between the "purely" motivated and the

"impurely" motivated. Even before the promulgation of the Yushin constitution, the military-dominated state was founded on strongly statist premises.

In 1968, buttressed by a wide margin of victory in the 1967 presidential elections. Park extended the influence of the military even further. He strengthened anti-communist ideological education, mobilized self-defense units, and

extended military training to high school and college students. By December 1968, everyone was required to

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. memorize a newly-written National Educational Charter. This

charter, which invoked etatism, nationalism, patriotism, and economic development as national priorities, was recited involuntarily by ordinary citizens and students at public gatherings and at school.

We were born in this land with the historical obligation to rejuvenate Korea. It is time for us to revive the glorious spirit of our ancestors and establish the spirit of self-reliance...and to contribute to the well-being of humanity. . . . [We] must recognize that the prosperity of the country is the basis of my personal prosperity. ..[We must] strengthen the national spirit of cooperation for developing [the economy] and [we must develop] a spirit of civic mindedness. Our way of life is guided by thoroughgoing patriotism, the spirit of anti-communism, and democracy... (Minjung Sokwan eds. 1971:53).

Despite the calls for civic-mindedness, nothing could

have been less achievable in the politically repressive climate that prevailed. In June 1961 Kim Jong-pil established the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

Under Kim's direction the KCIA quickly became the single most powerful government agency in the country, its tremendous human and physical resources concentrated on domestic surveillance and intimidation of dissent.

Increasingly it manufactured evidence of domestic subversion

to justify the government's harsh political measures. For example, on August 14, 1964, the KCIA claimed to have uncovered the "people's revolutionary party" incident (Kim Song-hwan 1984:377-8), an alleged Pyongyang-directed conspiracy to overthrow the government by instigating

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. student demonstrations against Korean-Japanese normalization. The alleged ringleaders and members of the People's Revolutionary Party were left-leaning journalists, students, professors, and others sympathetic to North Korea (1984:377). From this time forward, whenever street protests occurred, the government attempted to demonstrate direct or

indirect connections between student leaders and Pyongyang. This method appeared effective over the short term, given the intensity of anti-communist fears, but over the long term, people grew more wary of government charges, much as Americans had grown skeptical of Joseph McCarthy. Most Koreans began to consider so-called communist

revolutionary elements in Korea as fighters for democracy

against the dictatorial regime. This legacy of scare tactics made many reluctant to acknowledge that the student movement of the 1980s was led by avowed socialists. To most of the Korean public, these socialists were no more than democratic

opponents of the regime. Still the restrictions on democracy and free expression, coupled with sound economic achievements did

encourage political apathy, and hence, a low level of

political awareness. A 1966 poll of professors and journalists confirmed that economic modernization was their highest priority, while greater political democratization

ranked much lower. 56/

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1. The fact that the U.S. a former British colony achieved a successful war of Independence against an imperialist power and became one of the strongest countries in the world deeply impressed Koreans (Park Hyun-chae 1986:118). 2. One year after leaving office, in 1910, Theodore Roosevelt warned his successor President William Howard Taft of the folly of provoking the Japanese in Asia:

I utterly disbelieve in the policy of bluff, in national and international no less than in private affairs, or in any violation of the old frontier maxim, "Never draw unless you mean to shoot." I do not believe in our taking any position anywhere unless we can make good; and as regards Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England, plus an army as good as that of Germany (Tyler Dennett, cited in Bailey 1958:533).

3. See Rhee's comment in Oliver 1978:12; Yu Hong-nyol 1960.

4. According to Hodge, the AMG would have "great difficulty operating with any sweeping removal of Japanese unless willing to accept chaos. All utilities, communications, etc., are Japanese operated and government controlled. My Military Government setup is entirely inadequate to cope with the situation." (HUSAFIK, Vol 1, chapter 4:18) But an angry Seoul Shinmun editorial noted with sarcasm that "those who welcome the US landing" are not Koreans but Japanese. [Seoul Shinmun. September 10, 1945 cited in Kim Hak-jun 1982:149). Hodge was forced to cut ties with many of the Japanese bureaucrats in the face of widespread outrage among the various Korean political organizations and the public at large.

150

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5. See Rhee's angry comment in Oliver (1978:12); Park Bong-shik (1967:172). 6. Hodge notified Gen. Douglas MacArthur that "[o]ne of the greatest difficulties here in maintenance of order is the idea planted firmly in the mind of all Koreans that Korea is now... a free and independent nation... In talking to educated Koreans I discovered that translations of the Cairo Statement to Koreans have been "in a few days" or "very soon" rather than "in due course" in reference to the time of independence. Request that any future translations be carefully checked." (HUSAFIK, Vol. I Chap.4:21). 7. Cumings notes that "the Japanese Communist Party was one of the few groups in Japan that was sympathetic to Korean liberation and called attention to the abysmal conditions of Koreans in Japan. Some 350,000 returnees from Japan went to north Korea after liberation, even though many of them had been southerners originally" (Cumings 1981:60- 61) . 8. According to Cumings "official sources reported that some 75,000 Koreans were either retained or newly appointed inthe last three months of 1945. Given the time limitations, the vast majority of these appointments must have represented retention of existing officials " (1981:156). Most real patriotic fighters against the Japanese did not speak English, were shabbily dressed and were thus unable to make a favorable impression upon AMG authorities (Meade 1951:104). According to one calculation, some 80 percent of Korean AMG personnel were either KEP members or were recommended by KDP members (Shim Chi-yon 1984:36 and Han Hyun-wu 1975:242).

9. Gayn (1981:403) reports an instances of an American officer removing an elected leftist and replacing him with a failed rightist candidate. On p. 411, he notes jailing of leftists on charges of conspiracy, without any evidence and without any violent provocation.

10. Japanese had owned about 80 percent of Korea's total industrial assets prior to liberation (An Byong-jik 1979:322) and by 1930 the Japanese Government-General owned some 40 percent of Korea's total land area (Lee Ki-baik 1984:319).

11. Rumors spread that any Korean posing as an English-speaking Christian could claim a house on the spot (Seoul Shinmunsa 1979:78).

12. One high ranking leader of the KDP, Song Chin-wu was assassinated on the very day that rumors alleged that he

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. had supported the trusteeship decision. Hodge himself appears to have been misled by the State Department about the U.S. position on trusteeship. On January 30, 1946, when he learned the truth, Hodge fired off an angry radio message to the State Department which is reprinted in full in HUSAFIK, Vol. II, Chapter 4:341-343.

13. The KCP had initially opposed trusteeship but reversed itself abruptly on January 3, 1946 following instructions from the northern branch of the KCP concerning decisions made at the Moscow conference. (HUSAFIK, Vol. II, Chapter 1:25)

14. The largely circumstantial, but not incredible, evidence for this is described in HUSAFIK, Part II, Chap. I, pp.22-27. Hodge was convinced from the outset of Moscow's control of the KCP. 15. That the United States could so encourage a group that was so suspicious of it and so eager for its withdrawal is either a testament to U.S. forebearance, desperation, or both (HUSAFIK Part II, Chap. 11:99). 16. (HUSAFIK, PT II, Chap. 11:113). Park demanded the following: 1) Full and unqualified support of the Moscow decision. 2) Immediate release of all political prisoners. 3) Enactment of a Land Reformation Law similar to the one in North Korea. 4) Expulsion of "reactionaries" from public life. 5) The functions of government should be transferred at once from the hands of Military Government to the People's Committees. (Pt. II, chapter 11:115). 17. KCP membership totaled 3,000 by AMG reckoning and 20,000 according to the KCP (Memo for record, October 19, 1945, Summary of the Situation in Korea, Report from the Office of CG. XXIV Corps: OPD 014 CIS, September 1945). Section V cited in Park Hyun-chae et al 1984:135). 18. John Merrill. Personal communication. 19. Typical of this perspective was the editorial that appeared in Chosun Ilbo on August 31, 194 6: "We believe that the military government in Korea has not been successful in its efforts, and that this failure is due to your country's lack of understanding concerning Korea, the interpreter's administration [sic] the permission [sic] of free economy 152

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. without any preparation, and to your wavering policy." (Lauterbach 1947:237-8)

20. When the Korean elite first encountered Americans, they had much the same reactions. Minister Min Young-ik, who in 1883 headed the first Korean diplomatic delegation ever to visit the United States, reported to the King: "I was born in a world of darkness, went to the world of bright light, and came back to the world of darkness" (Kim Tae-jin and An Yong-chol 1988:2).

21. As we shall see in a later chapter, the idea that Americans should be forgiven for lacking in propriety and deference was no longer acceptable in the 1980s. The conduct of American athletes at the Olympics (Chapter 6) were universally condemned, a clear sign that Koreans were no longer willing to view themselves as inferior in status to Americans.

22. This denotation should not be equated with the uses of the term employed by Robinson (1988) whose excellent survey of nationalism in 1920s Korea more closely corresponds to political nationalism.

23. By referring to pro-Americanism as mythology, I do not mean to imply that U.S.-Korean relations were not, on the whole, cordial and mutually beneficial. But pro- Americanism became a mythology when it was enshrined as a ideal to which the whole population had to be committed. 24. It should be pointed out that Rhee, like most educated Koreans, was ambivalent about the idea of depicting U.S.-Korean relations in terms of patron and client. Hence, in an independence day speech on March 1, 1953, Rhee told his Korean audience that "in 1919 we were the Forgotten Nation, with no voice that any government in the world was willing to hear. Today we are free and equal partners in the great community of free peoples. Sometimes other governments may disagree with our views, but never again can our views be brushed aside and ignored." But two paragraphs later, Rhee, in true client fashion, proclaims the United States, "under the courageous and inspired leadership of President Dwight D. Eisenhower... the most beloved nation in all the history of the world" (Rhee 1953:8-9). Although Rhee adopted an pro-American stance, he was personally an extremely proud man who bitterly denounced sadaeiu'ui when he detected in others. According to one of his American confidantes, R.T. Oliver, Rhee once accused Chang Myun of trying to turn South Korea into an American puppet. (Kim Joungwon 1976:145). He also refused to be dictated to, as he saw it, turning down U.S. requests for a readjusted exchange rate, for normalizing relations between 153

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. South Korea and Japan, and for South Korean participation in the 1953 armistice talks. Rhee, who had tried to engage the United States (and Taiwan) in a war against the People's Republic of China (New York Times. July 29, 1954), was in no mood for an armistice, or for repatriating 25,000 avowedly anti-communist POWs.

25. Rhee's highly popular anti-Japanese policy included expanded territorial claims to sovereignty in the Sea of Japan (called the East Sea by Koreans) , the Rhee Line, and a rejection of normalization of relations between Korea and Japan, despite repeated pressures from Washington. According to one widely circulated story, Rhee's implacable hatred of the Japanese knew no bounds; in mid-1950, when his besieged government had moved to Pusan to escape invading North Korean troops, and the future of the south was in jeopardy, Rhee is said to have rejected the idea of military assistance from Japan. Instead of firing on the north, he is alleged to have said, our troops will turn our guns on the Japanese. 26. From 1953-1973, South Korea received 8 percent of U.S. foreign economic and military aid, or $11 billion (Ku Young-rok et al 1984:19) Without U.S. grain aid in the 1950s and early 1960s, South Koreans would have faced starvation (Yu Young-Ik 1990:31).

27. Of course, some intellectuals were quick to point out that U.S. assistance was not solely motivated by altruism, but also by pragmatic considerations of the U.S. national interest. The foremost foreign policy objective of the United States, it was observed, was the containment of Soviet expansionism and that South Korea played an important role in advancing this objective (Yu Chin-o 1956:97 cited in Kim Jin-kyong 1988:62).

28. A leading participant in 1960 student movement was Seoul National University (SNU) student Yu Kun-il, member of the Shin Jin hoe. (New Advancement Club), a student study group whose core members later organized the Student League for National Unification. On December 15, 1957, Yu submitted an article for the SNU newspaper entitled: "The Quest: Heading for a Proletarian Regime" (Ilwol Sogak II 1983:354). Laden with Marxist overtones, the article's publication outraged the authorities, who sentenced Yu to two year's imprisonment.

29. "Most of the embassy staff were sympathetic, but the American military, its policy powers ascendant in war, opposed any move to 'rock the boat'" (Henderson 1968:259). 30. Many more Koreans who desired to study abroad were

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33. New Life was also the name of a radical publication that circulated briefly in 1922, until closed by Japanese colonial authorities.

34. The contrast with the 1980s campaign against foreign cigarettes is instructive. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of how the 1980s campaign was linked to xenophobic fears of "spiritual pollution" from the United States. 35. Much had changed, as we shall see, in the 1980s. Radical students downplayed Soviet responsibility for the division of Korea. Moreover, in the 1980s, the Juche faction of students embraced reunification under northern direction, hotly denying that Kim Il-sung was anyone's puppet. 36. Although the political atmosphere under Chang Myun was much freer, the tenor of political debate stayed much the same. Politics continued to center on personal contests for power, while policy differences remained in the background. A typical opposition party slogan proclaimed: "life is difficult— let's change [the regime]" (Han Sang-jin 1990:233) 37. The same pattern was observable during the transition from authoritarian rule under Chun Doo-hwan to democratic rule under Roh Tae-woo: student demands began with a return to democracy but evolved into a reunification movement. 38. It was alleged that U.S. Ambassador McConaughy visited Chang without appointment. American informality and easy access to the prime minister was taken by many Koreans as a sign of disrespect. In one shocking incident at the Bando Hotel, a U.S. intelligence officer was seen calling out to Chang in familiar fashion and then pulling him by the sleeve into a private room (Yi Duk-ju 1965:46-7). 155

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39. Its founder Cho Yong-su was subsequently later executed by Park Chung-hee. 40. For a text of the first and second declarations see Kim Sam-ung 1984:19-20, 26-7. 41. Kodae Shinmun [Korea University Student Newspaper] May 6, 1961 by Park Chan-sae "Chavu Miniuiu'ui Nva, 'Fascism' Inva" [Free Democracy or Fascism?] cited in Ko Young-bok 1983:120. Note the use of the word "poisoned" which in this context is a form of xenophobic "pollution" language (Douglas 19 66). 42. McGinn et al (1980:202); subsequent polls for 1964, 1968 and 1970 were remarkably consistent. 43. Yet few give Feuer the credit he deserves. Although his Freudian jargon and references to individual psyches have prompted legitimate objections, Feuer was chiefly concerned with the social and historical context in which the "conflict of generations" occurs. His definition of student movements is well worth noting: A combination of students inspired by aims which they try to explicate in a political ideology, and moved by an emotional rebellion in which there is always present a disillusionment with and rejection of the values of the older generation; moreover, the members of a student movement have the conviction that their generation has a special historical mission to fulfill where the older generation, other elites, and other classes have failed (1969:11). For a classic illustration of the sentiments Feuer describes, see the last will and testament of Cho Sung-man, Chapter 6. 44. The leaders of the May 16, 1961 military coup did not have the privileged backgrounds of most of the leaders of the First and Second Republics, including men like Syngman Rhee and Chang Myun. The great majority were born into peasant families and were not Western-educated. Neither were they distinguished nationalists. Park Chung-hee, for example, who led the May 16 coup, was trained as a Japanese military officer in Manchuria and Japan. 45. After the coup, the Kennedy administration (and for a time, Pyongyang) assumed that Park was a communist sympathizer. Park is alleged to have been involved in the communist-led Yosu, Soonchun uprising in October 1945 and further, that he was handed a life sentence by a military court (Yi Sang-wu 1984:229). Notwithstanding conflicting 156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. stories about his release, it is clear that he was (re) inducted into the Korean Army during the early phase of the Korean War. The Kennedy administration assumed with greater justification that Park was anti-American. His communist record before the Korean war continued to plague him, hindering his chances for promotion and choice assignments. Yi Sang-wu suggests that Park blamed the United States for his failure to be promoted— not an entirely unwarranted assumption given the degree of U.S. influence in Korean military personnel issues at the time (Yi Sang-wu 1984:229). Park's animosity toward the United States may have been fueled by apparently close personal ties to Japanese military officials with whom he served during WWII. Yi also claims that, before the 1961 coup. Park was reluctant to join golf games or parties with U.S. military officers and Embassy staff stationed in South Korea, a common practice at the time among high-ranking Korean military officers. Whenever obligated to attend one of these functions, he is said to have remained off to one side, drinking alone and glancing coldly at Korean generals who were happily entertaining their American guests. Unlike other Korean generals during the 1950s, Park did not have an American nickname (Yi Sang-wu 1984:228-9). Of course. Park's resentments do not of themselves constitute a generalized mistrust of America.

46. Later, in August, the United States withheld a badly needed PL 480 consignment of flour, although it was already at the docks of Inchon. Park finally had to turn to Mitsui Trading Co. (Lee Chong-sik 1985:63). 47. As Park was to note some years later, "[w]e like America. We like their system of liberal democracy. They liberated us, they protected us from Communist invasion; they aided us economically. Above all, we like America because thev have not tried to enslave us. nor to make unreasonable demands of us. (Emphasis added.) If there had been any sign of unreasonable interference, our attitude would have manifested itself before long through our own reaction. The Korean people are very sensitive in this respect. This sensitivity of theirs will become keener as the days pass” (Park 1970b:153). Reflecting the sentiments of fellow Korean elites. Park expressed appreciation for the fundamental fairness and humanity of the United States. Yet his comments also reveal hints of exasperation. Recall, for example, the U.S. decision to withhold a PL 480 consignment of flour (fn. 3). Mindful of this interference, although unable to openly acknowledge it. Park notes Korean sensitivities as if to say: no further interference can be tolerated.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48. On February 9, 1967 the U.S. government signed a Status of Forces agreement (SOFA) to give the South Korean government jurisdiction over crimes against its citizens committed by GIs. Welcome as the agreement was, critics pointed to some unfair clauses such as waivers provided for in the appendix. Given the unequal nature of U.S.-Korean relations, this agreement could be abused to the advantage of the United States. For example, from 1976 to 1985, 15,000 crimes were committed by GIs. But the Korean court chose to exercise jurisdiction in just over .7 percent of these cases. By contrast, NATO countries exercised jurisdiction in 32 percent of cases, Japan, 11.2 percent, while in the Philippines, the courts tried 21.2 percent of the cases (Hong Sung-yong 1988:312-316). The implication that many Koreans draw from this— that Americans regard Koreans with greater contempt than other people— is a considerable source of shame and vexation.

49. Park's admiration for the Japanese was apparent in his decision to dub his 1972 constitution the Yushin (Restoration) constitution. The term "Restoration" recalls the "Meiji Restoration" of 19th century Japan, in which Japan began a modernization program that enabled it to rival Western power.

50. In 1971 Park's assessment of the importance of Japanese ties to South Korean security led him again to risk strong public condemnation. He invited high-ranking Japanese military officers to South Korea for the first time in Korean history. Park also allowed Japan to open its first cultural center in South Korea. As expected, these initiatives aroused anti-Japanese sentiments. On June 3, 1971 the Youth Council for Defending Democracy [Minju Suho Chongnyon Hyop'uihoe] declared the inauguration of a "new anti-Japanese movement" (Yi Chae-o 1984:301). According to the Youth Council: "It is necessary to reevaluate... Korea-Japan relations from the perspective of national interests because Japan is showing militarist ambitions. The government must immediately cancel plans to invite Japanese Prime Minister Sato to the Presidential Inauguration ceremony and must not allow the admission of Japanese military personnel because they are coming to Korea in search of new military opportunities (Park Hyun-chae et al 1986:200)

51. Note use of the word comprador which suggests a Marxist orientation. This must have represented extreme minority views (Yi Chae-o 1984:236).

52. A high point in Korean-U.S. security cooperation 158

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. came in during the Johnson administration. In 1965 and 1966, respectively, presidents Park and Lyndon Johnson exchanged visits as heads of state. Also in 1965 Park sent thousands of troops to Vietnam, in exchange for which the United States provided Korea with increased military and economic aid, not to mention lucrative military contracts for Korean businesses to support the war effort. But this honeymoon lasted only a few years. In January 1968 North Korea sent a 31-member commando unit to Seoul to assassinate President Park. The U.S. unwillingness to retaliate enraged Park. Also in January 1968, the U.S. Pueblo, with its 83-man crew, was kidnapped by North Korean patrol boats in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) . Subsequent U.S. efforts to negotiate for the release of the prisoners looked to Koreans like an exercise in humiliation. In April 1969, the U.S. intelligence plane EC-121 was shot down by North Korea over the Sea of Japan (East Sea). In response the U.S. dispatched the Seventh Fleet, raising South Korean hopes of U.S. retaliation. But after a brief show of force, the fleet departed. Furthermore, the United States had become bogged down in Vietnam, increasing South Korean anxiety about the U.S. ability and determination to defend the south from North Korean attack. The 1969 Nixon Doctrine and the subsequent decision to withdraw ground troops from the Asian continent was another severe blow. Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon warned that if the U.S. withdrew the U.S. Seventh Division, his cabinet would resign (Yi Do-hyung 1986:300). 53. Journalist Song Kon-ho noted wistfully: It is said that there are no eternal friends or enemies in international society. Since Nixon's trip to China, relations between the United States and China have been rapidly improving, although once they acted like enemies. Furthermore, rumor has it that the United States will give China military aid... As times grow more difficult, we will have to rely increasingly on ourselves. Unless we rely on our own strength we cannot survive in international society (1977:344).

54. From 1971-1973, the total value of Korean exports worldwide tripled. Although Japan was South Korea's largest trading partner by 1966, the United States ranked a close second (Lee Chong-sik 1985:86). 55. In 1963 only 8.7% of the work force were engaged in manufacturing or mining while, in 1976, 21.8 percent were engaged in this sector (Park Hyun-chae et al 1984:88). In 1960, only 2 0 percent of Korean resided in urban areas; in 1980 the figure rose to 57 percent (Im Hee-sop 1988:44). Educational opportunities expanded dramatically. In the early 1980s 95 percent of elementary school graduates 159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. entered junior high school, and 90 percent of these graduates entered high school, and 30 percent of high school graduates entered college (Im Hee-sop 1988:222). In the early 1960s 40 percent of Koreans were living in "absolute poverty"; twenty years later that figure had dropped to 10 percent (Im Hee-sop 1988:215). On the debit side. Park left a legacy of uneven regional economic development. Choila province in the southwest, was sorely neglected by industrial developers. This regional disparity, involving egregious discrimination against residents of Cholla province who were seeking access to high-level military and civilian jobs, became one of the most divisive political issues of the mid-70s and after.

56. (Im Hee-sop 1988:25). Other polls conducted during the 1960s confirm this view. See for example. Ko Young-bok (1970:290).

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ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA: 1972-1980

The Yushin Regime and the "End" of Politics

By 1971, Park's position no longer seemed so secure. He had nearly lost the April 1971 elections to charismatic opposition figure Kim Dae-jung. His international position looked less secure as well. The United States had already withdrawn one combat division from South Korea in 1970, and was poised for rapprochement with China and the Soviet

Union. In December 1971 Park proclaimed a National Emergency Decree to protect South Korea from what he alleged was the

heightened threat from the north. Martial law followed in October 1972. With the promulgation of the Yushin Constitution in November, Park gained dictatorial powers. He

was indirectly elected by an electoral college to a fourth

term to last six years. The constitution empowered him to assume the functions of all three branches of government

whenever he saw fit to declare a national emergency. Park also gained the right to appoint one-third of the members of the National Assembly. Such powers had been denied even to

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authoritarian regimes;

political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology (but with distinctive mentalities); without intensive or extensive political mobilization (except at some points in their development) ; and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined but quite predictable limits'(1973:185).

Park began to talk increasingly of practicing a "Korean- style democracy to suit ourselves" (Yun Tae-won 1990:162). However, the distinction between South Korea's "Korean-style democracy" and the repressive political system in the north

appeared to weaken seriously. With so little freedom left in the constitution, Seoul's previous commitment to reunification under the leadership of a free, and democratic government appeared to have been undermined. Reunification thus became a politically taboo subject.

Repressive government policies ensured that the

majority would remain easily manipulable. Extensive police surveillance promoted fear of communism and fear of

accusations of communist sympathies. Individuals whose family members were alleged to have had prior links to communist activities were barred from government employment. They were forbidden to travel abroad.

Anti-communist education in elementary and secondary schools involved the crudest slogans and stereotypes of

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their treacherous nature). Another frequently stressed point was that North Koreans could not be reasoned with: force was the only thing they could understand. Self-censorship was the rule in the arts and humanities. Only a minority needed government censorship to keep their works in line with official policy. In economics, only studies related to the free market were allowed to be taught in the universities. Studies related to labor, critical of capitalism, or related to Marxist-Leninist

interpretations of economy or society were banned. Only "pure literature" (sunsu munhak) . that is, literature devoid of political content, was considered worthy of publication. The same applied to the fine arts, popular songs, and cinema. The KCIA and the Department of Culture and

Information thoroughly monitored the various artistic media to ensure that they did not contain references to social problems.

Government repression intensified when South Vietnam fell to the north in the spring of 1975. The declaration of Emergency Measure No. 9 in May 1975 stated that all criticisms of the Yushin Constitution were strictly banned. With freedom of speech and press so sharply curtailed,

rumors replaced hard news. The Yushin period came to be

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. known as the "era of mistrust" fbulshinui shidae). Even a vendor or fortune teller who made offensive offhand remarks could be arrested. People began to look over their shoulders

while telling friends of their grievances. Many dozens of journalists were dismissed for writing articles that antagonized the government (Yi Chae-o 1984:283-4). The Park regime's incessant warnings about the threat of invasion by the north after 1972 were taken seriously by most Koreans. The elderly, uneducated, and rural were

particularly receptive to calls for discipline and order. Even younger and more educated citizens, who deplored government and police excesses, sometimes grudgingly accepted government justifications for curbs on democratic expression. Yet to a smaller group, consisting chiefly of students and intellectuals. Park's anti-communist rhetoric contributed to communism's appeal, even mystification. The

more the Park regime seemed anti-nationalist, anti- historical, and anti-humanist, the more communism looked like an appealing alternative.

The Yushin regime also produced a more combative

democratic opposition. Increasingly, Park characterized all

opposition as illegitimate (i.e. pro-communist) 1/. The opposition responded by abandoning its former program of criticizing government corruption. The new focus of attack became the regime itself. While the government attempted to

convince the public that the main focus of contention in

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Korean society was between communists and anti-communists, more and more citizens came to share the opposition view that the main contradiction was between the regime and the

rest of society. 2/ With the promulgation of Emergency Measure No. 9 in May 1975 individuals could be arrested for contemplating (as distinct from actively planning) subversive activity. Much of the student opposition went underground, although thousands continued to battle police in the streets. Opposition leaders and clergy also continued to challenge the Yushin regime. 3/

Relations with the United States during the Yushin Period

By the mid-1970s, U.S. influence on South Korea was strong, but diminishing. With Japan now playing the premier role in Korean trade and investment, the United States

could no longer wield such blunt instruments of influence as food and military aid to influence Park's domestic policies of repression. In addition to an already sizable export industry. South Korea possessed a military industry capable

of keeping the country self-sufficient in small arms at least. South Korea was no longer so diplomatically isolated as it had been in the 1960s (Ku Young-rok 1984:178-9).

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deteriorated in the wake of the 1973 Koreagate scandal (Boettcher 1980). Congress charged Korean businessman Tong- sun Park with bribing members of Congress to vote favorably on bills important to the Park government. Moreover, in 1974 Congress passed an amendment that denied South Korea $93 million in military and economic aid. The Park regime made clear to Washington and to Korean public opinion its view that South Korea had become a convenient target of "big country chauvinist" or "imperialist" wrath (Ku Young-rok et al 1984:332). Official pro-Americanism had probably not been more seriously challenged at any other time to date.

As bad as official Korean-U.S. relations were in the aftermath of the Koreagate scandal, they were bound to get worse during the term of Democratic President Jimmy Carter (1977-1980). Even as a candidate. Carter had pledged to withdraw all ground troops from South Korea. On the advice

of Democratic Senator Henry Jackson (Schlesinger 1986:97), Carter made human rights the centerpiece of his new approach

to foreign policy. He pledged to promote human rights everywhere, even among autocratic governments friendly to the United States. But the most immediate cause for concern was Carter's pledge to withdraw U.S. ground troops. This was not the

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retrenchment from Asia as part of an overall scaling back of U.S. security commitments. The Carter policy targeted South Korea in particular (Yi Sang-wu 1987:200). To Koreans who had suffered from the paranoia of the North Korean threat, Carter's proposals spelled betrayal of South Korea's vital security interests. Coming just a year after America's hasty retreat from South Vietnam and the communist victory there. Carter's election and reiteration of his campaign pledges

sparked panic in South Korea. The government took Carter at his word, and debate got under way about how to best prepare

for greater military self-reliance. 4 / For the first time since liberation, the Park regime sent to an international conference in Moscow its minister

of health and welfare, accompanied by a journalist. The move was intended as a chastening hint to the United States that South Korea had its own cards to play if Washington were

unwilling to fulfill its obligations. Carter's state visit to South Korea 5/ in June 1979 did nothing to ease tensions. Flouting protocol. Carter gave no arrival speech at the airport, proceeding instead

directly to U.S. military base near the DMZ, where he spent his first night. In the presidential summit that followed, Carter privately warned the Park regime to end human rights

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that South Korea's admirable economic achievements "could be matched by similar progress through the realization of basic human aspirations in political and human rights" (Richardson 1979:21). During face-to-face meetings. Park Chung-hee bluntly rebuffed Carter's demands, claiming that such matters were strictly domestic matters. Instead, in a 45- minute tirade. Park rebuked Carter for his plans to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea (Yi Sang-wu 1987:202). If Park had

expected from the summit a "friendly visit, based on Oriental courtesy" (Sankei Shimbun. July 2, 1979, cited in Yi Sang-wu 1987:202), he was sorely disappointed.

