Aufsatz Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, Via Rasella, and The

Home , 14th Army (Wehrmacht), Albert Kesselring, Alfred Jodl, Anton Dostler, Commando Order, Death in Rome

Aufsatz

Richard Raiber

Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, Via Rasella, and the »Ginny Mission«

This essay demonstrates how a clever and mentally agile defendant, with the help of equally intelligent confederates, successfully propagated a fiction at his trial shortly after the end of the Second World War that has remained arcane and un- challenged for more than fifty years. Contemporaneous documents strongly suggest that Generalfeldmarschall Albert Konrad Kesselring1 skillfully assumed culpa- bility for an alleged war crime in which he had not actually been involved. It was a diversionary ploy. While he probably expected to be punished for this, he hoped his admission would eliminate the possibility that the Allied investigators might discover he had actually participated in another, unrelated crime, the penalty for which would likely be much more severe. The dissemblance he manufactured was accepted because it was plausible, verisimilar, and because he was considered an honorable man. It has been assimilated by subsequent generations as well, so that it is now enshrined as historical truth. On 23 March 1944, in mid-afternoon, communist partisans detonated a home- made bomb in the Via Rasella, a 225-meter-long street which ran southwest- and northeastward one block north of the Quirinale, in the center of Rome. Their target was 2. Kompanie des III. Bataillons Polizeiregiment Bozen, which was marching eastward to the Macao Barracks in the Castro Pretorio complex.2 Thirty-three po-

1 According to some sources, including documents in National Archives and Records Ad- ministration (NARA) Record Group (RG) 242, the field marshal's name is sometimes spelled with the »ß« (ess/tset), i.e., »Keßelring.« However, I am convinced that he pre- ferred »Kesselring,« and that is how it will be written in this essay. According to his autobiography, Soldat bis zum letzten Tag (Bonn 1953), p. 11, the family name was original- ly »Chezelrinch.« 2 Polizeiregiment Bozen was raised from among overage, non-combatant inhabitants of South Tirol, in November 1943. Thus, it is possible some of its members were of Italian extraction. Sworn into active service on 29 January 1944, it was sent to Rome on 14 Feb- ruary. There it was tactically at the disposition of Der Kommandant von Rom, who em- ployed it to maintain order and guard German property in the »Open City« of Rome. Like all police units in occupied Italy, it was subordinate for administrative and disci- plinary purposes to SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS Karl Wolff, Höchster SS- und Polizeiführer Italien. It became SS-Polizeiregiment Bozen by decree on 14 Apr 1944. H.-J. Neufeld t, j. Huck, and G. Tessin, Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936-1945, Schrif- ten des Bundesarchivs 3 (Koblenz 1957), pp. 76-78; Dr. Gerhard Schreiber to Dr. R. Raiber, 4 Jul 97. Thus, »Bozen« was not an SS formation on 23 March 1944 as described in some contemporaneous documents and almost invariably in the popular literature. E.g., see Gen.St.d.H., OKH, Operationsabteilung/II, Meldungen Ob. Südwest, an OKH/Gen.St.d.H./ Op.Abt., vom 16.-31.3.44, Fernschreiben, Tagesmeldung Oom23.3.44,25/3 0225, Roem Eins A, Nr. 3161/44 g.Kdos. Alte Signatur: 34 079; in NARA RG 242, Microcopy T78, Roll 321 Frame 6 275 962 (T78/321/6 275 962); Robert Katz, Death in Rome (New York 1967), p. 22. Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis (Oxford 1949), p. 333, cited by Katz, Death in Rome, p. 22 fn.*, has written that »the Bozen SS was to earn a reputation of being >notoriously cruel·,« which does not seem to be supported by documentation.

Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 56 (1997), S. 69-106 © Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Potsdam 70 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber licemen and several Italian pedestrians were killed or died of their wounds, and more were injured in the blast.3 When Adolf Hitler was told of the incident, he became furious and ordered the execution of Italian hostages in reprisal. During the night of 23/24 March 1944 the selection of victims began, and through the afternoon and evening of 24 March 335 Italians were transported in small groups to the Ar- deatine Caves on the southern outskirts of Rome and shot. The killings were carried out by Außenkommando Rom des Befehlshabers der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Italien, the local Sipo and SD field office, commanded by SS-Obersturmbannführer Her- bert Kappler.4 Kappler's orders had come from his military superior, Generalleutnant (Lw) Kurt Mälzer, Der Deutsche Kommandant von Rom. The latter had received them from Ar- mee-Oberkommando (AOK) 14, to which his command was subordinate. In summer 1948 Kappler was brought to trial before an Italian Military Tribunal. He had personally directed the executions and admitted to having himself shot some of the victims: he was sentenced to life imprisonment.5 General Mälzer and Generaloberst Eberhard von Mackensen, Oberbefehlshaber der 14. Armee, were tried in Rome by the British in November 1946. Both were found guilty of transmitting Hitler's execution order to Kappler and were sentenced to death. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kes- selring, Oberbefehlshaber Südwest /Heeresgruppe C (O.B. Südwest [Obkdo. H.Gr. CD had been the highest military authority in Italy. Appearing as a witness for the defense at the Mackensen /Mälzer trial, he freely admitted responsibility for passing the reprisal order to AOK 14 but said he had been only the messenger for the Führer-

3 The number of Italian pedestrians who died in the explosion in the Via Rasella was gross- ly inflated, presumably by the Italian Fascist government for propaganda purposes, and has been similarly exaggerated by postwar writers. Significantly, the names of these victims were never published. General Umberto Prestis, who commanded the Italian Police in Rome in March 1944, asserted in 1956 that only two Italian citizens were among the victims. Dr. Gerhard Schreiber to Dr. R. Raiber, 4 Jul 97. 4 The principal document I have used for these details is the English-language transcript of Kesselring's trial together with attached exhibits, appendixes, and other papers filed with the copy of the transcript, all of which are deposited in the U.S. National Archives. There is no German-language copy filed with these records. The transcript appears to be complete, less the proceedings held on 10 Feb 47 (Day One) and 17 Feb 47 (Day Two) which are inexplicably missing. It includes all exhibits admitted in evidence, less De- fense Exhibit No. 72 (a map of the Rome area), No. 75 (two maps of San Martino), a pic- ture from a Venice newspaper, dated 5 Apr 47, purporting to show a »standing court«, No. 102 (sketch showing »court channels,« and No. 105 (map of »Fuccechio« [sic] Mars- hes). On the front cover is typed »To: The Judge Advocate, H.Q., Mediterranean Thea- tre of Operations, A.P.O. 512, United States Army.« Hereafter this document and all papers filed with it will be cited as »Kesselring Trans.« It is deposited in RG 338, Records of North African Theater of Operations U.S. Army, Records of the Spezial Staff, Adju- tant General, Headquarters, General Correspondence (»Decimal«) File 000.5, boxes 816, 817, 818, and 1329. 5 But he was destined to serve only thirty years of this sentence. In September 1972, suf- fering from gastrointestinal cancer, he had been transferred from his prison cell in the fortress at Gaeta, between Rome and Naples, to a military hospital in Rome. Early on 15 August 1977 he succeeded in escaping from his closely guarded hospital room with the assistance of his second wife, Anneliese whom he had married in 1972 and perhaps others. She spirited his frail body (his weight had fallen to 105 pounds) to (West) Germany and to his own house in Soltau, south of Hamburg. Italy requested his extradition, but the German government refused to acquiesce, which nearly produced an international incident. His disease was terminal: he died in his own bed on 9 February 1978. The New York Times, 10 Feb 78, p. A5; see also ibid., 17 Aug 77, p. 9. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 71 befehl, not its author. Nevertheless, in late 1946 Kesselring was informed that he, too, had been indicted as a war criminal,6 Kesselring's trial began on 10 February 1947 before a British Military Commis- sion in Venice. He faced two charges. The first, which alone will be discussed here, asserted that he had »committed a war crime« in passing to subordinate units a Führerbefehl which resulted in the shooting of 335 Italian nationals in the Ardeati- ne Caves in Rome on 24 March 1944/ On 6 May 1947 the Court found him guilty on both counts and sentenced him to be shot. On 3 July 1947 this sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life, but in 1952 he was released from custody because of impaired health. He died at Bad Nauheim on 15 July I960.8 Throughout his trial Kesselring and his principal witnesses Generalmajor (later General der Kavallerie) Siegfried Westphal, his Chef des Generalstabes, and Oberst i.G (later Generalmajor) Dietrich Beelitz, his la, repeated without significant deviation the following testimony: At sunup on 23 March 1944 the Feldmarschall had been flown southward from his Kommandostelle on Monte Soratte,9 thirty-five kilometers north of Rome, to visit the Cassino Front, 120 kilometers southeast of the Eternal City, where the »Second Battle (German reckoning) for Cassino« had reached a crisis.10

6 For a brief summary of Kappler's trial see H. Lauterpacht, ed., »Case No. 151, in re Kapp- ler,« Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases: Being a Selection from the Decisions of International and National Courts and Tribunals and Military Courts given during the Year 1948 (London 1953), pp. 471-82. For a brief summary of the von Macken- sen/Mälzer trial see H. Lauterpacht, ed., »Case No. 112, in re von Mackensen and Mael- zer [sic] (Ardeatine Caves Massacre Case),« Annual Digest and Reports of Public Internat- ional Law Cases: Being a Selection from the Decisions of International and National Courts and Tribunals and Military Courts given during the Year 1946. (London 1951), pp. 258-261. See Katz, Death in Rome, p. 232. 7 The two charges were: »CHARGE I[,] COMMITTING A WAR CRIME in that he AT ROME, ITALY on or about 23 March 1944, in violation of the laws and usages of war, was concerned in the killing as a reprisal of some 335 Italian Nationals in the Ardeatine Caves«; and »CHARGE II[,] COMMITTING A WAR CRIME, in that he [b]etween JUNE and AUGUST 1944, in violation of the laws and usages of war, when OBERBEFEHLS- HABER der HEERESGRUPPE SUEDWEST (Commander in Chief Army Group South West) [sic], incited and commanded the German Armed Forces and German Police Forces in ITALY under his Command to kill Italian Civilians as reprisals in consequence of which a number of Italian Civilians were killed.« The charges are listed in a summary of the trial written by the two American observers included among the papers deposited with the transcript in the National Archives and is entitled »Mediterranean Theater of Oper- ations, Report and Records of War Crimes Trial of Albert Kesselring, to the Command- ing General Mediterranean Theater of Operations,« paragraph 3. 8 The New York Times, 5 Jul 47, p. 2, and ibid., 17 Jul 60, p. 60. 9 In the German terminology of the Second World War, O.B. Südwest could refer to both Kes- selring, the Oberbefehlshaber, as well as his Kommandostelle. In order to avoid ambiguity, Monte Soratte, the location of his command post in March 1944, will be used in this essay whenever reference is made to the location and/or the command apparatus of the theater command situated there since September 1943. The Feldmarschall's Kommando- stelle was established at Frascati, south of Rome, in early 1943 and remained there until it was bombed out on 8 Sep 43. Monte Soratte (Soracte) was an extensive above- and be- low-ground installation which extended westward from the small village of San Oreste on the southeastern slope of the 691-meters-high Monte Soratte on the right bank of the River Tiber. The latter separates the mountain from the Sabine Hills. The Oberbefehlsha- ber's Kommandostelle was located there until the Allies, advancing from the south in summer 1944, forced it to be moved northward. 10 Kesselring, who had learned to fly at age 48, enjoyed piloting his own aircraft. After five accidents, however, Hitler had finally insisted that all further travel by air for him 72 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

Returning to Monte Soratte between 1900-2000 hours,11 23 March he was informed at once by Westphal and Beelitz about the Via Rasella incident, and that Hitler was insisting on a harsh reprisal. At about 2000 hours, an officer in the Wehrmacht- führungsstab im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht then at Berchtesgaden because Hit- ler was at the Berghof on the Obersalzberg above the town12 telephoned Westphal to tell him Hitler had agreed that a ten-for-one execution ratio was to be inflicted on Italian hostages. Simultaneously, according to Kesselring, Kappler telephoned the Feldmarschall from Rome to say that he, Kappler, could find a sufficient number of victims in the Via Tasso and other Roman prisons who were »Todeskandida- ten« to satisfy this requirement. Kesselring, Westphal, and Beelitz all testified how this good news produced relief and »elation« among the three, because it meant that prisoners facing death sentences, and not innocent hostages as specified by Hitler, would be executed. Westphal, as instructed by Kesselring, then telephoned the Führerbefehl to AOK14 for relay to the appropriate, subordinate echelons. Westphal testified that Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chef des Wehrmachtführungsstabes im Ober- kommando der Wehrmacht, telephoned him at 2300-2400 hours, 23 March to convey a second, expanded Führerbefehl: Hitler still insisted on the ten-for-one reprisal ratio but, in addition, demanded that Kappler's Sipo »carry out« the executions. Kes- selring had already gone to bed, but Westphal said he awakened the Feldmarschall to advise him of this amended Führerbefehl, and he was told to pass Hitler's order along to AOK 14. Kesselring, Westphal, and Beelitz said that this further heighten- ed their elation, because it freed the Wehrmacht of all responsibility for the reprisal. Early on 24 March, they said, Kesselring boarded his Fieseler-Storch and took off in it to revisit the Cassino Front.13 For nearly fifty years this version has been accepted and recited by every jour- nalist and historian, with a single exception to my knowledge, who has written about Kesselring in connection with the Via Rasella/Ardeatine Caves incident. It

must be as a passenger. Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier's Record, with an Intro- duction by S.L.A. Marshall, trans, by Lynton Hudson (New York 1954), pp. 23-24; »Kes- selring Trans.,« 3 Mar 47, p. 2, and 24 Mar 47, p. 26. 11 Whenever Kesselring traveled by air his takeoffs from Monte Soratte were always sched- uled for dawn and his landings at dusk, because the Germans knew from experience that Allied fighters invariably did not arrive overhead until ninety minutes after sunup and departed ninety minutes before sunset. »Kesselring Trans.,« 29 Mar 47, p. 2. 12 The Führerhauptquartier was not at the »Wolfschanze,« near Rastenburg in East Prussia, on 23 March 1944 as was erroneously reported on several occasions during Kesselring's trial (e.g., ibid., 26 Mar 47, p. 11) and perpetuated in nearly every postwar account (e.g., Katz, Death in Rome, p. 85). Hitler was at the Berghof and the leadership of the OKW was in the Berchtesgaden area on 23/24 March 1944. There they had been located since the end of February 1944 and would remain until 14 July 1944, save for two one-day flights by Hitler to conferences at the »Wolfschanze« on 20 March and 9 July, and to »VV 2« (near Margival, France), 16-18 June 1944. Peter Hoffmann, Hitler's Personal Security (Cam- bridge, Mass. 1979), pp. 154-55. 13 Prosecution Exhibit No. 1, p. 1, submitted in evidence »Kesselring Trans.,« 19 Feb 47, p. 3; Pros. Ex. No. 23, pp. 3,4, submitted in evidence ibid., 24 Feb 47, p. 2; Pros. Ex. No. 24, p. 1, submitted in evidence ibid., 24 Feb 47, p. 2. Among the many examples of testimony in which Kesselring, Westphal, and Beelitz swore that the Feldmarschall had been at the Cassi- no Front on 23 March, flew back to his command post on Monte Soratte at 1900-2000 hours that evening, remained there throughout the night of 23/24 March, and returned to the Cas- sino Front at sunrise, 24 March 1944 are the following: (Kesselring) ibid., 3 Mar 47, p. 15; 4 Mar 47, p. 2; 7 Mar 47, p. 8; 17 Mar 47, p. 15; (Westphal) ibid., 26 Mar 47, pp. 17,22-23,24; 27 Mar 47, p. 9; 28 Mar 47, pp. 4,5,6; 29 Mar 47, p. 7; (Beelitz) ibid., 24 Mar 47, pp. 27,30-31. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 73

is the standard litany, the origins of which can be traced back to the affidavits and testimony sworn at Kesselring's trial.14 This construction does not correspond with the documentary evidence. The facts are ineluctably embedded in contemporaneous German military records which were generated in March 1944 and later transferred to the Heeresarchiv at Potsdam. Surviving the war, the originals are now deposited in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, while a microcopy is available in »Archives II,« the U.S. National Archives facili- ty at College Park, Maryland. After spending a good part of the summer of 1996 carefully examining the more than 2,000 pages of the transcript of Kesselring's spring 1947 trial, the present author could find little cause to challenge the veracity of the Feldmarschall and his staff officers. Westphal had testified that Monte Soratte received telegrams confirming the two telephoned Führerbefehle, and in late August my search for the filed copies of them in Record Group 242 began.15 None was found where it should have been, that is, in the appropriate War Diary annex. Although these orders did not relate in any way to 10. Armee, it seemed to me that, in the interest of completeness, a review of AOK 10 files which had been compiled in the March 1944 period was nonetheless warranted. Not unexpectedly the Führerbefehle were not there either, but a document caught my eye which opened a Pandora's Box. This was the record of a monitored telephone conversation, morning of 13 March 1944, between Generalmajor Westphal and Generalmajor (later Generalleutnant) Fritz Wentzell, Chef des Generalstabes at AOK 10. At its close the two discussed Kesselring's plans for a vacation: »Zum Schluß Ge- spraech über das Befinden des O.B. und die Urlaubsabsichten des Feldmarschalls.«16 On 14

