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Overview of Middle East Track II Technical Discussions on Board of Sponsors Regional Cooperation in the Biological Sciences (Partial List)

* Peter Agre * Sidney Altman A Statement by the Federation on American Scientists to the 2015 Meeting of States * Philip W. Anderson th * Kenneth J. Arrow Parties Prior to the 8 Review Conference of the 1972 Biological and Toxin * David Baltimore * Paul Berg Weapons Convention (BWC) * J. Michael Bishop * Gunther Blobel * Nicolaas Bloembergen * Paul Boyer Geneva, Switzerland * Michael S. Brown * Linda B. Buck Monday, 14 December 2015 Ann Pitts Carter * Martin Chalfie * Stanley Cohen * Leon N. Cooper Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen; * E. J. Corey * James Cronin * Johann Deisenhofer Sidney Drell It is an honor to speak to this body today as an observer from the Federation of Ann Druyan Paul R. Ehrlich American Scientists, a non-governmental organization. George Field * Val L. Fitch * Jerome I. Friedman * Riccardo Giacconi Since 2010, a task force comprised primarily of policy and technical experts from * Walter Gilbert * Alfred G. Gilman several Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries (with some Western countries * Sheldon L. Glashow * Roy J. Glauber joining in) has convened multiple Track II engagement dialogues to discuss the technical * Joseph L. Goldstein * David J. Gross parameters of designing and implementing various WMD nonproliferation ideas and * Roger C. L. Guillemin * Leland H. Hartwell programs. * Dudley R. Herschbach * Roald Hoffmann John P. Holdren * H. Robert Horvitz In our discussions, it was determined that working on the biological aspect of * David H. Hubel * Eric R. Kandel WMD is a politically-viable starting point for better regional cooperation, due to the fact * Wolfgang Ketterle * Brian Kobilka that harmful microbes and pathogens can spread throughout the region as a result of * Leon Lederman * Robert J. Lefkowitz intentional or natural acts. The naturally-occurring spread of disease has been a much * Roderick MacKinnon * Eric S. Maskin more frequent event in the last several years (e.g., H5N1 - Avian Bird Flu, MERS-Corona Jessica T. Mathews Roy Menninger Virus and SARS). Additionally, unconfirmed allegations of Ricin production and use are Matthew S. Meselson Richard A. Meserve currently being made in the MENA region. Remarkably, it is the shared risk from the * Mario Molina Stephen S. Morse recent spread of naturally-occurring diseases in the region that has spawned significant * Ferid Murad Franklin A. Neva technical cooperation between states that have serious and intense political differences. * Ei-ichi Negishi * Douglas D. Osheroff What MENA states have recognized due to these developments is that microbes and * Arno A. Penzias * David Politzer pathogens do not respect political borders or religious differences and that without cross- George Rathjens * Burton Richter border cooperation, policies designed to address these biological concerns are ultimately * Richard J. Roberts * Phillip A. Sharp ineffectual. * K. Barry Sharpless Stanley K. Sheinbaum * Robert M. Solow * Jack Steinberger Members of the task force made previous recommendations through a paper * Thomas A. Steitz th * Joseph Stiglitz made available at the 7 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons * Daniel Tsui * Charles H. Townes Convention (BWC). Building upon that paper, the group has evolved in its membership * Harold E. Varmus Frank von Hippel with many next-generation scholars and discussed ways in which states can better prepare Robert A. Weinberg * Steven Weinberg for and respond to biological emergencies. * Torsten N. Wiesel * Eric Wieschaus * Frank Wilczek * Ahmed Zewail Board of Directors

Gilman Louie Rosina Bierbaum Stephen Hamblen Charles D. Ferguson * Nobel Laureate Chair Vice Chair Secretary-Treasurer President

Alton Frye Robert Gard Richard L. Garwin Lisa Gordon-Hagerty Lawrence Krauss Martha Krebs Rodney Nichols Jan Lodal Scott Sagan Maxine Savitz Michael Telson Peter Thiel Valerie Thomas

Ex officio: Robert Solow and Frank von Hippel

The original paper envisioned a three pillar framework for thinking about biosecurity in the region. The pillars are:

1. Prevention of the acquisition or use of biological weapons by malevolent actors; 2. Detection of outbreaks of infectious disease in the region, including those that could potentially result from acts of bioterrorism; and 3. Response and mitigation in the event of an attack using biological weapons.

The Second Pillar (Detection) is a viable starting point for cooperation between states as it rests on a foundation of mutually-shared interest in disease detection. To that end, the task force recently explored innovative ideas for better cooperation. During two meetings in 2015, the group discussed the scientific capabilities within the Middle East region for investigation of disease outbreaks, and explored options for building response capacities through new analysis tools, including enhanced microbial forensic competencies. In looking at this issue, the task force worked through a series of simulation exercises that illuminated the importance of technical cooperation between nations in analyzing and identifying the source of an outbreak. The simulation process raised awareness of the numerous potential sources and causes of a disease outbreak and how to deal with allegations of an illicit bio weapons program, as well as instances of alleged use of bio weapons. The group discussed how microbial forensics could be used either to support an allegation of bio weapons use, or, just as significantly, discredit a false allegation.

Microbial forensics is a scientific methodology that can be used to help determine the source and possible cause(s) of an actual or suspected biological outbreak. It is often an integral part of any investigation by the disease eradication community, the medical response community and the security community.

It should be noted that the basic capacity to understand and use microbial forensics in the MENA region already exists. There is already an inherent capability present in many laboratories and hospitals. There is no need to build expensive new elaborate facilities and capabilities. All that may be required is a focus on using microbial forensic methodologies within a nation’s existing hospitals, laboratories, universities and institutions as well as building regional cooperation on this topic. In fact, building up these capabilities internally may encourage better local buy-in, acceptance and use.

The role that technical cooperation can play as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) is significant in the Middle East; the idea being that if there is agreement at a technical level between nations in the region as to the source of a problem (with a shared understanding of the science), then the possibility of cooperation to eradicate the source(s) is enhanced. Concurrently, the possibility of poor policy decisions leading to punitive responses and armed conflict based on faulty data or erroneous interpretations as to the source of a biological phenomenon is also reduced. Finally, it was noted that better attribution capability may produce a deterrent effect of developing biological weapons capabilities that supports the ultimate purpose of the BWC through transparency. If neighbors understand that robust attribution tools exist, then they may be less inclined to develop illicit biological programs in the first place.

Interest remains in discussing capacity building initiatives involving all stakeholders within a guiding framework for regional confidence building and will continue to be discussed by the task force in the future.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen for your time and attention.

Christopher A. Bidwell Senior Fellow Nonproliferation Law & Policy Federation of American Scientists