The Student Movement of the 1970s: Shame, Guilt, and the Rise of the Romantic Left

In the late 1960s and early 1970s South Korea had transformed itself rapidly into an industrial society with a

large working class. Wages were low and working hours long to ensure Korean competitiveness in a world market dominated

by technologically advanced countries. The government had suppressed the labor movement (Paek Un-sun 1988:123), and censorship laws made it difficult for workers to popularize

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famine, hardship had been taken for granted by many. Hence the abysmal living conditions of workers did not come to the

forefront as a social issue until the early 1970s. 6/ This is not to say that there were no individual cases of protest against working conditions. For example, on

November 13, 1970, textile worker Chon Tae-il immolated himself outside his workplace. 7/ This desperate act made a deep impression on only a small minority of students, who had learned about his protest through word of mouth. Shocked by the incident, these students concluded that political democracy was not enough; improving the workers' welfare was also an urgent task.

To what extent these students were influenced by socialist thought is not clear. But some combination of socialism and populism was certainly evident. In 1971 for example, members of the Social Law Study Group at SNU Law School wrote about conditions in the Kwangju Housing Project, a shantytown just outside of Seoul. Residents there had rioted after the government failed to fulfill its promises to improve the terrible living conditions. Taking

stock of the situation, the students reported that the miniung 8/ is the main force of historical development and the student movement is an intellectual movement that contributed to the creation of miniung history'" (Park Hyun- chae et al 1986:190).

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compassion, was to animate the spirit of the student movement from this period on. The court testimony of one of these students, Yu Shi-min, dramatically reveals the process by which many students became disillusioned and guilt-ridden during their freshman year in college;

... At the end of February 1978, seven years ago 9 / , I left my hometown for college in Seoul. With pack in hand, I felt on my back the proud gaze of my mother who stood in the corner of the alley way. [I] The accused was just a 19-year old country boy who wanted to be a judge. (I had heard that being a judge was a good way to show my gratitude to my parents, who had given up good clothes and food for the sake of their six children. I also believed that being a judge was not a bad choice.) When I was accepted as a freshman at Seoul National University, I received nothing but warm congratulations [from friends and family]. The accused didn't realize that the Yushin Regime [was maintained at the cost of] blood and [political] imprisonment. I believed what [high school] social studies teachers told us, that 'Yushin is the only way'. How can teachers lie to students? ...... On campus, on a brilliant, blooming day in May , I first inhaled the burning aroma of tear gas. Through my swelling tears, I witnessed the arrest of a weak, female student who was dragged away by her hair. I [saw all this while] cowering at the rear of the student's center building, my heart pounding and fearful. Since that day, everything gradually seemed to take on a different meaning for me...I began to feel ashamed that our [student's monthly] room and board amounted to more than the monthly wages of a 16-year old girl working more than 60 hours a week. When I drank beer 1 0 / and went to the disco with a pretty college student, I began to blush more and more, as if I was being caught doing something wrong. This may have presaged my transformation into 'a trouble-making student'. That winter, after witnessing my beloved seniors emerge from the 'sacred court' as sentenced criminals, I felt strong inner conflict. I could no longer envision myself as a judge sitting on the high bench. During the following summer, the accused was elected as the student representative of the Department of Economics. This means that I was publicly recognized by

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This testimony reveals one student's initiation into dissent but it reveals much about the perceptions and motives of many of his fellow dissidents. We note from the

account that the student Yu was ambitious, interested in social issues (based on his interest in becoming a judge), and like most Korean high school students, inclined to trust

the word of teachers and other elders. Before long, Yu had witnessed the brutal forces of the state intruding in upon

his serene campus. Thus politicized, Yu's guilt was fed by his previous cowardice and by his relative wealth. Finally

the state's harsh punishment of his "beloved friends" caused him to draw mental boundaries between an enemy state and friendly dissidents. Noteworthy, too, is the implication that his identity as a dissident was reinforced by the

attitudes of school and police authorities.

More so, perhaps, than in most other societies, Korean students have been expected to exercise moral leadership. Lacking in possessions and obligations, they have been

judged to be morally pure, untainted by the compromises they must make later in life. But what had made students noticably more interested in the miniung?

Former Yonsei University student body president Kwon Oh-jong said that "I was involved in the [student] movement

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were not important [in light of] how many poor people there

are around me" (Kang Young-jin 1990:456). But that had been even more true of the 1950s and 1960s than of the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s the student movement had a strongly elitist character. Neither their emphases on frugality, economic self-reliance, or creating a new national culture could overcome this elitist tendency. The student's abortive efforts to politicize the countryside in

1960 dramatized the gap between students and peasants, a gap that most students did not try to bridge through sustained efforts. For most politically active students, the April 19 Uprising was a "romantic" movement for pariiamentary-style democracy (Do Heung-ryol et al 1987:3). The students' hero

was Andre Malraux, not Lenin (Yonsei Choonchu cited in Ko Young-bok 1983:119). By the 1970s, workers rather than peasants constituted

the largest segment of the workforce. University enrollments had broadened considerably. The nation was beginning to

enjoy some measure of prosperity while at the same time experiencing political repression unparalleled since the time of Japanese occupation. As in the era of Japanese colonial rule, Christian churches provided an alternative

social vision and one of very few alternatives to government institutions. From the late 1960s, a small number of

Christian churches became attracted to the cause of the

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interpretations of Christianity that would later form the basis of liberation theology (miniung shinhak) and "consciousness-raising" (uishikhwa kvovuk). Influenced by these missions, and recalling similar

efforts in the 192 0s, some students began to open night schools for workers that taught additional skills, and also subtly conveyed information about their labor rights. Often

these were set up inside mission centers for urban workers (Toshi Sanop Sonkvohoef . The clergy not only provided facilities and moral support; they also shielded the "graduate-workers" from possible retribution by the

government. If charged with leftist activities by the

government, a graduate-worker could point to his membership in one of the mission centers, claiming that as a good Christian, he could not possibly be a Communist.

An extreme minority of aspiring labor organizers even left school, renouncing all the privileges and opportunities

their university background provided, and became workers

themselves. Such students were quite different from the student leaders of the 1950s and 1960s who sometimes used their dissident experiences as a stepping stone to future careers in politics.

Still larger groups of students formed study cells in which they raised their consciousness fuishikhwa), that is,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inculcated a spirit of self-sacrifice and service to the miniung. 11/ They discussed the merits of progressive works in the fields of history, economics, philosophy, pedagogy, literature, and theology, etc. Because of strict government

censorship, students were unable to find copies of works by Marx and Engels; instead they read the secondary works of left-leaning Western scholars on Marxist theory. A favorite

reading list in political economy included the works of Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Maurice Dobb, the Frankfurt School,

including Theodore Adorno, H. Marcuse, Juergen Habermas, dependency theorists Andre Gunder Franck, and Samir Amin, P. Freire, George Lukacs, and in theology, G. Gutierrez. Other popular social thinkers were Erich Fromm, and Frantz Fanon. By contrast with the material students chose for

themselves in study groups, the material they were assigned to read in college classes was dry and unanalytical. From a period of intense ideological indoctrination in high school, students entered a sterile world of facts that were

irrelevant to their concerns : how to confront the manifold social, political and economic problems that they now felt obligated to act upon as intellectuals. 12/ At the

university, apart from some obligatory and ponderous ideological indoctrination the students entered into an intellectual vacuum which they had to fill largely on their

own. Among left-leaning students, two major political

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. strategies emerged. One group advocated a gradualist approach fhvuniana iunbiron), arguing that, before graduating, students should not engage in political

activities that might jeopardize their future chances of getting jobs as workers. Instead, they should raise their own consciousness. Later, as graduate-workers, they would be free to raise the consciousness of workers and to organize them. The immédiatist faction fchonachi tuchaenaron). rejected this argument. They claimed that if students failed to challenge the regime, no one else would. If the students did launch political struggle, they could also raise the consciousness of the mini ung and encourage them to take a stand (Choi Mun-sang 1988:148-9). Because of the degree of government repression, however, the immediatist position had an aura of unreality about it. Most politically active

students allied themselves with the gradualists. Even under the First Republic, some intellectuals had adopted a "progressive, nationalist" approach to the study of the social sciences, but they had not formed a distinct

school of thought. Under the Yushin regime, intellectuals focusing on minjung as the centerpiece of their studies came to be identified as miniung scholars. They criticized conservative Korean scholars for blindly adopting the positivist methodology of mainstream social science research

in the United States. Instead they advocated greater attention to history and class, as well as a more value

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alienated classes in South Korea. Because of the climate of repression, the meaning of minjung was not precisely spelled out. Among its supporters however, there appears to have been some tacit understanding. Miniung represented a class coalition of workers, peasants, students and progressive intellectuals.

In the late 1980s, when Koreans enjoyed greater freedom of study, one miniung scholar. Park Hyun-chae, gave a more

detailed definition. "Miniung". according to Park, "includes

national bourgeoisies owning sm'all to medium-sized enterprises, small independent farmers, workers, intellectuals, the urban poor, and merchants who own small or medium-sized stores" (Park Hyun-chae et al 1986:48).

In addition to class, the miniung scholars were deeply committed to nationalism, believing that most of the

contradictions in South Korean society stemmed from the division of the country. Thus reunification became a preeminent political and social goal. The nationalist

emphasis also entailed anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiment, since both these countries were judged as having

to share blame for the division of Korea (Hvundae Sahoe Yon'guso eds. 1985:5).

Because of government repression, the socialist and

anti-American sentiments among the miniung scholars could not receive widespread recognition or support from the

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Yi Young-hee and the Allegory of Vietnam

The works of left-leaning Western scholars were very influential not only for members of study cells but for nationalist intellectuals as well. The towering figure among these intellectuals was Yi Young-hee. Yi's reputation among students and intellectuals is founded on both his synthesis of Western scholarship and his courageous opposition to the

Yushin regime. Yi was arrested several times and spent more than two years in prison. Most influential among his works were The Logic of Changing Times (Yi 1974) and Idol and

Reason (Yi 1977). In the early 1980s, students under interrogation confessed that Yi's book The Logic of Changing

Times was their favorite (Kim Chae-myong 1988:324). 13/

Yi's principal contribution was to offer an alternative view of the Cold War. He was able to do so by carefully relying on U.S. sources and by withholding his own interpretations. As a result, government censors appear to have completely missed the revolutionary impact of his works

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by martial law censors. The Logic of Changing Times' highly sympathetic portrayal of the communist struggle in South Vietnam was accompanied by a highly unflattering depiction of the United

States. The United States, in essence, was a friend of reactionary elites, former collaborators with French colonialism who were trying to destroy nationalist forces in Vietnam. To Yi, the United States supported the division of Vietnam as the best means of preserving the status quo. He noted blatant U.S. interference in the affairs of the South Vietnamese military regime (1974:283-361). Yi's writings on

Vietnam were probably all the more effective because they relied exclusively on U.S. sources. If Americans themselves could be so critical, the truth about America's role in Vietnam must be as they say, or worse! Of course it was not South Vietnam that principally

concerned Korean students and scholars, but Korea. The parallels between America's role in South Vietnam and its role in South Korea were striking— all the more so because

Yi chose not to make them explicit. Right-wing leader's Ngo Dinh Diem's ascent to power as a U.S.-made President recalled the case of Syngman Rhee's rise to power. The U.S. policy of reappointing former French collaborators as

officials of South Vietnam reminded readers of AMG policy in Korea just after liberation. Yi's description of U.S.

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Yi's portrayal of U.S.-Vietnam relations also spurred debates on revolution and reunification strategy. Left-wing students had already rejected South Korea's vague (and, at the time, totally unrealistic) plans for "reunification through victory over communism" fmyoloong tona'il]. To the

most radical among students at least, Yi's book raised another possibility, one which had receded in the wake of Park's 1961 military coup: reunification through urban

guerrilla warfare. (There were of course no jungles in South Korea, and mountain-based guerilla units had been defeated— at great cost, in the battles of the 1940s and 1950s). Still, this notion was not entertained very seriously, given the overwhelming military and other resources at the

disposal of the Park regime. 15/

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Yi's writings on Communist China were also highly influential. His was the first positive account of Mao's

China ever published in South Korea by a Korean author— again, based almost entirely on U.S. sources. His complimentary portrait of China under Mao, especially its egalitarian, non-materialistic, and self-reliant aspects, (1977:83-179) inspired readers who had shared Song Kon-ho's loathing for Korea's "age of mammonism". Mindful of the selfishness they saw around them, readers warmed to Yi's

description of China's "new socialist man" who desired to "serve the people" first (1974:78-9). Yi's account of Chinese economic development purported to show the positive benefits accruing to countries that did not submit to American or Japanese economic "exploitation". All this sharply contrasted with the official view of China as a

discontented mass of starving people, awaiting their first opportunity to overthrow the government.

True to Korean tradition (and typical of all countries where political repression prevails) Yi made effective use of allegory. His portrayal of American rapacity in Vietnam

deeply influenced the anti-Americanism of the 1980s. 16/

Among young people and those describing themselves as

progressive-minded, many "confessed that after reading Yi's work [they] were greatly shocked and felt 'born again'" (Kim Chae-myong 1989:333). The largely conservative older generation, by contrast, took the view that "under the

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cause of Kim Il-sung. In other words, it gives aid and comfort to the enemy." Moreover, many considered Yi a "red" fppalaaenai) or "a ringleader of the consciousness-raising [movement]" (Kim Chae-myong 1989:333-335).

The mid-1970s until the Kwangju uprising of May 1980

thus laid the foundations for the popularization (especially of the young) of progressive thought and anti-Americanism. To what degree student activists in the 1970s were anti- American is not clear. What is certain is that student activists joined leading opposition figures in appealing to

the United States for support in their efforts to restore

democracy. 1 7 / Certainly, many remained highly skeptical of Carter's commitment to human rights; criticism of Washington's policy, perhaps to Carter's surprise, had not abated with the end of the Ford administration (and its much

lower human-rights profile). Still, for the most part, students seemed hopeful that Carter administration policies

would have a favorable influence on the Park regime. 1 8 /

The End of Yushin

The beginning of the end of Yushin dates from October

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1979, with opposition party leader Kim Young-sam's expulsion from the National Assembly. On September 15, 1979, Kim called on the United States to bring the full weight of its influence to bear on the Park regime. "The time has come", he told the New York Times. "for the United States to make a clear choice between a basically dictatorial regime, increasingly alienated from the people, and the majority who

aspire to democracy". Kim also angrily criticized Carter for his June state visit to Seoul, claiming that Carter "gave Park the courage to wipe out the opposition by boosting his [Park's] prestige here" (New York Times. September 16, 1979:17). Reflecting the views of most anti-government

activists, Kim did not praise any of Carter's actions during the visit, not even Carter's call on the Park regime to release its political prisoners. Instead, he stated that the United States had an obligation to strive more forcefully for democratic change in South Korea.

Whenever I tell American officials that only by public and direct pressure on Park can the U.S. bring him under control, they say that they cannot interfere in the domestic politics of South Korea. This is a phoney theory. Doesn't the U.S. have 30,000 ground troops here to protect us? What is that if not interference in domestic affairs?

The government was furious. Besides expelling Kim on October 4, 1979, the ruling Democratic Republican Party

denounced him as having displayed servility before the great power (Chang Ul-pyong 1988:111). "[Kim's] interview did not 182

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. display the dignity [that we should expect] from a politician of an independent country; [it] harms the

country. [His action] should be punished in the name of Korean history and people" (Yi Sang-wu 1987:207). The deeply wounded Park regime now sought to protect its legitimacy through an impassioned appeal to national dignity and self- reliance. In a formal reply issued by Kim Young-Sam's party, the case for benevolent but forceful U.S. "interference" in

South Korean affairs was restated. This time, however, the much desired U.S. "interference" was referred to as support:

Party Chairman Kim Young-Sam's interview with the New York Times is part of the Korean people's opinion which correctly reflects the nature of Korean-American relations, past, present and future, and is never a question of "sadaeiu'ui". The reason why Chairman Kim told the New York Times correspondent that Carter didn't exercise strong pressure on Park's regime was that the United States was Korea's best friend and has no political and territorial designs on Korea... Is serving one's own country a case of "sadaeiu'ui?" Was it "sadaeiu'ui" when the Yi Dynasty asked [China's] Ming Dynasty to help Korea repel the Japanese invader, when the United States received French military aid during the War of Independence, and recently, during the Korean War, when more than 10 countries including the United States, fought for Korean democracy? [We] can not regard requests for foreign support extended on behalf of national interests or security rather than personal interests as an example of "sadaeiu'ui" (Yi Sang-wu 1986a:205).

This time the government and opposition had switched

positions. The government posed as the protector of national dignity, while the opposition echoed the long-standing

government view that foreign support in service of national 183

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. interests was not sadaeiu'ui at all. Moreover, the opposition reminded the government that the United States was a benign power that could be depended upon to support Korean interests. Since this had been the government line all along, it was difficult to rebut.

As if to confirm Kim's optimistic expectations, Washington recalled Ambassador William Gleysteen from Seoul on October 5. This was the first ambassadorial recall since 1958. Soon thereafter, in Kim Young-sam's political strongholds, Pusan and Masan, thousands of college students

and civilians joined in demonstrations against the regime. In response. Park declared martial law in the two cities. On October 26, 1979, Park was assassinated by his long-time associate, KCIA director Kim Chae-kyu, ending 18 years of Park's presidential rule.

Rumors abounded at first that the U.S. CIA had had a hand in the assassination. This was not surprising, given Korean perceptions of U.S. omnipotence, the confusion and

shock accompanying Park's violent death, and the politically repressive domestic environment which encouraged rumors.

Those who credited rumors of CIA involvement noted that

U.S.-Korean relations were at their lowest ebb and that the U.S. had "bugged" the Korean presidential residence, the Blue House. Moreover, the United States was allegedly working behind the scenes to derail Park's nuclear program

Cho Kap-chae 1989b:227-8). Finally, immediately after Park's

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taken very seriously. Had they been believed, it is highly doubtful that the United States could have escaped the wrath of millions of Korean citizens. Nor is it conceivable that, such violent suspicions, if truly credible, would have faded from memory, as they did in the weeks and months that followed. In short, the rumors that circulated at the time of Park's death appear to have been casually made and casually forgotten.

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1. For example, in April 1974, a small group of dissident students was targeted under Emergency Measure No. 4. The KCIA director announced that students belonging to the underground organization Chong'auk Minnu Chunanvon Haksaena Chonavonmaena [National League for Democratic Youth and Students] had attempted to overthrow the government and establish in its place a government of peasants and workers. Behind this organization, the government alleged.- were South Korean communists (remnants of the banned People's Revolutionary Party) and Korean Japanese communists loyal to Pyongyang. The investigation led to the interrogation of 1,024 persons. Among them, 253 were sent to the military court and 54 were convicted of crimes (Dong-A Ilbo. April 25, 1974). The military high Court of Justice handed 27 core members sentences ranging from death to 12 years. From the outset rumors circulated that this CMCHC incident was fabricated on the basis of forced confessions. This perspective gained credibility when just 10 months later, (February 1975) the government began quietly to release those previously sentenced to stiff sentences except for those who the government claimed were PRP members; they were executed. 2. Indeed, whereas Park had confined political legitimacy to governments practicing "nationalist democracy" in the 1960s, his new political philosophy tolerated all manner of infringements upon the powers of institutions and individuals as long as it served the causes of reunification and economic development. 3. For example. Former President Yun Bo-sun and other noted political figures were among the founders of Miniu Hoebok Kukmin Hoe'ui [National Conference for Recovering Democracy]. Former student activists organized Miniu Chongnvon Hvop'uihoe [Committee for Democratic Youth]. Fired journalists formed Chavu Olon Suho Tuchaeng Wiwonhoe [Struggle Committee for the Defense of a Free Press] . Dissident writers organized Chavu Shilchon Munin Hvop'uihoe [Association of Free Writers]. Expelled professors formed the Haeiik Kvosu Hvop'uihoe [Committee for Expelled Professors].

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4. Professor Yang Dong-an, for example, proposed that South Korea develop its own nuclear weapons industry (Yang Dong-an 1977:78). Reliable news sources indicated that Park was doing just that (Cho Kap-chae 1988:228; New York Times. November 2, 1978:65). Publicly, meanwhile. Park indicated plans for boosting development of Korea's small arms industry. 5. When Seoul learned of Vice President Walter Nondale's planned trip to Japan in January 1977, it requested that he stop over in South Korea. Carter rejected turned down the request, apparently in a continuing effort to keep Park at arm's length. 6. (Park Yong-hon 1985:223) . The poll suggests that up until the early 1970s, at least, there was a national consensus in favor of high growth rates and that questions of economic justice were a lesser priority.

7. Government-controlled newspapers at the time buried the story on the backpages, omitting mention of the cause of Chon's suicide. Standing outside his sweatshop. Chon had demanded " 1) a reduction of work hours from 16 to 9, 2) institution of 4 rest days a month [Sundays off], 3) giving special bonuses for night shift workers, 4) raising salaries for apprentices, 5) improving working conditions, and giving workers medical checkups once a year." When Chon's protest was disrupted, he shouted "obey labor laws", "we are not machinery", and "let us rest on Sunday" (Moon Il-chul 1986:111) before dousing himself with gasoline and setting himself on fire.

8. Moon (1985:1) defines the miniunq as "those who are oppressed politically, exploited economically, alienated socially, and kept uneducated in cultural and intellectual matters". From Moon's theological perspective, the Korean miniunq are poised not only for a dynamic new role in Korean history, but in world history as well. "The axis of Christianity", he writes in his preface, "is moving from the West to the East" (1985:v). This millenarian outlook is discernible in most writings about the miniunq. whether Christian or Marxist in orientation.

9. Yu's stay at college was interrupted by three year's military service. In 1985, he appealed his conviction on charges of fomenting violence on campus. His petition letter to the court of appeals is reprinted in Hwang Ui-bong 1986:267-8).

10. Domestic beer is an expensive drink in South Korea, costing more than domestic hard liquor.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11. (Han Wan-sang 1984:34-6). For an unsympathetic view see Anonymous (1986:36). 12. (Ku Bom-mo 1988:238). These clubs introduced students to the kind of intellectual stimulation and exchange of views that was missing from the classrooms. Because of certain constraints imposed by the university system, students often found themselves opting for departments that had little appeal to them. According to a recent survey, 54.1 percent of Seoul National University freshman said they chose their major without considering their talents and interests. See Yi Sang-an (1986:359). Once they were in a department, it was almost impossible for them to change their major. For these reasons, many students were highly dissatisfied with their formal academic life. 13. It should be noted, however, that my appraisal of Yi's importance is not based on these confessions alone. Of greater significance are frequent scholarly citations of his works and my personal recollections during the late 1970s, while a university undergraduate. 14. In February 1961, just months before Park's coup, one observer suggested that the Kennedy administration was losing interest in Korea because it was looking more and more like "an insecure investment". He concluded that only officials with "a high level of intelligence" could persuade Kennedy's "brilliant" and "logical" brain-trusters to continue support. Typical of Korean analysis at the time, there was little talk of sinister machinations by Washington. The greatest fear, apparently, was the prospect of abandonment by the United States (Choe Ki-il 1961:100).

15. Note, however, the KCIA Director's announcement in October 1979 concerning the discovery of a "Preparation Committee for the South Korean National Liberation Front". According to the director, they planned to launch urban guerrilla against the government, establishing a communist government in its place (Saegae Press eds. 1986:103). Although it is difficult to gauge the truth of these allegations, it is clear that, whether communist or not, the organization was isolated, lacking any demonstrable contacts with worker and peasant organizations (Chung Dong-hwa 1988:269). 16. To name just two of many examples. Moon Bu-shik and Kim Un-suk, the arsonists of the U.S. cultural center at Pusan in March 1982, acknowledged that they had "strengthened their anti-Americanism through comparative studies of Korea and Vietnam" based upon Yi's work (So Chong-sok 1988:605).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17. Former President and leading opposition figure Yun Bo-sun, for example, stressed the importance of U.S. pressure on Park, noting that "We are struggling to restore many of the values Americans champion" (New York Times. March 7, 1977:5)

18. An anonymous dissident was quoted as saying, "with Carter talking human rights. Park doesn't dare arrest all of us. It would mean another whole year of embarrassing sham trials (New York Times. April 10, 1977:10).

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THE RISE OF RADICAL ANTI - AMERICANISM IN THE 19808

The Kwangju Uprising: National Trauma

Considered ruthless by many, Park Chung-hee was

nonetheless widely believed to have acted on the basis of national rather than personal interests. His assassination stunned and saddened the population, even those who had

strongly opposed him (Rhee 1989:30). But in the weeks that followed, the national mood grew hopeful once again. The Yushin regime, after all, had been closely associated with Park's personal rule and Park's death thus seemed to

spell the end of Yushin. On November 9, acting president

Choi Kyu-hah announced that elections by electoral college would be held to select an interim president. The announcement touched off some demonstrations but most

remained optimistic. Opposition politicians who had been barred from politics under the Yushin regime regained their legal rights to participate. Debate on constitutional change

became heated. It seemed that "politics" had returned. Dark clouds soon gathered, however, over the budding

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. democratic climate that was later dubbed "the spring of Seoul". December 12, 1979, just one week after President Choi Kyu-hah's election by electoral college, rebellious

junior officers led by Major General Chun Doo-hwan arrested Martial Law Commander-in-Chief Chung Seung-hwa. These junior members, including Chun, Roh Tae-woo, Chung Ho-yung, came from northern Kyongsang Province, as had their patron Park Chung-hee. Under Park's tutelage, they had been promoted

more rapidly than their colleagues, and had been entrusted with important military posts. As the "politicized" beneficiaries of the Yushin regime, they were not eager to destroy it.

The self-described "new military" forces had seized control of the government, but they lacked a pretext to rule directly. Signs of their influence were not hard to find, however. For example, later that month. President Choi announced that democratic elections would be postponed until

1981 and that revisions of the Yushin Constitution could

begin in 1980— barring unforeseen developments. After prolonged repression of all anti-government and labor activities, dissident forces were not prepared to wait so long. Student demonstrations soon spread to all parts of the country in defiance of martial law. Shouting slogans that recalled the April 19 Uprising of 20 years before, the students demanded a return to democracy and the dismissal of

professors who had ties to the former Yushin regime. Many

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. handbills and campus wall posters even called for the dismantling of "comprador capitalism" and the redistribution of wealth, recalling the more radical phase of the student

movement of 1960-1961 (Richardson 1980a:9) . Labor demonstrations erupted as well. From April 21-24, 1980, in

Kangwon province, some 700 miners protested against low wages and government control of labor unions. The protest ended in violent rioting.

On May 14, 50,000 students gathered to demand the resignation of now Lt. General Chun Doo-hwan, whose appointment as KCIA director on April 14 had aroused strong

protest throughout the country and in the United States. 1/ Faced with the largest demonstration in 15 years, the Choi

government appealed for restraint. Two days later, students called off further demonstrations. But by then it was too late. The following day. May 17, the government closed all universities, extended martial law throughout the country,

and arrested prominent members of the opposition including Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil. Chairman of the opposition

New Democratic Party, Kim Young-sam, was placed under house arrest.

The moves were justified on the grounds of "North Korean maneuvers and nationwide unrest" (Hwang Sok-Young 1985:33). But in an unusual step, the State Department issued a statement flatly contradicting South Korean assertions of abnormal movements by North Korean forces

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (Backgrounder 1989:12). On May 18, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke warned the Korean Ambassador to the United States, Kim Yong-shik, that the latest crackdowns jeopardized bilateral relations (Backgrounder 1989:14). If the Korean military leadership was concerned about Korean-U.S. relations, they had much more reason to fear the consequences of worsening relations with the frustrated citizens of Cholla province. Kim Dae-jung was Cholla province's "favorite son". Once again, as in 1976-1979, his constituents learned of his imprisonment at the hands of a Kyongsang province general (who headed yet another Kyongsang province-dominated government). On the morning of May 18, in front of Kwangju city's Chonnam University, about 200-3 00 students confronted the small special forces (paramilitary) unit which had occupied the campus (McBeth 1989). Standing face-to-face with this unit, students chanted slogans like

"Get rid of martial law" "Out with Chun Doo-hwan", and "Reopen the campus" (Hwang Sok-young 1985:36). The confrontation grew heated. The paratroopers began to attack students with clubs (1985:36). Those who escaped to the

center of the city regrouped, chanting "Mr. Kim Dae-Jung has been arrested" and "Chun Doo-hwan has launched a military coup". Crowds gathered around them, deeply disturbed (1985:37). At first, citizens of this city of 800,000 were reluctant to join the student demonstration.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. But when the paratroopers arrived, wielding clubs and beating students brutally over the head with them, many

citizens became enraged. One elderly man who witnessed the crackdown is said to have exclaimed "How can they do that? I have seen horrible policemen during Japanese rule and communists during the Korean war, but I have never seen guys

who kill people in such a brutal manner. Why do they do that to innocent students? Even if the students were guilty of something, the paratroopers can't do that to them. They are

not the national military. They are devils wearing human masks" (1985:51). From May 19, what had been a demonstration turned into a city-wide uprising. Thousands of angry citizens poured into the streets, many of them searching for hoes, sticks, and shovels, anything that could be used to combat the paratroopers. Several self-proclaimed leaders emerged to boost the morale of demonstrators and to encourage

sympathizers to join. Among them, Chun Choon-shim [also known as Chun Ok-ju] played a noteworthy role. She broadcast

slogans to the gathering, saying "I am not a communist; I am not a rebel; I am only one of Kwangju's decent citizens. We

can no longer watch innocent students and citizens die. Let us rise up! Let us save the students! Let us overcome martial law armies and defend Kwangju!" (1985:69).