14 Among those who have disseminated this version are Kenneth Macksey, Kesselring's biog- rapher, in his Kesselring: The Making of the Luftwaffe (New York 1978), p. 204; Kesselring's chief interrogator at the »Kensington Cage,« Lt.Col. A. P. Scotland, in his Fall Kesselring: Eine neue Darstellung des Prozesses in Venedig, Italien Frühjahr 1947/The Kesselring Case: being a rep- resentation of the trial in Venice, Italy Spring 1947 (Bonn 1952), p. 42; United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. VÜI (London 1949), p. 9; Rich- ard Lamb, The War in Italy, 1943-1945: A Brutal Story (London 1992), p. 57. A caveat: the ac- counts of Via Rasella and the Ardeatine Caves executions by Katz, Death in Rome, and Lamb, War in Italy, contain other significant factual inaccuracies, misspellings, and in some cases apparent falsifications of the facts: they should be accepted with utmost circumspection. In his memoirs Kesselring does not mention where he was on 23/24 March 1944, an omission of obvious significance. Kesselring, Soldier's Record, pp. 353-66; Kesselring, Soldat, pp. 433-45. Rudolf Aschenauer, in his Krieg ohne Grenzen: Der Partisanenkampf gegen Deutschland 1939-1945 (Leoni am Starnberger See 1982), pp. 322-23, is the only writer to my knowledge who has ac- curately stated that Kesselring was not at Cassino and Monte Soratte on 23/24 March 1944, as he had claimed, but in north and central Italy. I have recently been informed that some Ger- man historians in addition to Dr. Aschenauer know Kesselring lied at his trial, because they, likewise, had found the original documents in the BA-MA of the same microcopies I discovered in RG 242; however, they have not fathomed why he used this prevarication as the principal strategy of his defense. Dr. Gerhard Schreiber to Dr. R. Raiber, 22 Mar 97. 15 The two alleged telephoned Führerbefehle and their contents were essential to Kessel- ring's defense: if taken at face value, they mitigated the extent of the Feldmarschall's röle in the Ardeatine Caves murders to which he was admitting. Westphal had said confir- matory cables were received at Monte Soratte. »Kesselring Trans.,« 26 Mar 47, pp. 17,21. He had also testified that a telegram corroborating his telephoned transmission of the second Führerbefehl was sent from Monte Soratte to AOK 14 on 24 Mar 44. Ibid., 31 Mar 47, pp. 12-16.1 was able to find no copies of any of these cables in the O.B. Südwest/(Obk- do. H.Gr. C) or in the AOK 14 files in the RG 242 microcopies for this period. 16 AOK 10, la, Anlagen zum K.T.B. 5, Meldungen, 1.3-20.3.44, telephone conversation West- phal/Wentzell, 1110 hours, 13 Mar 44. Alte Signatur: 52071/7; in T312/90/7 614 401. 74 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

March Kesselring spoke via telephone with Wentzell, and this proved to be the last telephone conversation logged between Kesselring and AOK10 until the morning of 26 March.17 In a telephone conversation on 18 March between Westphal and Ge- neraloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff gen. v. Scheel, Oberbefehlshaber der 10. Armee, the following dialogue took place: »O.B. [v. Vietinghoff-Scheel]: Haben Sie mit dem Feldmarschall schon telefoniert? W.: [Westphal]: Nein, ich kann nicht mit ihm sprechen.«18 On 22 March 1944 Westphal said to Wentzell: »Der Feldmarschall wird heute abend in den italienischen Raum einpassieren.«19 On 23 March Westphal said to Wentzell: »Der Feldmarschall kommt erst am 26. zurück.« Wentzell, forgetting what he had been told by Westphal on the previous day, asked if Kesselring was still in Germany, to which Westphal replied: »Nein, er bleibt noch in Norditalien. Erfährt noch runter nach Sßvona und Genua und trifft sich morgen mit Dorpmüller in Florenz. [...] Dann geht er am 25. zur Heereswaffenschule, die wie die Nachrichtenschule gut arbeiten soll.«20 At 1030 hours, 24 March Westphal informed Wentzell: »Der Feldmarschall ist noch oben in Nordita- lien. Er schreit, in Genua wäre alles viel zu dünn.«21 Finally, in a telephone conversation with von Vietinghoff, morning of 26 March 1944, Kesselring said: »In den letzten vier Tagen war ich in Nord- und Mittelitalien und habe mir die dortigen Verhältnisse angesehen. Nachdem ich jetzt zurück bin, möchte ich Ihnen meinen besonderen Glück- wunsch aussprechen für die fabelhafte Führung während meiner Abwesenheit.«22 These pieces of evidence revealed that the Feldmarschall had not been at the Cas- sino-Garigliano Front and Monte Soratte on 23/24 March 1944: he was distant from the main operational zone from 14 or 15 March until he returned to Monte Sorat- te on 25 or 26 March 1944. They showed that the testimony to which former Gene- ralfeldmarschall Kesselring, Westphal and his la had repeatedly sworn in Venice in spring 1947 had not been the truth. With the fighting raging at Cassino, what was he doing so far from Monte So- ratte and the main battle arena? German reserves were spread thinly, and he had always been fearful that the Americans and British might try to land in force on the coast of Tuscany, that is, behind the 10th and 14th Armies, as they had farther south at Anzio/Nettuno in January 1944. In early March he had transferred the Fallschirmpanzerdivision »Hermann Göring« from the Anzio/Nettuno beachhead to Lucca, north of Pisa in Tuscany, to serve as a mobile reserve which could strike against an Allied invasion in this region.23 On 8 March 1944 he, General der Infan- terie Anton Dostler, Kommandierender General des LXXV. Armeekorps responsible for defending Liguria and Tuscany, and Generalleutnant (Lw) Paul Conrath, Divisions- kommandeur of »Hermann Göring,« inspected defenses in northern Tuscany as far northward as Carrara, twenty-five kilometers east of La Spezia.24 Westphal had told Wentzell on 23 March 1944 that Kesselring, while returning from Germany,

17 Ibid., Kesselring/Wentzell, 0900 hours, 14 Mar 44; in T312/90/7 614 427. is Ibid., v. Vietinghoff /Westphal, 1120 hours, 18 Mar 44; in T312/90/7 614 555. w AOK 10, la, Anlagen zum K.T.B. 5, Meldungen, 21.3-31.3.44, Westphal/Wentzell, 1025 hours, 22 Mar 44. Alte Signatur: 52071/8; in T312/90/7 614 691. 2° Ibid., Westphal/Wentzell, 1025 hours, 23 Mar 44; in T312/90/7 614 724. 21 Ibid., Westphal/Wentzell, 1030 hours, 24 Mar 44; in T312/90/7 614 757. 22 Ibid., Kesselring/v. Vietinghoff, 0850 hours, 26 Mar 44; in T312/90/7 614 811. 23 C.J.C. Molony, with F.C. Flynn, H.L. Davies, and T.P. Gleave, The Mediterranean and Mid- dle East. Volume V. The Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy 3rd September 1943 to 31st March 1944 (London 1973), p. 762. 24 Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K. K.T.B. I., Ia (Führungsabteilung), vom 20.1.44r-30.4.44, Eintragung 8.3.44. Alte Signatur: 52536/1; in T314/1569/066. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 75 would be stopping at Genoa and Savona. Most likely, it seemed to me, this was for the purpose of inspecting coastal defenses in Liguria. Perhaps an account of his tour might be among the records of Armeegruppe von Zangen and also of General Kommando LXXV. Armeekorps, subordinate to the former. The assumption was correct on both counts. There were, indeed, reports in these records which showed Kesselring had departed at 1400 hours, 22 March 1944 by air from San Andrea, southwest of Parma where Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K. was located, and arrived at 1630 hours at Flugplatz Novi Ligure, north of Genoa. He appears to have stayed the night at the Hotel Savoy in Nervi Voltri near Genoa. At 0700 hours, 23 March he set out to inspect local defenses and then was driven westward along the Gulf of Genoa, stopping at Voltri, Pegli, Celle Ligure, Savona, Albenga, Alassio, Imperia, San Remo, and Ventiglia near the Franco/Italian border. Late in the afternoon he returned and, passing through Genoa, arrived at 1930 hours at the Hotel Excelsior in Rapallo, 40 kilometers southeast of Genoa. He conferred with Kapitän zur See Max Berninghaus (Seekommandant Italienische Riviera) that evening beginning at 2030 hours, after which he presumably went to bed, and with Oberst Almers at 0700 next morning, 24 March, before departing southward. He stopped at Chiavari, then at Sestri Levante, and at 1045 hours arrived in La Spezia. There he inspected La Spezia's harbor defenses and other sites in the area, including gun emplacements on Punta Bianca at the mouth of the River Magra nearby. He then proceeded southward to Livorno, where he ended his tour at 1620 hours, 24 March.25 No document has surfaced to show that Kesselring met Reichsverkehrsminister Dr. Julius Dorpmüller in Florence which, according to Westphal, had been planned. However, we can account for his location next day: At 0700 hours, 25 March 1944 he, the Id der H.Gr., a Stabsarzt der Luftwaffe, and one of his Generalstabsoffiziere landed at Forli, southwest of Ravenna on the Adriatic coast of Italy. After spending the morning at the »Waffenschule des O.B. Südwest,«, in the afternoon he inspected defenses along the coast north and south of Ravenna which were the responsibility of Generalkommando Witthöft, Befehlshaber Venetianische Küste. Late in the afternoon Kesselring and his escort returned to Flugplatz Forli » wo die Sondermaschine um 1800 Uhr [25 March] zur H.Gr, startet.«26 It is clear that Kesselring left the main zone of operations for a short holiday in Germany on 14 or 15 March and did not return to Monte Soratte until evening of

25 Armeeabteilung (-gruppe) >von Zangen,< la, K.T.B., Anlage 2 (27.Jan.-30.Jun.1944), Besichti- gungsbemerkungen des O.B., Teil I, Blatt 62-71, St.Qu., den 25 März 1944, Besichtigungsbe- merkung anlaesslich des Besuches des O.B.-Suedwest im Bereich des Generalkommandos LXXV A.K. am 23. u. 24.3.44, (Stempel: Armeegruppe v. Zangen, handschriftlich: la Nr. 1146/44, geh. 28.3.). Alte Signatur: 64839/6; in T312/90/1638/993-1 004; Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., Ia, An- lagenband V zum K.T.B. I, 23.1.1944-28.4.1944, Anlage 29, Besichtigung des Korpsabschnittes durch den Herrn Oberbefehlshaber vom 22. bis 24. März 1944. Alte Signatur: 52536/16; in T314/1569/816-822. 26 Gen.Kdo. Witthöft (Befh. Venetianische Küste), Anlagen zum K.T.B. Ia, Bd II, vom l.Jan.- 30.Jun.1944, Anlage 2, Bericht über den Besuch des Oberbefehlshabers Südwest, Generalfeld- marschall Kesselring, am 25.3.1944. Alte Signatur: 58009/2b); in T501/334/523-525. Ac- cording to frame 334 the provenance of this folder could not be established by American archivists. Thirty-kilometer-deep strips along the eastern and western coasts of Italy, de- fended by Armeegruppe von Zangen to which Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K in the west and Gen.Kdo. Witthöft, Befehlshaber Venetianische Küste, in the east, were directly subordinate were really northward extensions of the main operational zone, the fronts of which were along the Rapido, Gari, and Garigliano Rivers and at Nettuno/Anzio. »Kesselring Trans.,« 28 Feb 47, pp. 19, 20; 1 Mar 47, pp. 2, 7, 8. 76 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

25 March 1944.27»Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring hat mit dem heutigen Tage den Ober- befehl wieder uebernommen,« Monte Soratte informed OKH in East Prussia in the Ic's Tagesmeldung dispatched to OKH at 0240 hours, 26 March.28 What did these findings mean? Why, as it appears from these documents to be ir- refutable, had he and his staff officers conspired to prevaricate in their affidavits and repeatedly in their testimony about his location on 23/24 March? Why had he not told the simple truth from the beginning: »I was in Liguria, not at Monte Soratte, when Hitler's reprisal order for Via Rasella arrived and knew nothing about it until I was informed after the event«? He appears to have established this fiction early in the postwar period and never strayed from it when interrogated. It was accepted by Col- onel Scotland, his principal interrogator at the »Kensington Cage« in London, as well as by others who later interviewed Kesselring.29 He knew that his stubborn ad- herence to it was likely to render him vulnerable to prosecution for involvement in the Ardeatine Caves killings. Why, then, did he persist in its propagation? The only explanation, it seemed to me, was that he must be hiding something which was more threatening than accountability for his röle in the Ardeatine Caves shootings. A chance telephone conversation with William Wiley, a Canadian historian, produced the clue which pointed toward the most likely solution of this enigma.30 Wiley had been working on records concerning German Army reprisals and mentioned to me that two American officers and thirteen enlisted men had landed on the western coast of Italy to demolish railroad-tunnel exits, had been captured on 24 March, and were shot on 26 March 1944. They were members of an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Operational Group (OG) which was code-named »Ginny Mission.« At once it was clear to me that they must be the American saboteurs described in two almost-forgotten entries in a Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., Tätigkeitsberich- te, Abteilung Ic file for this period: 1) »24.3.1944: Landung eines amerik. Commando- Trupps [sic] bei Bonassola [in Liguria, Italy]«; and 2) »25.3.1944: Im Zusammenhang mit dem gelandeten amerik. Commandotrupp schlägt Ic vor, die Leute wie gewöhnliche Kgf. zu behandeln; es sind Soldaten in Uniform, die den Auftrag hatten, einen Eisenbahntun- nel unmittelbar hinter der Front zu sprengen und nach Durchführung sofort zurückzu- kehren. Der Komm. Gen. entscheidet dahingehend, dass es Saboteure sind und gibt den Be- fehl, die Leute sofort durch die eigene Truppe erschießen zu lassen.«31