On the afternoon of May 20, paratroopers began to open fire on demonstrators. Chun Choon-shim appealed to the

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our bare fists, but we must win." "The paratroopers are killing our brothers" (1985:102). Demonstrators began to arm

with rifles, securing about 5,400 in raids on police stations. By May 21, the angry crowd had swelled to an estimated 200,000. After suffering the heaviest casualties since the conflict began, protestors successfully stormed government headquarters. That day, the special forces units

withdrew from the city (1985:170). An entire city had fallen into the hands of demonstrators. Although encouraged by their surprising victory, many residents were growing nervous in the face of almost complete military-imposed isolation from the rest of the country. Somehow they learned that two U.S. aircraft carriers had docked at Pusan port.

Under such chaotic conditions some were all too willing to believe that the United States had come to check the ruthless brutality of Chun Doo-hwan's forces (Yun Tae-won 1990:218).

The following day. May 22, citizens had formed the

"Committee of Citizens and Students of the May 18 Uprising". Unable to present unified demands to the government, the committee soon split into two groups. The first, consisting of older residents, presented moderate demands that they

believed the government could accept. They demanded a

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promised to lay down their weapons. The second group, consisting mainly of students, was in no mood for

compromise. Adding to the demands made by the older

residents, the students called for the resignation of the Choi Kyu-hah government and the establishment of an interim government led by democratic forces (presumably to be led by Kim Dae-jung). Undoubtedly aware that these demands would be

rejected, the group further insisted that Lt. General Chun be arrested and tried for murder (Hwang Sok-young 1985:172- 178,202-3). As expected, the government did not yield to the students. But neither did it offer any words of encouragement to the moderates.

Frustrated by the stalemate, students on May 2 6 requested mediation by U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen Jr.

Ambassador Gleysteen turned down the request, believing

that, in the words of the State Department, "such a role was inappropriate for the U.S. Ambassador and would not be accepted by the ROK authorities" (Backgrounder 1989:21). On May 27, the Special Forces units returned this time disguised in regular army uniforms (1989:22). They were

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Division, regular army units trained in riot control, who did most of the work of restoring order. These troops had

been withdrawn from U.N. command for this purpose. (Later, as we shall see, many Koreans would come to bitterly criticise the United States for allegedly "approving" the

release of these troops). 2 / A small number of troops from the 31st division were also involved. According to the

Martial Law command, Kwangju had been recaptured at the cost of 3 0 civilian lives. The 10-day confrontation ended with 192 civilian casualties (McBeth 1989).

Chun's Consolidation of Power

In the course of less than 10 months following the December 12, 1979 military takeover, one-star general Chun Doo-hwan promoted himself to the rank of four-star general and retired from the army. On September 1, 1980, he was

inaugurated as 11th president of South Korea, having been indirectly elected through a military-controlled electoral college. Like Park, Chun pledged to develop a Korean-style democracy, to promote the general welfare, to foster a new generation of leadership, and to revive the national and civic spirit. Also familiar was Chun's pledge to root out

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. corruption, factionalism and laziness in public life. He also pledged for South Korea "the realization of a society based on justice" fchuna'ui sahoe auhvun). Unlike Park,

however, Chun acknowledged that "the days when an individual or a small group of leaders could shape the course of history are gone" (Nahm 1988:471).

Times had certainly changed. The median age of the

population was 21.8 years in 1980. Students in their teens and twenties had not experienced invasion by North Korea, but they had directly encountered the brutality of their own country's martial law troops. They had repeatedly learned to

value democracy, yet what they witnessed made some cynical, and others impatient.

Chun had correctly perceived that it would be difficult for him to acquire the stature of his predecessor. Unlike Park Chung-hee, who had attended one of the country's best teacher's colleges and who had graduated with honor in

a military academy, Chun had an undistinguishea*ac'ademic record. He had neither the personal trappings of legitimacy

nor a political program that could capture widespread popular support. While some citizens, especially the older and rural segments of the population, welcomed a strong hand, Chun was largely estranged from the well-educated, young, and urban citizenry. His brutal suppression of the

Kwangju uprising only confirmed his image as a military dictator rather than political leader. 3/

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the United States strongly supported his leadership. In July

1980, for example, Chun conducted a sweeping crackdown on South Korea's print media. When it was over, 172 periodicals had been shut down and about 10 percent of all journalists found themselves without jobs (Richardson 1980b:16). On August 8 and 9, the newly purged newspapers carried the same headlines, announcing that a high-ranking U.S. military

official had expressed U.S. support for Chun Doo-hwan. The Dona-A Ilbo (Korean edition) article, based on a Los Angeles Times story of the previous day, was typical of all the rest:

The Los Angeles Times of [August] 8, quoted a high- ranking U.S. military source in Seoul as saying that General Chun Doo-hwan will surely gain wide support from [the Korean] people. This newspaper reported that Koreans from all walks of life, who are now expecting strong leadership, are following Gen. Chun's guidance. A high-ranking U.S. military source said that the US, which regards peace and security as vital on the Korean peninsula, considers Korean security and domestic stability a higher priority than domestic political development. A high-ranking U.S. military source said that the relationship between the Korean military, including Gen. Chun Doo-hwan, and high-ranking U.S. military officers is wonderful— better than ever before.... On the other hand, the U.S. State Department ... said that Koreans themselves will decide who becomes president of Korea and how democratic development proceeds. The State Department further noted that present Korean-American relations in the fields of politics, economics and security, etc are very, very normal and friendly.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. But neither the Dona-A Ilbo nor any other Korean

newspaper mentioned the official's [Wickham's] qualification that Chun must first come to power legimately; nor did they include the State Department view that Chun Doo-hwan "is

not, at least yet, demonstrating that he has broad-based support" (Richardson 1980) . This was not the first time, nor would it be the last, that official positions of the United States would be misrepresented by the government-controlled

press. 4 /

U.S. Policy and the Rise of Anti-American Sentiment After Kwangju

In part at least, the growing anti-Americanism in South Korea could be blamed on the government-controlled

press. But press distortions could have only limited effect among people who had strong positive convictions about U.S. intentions. Resentment against the United States had already been building from the year before. Opposition figures

openly and bitterly denounced President Carter's official trip to South Korea. Five months later, rumors circulated

that the United States had backed Chun's December 12 seizure of power. The United States vehemently denied the charge, pointing out that it had angrily objected when Korean

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. generals withdrew some military units under Korean-U.S. joint command without proper notification. 5/ Opposition leaders also criticized the Carter Administration for failing to stand by its human rights policy, which had become muted as a consequence of heightened strategic concerns. With the revolution in Iran in the spring of 1979, the United States lost a major ally in the Middle East. Then, in December, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. These developments led Carter to reassert the primacy of geopolitical considerations (Smith 1981:181-2). Yet the worst that could be said about Carter's policy toward Korea after 1979 is that it was essentially more in

line with the policies of earlier U.S. administrations. The

U.S. government, from the time of the Korean war onward, had committed itself unconditionally to the defense of South Korea from North Korean attack. Since that time, it had never once threatened to use its ultimate card, its troop

presence, because no U.S. administration had ever deemed that such a threat, if acted upon, would serve either the interests of the United States or the Korean people. Hence,

during the many uprisings and demonstrations in South Korea, the United States had always weighed its words carefully. Even during the April 19 uprising, the United States had reacted with caution. It did not take a public position at first for fear of worsening the instability. Then, when it

became clear that the Rhee government had already set the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. worst turmoil in motion, the United States felt free to hasten the process along. 6/ In fact, the highly-praised U.S. role in the April 19 uprising did not constitute a break with the past. The United States was prepared to encourage democracy whenever possible, but not at the cost of violent domestic upheaval. Moreover, most officials were convinced that public criticism only antagonized the offending government, without bringing the desired changes. Washington was prepared to exert what pressure it could to promote democracy, economic, political, or otherwise, but only a minority opinion in government held out the desirability of troop withdrawal (Reischauer 1974).

What, then, accounts for the rise in anti-Americanism after Kwangju? During the April 19 uprising, the balance of forces between government and opposition had shifted in favor of the latter. The United States was thus free and more important, capable. of exerting decisive pressures on

Rhee to step down. During the Kwangju uprising, the United States had no such capability. Power weighed heavily in

Chun's favor. Moveover, the United States was in the difficult position of attempting to advance democratic

processes in South Korea without appearing to take sides and add fuel to an already inflammatory situation. As we have already seen. South Koreans had, for decades, alternated between tendencies to criticize

themselves bitterly for perceived national shortcomings and

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. tendencies to blame the United States for these same shortcomings. But in the aftermath of Kwangju, temptations to blame the United States grew stronger. First, the massacre of civilians at Kwangju had been a national disgrace, provoking shame and anguish among most Koreans.

Second, the opposition had proven incapable of defeating government forces. The humiliation of defeat, and the shock of Korean soldiers killing their own people, could be easier to bear if the United States could be made to share the

blame. Third, the shame of continued psychological,

political and military dependence on the United States had grown with South Korea's rising status in the world economy. Radicals, in particular, wondered how Koreans could tolerate this continued dependence on the United States if Washington did not even serve Korean interests. Others did not go so far, stressing instead the vital role that the United States

continued to play in South Korean security.

For the duration of his term of office Carter continued to maintain a "cool and aloof" public stance

toward Chun Doo-hwan (. Backgrounder 1989:22). After the suppression of the Kwangju uprising, the Carter

administration decided indicate its displeasure and exert

pressure by: 1) postponing indefinitely a scheduled investment mission by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 2) postponing decisions on two international agency loans to South Korea, and 3) postponing

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a routine policy planning meeting between U.S. and South Korean diplomatic officials. Despite assertions to the contrary, the Eximbank delegation was allowed to go to South

Korea, not to shore up the Chun regime, but to "prevent undue concern in banking circles in Seoul that could have further undermined the economy" (New York Times. June 13, 1980) 7/. Despite these initiatives. Carter was not popular.

Opposition figures had to take care not to appear as sadaeiu'uiia by singing American praises. Nor were they in any mood to praise the Carter administration, whose policies never seemed decisive enough to them. One initiative appeared undercut by another. Moreover, the opposition was ashamed of its own weakness, its failure to convince Washington that the balance of power was shifting in their

favor, and that all Washington had to do was apply a little pressure. Sometimes this shame came closer to the surface.

"Do they [U.S. officials] mean that only first class citizens like Americans can enjoy human rights?" asked Kim Dae-jung rhetorically (Shim Jae-hoon 1979:29).

As President Ronald Reagan took office, U.S.-South Korean relations had been under tremendous strains. The

Carter administration had been unable to secure the release of imprisoned Kim Dae-jung, nor even the commutation of his death sentence. Opposition leader Kim Young-sam remained

under house arrest. Security consultations between the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. United States and South Korea, suspended since the December 12 military takeover, had not been resumed. All this changed

in short order following Reagan's accession to office. The new administration apparently raised only one serious objection to Chun's record on democracy and human rights in

South Korea: his treatment of Kim Dae-jung. By contrast, Chun faced several hurdles in his relations with the Carter administration. It is ironic, if also instructive, that the Reagan administration was able to gain more concessions from Chun despite (and because of) its lesser interest in promoting human rights around the world. 8/ On February 2, 1981, President Chun became the first foreign head of state to visit the Reagan White House. On the eve of his visit, Chun announced the commutation of Kim Dae-jung's death sentence to life imprisonment. Six months later Kim was released from prison. This action removed the major obstacle to normalized relations between the United States and South Korea. Over the next several years, both sides chose to emphasize their common strategic interests

and to downplay differences— including differences over

human rights in Korea. 9/

Kwangju Aftermath: From Anti-American Sentiment to Anti-

Americanism

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Kwangju represented a classic case of a precipitating event (Toch 1965:170). It prompted fundamental reassessments not only about the regime but about the value of bourgeois democracy as well (Park Chan-hee 1986:264). It plunged many activists into a debilitating but shared grief (Cottam

1984:43). When they had recovered, the students found themselves more emotionally drawn to one another than ever before. The following personal recollection sums up the lessons that many activists at SNU drew from the Kwangju massacre. The student graduated from Seoul National

University in the early 198 0s.

After the Kwangju massacre of 1980, student activists engaged in profound self-reflection. They felt helpless after witnessing the miserable crumbling of their power in the face of the tremendous violence of military dictatorship. Most student activists were disoriented. They fell into a stupor and had no energy to do anything. When they finally recovered, student activists shared some lessons. First, our goal must no longer be democratic "reform" but "fundamental change." If the [military dictatorial governments] uses tremendous physical and institutional violence to maintain a social structure rife with contradictions, we cannot make up or compromise with them. Not only is it necessary for individuals to sacrifice themselves to the cause of "fundamental reform", but democratic activists as a whole require strong mass organizations, dedicated front organizations, and scientific ideology for fundamental change to maintain this movement. This was the second lesson. The third lesson relates to America. At the end of the Kwangju massacre, we students confirmed that the United States is not on our side. It was on their [the military's] side (Ho Mun- young 1989:559).

The former student's recollections vividly illustrate

how student activists were further radicalized in the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. aftermath of Kwangju. The government proved itself unwilling to compromise. It had quashed the uprising with great force. Under such conditions it was not difficult to understand how some students quickly drew new mental boundaries that

divided people— and governments— into either/or categories of friends and enemies.

Probably the first public expression of the new anti- Americanism came at a demonstration of some 500 Kyunghee University students on September 10, 1980. According to a statement issued by the Kyunghee University democratic student league that day:

The United States, which claims to be a 3 0-year old friend of South Korea, was actually an accomplice of those who massacred democratic citizens by allowing troops under joint US-ROK command to be sent to Kwangju. It is deplorable that some Americans make ridiculous statements suggesting that Koreans support the Chun regime. If the United States, which claims to love freedom and peace, human rights diplomacy and moral politics, supports the Chun regime, the United States can no longer be the friend of Koreans. The United States will also be condemned by the international community. The United States has to end its support for the Chun regime and become once again [emphasis added] thetrue friend of Koreans, exerting efforts on behalf of Korean democratization (Yi Sang-wu 1988:469).

This crystallization of anti-American sentiment was accompanied by a shared sense of shame that Koreans could kill Koreans, followed by anger toward all symbols of brutality and hypocrisy. The following is the court

statement by Moon Bu-shik, one of 16 charged with arson of the U.S. Cultural Center in Pusan in March 1982. 207

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. If there had been no Kwangju massacre I would not have been here. As a Christian, I could not just look on as a bystander [after learning of] the brutal massacre of my own people. When the so-called Christian leaders at their breakfast prayer meetings prayed for the bloodthirsty felon [Chun] calling him "the leader from Heaven", that crazy dictator...[testimony interrupted by the judge asking Moon to show restraint]. After Kwangju...I thought about why the Kwangju massacre happened, and thought I should find out who was responsible for it... The military brutally massacred even children and elders shouting for democracy with weapons purchased with people's tax money; and massacred them with even more brutality than was shown during the Korean war... The United States also has tremendous responsibility for the Kwangju massacre. I thought that the United States, as a friendly, free, democratic country, had stayed in Korea for the development of Korea. [But] the United States has supported any regime since Yushin which claims to anti-Communist. The United States should have prevented the December 12 incident [coup] and the Kwangju incident... The arson attack was a Korean warning to the United States, which has supported any regime claiming to be anti-Communist. The arson attack arose from the Korean conscience, which asked who is responsible for the Kwangju incident, and to show the yearning for democracy... (Committee for Justice and Peace 1982:58- 9) .

From this account we see that Moon had seemed to place more trust in the benevolence of the United States than in his

own government. In the emotionally charged atmosphere, the widespread

belief that the United States supported any anti-Communist regime became extremely damaging. As Heider (1958) notes, the more antagonistic one feels toward two enemies, the more likely it will seem that they are cooperating with each other. One anti-American college student who occupied the

U.S. Cultural Center noted this connection.

208

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Not only did the U.S. know about the Kwangju massacre because the U.S. has a broad and precise intelligence network, but also the coup forces, lacking domestic support and heavily dependent on the United States, could not have terrorized [the population] so much without first consulting the United States. This was proved by the following: as soon as Chun Doo Hwan was inaugurated, he was invited as the first foreign head of state to visit the United States (Anonymous 1985b:99). 1 1 /

Political repression had long made South Korea fertile ground for all sorts of rumors and conspiracy theories. Most were of little consequence. With the trauma of Kwangju came the birth of a big myth— the myth of a grand conspiracy between Washington and Seoul that aimed to repress Korean

aspirations for democracy. 1 2 / Students proved among the most susceptible. They had many opportunities to exchange

views in small, confidential groups. They had had direct confrontations with martial law forces. The relatively few demands of academic life gave them opportunities to reflect on the humiliation of past events. The more they reflected

on the government's seeming contempt for its own people, the more they ascribed the same contempt to America's official conduct during the crisis. The shock of Kwangju gave

"momentum to the rapid decline of American charisma, myths and moral dignity" (Chang Dal-chong 1988:409). As we shall see, anti-American views gradually shifted from criticisms of American inaction to charges of outright and deliberate

American complicity.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. V. Rise of Anti-American Ideology

Because as students they felt themselves morally obligated to save the nation, the ignominy of past defeat was harder to bear. It was necessary to come up with an explanation for defeat and a new program for action. Of all the theories available to students, none seemed more appealing and more suitable than Leninism. But before we consider student debates about the nature of the Kwangju uprising and prescriptions for social

protest, let us examine a work that was published one year after the Kwangju uprising, a work that would profoundly influence anti-American students in the years to come.

The Revisionist Appeal; Bruce Cumings and the Search for a New Mythology

As noted earlier, the study of Korean history was

complicated even more by the increased repression of Park's later years. Many crucial subjects were virtually taboo. The nature of the independence movement in the 1920s and 1930s could be studied only within carefully proscribed limits. The critical role of socialist and communist nationalists

had to be downplayed or disparaged, despite their conspicuous role as anti-Japanese guerilla fighters.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. similarly the scope of communist activities and popular sympathies might cast doubt on the legitimacy of the anti

communist governments. 13/ The U.S. role in the division of

Korea was acknowledged but not scrutinized; most of the blame was reserved for Joseph Stalin. From the mid-1970s, students who had read revisionist interpretations of modern history in other countries were eager for a study that applied this approach to their own

country. But political repression made information-gathering difficult and publication of revisionist views highly risky. Then, in 1981, came the publication of The Origins of the Korean War by American political scientist Bruce

Cumings. Cumings did what most Korean scholars did not dare to do: using recently declassified U.S. documents, Cumings challenged the prevailing assumption that the Korean War was a war of international communist aggression against South Korea. To Cumings, the Korean war was a civil war. Its roots

could be traced to the social, political and economic

contradictions inherent in Korean society. Cuming's views also corroborated the works of Yi

Young-hee. Like Yi, Cumings showed how the United States supported right-wing and anti-nationalist elements to secure its strategic interests. Instead of cooperating with the people's committees, an indigenous organization popular with the people, the AMG took the highly unpopular decision to

support hated collaborators and members of the former

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. colonial police force. Cuming's contrasted this policy with progressive policies pursued by the Soviets in the north. Especially compelling to young South Korean readers was Cuming's depiction of the U.S. military as an occupying rather than a liberating force (1981:126).

Cumings' work argued, cogently and persuasively, that American support for reactionaries in Korea had not been the product of "indirection" as Henderson (1968:135-136,147) had supposed, but of design. The United States, like its counterpart, the Soviet Union, was not motivated primarily by the interests of Koreans, but by its own interests. South Korea was important to the United States only as "a bulwark against communism" (1981:439). 14/ This view coincided with the suspicions of many sensitive students, who deeply resented what they believed was American lack of regard for their country. A typical

expression of this resentment went as follows:

The U.S. always wants to keep the status quo in Korea. Your policy led to the division of Korea, using Korea as a bulwark against communism. You will deny it, but it is quite clear to me that the United States Army sowed the seeds for the division of the peninsula. The U.S. has recognized and supported every South Korean regime, despite the embarrassment caused bv everv one of them [emphasis added]. Everyone knows that most Koreans did not want those regimes. The U.S. is not a genuine friend of Korea, concerned only with its own interests...("Letters to the editor", Sisa Nonpvonq. September 1988, p.3)

As the letter also shows, blaming the United States for the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. embarrassing condition of Korean politics enabled some citizens to escape self-blame for the persistence of autocracy in South Korea. Put in the terms of South Korean radicals, August 15, 1948 was not the date of establishment of an independent

South Korean government, but rather the date on which South Korea became the "neo-colony of the United States" (Song Kwang-sung 1989:213). Polls indicate that the majority of students had come to endorse this view by 1987, at the latest. 15/

Cumings had written a careful, scholarly account of South Korea under the American Military Government. He did

not refer either to the AMG government nor its South Korean successors as "neo-colonial fascist regimes". Nor did he portray the American occupiers as "evil men". To the

contrary, he denied that they were hypocrites, conspirators or exploiters harboring evil intentions toward the Korean people. Nevertheless, the The Origins of the Korean War implicitly endorsed a new mythology. Cumings claimed that

the Korean People's Republic and its attendant people's committees "possessed a raw appropriateness, or legitimacy, based on the records of its leaders and on its indigenous origins." (p.428). He observes that in the north, the Korean People's Republic was able to give the mass of Koreans

"much, if not all, of what liberation promised". By

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. contrast, AMG policies in the south "dashed the expectations of August 1945..." Accordingly, one must conclude that, had the superpowers not intervened, Korean leaders would have been able to set up a government that roughly corresponded to popular wishes. Cumings tantalized readers with the suggestion that Korea had been denied the promise of unified and politically efficacious leadership because of superpower intervention. He rightly pointed out that Korean socialists were nationalists who enjoyed greater legitimacy, overall, than

right-wing figures. But he also glossed over the uncomfortable facts of Korean factionalism, resistance to compromise, and the ubiquity of violence against political foes. Most of all, he obscured the fact that political power in the north and south after 1945 rested ultimately upon

organization and force of arms, not upon a popular mandate to rule.In short, Cumings' interpretation of the 1945-48

period of Korean history was largely congenial with the views of Korean radicals. For this reason, the work was banned until 1987, circulating widely nonetheless among

students and intellectuals who read it in samizdat form

(Paek and Cumings 1992:380). 16/

The Radical Debate over Strategy

214

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In the minds of the more radical student activists, Kwangju presaged the full-fledged development of urban-based

revolt against the government. Based on an incomplete study (Committee for Peace and Justice 1988:10), they concluded that as the clashes between the military and demonstrators wore on, the most ardent demonstrators had been the workers and the urban unemployed (Hwang Sok-young 1985:191). 17/

To activists, therefore, gaining middle class support was welcome, but not a top priority. Their main concern was to arouse the working-class consciousness of the minjung. To do so, they required a clear ideology and organization to

unify, discipline and mobilize people for a sustained struggle against the authorities. Leninism provided them with a "scientific ideology". Since public discussion of these ideas was impossible, each study cell circulated pamphlets, leaflets and booklets,

to interested students. Each cell hoped to establish a new orthodoxy based on its particular analysis of the situation. A dogmatic publications war ensued which did nothing to end controversy on key points of interest, but did intensify

student efforts to come up with the definitive "line". 18/ Many activists agreed that the Kwangju uprising had failed because it lacked cohesion. But they disagreed sharply over future strategy. Once again, the main factional rift was between gradualists and immediatists. A typical

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. exposition of the gradualist line was contained in "On

Criticizing Night School", published in 1982. It argued that

reckless and excessive political struggle only invited a harsh response from the government, weakening the leadership of the student movement. Instead of dissipating their strength, the students should recognize that their most

powerful contribution can be made only after graduation. Only then can they concentrate their efforts on organizing

the workers who, after all, have the actual capacity (not to mention the strong motivation) to mount a successful challenge to the government (II Song Chung 1988:227-269). Students who supported this line of thinking contended that the failure of Kwangju resulted from "the lack of

[both] unified leadership and strong grass-roots organization" Kang Shin-chol et al 1989:24). These students were "gradualists" who envisioned a protracted and phased

struggle with the state. The opposition view was adopted by the group that wrote "Prospects of the Student Movement", also published in 1982. They insisted that students must remain organized and

active in efforts for social reform. Otherwise, the momentum

for reform would be lost. This group also interpreted the lessons of Kwangju differently. They claimed that the

Kwangju uprising demonstrated "the possibility of revolution in Korea". But revolution could only take place with students as the vanguard. Therefore, student demonstrations

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. were definitely not a waste of time or talent. Although the gradualists and the immediatists

frequently used Marxist terminology, they still adhered to a hedged and shallow interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. For example, in this period, they continued to criticize the

United States for its inconsistent policies toward South

Korea. The United States was not depicted as firmly aligned with anti-democratic forces against progressives. Instead, it wavered between the two. Neither did these groups call for an anti-imperialist, anti-American struggle. They had

not yet phrased the problem in terms of Lenin's question "Who are our friends? Who are our enemies?" The United

States was not yet an implacable, imperialist foe.

The major turning point came in January 1983 with the publication of "Understanding and Prospects of Revolutionary Struggle in the 1980s" (Kang Shin-Chol et al 1989:389-418). For the first time since Kwangju, a study group had clearly

espoused an anti-imperialist, anti-American line, based upon

a combination of Marxist-Leninist and dependency analyses as well as Maoist dialectics.

First, the present phase in South Korea is basically neocolonial. South Korea's colonial nature, [the product of its] history, has the characteristics of both an economic and a military-strategic colony. In the case of Japan, [South Korea] is primarily an economic colony of Japan; in the case of the United States, [South Korea] is primarily the military- strategic colony of the United States...So the fundamental contradiction which produces all other contradictions in Korean society is the contradiction between U.S. and Japanese imperialism and the South

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Korean minjung. This [fundamental contradiction]...can be resolved only through national liberation struggle... Second, the proxy of imperialism is military fascism...So, the basic nature of the present regime dictates the outcome: anti-nationalism and anti democracy. For this reason, there is a political contradiction between the present regime and all forces yearning for democracy... Third, South Korea's stage of economic development is that of dependent state monopoly capitalism. This stage can exist under the premise of the double exploitation of the working masses (Kang Shin-chol et al 1989: 396-8).

"Understanding and Prospects" also stated that "our enemies are U.S. military imperialism and Chon's military fascist regime" (Kang Shin-chol et al 1989:390). Confronted by such powerful enemies, and in the absence of a united

front, it was only natural that the Kwangju uprising would fail. Thus it proclaimed the establishment of an "anti fascist united front" including professional revolutionaries, students, workers, intellectuals and farmers (Kang Shin-chol et al 1989:390,402). The booklet was hailed as the "highest level of movement theory at the time"

because of its "comprehensiveness" and "depth" (Kim Sung-bo 1990:96). Most important, it marked the ascendancy of the

immediatists. The 1984 booklet "Subordination and Outcry" was South Korea's next milestone in radical immediatist thought. The preface squarely blames U.S. imperialism for all of South

Korean political, economic, and social ills.

The source of all [Korean] misery and agony is

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. America. Koreans cannot escape from vexing poverty, political oppression and vulgar culture unless Koreans are liberated from the United States. The United States takes abroad all money produced by Koreans except for meager living expenses and money for the national defense, which is really for U.S. national security. America is our master and Korea's comprador regime is America's slave. The U.S. is the colonial master and [South] Korea is the neo-colony. Whenever we cry for democracy and national independence, the military mobilizes troops and blocks our repeated efforts for democratization; we only pay the price for this. But it is the Yankee U.S. Commander-in-Chief of the forces in [South] Korea who has the real power to mobilize troops. The United States is the country that rules and we are the ruled. The souls of the several thousand martyrs in Kwangju, who were killed by the U.S. puppet military dictatorial regime, are haunting the United States with the unresolved han in their hearts. ...The United States, which is the most formidable enemy of reunification, is pursuing a two-Korea policy...... The United States turned [South] Korea into a U.S. defense base in northeast Asia [and] as a forward base for invading the Asian mainland. In addition, the United States brought many nuclear weapons to Korea, with a view to conducting limited, proxy nuclear warfare. ...The fundamental contradiction in [South] Korea is between imperialism and neo-colonialism [sic]. And contradictions between comprador forces and the people arises from this fundamental contradiction. To achieve real democratization and joyful reunification we should not only fight resolutely against comprador forces but also fight against imperialist forces; we should be liberated from the United States. Let's shout loudly the slogan "Yankee go home! to the United States, which is cowardly hiding itself behind the comprador forces. Let's diligently carry out our anti-American struggle and let our anti-American cries ring out throughout the country....(Anonymous 1984rpreface).

Both "Understanding and Prospects" and "Subordination

and Outcry" evaluated the problems of Korean society and the Korean-U.S. relationship from a similar perspective. However, unlike the former booklet, "Subordination and

219

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Outcry" borrowed terms and phrases directly from North Korean propaganda. Another noteworthy feature of "Subordination and Outcry" was its frequent use of examples to support its claim of widespread U.S. interference in South Korean affairs. It claimed that the United States still worked closely with the Seoul in the preparation of the South Korean budget. In this way, Washington exercised complete

control over the South Korean economy (Anonymous 1984:33). Moreover, Washington had chosen all of South Korea's past presidents, ousting them whenever they outlived their usefulness. Accordingly, the United States tapped Park Chung-hee as a successor to the increasingly unpopular

Syngman Rhee. But when Park, too, was unable to preserve

social order, the United States removed him as well. Chun Doo-hwan had been groomed by the CIA as Park's successor

long before Park's assassination (Anonymous 1984:49-51). Also unusual was a proposal in "Subordination and Outcry" for an anti-nuclear movement as a means of promoting the anti-American movement. The anti-nuclear movement was important because, by calling attention to the destructive

power of nuclear weapons, opponents of nuclear weapons could convince the public that the United States— rather than safeguarding Korean security— actually posed a threat to it. Because the anti-nuclear movement had strong roots in many advanced industrial countries, the South Korean government

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. could not crack down so ruthlessly on the Korean counterparts of this movement (Anonymous 1984:88-90). Thus the anti-nuclear movement was advocated as a stepping stone

to a full-fledged anti-American movement. The logic of anti-Americanism expressed in both "Understanding and Prospects" and "Subordination and Outcry" correspond with earlier statements issued by the students who participated in the burning of the United States Cultural Center in Pusan in March 1982. That is, the United

States was seen as a multiple threat to South Korea: it exploited the economy, opposed democratization, thwarted reunification, and destroyed traditional Korean culture, replacing it with vulgar American culture. In the early 1980s, anti-Americanism was frequently

discussed in student activist circles. However, it attracted little apparent interest among non-activist students. Even members of the study cells were afraid to air their anti- American views publicly. For example, the burning of the

cultural centers in Kwangju and Pusan shocked even many

student activists. Stunned, they did not even circulate leaflets in the arsonists' defense. And students who occupied the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul in 1985 declared that "We are not anti-American" (So Jin-young et al

1988:159). Meanwhile, from the end of 1983, when the Chun government relaxed its controls on dissent, activists who

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. had graduated from college began to organize political groups. Most prominent among them was the Youth League for the Democratization Movement (YLDM) . The YDLM hoped to forge

a consensus among dissidents as well as a program with greater popular appeal. Their first task was to summarize the contributions of three principal lines of dissident

thought: (1) the "civil, democratic revolution" (2) the "national democratic revolution" and (3) the "people's democratic revolution". These three positions were collectively known as the "C-N-P debate".

According to the YDLM, the civil democratic revolution

considered the main contradiction of Korean society to be the conflict between the military dictatorship and the Korean miniunq (which includes everyone except reactionary elites). Their goal was to establish a bourgeois, democratic regime by civil, democratic revolution. In their view, the

interests of the military dictatorial regime and the United States do not always coincide. But when Koreans establish a

democratic government, South Korea will be in a much better position to stand up to the United States. The YDLM next summarized the position of the National

Democratic Revolution (NDR). This theory holds that the main contradiction in Korean society is between U.S. imperialism and the military dictatorial regime on the one hand, and the

miniunq and progressive students and intellectuals on the other hand. (The middle class is not grouped with the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. miniunq. ) Accordingly, they call for an anti-imperialist,

anti-fascist struggle. Finally, the People's Democratic Revolution, as summarized by the YDLM, posits a fundamental contradiction between the proletariat and bourgeoisie in Korean society.

Thus, for the PDR the first goal is to strengthen the proletariat to enable it to seize power. In the mid-1980s, when the C-N-P was in full bloom, the majority of social activists considered the NDR theory most suited to conditions in South Korea. The Civil Democratic Revolution theory was branded by many as "right- wing opportunism" while the PDR was dismissed as "left-wing adventurism" (II Song Chung eds. 1988:57-65). The NDR theory, as we have seen, was the most nationalistic, and anti-American of the three lines.

Anti-American Activities: 1980-1985

We have already noted the demonstration of Kyunghee

University students on September 10, 1980, probably the

first public expression of outrage at alleged U.S. complicity in the Kwangju massacre. Following this event,

the major anti-American activities of this period include the arson attack on the U.S. Cultural Center in Kwangju in December 1980; the arson attack on the U.S. Cultural Center

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in Pusan in March 1982; the explosion at the U.S. Cultural Center in Taegu of September 1983; the student occupation of

the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul in May 1985; the occupation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Seoul in November 1985; and the occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center in Kwangju in December 1985. The 1980 arson attack on the U.S. Cultural Center in Kwangju was led by Chung Soon-chol and Im Chong-su, both in their early twenties and both members of the Kwangju branch of the Catholic Farmers' Association. (The Farmer's Association itself was not involved in the plot; the two arsonists developed their friendship through their mutual

affiliation with this organization.) This earliest of anti- American incidents did not attract much attention at the time. No leaflets had been disseminated announcing the aims of the arsonists. Moreover, government disinformation at first indicated that the fire was accidental; following the arrests of the two men, the government characterized the incident as the work of hoodlums. In a petition letter, one of the defendants, Im, stated that his arson was intended as

a message to "all freedom- and justice-loving people of

conscience throughout the world" concerning human rights abuses in South Korea and "the solemn cause of the Kwangju Uprising." He also warned against "neo-imperialism" (Im Chong-su et al 1988:602). Although Im referred to "neo

imperialism" he did not once mention the United States by

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. name, as if fearful of openly acknowledging his hostility toward the United States. Since Im used "neo-imperialism" as an epithet, without explaining or defending it as a

political position, the arson appears to have been an expressive act motivated by anger rather than by rational calculations of political gain. Nevertheless, even as an

expressive act, the 1980 arson attack was the first incidence of deliberate attack on U.S. government facilities by South Koreans. Unlike the first incident, the second arson attack— this time against the U.S. Cultural Center in Pusan on March 18, 1982— was accompanied by concerted and simultaneous efforts to disseminate anti-American leaflets and to photograph the event as it was happening. This would ensure that the public was aware of the deliberate, political nature of the attack. The leaflets read:

"U.S.: don't treat us as a dependent country anymore. Get out of Korea [emphasis in original]. Looking back at history, we realize that the U.S. policy toward Korea since liberation has been one of continuous economic exploitation. As a so-called friendly country, the United States forced us to accommodate ourselves to its ruling logic by allying itself with domestic monopoly capital and by developing a comprador culture [in our country]. The United States has supported a fascist, military regime, which is against the yearning of the Korean people for democratization, social reform and reunification. And the United States has perpetuated the division of Korea. Now, in the belief that we Koreans must decide our future on our own, let's carry out continuous anti-American struggle to completely eliminate American power which is running amok [in Korea]. Above all, by burning the U.S. Cultural Center in Pusan, which is the symbol of U.S. culture, we will raise the torch of anti-American 225

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. struggle and will appeal to the citizens of Pusan to heighten their national consciousness... (Han Yong et al 1989:308-9).

Most of those involved in coordinating the arson and

related activities (including the 16 who were arrested) were members of study cells at Koryo Seminary in Pusan. The leader of the arsonists, Moon Bu-shik, said he learned that "to recover democracy in Korea, the foremost task is to

overcome the dependent relations between Korea and the

United States." Moon also described how the dignity of the Kwangju people had been trampled upon by the military (So Chong-sok 1988:606). The Pusan arson attack marked another turning point in the history of the student movement in the post-liberation period, because it was audacious (having taken place during the day) , well-prepared, and unstinting in its use of anti-

American rhetoric. But only a small group of Kangwon

University students openly backed the arsonists, burning a U.S. flag on campus in a show of solidarity. The rest

remained silent. The flag-burners, incidently, were promptly imprisoned for violating the National Security Law. 19/ Like

the arson incident in Kwangju, the attack in Pusan was conducted chiefly by members of one study cell and was not

coordinated with other cells. Nevertheless, the Pusan incident, which had wrought much greater damage than the 1980 arson, attracted much greater attention and support. One month later, on April 20,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Korean Christian Action Organization (KCAO) (representing 42 Christian leaders) issued a statement proclaiming that Korean perceptions of the United States had changed in the aftermath of the Kwangju massacre. Yet what

seemed to disturb members of the KCAO was not so much specific U.S. actions taken (or not taken) during the Kwangju uprising and after, but perceived U.S. insults to

Korean dignity. Thus the KCAO did not make specific recommendations to the United States concerning Kwangju (e.g. providing a full accounting of its conduct,

apologizing, etc) . Instead, it demanded the recall of U.S. Commander-in-Chief Gen. John Wickham, who had enraged Koreans in August 1980 with the remark that Korean people

were "lemmings", willing to follow any leader. It also

demanded the recall of Ambassador Richard Walker, long perceived as lukewarm to the democratic opposition in Korea.

Like Wickham, Walker raised public ire by referring to student activists as "spoiled brats" in an interview with an American newspaper fDong-A Ilbo. April 20, 1982). By urging

the recall of these two officials, the KCAO appeared to seek recognition and respect from Washington for the dignity of

the Korean democratic opposition and the Korean people as a

whole. Unlike the Kwangju and Pusan arson incidents, the

occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul on May 22, 1985 did not involve much destruction of property. Instead

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of chanting anti-imperialist slogans, the occupiers chanted "Down with Chun Doo-hwan, who is responsible for the Kwangju massacre!" "U.S.: Admit Your Responsibility for the Kwangju Massacre and Publicly Apologize!" (Han Yong et al 1989:347). This demonstration was conducted and organized by the Struggle Committee for National Reunification,

Democratization, and People's Liberation— popularly known by its abbreviated name, Sanmintu) which was under the umbrella

organization National Federation of Student Associations — popularly know as Chonhaknvon). 20/ The occupation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Seoul on November 4, 1985 was noteworthy because it involved economic rather than political grievances. It occurred just as South Korea was coming under increasing pressure from

Washington to open its markets. Most South Koreans were angry, since they had just begun to enjoy a trade surplus with the United States for the first time ever. The U.S. policy appeared mean-spirited; even worse, according to the nationalistic Korean press, the U.S. actions were

prejudicial, taking harsher aim at Korea than at others (Kim Dong-hyun and Choi Yearn H. 1989:33). Of the U.S. demands,

most incendiary was the call for an open agricultural market, which sparked angry rallies by farmers and students. These rallies, with their populist/nationalist slogans, attracted considerable sympathy from the press and the

public. A common view held that South Korea's remarkable

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. rate of industrial growth was achieved at the expense of the hard-working farmers. Since a high proportion of farmers come from Cholla Province, agricultural market-opening measures would not simply hurt the agricultural sector; it would hurt the most underprivileged and politically victimized province in Korea as well. Thus U.S. demands for

an open agricultural market deeply offended regional as well as national sensibilities. Moreover, with the memory of U.S. "betrayal" so fresh in the minds of many Cholla Province residents, particularly those in the provincial capital of Kwangju, many interpreted U.S. demands as further

confirmation of its perfidy and selfishness. In this context, the 14 students from 7 universities who occupied the U.S. Chamber of Commerce thought they had an excellent opportunity to promote the national cause before a receptive public. Much to their disappointment, the Korean newspapers uniformly reproached the students for resorting to violence (Kim and Choi 1989:36). The arrested students attracted

little public sympathy.

After the 1980 arson attack on the U.S. Cultural Center in Kwangju, the Center was reoccupied by students on

December 2, 1985. 21/ The very presence of the U.S. Cultural Center seemed an outright provocation to many

radical students, symbolizing not so much the cultural influence of the United States as its humiliation of Korea. However, we must also note that among professional groups

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. with anti-American tendencies, many disapproved of student efforts to close the Center. They believed that the Center library made a valuable contribution to the intellectual

community. Against the United States, student tactics concentrated on dramatic actions designed to catch public attention rather than to achieve pragmatic, attainable goals. The same is largely the case of student-led opposition to the government. However, with the government "restoration" of campus autonomy in 1984 (though by no means total freedom from governmental interference), a number of activists did become more engaged in politics. For example, many established "Democratization struggle" committees to monitor elections and government corruption, while promoting

revision of repressive laws (Shim Jae-hoon 1984:32). However, as the term "struggle" connotes, most radical students were highly ambivalent about mainstream politics,

preferring to work on its outer fringes, where they could push for a more radical agenda. Few activists were willing to allow the mainstream opposition to dictate the terms of

debate.

Recruitment Patterns

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. study cells recruited members very selectively to reduce the risk of exposure. New candidates, for example, were more likely to be loyal if they had some common bond with one of the present members, such as a common home town or high school. The candidate was then subjected to a thorough background check. The best candidates were students (1) from rural areas who did not commute to the university daily from home, and thus were under less influence from their parents, (2) with working-class backgrounds, and (3) who were younger sons in their family, because the greater expectations imposed on elder sons tended to incline them to conservatism (Anonymous 1986:31). Recruitment into one of these cells transformed students into professional student activists, but the process of initiation was gradual. Still not fully trusted,

a new recruit fhubae) was admitted to general cell meetings, but not to those of the core (senior or sonbae) members. For new recruits, the first step was to immerse themselves in the prescribed readings and discussions. On weekends, they often gathered in the countryside to share meals, games and informal conversation designed to reveal something more of

their personal feelings and aspirations. These overnight get-togethers strengthened solidarity among members. During summer vacations, the study cell members went into the countryside, where they offered free labor to the farmers and discussed with them the problems of the village. During

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. winter vacations, some of these members found jobs as temporary laborers. Through these activities, members gained valuable experience and heightened "consciousness” that reading books alone could not provide. New members also joined demonstrations, intensifying their adversarial view of the government. 22/ To create a new type of human being, the study cells introduced an intensive regime of physical exertion and

study. The daily routine of members working on farms was very rigorous. Rising daily at 5 A.M., they worked until 7 P.M. in the fields. Dinner was followed by discussion with the farmers until 9 P.M. Then, until 2 A.M., members

reflected on the day's events and discussed plans for the following day. Students were expected and encouraged to persevere on only three hour's sleep each night (Hvundae Sasang Yon'auhoe 1987:42). The ritualistic element in these

gatherings was prominent, exemplified in such nightly slogans as "Live With Brothers Together, Die With Brothers Together", "Keep Secrecy At the Cost of Your Life",

"Collective Life Is More Important than Personal Life" (Hvundae Sasang Yon'guhoe 1987:43). Over time, as the

members passed these stages of initiation— often including police arrest— they entered the inner core of membership and either participated in organizing activities or became theoreticians. The latter group was expected to provide training for new recruits and to expound the group's

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ideology in pamphlets and booklets. In the event that the organizers were arrested, the theoreticians, who intentionally maintained a low profile, were able to assume leadership of their cells.

Radical Influence and Value Change on Campus in the 1980s

It has commonly been observed that radical activists make up only a small percentage of students on campus. That was true of the 1980-1985 period under discussion; it is true today. But such facts obscure the tremendous influence

that radicals exerted upon the general student body. Radicals were admired as heroic and selfless. Although their tactics were judged on occasion as misguided or reckless by more moderate students, radicals kept their reputation as morally pure. A poll conducted in May 1985 shows that 87 percent of SNU students agreed that the student movement was righteous (Park Chan-hee 1987:150). In fact, failure to

participate actively in demonstrations often aroused

tremendous guilt (Han Wan-sang 1986:562-3). Radical influence, like the influence of other groups in South Korean society, was not so much based on force of

argument as "pure" reputation. Radicals were the bravest opponents of the government, the most intolerant of government lies, brutality, and hypocrisy. Their populist

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and nationalist appeals inspired young people as the government could not. They strove for national dignity based

on an empowered miniuna and on self-reliance in all spheres- -economic, political, and cultural. The Chun government's less than visionary preoccupation with eliminating "illegalities, corruption and irregularities" was no match (Chun 1983 11:22). Moreover, Chun's reach on campus was limited, especially after 1984, when some measure of campus autonomy was restored. According to a 1988 SNU poll of college freshmen, 20.8 percent of information about anti-Americanism came from upperclassmen, 15.9 percent from peers, 12.5 percent from

campus wall posters, and 5.2 percent from professors. An additional 2 0.8 percent came from books. As to off-campus sources, 11 percent came from the media. The same poll shows that pro-American influences on campus were restricted to

college lectures (including required ideological

indoctrination classes that are scoffed at by most students). Other sources were high school teachers (12.5

percent) and the media (21 percent) fDona-A Ilbo January 27, 1988) .

In October 1988, another SNU poll of students reported that 50.6 percent considered the United States neither a friend nor an enemy, but just a foreign country pursuing its

own interests. More surprising was the finding that 41.2 percent believed that the "United States is primarily

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. responsible for the division of Korea and is the greatest impediment to reunification." One year later, a 1989 poll of Korean college students revealed that 20.3 percent of

students considered the Korean war to have been a war of national liberation (Yi Hee-dok 1990:63-66). Signs of growing radical influence were everywhere.

Until the 1980s, each campus had sponsored an annual schoolwide festival featuring Western-style rock concerts and dancing. Only dissidents shunned these in favor of traditional plays and musical performances. But after 1980,

the emergence of miniuna ideas rendered Western-style festivals illegimate. Unlike the court arts derived from China, Korean folk art did have an earthy and emotional appeal because of its frequent depiction of class resentment

fhan). The tal chum (masked dance), in particular, allowed commoners to satirize the behavior of arrogant vanaban and to vent their anger freely from behind masks. Madana theater

revived the traditional tendency to mask criticism of contemporary events as commentary on historical or fictional

events. The great majority of these plays pitted the miniuna (variously represented as labor leaders, farmers, Tonghak

rebels, students, and journalists etc.) against the state (Suh Yon-ho 1989:24-25). Students also organized literary festivals and symposia on Korean domestic problems, the problem of reunification, and even some international issues.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The new mood imposed a new standard of conformity. Until the end of the 1970s, most students proudly displayed their college affiliation by wearing school buttons. But in the 1980s, openly striving for prestige was no longer socially acceptable. The guilt that had, in the 1970s, transformed a small minority of students into activist exponents of

miniuna thought, now gained widespread acceptance. Before the 1980s strident criticisms of the United States were virtually unthinkable. In the 1980s students

were considered naive or out of touch (Hwang Byung-sun 1988:166) if they did not display a sufficiently critical attitude toward the United States. Pro-American moderates

among the faculty were stigmatized as lacking in "moral purity", and hence unworthy of respect. Wall posters

denouncing them by name or calling for their resignation added to the climate of intimidation on campus. Many faculty mambers began to decline interviews with American

journalists, or at minimum, insisted that they be quoted

anonymously (Kim Myung-sook 1989:389-90). Even a Ph.D from an American university was not the

asset it once was. From the mid-1980s, some students

demanded that school authorities no longer hire American- educated scholars. As in the days and months following the April 19

uprising of 1960, the atmosphere was filled with the spirit of national defiance.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ...Friends! You and I refuse to live in disgrace Let's refuse to live as slaves with full stomachs in a colonial, dependent country. Instead, fill empty intestines with freedom Walk tall; stand up as an independent nation... (Kim Nam-ju 1989:145).

National reunification, as in the early 1960s, was viewed as the prerequisite for true independence. Old and young alike were zealous supporters of reunification, but the older generation worried more about the means than did students. Moreover, from the Park years on, only the vaguest expressions of longing for reunification were permissible.

Advocating that the South take concrete steps toward this end was politically taboo, since the south did not have the ability to conquer the north, and, as Park saw it, unification through accommodation spelled surrender to communism.

To the younger generation, their elders' obsession with security seemed cowardly. Even though most students during this period continued to support an American troop

presence in South Korea, they were ashamed of their elders' lack of national self-assertion. As in 1960, they yearned

for some sign that South Korea was willing to "stand up" to the United States. Taking an independent line on national reunification could be one powerful way to "cleanse

ourselves of [inferiority] complexes" (Ho Kyung-gu 1989:417) .

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1. "To show its disapproval, the United States announced to senior Korean officials the indefinite postponement of the Security Consultative Meeting (SOM), which is held annually between the ROK Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defense" (Backgrounder 1989:10). 2. Instead, the State Department repeatedly appealed to Korean officials to exercise "restraint" (p.15). The 52- page Backgrounder. from which I have already quoted, includes a 26-page appendix and provides an invaluable summary of the U.S. positions. 3. The military operational control of Korean armed forces was transferred immediately after the outbreak of the Korean war to the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, who also served as U.N. Commander-in-Chief. At that time, the South Korean Army, Navy and Air Force Commander-in-Chief, General Chung Il-kwon, proposed to Syngman Rhee the transfer of operational control to the United Nations Command to more efficiently prosecute the war. But after the war, two important revisions were made to this command structure. First, during the miltary coup of 1961, Park mobilized armed forces that had been under the command of U.S. General MacGruder, a serious violation of existing regulations. The two sides then decided that the "U.N. commander-in-chief would exercise operational command and control power to defend South Korea from communist invasion." Moreover, since that time, the South Korean government has been given operational control over some of its armed forces [Special Forces and Sudo] (Dona-A Ilbo. July 22, 1989, (Washington edition). In other words, the United States made institutional changes that would insulate it from responsibility for the conduct of South Korean troops deployed for political purposes. Chief among these troops were the Special Forces units and the army division in charge of defending Seoul fSudo Kvunabi Sarvongbu), both of which functioned as "palace guards". This institutional change, however, did not completely clarify the limits of U.S. responsibility, as Washington had hoped. What if a South Korean leader chose to mobilize a division under U.S. operational control for political purposes? Was the fact of U.S. operational control paramount, or the fact that the troops were to be used for

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. political purposes the overriding factor? This question was not resolved. But it arose on December 12, 1979, when part of the 9th division, which was under U.S. operational control, was mobilized for the coup. Did the U.S. have the authority to recall troops under its operational command, using the justification that withdrawal could jeopardize South Korean security? (The 9th Division was engaged in border patrol at the DMZ just north of Seoul). Or did the South Korean government have authority over the troops as long as they were being used for domestic purposes? The second institutional change occurred in November 1978 when the United States and South Korea established the Korean-U.S. Joint Armed Forces Headquarters. Since the establishment of these headquarters, the U.S. Commander-in- Chief was no longer referred to as heading the U.N. Command, but as heading the Korean-U.S. Joint Armed Forces. After this change, the United States and South Korea jointly exercised operational control over the unified command. Thus, the (U.S.) Commander-in-Chief of the Korean-U.S. Joint Forces executes the directives of the Joint Military Committee jointly headed by U.S. and South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff. These two institutional changes have not had much of an impact on Korean public perceptions, however. Many still believe that the U.S. exercises strong de facto influence on the Korean armed forces and that the other changes have been strictly cosmetic. With the demise of the Cold War and the greatly diminished threat from the North, and given strong nationalist sentiments in South Korea, the strategic role of the U.S. military presence in South Korea appears to be developing into more of a political and economic liability than ever before. 4. In the words of one radical author, the president's standing had been reduced to that of "the boss of a faction" (Choi Jang-jip et al 1989:37). 5. For additional examples of South Korean press distortions of U.S. government positions see The New York Times. June 23, August 29, and August 30, 1980. See also Backgrounder (1989:3,19,20).

6. For a detailed refutation, see Backgrounder (1989:6-8). See also Dong-A Ilbo August 28, 1989, (Washington edition). 7. Of course, anti-Americans frequently contend that U.S. behavior in South Korea has been purely opportunistic. To adopt such a position, however, it is necessary to ignore, or completely discredit, the weighty evidence to the contrary available in the personal memoirs of U.S. officials and official documents; one would also have to overlook the many instances of U.S. pressures that were initiated during

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. times of opposition weakness, such as the pressures applied during the Kennedy and Carter administrations. On the other hand, it is certainly true that in times when U.S. strategic concerns were uppermost, such as during the Johnson and Reagan years, U.S. administration concerns for human rights in South Korea were downplayed in favor of enhanced military or security cooperation. But it is one thing to argue that the United States placed national security considerations first (whether correctly assessed or not), and quite another to argue that successive U.S. administrations cared nothing about human rights in South Korea. 8. In a characteristic exercise of the anti-American tendency toward selective perception, Lee Sam-sung (1988) claims that Carter sent Eximbank chairman John Moore to South Korea in the aftermath of the Kwangju massacre in order to further U.S. economic interests. Although citing a June 3, 1980 article in the New York Times. Lee fails to acknowledge the same article's principal contention: that Moore's mission was approved in the hope that it would put the United States in a better position to press for democracy; moreover, he overlooks entirely the New York Times article of June 13, 1980, which identified the measures the Carter administration had taken to pressure Chun. 9. Arthur Schlesinger, citing a passage in Carter's memoirs. Keeping Faith (1982), writes: When Carter mentioned his intervention on behalf of Kim Dae-jung to Ronald Reagan after the 1980 election, the President-elect, as Carter remembered it, confined his comment to expressing "with some enthusiasm his envy of the authority that Korean president Park Chung Hee had exercised during a period of campus unrest, when he had closed the universities and drafted the demonstrators."

Schlesinger concludes that "[t]his reaction foretold the fate of human rights in the next administration". Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that, at least on occasion, the Reagan administration had to accommodate pressures for democratic change in South Korea from within Congress and the State Department. 10. Immediately before his U.S. visit, Chun had gone so far as to say that he saw "no differences" between South Korea and the United States; his statement was never contradicted by the U.S. officials either before or after the visit. Instead, the State Department, at the behest of the Reagan Administration, delayed publication of their annual report on human rights violations (prepared during the Carter Administration) which had contained embarrassing 240

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. criticisms of South Korean violation of human rights (New York Times. February 3 , 6:1). The State Department also indicated that during Chun's visit, the United States did not bring up the matter of Kim Dae-jung's treatment by the government, calling it "an internal affair" of South Korea (New York Times. February 3, 1981,1:5). This solicitous regard for Chun's feelings did nothing to quell the rising anger of Korean opposition forces. 11. It should be noted, that Kim Dae-jung's Peace and Democracy Party fPvonahwa Miniu Dana), took a similar position fDong-A Ilbo August 28, 1989) . 12. Graumann and Moscovici (1987) identify the emergence of a collective conspiracy theory as the product of three stages: 1) a triggering situation involving intense social upheaval 2) a crisis of consciousness 3) the search for explanations involving categories of good and evil and a preoccupation with concealed forces. Said Moon Ik-hwan, a well-known dissident leader: "All of a sudden I realized that America and Japan are pulling the strings behind them [Korean dictators]." Acknowledging his previous high regard for America, Moon notes that after Kwangju "I awakened from the dream" (Washington Post. February 27, 1989). 13. The 1948 communist uprising in Yosu and Sunchon cities, was a particularly sensitive matter, not only because it was a communist movement, but because ex- communist Park Chung-hee had himself had participated in it. 14. This point was made much earlier (without the theme of the Korean war as civil war) . See Cho Sun-sung (1960); Park Chun-kyu (1960). 15. According to a 1987 poll of college students, 54.9 percent agreed that "the U.S. soldiers in 1945 came to Korea not as liberators but as occupiers and established a neo colonial, fascist regime." Only 17 percent of students disagreed with the statement (Do Heung-ryul et al 1987:13). 16. Many Korean radicals would disagree with my statement that Cuming's account underestimates the difficulties of self-government in the early postwar years. On the contrary, they were deeply offended by his depiction of Korean society as disorderly and vulnerable to outside forces (Kim Tae-ik 1988:212; Han Sok-jae 1988:22). 17. They appear to have misread Marx, who specifically warned that the lumpenproletariat (the demoralized segment of the urban unemployed), although inclined to participate in mass riots, lacked the consciousness on which to base a proletarian revolution. 241

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18. Among the most noteworthy publications during this period were "On Criticizing Night School" (Yahak Bipan) . "Prospects of the Student Movement" (Haksaeng Undong Ui Chongmang) , "Understanding and Prospects of Revolutionary Struggle in the 1980s" (Palshio Nvundae Hvunomvung Tuchaeng ui Inshik kwa Chonomang) . and "Subordination and Outcry" (Yesok kwa Hamsungf. 19. By comparison, when students burned the Japanese flag in August 1982 to protest the textbook incident, the government took no action. 20. Following the founding of Chonhaknvon in 1984, Sanmintu was organized for the express purpose of carrying out a wide variety of prohibited activities. Chonhaknyon concentrated on organizing student activities that were, by and large, legally permissable. Sanmintu turned its attention to illegal forms of protest (Hwang Ui-bong 1985:460-466). 21. A total of 28 student assaults and trespasses followed, prompting the Center to close down on May 10, 1989. When a more defensible location was found, the Center reopened on June 11, 1990. The very next day, students threw Molotov cocktails at the Center Segae Ilbo (Seoul edition) June 13, 1990). 22. A description of the study cells and their activities is provided in Hvundae Sahoe Yon'guso (1987;viii).

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ANTI-AMERICANISM AFTER 1985

The Further Erosion of Government Legitimacy

The legitimacy crisis faced by the Fifth Republic posed a difficult problem from the beginning. But continuous abuses of the public trust, publicized by courageous activists and journalists, seriously challenged the Chun

government's credibility. At the same time, its overriding commitment to host the Seoul Olympics in 1988 imposed limits

on the degree to which opposition forces could be stifled. Hoping that the Seoul Olympics would bolster regime

popularity, Chun was anxious at all costs to avoid bad publicity abroad. As the daily countdown to the opening of

the Olympic Games got under way, student activists grew

bolder. Under Yushin, people had been very afraid of the

government. But under the Fifth Republic, fear was steadily

diluted with heavy doses of contempt. 1/ The first great blow to government prestige came in 1985 with news of the

arrest and torture of Kim Keun-tae, chairman of the National

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Youth Alliance for Democracy. Rumors about Kim's torture traveled widely among students and social activists. Human rights organizations in the United States also received word

and began to publicize his case. Especially significant was the formation of the Association of Families of Prisoner's of Conscience which represented the families of some 1,000 prisoners, some 80 percent of the total. Such as organization was unthinkable during the Yushin period.