27 The precise date on which Kesselring departed from Monte Soratte on his holiday is unknown. Molony, Campaign in Sicily and Campaign in Italy, p. 781, writes that he left »on short leave about« 11 March [1944] but gives no reference; Dominick Graham and Shelford Bid- well, in Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943-1945 (New York 1986), p. 213, report he departed on 11 March, likewise without citing a source. However, in view of Kesselring's telephone conversation with Wentzell on 14 March noted above (AOΚ10, la, Anlagen zum K.T.B. 5, Meldungen, Kesselring/Wentzell, 0900 hours, 14 Mar 44; in T312/90/7 614 427), the Feld- marschall could not have left Monte Soratte for Germany before late in the morning of 14 March. His autobiography is of no help on this point: in it he does not mention his holiday in March 1944, while writing that he took a few days leave »at the turn of the year [1940-41]the only ones I had during the whole war.« Kesselring: Soldier's Record, trans. Lynton Hudson (New York 1954), p. 88. We know now, of course, that this was not the absolute truth. 28 GenStdH, Op Abt. [II], Meldungen Ob. Südwest, vom 16.-31.3.44 Fernschreiben, Tagesmel- dung 25.3.44,26/3 0240, Ia Nr. 3240/44, g.Kdos. Alte Signatur: 34 079; in T78/321/6 275 978. 29 It is obvious Scotland admired Kesselring and accepted without question the Feldmar- schall's lie that he had been at Cassino and Monte Soratte on 23/24 March 1944. Scot- land, London Cage, pp. 170-86. 30 Dr. William H. Wiley to Dr. R. Raiber, 7 October 1996. 31 Gen.Kdo. LXXV A.K., Anlagenband VII zum K.T.B. I, Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ic vom 20.12.43-30.4.44. Alte Signatur: 52536/8; in T314/1570/020. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 77

The Kommandierende General who ordered the executions, in accordance with Hitler's Kommandobefehl of 18. Oktober 1942, was Anton Dostler. Newsreel clips of his execution by an American firing squad in December 1945, seen by most Amer- icans of my generation, came to mind.32 The Ginny Mission OG, captured near Bonassola at about 1000 hours on 24 March 1944, had been transported to La Spe- zia, twenty-two kilometers southeast of Bonassola, in mid-afternoon. Kesselring had already arrived in La Spezia at 1030 hours that morning. How could he not have been informed about this »special event«? Moreover, according to testimony given at Kesselring's trial, the Feldmarschall had reserved the right to confirm all death sentences, including those of every captured Allied commando, in his theater.33 After the war it could not have escaped Kesselring's notice how little time elapsed before the enraged Americans exacted vengeance by bringing Dostler to trial and shooting him.34 His own chances would be better, he must have reasoned, if he were to accept responsibility for passing on a Führerbefehl which resulted in the deaths of 335 Italians in Rome rather than reveal his presence in La Spezia on 24 March and thereby establish a link between himself and the murders of fifteen Americans. The tragic story of the Ginny Mission must now briefly be told: This OG be- longed to Unit »A,« First Contingent, 2677th Headquarters Company, OSS, Exper- imental, (Provisional), in August 1944 renamed Company »A,« 2671st Special Re- connaissance Battalion, Separate (Provisional).35 Recruitment by the OSS of its officers and men from regular U.S. Army units began in April/May 1943. All were and remained U.S. Army personnel. All had already been trained as riflemen, en- gineers, radio operators, medical corpsmen, and the like. Their mission, unlike those of the U.S. Rangers, would be to land and operate behind enemy lines in Italy, where they would train, organize, and support native partisans and sabotage Ger- man installations. They received special irregular-warfare training in the United States before shipping overseas, and this was continued in Corsica after they had helped drive the Germans out of the island in October 1943. All were volunteers, understood the hazards their missions would involve, and presumably spoke Ital- ian with more or less fluency.36 They were not U.S. Rangers, although the two for-

32 I also remembered a brief account of the Ginny Mission tragedy described by Whitney R. Harris in his Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg (Dallas, Tex. 1954), pp. 225-28. 33 This authority is analyzed infra. According to the testimony of Generalrichter Hans Kel- ler, Kesselring's legal officer, the Feldmarschall relegated to himself the right to confirm all death sentences imposed on Italians as well as on German Army personnel in his jii- risdiction: »Now General,« Prosecutor Colonel Halse put to Keller on 20 Feb 47, »I want to ask you one or two, I think, simple questions. First of all so far as death sentences on Italians were concerned the Field Marshal had reserved confirmation of these to himself, had he not. »Yes,« Keller replied. »Kesselring Trans.,« pp. 31-32; see also ibid., p. 34, ibid., 21 Feb 47, p. 2, ibid., 31 Mar 47, p. 22. However, Kommandeure at the local level apparently also had this power under certain circumstances. Dr. Gerhard Schreiber to Dr. R. Raiber, 4 Jul 97. 34 Anton Dostler was the first German general to be executed for war crimes in western Europe. The Washington Post, 2 Dec 45, p. 8M. 35 History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War De- partment, Washington, D.C. The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS (Office of Strate- gic Services), vol 2, with a new introduction by Kermit Roosevelt (New York, Washing- ton, D.C. 1976), p. 87. 36 »History of OGs,« an undated, unsigned typescript whose title page is missing, in RG 226, entry 143, box 11, folder 145, pp. 1-12. This appears to be a working draft intended to be developed later as an official history of the OSS OGs. The members of »Unit A« were 78 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber mations were alike in some ways: the chief difference was that Rangers operated in front of the enemy, while OG operations, like most OSS activities, typically fo- cused on targets in the enemy's rear.37 »The primary mission of the OGs was to organize, train, and equip resistance groups in order to convert them into guerrillas, and to serve as the nuclei of such groups in operations against the enemy as directed by the Theatre Commander.«38 At dusk on 22 March 1944 the two officers and thirteen enlisted men of the Ginny Mission OG sailed in two PT boats of Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 15, U.S. Navy, from Bastia, on the eastern coast of Corsica, into the Gulf of Genoa. Their objective was Stazione di Framura on the coast of Liguria, 170 kilometers northeast of Bastia and 25 kilometers northwest of La Spezia. Their task was to demolish the exits of two railroad tunnels separated by 100 meters of open track 300 meters southwest of Stazione di Framura. This was part of the main western coastal rail line which, wind- ing through mountainous Liguria, carried supplies from Genoa southward through La Spezia and Tuscany to Rome and then to the German 10. Armee, defending along the rivers Rapido, Gari, and Garigliano, and 14. Armee at Anzio/Nettuno. The tunnel exits selected for demolition were considered inaccessible to air strikes. The OG's orders were to find the target as quickly as possible, set their explosives, and then return immediately to the boats: it was to be quickly in, quickly out.39 At 2300-2330 hours the OG made landfall in rubber boats which had been launch- ed from one of the PT boats 300 meters west of the target. Shortly afterward the OG radioed that it was »on target«; then, however, further radio contact between it and the PT boats was lost when a German convoy approached, forcing the boats to take evasive actions. Ship-to-shore communications had still not been re- established by 0300 hours, 23 March; with dawn approaching, the decision was made aboard the boats to return to Bastia. In accordance with a contingency plan, the PTs returned to offshore positions west of Framura the night of 23/24 March and again on 25/26 March. On neither occasion were radio or flashlight signals received from the OG ashore. The latter had been furnished with the address of a partisan safe house at Bobbio, on the River Trebbia 70 kilometers northeast of Bo- nassola.40 In the event recovery by sea was not possible, they were instructed to make their way to this refuge, from which they might later be exfiltrated. Aerial re-

chiefly of Italian extraction and were supposedly fluent in Italian; other units in 2677th Headquarters Company were assigned to other areas in occupied Europe, e.g., France, and spoke that language. During a conversation in Baltimore, Maryland on 5 May 1997, Albert R. Materazzi, former U.S. Army captain and the OSS operations officer who planned the Ginny Mission, told me that some of the fifteen men spoke, even understood, very little Italian! In August 1943 every OSS irregular warfare group had been designa- ted a »Headquarters Company (Provisional),« those in the western Mediterranean com- bining as the 2677th Headquarters Company (Provisional). Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (New York 1983), p. 228. 37 History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War De- partment, Washington, D.C., War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), with a new introduction by Kermit Roosevelt (New York 1976), p. 229. 38 »History of OGs,« p. 13. 39 Ibid., pp. 93-96; Headquarters Detachment »C« 2677th Headquarters Co Exp (Prov), APO 512, U.S. Army, 27 March 1944, Report of »GINNY« Operation, 22 March 1944, in RG 153, ent. 143, box 532, bk. 1-2, fol. 4. Proceedings from »Record of Trial of Anton Dostler by Military Commission, Rome, Italy, October 8-12,1945,« in RG 153, ent. 143, box 532, Case No. 15-115, pp. 55, 73, hereafter cited as »Dostler Trans.« 40 Information from Albert Materazzi on 5 May 1997. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 79

connaissance showed that the tunnel exits had not been demolished.41 On 27 March 1944 a Radio Vienna communique was intercepted which dashed the hopes of those waiting anxiously for news of the missing OG: »Along the Oriental coast of the Gulf of Genoa, an American unit composed of two officers and thirteen enlisted men landed northwest of La Spezia and was killed in combat.«42 This was the standard format ordered by Hitler to be used in reporting the deaths of all captured commandos.43 The OG had not been killed in combat. All fifteen had surrendered on 24 March and, although wearing full, regular U.S. Army uniforms, were shot without trial early on the morning of 26 March 1944.44 These details were not known until after La Spezia had fallen to the U.S. 92nd Infantry Division on 24 April 1945.45 Only then could investigators interrogate local Italian citizens, some of whom showed them the common burial site, from which the remains were disinterred a few weeks later. In May 1945 members of the Wehrmacht who knew about the capture and executions were located in Allied P.O.W. enclosures. From them it was learned that

41 For above see Headquarters Detachment »C« 2677th Headquarters Co Exp (Prov), APO 512, U.S. Army, Report of »GINNY« Operation, 22 March 1944, dated 27 Mar 44; Report of First Attempt to relieve »GINNY« Party, 23 March 1944, dated 27 Mar 44; and Report of Second Attempt to relieve »GINNY« Party, 25 March 1944, also dated 27 Mar 44. All in RG 153, ent. 143, box 532, bk. 1-2, fol. 4. 42 An English translation of the radio intercept is contained in War Department, AGO, Mil- itary Personnel, Casualty, S.R.&D., SPXPO-S, File No. AG 704 (23 Jan 45) FC-S, to Com- manding Officer, USAF Mediterranean Theater of Operations, APO 512, c/o Postmaster, New York, 4th Ind., AG 704/076-C, Co. »A« 2671ST SP RCN BN SEP (PROV), To: CO, 2671st Sp Ren Bn Sep (Prov), 12 Feb 45, p. 4, in RG 153, ent. 143, box 530, fol. 16-115. The original German version as broadcast on 27 March 1944 is reprinted in Veröffentlichun- gen deutschen Quellenmaterials zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, »Das Oberkommando der Wehr- macht gibt bekannt...«: Der Deutsche Wehrmachtbericht, vol. 3,1944^-1945, with register by Günter Wegmann (Osnabrück 1982), p. 67. 43 For English-language versions of Hitler's Commando Order of 18 Oct 1942 and its important supplementary instruction issued on 19 Oct 1942, as well as testimony concerning nature and distribution of the order by defendant Walter Warlimont, former General der Artillerie and Stellv. ChefWFSt. i. OKW, see Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10: Nuernberg October 1946-April 1949, vol. 11 (Washington 1950), pp. 73-80. The prescriptions laid down in these documents were clear and unequivocal: all saboteurs, whether or not they were in uniform, resisted capture, or surrendered even if they were unarmed were to be shot after interrogation. It would then be broadcast that they had been killed in action, as, indeed, was announc- ed on 27 Mar 44 in the case of the Ginny Mission OG executions. If their captors were not Wehrmacht, e.g., Italian soldiers or civilians, they were to be turned over to the Si- po/SD for interrogation. Under no circumstances were they to be treated as prisoners of war. Strong measures were threatened for German officers who did not comply. In the supplementary instruction Hitler explained that the purpose of the Kommandobefehl was to eliminate prisoner-of-war status as a possibility for commandos and saboteurs who might carry out their mission and then surrender rather than fight when facing imminent capture. The mission of the captured Americans was sabotage; therefore, they fit this for- mula except that they had not blown up the tunnel exits. Technically, therefore, they had not committed the crime of sabotage. 44 That the Kommandobefehl was manifestly »unlawful« is another matter. Paragraph 3 of the »Ten Commandments,« pasted inside the front cover of every German soldier's pay book, stipulated unambiguously: »No enemy who has surrendered [underlined in original] will be killed including partisans and spies. They [sic] will be duly punished by courts.« »Kesselring Trans.,« Defense Ex. No. 69, presented in evidence on 18 Mar 47, p. 30. 45 Hondon B. Hargrove, Buffalo Soldiers in Italy: Black Americans in World War II (Jefferson, N.C. 1985), p. 164. 80 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber the Americans, after landing, had not been able to locate the target. They had gone up into the hills behind the shoreline, where they found cover in an unoccupied stable 500 meters northwest of Bonassola. Early on 24 March their rubber boats and explosives were discovered by a peasant who reported his discovery to the Fascist-Republican militia in Bonassola. The Germans were alerted, and a mixed militia/ Wehrmacht patrol began combing through the area. By 1000-1030 hours, morning of 24 March, it had captured the fifteen Americans after a brief struggle. The prisoners were taken to Bonassola where they were interrogated by Italian officials and, early in the afternoon, transported by the Germans to La Spezia. Oberst Kurt Aimers, whose Festungsbrigade 135 was responsible for defense of the area around La Spezia, a former Italian naval base, had established his headquarters in a castle at Carozzo on a hillside one kilometer northeast of La Spezia. The Ameri- cans were confined there.46 It is inconceivable that Kesselring, who must have stopped at the castle when he was in La Spezia that same afternoon, knew nothing about them. The prisoners were intensively interrogated, and a tactical report was sent to General Dostler's headquarters near San Andrea as soon as it was learned that no Allied invasion in Liguria or Tuscany was imminent. Next morning, 25 March, Oberst Almers received an order from Dostler's headquarters to proceed with the execution of the Americans pursuant to the Kommandobefehl.47 Some German officers did not believe the Americans should be classified as saboteurs and qualify for execution, rather that they should be treated as prisoners of war. One of these was Hauptmann d.R. Alexander Fürst zu Dohna-Schlobitten, serving in March 1944 as the Ic at Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., and it is his report to Ar- meegruppe von Zangen that is quoted above.48 When he learned that the Americans had been in uniform, he advised Aimers that they should be sent to a prisoner-of- war stockade. Although early on 25 March Dostler had ordered the executions, in the afternoon Aimers received an instruction that these be temporarily postponed. Later, in Dostler's absence, Oberst i.G. Horst Kraehe, Chef des Generalstabes at Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., detailed Dohna-Schlobitten to transmit Dostler's execution order to Aimers. Dohna-Schlobitten was incensed (empört): unable to convince Kraehe that he was certain the Americans were not candidates for execution, that shooting them would constitute a contravention of the Geneva Convention, and that the same penalty would henceforth likely be applied to German saboteurs and commandos caught by the Allies, he refused to obey his superior officer. A few weeks later Dohna-Schlo- bitten was informed by Kraehe that he would be dismissed from the Corps because he had protested the order. Dostler wrote in his personal file that he was »politi- cally unreliable,« and in May 1944 he was discharged from the Army and assigned to dig antitank ditches at Lyck in East Prussia. Had his recalcitrance occurred after 20 July 1944, Dohna-Schlobitten is convinced he would have been executed.49