Families were ashamed to acknowledge that a relative of theirs had been imprisoned for violating the anti-Communist law. During the Fifth Republic, it became almost a source of pride (as well as grave concern) when a loved one was

arrested in violation of this law. The second severe blow to government prestige was the June 1986 case of "sexual torture" (a term introduced into public use for the first time in South Korea) (Moon Myung-ho

1987:574). The victim, a young college drop-out named Kwon In-sook, had gotten a job as a worker using false

identification. 2/ Arrested by the police, Kwon was asked to provide names of others involved in illegal labor

organizing. In the process, she was sexually tortured by one of the police officers. Then Kwon did the unimaginable: she decided to publicize her story. At first, the government

responded with ridicule and disgust, claiming that activists were stooping to the most vulgar tactics for political gain. But the public, believing Kwon, reacted in horror. Sexual

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. malfeasance that was condoned and even covered up by the government destroyed all its pretensions to morality,

according to Confucian precepts. Six months after the sexual torture case, in January 1987, SNU student Park Chung-chol was tortured to death.

Like Kwon, Park was arrested without a warrant and asked to inform the police about other student activists. During the course of a brutal interrogation. Park suffocated. Once again, the government denied that the incident took place. Citizens who had never been interested in politics before

were outraged. Parents who might have identified with the government on other occasions, now saw it as a threat to their own children (Chun Man-gil 1987:199-207).

1986: Radical Anti-Americanism at High Tide

The Ascendancy of the Anti-Imperialist Line

In 1986 student activists openly endorsed socialism as

the goal of their movement. Chong Min, a leading radical

activist, explained in an interview why he became a pro- North Korean socialist. "After confirming my thought that - 'Anything the government says is a lie; anything they say is

bad, I think is good,' I came to take a friendly interest in

North Korea" (Kang Young-jin 1990b:452).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. How many students actually embraced socialism in one form or another is unclear, but a 1987 poll by the Modern Society Research Institute (MSRI) concluded that 8.4 percent of students were "leftists" (Do Heung-ryul et al 1987:17). Such a poll, however useful, does not reveal the extent of

socialist influence. In 1986 even politically inactive students came to adopt some Marxist-Leninist terminology and frames of reference. In the early 1980s, most activists did not openly seek socialist revolution and the overthrow of U.S. imperialism. Instead, most backed Western-style "civil-democratic revolution" in which all classes (particularly the middle- as distinct from the miniuna classes) united against the government. How this united effort was to proceed was not clearly spelled out.

This all changed in 1986. Most student activists

rallied enthusiastically behind "The Theory of National Liberation and People's Democratic Revolution". Where once the military state had been blamed for the country's misfortunes, U.S. imperialism was now blamed. Where once the

military state had been viewed as all-powerful, it was now a

mere proxy of American influence. From this time forward, "Yankee Go Home!" became a popular chant. Despite the obvious signs of radicalization, most older conservative and anti-Communist Koreans still seemed unwilling to recognize that student activists were not

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. merely pro-democratic nationalists. So pervasive was this selective perception that it might be called the "myth of the student movement for democracy and nationalism". Probably the main reason for this myth (which persists

even among Korean scholars in the 1990s 3 / is that students have been judged the most powerful force for democratic change, exceeding in influence even the organized efforts of opposition politicians, intellectuals and clergy in influence (Han Wan-sang 1989:34). Those who sympathized with student grievances against the government had no desire to

see student leaders come to harm. Nor did they desire to see the democratic movement come to grief because of its association with "communists". Perhaps, too, sympathetic elders shuddered to think that influential student leaders supposedly the most morally pure forces in the country,

really desired revolution. As to the rank and file within the student movement, most were not deeply immersed in Marxist dogma. Nevertheless, they did not challenge Marxist

assumptions nor did they refrain from using Marxist terminology themselves.

Emergence of Cheunintu. The change in the orientation of the radical anti-American movement coincided with the emergence of a new group that was defiantly pro-Pyongyang in ideology and political sympathies. The new group was a by product of ideological debates among rival study cells at

SNU. Among the most influential pamphlets of the mid-1980s

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was "Let's resurrect [emphasis added] ourselves as the standard bearers of national liberation, holding the torch of an anti-imperialistic movement for people's democracy" (abbreviated as "Prefatory Poem on Liberation" (Haebanq Soshi) (Kang Shin-chol et al 1989:436-448). It is believed

to have been written at the end of 1985 by Kim Young-hwan, member of the study cell known as "Tanie Thought Study Group". 4/ Also written by Kim was a series of pamphlets issued in 1986 and collectively entitled "Letters from Kang Choi". 5/ In Haebang Soshi Kim criticized the idea that the student movement should pursue a two-stage struggle in which anti-fascism preceded anti-imperialism. To Kim, since the United States was pulling the strings, it made little sense to attack the fascist proxy. Here, at last, we see a precise

Leninist-style effort to distinguish between main and lesser enemies. But in his overriding concern with the character of activists, we see in Kim a staunch Confucian as well. In the

series "Letters from Kang Choi", he warned others to steer clear of pedantry. The students' mission, he reminded them,

was to teach, organize and lead the miniung. And the only

way for students to be effective was to cultivate the virtues of honesty, humility, simplicity, courage and sincerity (Kang Young-jin 1989:386). Supporters of Kim developed his ideas further within

the Student Federation to Save the Country (Guguk Haksaeng

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Yonmaeng), founded on March 29, 1986. It is said that the SFSC was organized mainly by members of the Tanje Thought

study cells and had some 100 members (Kang Shin-chol et al 1989:170). This Leninist "Revolutionary Mass Organization" (RMO) also formed a public arm designed to propagate and carry out the struggle against U.S. imperialism (Struggle Committee for anti-American independence, anti-fascist democratization, hereafter called Chamintu). By dividing the organization into two parts, the SFSC hoped to ensure the continuity of the struggle: whenever Chamintu members were

arrested, they could be replaced by others from the underground SFSC. Members of this organization called for a more serious, disciplined and austere approach to the struggle against U.S. imperialism. As true fighters for liberation,

students were advised to avoid excessive drinking and

smoking, and to exercise regularly. To strengthen comradeship, they advocated Maoist criticism and self- criticism. On a daily basis, every student should strive to

increase his animosity toward U.S. imperialism and to strengthen his loyalty toward the fatherland and the miniuna

(Kang Young-jin 1989:386-7). Kim's ideas were referred to collectively as "National Liberation People's Democratic Revolution" theory (NLPDR— commonly referred to as Juche ideology). From 1986 until the present, the majority of student activists have concurred

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. with its central thesis, namely, that South Korea can rid itself of military fascism and achieve reunification only

when U.S. imperialism is ousted from the country. 6/ The Juche faction also maintained that South Korea's political and economic malaise was the product of its dependency on the United States. In this view. South Korean society was "semi-feudal and colonial", and the essence of the South Korean economy was "dependent capitalism". The South Korean

state's dependency on the United States for its survival was captured in the term "neocolonial fascist" (Haebang Sun'un

[Declaration of Liberation] April 17, 1986:3). Compared to the United States, Japan hardly merited attention in this schema. This neglect seems odd,

considering that, since the late 1970s, the value of Japanese investments in South Korea was roughly twice that of the United States. An economic analysis would have required a close examination of Japanese trade and

investment, but that is precisely what the Juche analysis was not. For all its pronouncements on political economy, NLPDR theory was in essence a political line. The main target of its wrath was the extraordinary political and

military influence of the United States in South Korea. For all its economic power and cultural influence, Japan was not

South Korea's patron. It was not solicited for its advice on political matters, and Japan was content with this role. The United States, by contrast, maintained a high political

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. profile (paradoxically, in part because many Koreans encouraged such a role). The views of higher and lesser U.S. officials and even academics were eagerly sought by the South Korean media. Any official U.S. statement was carefully dissected in the press. To the Juche faction, as to many other sensitive nationalists, the U.S. profile in

their country was a shameful reminder of South Korean dependence. 7/ Hence, despite the strong antipathies of many Koreans toward Japanese, Japan was spared the brunt of Juche attacks directed at the United States. The inspiration for this program of national self-

reliance was Pyongyang. Juche concepts and terminology are

completely derived from official North Korean ideology.

Proscribed by the South Korean government from using the "communist" word "inmin" for people, the Juche faction substituted the term miniung. 8/ Otherwise, however, the NLPDR or Juche theory in the North and South is identical.

For example, when Juche theory was first introduced, many

activists criticized its portrayal of South Korean society as semi-feudal and colonial. Nevertheless, proponents of Juche persisted in their analysis until 1988, when North

Korea changed the official designation to "semi-capitalistic colonial" society. Juche promptly adopted the new terminology and its attendant analysis. (Yang Dong-an 1989:17). 9/ Kim has never wavered from the position that the Juche ideology is superior owing to its blend of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. orthodox Marxist-Leninism and Korean revolutionary traditions" (Shim Yang-sop 1989:278). In other words, there has been no need for a more authentic theory since North

Korea had already devised one suitable to South Korean

conditions. As we have seen. Juche theory gained momentum rapidly in 1986, becoming the guiding ideology of the student movement. Although the precise nature of debates within the underground SFSC are not known, it is likely that they deliberated on ways to enhance Chamintu's appeal among the mini ung. The consensus apparently was for greater and more

strident use of nationalist and anti-American symbols and appeals (Kang Young-jin 1989:386). Moreover, instead of calling for the end of U.S. imperialism, they demanded that it be "smashed" or "crushed" (Shim Yang-sop 1989:290-91).

10/ Not long after the first RMO was founded at SNU, similar RMOs were founded at 25 other universities. As their

organizational power grew, the leaders of the RMOs attempted to establish a national umbrella organization. On October 28, 1986, representatives gathered at Kon'guk University in Seoul to organize the National Patriotic Student's Struggle Federation against Foreign Forces and Dictatorship (Ehaktu). The inaugural ceremony proved disastrous. Before it

had ended, 1,525 students had been arrested by riot police; of these, 1,290 were subsequently jailed. For a professional

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. organization that disdained amateurish tactics, the Ehaktu had suffered quite a humiliation. However, by the spring of

1987, the Juche faction had recovered sufficiently to reorganize. On May 8, 1987 it formed the Council of College Student Representatives of Greater Metropolitan Seoul (Spdaehyop) . On August 19, under the auspices of Sodaehvop. about 4,800 members of the Juche faction from 79 universities gathered at the National Southern Chungchong

Province University and organized a new nationwide organization designed to replace the ill-fated Ehaktu called the National Council of College Student Representatives f Chondaehvop). The number of Juche faction core members and dedicated activists was estimated at about 7,000 students

from 92 universities (Pukhan Yon'guso 1988:6). How did the Juche faction become the most prominent among student radical groups? First, many radical students

had become persuaded that the North Korean regime, rather than the South, had inherited the mantle of Korean nationalism and reunification. Their views were influenced by miniung intellectuals and by revisionist historians like

Bruce Cumings. They also were influenced by their bitter

hatred for the regime. Most adopted the old saw, expressed above by Chong Min, that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Consequently, they became intrigued by Juche ideology, a

politically taboo subject even today. Second, despite the inflammatory rhetoric and

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. seemingly rigid adherence to North Korean orthodoxy, the Jucheists were pragmatists at heart. They often proved

responsive to student and public opinion. For example, when a bitter (and pedantic) debate with rival organization Minmintu threatened to decimate Chamintu's following, it quickly adopted a new agenda, calling for the ouster of college presidents who kowtowed to government authorities and for the recovery of campus autonomy. Furthermore, when

the government and opposition parties were locked in a heated debate about changing the constitution, Chamintu sided with the opposition while Minmintu rejected both positions in favor of the highly unpopular proposal for a "provisional revolutionary government".

Third, the Juche faction appeal was at once

"scientific" and romantic. The combination of the two strengthened the students' sense of mission. Fourth and most important, the Juche faction was the

most fervently nationalistic of all the radical organizations. Its analysis of the South Korean situation

held that the United States responsible for most of the

country's troubles. Although Chamintu was less involved in labor organizing than its chief rival, Minmintu. it did propagate its ideology with the help of college graduates and recent

college drop-outs who had taken jobs on the factory floor. According to Shim Yang-sop (1989:282), there were about

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1,000 of these workers in Seoul. Instead of setting up their own labor organizations, they infiltrated recreational groups within the factory. After gaining the confidence of individuals within these groups, the Juche activists attempted to indoctrinate them. Many "converts" were later mobilized for participation in pro-Chamintu demonstrations.

This approach accorded with Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese partisan tactics, in which all-out battles were avoided in favor of clandestine, small-scale operations.

Chamintu's Anti-American Activities and Influence

In their clandestine newspaper, Haebang Sunun. the Juche faction declared that South Korean military forces were merely mercenaries for U.S. imperialism. Because they

lacked autonomy (i.e. no operational control), they lacked a mandate to serve the national interest. They could serve only U.S. interests, in Northeast Asia and even in Vietnam

(Special Edition, April 25, 1986). Accordingly, the Juche

faction called for an end to military drills for college students. 11/ The Juche faction warned that the military alliance with the United States not only served U.S. rather than Korean interests, but it was positively harmful to Korean interests. If war broke out, they noted, the Korean

peninsula could be completely annihilated by U.S. nuclear

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. weapons based in South Korea. Thus in the spring of 1986 their "struggle" aims were twofold: to combat the education of mercenaries for U.S.

imperialism and to promote an anti-war, anti-nuclear movement. The "struggle" reached its peak on April 28. As

9,000 students demonstrated nationwide, two Chamintu members from SNU set themselves on fire. Just before their self- immolation, Lee Jae-ho and Kim Se-jin had cried "anti-war, anti-nuclear [weapons], Yankee go home!" "[We] oppose training in military camps at the risk of our lives; [it is]

just mercenary training for U.S. imperialism" and "Long live anti-American, independent, anti-fascist, democratization struggle." The students' suicides shocked the country, dramatizing the extent to which the student movement had been transformed into a "struggle" against U.S. imperialism. The heightened sense of desperation seems to have influenced other SNU students unconnected to Chamintu or

other activist groups. On May 20 Lee Dong-su set himself on fire after shouting "Out with Chun Doo-hwan! Out with U.S. imperialists!" Yet another non-activist student. Park Hye-

jong threw herself into a river and drowned. The note she

left behind did not echo the Chamintu line, but it did reveal the enormous guilt she felt toward the underprivileged. The next major test of Chamintu power came on May 3,

when Chamintu led radical efforts to disrupt a major rally

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. by the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) . The mainstream opposition group had organized the rally in support of their three-month signature campaign to revise the constitution. But radicals were angry. Just days before, NKDP leaders had held a press conference in which they warned students against making America the enemy. Chamintu. along with representatives of other radical groups delivered an unambiguous reply. 13/ Among the slogans chanted by students and this time workers as well: "The country has been ruined

by pro-Americanism, let's save it with anti-Americanism." "Overthrow pro-American dictatorship by securing a democratic constitution". For the first time, the NKDP itself was condemned for allegedly colluding behind the scenes with U.S. imperialism. One demonstrator screamed at

Kim Young-sam: "Go blow yourself up!" ( "Chanokhara ! " ) Others turned violent, setting fire to a local office of the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and to the car

of an NKDP organizer. The red-faced NKDP leadership tried to downplay the incident. Kim Young-sam charged that the riot police had provoked the incident through their indiscriminate use of tear gas. But eyewitnesses agreed that

the demonstrators had initiated the violence (Kim Sung-bo 1990:105). Among the many protestors joining in for the first time were members of labor organizations— largely

under the auspices of Mintonanvon (People's Movement for Democracy and Unification), an umbrella organization for 24

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dissident religious and labor groups. On May 21, 1986 members of Chamintu occupied the U.S. Cultural Center in Pusan to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the Kwangju Uprising. Unlike the Sanmintu occupiers of the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul in May 1985, who denied that they were anti-American, the Chamintu

students proudly proclaimed their anti-Americanism. And while the Sanmintu students left the Cultural Center of their own accord, the Chamintu students stayed and were

arrested by police. Meanwhile, in words oddly reminiscent of John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, DJP and government officials vowed to stem the radical tide. They claimed it was necessary to "pay any price, and make any sacrifice" to eradicate student radicalism (Korea Herald. April 30, 1986; 1-2) . But the student mood, if anything, was growing more

radical.

Students had already broken the taboo on portraying the United States as an enemy of Korea. Now it was time to reassess the "fearful enemy from the north". On October 17, 1986 the following "big character poster" ("taeiabo".

recalling the Chinese "dazibao") appeared on the campus of Sokang University in Seoul. The influence of Chamintu is unmistakable:

North Korean Kim Il-sung has declared an 'independent line' and is strenuously pursuing [an independent] diplomacy between the Soviet and Chinese

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. superpowers...Have our South Korean leaders ever even tried strenuous diplomacy to check the United States and Japan? North Korean foreign policy is exerting a lot of effort to maintain its self-reliance within the constraints of its limited capabilities! U.S. armies entered Korea after liberation and they now number 40,000. There are several U.S. army and air force bases in Korea and the U.S. Pacific Fleet is freely roaming the East Sea. [All this has been going on] for the past 40 years, [sic] ... Is there a joint North Korean-Soviet commander-in-chief who has military control power in North Korea? Are there any Chinese or Soviet troops in North Korea to defend them? I've heard this has never been the case. I heard there ...are no nuclear weapons in North Korean...... Who is doing their best to establish national independence and self-reliance within the given environment! (Sogang University taeiabo in Kim Heung- ryul et al 1987:62-63).

The Emergence of Minmintu

Among radical students, a large minority disagreed with Juche ideology and emphasized the primacy of

overthrowing the South Korean government (as opposed to ousting U.S. imperialism from South Korea). In February 1986 SNU students established an underground organization called the Central Committee for the National Democratic Struggle

against Imperialism and Fascism 14/. In the following month, it established an aboveboard organization called the Committee for the National Democratic Struggle against Imperialism and Fascism (popularly known as Minmintu). The

group's official organ was the National Democratic

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Declaration (Minnok Miniu Son'on).

Like Chamintu. Minmintu attempted to expand their organization to other universities. On April 28, 1986, Minmintu organized the All-Korea National Democratic Student Federation. With the nearly simultaneous founding of these two rival student organizations, the power struggle between them and concomitant ideological "struggle" contributed to escalating enmity and violence. While Chamintu had about 7,000 core members from 92 universities, Minmintu had about 3,000 core members from 42 universities. (Pukhan Yon'guso 1988:6). As if to compensate for their smaller numbers, Minmintu demonstrations were generally more violent. Minmintu's inspiration came from a mix of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and neo-Marxist dependency theory. Unlike Chamintu. which described South Korean society as "colonial,

semi-feudal society" (later changed to "colonial, semi-

capitalistic society") and which describes the South Korean economy as "dependent capitalism", Minmintu describes South Korean society and economy as "neo-colonial, dependent, monopolistic capitalism" (II Song Chung 1988:123). Their views apparently corresponded very closely with those of many radical students in the mid to late 1970s, who, as we

have seen, were particularly impressed by the arguments of Western Marxist economists like Baran and Sweezy. Minmintu

members have also been markedly influenced by Japanese

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Marxist scholars, who focus on ways in which Western Marxist doctrines can be adapted to an Asian setting.

According to the theory of "neo-colonial, dependent, monopolistic capitalism". South Korea's fascist government was not merely a proxy of the United States as the Juche faction claimed. The South Korean fascist government had relative autonomy from the United States. Thus Minmintu argued that Koreans could not expect the downfall of the fascist regime and the establishment of a people's democracy

simply by ousting U.S imperialism from South Korea. A people's democracy could only be established by concentrating on the main obstacle, the South Korean fascist regime. Once a people's democracy were established, U.S.

imperialists could be evicted from South Korea (II Song Chung 1988:126-7). Unlike the Juche faction, which considered South

Korean capitalists as the "front men" for industrialized

monopoly capitalists [e.g. the United States and Japan], Minmintu, (while acknowledging South Korean dependence) insisted that South Korean capitalists were powerful in their own right. Whereas Chamintu emphasized a national

(largely miniuna) struggle against U.S. imperialism, Minmintu was unwilling to postpone class struggle. It

favored a two-pronged conflict in which the miniuna challenged both the state and the bourgeoisie for power. In line with this class orientation, Minmintu members were the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. most active organizers of radical demonstrations in poor neighborhoods and among workers. 15/ The society's underprivileged were of much more than instrumental value to the Minmintu ; they constituted the raison d'etre of the Minmintu movement. Another distinguishing feature of the Minmintu leadership was their orthodox, and highly rigid,

interpretations of Marxism Leninism. For example, as had Lenin insisted before the Bolshevik revolution, Minmintu demanded the drafting of a constitution to establish a "people's democratic republic". The fact that Minmintu had neither the power nor the influence that the Bolsheviks

enjoyed in 1917 seemed of little concern. In addition, the Minmintu's earnest application of the Leninist call to armed struggle was nothing short of ludicrous. Warning the miniuna to learn the lessons of Kwangju, Minmintu emphasized the importance of remaining continually armed. Accordingly, Minmintu kept ample supplies of Molotov cocktails and stones

ready for use in battles with riot police! (Yun Sok-jin 1988:543).

Radical Anti-Americanism from the 1987 Elections

Anti-American demonstrations continued throughout

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1986. The greatest violence occurred in Seoul from September through November. Despite government attempts to thwart dissent through crackdowns and mass arrests, opposition forces gained momentum. Now even formerly quiescent Buddhist organizations joined the fray. As chaos mounted the Reagan administration appears to have coaxed Chun into yielding to opposition demands for a revision of the constitution. A week later, on May 8, 1986, visiting U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz gave a speech that strongly suggested U.S. support for Chun. While criticizing Korean opposition members who "incited" violence, Shultz affirmed the U.S. "admiration for the way

the Korean institutions have evolved and managed things in the last few years" (Washington Post May 8, 1986) .

With political instability mounting however, the Reagan administration abruptly reversed course in February 1987. In a speech addressed to the U.S.-Korea Society in New York on February 8, 1987 Assistant Secretary of State Gaston

Sigur called for a "more open and legitimate political

system" in South Korea. He also appealed to the South Korean

military to get out of politics. In March 1987, Shultz returned to Seoul, urging Chun once again to compromise with the opposition on the matter of constitutional revision. Although Chun appears i conciliatory, he reversed himself again in April, declaring an end to the debate on

constitutional revision. Once again South Koreans learned of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. U.S. pressures on Chun by U.S. representative Steven Solarz (D-NY) and the State Department. In June, President Reagan himself sent a letter to Chun urging him to resume talks with the opposition. Given the flurry of U.S. official visits and pronouncements as well as the marked shift in U.S. policy over the past year, many South Koreans suspected that the United States was controlling events behind the scenes. Predictably, Chamintu had concluded that Chun's "puppet government" was merely relaying instructions from Washington

when it cancelled further debate on the constitution. It assumed that the United States opposed a direct presidential system, fearing that a popularly elected president might be more difficult to "control". As a result, the Juche faction became ardent champions of the direct presidential system. From fierce opponents of the NKDP toadies, Chamintu became

key supporters. Anti-American rhetoric was toned down as

Chamintu joined mainstream opposition politics for the first time.

On June 29, 1987 ruling party president Roh Tae-woo declared that he would not be a candidate for president

unless President Chun accepted popular demands for a direct presidential system. Once again, many Koreans believed that the United States was behind the new development (Kang Joon-

shik 1990:150-167). Rather than redounding to U.S. credit, this widespread belief contributed to the view that

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Washington could have brought about democracy in South Korea

much earlier, had it determined that it was in its interests to do so. Much to the surprise of the Juche faction and of most Koreans, Chun finally gave in to proposals for a presidential system. 16/ As the December 1987 presidential elections approached, neither of the two major opposition figures proved willing to stand aside in favor of the other. As a result, Kim Dae-jung, to whom the Juche faction had

extended support "with reservations" not only lost the

elections, but was strongly discredited. The ruling party led by Roh Tae-woo had been elected with just 3 6 percent of the popular vote. The Juche faction itself could not help but become demoralized in the wake of such serious miscalculations.

For the student activists, the December 1987 elections

should have proved their crowning achievement. Consistently throughout the 1980s, they had wielded remarkable influence over the political scene given the negligible resources at their disposal and their reluctance to cooperate with the mainstream opposition. Their ability to maintain an

atmosphere of political crisis in South Korea was probably more decisive than even the considerable efforts of the mainstream opposition to mobilize public support for

constitutional revision (cf. Gamson 1975; Tilly 1975; Brym 1980).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. But just as the Chun regime had lost face with the public, so, too, did both Chamintu and Minmintu lose face with the general student population in the aftermath of the elections. Like the mainstream opposition, each radical group had undercut the other in a shameful display of factionalism. Neither side would participate in the other's

demonstrations. Indeed, they sometimes tried to disrupt them. It was inevitable, therefore, that the sharp criticisms of the opposition parties' inability to cooperate would also be leveled at the radical student organizations. Of the two groups, Minmintu had become the most demoralized. It had fielded its own candidate for the presidential elections in the middle of the campaign. Having

failed to attract much attention, the candidate abruptly withdrew before the elections. Chamintu. in a spirit of compromise, had thrown its support behind Kim Dae-jung. But there were more basic causes for the decline of

Minmintu. As the smaller of the two organizations, Minmintu had always been on the defensive. Over a period of two and a

half years, it had not measurably increased its popularity

among students. From the beginning, it had had more

influence on scholars. The Juche ideology, on the contrary, was dismissed out of hand by most left-leaning scholars but received enthusiastically by many students. Perhaps

Minmintu's greatest disadvantage was its ambivalence about the student role in miniung struggle. Minmintu's objective

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was to develop the consciousness of the proletariat so that this class could lead the revolution. Chamintu. with its more nationalistic emphasis, wholeheartedly supported a united front led by students. Another disadvantage Minmintu faced was its inability to maintain a single focus. It

dissipated its support by attacking too many enemies: the state, the bourgeoisie and the United States. For many students, Chamintu's enemy was clear: U.S. imperialism. The message had strong national appeal, and it could unite Koreans in a single cause against an external threat, rather than divide them along class lines. In July 1988 Minmintu disbanded. The majority of

Minmintu leaders defected to Chamintu. But before long, former members of the Minmintu established a new faction called the People's Democracy faction (popularly known as

PD). This group competed against Chamintu in student body elections. Still, the rivalry was less serious since the PD faction lacked a nationwide student organization of its own. For nationwide coordination of student activities, PD relied upon Chondaehvop. the mother organization of Chamintu. The arrangement encouraged both factions to project an

appearance of unity before the student body. 17/ Meanwhile, the Juche faction attempted to recover fading student support. In June Chamintu followed up with demands for a conference of North and South Korean students, jointly held gymnastic games, and a "grand march of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pilgrims". The latter proposal foresaw students from North and South Korea marching from opposing ends of the peninsula and meeting at the DMZ. The Juche faction calculated that the government would oppose their reunification programs. Once again, Chamintu would put the government on the defensive for opposing a nationalistic effort. If by luck, the marching students were able to get as far as Panmunjom, TV crews and photographers could record how the U.S. GIs stationed there prevented the students from marching north. Such a scene would have tremendous symbolic power. It would prove that the United States opposed reunification and that the government was powerless to speak up for its own people.

The Juche faction reasoned that it had nothing to lose. Either way, they expected substantial popular support for reunification, and by extension, for their campaign to oust the United States from South Korea.

The Juche faction's calculations proved too optimistic. Although many students rallied to their cause, the general public had had enough of radicalism for the time being. The

Juche faction now found itself in the less enviable position of opposing a popularly elected government that had shed its

stance as an implacable foe of communism. Even worse, the Juche ideology appeared to be losing its relevance. The Cold War was winding down. The emergence of reformist governments in China and the Soviet Union

opened up to Seoul the possibility of normalized relations

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. with the Communist world. From their most tentative trade and diplomatic contacts in the early 1980s, China and South

Korea were developing more open relations. Chinese participation in the 1986 Asian Games was followed by its participation in the Seoul 1988 Olympic Games. Indeed, the flags of all communist countries except Cuba and North Korea

flew at these games. The South Korean government, far from looking like America's proxy, appeared to relish the opportunity to diversify relations and expand trade relations as it saw fit.

Moreover, in the late 1980s, America seemed more fearful of Japanese economic might than the Soviet Union.

The Juche faction might still excoriate American imperialistic designs. But its focus on South Korea as America's forward base against the Soviet Union seemed increasingly dated. And plans for a miniuna revolution to establish socialism in South Korea seemed less compelling

when the miniuna in the socialist countries were heading the other way.

The Collapse of Socialism in the Soviet Bloc

Regardless of their factional affiliation, socialists have become demoralized by the events of the past four years

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. One SNU student, who resigned his position in the student government in 1991, remarked that the collapse of socialism had greatly shaken his belief in the historic inevitability of socialism. Acknowledging his current confusion, the student said that

he needed time to reflect and to seek out new visions of the

future. Also in 1991, Sochonanvon (Chondaehvop's Seoul

branch) broke ranks with its umbrella organization by admitting publicly that "defeatism" and "nihilism" is prevalent among student activists because of the collapse of

socialism. (Dong-A Ilbo. (Washington, D.C. edition) December 28, 1991). This phenomenon is evident in even extreme left- leaning organizations. Park Ki-pyong (pen name: Park No- hae) , leader of one of the most far-left organizations, the League of South Korean Socialist Workers, had this to say at his trial:

After the transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern European societies, my view of socialism has changed. I have begun to realize that Marxism-Leninism does not represent absolute values. It is not without its mistakes and limitations...I will pursue the building of mass socialism that suits Korean reality after critically adapting existing socialism... Although in the past I thought of capitalism as a system that must be overthrown, recently, I have come to realize that capitalism has its own merits. However, I cannot abandon the socialist movement as long as capitalism's contradictions remain (Dong-A Ilbo. Washington, D.C. edition November 19, 1991).