46 »Dostler Trans.,« pp. 13-16. 47 Ibid. 48 Gen.Kdo. LXXV A.K., Anlagenband VII zum K.T.B. I, Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ic vom 20.12.43-30.4.44 Eintragung 25.Mar.44. Alte Signatur: 52536/8; in T314/1570/020. 49 Alexander Fürst zu Dohna-Schlobitten, Erinnerungen eines alten Ostpreußen (Berlin 1989), pp. 257-58. Dohna-Schlobitten writes: »Gleichzeitig [late on 24 or early on 25 March 1944] meldete ich das Vorkommnis General Dostler sowie General von Vietinghoff, dem Oberbefehls- haber der Armee, dem das Korps unterstand. [...] Bis zuletzt hatte ich gehofft, General von Vie- tinghoff würde eingreifen, aber nichts geschah.« Ibid., pp. 257,58. This strongly indicates that v. Vietinghoff, who was the senior commander subordinate to Kesselring in the theater, was acting as the Feldmarschall's deputy — further evidence that Kesselring was absent Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 81

Dohna-Schlobitten wrote that he had been able to convince Aimers that the executions should not be carried out.50 Other officers at La Spezia had arrived at the same conclusion. Among these were Fregattenkapitän Friedrich Klaps, naval Ic sta- tioned at the arsenal in La Spezia, Leutnant zur See Georg Sessler, his subordinate, and Oberleutnant Hans-Georg Körbitz, Ic in Aimer's command. By early evening 25 March they had decided to send a telegram to Dostler explaining that »from [their] point of view this group [of Americans] was not a sabotage group and was not a commando group or something like that; that it was a military mission.«51 In their wire they requested a delay of the executions so they could continue their in- terrogations.52 A copy of this telegram was sent to the Ic, O.B. Südwest (Obkdo. H.Gr. C) at Monte Soratte.53 Klaps, senior officer who spoke for the group, telephoned Dostler's headquarters several times on 25 March in order to emphasize their mis- givings. Among the officers at San Andrea with whom he spoke were the duty officer, the Ic (Dohna-Schlobitten), the Chef des Generals tabes (Kraehe), and the la (Major i.G. Johannes Köpper).54 Finally, Klaps said, between 0430 and 0530,26 March he was connected by telephone with Dostler. The connection was poor; moreover, in order to maintain security they had to speak »in camouflage.« Although he could hear the general's voice, he could not make out what he said, so their conversation had to be relayed by the telephone operator. Shortly after, Aimers ordered Klaps, apparently on orders from Dostler, to make no further telephone calls concerning the executions. »You know how this order is handled. [The last paragraph] of the order it reads, officers which [sic] do not comply with those orders come before a court martial.<«55 Even though Dostler's headquarters had delayed the executions during the afternoon while the matter was discussed with »higher authority,«56 Aimers ordered one of the officers belonging to Festungsbataillon 905 of his brigade to select an execution site on Punta Bianca and prepare a grave. That evening Dostler insisted that Aimers carry out the executions next morning. Early on 26 March the Ameri- cans were divided into two groups and trucked to the tip of Punta Bianca where they were shot by German soldiers of Festungsbataillon 906. Their bodies were buried in a common grave near Ferrara (Liguria), approximately one kilometer southeast of Ameglia.57 As described supra, Kesselring had inspected gun positions

from Monte Soratte and not available to his staff at this time. However, it should be noted that Westphal testified it was Generaloberst von Mackensen, Oberbefehlshaber der 14. Ar- mee, to whom he would have turned if a command decision — albeit admittedly referring to Via Rasella — were required when Kesselring was absent. »Kesselring Trans.,« 27 Mar 47, p. 13; 29 Mar 47, pp. 2-3. According to Dohna-Schlobitten, Dostler was absent from his command post at San Andrea through most of Saturday, 25 March when he went »again because of a toothache to the coast.« Dohna-Schlobitten, Erinnerungen, p. 257. so Ibid., pp. 257. 51 »Dostler Trans.,« pp. 55-56. 52 Ibid., p. 56. 53 Ibid., pp. 75, 79. 54 Ibid., p. 77. 55 Ibid., p. 81. 56 Ibid., pp. 181-183,188,223. 57 Summary of Evidence, Irvin Schindler, Col., JAGD, to General Richmond, 6 July 1945, pp. 1-9, in RG 153, ent. 143. box 532, fol. 4 bk. 1-2. Initially the American investigators assumed the burial site was at Ferrara, north of Ravenna, in eastern Italy. Headquarters, Army Service Forces, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Washington, D.C., 29 Aug 45, Memo for General Weir, SPGI 15-115. However, OSS investigators, who arrived in Ameglia shortly after its liberation on 24 March, quickly learned the Americans were buried near the »Ferrara Powder Magazine,« 14 Kilometers southeast of La Spezia between 82 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

General situation

Venice Trieste<

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at the mouth of the River Magra in the afternoon of 24 March, and it is not unlikely he stopped at a battery emplaced on Punta Bianca near the spot where the fifteen Americans would be shot less than forty-eight hours later.58

Ameglia and Bocca di Magra, on Punta Bianca in Liguria. Giovanni Ferrari, affidavit, 26 Apr 45, at Ameglia; Pio Lazzarini, affidavit, 26 Apr 45, at Amgelia; Mario Pugliese, affidavit, 26 Apr 45, at Ameglia; all in RG 226, ent. 146, box 36, fol. 475; [OSS] SCI Unit-Z 2, 27 Apr 45, »Report of the Photos taken of place of the believed to be 13 American O.G. of the Ginny Mission« [sic], sketch of burial site attached, in RG 226, ent. 190, box 193, fol. 1561. 58 These were the heavy naval guns, protected in armored casemates and shuttled on rails

84 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

Careful review of the pertinent documents in RG 242, that is, in the surviving files of O.B. Südwest (ObKdo C), AOK 10, AOK 14, Armeegruppe von Zangen, and Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K. produced none which unequivocally links Kesselring with the executions of the fifteen Americans. There are no files generated by Der Deut- sche Kommandant von Rom in this period, and none at all by Festungsbrigade 135, in RG 242. Unfortunately, it is the unhappy experience of every researcher who ex- amines RG 242 to discover sooner or later that many of the files or their parts are missing. For various reasons some never reached the Heeresarchiv in Potsdam from the field commands; others were found and carted off eastward by the Red Army; still others were destroyed by their German custodians at the time of the German collapse. In the case at hand no document beyond the initial brief reports of the capture and summary execution of the Ginny Mission OG could be found, and a suspicion gradually developed that more than chance alone must explain so complete an absence of a paper trail. This was confirmed by evidence which emerged in the transcript of Dostler's trial. Several German officers testified that in early April 1944 units associated with the executions had received telegrams from Mon- te Soratte ordering that all records of the affair were to be destroyed, and compli- ance with this order reported. The following extracts from the Dostler transcript clearly show what happened: Major Frederick W. Roche, judge advocate (prosecutor): Do you know anything about the secret files of the German Army or your records pertaining to this incident [the capture and secret execution of the Ginny Mission OG]? Do you know who destroyed the records? Fregattenkapitän Friedrich Klaps: On my place of duty [sic] I myself destroyed the papers. On my place of duty and the other places of duty and commando places destroyed the other places [sic] and in the end I had to report to my superior place that I destroyed the papers and my superior place reported to the Supreme Command Southwest. Roche: Who was your superior you reported the destruction to? Klaps: Intelligence place, Italy [Abwehrstelle of Marine I in Italy], Roche: That is the German Intelligence? Klaps: Yes. Roche: Did you receive a specific order from any person to destroy these records? Klaps: I was told verbally by Lieutenant Tarbuch [an SS officer] that they are to be destroyed and I think I also received a wireless. Roche: Was that an aptverstehle [Abwehrstelle] order? Klaps: I received the order from the intelligence but the intelligence itself received the order from higher up to destroy, and had to report to the Supreme Commander, Southwest the destruction of the papers. Roche: Then the report had to be made to General Kesselring's headquarters, Supreme Commander, Southwest? Klaps: Yes, to the [Jc] of the Supreme Commander, Southwest.59 Next day, Colonel Claudius O. Wolfe, defense counsel, asked Klaps about the destruction of records:

in and out of caves in the rocky cliffs, which shelled the 92nd Infantry Division with such deadly effect as it slowly advanced northward along the coast of Tuscany beginning in February and until they were finally overrun by the Americans on 21 April 1945. Har- grove, Buffalo Soldiers in Italy, pp. 98-99,164. 59 »Dostler Trans.,« pp. 81-82. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 85

Wolfe: You testified yesterday that you were ordered to destroy all of the records pertaining to this investigation of these fifteen Americans by the Supreme Commander of the Southwest. Will you please state when you received that order to destroy the records? Klaps: I believe it was Easter Monday and it was the 12th of April I received oral- ly the order from Tarbuch when I was in Verona. It was the 13th of April. [Sic; in April 1944 Monday fell on the tenth, not the twelfth; Thursday was the thir- teenth.] Wolfe: 1944? Klaps: 1944. Wolfe: Did you destroy the records pertaining to this investigation or this case of the fifteen Americans as soon as you received the order? Klaps: I have destroyed the files that were with me as soon as I received the order.60 Oberleutnant Hans-Georg Schultz had been an Ordonnanzoffizier to Oberst Kurt Ai- mers in March 1944. The prosecutor elicited the following testimony from him concerning the execution order Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K. had sent to Festungsbrigade 135: Roche: Where at the present time is the telegram that you saw the morning before the execution? Schultz: It has been destroyed. Roche: When was this telegram destroyed? Schultz: About 14 days after the execution. Roche: Did you see the destruction of this telegram? Schultz: Yes sir. Roche: Who actually destroyed it? Schultz: The adjutant of the brigade, and I was witness.61 Wolfe, likewise, questioned Schultz about this: Wolfe: Now, I believe yoy stated that the telegrams or papers pertaining to this execution were destroyed about 14 days after the execution. Schultz: Yes. Wolfe: Who ordered you to destroy them? Schultz: A telegram from the Herres Gruppe [sic], Wolfe: Just how did that telegram read? Schultz: All files pertaining to the execution of the troop of saboteurs have to be destroyed. Destruction is to be reported by such and such a date. Wolfe: Who was in command of the Herres Gruppe [sic]? Schultz: The General Field Marshal. Wolfe: What is his name? Is it Kesselring? Schultz: Yes. Wolfe: It came from General [sic] Kesselring's headquarters? Schultz: From his staff.62 Former General der Infanterie Gustav-Adolf von Zangen, Befehlshaber der Armee- gruppe von Zangen, testified concerning what he knew about the order to destroy the records as follows:

« Ibid., p. 84. μ Ibid., p. 109. « Ibid., p. 113. 86 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

Colonel Franklin T. Hammond (member of the Military Commission): Did your headquarters ever issue any order for destruction of the records concerning the execution of the fifteen Americans? General von Zangen: I cannot affirm that. I have personally learned during the interrogation that an order for the destruction of the files has been issued by the aptverstehle [Abwehrstelle], that is intelligence headquarters, Italy. An orga- nization outside of normal channels. This was to me very surprising news. Wolfe: I would like to clarify this point. Who was the next higher headquarters they [Abwehrstelle] were under? Zangen: I am not thoroughly acquainted with the set-up of all these intelligence headquarters. I have only heard during the preliminary interrogation that these headquarters had to report the destruction of the files to the Heeres Gruppe. Therefore it appears that the order of destruction had been issued from the Hee- res Gruppe. Hammond: The Heeres Gruppe was commanded by whom at that time? Zangen: Field Marshal Kesselring.63 General Dostler also testified on this point: Wolfe: This execution of these fifteen persons was carried out by Colonel Ai- mers. Did you ever give Colonel Aimers any orders to destroy all records pertaining to that incident at his headquarters? Dostler: No. Wolfe: When is the first time you learned that these records had been ordered destroyed? Dostler: Captain [sic] Klaps told me about it during the ride from Rome to Aver- sa two months ago. Wolfe: Who did Captain Klaps tell you had ordered that these records be destroyed? Dostler: His next higher headquarters had received the order from Heeres Grup- pe and had to report the destruction of the files to the Heeres Gruppe. Wolfe: And at that time who was the commanding general of the Heeres Grup- pe? Dostler: Field Marshal Kesselring.64 In his closing address Colonel Wolfe summed up the consequences of the order from Monte Soratte to obliterate all incriminating documentation when he said: »If we had those records today we would know the truth perhaps.«65 Equally unrewarding was my search for copies of documents which might link Kesselring to the Ginny Mission OG that could be in other collections in RG 242, namely, iri the files of Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Italien (SS- Brigadefiihrer und Generalmajor der Polizei Dr. Wilhelm Harster), Der Höchste SS- und Polizeiführer in Italien (SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS Karl Wolff), Der Bevollmächtigte General der Deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien (General der Infanterie Ru- dolf Toussaint), the very voluminous records of the Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Deut- schen Polizei, and those of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab). Thus, one searches in vain for the »smoking gun.« It is possible pertinent documents held in former East German or in Russian archives might eventually surface.

ω Ibid., p. 165. Μ Ibid., pp. 184-85. ω Ibid., p. 225. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 87

There is one further source which remains to be investigated: Beginning in early 1944 virtually all German Army non-morse radio traffic processed by Schlüssel- zusatz and transmitted between Monte Soratte and the Führerhauptquartier was intercepted and decrypted by the »magicians« at Bletchley Park.66 This sigint was code-named »Fish« by the British code breakers. The German Army machine, that is, the Lorenz Schlüsselzusatz 40 (LZ 40, later LZ 42), was known to the British as »Tunny«.67 This system was reserved chiefly for communication at the highest level, as between army groups and OKW or ΟΚΗ.6β The »Fish« link between Monte Soratte and the terminal at Strausberg, east of Berlin, which then relayed this traffic eastward to »Anna« and the Führerhauptquärtier, was code-named »Bream« by Bletchley Park.69 It is possible Kesselring used »Tunny«/«Bream« to report the capture and execution of the Americans in terms which would have revealed the extent of his involvement to the Führerhauptquartier in this period. With that said, my serious charge that the Feldmarschall dissembled at his trial is supported solely by the records, cited supra, which document that he had been in northern Italy from 22 to 25 March 1944. Fortunately for the historian, these records seem not to have been included in his expurgation order. The evidence in the telephone log brands Westphal as a dissimulator: he knew he had not told the truth. Dietrich Beelitz, likewise, testified falsely that the Feldmarschall was visiting the Cassino Front on 23 and 24 March, albeit only circumstantial documentary evidence exists to prove that he actually knew otherwise. Siegfried Westphal died in 1983: of the three highest-ranking officers at Monte Soratte in March 1944 only Beelitz is alive today. During the course of two interviews in May 1997 he was shown the records of Kesselring's tours of inspection in Liguria on 23 and 24 March 1944 and at Ravenna on 25 March, as well as copies of the AOK10 telephone logs which had surfaced at the National Archives. After over- coming initial surprise, he pronounced them genuine70 He then claimed that the itin- eraries were actually only schedules; however, after examining these documents more closely he recognized them as Berichte of the events as actually experienced. Now agreeing that Kesselring had, indeed, not been at the Cassino-Garigliano Front on 23 March as he and the others had repeatedly testified, he proposed that the Feld- marschall must have flown from northern Italy to Monte Soratte in the evening of 23 March, stayed the night of 23/24 March at his Kommandostelle, and then flew back to Liguria.71 If that had been the case, one supposes it would have been recorded in a log which his pilot was obliged to keep, and that this document should be filed in the Bundesarchiv-Militararchw: however no pilots' logs are deposited there.72 As has been documented supra, Kesselring, Westphal, and Beelitz agreed in their testimonies that Kesselring had arrived at Monte Soratte between 1900-2000

66 F.H. Hinsley, »An Introduction to Fish,« in Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park, eds. F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (Oxford 1994), pp. 142-46. 67 Ibid., p. 141. « Ibid., p. 143. 69 F.H. Hinsley, with E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, vol. 3, part 1 (New York 1984), p. 75. 70 For this and the following, information from Professor Peter Hoffmann, 4 Jun 97. The interviews with Dietrich Beelitz, conducted by Hoffmann, took place in Stuttgart on 11 May and at Herrenhalb on 29 May 97. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 88 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

hours, 23 March 1944 after a flight from the Cassino-Garigliano Front.73 This was important for them to establish, because it fixed in time two telephone calls to Mon- te Soratte which were essential features of the defense strategy at Kesselring's trial. According to the transcript, a vehicle fetched the Feldmarschall from the Fiese- ler-Storch landing field at Stazione di San Oreste, in the valley three kilometers (as the crow flies) southwest of the headquarters installations on Monte Soratte. West- phal and his former la testified that they met him as he descended from the vehicle in front of his office building and briefed him quickly about the events at Via Ra- sella.74 »A short time after the return of the Field Marshal there was a call [to him] from Kappler,« his former la testified.75 Kappler, in a conversation which lasted only a few minutes, offered to furnish a sufficient number of Italians who were »To- deskandidaten« (or »todeswürdig«) from Roman prisons to satisfy Hitler's reprisal demands.76 At about the same time Westphal had been summoned to the telephone in his own office: Generalmajor Horst Frhr. Treusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels, Chef der Operationsabteilung im Wehrmachtführungsstab, was telephoning from Berchtes- gaden to inform Monte Soratte that Hitler had accepted the 10-for-l reprisal for- mula.77 In the midst of Westphal's telephone conversation, Kesselring came into the room. After Westphal had rung off, he told Kesselring about the call from Butt- lar, whereupon the Feldmarschall informed his Generalstabschef of the discussion he had just had with Kappler.78 Kesselring's former la swore he had been an eyewitness to these events. More- over, he added, he knew the contents of the telephone calls in each case because he had monitored parts, at least, of both through separate earphones, a duty expected of him.79 However, comparison of his testimony in 1947 with what he now avers in 1997 should be assessed against the following excerpt from the report of Kes- selring's inspection tour in Liguria: »[...], 16,00 [Uhr, 23.4.44] Abbruch der Besichti- gung, Rückfahrt über Genua nach Rapallo. 19,30 [Uhr] Eintreffen Rapallo (Hotel Excel- sior). 20,30 [Uhr] Besprechung mit O.T.-Bereichs- und Abschnittsführer und Kpt.z.S. Ber- ninghaus. 24.3.44 7,00 Uhr Meldung Oberst Almers, Vortrag über Gliederung und Ein- satz der Kräfte. 7,20 [Uhr] Abfahrt Richtung Chiavari. f...]«80 Rapallo, it should be noted, is 350 kilometers northwest of Monte Soratte. When reminded that the Feld-

73 Kesselring: »Kesselring Trans.,« 3 Mar 47, p. 15; Beelitz: ibid., 17 Mar 47, p. 28; Westphal: ibid., 26 Mar 47, p. 15; Laternser (closing address): ibid., 30 Apr 47, p. 11. 74 Ibid., 3 Mar 47, pp. 16-17. 75 Ibid., 18 Mar 47, p. 8. 76 Ibid., 3 Mar 47, p. 16. 77 Ibid., 26 Mar 47, pp. 17-18. There were discrepancies between points in Buttlar's very important affidavit (defense exhibit no. 53, entered in evidence on 3 Mar 47) and the testimony of some of the witnesses. Dr. Laternser said he had requested that Buttlar be brought from Allendorf to Venice to testify, but he was given the impression by the Brit- ish that his affidavit, alone, would suffice. Ibid., 3 Mar 47, pp. 17-18. Since this general had been close to the throne in this period, he would have been able to clarify several of the unresolved contradictions: his live testimony might have been to Kesselring's ad- vantage, although exactly the opposite could also have been the case. 78 Ibid., 3 Mar 47, p. 16. 79 Ibid.; ibid., 18 Mar 47, pp. 8, 12. These and all of the above details were also described by Dr. Laternser in his closing address, ibid., 30 Mar 47, pp. 12-18. Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., la, Anlagenband V zum K.T.B. I, 23.1.1944-28.4.1944. Anlage 29, Be- sichtigung des Korpsabschnittes durch den Herrn Oberbefehlshaber vom 22. bis 24. März 1944. Alte Signatur: 52536/16; in T314/1569/818. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 89

marschall untruthfully testified he had visited the Cassino Front on 23 and 24 March, Beelitz was unresponsive.81 One should not be surprised to learn that there is no mention in the transcript of Kesselring's trial of his departure from the main operational zone for leave in Ger- many; San Andrea; Genoa; the Hotel Savoy; the Feldmarschall's inspection of coastal defenses westward along the Gulf of Genoa to the Franco-Italian border; Ra- pallo or the Hotel Excelsior; an alleged flight to Monte Soratte from Liguria which began after 2030 hours, 23 March; his return from Monte Soratte and arrival at the Hotel Excelsior before 0700 hours, 24 March; La Spezia; Punta Bianca; the River Magra; Ginny Mission; Fifteen American P.O.W.s and their executions; Oberst Al- mers; Festungsbataillon 905 and/or 906; Festungsbrigade 135; Livorno; Forli; or Ra- venna; among others. Today, Beelitz categorically denies any knowledge of a rela- tionship between Kesselring and the Ginny Mission murders.82 When the Oberbefehlshaber was absent from his Kommandostelle, his Chef des Ge- neralstabes was the senior officer and deputized for him. In that capacity it would have been mandatory for Westphal to know the location of Kesselring: he did, as is confirmed in the telephone log. During most of the afternoon of 23 March 1944 Westphal was inspecting »Reece Unit 400,« a newly created rapid-deployment battalion, near Civita Castellana about thirty-five kilometers southwest of Monte So- ratte.83 Until Westphal returned when summoned because of the events in the Via Rasella, Kesselring's la was the senior officer at Monte Soratte. With both Kessel- ring and Westphal absent, it is reasonable to assume that Beelitz would also have been aware of the Feldmarschall's true location in northern Italy. If the principals did not have opportunities to meet before Kesselring's trial began, it is difficult to imagine how they might have participated in a conspiracy to prevaricate. But in addition to other occasions when they could have seen each other in Allied P.O. W. enclosures, all participated in the postwar project sponsored by the Chief Historian of the European Theater, U.S. Army, the purpose of which was to produce manuscripts describing military operations as seen from the »other side of the hill.« Meetings among them probably occurred much less casually than West- phal tried to make it appear in the following excerpts from the Kesselring transcript. Col. Halse: Just one or two preliminary points: you were captured by the Amer- icans, were you? Westphal: Yes. Halse: And a prisoner of war with them? Westphal: Yes. Halse: How long were you a prisoner of war with them before you went to Nu- remberg? Westphal: Until July 1945 I was given the task by General Eisenhower of de- mobilising the German forces in South Germany. On 6th July 1945 I became a prisoner of war and on 2nd October I went to Nuremberg. Halse: How long did you stay at Nuremberg? Westphal: Until the end of June 1946. Halse: And then where did you go? Westphal: I came first to Langwasser near Nuremberg and then to Allendorf. Halse: That is the historical division of the USFET, is it not?

81 Information from Professor Hoffmann, 4 Jun 97. 82 Ibid. ω »Kesselring Trans.,« 17 Mar 47, p. 27; ibid., 26 Mar 47, pp. 9,10,11. 90 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

Westphal: Yes. Halse: In Germany? Westphal: Yes. Halse And you have been there from mid July 1946 until when this trial started two or three months ago? Westphal: Now and again I spent, say, three weeks in Nuremberg and in January I was on holiday. Halse: But a large part of the latter half of last year you spent in Allendorf? Westphal: Yes. Halse: When you were at Nuremberg did you meet a lot of your old comrades? Westphal: Yes. Halse: The Field Marshal was there, was he not? Westphal: Yes, but most of the time he was separated from us. Halse: And General von Mackensen was there? Westphal: I saw him in September or October 1946 but could only speak very little with him. Halse: When you went to Allendorf there were quite a lot of the senior staff officers and commanders of OBSW and subordinate formations there, were there not? Westphal: No, a few. Halse: The Field Marshal was there? Westphal: He only came later; a few weeks after I came. Halse: I am talking about after you came; the Field Marshal was there? Westphal: He was not there when I came. Halse: But later he arrived? Westphal: Yes. Halse: And he was there with, I think, two breaks until he left to come down here? Westphal: Yes. Halse: And General von Mackensen was there? Westphal: No, he was not. Halse: Your successor was there? Westphal: He came in the course of the summer, yes. Halse: And a certain number of others; I am not going through them all; quite a lot of you altogether and you came down from Allendorf for this trial? Westphal: On my own staff was only Oberst Zolling there who arrived there January 1947, the end of January 1947. Halse: But the subordinate commanders were there; Army commanders were there at times were they not and some of the divisional commanders? Westphal: There was nobody there from 10 Army; in 14 Army only the chief of staff, [Wolf-Rüdiger] Hauser, and of Zangen's army detachment von Zangen came along in the course of the summer. I can remember the divisional commanders Lutwitz [sic], Craseman [sic], Zimmon [sic], Ehlert, and Bohsen [sic] and other names which do not occur to me at the moment. Halse: And of course your object at Allendorf was to prepare the history of the Italian campaign? Westphal: No. Halse: What was the object of going to the historical division of USFET? Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 91

Westphal: I was meant to describe the history of the campaign in the West. Halse: But Roettiger [sic] was doing the campaign in the South West? Westphal: No, as far as I know Roettiger's job was to write about liaison between the Italian front and the Western front. Halse: I have no doubt you fought your old battles all over again. Westphal: Yes, to some extent.84 A few days later the judge advocate (J. A.) closely questioned Westphal likewise in order to demonstrate that the witnesses had ample opportunity to collude: J.A.: How many witnesses in this case have you talked to? You have talked to von Buttlar [sic], have you not? Westphal: Yes, I have mentioned that. J.Α.: About matters having a direct bearing on this case? Westphal: Yes, because the telephone conversation was missing in his affidavit. J.A.: How much of the case have you discussed with the Field Marshal? Westphal: Comparatively very little. J.A.: And I suppose you have had a pretty good collaboration with Beelitz, have not you? Westphal: I said before, that I did not see, I did not talk and I did not correspond with Beelitz for two years and a half. J.A.: How often have you talked to him before you gave evidence in this case? Westphal: A few times; not very much. J.A.: What a few times? [sic] Westphal: Three times, perhaps four times. J.A.: And did that enable you to remember things or not? Westphal: It only confirmed things which I knew and confirmed some of my memories which I have quite clear in my mind. J.A.: Did you discuss those detailed conversations that you had with people when Beelitz was listening? Westphal: No. J.Α.: Have you talked with General Hauser in the last month or two? Westphal: No. J.Α.: Have you had an opportunity of talking to General Hauser about the trial? Westphal: I could speak to him but I did not because his knowledge concerns other matters than mine. J.A.: He is a very important witness on conversations, is not he, with you? Westphal: Yes, he reported once and I passed one order on. J. Α.: I do not want to go into it again but it is quite clear your account and von Buttlar's [sic] are not in agreement; is not that right? Laternser: I am very sorry indeed to interrupt but it seems very important to me to make this statement here. Neither the witnesses, as prisoners of war, nor the defense have used any influence, or were in a position to use any influence, as to how the witnesses were accommodated. J.Α.: I take the answer of the witness. I ask him who he has discussed the case with and he tells me. I take it no further than that. Laternser: I just want to avoid that just because, without any responsibility of the defense or the witnesses themselves, various witnesses might perchance