Before the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe,

radical intellectuals tended to blame Stalinist-style

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. leadership and policies for the problems socialist countries were then facing (Hanavore Shinmun. November 7, 1989; Kim

Won-je 1990:101; Yi Young and Park Hyung-chung 1990:407). Writing before the demise of the Soviet Union, they argued that the crises facing socialism were the result of mistakes

committed by bureaucratic Stalinist socialism. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had introduced perestroika in order to correct these mistakes. This view was typical of the PD faction. Another explanation, advanced by professor Cho Hee-yon in terms reminiscent of Marxist analyses of capitalism, was

that socialism is prone to crises in its development. These crises occur, in the case of socialism, when the communist party becomes too doctrinaire. Ultimately, mounting contradictions create pressures for a new phase of regeneration. This rather confused perspective, while hinting at problems inherent in socialism, mainly supported

the view that mistakes in execution (i.e. doctrinaire

attitudes) are responsible for the current crisis (Son Ho- chol et al 1990:52). Professor Yi Young-hee disagreed. Yi, as we have

already seen, had a vital formative influence on South Korean radicals. He implied that the collapse of socialism was due to inherent flaws in the model rather than mistakes in execution. Socialism, he wrote, has been based on an over idealized conception of human nature; it cannot work

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However, Yi did not think that the failure of socialism spells the victory of "American-style free

democracy". He characterized American democracy as "amoral", incapable of being "cured" without considerable doses of socialist policies:

American society, which takes pride in having attained a highly developed stage of capitalism has not succeeded in liberating 14 percent of its population from 'poverty'. America is a society with 90 percent [sic] of the world's AIDS patients, in which Americans cannot free themselves from the agony of the current situation without using drugs, in which policemen must be assigned even to elementary schools to prevent crimes, and in which the president, at his inauguration, must declare 'war on drugs and crime' as a national goal. This is the true nature of American- style free democracy which is said to have gained victory over socialism... There are other problems of American-style free democracy. Concerning domestic developments, American society has achieved certain human rights, freedom, equal opportunity, development and rule of law...Nevertheless, from an international perspective, the United States is maintaining domestic prosperity and free democracy by continuous oppression, interference and plundering of weak, underdeveloped countries, and by forcefully denying...[the rights of] each nation to choose their own political system. This demonstrates the amorality of American-style free democracy (Yi 1991:318).

Yi suggested that Korean thinkers return to the spirit of young Marx to find ways to rescue mankind from the

alienating affects of capitalist society. As for Marx's 272

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. later writings, Yi contended that they have lost their relevance and persuasiveness as economic theories (Yi

1991:319). Yi rejected Communist orthodoxy. He appealed for a new realism and for a humanist, self-reliant alternative to American "domination". He appeared to reject most certitudes, except for the major tenet of anti-American apostasy: the notion that South Korea has nothing of moral

value to learn from the United States. Although many influential radical intellectuals have rejected Yi's views as too moderate, Yi remains a respected figure in these circles. His focus on rebuffing America's moral claims, even in the absence of any clear countervailing visions, may yet

be embraced by the radical majority. But whether radical elites continue to uphold orthodox Marxism or merely endorse

Yi's vague socialist humanism, they will likely face the prospects of increased marginalization in Korean society.

Off-campus, at least, the crucial test for any political

group has become its ability to make the political system more responsive to the needs of the majority.

The End of Ideology on Campus?

From 1990, the most noteworthy development was the growing popularity of politically uncommitted student

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32 in 1990 (Kvonahwang Shinmun. (Seoul edition) December 6, 1989; Dong A Ilbo (Washington.,D.C. edition) December 2, 1991) A Sungkyunkwan University student body representative observed in 1992 that most politically-oriented events have been dropped in favor of cultural and sports events. The latest movement involves a concern for "healthy" dressing and food (Dong-A Ilbo. February 21, 1992). Cultural nationalism is expressed mainly in a concern for simplicity,

a revulsion against the meretricious excesses that American society is made to symbolize. In another sign of ideological fatigue, sales of Marxist-Leninist literature have dropped dramatically since 1991. One of the most popular writers at present is not Mao or Trotsky, but Isaac Asimov. And following years of

attention to romanticizing the student movement, novelists are returning to more traditional themes.

Radical miscalculations appear to have hastened these changes. In July 1990 Chondaehvop erred when it decided to send representative Im Su-kyong to North Korea's World Festival of Youth and Students. Her critical remarks about South Korea offended many students. In addition, the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. persistence of radical factionalism left some erstwhile supporters disillusioned. More important, perhaps, was the widespread perception that the radical cause was neither as clear nor as compelling now that Chun had been removed from government.

Although the new Roh Tae-woo government had not received much of a popular mandate, with just 36 percent of the vote, it had won the elections in a fair contest. Opposition attempts to blame the outcome on election-rigging were greeted by most citizens with stony silence or angry calls

for new opposition leadership. Moreover, on the whole, Roh Tae-woo has created a freer political atmosphere. The press is more independent

and diverse than ever. The military has lost much political influence. Roh has adopted a more resilient approach to radical demands. One of the best examples of the new style was Roh's decision, in April 1991, to fire his Interior

Minister in response to student protests. The students had

charged that police had beat a student to death. Instead of denying the story, or cracking down harshly on demonstrators

as Chun had done on similar occasions, Roh acknowledged that

students had been "victimized" by the police. Though it is possible to overstate the accomplishments of the Roh government, it is without doubt the most tolerant government

South Koreans have seen in 3 0 years. Among the lesser factors accounting for the change

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. was the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which did much to dispel the mystique of communism. Not only did communist revolution seem less romantic and chic; it appeared

downright anti-populist as people battled the communist state for their rights. Politically uncommitted students capitalized on the turn inward with with their focus on school autonomy, student welfare and other campus-related issues.

Why, then, do Chamintu student body presidents continue to dominate student politics, occupying 50.9

percent of the posts nationwide? (Dong-A Ilbo. Washington, D.C. edition, December 2, 1991). First, the level of

political institutionalization is still quite low. Chamintu's confrontational style is seen as reckless, but not precisely aberrant behavior. Second, nationalism in South Korea is as strong as ever. Perceptions that Koreans

have an obligation to extirpate a shameful historical legacy have not abated. Moreover, as an October 1988 SNU poll shows, 84.5 percent of students believe that South Korea is still "subordinate" to the United States. So far, no other group has come forward that addresses this problem as

forcefully as does Chamintu. Third, Koreans are still struggling with the problem of national identity. They long to be modern, but as already noted, what is modern is seen as Western. Thus, many Koreans, students especially, believe

that the country still lacks a "soul", that is, a Korean

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. soul. Fourth, Koreans still resent the extraordinarily high profile that the United States enjoys in their country.

Fifth, the Korean people appear to be in a reformist mood. A nationwide Dona-A Ilbo poll conducted on August 27, 1988 found that 12.4 percent of respondents desired some mix of

democracy and communism as a political system after reunification. More (19.8 percent) favored a mixed capitalist/communist economy. And the majority (70.8 percent) supported the establishment of socialist parties. With its steadfast dedication to upholding national

dignity and well-being, Chamintu has a sense of purpose and a spirit of sacrifice which many students continue to admire. Against Chamintu. a more moderate organization risks appearing more equivocal, less morally "pure". It would necessarily endorse some features of a modern capitalist society. It would certainly not reject economic and other

ties with the world community. A moderate organization could not support a wholesale purging of the "rotten" elements of society. While most students make compromises with the existing order, many still look up to those who make no compromises.

Chamintu's position is further strengthened by the emergence, since the mid-1980s, of a large complement of radical anti-American scholars in the social sciences (Kim Jin-kyun et al 1989:23-25). 18/ Unlike the earlier generation of "miniung scholars", this "third generation" is

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approach than to appeal to sentiment. 19/ They have been largely trained in South Korea. From their near total preoccupation with Korean problems, we can see that these intellectuals are nationalist first, and Marxist second. 20/

Most significant, they are responsible for a tremendous outpouring of social science literature that is clearly influenced by dependency theory. Together, Chamintu (and the Juche faction generally) the "third generation", and former student activists who remain active in dissident circles, 21/ have been the most strident nationalists. They reject everything that is not

authentically Korean. They reject, in principle at least, all American attempts to dominate South Korea, whether materially or spiritually. They reject capitalism, which they see merely as another American import. In the Korean

context, such a stance virtually guarantees their popularity. In addition, they have demonstrated their willingness to jeopardize their careers for their beliefs.

In contrast, the second generation, the group most associated with pro-Americanism, is widely believed to have compromised themselves personally, and to have lost all pretensions to nationalism because of their U.S. ties. Unintentionally, therefore, the sustained barrage of nationalist rhetoric by government and media alike enhances

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the image of radicals. As ardent nationalists, their "progressive" label cannot be challenged. 22/ In conclusion, while radical fervor appears to be

waning on Korean campuses, the hunger for national pride remains— as embodied in such causes as reunification,

greater national self-reliance, and even personal moral "purification". As long as Korean students remain critical

of their national self-image and their perceived image in the eyes of others, radical ideology is likely to remain popular in intellectual circles. Off campus, however,

radicals still appear reluctant to fully engage themselves in the give-and-take of mainstream politics. As marginal figures in relatively quiet times, their anti-American ideas

are likely to remain influential chiefly in intellectual circles.

Congruity and Incongruity between the Goals and Beliefs of

Radicals and Moderates on Campus

How have Chamintu and other radical groups influenced student opinion? It is difficult to be certain. Before the

1987 elections, and even today, "pro-communist" sympathies are not a matter for casual discussion. One approach is to evaluate the content of student papers and dissertations. A 1990 survey estimated that in recent years, 80-90 percent of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. masters' dissertations from SNU's Department of Sociology were based on Marxist methodology (Yi Hwa-su 1990:42).

Another approach is to survey student opinion. Public opinion polls cannot directly gauge radical influence, but they do enable us to better understand how activist and non activist beliefs and goals compare. First, let us consider the extent to which radical and moderate students have defied prescribed political opinion. For example, by 1987, how many college students believed that North Korea was a Soviet puppet, as had been taught in high school? MSRI reported that 3 0.1 percent of students agreed with the statement: "There is self-reliance in North Korean politics" (Dong Heung-ryul 1987:63). High school students were also taught that the Soviet Union was mainly responsible for the division of Korea. But college students were not so sure. The same MSRI poll shows that in 1987, 31 percent of students surveyed fully agreed

with the view that U.S. policies were responsible for the division of Korea after liberation. Another 54.3 percent indicated partial agreement (Dong Heung-ryul and Yi Hee-duk

1987a:5) .

Radical students were more than twice as likely to fully agree that the United States was responsible for division. That is, 78.5 percent fully agreed with the statement, with only .7 percent of them in complete disagreement. By contrast, only 22.6 percent of conservative

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. students fully agreed with the statement. However, the poll shows that on this issue, there was less polarization than one might expect: among conservative students, 61 percent partially agreed with the statement. Only 1.8 percent of conservative students fully disagreed (Do Heung-ryul and Yi Hee-duk 1987b:20). Thus we may suppose that conservative

students are not completely unreceptive to radical expressions of bitterness toward the United States. Of course, responsibility and blame for something are not identical. The poll does not tell us how angry most students are about the U.S. role in division, an important measure of anti-Americanism. But the 1987 poll by MSRI revealed that 29.5 percent of the students considered the United States to be the main obstacle to reunification. North Korea was only second, the choice of 26.5 percent of students. South Korea was cited by 24.7 percent, while just 7.8 percent identified the Soviet Union as the chief

obstacle. Thus more than half of students surveyed had

highly unorthodox views on reunification (Do Heung-ryul et al 1987b:8).

Unorthodoxy was not merely rampant among students.

Just one year later, in the 1988 Donq-A Ilbo poll already

cited, 50.3 percent of respondents surveyed nationwide believed that the United States was not only responsible for division but also a major obstacle to reunification as well. This flatly contradicts what Korean students learned in high

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. school, namely, that the North Korean Communists [and the Soviet Union] posed the greatest obstacle to reunification. Second, let us examine the degree to which students harbor anti-American sentiments. The MSRI poll asked: "What is the chief obstacle to the development of democracy in

South Korea?" The most popular response, chosen by 37.5 percent of the students was the "undemocratic nature of the South Korean leadership". "Military involvement in politics" ranked second, with 32.4 percent. "The immaturity of popular conceptions of democracy" came next with 16.2 percent of responses. Finally, "foreign influences, including the United States" was chosen by only 10.6 percent (Do Heung- ryul et al 1987a:15).

Thus, judging the student body as a whole, virulent anti-Americanism— simply defined here as the tendency to blame the United States for domestic ills— was supported by a significant, but still small minority of respondents.

Predictably student "activists" and "radicals" were much

more likely to view the United States as the foremost obstacle to democracy, at 47.4 percent and 55.6 percent,

respectively (Do Heung-ryul et al 1987a:35). The poll suggests that moderate students are much more likely to blame state repression first for the lack of democracy in South Korea. Minmintu would agree, while Chamintu does not.

Yet Chamintu is the more popular organization. Apparently this difference in emphasis is not very important.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The results of MSRI's July 1989 poll reinforce the conclusion that, despite differences in emphasis, the

majority of young Koreans — nearly 60 percent— support anti-American demonstrations. However, even this poll is difficult to interpret, given the degree to which anti-

American demonstrations are simultaneously anti-government demonstrations. What is clear, of course, is how polarized the generations are on this question.

Table 1. — Support for Anti-American Demonstrations, by Age:

Youna Generation Older Generation Agree 59.9 26.1 Disagree 40.1 73.9 Total 100.0 100.0 Source; Nam Hui-yong (1989:18). Persons over 36 were classified as members of the older generation. According to this classification, 40 percent of the population consists of the younger generation.

The same poll also evaluated the results according to education and income. The poll indicates significantly greater support for anti-American demonstrations among

higher-income and more educated respondents:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 2. — Support for Anti-American Démonstrations, by

Level of Education

m . Youna (Generation Older Generation Low Hiah Low Hiah Agree 51.3 73.9 23.4 38.6 Disagree 48.7 26.1 76.6 61.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source; Nam Hui-yong (1989:32). Respondents with no more than high school diplomas are classified as having a low level of education; some college or above ranks as high education.

Table 3. — Support for Anti-American Demonstrations, by Income

111 Youna (Generation Older Generation Low Hiah Low Hiah Agree 57.9 67.1 23.8 33.6 Disagree 42.1 32.9 76.2 66.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Nam Hui-yong (1989:32). Household income above 700,000 won is classified as high level of income.

The 1989 poll shows that age is more closely associated with support for anti-American demonstrations

than either education or income. A young person with little

education is still more likely to support the demonstrations than an older person with more education. A lesser but also significant factor is high level of education. High incomes also show a positive correlation with support for anti- American demonstrations, but this discrepancy is less

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. significant and may actually reflect the correlation between higher incomes and higher education. Another poll conducted by a monthly magazine lends additional support to the finding that age is the single most important correlate of anti-Americanism. When college students and their parents were asked "Which foreign country

do you like the best?" the most popular reply of students was Switzerland, chosen by 21 percent. America ranked only fourth among students, garnering 7.8 percent of responses. By contrast, parents chose the United States by an overwhelming margin: 48.6 percent. Parenthetically, one should note that the main appeal of Switzerland is probably its neutrality. Although students undoubtedly admire the

rustic beauty of its countryside, there is little evidence to suggest that most students have any special knowledge of, or intrinsic interest in, Switzerland. To the question, "Which country do you like the least?" more than half of both parents and students chose Japan. The generation gap is revealed in the student's second choice— the United States. However, the United States

does not even appear as one of the countries cited by

parents as least favorite.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 4. — Country of Preference: Most Favored Colleae Students Parents (1) Switzerland 21.0% U.S.A. 48.6% (2) France 11.8% Switzerland 21.6% (3) Taiwan 9.8% Taiwan 5.4% f4) U.S.A. 7.8% — —

Least Favored Colleae Students Parents (1) Japan 52.1% Japan 54 .1% (2) U.S.A. 17.6% U.S.S.R. 8.1% (3) U.S.S.R. 11.8% North Korea 8.1% (4L North Korea 5.9% — Source: Kim Han-gu (1987:229).

As the statistics suggest, anti-Japanese sentiment is high among young and old generations alike. But anti- American sentiment is only prominent among younger generations, and probably higher than the statistics would appear to indicate. If students were free to choose two countries instead of one, it is possible that the United

States would share first place with Japan. 2 3/ Another poll conducted in June 1988 by Donq-A Ilbo approached the subject a little differently. It asked

whether the respondents felt a sense of "affinity" with the

United States. Only 37.4 percent answered in the affirmative. The low response is astonishing when one considers that an identical poll four years earlier found

nearly 70 percent acknowledging affinity with the United States. But whether this represents a drop among younger

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. respondents alone or members of the older generation as well is not clear from this poll.

More revealing, perhaps, was a poll conducted the month before by the Seoul Research Institute. It asked respondents how they judged Korean-American relations. The majority, 42.2 percent said that Korean-American relations were unfair; 38.4 percent said that both sides pursued their mutual interests in a fair manner; and only 12.3 percent

characterized relations as a blood alliance free from

calculations of national interest. It would have been interesting to know how angry the 42.2 percent were about the perceived unfairness, who they blamed for it, and whether they thought the United States was deliberately trying to harm Korean interests. In sum, the polls reviewed here are of limited value for understanding anti-Americanism. They measure dissatisfaction with U.S.-Korean relations, not distrust of

the United States. Dissatisfaction or dislike, for example, may be founded on incompatible goals and values, not

generalized hostility. To really gauge the breadth and depth of anti-American sentiments, the polls will have to inquire

into more than just the likes and dislikes of Korean citizens. They will have to explore the degree to which

their respondents may or may not be hostile to the United States, the degree to which the United States is thought to pose a threat to Korean society, and the nature of that

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society is also highly relevant.

Non-Marxist Sources of Anti-American Sentiment

The Green Movement: The Rise of Middle-Class Populism and Radicalism

In recent years, middle-class organizations have arisen that have had a genuinely populist orientation. And, like many other populist organizations, these groups often

incorporate xenophobic themes in their programs. Although the radical student movement dominates organized anti- American activities, these new groups should not be ignored. Though relatively small at present, these organizations stand to grow as democracy and national prosperity grows,

much as the middle class movements of Western Europe have done (Parkin 1968).

Like their Western European counterparts, the Korean middle class began to organize campaigns for consumer

protection, and against nuclear weapons, war, pollution, and economic inequality. One of the earliest of these groups was

the Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection in Korea (CACPK). Founded in 1983, CACPK was influenced by earlier efforts at consumer protection by the YWCA.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Organizations like this seem to herald the beginning of a more constructive spirit in domestic politics. However, their strong populist tendencies also help to inflame anti- American sentiment. The most flagrant example of this approach was their appeal to Korean consumers not to buy foreign (mainly U.S.) cigarettes. The organization's focus

on American rather than all cigarettes as a health hazard raised the specter once again of an exploitative America, ready to make money at the Korean people's expense. More anti-American were the allegations made by the Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ). According to this group American cigarettes used dangerous pesticides.

Similarly, American agricultural goods were safe for domestic consumption, while exports were laced with harmful preservatives. 25/

In December 1989 several individuals sympathetic to the Green movement declared their intention to establish a Green party. However, the group has been plagued by financial problems and lack of organizational skills.

Founded in March 1991, the League for the Anti-Nuclear Peace

Movement is among the most expressly anti-American of the

Greens. Their manifesto proclaims: "[we] will fight against domestic and foreign forces who support nuclear [weapons and energy] alongside the Korean miniunq." Their goal is to amend the constitution, establishing South Korea as a

nuclear-free zone. They have also proposed that the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. governments of North and South Korea sign a non-aggression pact. To publicize their views they give open lectures, publish books and stage plays dramatizing the dangers of nuclear weapons and energy fDong-A Ilbo. Washington edition March 23, 1991).

In February 1991 the Christian Women's Peace Research

Institute spearheaded a campaign designed to thwart U.S. efforts to gain support for their prosecution of the Gulf War. The ad hoc group was called Mothers Against the Gulf War and the Dispatching of Korean Troops. Chairing this group was Kim Yun-ok, who denounced the war as an

opportunity for the big powers (i.e. the United States) to engage in the "dirty" pursuit of their own interests.

Meanwhile, said Kim, innocent lives and the environment were being hurt CDong-A Ilbo. Washington edition,February 27, 1991).

Notwithstanding their anti-American tendencies, these middle class organizations are not likely to carry anti-

Americanism to the lengths that became common among many

radical student organizations. Unlike the student organizations, the middle class populist-radicals do not

immerse themselves in ideological rites of passage and other forms of clandestine ritual. All share a more programmatic, and less expressive, orientation to Korean politics. These

tendencies should result in less intense, more intermittent expressions of anti-American sentiments.

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In 1986, at the height of radical anti-American fervor, one of America's foremost Korea specialists maintained that, before 1980, anti-Americanism in South

Korea was "about as common as fish in trees" (Gregory Henderson in The Washington Post. July 1, 1986). Perhaps this is true according to the restrictive definition of anti-Americanism offered in this study. But it is also misleading. Anti-American sentiments have been as integral a part of most Korean psyches as pro-American enthusiasms. Nowhere is this more clear than in South Korean literature that emerged after the end of Japanese occupation. Until the late 1970s few novels dealt exclusively with Korean-U.S. themes. Most were about the sheer desperation of life in the post-Korean-war period. But those that did

tended to portray America unsympathetically. A popular theme explored the relationship between a Korean prostitute (or poor houseboy) and American GIs fShortv Kim 1957). Typically, the prostitute was victimized and defiled by

selfish, overpowering U.S. soldiers. The portrayal of a weak and pure Korea helpless before the predations of powerful and impure America was not new. As we have seen, such fears

of American cultural "pollution" were expressed as early as the 1940s. But the American image in many of the novels of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the 1940s. But the American image in many of the novels of

the 1970s seemed even more sinister. 26/ With the partial relaxation of political repression in the 1980s, novelists could afford to make their political views somewhat more explicit. A favorite theme expressed Korean disillusionment with the American "liberators", who soon were seen as occupiers, and sometimes even rapists. 27/ In Silver Stallion. Ahn Jung-hyo builds on this theme by stressing Koreans' yearning to have liberated themselves, their shame at having failed to do so. Another familiar theme questioned the conventional view of the Vietnam war as

symbolizing the struggle between free democracy and subversive communism. The revised interpretation in the 1980s incorporated the thinking of miniunq ideology,

portrays America's humiliation of Asian people, who served as their servants and prostitutes. The South Korean troops,

far from being crusaders for freedom, as the Korean government had claimed, were no more than U.S. mercenaries, or accomplices, perhaps. 28/ Yet another category of novels pointed to U.S. culpability in the Kwangju incident. 29/ Some novels have even dealt with the U.S. economic

"invasion" of Korea. 30/ The unusually harsh judgment that American cultural imperialism represents a calculated attempt to subjugate the Korean "colony" is expressed in Koppi [Reins] by Yun Chong-mo. 31/ In the above novels, Americans have been characterized

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. as 1) betrayers and manipulators 2) exploiters personifying

capitalism 3) cultural imperialists who undermine faith and the authority of traditional culture and 4) sexual aggressors. With Chung Do-sang's novel, "America Dream" [sic] (1990) we have a fifth category, that of inhuman, diabolical murderers of Korean children. Before describing this novel I should point out the the five categories noted above are not original with me. They have been adapted from Fein's (1987:72) thematic analysis of classic anti-semitic tracts. The similarities between anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism are thus highly suggestive. In America Dream. the author tells the story of an American family whose natural son has terminal heart disease. The couple learns that only way they can save their son is by arranging for a heart transplant operation. They

decide to adopt a Korean orphan, who they bring to their home and treat kindly for a few days. The trusting boy is delighted with his new parents. But when he is brought to

the hospital for a "checkup", he is killed by a doctor. His heart is then transplanted into the body of the family's

natural son. The dead Korean boy is put into a black plastic bag and discarded like garbage. This story presumably relates the author's view of the Korean-U.S. relationship: America takes what it wants from Korea for its own use, regardless of the consequences for Korea.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. One might dismiss this work as the effort of an obscure young writer. Yet one of South Korea's most famous directors, Kim Soo-yong, attempted to turn the novel into a

movie. Only vehement protests from the American cultural center seem to have put an end to the project— for now. 32/ Curiously, the inspiration for this work seems to have come from rumors first reported in the Honduran press in 1987. According to these rumors, foreign children had been kidnapped and murdered so that their organs could be transplanted into the bodies of rich American children. Since then, one or another version of this story is said to have surfaced in at least fifty countries. Although none of

the accusers could substantiate their charges, these crude, xenophobic rumors persist (Schrieberg 1990:12; cf. Arevalo 1961:251). Although ethnocentric prejudices are a recurring

feature of these anti-American novels, it would be a mistake

to assume that anti-Americanism is simply the byproduct of

ethnocentrism. The critical element in all these works is Korean shame at their dependency on the United States, not just economic or military, but psychological. Typically, the

greatest expressions of rage and bitterness are leveled not at the Americans, but at the cowardly, sycophantic Korean characters who tacitly accept American superiority. Thus anti-Americanism is revealed as rage directed not primarily

at specific wrongs committed by Americans, not even at

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. American arrogance or perfidy at a whole, but at Korean self-loathing which keeps the country in psychological

bondage to the United States. Some of this self recrimination is apparent in the testimonies and wills of student radicals. In their formulaic political tracts however, much of this sentiment is suppressed. After all, it is appropriate for radicals to flay Korean politicians for servile obedience to U.S. whims, but it is inappropriate, even heretical, to criticize the miniunq (or

themselves) for displaying feelings of national inadequacy. The profound sense of national shame is also apparent in anti-American poems, which have proliferated since the 1980s with the growth of the student movement. But because so many of these poems served as vehicles of political protest, they were often little more than diatribes written for the pleasure of radical audiences. In the following example, America is criticized for its hypocrisy and its

arrogant condescension to other people, who are treated worse than dogs;

Dialoque Between an American Doq and a Korean Doq Korean dog; Hello, American dog. Your country is a bizarre society, a dog's paradise, where dog's live luxuriously; How ridiculous that a dog's life is pampered, while your neighbors like El Salvador have no human rights. Our master's country has been trampled by Yankees, Japanese and Russians who divided our territory. Hello, American dog. We are willing to sacrifice our lives for our master. We are happy. We can't understand civilized Americans putting the rights of dogs over those of people. Murderous humanism! Goodbye, happy American dog (New York Times. July 26, 1987). 295

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. However, the lines that reveal the subject's viewpoint, the Korean dog, are full of deception. The Korean dog claims that it does not want to live in a dog's paradise, that it wants to sacrifice its rights and its own life for its Korean master— hardly a plausible attitude for either dog or human. The falseness of the proposition is exposed in the last line which seethes with bitter sarcasm and envy toward the fate of the happy American dog. The poem, whether

deliberately or not, points to the need of the Korean dog to adopt a nationalistic, contented posture so as not to be ridiculed by the American dog. 33/

Anti-American Sentiments Among the General Public

Anti-American sentiments had risen among the general population in the 1980s. Radical students had dared to challenge official (though muted) pro-Americanism. They had become the first to embrace the label "anti-American".

Moreover, their denunciations of the United States had been

harsh. They had dared to burn "Uncle Sam" in effigy, to burn or trample upon the U.S. flag. At first, such sights were shocking. But over the months and years, the public grew

accustomed to them. Gradually, more and more people among the older generation could be heard to refer to Americans as "Miquknom" (American bastards).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. This transformation might have taken place much earlier in a freer political climate. The mixture of curiosity and respect with which Americans were generally

greeted in the first three decades following liberation had been the product of the great social distance that existed between the two peoples. The American stereotype in many Korean minds, was that of a white male, prosperous, tall, strong, educated, and of high status. The prevailing Korean

self-image was that of an ignorant, slothful peasant. But as Koreans themselves grew educated, moved to the cities, and acquired enough prosperity to think of themselves as middle class, the perceived social distance had narrowed. It is difficult to assign dates to this transformation. Since the turn of the century at least, Korean elites had begun to think of themselves as worthy of equal treatment by Westerners. But by the 197 0s, certainly. South Korea's remarkable economic transformation had produced many more citizens whose educational and vocational achievements had narrowed the perceived gap between themselves and Americans. The 1970s was a period of worsening political

repression. The Park regime derived much of its legitimacy from its proclaimed ability to thwart Communist aggression, and it could only do so with confidence as long as it enjoyed American support. Anti-Americanism was thus politically taboo. At the same time, the government and the

intelligentsia exalted nationalism as the paramount virtue

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of its citizens. To be less than a passionate nationalist was to be a traitor or opportunist, a sadaeiu'uiia who only admired what was American. Even the rare individual who affirmed some interest in internationalism had to display, simultaneously, the greatest national zeal. The crumbling legitimacy of the Chun government loosened inhibitions on expressions of anti-American sentiment. Meanwhile, nationalist fervor continued to grow. Individual yearnings for greater national respect were intensified by a nationalistic press, government, and academic community.