Ibid., 27 Mar 47, pp. 6-7. 92 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

have come together I do not wish that to be any disadvantage to the defense or to the witnesses. That is all I wanted to point out.85 In several instances the testimony of one of Kesselring's defense witnesses suspi- ciously contradicted that of the other. For example, we have seen how Kesselring swore that, shortly after his return at dusk on 23 March 1944 to Monte Soratte from the Cassino Front, he received a telephone call from Kappler offering to furnish for the reprisal executions only those in his prisons who had been sentenced to death.86 But Kappler repeatedly denied he had spoken with the Feldmarschall that day.87 Kesselring also found himself and Westphal pulling at opposite ends of the rope on another issue. Kesselring's former Chef des Generalstabes said Generaloberst Alfred Jodl had telephoned him from Berchtesgaden shortly before midnight, 23/24 March to deliver a second Führerbefehl. This supplemented Hitler's earlier order, telephoned from the Führerhauptquartier to Westphal circa 1930-2000 hours on 23 March, which had conveyed to Monte Soratte Hitler's approval of a reprisal ratio of ten Italians to be executed for every dead policeman. Now, Jodl informed West- phal, the Führer had decided to assign full responsibility for the reprisal action to Kappler's Außenkommando Rom. The Feldmarschall, Westphal testified, had planned to fly back to the Cassino Front before dawn on 24 March and had already gone to bed when this call came. When the Generalstabschef awakened him to report the news, both rejoiced. With his Feldmarschall's happy approval, Westphal said, he passed Hitler's second order to AOK14 for transmission to the Kommandant von Rom and thence to Kappler. Not once in the witness box did Westphal budge from this position. Kesselring, on the other hand, asserted as steadfastly that he could not remember having received this information from Westphal, either during the night or when the latter saw him at the nearby Fieseler-Storch landing field before take- off in the morning. He asserted that he did not learn of the second Führerbefehl .until he had returned to Monte Soratte in the evening of 24 March, or perhaps even on the following day.88 Here, presumably, the two conspirators had failed to cor- relate invented recollections. Another who, probably inadvertently, helped perpetuate the perjury was former SS-Standartenführer Eugen Dollmann, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler's eyes and ears in Rome. In his memoirs Dollmann claimed he and Wolff conferred with Kesselring at Monte Soratte late on the afternoon of 24 March.89 Since Kes- selring was in the area of Livorno until after 1620 hours on 24 March, it is not pos- es Ibid., 31 Mar 47, pp. 15-16. See also ibid., 20 Feb 47, p. 16; ibid., 26 Mar 47, pp. 23, 25; ibid., 28 Mar 47, pp. 9-10; ibid., 31 Mar 47, p. 16; and ibid., Appendix No. 6, pp. 15-16. 86 »Kesselring Trans.,« 3 Mar 47, p. 16; ibid., 7 Mar 47, pp. 10-16. 87 Ibid., 20 Feb 47, pp. 15-16. Kappler's testimony on this point must be judged as virtually worthless. Initially he stubbornly denied he had spoken with Kesselring on 23 March, then he said it could have been with another officer, and he mentioned Oberstleutnant i.C. Graf Ludwig von Ingelheim gen. Echter von und zu Mespelbrunn. However, Ingel- heim did not arrive at Monte Soratte until 25 March (as Ια/Γ in Beelitz's Führungsabteilung). Finally, following intensive probing by Dr. Laternser, Kappler admitted it might have been possible he spoke with the Feldmarschall. Ibid., 20 Feb 47, pp. 9,15-17; ibid., 24 Apr 47, p. 2. There were long-winded discussions at several intervals during the trial concerning the precise category of inmate Kappler allegedly said he could produce, i.e. »to- deswürdig,« »Todeskandidat,« etc. 88 Ibid., 4 Mar 47, pp. 2-3; ibid., 28 Mar 47, pp. 26-28. 89 Katz, Death in Rome, p. 163, citing Eugen Dollmann, Roma nazista (Milan 1949), p. 248. Katz, Death in Rome, pp. 181-82, citing Eitel Möllhausen [sic], in the letter's La carta perdente (Rome 1948), pp. 240^11, says the Konsulgeneral met with the Feldmarschall at Mon- Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 93 sible such a meeting could have taken place. Possibly Dollmann has merely mistak- en the date; however, since he seems to have been the type who »hears the grass grow,« he might have had another motive which remains obscure. At any rate it is not likely he was privy to the alleged conspiracy. Dr. Hans Laternser, Kesselring's very able counsel, nearly blundered into a very dangerous mine field when he asked Westphal about enforcement of Hitler's Kom- mandobefehl in Italy: Laternser: It was put to you that it was very difficult to understand that through the agreement of the Wehrmacht with Kappler the carrying out of a Hitler order [that Italian hostages must be executed] was canceled, and you mentioned in this connection the so-called commando order and you said this commando order had not been carried out either. Westphal: Yes. Laternser: What were the contents of this so-called commando order. Westphal: The gist of it shortly was the following: All enemy soldiers who were caught behind our own lines independent, whether they came by sea or were dropped by air, will be killed. Laternser: And in case that this order should not be carried out what sorts of threats were issued? Westphal: I think the gist was: »I shall hold responsible every officer who does not carry out this order.« Laternser: And signed by whom? Westphal: Hitler personally. Laternser: When was this order issued? Westphal: Autumn 1942. Laternser. What was the treatment which this order received with the troops and particularly with regard to the staff of O.B.S.W.? Westphal: I myself saw this order for the first time in Africa; at that time in Af- rica it was burned at once so that nobody could even get it into his head to pass such an order on, and in Italy I never saw it but it was not carried out; it was never carried out that is in Italy with the exception of one case, General Dos- sier [sic]. In all the other cases we did not [report them] to higher authority as so-called commando troops but treated them as simple normal P.O.W.s; and an additional remark with regard to General Dossler's case; this was not known in time [at] Army Group Headquarters. Laternser: What was the attitude of General Field Marshal Kesselring with regard to this commando order? Westphal: He objected to this order and his objection was really the only fact why this commando order was not being obeyed in Italy. Judge advocate: Is he saying that the Field Marshal did not publish this order to his troops or is he, saying it was published but they did not act on it?

te Soratte at dawn on 25 Mar 44, which was not possible. Dan Kurzman, in The Race for Rome (Garden City, N.Y. 1975), pp. 182-83, citing Dollmann, Roma nazista, but giving no pages, and also based on interviews with Dollmann and Karl Wolff, but furnishing no dates, likewise says Dollmann and Wolff conferred with Kesselring on Monte Soratte in the late afternoon of 24 Mar 44: impossible. However, Kurzman, Race for Rome, pp. 186-87, citing Moellhausen's La carta perdente (no pages) and interviews (no dates), similarly reports that Moellhausen saw the Feldmarschatt at Monte Sorrate, but he claims this meeting took place on 26 Mar 44, which could have been true. > 94 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

Westphal: It is not clear. Laternser: Do you know whether this order was passed on or whether he saw to it that it was not published or whether an additional order was published to this original order which in reality canceled the sense of the Hitler order, or what do you know about it? Westphal: During my time this order was never published. It was never passed on, but I must say that I came to Italy later than this order had been received, but the Field Marshal reserved for himself the right to decide upon the fate of every member of a commando and he decided always in all cases that they should be treated as normal RO.W.s and had he known about the case of Gen- eral Dossier his decision would have been exactly the same as in other cases.90 It is hardly likely that Kesselring was in La Spezia on 24 March and did not know about the captured Ginny Mission »commandos.« It is equally unlikely that Dost- ler would have ordered their executions without first receiving confirmation from Kesselring.91 The above testimony by Westphal at Kesselring's trial in spring 1947 should be measured against statements which had been sworn in 1945 at Dostler's trial. Here is what the highly respected former General der Panzertruppen Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, who had been Kommandierender General des XIV. Panzer Korps on the Cassino-Garigliano Front in Italy, said in October 1945: Wolfe: Do you know how many fuehrerbefehls [sic] were issued on this subject of execution of saboteurs by the German military authorities? Senger: I was astonished to see that this fuehrerbefehl had been given out as early as October 1942, because I have to remember we had a similar fuehrerbefehl of a different wording while I was in service in the italian theater; that would be after autumn 1943, and I have been informed by another general that two fuehrerbefehls on the same subject had been given out. I almost must conclude that I knew only the second one and not this one. I didn't [sic] remember it when I saw it for the first time, and I believe there was another fuehrerbefehl on the same subject with different wordings.92 General Dostler had the following to say about the Kommandobefehl: Wolfe: [Here is] a copy of the fuehrerbefehl of 1942 which was introduced in evidence (handed to the witness). Will you tell us after examining it if that is substantially correct as you recall it? Dostler: This copy is not the complete fuehrerbefehl as it was valid in March 1944. In the order that laid on my desk in March 1944 it was much more in detail. I don't [sic] recall whether that order and a supplement to it had been com- bined. In any case the fuehrerbefehl which was laying [sic] in front of me listed the various categories of operations which may come under the fuehrerbefehl. In addition there was something said in that fuehrerbefehl about the interrogation of men belonging to sabotage troops and the shooting of these men after their interrogation. Wolfe: General Dostler, was this fuehrerbefehl which you now have in your hand substantially as it existed in 1942? Dostler: Yes.

90 »Kesselring Trans.,« 31 Mar 47, pp. 21-22. Dr. Gerhard Schreiber to Dr. R. Raiber, 14 Apr 97,4 Jul 97. 92 »Dostler Trans.,« p. 173. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 95

Wolfe: Was that later supplemented by a supplement or was a new one issued? Dostler: I stated that I am not clear about the point, whether a new fuehrerbefehl covering the whole matter came out or whether only a supplement came out and the former fuehrerbefehj was still in existence. Wolfe: Did the new fuehrerbefehl which you had in 1944 contain substantially everything that was in the one in 1942? Dostler: Yes, it contained that and in addition specific additions and instructions. Wolfe: Now, will you please state, in order to clear this up, were there any additional instructions with reference to saboteurs and what constituted a saboteur? Dostlen The fuehrerbefehl has as its subject commando operations and there was a list of what is to be construed as commando operations. I know exactly that a mission to explode something, to blow up something, came under the concept of commando troops. Wolfe: Will you state to the commission how this fuehrerbefehl came into your possession? Dostler: The fuehrerbefehl came to me through channels from the Army Group. Wolfe: Do you know who issued the fuehrerbefehl? Dostler: The Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.93 General von Zangen, it is true, said he could not remember having seen a supplement to the Kommandobefehl of 18 October 1942.94 It is clear that the prosecution did not believe such a document ever existed.95 A supplement was issued on 19 Octo- ber 1942, but this was little more than Hitler's attempt to explain why he believed the Kommandobefehl had been necessary. There is some evidence, however, that Kes- selring issued a directive which Senger, Dostler, and perhaps others construed as a supplement to Hitler's order. At Nürnberg, while discussing the Kommandobefehl on 21 August 1946, Dr. Laternser mentioned such a document: »I was not able to clarify the case of Dostler, because the records of the court martial were not put at my disposal, despite my request. Nevertheless, I should like to point out that a supplementary order by Field Marshal Kesselring was issued, and that he reserved the right to determine just what constituted a Commando operation. General Dost- ler does not belong to the group of persons accused.«96 Unfortunately, Dr. Latern- ser did not enter Kesselring's supplementary order as evidence, nor did he further identify this document. Its existence would mean that Dostler could not have ordered the executions before he had consulted with Kesselring to determine if the captives were commandos according to the criteria of the Feldmarschall.97 Dietrich Beelitz has recently affirmed »that an order to shoot the Americans had come through O.B. Südwest and had been passed on down to Dostler.«98 Presumably this occurred sometime in the late evening of 25 March. On 12 March 1946, Kesselring, in the witness box at Nürnberg, introduced the notion that it was »his interpretation« of the Kommandobefehl which had prevailed throughout the Italian theater:

93 Ibid., pp. 179-80. 94 Ibid., pp. 200-201. 95 Ibid., p. 238. 96 Trial of The Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 19451 October 1946, vol. 21 (Nuremberg, Germany, 1947), p. 405. 97 Dr. Gerhard Schreiber to Dr. R. Raiber, 4 Jul 97. 98 Professor Hoffmann to Dr. R. Raiber, 9 Jul 97, information obtained by Hoffmann during interview with Beelitz on 29 May 97. 96 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

Dr. Laternser, Hermann Göring's chief defense counsel: Did you know about the Commando Order? Kesselring: Yes, I did. Laternser: And what did you think of this order? Kesselring: I considered such an order, received by me as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, where I held a double post, as not binding for me, but as the outline of an order which left me a free hand in its application. On this question I held the view that it was for me, as commander-in-chief, to decide whether a Commando action was contrary to international law or whether it was tactically justified. The view adopted more and more by the army group, which view was directed by me, was that personnel in uniform who had been sent out on a definite tactical task were to be treated and considered as soldiers in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention for land warfare. Laternser: The Commando Order was consequently not applied within your command? Kesselring: In one case, yes, it was certainly applied. Laternser: Which case do you mean? Kesselring: I mean the case of General Dostler. Laternser: The case of General Dostler has already been mentioned in this Tri- al. Did you know about this case when it was pending? Kesselring: As a witness under oath I have stated that I cannot remember this case. I think there are two reasons why I was not informed of it. Firstly, after a conversation with my chief, who spoke to another commander about it, it appeared that none of us knew anything. Secondly, because of the gigantic operations on the Southern Front, I was more often absent than not from my headquarters. Laternser: Witness, if you had been called upon to make a decision on the Dost- ler case, how would you have decided? Kesselring: I am not well enough acquainted with the case. I know it only from hearsay. Mr. Justice Jackson, Representative of the United States and Chief Counsel: I do not think we can try Dostler's case or that this witness should give his conclusions, inasmuch as Dostler's case had been tried by a competent court and that issue is disposed of. I have no objection to any facts that inform this Tribunal, but his conclusion as to the guilt of his fellow officer is hardly helpful." Jackson's abrupt interruption of Kesselring at this point was shortsighted and most untimely. Dr. Laternser left the subject, doubtless much to Kesselring's relief. Of course Jackson was unaware of the rich vein which lay untapped just beneath the surface. Apparently his attitude was that Dostler's execution had closed that case, and he was determined to spend time only on German misdeeds as yet unpunish- ed. But Kesselring's testimony must have left unanswered questions in his mind, because next day he again interrogated the witness about enforcement of the Kom- mandobefehl, although not in terms of Kesselring's link to Dostler: Jackson: You testified yesterday that you did not consider Hitler's Commando Order binding on you, and that you did not carry out that order, is that right? Kesselring: In the Mediterranean theater, yes. Jackson: Was that because the order left discretion in your hands, or because you just took discretion into your hands?