The Seoul Olympic Games: Anti-American Sentiment Surges

As we have seen, Chun Doo-hwan's commitment to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games was so great that it almost

overrode his determination to quell dissent. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of South Koreans had made a deep emotional investment in the games. 34/ The Olympics were to

inaugurate the beginning of a new image of South Korea. Foreigners would see that the poverty and depredations of the Korean War were a thing of the past. Koreans desperately wanted an opportunity to show how three decades of rapid economic growth had transformed Korea into a "civilized"

country, a country worthy of respect. To do this, they were

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. eager to show their best side to the world, and do their best to conceal less attractive aspects. 35/ Unfortunately, neither the American athletes nor the the American press shared this mission. At the opening ceremonies, the American athletes clowned for the cameras as

they conducted a disorderly parade around the track. To Koreans, who had awaited this moment for seven years, the opening ceremonies were a solemn and emotional event. They had never seen such antics at any other Olympic event. Many

were quick to conclude that the display symbolized American contempt for South Korea (Washington Post. September 27, 1988). 36/ NBC's editorial policy also angered the public. Most Koreans did not see the broadcasts but they did read about them in the Korean newspapers. According to the unanimous opinions of the Korean print and electronic media, NBC had deliberately attempted to expose unflattering aspects of the

country. They had chosen to film a dirty, traditional markets instead of gleaming, state-of-the art shopping complexes. They filmed shanty towns when they should have

restricted their coverage to skyscrapers and modern apartment buildings 37/. Since the government-controlled Korean media had for years routinely downplayed unfavorable domestic news in favor of upbeat reports on modernization,

the U.S. media's unrestrained look at poverty in Korea was certainly shocking by contrast.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Public anger finally exploded when NBC repeatedly showed footage of the Korean boxer who was staging a sit- down protest and also frequently replayed footage of the coach accosting the referee. The Korean press complained

that "the foreign media does not mention whether the referee's call was fair; they just exaggerated the facts. NBC, in particular, concentrated on negative coverage, including the boxing episodes" (Donq-A Ilbo Washington edition, September 30, 1988). Koreans were similarly enraged by the conduct of some

American athletes off the track. An American swimmer and his friend were charged with stealing a lion mask from a hotel. An American runner was arrested for kicking a taxi following an altercation with the driver. Many also felt insulted when one swimmer declined a drink of Seoul's tap water. Earlier, upon his arrival at Kimpo airport, an eagerly awaited American track star shoved Korean security and rudely

brushed aside questions from reporters. During the Olympic Games, Moscow sent the Moscow Philharmonic and the Bolshoi Ballet Company. But the United States appeared less forthcoming and less interested in the

cultural events. All of these gestures, taken together, convinced Koreans that Americans had rejected them as inferior. What appeared to Americans to have been minor and unintended slights, were to Koreans unmistakeable proof of contempt.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The startled Americans had not realized that, underlying the Koreans' strong national pride in those weeks, was an intense collective anxiety, a fear of being shamed. People who had not paid much attention to anti-American slogans before were now inclined to see the United States as an

arrogant colonial master (Chae Chung-ku 1988:33). KBS TV polls conducted in August and October 1988 confirmed these changes in sentiments. In August, 56 percent of respondents chose the United States as one of the three countries they liked best. In October, just 40 percent did so. Those who disliked the United States rose from 16 percent to 38 percent. A poll conducted in December showed

similar results, suggesting that anti-American sentiments may have continued to rise months after the Olympic Games had ended. The December 1988 poll revealed that 47 percent of respondents said they disliked America, almost twice as

many as those who said they disliked Japan (25 percent) . Of those who expressed a dislike for America, 84 percent claimed that their attitude was chiefly influenced by NBC's coverage of the Games (Donq-A Ilbo. Washington edition, September 2, 1989). The poll also showed that 49 percent of

respondents expressed regard for the Soviet Union, 43 percent for China, 34 percent for East Germany. 38/ SNU polls conducted in December 198 6 and December 1988 also confirm an increase in public antipathies toward the United States. Asked in 1986 whether they would cheer for

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the United States or China in a sports contest, 87 percent of respondents chose the United States. Two years later, following the Olympic Games, the proportion had plummeted to just 58 percent. The 1986 poll also showed that only 14 percent of respondents depicted Korean-U.S. relations as deteriorating; in 1988, the proportion had risen to 55 percent. SNU sociologist Han Wan-sang interpreted these results as indicating "a sharp increase in anti- Americanism". However, this seems to read too much into the poll results. All we can reliably conclude from the poll is

that the Olympics had soured the public mood (kibun) toward the United States.

After the Olympics had ended, opinion was divided on the future of Korean public attitudes toward the United States. One U.S. diplomat feared that the Korean uproar over U.S. conduct would have an enduring impact (The Washington

Post. October 8, 1988). Korean officials apparently agreed.

In September President Roh urged his cabinet to help bring anti-American sentiments under control by carefully weighing their remarks and by persuading newpaper editors and publishers to do the same (Washington Post September 30,

1988). In the end, most Korean officials eagerly dismissed

the surge of popular anger as a temporary phenomenon. In retrospect, we should note that Koreans have neither forgotten the collective experience of anger toward the United States, nor transformed it into a powerful symbol. It

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the capacity to deeply wound Korean self-esteem.

In sum, public attitudes toward the United States in the 1980s and after were based on varying, unresolved

mixtures of resentment and admiration. Most people lacked an ideological framework in which to sort out their emotions. They had not participated in study cell initiation rites, demonstrations, or any of the score of activities that

helped to congeal anti-American sentiment into an "ism" among radical students.

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1. The 9 P.M. primetime news regularly opened with a story on Chun's daily activities. Tired of this nightly ritual, many Koreans began to imitate the opening moments of the news this way— Ding, Dong, Dang [nine o'clock strikes]: "Bald-head!" Chun's wife was not immune to ridicule, either. Much as Chun's predecessor Park inspired fear and anger, he was not the butt of popular derision, and his wife was genuinely revered as a virtuous woman.

2. Students who got jobs as workers were closely monitored by the government. 3. Chang Dal-chong, in his influential study of anti- Americanism as a political movement, refers to the students as "anti-foreign nationalists". Similarly, the late Choi Sung-il, another leading scholar in the field, identified them as nationalists who, despite their use of Marxist rhetoric, must be sharply distinguished from Marxists in Third World countries (1989:11). The reluctance of Korean scholars to identify these students as Marxists is understandable when one considers that the struggle for reforms in South Korea has been more a contest over righteousness than a struggle over discrete policies. Nevertheless, it obscures an important aspect of the anti- American phenomenon in South Korea.

4. Tanje is the pseudonym of nationalist historian Sin Ch'ae-ho (1880-1936). 5. Kang Choi, which means "steel" was Kim's pseudonym) (Kang Choi Soshin).

6. Haebang Sun'un [Declaration of Liberation] No. 2, April 17, 1986, p.3. This newpaper represents the views of the Student Federation to Save the Country. The Federation also puts out a political magazine called Guguk ui Hamsung routcrv to Save the Countrvl.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7. Chamintu did occasionally link American and Japanese imperialism and call for the ouster of all foreign capital. But as noted, anti-Japanese slogans and activities were very much in the background. Chamintu members were, of course, not the only ones to chafe at the way that Koreans toadied before representatives of U.S. government, academia and the press.

8. Chong Min makes this point in Yang Dong-an et al 1989.

9. Because of its close identification with North Korean ideology, the Juche faction had been suspected by South Korean intelligence of having been infiltrated by North Korean agents. However, this is not necessarily the case. Kim Young-hwan claims to have listened to clandestine North Korean radio broadcasts called "Voice of National Salvation" (Guguk ui Sori Banasonaf. Listening to these broadcasts is still a crime under South Korean law. 10. From the mid-1980s, study cell members began to make extensive use of "code words" in their speech. Among themselves and in their pamphlets, they abbreviated imperialism as "im-pae", instead of fascism, they said "eff" instead of capitalism, they said "cap". For bourgeoisie, they said "Bi-gi", and for proletariat "Pi-ti".

11. In South Korea, high school and college students spend two hours each week in military training and college freshmen and sophomores spend several days each year in a military camp for additional training. Most young men spend a mandatory three years in military service, after which they are organized into home defense and civil defense units.

12. None of these organizations are headed by charismatice leadership. Those who have died for the cause are remembered fondly by student activists, yet the movement as a whole remains highly impersonal. 13. Minmintu participated as did a short-lived alliance called Minkuknvon but the slogans and leaflets were mainly typical of Chamintu's position. 14. The SNU group that organized the Minmintu and its Central Committee was called the Struggle Committee for Democratization (Miniuhwa Tuchaeng Wiwonhoe) .

15. For more information about Minmintu's demonstrations see Kang Shin-chol et al (1989:151-2).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16. Later reports indicated that Chun had been on the verge of a decision to establish martial law in select cities throughout the country, on or around June 19. He is said to have changed his mind when moderates pointed to the grave risks such action posed to the future of the Seoul Olympics and ROK relations with the United States, among other countries.

17. For more information on the PD faction see Park Duk-gun 1989:402-411; II Song Chung eds.1990:243.

18. These scholars, though by no means a small minority among intellectuals, are nevertheless alienated from the mainstream academic community. They are often unable to secure tenured positions as university professors, where hiring determined by the second generation scholars. For many, the only recourse is to find work at small progressive research institutes and publishing houses. These positions are not as prestigious or secure as is the position of university professor. But because of greatly relaxed government restrictions on publications, they have the satisfaction, at least, of disseminating their views. 19. The first generation consists of scholars who studied in Japan during the colonial period. The second represents scholars who studied in the United States during the post-liberation period. 20. Ironically, these nationalistic radical students and intellectuals have also been markedly influenced by Japanese Marxist scholars. Many Koreans consider the Japanese as more experienced with the process of amalgamating Eastern and Western thought, customs, and artistic expression. Thus the interest of left-leaning Koreans in the radical thought of Japan is not surprising, despite their often strongly anti-Japanese sentiments). The main contribution of the Japanese Marxist scholars is to indicate ways in which Western Marxist doctrines can be adapted to an Asian setting. Unlike many Western scholars, Korean radical intellectuals display little intrinsic interest in class conflicts elsewhere in the world; attention to international affairs is riveted to U.S. imperialist activities around the world, and even then, the central concern is to determine the bearing these developments may have on events in Korea. 21. Many student activists, after graduation, have found work with labor organizations, Christian urban missions, publishing houses, and schools. Others become miniunq poets, novelists, painters, and musicians. In consequence, anti-American and miniung ideology spread into

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. non-student circles over time. In 1989 the Dona-A Ilbo cited official estimates that placed the core left-leaning forces on campus 6,500; in labor organizations, they numbered 2,200; in publishing, cultural and educational fields, 1,000; and professional activists and religious organizations, 800, for a total of 10,500 core members. fPoncf-A Ilbo. July 1, 1989, Washington, D.C. edition). Whether close to the mark or not, these estimates cannot tell us how influential these core members are. 22. No progressive group in South Korea is dedicated to changes in personal lifestyle. A concern with personal values, or self-fulfilment is considered selfish, and hence illegitimate. This constitutes a major difference between existentialist members of the Left in 1960s Europe and America, and the overwhelmingly nationalist left in South Korea.

23. Of course, admitting that the United States is one's least favorite country does not make one anti- American. However, considering the circumstances under which the poll was administered, one can be reasonably sure that ranking the United States as "least favorite" is indicative of strong resentment. The results for Japan are similarly suggestive.

24. In August 1990, the Libyan Ambassador to South Korea proposed to serve as a go-between for Chonminnvon and the Libyan "people's organizations" to form an anti- American, anti-foreign coalition fPong-A Ilbo (Washington, P.C. edition) August 27, 1990:28). Chonminnvon offered to "consider" the proposal, which implied a polite rejection. Whatever other calculations may have been involved, the main reason why Chonminnvon and other dissident organizations have not tried to "internationalize" their movement is that, in the final analysis, they are nationalists with an almost exclusive interest in Korean problems. Ironically, to the extent that there is an international connection, it is to the left-leaning and humanitarian organizations in the United States. American (largely missionary) humanitarian organizations had helped protect and inspire nationalist movements in the colonial period; today, these organizations play a lesser but still influential role in the Korean human rights movement. 25. Founded in July 1989 by professionals, religious figures, and scholars, the organization is committed to incremental change. It publishes position papers, hold press conferences, and even takes to the streets now and then. Most members have been former student activists. One of CCEJ's leading spokesmen. Rev. Suh Kyung-suk, for example, had been deeply involved in the student movement under Park

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. regime. Recently, in an unusually frank interview. Rev. Suh acknowledged that he had been a socialist in college. A former engineering student at SNU, Suh organized study cells in the early 1970s. He also introduced liberation theology to the church-based college group to which belonged. In 1982, Suh came to the United States to study theology. Here he met Korean-Americans who had visited North Korea. Suh grew disillusioned with communism. He also was impressed by the sight of so many Korean cars in America. As Suh put it, it was fortunate that the young employees of big Korean companies had not subscribed to dependency theory. Otherwise they would have never have been able to realize such ambitious dreams fDona-A Ilbo (Washington edition) March 20, 1992).

26. Among the most well-known novels in this genre are Wananeung kwa chudun'aun fKina's tomb and stationary troops] by Ha Kun-chan, Haepyok [Sea Jade] by Yi Moon-gu, America by Cho Hae-il, and Hwang'au ui Biaeuk [Tragedy of a Yellow Dog] by Chun Seung-sae. 27. Prominent examples include Taebaek Sanmaek [Taebaek Mountain Range] by Cho Chung-rae and Tak Rvu [Muddy Currents] by Yi Un-jik. 28. Novels taking this view include Muai ui Keunul [Shadow of Arms] by Hwang Suk-young and Hwanasaekin [Yellow Man] by Yi Sang-mun and White Badge by Ahn Junghyo.

29. Kitbal [Flag] by Hong Hee-dam and Yogi. Shikmin ui TTangeso [Here, from the colonial land] by Chung Do-sang. 30. Naega Keurin Nae Olaul Hana [One self-portrait] by Yu Soon-ha is one of the most well-known.

31. For a survey of anti-American literature in the 1980s, see Park Duk-kyu 1989:528-537). 32. John M. Reid, director of the U.S. Cultural Center in Seoul, wrote a letter of protest to Dong-A Ilbo on February 8, 1990 (Washington, D.C. edition):69.

33. For an exhaustive anthology of South Korea's anti- American poetry of the 1980s, consult Im Hon-young (1988). 34. Radicals, of course, had opposed the Seoul Olympic Games from the start. They believed that the Games were deliberate U.S. scheme to prevent reunification. That is, the United States was allegedly trying to perpetuate the division of Korea by encouraging world public opinion to recognize the finality of this division. This excerpt from the will of student radical Cho Sung-man, who committed 308

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. suicide in May 1988, sums up the view of radical opponents of the Olympics: It is unquestionable that the Olympic Games to be held this year are a mandatory rite aimed at maintaining the vested interests of the United States and the present military government. [They] try to perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula through the Olympic Games. This action drives a stake through the heart of Koreans. Because a solution to the problem of Koreans is possible only with the reunification of the country, we must block the anti-nationalistic actions of the United States and the military government, which hinder the reunification of the Korean peninsula. 35. The massive spruce-up effort cost more than $3 billion. 36. (Washington Post. October 3, 1988). It is perhaps worth noting that the American informality which had so offended the Korean spectators at the opening ceremonies was embraced by nearly all foreign athletes at the concluding ceremony.

37. For a well-reasoned defense of the NBC coverage of the Olympic Games, including a list of all Korea-related stories broadcast by NBC News during the Olympic Games see Sisa Nonpvong October 1988.

38. This mood corresponded to the government's efforts to cultivate ties with socialist countries. Due to the newness of these contacts and their upbeat promotion by press and government, Koreans were in the midst of a "honeymoon period" with the East bloc.

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SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS

Shared Beliefs

Korean journalists and scholars often attempted to draw sharp distinctions between the anti-American views of

radicalized elites and the more moderate views of the general public. Much less attention has been devoted to exploring the ways in which radical and moderate views coincide. Yet we should expect many beliefs of student activists and the general public to be congruent. Reflecting the extraordinary degree of ethnic homogeneity in Korea over

the centuries, the Korean language draws heavily upon shared meanings. Subjects are routinely omitted, connections

between thoughts often vague and imprecise. Meaning is often implicit rather than explicit. Much more so than in the West, speech in Korea is persuasive if it strikes the right emotional chord; the persuasiveness of the speech also depends on the perceived sincerity of the speaker. Of

course, homogeneity in speech forms and in culture does not guarantee that people will always draw similar

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. conclusions. It does suggest however, greater homogeneity of values and beliefs than would obtain in multi-cultural societies employing what Bernstein (1979) has called "formal speech" patterns. Radical anti-Americanism in South Korea is characterized by a systematic exposition of the threat which the United States is said to pose to Korean national integrity. Diffuse anti-American sentiments among the general public consist of rather unconnected, and frequently contradictory, beliefs and sentiments that, on balance, incline an individual either toward trust or distrust of

American aims and motivations. Among radicals and moderates alike, the subject's attitudes toward individual Americans are immaterial. What is important is America as a symbolic representation of "otherness"— against which national/self assessments are made.

Korean radicals and moderates share three basic concerns that condition their attitudes toward the United States.

1) Modernization compromises the national identity. Perhaps the broadest generalization that can be made about

radical and moderate views of America is that for both,

America constitutes an "alternative symbolic universe", to borrow a term of Peter Berger's (Berger 1967:108). America

is not merely the most advanced of modern societies. It represents a set of alien Western values— individualism,

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adopted without fully claiming as their own. Most Koreans identify what is authentically Korean with the pre-modern

virtues of a largely impoverished, peasant society. 1 / The process of modernization in Korea has thus been widely understood as a process of compromising national identity. Modernization could be interpreted as an admission that the

"authentic" Korean way was not good enough. Thus, to Koreans, as to other non-Western peoples, America, and the West generally, serves as a continual reminder that Korea is not so much forging its own way as following in another nation's footsteps. 2/

The difference between radicals and moderates is that radicals have adopted a posture of total rejectionism. They reject America as a political, economic and cultural model. In American society, they say, human beings are just tools

of production and objects of sexual enjoyment (Moon Dong- hwan eü al 1988:22). Among those who are avowedly Marxist,

their Marxism is in no way antithetical to nationalism; quite the contrary, it is inseparable from the other aspects of their anti-Western apostasy. They admire Korean

communists and Tonohak rebels equally; both had had the courage to defy Western (and thus, American) pretensions to superiority.

Moderates have chosen to leave these modernizing tensions largely unresolved. Most have judged their personal

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Western ways while, at the same time, resisting full acculturation. Westernizing is adopted to the extent that it strengthens Korea's ability to compete for prestige and power in the world community. It is shunned whenever it threatens to undermine traditional patterns of authority and

national esteem. 3/ Hence the longstanding governmental curbs on American pop and rock music, movies, and television programs. Traditional Korean ambivalence toward wealth is

also a product of fears that status based on wealth rather than merit could upset the social order.

Conservative scholar Lee Yong-hee has been an outspoken critic of untrammeled Westernization. To him,

"cosmopolitanism" means capitulation to foreign domination, which can only lead to the estrangement of younger and older generations (Chung Chong-shik et al 1979:65). Rapid social change in the South, based on the American pattern, also

threatens to make national division permanent (Park Kwon- Sang 1984a:548).

2) Korean-U.S. relations are not marked by parity. Secondly, both radicals and moderates are keenly aware that the "structure of attention" in the Korean-U.S. relationship is overwhelmingly in America's favor. Apart from government officials and area specialists, Americans know and care

rather little about South Korea. It does not often dominate the headlines; visits by noted Korean officials or

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cultural fashions are emulated, although often indirectly via Japan. Visiting Americans are frequently treated as

honored guests. This fundamental imbalance in the relationship is sometimes accepted with resignation, but it is also often resented. In the following excerpts, a pro government editorial lambasts the opposition for its

"toadyism." Its main intent is to discredit the opposition. However, the fury sounded about toadyism is highly representative ;

...It has been learned that some 200 figures, including top-level opposition figures and incumbent National Assemblymen, made a fuss about attending a press interview and a lecture meeting that this group led by a U.S. representative held in the office of an opposition organization. It has also been learned that secretaries even bandied words with each other in order to secure sears just behind the U.S. representative, seats of honor. Also, a while ago, receiving a telephone call from the chairman of a U.S. newspaper company requesting an interview, top-level opposition figures rushed to her hotel room all at once, even without having breakfast. While assuming a low posture, our politicians have unconditionally extended a "warm reception" to U.S. congressmen on visits to Korea, whoever they are, even without judging their importance in U.S. political circles and without judging to what degree they exercise power to influence the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. In a word, this vividly exposes our politician's attitude of lacking independence. As long as they are not trouble-shooters who can resolve our domestic affairs with alacrity and as long as they are not the omnipotent saviors of the world who can resolve all disputes in the world at once, why in the world must we receive them, while assuming a low posture? (Kvonavanq Shinmun. Seoul edition, March 11, 1986) 314

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3) Korea has a shameful legacy of subordination to foreign whims. Radicals and moderates alike have been deeply angered and shamed by a centuries-long pattern of Korean helplessness before foreign powers. Seligman (1980:165)

tells us that individual dignity and self-esteem are based on a "sense of mastery". The Korean case is one of many

demonstrating that national esteem rests on similar foundations.

North Korean leaders presumably gained some sense of

mastery by portraying their country as free from all foreign influence. 4/ South Korean leaders achieved similar results by demonstrating that when Koreans rolled up their sleeves, their economic achievements could match or exceed those of

any other country. Still, both North and South Koreans combine defeatism with anger by alternately accepting and rejecting the traditional national self-image of Korea as pawn or victim.

As no other country can, America reminds Koreans of their national limitations. No matter how strong they

become, Koreans know that American influence and power is capable of influencing domestic decisions. Among many moderates, American influence is not perceived as malevolent. But it is resented all the same. Although moderates and radicals apportion blame

differently, all agree that the division of Korea was a national tragedy "beyond words". More is meant by tragedy

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. than the painful separation of families. Division, it is widely believed, was the inevitable consequence of Korean's chronic lack of solidarity. Just as Yi dynasty factionalism

left Korea vulnerable to Japanese colonialism, factionalism after liberation left Korea vulnerable to the great powers. All three of the widespread beliefs noted above involve resentment of American domination. This great resentment replicates itself continually in a host of

"greater" and "smaller" resentments. Middle class activists resent (more than they fear) U.S. nuclear weapons on Korean soil, because it places Korean lives in U.S. hands. Clergy resent domination by Western churches (Moon, Cyris 1985: 74) . Fa^nmers and workers resent successful American pressures for open markets. Third generation scholars resent the domination of America-trained second generation scholars.

At the same time, Koreans of all political persuasions have deeply resented American "abandonment" of Korea. Abandonment, as much as domination, signifies a lack of regard. For example, moderates as much as radicals firmly

believe that the United States had betrayed Korea in 1905. It is virtual national heresy to point out that the Shufeldt treaty had not obligated the United States to come to Korea's defense, at least in Washington's view. Moreover, in the 1905 Taft-Katsura agreement, the standard view is that

the United States handed Korea over to Japan. Among

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Shared Emotional Responses

Han is Korean for ressentiment. (See Chapter 3) . It is not merely a state of anger, but anger induced by shame. The subject's inability to control the individual or group that humiliated him creates an enduring state of anger mixed with defeatism, what Lewis (1971) has called "helpless anger". It

is a quintessentially Korean term that demonstrates the prevalence of "learned helplessness" (Seligman 1980; Lefcourt 1982) in Korean society. Manifestations of this phenomenon are not hard to find. In the older generation, learned helplessness consists more of fatalistic passivity than anger. In some members of the younger generation, anger comes closer to the surface.

However, this anger is often strongly mixed with defeatism.

The consequences are sometimes tragic. On May 15, 1988, SNU student Cho Sung-man committed seppuku (Japanese ritual suicide) atop Myungdong Cathedral in Seoul. The will he left behind is worth quoting at length.

...Forty-four years have passed since the division of Korea. The proud spirit of liberation fighters under

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Japanese imperialism, who fought to save the country at the cost of their lives, was buried by the United States, which considered human beings as a place [sic] from which to extract something for its own interest. The miniunq. the masters of the country, are living in a world of pain all around. [It is a world] in which, since liberation, people who have talked of reunification and independence have been branded enemies of the country by the proxy regimes of the United States. (Pro-American sadaeiu'ui'ia Syngman Rhee and the graduates of Japanese military academies who were tracking down and killing national liberation fighters— their anti-nationalistic actions has a history that can never be forgiven. People's lives have been uprooted and they are becoming more and more dehumanized...It is undeniably true that the cause of all these conflicts is the United States, which considers the Korean peninsula as a place [that serves] its own interests, and [the interests of]its proxy military regime. ...In Korean modern history, the emergence of the United States [sic] was accompanied by a [miserable] situation which cannot even be described in words. U.S. imperialism only exists for the interests of the United States, as shown in the massacre of the Cheju Island people who cried for national independence, the killing of Koreans (including both north and south Koreans) by U.S. armies during the Korean war, [U.S.] support for Park's military coup and the unforgettable Kwangju massacre of 1980. And [the U.S.] caused the situation in Korea in which a single nuclear weapon can annihilate all of Korea. We confront a situation in which we can no longer control the destiny of Koreans in our own hands. The idea that solving the Korean problem is only possible by getting rid of the United States can no longer be considered national treason... At present, innumerable problems have left so many of our brothers in pain. I would prefer to lead a calm life, but I can no longer just [be satisfied with] criticizing myself because of the situation; [and I] feel an ever-deepening sense of responsibility to defy the older generation and to assume responsibility for handing over a proud nation to our descendants... 5/ In his will, Cho expressed his belief that Korea's problems could only be solved by ousting the United States. He resolved to "defy the older generation and to assume

responsibility for handing over a proud nation to our

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. descendants." But rather than confront the United States

directly, Cho turned on himself. His act of self-destruction reveals a profound sense of inefficacy. He simply had no idea how to respond positively to what he thought was the tremendous U.S. power arrayed against him. Cho's suicide was an extreme response that shocked the nation. At the same time, as an expressive act (Turner 1969) , it was comprehensible in Korean cultural terms— and as we shall see, in the universal terms of psychology as well. (The Korean word that applies to Cho's act, connoting uncompromising purity, is sun guk. or "patriotic martyrdom"). The expressive act is a form of symbolic protest that is not expected to change outcomes. Rather it aims at preserving the dignity of the disgruntled person. Americans caught a glimpse of this during the Seoul '88 Olympics when a Korean boxer sat in the ring for one hour to

protest the referee's decision.

Expressive acts have been called irrational, and perhaps in one sense they are. They do not directly change outcomes. However, they do preserve the dignity of the offended subject. And in Korea's profoundly status-conscious

society, preserving one's dignity (or "face") is sometimes a life-or-death matter.

From whence comes this preeminent concern for personal (and family) honor? In Korea, as we have seen, society is dominated by a rigid, vertical hierarchy of patron-client

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. relations. Prestige and authority are "limited goods" that bestow an extraordinary sense of mastery to the patron and, often, abject resentment (han) to the client. Yet despite their han. subordinates are obligated to extreme demonstrations of deference. These tensions created inordinate pressures in Korean society, pressures that are often released through drinking or violence. The relief obtained through these means is temporary, however. Revenge is often seen as the only certain cure for han. But it would be a mistake to consider Cho's suicide to be an example of a uniquely Korean response to social pressures. On the contrary, the sentiments expressed in his will sound remarkably similar to those identified as "humiliated fury" by Lewis (1971). When humiliated fury is evoked, the self becomes the target of hostility since its deficiencies are the source of hostility. Expressing humiliated fury toward the apparent source of the humiliation is blocked by guilt for unjust anger; it is also blocked by positive feelings for the source of the humiliation, which coexist along with the hostility. Humiliated fury or rage is thus likely to be diffuse and nonspecific, except that it is evoked by indications that the other does not value the self (p.87). What Lewis describes as humiliated fury can also be taken as

an astute summation of anti-Americanism in its most virulent

form. Despite its name, anti-Americanism its not purely an antagonistic psychological state. Fundamentally, it is an ambivalent one. Feelings of vengefulness combine with admiration. As long as guilt persists, hostility is generally contained. 6/ This explains why, even in the more

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have been reluctant to characterize themselves to Americans as anti-American. Many students who utter angry slogans tell American reporters they are not anti-American. Authors who display han toward America in their novels and poems do the same. The guilt is produced by images of American generosity

and congruence of interests that often counteract strong feelings of resentment. It is based on an inner awareness that the anger has been displaced from the "self" where it belongs, to the "other", the United States.

The Components of Mistrust

Thus far, this study has considered two basic conditions that have marred Korean-U.S. relations. The first is the acute sense of national shame that has accompanied

Korean vulnerability to foreign domination. It could not

prevent occupation after the turn of the century by Japan and after WWII by the United States (and the Soviet Union in

the north). Neither could it contain to its satisfaction the post-independence influence of the United States (political,

military, economic and cultural), and secondarily, the economic and cultural influence of Japan. Although there has

been much talk about selectively adapting Western (American) ways to the Korean scene, there is not yet much genuine

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example. Park Chung-hee called upon Koreans to develop a unique "Korean style" of "nationalistic democracy". What Koreans got, however, was parliamentary government undermined by political repression — a formula that seemed neither uniquely Korean nor conducive to national pride. The second condition that mars trust is the basic and pronounced disparity of prestige and power between Korea and the United States. In this "American century", perhaps only

Great Britain has ever enjoyed a sense of national parity with the United States. Since the 193 0s at the latest, the United States has claimed world attention as no other country. Some countries, notably Western and English- speaking (or where English is widely spoken, e.g

Scandinavia), have appeared to cope with this fundamental disparity better than others. Nevertheless, any nation seeking relations with the United States must remain wary (and inevitably, perhaps, somewhat resentful) of America's often far greater capacity to influence outcomes.