TMWC, vol. 9, pp. 185-86. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 97

Kesselring: I made those reservations myself, firstly for ideological consider- ations, and secondly because in the Mediterranean I had, as I said yesterday, a twofold command, and the German orders could not be included in the general administration without modification. Jackson: Well then, the extent to which an order of that kind was carried out depended somewhat on the character and courage of the officer who received it, did it not? Kesselring: I would like to express it somewhat differently. These orders could be interpreted in different ways that Commando Order, for instance insofar as it was certainly quite possible for the Commander-in-Chief to consider an operation either as a special task or as a tactical measure which was militarily justified. Jackson: You were in command of the forces in Italy at this time, were you not, at the time of the Commando Order? Kesselring: With a difference, I did not have full powers until September 1943. Jackson: I will ask to have you shown Document Number 498-PS in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-501 [the Commando Order of 18 Oct 42]. I call your attention to Paragraph Number 6 of that order which reads as follows: »I will hold responsible, under military law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.« You see that paragraph in the order? Kesselring: Yes, I have just read it. Jackson: Now, did you ever report that you were not carrying out this order or did you deceive your superior officers as to whether it was being carried out? Kesselring: In one special case that question was treated very decisively at headquarters. [Kesselring describes how he spared English commandos who were captured at Pescara and then, he says, because of Jodl's intervention there were no repercussions from Hitler.] But I should not like to call it a deception, the word you used just now, for I wish to emphasize that, in my military sector, I considered actions of this kind as guiding orders, and this Commando Order certainly allowed for several interpretations. Jackson: In other words, the extent which one of these orders was carried out depended on the commanders in charge, is that right, that Hitler could not de- pend on it that an order as emphatic as this would be carried out by his commanders? Was that the state in the German Army? Kesselring: No, not that, but the situation can be explained as follows: If, on the part of an army, such an operation is reported to a superior as a Comman- do operation in the sense of that order, than the necessary measures would have to be carried out. That depended, however, on the way of reporting by the units concerned, and I already explained in detail yesterday that a unified con- ception had gradually set in, that men in uniform, who carried out a tactical move, were not Commandos within the meaning of this order. Jackson: You testified today, and another witness has testified here, that if an order of Adolf Hitler was resisted, it meant death. You are also testifying that an absolute order to execute Commandos, under threat of punishment if you failed, left you discretion to do it or not, and I want you once and for all to tell the Tribunal which is the fact, and then we will leave that subject. Kesselring: I must repeat what I said before, namely, that the Italian theater of war was not to be compared with the other theaters of war. Through the co- 98 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

operation of Hitler and Mussolini there was always a very obliging attitude, therefore, these orders made by OKW could not easily be applied to the Italian theater of war.100 Once again Jackson apparently overlooked Kesselring's obfuscations and equivo- cations which, admittedly, are so readily apparent in retrospect. Perhaps he had concluded it was not possible to elicit straight answers from the witness, threw up his hands in frustration, and moved on to other subjects. The provisions of the Kom- mandobefehl of 18 October 1942 are as clear and definitive today as they must have been to German generals in March 1944. Is it possible to imagine that Hitler would have tolerated interpretation by field commanders of this or any Führerbefehl which deviated from his own? Kesselring himself answered this question: »I have understood from your testimony this morning that you felt perfectly free to disagree with Hitler and to make suggestions to him and give him information, »Jackson had asked earlier,« but that, after his mind was made up and an order issued, it had to be obeyed. That is to say ...« »Yes,« Kesselring shot back.101 It was one instance in which he spoke the unvarnished truth. Significantly, there is not one word of testimony at his own trial in spring 1947 about his usurpation of the authority to interpret application of the Kommandobefehl in the Italian theater. Despite testimony by Kesselring and Westphal to the contrary, several German officers gave evidence at Dostler's trial that telegrams reporting the capture of the Americans were dispatched to Monte Soratte on 24 and 25 March.102 This is supported by documentary evidence: included in his Tagesmeldung for 24 March, dispatched from Monte Soratte at 0225 hours on 25 March and addressed to OKH in East Prussia, Beelitz reported »[...] ein amerik. Commando in Staerke von 2 Offz., 13 Mann in Bonassola (22 km nordwestl. La Spezia) abgesetzt und festgenommen. Einzelheiten lie- gen noch nicht vor.«103 Oberstleutnant i.G. Emil Zolling, Feldmarschall Kesselring's Ic, reported essentially the same information in his Meldung for 24 March 1944 which was cabled to OKH at 0445 hours, 25 March.104 These documents categorically establish that the capture of the Ginny Mission OG must have been known at Monte Soratte by midnight, 24/25 March, or shortly thereafter, at least thirty hours before the executions took place and in sufficient time to stop them had that ever really been an intention. And despite Westphal's denials, the Kommandobefehl had, indeed, been distributed to the subordinate formations in Heeresgruppe C. Former General von Senger und Etterlin had come to Heeresgruppe C even later than West- phal but said he knew about it.105 Dostler testified he had known of its provisions since the time of issuance in autumn 1942.106 Leutnant zur See Georg Sessler, the naval officer who interrogated the captured Ginny Mission OG, swore he had seen a copy.107

100 Ibid., pp. 209-211. 101 Ibid., p. 201. ι»2 »Dostler Trans.,« pp. 75, 78-79, 80, 95-96,103, and 199. 103 Gen.St.d.H., OKH, Operationsabteilung/II, Meldungen Ob. Südwest, an OKH/Gen.St.d.H./ Op.Abt., vom 16.-31.3.44, Fernschreiben, Tagesmeldung 24/3 44, 25/3 0225, Roem Eins A, Nr. 3196/44 g.Kdos. Alte Signatur: 34 079; in T78/321/6 275 971. 104 Gen.St.d.H., OKH, Operationsabteilung/II, Meldungen Ob. Südwest, an OKH/Gen.St.d.H./ Op.Abt., vom 16.-31.3.44. Fernschreiben, Meldung fuer 24.3.44, 25/3 0405, Roem Eins C, Nr. 3200/44 g.Kdos. Alte Signatur: 34 079; in T78/321/6 275 975. los »Dostler Trans.,« p. 172. 106 Ibid., p. 179. 107 Ibid., p. 65. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 99

Dr. Laternser firmly believed in his client's veracity, as the following excerpt from his closing address to the court demonstrates: Anyone who has seen the Field Marshal during the two weeks of his being questioned will have gained the conviction that this man has never attempted to speak an untruth. His sometimes rather complicated answers could always be traced back to the obvious desire to discover the truth himself, to serve the truth, and to let truth be victorious even if it were at his own expense. Can any man who has seen the Field Marshal as a soldier believe that he has not the courage to stand by the truth? One who has carried out fairly the battle against the enemy in most difficult times will not disparage his own value and will not attempt to ward off this most difficult battle of his life by a lack of truth. This is my conviction, that full credence must be given to the evidence of these officers who have appeared as witnesses as well as to the sworn statement of the Field Marshal himself.108 There is no evidence to suggest the thought ever occurred to Dr. Latemser that the scenario his client had crafted was anything short of the truth. It must be presumed he had been duped. Like most Germans, Hans Laternser doubtless accepted as an article of faith that the honorable qualities of character he perceived in Kesselring were those which prevailed among German Feldmarschälle, indeed generally throughout the German officer corps. On at least two occasions while on the witness stand Kesselring bristled when the prosecutor made it quite clear he thought the Feldmarschall was lying. »May I say the following on that subject,« Kesselring said with apparent wounded pride to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, while testifying at Nürnberg as a witness for Hermann Goring, »if my statements as Field Marshal and witness under oath are considered as little as you are considering them, Mr. Prosecutor, then further statements of mine do not serve any purpose.«109 After reacting similarly to intensive questioning by the prosecutor at his own trial, Kesselring quickly regained his composure and addressed the court as follows: »May I say a few words to the court? I would like to apologize to the court for my temperament and for my temper which apparently arose a little bit, but I am at the moment in the claws of the beginning 'flu and therefore I think the court will understand, and apart from my state of health which today is not perfect I was excited because I was accused of having told a lie.«110 It is clear today that these apparent manifestations of Kesselring's indignation were nothing short of hypocrisy. »Nothing can hurt a man who is acquitted by his own conscience,« he wrote in his memoirs, baldly continuing to defend his veracity. »This is, besides, an attitude which stood me in good stead at my trial.«111 »A German officer moves within the framework of international law,« Kessel- ring said.112 That is essentially how generals in the enemy's camp viewed him. To most he had been an outstanding military defensive strategist and worthy opponent, as well as a man of honor, of decency. In their view it had been the fighting

108 »Kesselririg Trans.,« Appendix No. 6, pp. 21-22. An edited version of Dr. Laternser's closing address (»Kesselring Trans.,« 30 Apr 47, pp. 3-72, reprinted in ibid., Appendix 6, pp. 1-68) has been published in his Verteidiger deutscher Soldaten: Plädoyers vor alliierten Gerichten (Bonn 1950), pp. 51-108. 109 TMWC, vol. 9, p. 219. 110 »Kesselring Trans.,« 7 Mar 47, pp. 7-8. 111 Kesselring, Soldier's Record, p. 155. 112 Ibid., 17 Mar 47, p. 20. 100 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

then raging in the town of Cassino, not the assassinations in the Via Rasella, upon which his attention was riveted on 23 March 1944: when Hitler's reprisal order arrived he had merely nodded his head in assent that it should be passed to the responsible subordinate formations and then turned back to concentrate on his enormous military problems at Cassino. That had been the extent of his »war crime.« Most have agreed that, despite a somewhat tarnished shield because of his insistence on a vig- orous anti-partisan policy in Italy, he had been unfairly judged and convicted, and that his death sentence was not deserved.113 Two American colonels assigned by the U.S. Adjutant General's Office as observers at his trial went on record to say they had not been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution had proved either of its two charges against Kesselring.114 Obviously disagreeing with the prosecution's position that the execution of innocent civilians during a reprisal is always unlawful, one of them (Colonel James Notestein) voluntarily approached Dr. Latern- ser and donated to the defense his personal copy of the U.S. Field Manual 27-10, Rul- es of Land Warfare, 1940 edition. Its paragraphs 358 and 359, declaring that reprisals are sanctioned under certain conditions, were entered as evidence.115 The American observers, like Dr. Laternser and all others in the courtroom except the former Feld- marschall and his principal witnesses, could not know they had been victimized. Study of the transcript, alone, reinforces an impression that British justice did not serve Kesselring fairly in spring 1947; indeed, it is not hard to conclude that he might have fallen prey to a festering British thirst for victors' justice. Had he been too successful a battle-field opponent in Italy? Be that as it may, the documents newly unearthed in Record Group 242 seem to reveal a dark, unattractive component of his character which has long remained hidden from those who admire him.116 Perhaps his secret would have remained undetected for another fifty years had he and Westphal been more discrete in their telephone conversations with officers

113 Macksey, Kesselring, pp. 240,242; Carlo d'Este, Fatal Decisions (New York 1991), p. 426; Shel- ford Bidwell, »Kesselring: Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring,« in Correlli Bamett, ed., Hit-, ler's Generals (New York 1989), p. 287. 114 »Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, APO 512, Report and Records of War Crimes Trial of Albert Kesselring, [undated], to the Commanding General Medi- terranean Theater of Operations, »Conclusions,« by American observers Preston J.C. Murphy, Colonel, G.S.C., with which Colonel James Notestein concurred, in RG 338, Re- cords of NATOUSA, Records of the Special Staff, Adjutant General, Headquarters, General Correspondence (»Decimal«) File 000.5, box 816. The »Conclusions« is part of a report submitted by the American observers which has been deposited with the transcript in the U.S. National Archives. It is a frank statement of the opinions of these high-ranking, emi- nently qualified American legal officers who were eyewitnesses at the trial. There is a handwritten as well as a typed copy of their report. This is an important and unique document, obviously not part of the trial transcript deposited in any other archives. 115 »Kesselring Trans.,« Defense Exhibit No. 70, entered as evidence on 18 Mar 47, pp. 3-7. Mr. C.L. Stirling, Esq., the very astute judge advocate in the Kesselring trial, argued that the execution of innocents in a reprisal need not be unlawful and in no uncertain terms lectured the prosecutor accordingly. Ibid., 18 Mar 47, pp. 4-5. 116 There have been other instances öf odious malfeasance which besmirch Kesselring's record as a man: Generaloberst von Vietinghoff had succeeded Kesselring as O.B. Südwest, and General der Panzertruppen Hans Röttiger, Westphal's replacement, was his Chef des Generalstabes. In late April 1945 they and others were deeply involved in Byzantine ne- gotiations to end the Wehrmächte struggle in Italy which had long been hopeless. Kes- selring, since 22 April O.B. Süd to whom O.B. Südwest/Obkdo. H.Gr. C was subordinate, ordered their arrests and execution. It is likely they would have been shot had Hitler's suicide on 30 April 1945 not intervened. Dr. Gerhard Schreiber to Dr. R. Raiber, 14 Apr 97, 5 May. 97. Dr. Schreiber will have more to say about this contemptible affair in his Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 101 at AOK10, and if the Feldmarschall had not overlooked — apparently — the incriminating descriptions of his inspection tours in Liguria and at Ravenna in the records of subordinate headquarters. Until Beelitz confirmed the authenticity of these documents shown to him by Professor Hoffmann in May 1997, not one of those who knew has ever admitted that Kesselring was in La Spezia on 24 March 1944, or that much of the testimony sworn in his defense at his trial was nothing but per- jured, worthless nonsense. Anton Dostler, shot on 1 December 1945, was the only German general to be executed solely on American authority after the Second World War.117 It would appear that this was an object lesson which Kesselring grasped immediately: he sure- ly noticed how swiftly American wrath over the killing of the Ginny OG had doomed Dostler. Most likely he decided early on that it would be in his best inter- ests to risk the consequences of assuming responsibility merely for passing on Hitler's order to execute 335 Italians. That was the essence of his defense, and it is doubtful he believed the British would sentence him to death for it.118 But Kapp- ler's executioners had shot 335 before the horror ended.119 »Whatever you may say about international law and reprisals, clearly five men of these 335 were murdered,« the judge advocate said in his summing up of the evidence at Kesselring's trial. »There is no other way out: that was a war crime, and you cannot get away from it. There was no Fuhrer [sic] order to cover that; it was quite outside the reprisal.«120 Not realizing how close he had come to the ultimate truth, the prosecutor had said to Kesselring at one point in the trial: »Let me make it quite clear. If one of your officers had passed on [the Führerbefehl] to 14th Army in your absence at the front and without your knowledge you would never be in the dock today on a charge of being concerned in the killing of those 335 Italians.«121 That might have been an opportune moment for Kesselring to admit the truth, but he continued to stay the

contribution »Große Strategie und die Kriegführung im Mittelmeerraum 1943-1945,« in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (eds.), Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol 7/1, which is forthcoming. That was no aberration: on 26 April Kesselring had ordered the summary execution of German officers who had tried to take control in Munich and surrender the city as the American Seventh Army approached. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Unit- ed States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Cassino to the Alps (Washington, D.C. 1977), p. 520, fn. 17. 117 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York 1992), p. 255. 118 »It is no part, as I understand it, of the defense that the Field Marshal carried out an unlawful order of the Fuhrer [sic],« said the judge advocate in his summing up. »Indeed his real defence [sic] is: >1 never carried out an order at all. All I did was to pass along the chain of communication a message to the S.D. That is what the Field Marshals real defence is.<« »Kesselring Trans.,« 3 May 47, p. 16. 119 Only thirty-three policemen had died by the time Kappler's list was completed at about noon on 24 March. It was maintained that SS-Hauptsturmführer Erich Priebke, one of Kappler's minions, had miscounted. Escaping from a British P.O.W. cage in summer 1945, Priebke made his way to South America. In 1995 he was extradited from Argenti- na to Italy, where he was brought to trial in 1996 for his participation in the Ardeatine Caves executions. An Italian Military Commission decided that the statute of limitations had run out and released him, but he was soon rearrested (NYT, 20 Oct 96, p. 4). He has been retried and, in July 1997, was sentenced to fifteen-years imprisonment. This was reduced to five years because of »mitigating circumstances,« and it is likely he will be released by the end of the year. Ibid., 23 Jul 97, p. A4. 120 »Kesselring Trans.,« 3 May 47, p. 11. 121 »Kesselring Trans.,« 7 Mar 47, p. 7. 102 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber course, to hew to the dissemblance: he must never, never connect himself with La Spezia on 24 March 1944. And who passed along the Führerbefehl to AOK 14, ultimately to Kappler, remains unknown to this day. At 0930 hours, Tuesday, 6 May 1947 Kesselring was told that the court had found him guilty on both charges. One hour later the judge advocate pronounced the sentence: he was to »suffer death by being shot.«122 The effect on him must have been catastrophic. Had his carefully engineered alibi been a colossal exercise in futility? No: he was never brought to trial by angry, revenge-seeking Americans for complicity in the Ginny Mission killings so he won his war. Even the battle was lost only temporarily, for in July 1947 his death sentence was commuted, and he was released from confinement in 1952. He survived until July 1960, when he died in a hospital bed at Bad Nauheim instead of standing there beside — perhaps even instead of — Dostler before the American firing squad at Aversa, Italy in the swirling fog on an early December morning fifteen years earlier. While preparing his defense Dostler had requested that interrogatories be submitted to Kesselring and Westphal. Both must have known they could supply information which would help Dostler, but they did not do so. On 4 October 1945 Westphal was interrogated by Major Robert E. Haythome at Nürnberg, where he was being held as a possible witness, and swore as follows: Haythorne: If the matter of the execution of these [Ginny Mission] soldiers had come to your headquarters, would you probably have known about it? Westphal: If it had come to my headquarters, I would have known about it. Haythorne: Do you recall or can you remember any incident, like the incident I have described, of the execution of the two officers and thirteen American soldiers? Westphal: I recollect now that such report had come along, that commando troops had been captured. Haythorne: What action was taken at your headquarters on that matter? Westphal: As far as I remember, an action to postpone this matter had been taken. Haythorne: Was it referred to OKW? Westphal: I think that the capture of commando troops had been reported to the higher headquarters, because all reports had gone straight to the OKW from all Army Groups, that is Army Group South West. Haythorne: Let me ask you again: Are you reasonably sure that it was this particular instance I have described? Westphal: I cannot say with certainty. Haythorne: Do you recall an order by OKW as to what was to be done with these troops? Westphal: It is very difficult for me to testify to this under oath, but I believe that an order had come down from OKW that these troops should be treated according to the Fuehrer's decree. May I put it this way: That had it been reported that such troops had been captured, it could have been safely expected that the OKW would have sent in an order for these troops to be treated according to the Fuehrer's decree. Haythorne: On what do you base your recollection that this matter was referred to OKW? i22 Ibid., 6 May 47, p. 2. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 103