Moderating this wariness is a sense of cultural

"attunement" between nations, or representatives of nations. Attunement is not merely a perception but an actual

similarity between the affective, behavioral, and cognitive components of the two "subjective cultures" (Triandis 1972) .

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their American counterparts. Among Koreans who consider themselves "pro-American" (chiefly those who remember the Korean war), very few actually consider themselves culturally attuned to the United States. Most regard pro- Americanism as an acknowledgment of American prestige. More

important, they regard Korean association with the United States as a means of enhancing the national prestige. In the same way, some older Koreans continue to express pride in

their ability to speak Japanese as well as their present or former contacts with Japanese businessmen or officials (Kim and Cho 1972:33). Pro-Americans, like many "anti-Americans", often believe that the United States has a special obligation to protect Korean interests. The patron-client mentality can pose special problems to pro-Americans. They must

continually convince themselves that South Korea and the

United States enjoy an idealized "special relationship". But with fading memories of the Korean war and hvulmaeng ("blood alliance") comes the feeling that the United States no

longer acts as a special patron or even friend. Perhaps the greatest obstacle is American

insensitivity to the matter of "face" in Korean society. American officials and corporate representatives who come to Korea are usually unskilled in the deferential behavior that

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lacking in humility. Many Americans, anxious to say the right thing, fail to recognize that unspoken conduct— body posture, tone, facial expression, are at least as important, if not more so, than actual words (Barnlund 1989:42). Americans may wonder why U.S. officials are expected to display deference when the United States is still tacitly

(though rarely openly anymore) acknowledged as South Korea's patron. As Foster (1972a) has pointed out in a stimulating article, the objects of envy (i.e. a patron) in any society habitually act in a way that softens the jealousy of others.

In the case of Korea, a patron is wise to display exceptional deference (on ritual occasions at least) and to show generosity toward his subordinates. Failure to do so

provokes (shame-derived) anger in Korea's highly shame conscious society.

Perhaps this is one reason why trade disputes between the United States and South Korea have been so heated. Part of the anger can undoubtedly be explained purely on the

basis of conflict of interest and mutual perceptions that the other side is adopting an opportunistic approach to the issue. However, cultural expectations are also involved. The United States believes that resolving trade issues is a simple, business-like proposition. If trade opportunities

are not strictly reciprocal, the United States is correct to

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perceived differently. The United States (with whom Seoul claims to be on equal footing, while displaying deferential attitudes in practice), is not taking its status into

consideration. Since the beginning of its trade relations with South Korea until very recently, the United States has enjoyed a favorable balance of trade with South Korea. As a country that enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world, and which enjoys a special relationship with

South Korea, the United States, most Koreans say, should pursue a policy of largess toward its much poorer "client/partner".

In Korea, relations of trust are based on personal contact. Gatherings of large, impersonal groups are occasions for somber speeches and statements of purpose.

Actual work is done in smaller groups, among individuals who have already had an informal opportunity to develop mutual confidence. Americans find personal ties useful but expendable. This attitude undermines trust on the Korean side.

For all the personal animosity that often exists

between Koreans and Japanese, they usually feel more

comfortable doing business with each other than with Americans. Both respond very much the same to a wide array

of social cues. Styles of conversation and patterns of thought are also very similar. For example, in both

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Japanese and Korean culture. Similar circumstances will generally produce similar facial expressions among both Japanese and Koreans, particularly where matters of shame and deference are involved. As the Japanese textbook controversy of recent years

makes clear, tactlessness and bitter recrimination continue to mar Korean-Japanese relations. However, much of the heat is generated by remarks that each side makes in their own country. A Japanese in Korea is seen as much less likely than an American to make an "inappropriate" remark or to

appear overbearing. Both Japanese and Korean are emotional languages. As

mentioned earlier, speech is often deliberately vague. Expression of feeling takes precedence over clarity of thought (Park, M.S. 1981). Words are chosen primarily for

emotional effect. The American use of formal speech, with

its emphasis on clarity and rigorous logic is widely admired in Korea. At the same time, Koreans are dismayed by what they perceive as less American concern for the emotional consequences of speech on the listener.

Consider, for example, Korean reaction to a 1985 Shin

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William Gleysteen. Gleysteen had come to South Korea in January 1989 in response to a Korean National Assembly inquiry into the U.S. role in the Kwangju massacre. Gleysteen denied that he knew anything of the Kwangju

massacre by green berets and said that the United States had "nothing to apologize for" concerning its conduct at the time of the uprising. Gleysteen claimed that those who blame the United States for Kwangju fail to distinguish between the brutality of the Special Forces (not subject to U.S.

command or control) and the more restrained conduct of the 20th division, (regular forces with special training in riot control). When the ROK military notified Gleysteen of their decision to use the 20th division, he approved, believing that these forces were much preferable to the Special Forces

Units (An Chae-hoon 1985:323) 7/.

Gleysteen's remarks, instead of providing reassurance of a benign U.S. role in the affair, inflamed sentiment even more. Not all Koreans took issue with the logic of Gleysteen's arguments. This aspect of the ambassador's

statement was almost irrelevant. As stated above, what

counts in Korean communication is "emotional exchange". The phrase "nothing to apologize for" appeared unsympathetic, and arrogant. That is undoubtedly why the Shin Dong-A article chose to incorporate those words in its title. In

conformity with Korean custom, the Ambassador would have

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little to change many minds about the affair, but it might have lessened the outrage that was expressed afterward. 8/ We have now reviewed three major components of mistrust: acute sense of national shame, disparity of prestige and power, and lack of attunement. It has already suggested that the rather amicable relations between the

United States and the English-speaking countries of the West, as well as Scandinavia, may be due to the relative absence of problems in these three areas. Two other factors

of considerable importance are: the degree of "totalism" in the society, and the profile adopted there by the United States.

The case of Scandinavia is especially useful for explaining what is meant here by totalism (cf. Lifton 1961;1962). Although the Swedish public has expressed support for reducing the tremendous tax burdens of their welfare state, Sweden remains a country in which the state

sector plays a prominent role in domestic affairs.

Nevertheless, the state remains a "service organization"

(Hancock 1972:45) rather than a mysticized entity. Indeed, Swedish political culture is characterized by an "abhorrence of abstract speculation and intellectual 'systems'" (Dyson 1980:98). In short, the essence of the Swedish political

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the other way around. Contrast this situation with that of Germany. According to the German Brockhaus encyclopedia, the only valid way to view the state is as

no mere tool or 'machine' for the pursuit of individual or group interests; it is a phenomenon in its own right, the standing and value of which rests upon the fact that it is a manifestation of a concept of the state transcending an individual (translated in Dyson 1980:231).

The encyclopedic entry on "der Staat" even ends with the expressed hope that rival (non-abstract) notions of the

state (which gained ground following Germany's defeat in World War II) will lose all influence (Brockhaus 1957) . Even today, the German criminal code still penalizes those who "ridicule the state" (Herz 1982:31). Reverence for the

abstract notion of 1'etat is also rife in France. Indeed, O'Brien (1988:46) states that the German divination of the

state is the direct product of French influence during the

French Revolution. Such views could be called statist, but I have opted for the term totalist to encompass broader social, rather than merely political/institutional, tendencies. In other words, totalism refers to the belief that it is justifiable for ideas and institutions to make total, highly abstract claims. In nature, it is the opposite of eclecticism, which

shuns the great Idea in favor of smaller ideas, borrowed 329

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Some "statist" societies are more totalist than

others. For example, in Germany and France (Jellinek 1965; Hoffman 1963;1974) today, totalism is less prevalent than it

is in South Korea. The much more pronounced tendencies toward individualism counteract totalism, as does the existence of many more plural institutions. Nevertheless, totalism in political culture, and statism in political institutions are still forces to be reckoned with in Germany

and France today. In Germany, for example, the Green

movement has arisen as a challenge to statism; yet at the same time, it is often prey to the same totalist mentality which it purports to oppose (Kvistad 1987:212).

By the mid-1980s the Greens had positively adopted the political ideology of 'Old German' statism in the following ways: with a vague and generalized definition of the opponent; with a moralism that sometimes has heavily Christian overtones; with an ambivalence about political conflict and a sensitivity to 'anarchy'; with a rejection of political parties and particular political ideologies and with the corporatization of Green parliamentarians via the imperative mandate (1987:213)

Kvistad's reference to the Green's moralistic tendencies illustrates why I have chosen the broader term "totalism"

rather than statism in this analysis.

In the case of South Korea, we can see that totalism pervades all aspects of culture. First, the Confucian legacy, with its fixed notions about the moral order of

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Second, the familial political institutions typical of

patron-client societies are founded on the notion of state paternalism. The citizen-clients are expected to defer to state wisdom and direction, offering only loyalty and an infinite capacity for self-sacrifice. Indeed, the emphasis on self-sacrifice (including martyrdom) is a recurrent theme in all modes of Korean cultural expression. Third, the

absence of civic trust in Korean society, also the product of the patron-client system, enhances the tendency of opposing groups to make totalist demands rather than to find a middle ground. Thus, the Korean state promises to "root

out impure elements"; student groups demand nothing short of the government's resignation. Similarly, most student activists shun participation in the political process because it would compromise their purity.

In these circumstances it is not hard to understand why mediators are so important in Korean society. Mediators provide the only opportunity both parties have to save

"face". That is why the militant students requested U.S.

mediation during the 1980 Kwangju uprising. Whereas the more deferential group of older professionals found it possible to negotiate, the defiant students could not. When the

United States failed to assist them, they lost face. By extension, the United States lost face as well. 10/

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Totalism naturally leads to both political extremism and apathy. Extremism, because the excessive demands of the state produce countervailing excessive responses from the

opposition. Apathy, too, because the majority, unwilling for various personal reasons to take a defiant stand against the

state, finds few available alternatives. Anti-Americanism, itself the product of totalist thinking, flourishes in such an environment. As noted

earlier, it is a generalized mistrust. It does not discriminate between the actions and beliefs of different Americans or different U.S. administrations. America is an abstraction rather than a country of manifold contradictions and exceptions.

In addition to frames of mind, totalism at the top of the social structure, the state, produces totalist social organizations that are perfect vehicles for expressing anti- Americanism. In some respects, such organizations resemble religious sects more than they do bona fide political

organizations. Rituals take precedence over programmatic responses to social ills. For example, emphasis is on proper

initiation into the organization; secrecy; knowledge of esoteric concepts and terminology (codes); reciting of poems; group songs; induced fatigue and sleeplessness to "mortify the flesh" (Wallace 1966 ; 55); ritualized confrontations with the police; burnt effigies, flags and other examples of what Frazer called "imitative magic"

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. (Wallace 1966:58); uniforms and headbands; synchronized chants; isolation from the "uninitiated"; self-immolation; and attendant mythology. Rituals also frequently involve scapegoating behavior. America is the logical scapegoat for past failures to revitalize the nation (cf. Wallace

1966:208-9). The effect of these rituals (and the symbols they employed) is to intensify the emotions of the participants (Cantril 1941:45). Thus stimulated, they are more predisposed to cast aside doubts, and thrust themselves

wholeheartedly into a social movement. With participation comes a greater sense of control over events. Rituals rationalize unpleasant facts. They explain why

Korea is an "insignificant nation" in the minds of many Koreans (Charles Lee 1988) 11/ : it is being kept down by the United States. They explain why Korea has had trouble achieving democracy: a superpower, with its vast military might, has propped up a proxy military dictatorship. 12/ In

so doing, these and other rationalizations associated with ritual cover up shame (Wallace 1966:197).

Dependency and Mistrust

The view that America's high profile in a country's domestic

affairs can intensify anti-American sentiments there is not

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. new (Tai et al 1973; Patch 1957; Arevalo 1961; Lillibridge 1966; Mazrui 1969; Hollander 1978). 13/ Most studies, from one perspective or another, take such sentiments for granted.

This study contends, however, that resentment toward America's high military and political profile, especially, is based on the shame that dependency generates. 14/ Dependency is never a "good thing." No matter how benevolent the intentions of the dominant nation, its actions will always be resented. 15/ The high points of U.S. political intercession on behalf of democracy in South Korea bear this out. As we have seen. President Carter's high profile campaign for human rights in South Korea earned him

more criticism than praise from the very opposition he hoped to "protect". (This was of course true of the U.S. press as well.) What he did do— repeatedly snub the Park government,

issue sharp denunciations and statements contradicting

Seoul's official positions, confront Seoul with lists of

political prisoners, "requesting" their release, postpone decisions on loans, postpone an investment mission— was generally ignored, while what Carter failed to do was accentuated.

In 1985, when, after three years in the United States,

Kim Dae-jung returned to South Korea surrounded by 22 U.S.

escorts, Kim's followers played down the event to ward off charges of sadaeiu'ui. The charges were made anyway. One

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Reproduced with permission ot the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. government spokesmen reacted angrily, "[w]e are not a nation of savages... [T]his is an insult to our country" (Shim Jae- hoon 1985:38). Few Koreans reacted with the government's

fury, but equally few showed any signs of gratitude. Neither did the United States earn much good will during the second zenith of U.S. diplomatic activity in South Korea, the period before the December 1987 elections. Regardless of the pressures put on the Chun government

during this period, a common view held that the United States could have actually done more if it had chosen to do

so. 1 6 / At the same time, offers by American human rights groups to help monitor the elections were firmly rebuffed by students. Of course, U.S. efforts in support of democratic forces were not intended to feed mistrust. Yet as Tony Smith has pointed out, U.S. leaders are frequently overconfident

that timely U.S. support for democracy in a given country will regain the good will of the people. They often fail to recognize that the slate cannot be swept clean and that intercession may not be gratefully received. On the

contrary, U.S. intervention may kindle greater revolutionary

fervor, or at the very least, greater resentment of U.S.

interference (Smith 1981:197). 1 7 / Thus, if the United States does choose to use its influence to promote democracy in a politically unstable country, its decision will have to

be based on a calculation of perceived long-term, rather

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The Components of Trust

How the United States can regain the trust of the

Third World has become the subject of an increasing number of studies, particularly by liberal foreign policy analysts (Wiarda 1985; Ungar 1985). A common mistake of these studies is the assumption that the asymmetrical nature of U.S.

relations with the Third World is the function of ethnocentrism. In this view, the United States does not show sufficient humility. It imposes its ideas on others, failing

to recognize the validity of other values and choices. Although their goals are laudable and worthy of much consideration, these analysts overlook a salient point: the U.S. prestige system is not so much imposed as it is adopted. 18/ No matter what country holds the most prestigious position (and no matter how cosmopolitan its inclinations), a situation will always exist in which it

will receive more attention than it focuses outward.

Although much can be done to improve U.S. policy and diplomatic style, nothing can be done to alter the fundamental fact of U.S. prestige. Nothing, that is, except the erosion of American power and principles and their

replacement by one or more rival "prestige systems".

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between South Korea and the United States, this study does

not conclude that the two countries must be completely resigned to a state of mistrust. Given sufficient motivation on both sides, tensions can be reduced, at least in times of relative domestic stability. Already, over the past few years, the United States has taken steps to elevate the

South Korean military from junior partner in the command structure of the U.N. forces in Korea to a more equal

partner. The U.S. military's decision to relinquisha showy golf course located in land-hungry downtown Seoul was another gesture of good will that further reduces U.S. visibility in Korea. The suggestion has sometimes been made that anti-

Americanism in South Korea can be moderated by means of better communications between the U.S. embassy in Seoul and Korean students (Niksch 1988) and the general public

(Ambassador James Lilley, quoted in the Los Angeles Times. March 15, 1987). There are several problems with this proposal, however. First, as this study has attempted to

show, the United States government does not gain sympathy

and understanding by becoming more conspicuous, even if it does so with the best intentions. Second, the U.S. embassy in Seoul already publishes a monthly newsletter in Korean

that effectively conveys the position of the U.S. government to interested Korean citizens (and contains

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opinion. Third, anti-Americanism in South Korea, as elsewhere, has been characterized by selective perception. More information, especially from an obviously biased source like the United States government, can hardly be expected to change opinions. Still, trust depends, at least in part, on communication. And since no group is more dedicated to

communication than journalists, perhaps it is with them that Korean and U.S. efforts to enhance trust should begin. Although united by their common commitment to professional journalism, members of the Korean and American media have

themselves collided over differing interpretations of developments in Korean-U.S. relations. The Seoul Olympics provided one such occasion for misunderstanding, as we have seen. More recently, tensions flared over U.S. and Korean

media coverage of riots in Los Angeles in May 1992, during

which nearly 2,000 Korean-American businesses were looted or destroyed. The Korean media scored its U.S. counterparts for biased (anti-Korean) coverage of the events; at least some Americans who regularly follow the Korean press countered that the Korean media itself distorted the story (e.g. K. Kaliher in The Korea Times. May 14, 1992). These charges and

countercharges create an additional layer of bad feeling that can only diminish through face-to-face discussion. One

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compare notes and examine biases. Such a forum, led by journalists and academics familiar with domestic conditions in one or both countries, could do much to promote trust. Its success would depend upon the commitment of all participants to the highest standards of journalism as well as a desire to understand the sensitivities of the other side. Differences of opinion would certainly persist, as

would some attendant frustration and anger. The objective would not be to eliminate all disagreements, but to ensure that disagreements were not exacerbated by perceptions of ill will on either side.

As worthwhile as this proposal may be, however, its implementation is not likely to produce sea-changes in the Korean-U.S. relationship. What counts most of all, over the long term, is for South Koreans to find pride in their

growing national accomplishments and to redefine their identities in terms of present abilities rather than past shortcomings. True national self-assurance will depend greatly on this sense of positive national identity, rather

than on any outward show of national assertion. A positive national identity, in short, is the key to reducing the smoldering resentments that have typified anti-American

sentiments in South Korea.

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1. This tendency poses grave problems, however, for there is much in Korean tradition that present-day Koreans do not like— as is the case everywhere in the world. What Isaacs observed in the Japanese case is just as true of Korea: Those aspects of the Japanese past that are valued and admired by young people in Japan now are called 'Japanese' and 'traditional' while those that are disliked become 'feudalistic' and not distinctively Japanese at all. In the same way, what they like or embrace in the present culture they call 'modern', while anything they don't like becomes 'Westernized" or 'Americanized' or just plain 'capitalistic' (Isaacs 1989:133; see also Chun Doo-hwan interview in Shim and Davies 1981) .

Kim Dae-jung identifies Confucianism, rather than "feudalism" as the source of undesirable, and therefore, non-Korean morality in the past. Many of those who speak of reinstating Confucian morals confuse our own traditional moral system with Confucian morals. We have to be able to distinguish accurately between them; otherwise, we will be negligent in our present task of rooting out the vestiges of Confucian morality, which not only suppressed our people during the five hundred years of the Yi dynasty but also led to its downfall. Furthermore, such confusion would bring about ignorance and contempt [emphasis added] by making it seem that before the advent of Confucian morals our nation was nothing more than savages without anything resembling a system of morals (1987:119).

Having thus broadly hinted at Korean self-doubt, Kim goes on to note the traditional morals worth saving: ...filial piety, love between siblings and relatives, extended family relationships, humaneness, the spirit of cooperation and reciprocity, cheerfulness, magnanimity, peacefulness, humility, hospitality, and respect for dignity. Also, we have to restore frugality, courage, and honesty, which are some of the

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2. Part of South Korean's grudging admiration for Japan is based on the perception that Japan is beginning to forge its own way. 3. A typical example of this view is provided by former SNU political science professor and prime minister, Noh Chae-bong who currently serves as a DLP-appointed congressman. Noh blames the influence of American pragmatism for Korean teachers' loss of authority over students. Influenced by American educational philosophy and methods, these teachers dispense knowledge without also molding the character of students. Noh also sharply criticizes the demise of the patriarchal family structure in America, while undermines male authority. Quoted in Park Kwon-sang 1984a;549-50. 4. Pyongyang treats the matter of Soviet and Chinese aid as a delicate subject. Much information that is available in the Chinese and Soviet press about communist aid to North Korea is not made public in North Korea. 5. Leaflet: Tongil Yolsa Ko Cho Sung-man Minju Kukmin Changrae Wiwonhoe Soshik [News from the Committee for the Democratic National Funeral for the late Cho Sung-man— Patriot for Reunification], May 18, 1988. 6. Based on this analysis, it seems that Hitler's principal "contribution" to anti-Semitism in Germany (and elsewhere) was to remove the pervasive guilt sentiments that kept elements within the Gentile population from annihilating the Jewish "other". In other words, some measure of admiration for the resented outgroup is not sufficient to spare it from destruction. The key is the perception that such destruction is illegitimate. 7. Recall that Washington's official position is somewhat different, namely, that the United States has no legal authority to approve or disapprove the release of ROK troops for use in Korea's domestic affairs. 8. By contrast, the style of the current U.S. Ambassador Donald Gregg shows much greater awareness of Korean cultural precepts. He displayed humility in his interview with Shin Dona-A in May 1990 (Chung Chong-moon 1990) and also in his decision to visit poor farmers at their home, where he listened to complaints about U.S.

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9. However, it should be noted that the constant references to "purity" and "impurity" appear to have very distant origins, predating the wholesale introduction of Confucian culture during the Yi Dynasty. Whatever the precise origins of these concerns, the obsession with purity is quintessentially totalist. 10. Clark (1988) expresses surprise at the student's call for U.S. mediation during the Kwangju standoff. He rightly notes that conflict in Korean society has received insufficient attention by anthropologists, the work of Brandt (1971) being a notable exception. However, I would argue that a student of Mediterranean patron-client systems would have little trouble understanding why the students acted as they did.

11. One Indian observer interpreted anti-American sentiments in his country as "necessary defense mechanisms" that serve two purposes: "One is their need to believe that India is an exceptionally important country subject to close U.S. scrutiny. The other is a need to deflect responsibility for the mess India is in." (Washington Post. June 14, 1991). 12. An overly rational assessment of the impact of student demonstrations (e.g. Gamson 1975) would suggest that the student demonstrations have been ineffective because they usually fail to elicit a favorable government response. However, one should not overlook how demonstrations affect public opinion. Although many older Koreans may disapprove of the demonstrations, the clashes do remind everyone that the state has a monopoly on coercive power. They also tend to reinforce an image of the state as bully whenever riot police use excessive force. Yet another, possibly unwitting, consequence of demonstrations is that they appear to validate radical views that the state, rather than "society" is responsible for social ills. As one proponent of this view put it, "[t]he whole system of violence has nothing to do with people wanting it. It is not a characteristic of Korea as an underdeveloped country, but has to do with the desire of the police and military to keep the ruling party in power" (Yang Soon-kyun quoted in Clifford 1992:33). 13. An article by Tai et al dealt exclusively with measuring the extent to which "internal stress" on the one hand, and "U.S. penetration" on the other, stimulate anti- Americanism. They concluded that "U.S. presence" was a factor, but less important than internal stress. I have not made use of these findings, however, because the authors' definition of anti-Americanism is so different from my own

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14. In Okinawa, for example, the presence of the U.S. military base is a tremendous source of consternation and apparently the only real cause of ill-will on the island (Washington Post. April 1, 1990).

15. Riding (1984:328) observes: "Yet, the more blatant Mexico's economic dependence on the United States, the more the country needed to deny it. Even praise of De La Madrid's economic policies from American officials was therefore counterproductive at home [in Mexico]."

16. In Paris just before the French Revolution, conspiracy theories circulated that blamed the famine on a deliberate plot to withhold grain. Kaplan (1982) contends that the French state's unwillingness to acknowledge its limitations created a widespread perception that the state was omnipotent. Many concluded that the famine could have only resulted from state collusion with speculators. The problem in the case of South Korea was not so much that the United States claimed omnipotence, but that its claims to have limited influence were not believed. Change in these perceptions is only likely to begin (but not end) with the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Korea. 17. An exception wouldbe in a country where the perceived "social distance" from the United States was so great as to defy comparison. I am thinking of South Korea in 1960, when U.S. Ambassador McConaughy was cheered wildly for his part in the overthrow of Syngman Rhee. Under similar circumstances today, a U.S. ambassador is more likely to be pelted with eggs than confetti.

18. As a general rule, the lower classes are the most receptive to U.S. influence. The elite are the most grudging because they see themselves as the rival leaders of their indigenous prestige system, and because they are most likely to make comparisons between themselves and their U.S. counterparts.

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The most common view of anti-Americanism in South Korea is that it was unknown to the country before 1980 and emerged only because of America's alleged complicity in the Kwangju massacre of May 1980. Later, anti-Americanism was sustained by the U.S. failure to support democracy in South Korea. Most left-leaning Korean analysts assert that anti- Americanism was an inevitable response to specific U.S. actions that damaged the interests of the South Korean people. Conservative scholars, by contrast, tend to

emphasize the connection between radicalism and support for anti-Americanism. Despite differences in emphasis, Korean scholars across the spectrum of political opinion agree that anti-Americanism is largely the product of clashing national objectives.

This study has challenged this conventional

interpretation not to furnish an apologia for U.S. foreign policy, flawed as it has been, but to correct the prevailing notion that differing values, opinions and objectives should inevitably provoke lingering resentment or even fury. It is not unheard of, after all, for two sides to disagree

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acknowledged, as is so often the case. And in South Korea, much of the popular anger and resentment directed at the United States was prompted by feelings of shame. Ever since their liberation from Japanese occupation by American troops, most South Koreans had been ambivalent

about the United States. They were grateful for their independence, but wished they could have done it themselves. They appreciated U.S. military and economic assistance, but yearned for strength through self-reliance and national integrity through reunification. They admired American accomplishments, but wished that their own achievements

would be worthy of similar recognition. Whatever the United

States did for them only underlined in their own minds what they had failed to do for themselves. And throughout the post-WWII period, no Korean, it is safe to say, was spared recurring suspicions that, deep down, Americans regarded

them as inferior people. In the context of a culture already preoccupied with feelings of shame and pride, the South Korean encounter with the United States was perhaps even more painful than it might have been otherwise.

Yet this study has also maintained that,

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similar circumstances. Indeed, one aim of this study has been to show that the nationalist experience worldwide, and throughout modern history, has been fueled by national

feelings of shame and the desire to regain positive national identity. The difference between anti-Americanism and nationalism is that anti-Americanism stresses rejection of American claims to the most prestigious position in the world community, whereas nationalism tacitly acknowledges

this prestige and strives to narrow the gap. Why, then, did the milder anti-American sentiments of pre-1980 South Korea, so common in other parts of the world, develop so rapidly into full-blown anti-Americanism, complete with an organized movement, ideology and feelings

of utter rage? First, the trauma of the Kwangju massacre

galvanized the emotions of many citizens, none more so than the country's students. Those who felt most strongly responsible for their country's future also tended to feel the most impotent rage at the shameful conduct of their

country's leaders. With emotions at fever pitch, all sorts

of shame feelings converged. Increasingly, activists and

intellectuals, in particular, felt shamed by their seeming abandonment by the United States, their inability to overthrow an embarrassing government, and the ignominious

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resolving political disputes peacefully. All this inspired the relatively small underground movement to redouble efforts to forge an ideology of defiance to the "other" that was the source of their shame; the fused image of an arrogant United States and a despised Chun regime. Not so confident at first, the anti-American, anti

government movement was aided by growing opposition to the Chun regime from middle-class citizens and by a government policy that vacillated between repression and conciliation. The anti-American movement was also unwittingly aided by the unrelenting nationalist propaganda that bombarded the schools and airwaves, and found its way into countless government-sponsored programs for farmers, professionals, and the military. Accepting the government premise that

nationalism was the noblest cause of any citizen, the anti- American activists attempted to show that they, not the

government, were the true nationalists. The Chun regime, far from being nationalistic, was portrayed as the shameless tool of U.S. imperialism.

A similar tactic was used against the United States.

Radical activists derided it as a hypocritical power, eager to espouse democracy but disdainful in reality of the rights of other nations. Adopting the frameworks of orthodox

Marxism and neo-Marxist dependency theory, the radicals claimed that the United States was not as admirable as it

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itself. The conclusion was obvious: if American superiority was proven to be a hoax, Koreans could regain their self- respect. The United States would no longer be qualified to pass judgment on, or to define, the Korean identity.

To those who ascribe part of the rise of anti- Americanism to weakening U.S. confidence, it should be noted that anti-Americanism in South Korea surged during the 1980s, when American confidence was, by all accounts, on the rise. The real link between anti-Americanism in South Korea of the 1980s and the worldwide anti-American protests during the Vietnam era (1965-197 2) was the incessant charge of hypocrisy. In both cases, the United States was seen as displaying contempt for the rights of weaker nations. This perception encouraged those who already had ambivalent feelings about U.S. dominance to justify their shame-based anger.

Still, anti-Americanism did not flourish among all segments of the population. As we have seen, anti-

Americanism — defined as a generalized mistrust of the

United States — was most prevalent among college students. More than most other groups, students had a chance to transform milder resentments and contradictory feelings for the United States into a coherent ideology of rejection. They did so by stressing the primacy of solidary ties over

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promoting Korean security and economic growth. It is hoped that the perceptible decline of the anti- American movement in recent years will not persuade students of Korean-U.S. relations to abandon the topic. Anti-American

sentiments, unlike anti-Americanism, do not appear to be on

the wane. To gauge the breadth and intensity of these sentiments, scholars and surveyors of public opinion will have to move beyond current definitions that stress dislike of America, to those that assess self-images and degrees of trust.

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