Westphal: It has certainly been reported in the daily report of the Army Group von Zangen to us. Haythorne: Do you remember anything about it? Does it sound familiar to you now? Westphal: I think, yes. I already mentioned something about some troops in La Spezia, in Freising, without knowing anything more about it. I think that my testimony, that I have in Freising, must show this, because I said that we had tried to avoid the execution of these troops, at first in Ancona [a case involving the capture of British commandos], and then perhaps later on in La Spezia, too. I would say that I have a vague recollection of it. I must add that at that time I worked for 17 hours a day, and I, at that time, just went to the hospital, too. Later on, I still suffered from heavy blood poisoning, and I have to state that I know very little of what went on in this half a year. Perhaps I may put it this way: I remember that commando troops landed near La Spezia, and I think it is prob- able that such reports had been referred to the OKW.123 Here we have another example of circumlocution by Westphal in a determined ef- fort to hide the facts. As shown supra, Beelitz and later Zolling reported the capture of the Americans to the OKH more than twenty-four hours before they were executed.124 It could scarcely have been possible that they knew this but Westphal did not. On 6 October 1945 Major Haythorne interviewed Kesselring, then in confinement at Oberursel, and the following exchange took place: Haythorne: If the matter of the execution of these soldiers [the Ginny Mission OG] had come to your Headquarters, would you probably have known about it? Kesselring: I suppose. Due to the mass of reports that came to me about terror- ist partisan activities, one incident or another might have escaped my attention due to the fact that I was frequently away from my headquarters. Haythorne: Do you recall or can you remember any incident like the incident I have described of the execution of two officers and 13 American soldiers. Kesselring: No, I do not recall that specific incident.125 Haythorne could not have suspected that Kesselring and Westphal were dissem- bling, so he did not know to ask the quintessential question: »Was the Feldmarschall in La Spezia on 24 March 1944?« Neither was asked; neither needed to gainsay. The key to the unlocking of their secret was unknown to Haythorne. It lay buried in the many tons of German records that had fallen into Allied hands, but which, in 1945, still lay largely unexamined in government warehouses. Like Haythorne in autumn 1945, several subsequent generations of historians and journalists have accepted without challenge the elaborate fiction disseminated at Kesselring's trial in spring 1947. Why should anyone imagine that a defendant would have deliber- ately placed himself in harm's way by admitting his connection with the Ardeatine

123 Testimony of Siegfried Westphal taken at Nuremberg, Germany, 4 October 1945,0930-1000 hours, by Major Robert E. Haythorne, FA, in RG 153, ent. 143, box 531, fol. II bk. 1-2. 124 Gen.St.d.H., OKH, Operationsabteilung/II, Meldungen Ob. Südwest, an OKH/Gen.St.d.H./ Op.Abt.,vom 16.-31.3.44. Fernschreiben, Tagesmeldung 24/344, 25/3 0225, Roem Eins A, Nr. 3196/44 g.Kdos. Alte Signatur: 34 079 in T78/321/6 275 971; ibid., Fernschreiben, Mel- dung fuer 24.3.44, 25/3 0445, Roem Eins C, Nr. 3200/44 g.Kdos. in T78/321/6 275 975. 125 Testimony of Albert Kesselring taken at Oberursel, Germany, 6 October 1945,1000-1100 hours, by Major Robert Haythorne, FA., in RG 153, ent. 143, box 531, fol. II bk. 1-2. 104 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

Caves murders if it were not true? Nor, apparently, has anyone previously questioned the existence of a telegram confirming the second Führerbefehl telephoned by Jodl to Westphal, trolled through RG 242 to look for it, and stumbled on evidence of the conspiracy. Dostler had also requested that the following be found as witnesses in his behalf: Chef des Generalstabes der Armeegruppe von Zangen (Oberst i.G. Walter Nagel); his own Chef des Generalstabes (Oberst i.G. Horst Kraehe), his erster Generalstabsoffi- zier (Major i.G. Johannes Köpper), and his Ic (Rittmeister Alexander Fürst zu Doh- na-Schlobitten) at Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., as well as Oberst Kurt Almers. Allied prisoner of war enclosures were searched, but none of the first four was located before the trial ended in October 1945. Aimers, who had been in an American P.O.W. enclosure, escaped when he learned he would be required to testify at Dostler's trial and was not apprehended. All might have provided very helpful testimony in his behalf.126 Dostler and von Zangen knew Kesselring was in Liguria on 23 and 24 March because both had accompanied him on his inspection tour.127 However, in their sworn testimony at Dostler's trial neither admitted this nor mentioned that he knew the Feldmarschall had been there. Since Dostler was in Genoa for hours on 25 March, as shown supra, it is likely that Kraehe participated in transmission of the execution orders during his absence.128 As a defensive strategist with few peers on either side in the Second World War, Kesselring, the soldier, deserves acclaim. But if, as the evidence seems to show, he chose to ignore a brother officer's cri de coeur, he is found wanting when he is weigh- ed in the scales which measure man's worth in terms of moral and ethical qualities. The same must be said of Siegfried Westphal: among the very best products of the German General Staff system, he forfeited his honor when his equivoca- tions, denials, and silence helped to damn Dostler.129 It is a given that few men can be expected not to lie when their necks are in the noose. Lying to save one's self is one thing, but it is something else again when the perfidy serves as means by which the liar survives and another perishes. It is quite possible, of course, that both he and Dostler might have been executed even if Kesselring had admitted the truth to Colonel Scotland or Major Haythorne. But he could not have known that with surety before Dostler's trial began. It is almost certain that Kesselring knew all about the capture of the Ginny Mis- sion OG and was the »higher authority« who confirmed Dostler's order to shoot the Americans. For what other conceivable reason would he have ordered the pur-

126 »Dostler Trans.,« pp. 158-61,166. 127 Armeeabteilung (-gruppe) >von Zangen,< la, K.T.B,. Anlage 2 (27.Jan.-30.Jun.1944), Besichti- gungsbemerkungen des O.B., Teil I, Blatt 62-71: St.Qu., den 25. März 1944, Besichtigungsbe- merkung anlaesslich des Besuches des O.B.-Suedwest im Bereich des Generalkommandos LXXV A.K. am 23. u. 24.3.44, (Stempel: Armeegruppe v. Zangen, handschriftlich: Ia Nr. 1146/44, geh. 28.3.). Alte Signatur: 64839/6); in ΝΑ T312/1638/996, -997, -999, and -1000; Gen.Kdo. LXXV. A.K., Ia, Anlagenband Vzum K.T.B. 1,23.1.1944-28.4.1944, Anlage 29, Besichtigung des Korps- abschnittes durch den Herrn Oberbefehlshaber vom 22. bis 24. März 1944. Alte Signatur: 52536/16; in T314/1569/818 and -819; Dohna-Schlobitten, Erinnerungen, p. 257. 12® »Dostler Trans.,« pp. 223-25. The prosecutor at Dostler's trial suspected Nagel was also involved in this. Ibid. 129 »One of the best horses in the stable,« Westphal was called by former General der Pan- zertruppen Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, himself second to few others among the Ger- man Generalität, in the letter's Neither Fear nor Hope: The Wartime Career of General Frido- lin von Senger und Etterlin, Defender of Cassino, trans. George Malcolm (London 1963), p. 181. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring 105

gation in April 1944 of all records which might link him to the executions on Pun- ta Bianca and, after the war's end, to conceal his presence in La Spezia on 24 March 1944? Colonel Wolfe, Dostler's defense counsel, did not know in 1945 what we know now. Yet, although unable to prove it, he was convinced Kesselring and probably others at Monte Soratte and in the subordinate headquarters were implicated in the killing of the fifteen Americans. This is clearly shown in the following excerpt, quoted at some length, from his closing address: It is undisputed that the execution [of the Americans ordered initially by Dost- ler early on 25 Mar 44] was not carried out immediately. Klaps so states. Prose- cution witness Captain Klaps. Now, it is also undisputed that another telegram [delaying the executions was sent from Dostler's headquarters to Aimers in the afternoon]. Koerbitz [sic] and Klaps both state that. A third telegram [from Dost- ler's headquarters which again ordered the executions to proceed] arrived later in the afternoon of Saturday. Now, that is exactly according to General Dostler's statements here on the witness stand. What does he say as to that? He got this telegram [from Klaps, Sessler, and Körbitz]; he talked on the phone with Colo- nel Aimers; he called his chief of staff in and he discussed the question. Then he directed his chief of staff to take the matter up with higher headquarters and get a decision on that question, since there was some question as to whether under the fuehrerbefehl [sic] it should be carried out. [...] General Dostler had a perfect right to rely upon his chief of staff [Kraehe] performing his duties. He presumed it was sent out; he does not know who it went to; whether it stopped with the Army Group [sic] or whether it went up to the Supreme Command. Gentlemen, under the facts in this case there is only one conclusion; that it must have gone up to the Supreme Command of the Southwest because General von Zangen, who was the Army Corps [sic] Commander, testified that his command was extremely large and that he was gone most of the time or a great deal of the time from his headquarters; that he has no independent recollection of this incident; that his chief of staff [Nagel] in his absence was authorized to do two things: Make decisions on normal procedural matters, or, second, if it was a matter of importance not to wait until the general got back but to send it up to the next higher headquarters. Now, since the general didn't hear anything about it must have been sent up to the next higher headquarters, and that is further born out by the fact that the Supreme Command of the Southwest had already been notified of it, and further by the telegram that came down on Sun- day [ordering cancellation of the executions, i.e., after they had already taken place]. That establishes that the Supreme Command of the Southwest did know of it. General Dostler said that his chief of staff later advised him that he had received a reply [to the request for confirmation from higher authority]. There is no witness here that says who the reply came from and neither did the chief of staff say. The normal channel of communication would have been from the Su- preme Command of the Southwest down to the [Armeegruppe] and down to General Dostler. In any event, the decision was the men will be executed and it was so ordered. General Dostler had rescinded his [first] order of execution; he had passed the question on up to higher headquarters for decision and there was his decision. This was passed down by a second [sic] telegram. That this second [sic] telegram ordering the execution was received is not questioned by Lieu- tenant Koerbitz [sic] or by any of the witnesses. As a matter of fact, it is verified by all witnesses. 106 MGM 56 (1997) Richard Raiber

Now with regard to the contents of that telegram. We closely examined the witnesses with respect to that and not a one of them said it said, »I [Dostler] order you to execute them.« It simply said, »The execution will proceed«. [...] We do not have General Dostler's chief of staff whom he has requested; neither do we have his other staff officers; neither do we have General Von [sic] Zangen's chief of staff, who probably handled this in his absence. Let us look at several other peculiar things about this case as far as the Suprem [sic] Command of the Southwest is concerned. This order of Sunday [26 Mar 44, canceling the executions] which was received from the Supreme Command of the Southwest was not sent through General Dostler's headquarters. Can there be any reasonable explanation of why General [sic] Kesselring would not or did not want to send that through General Dostler's headquarters? All the witnesses who testified on the point say that it came direct from two higher echelons to an inferior headquarters directing that the execution not proceed at a time well past which they knew or should have known the execution was to take place. The only conclusion you can draw is that we are not trying the right man in this case. I think General [sic] Kesselring's headquarters knew of this; that they ordered the execution and that they intended to fix the responsibility on some intermediate commanding general if they could do so. Now, what else could they do to cover up? Not only did they fail to send it through its proper channels but within 15 days after the order had been sent the Supreme Command of the Southwest sent another order, which is undisputed, directly to the Brigade, mind you, telling them that they were to destroy all records pertaining to this execution. Now, General Dostler would not have had a copy of that particular telegram; neither would he have had a copy of anything that would have gone directly from Kesselring's headquarters to the Brigade. Somebody [at Monte Sorat- te] knew they had done wrong; somebody wanted to cover up in [sic] their tracks and it was not General Dostler. He never ordered the Brigade to destroy a single record. If we had those records today we would know the truth perhaps. Where are those records? After six months he says they were forwarded to Potsdam.130 An obvious question remains: Why did Dostler not clearly and unambiguously say he had been with Kesselring on 24 March 1944, that both must have known about the captured Americans, and that the Feldmarschall was the »higher authority« who instructed him to pass the execution order to Aimers? At the present state of our knowledge, the best answer seems to be that it was a matter of Korpsgeist. If that was the case, the consequences were fatal for Dostler: he had fallen victim to a unilateral ethos which was devoid of reciprocation from Kesselring and was deserted when the »wagons were circled.« In the end it is not likely we shall ever know why Dostler did not name Kesselring as his consultant who sealed the fate of the fifteen Giruriy Mission Americans.

130 »Dostler Trans.,« pp. 223-25; see also ibid., p. 220. For the record: Dostler's first telegram ordering the executions arrived at Festungsbrigade 135 in the morning of 25 March. Later that day he sent telegram No. 2 which temporarily postponed the executions while he consulted with a higher echelon. In the evening, 25 March, he sent telegram No. 3 ordering the executions to proceed early next morning. After they had been carried out, the telegram arrived directly from Monte Soratte which ordered that they be delayed. Although this last telegram is mentioned here by Colonel Wolfe, it was not, surprisingly, explored in depth at Dostler's trial. That it did arrive, as Colonel Wolfe points out, further shows that others at Monte Soratte had been well aware of the murky business transpiring in La Spezia.